i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration……………………………………………………………………………ii
Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………..iii
Table of Contents…………………………………………………………..…………iv
Research Methodology………………………………………………………………...v

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..1

Chapter 1: Local Governance of Iran……………………………………………….3

Chapter 2: Local Governance of Iraq………………………………………………12

Chapter 3: Comparison of local governance of Iran and Iraq……………..…….18

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………20

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………….21

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 RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY

1. Research Objective

The objective of this project report is to examine the local governance of Iran and Iraq, their
history, their working and comparison between the local governance of these two countries.
2. Research Methodology and Source of Date

The topic of study is “Comparative Study of local governance of Iran and Iraq”. Given a study of
this kind, a descriptive analytical method has been followed to carry out the study.

Source of Data: Secondary Sources of data have been used to carry out the study. These include
Books, Research Papers, and International Documents etc.

3. Research Questions

When and how did the local government established in Iran and Iraq?

Whether the system of local governance has been successful or not?

4. Mode of Citation

A uniform mode of citation has been followed through Harvard Bluebook 19th edition.

5. Scope and Limitation

The study is limited to the local governance of Iran and Iraq, which includes their history and
working and comparison of the two countries local governance.

iii
 INTRODUCTION

A government is generally understood as “the political system by which a nation or community

is administered and regulated”. Iran represents a distinct political system in the Islamic World
especially after its 1979 Revolution, its government in recent years has undergone structural
reforms as a response to internal power struggle, and most importantly, to the international
clamor for people’s participation and human rights advocacy. In the past, the basic duties of
government were to establish and preserve public needs, order, and justice. With the growing
population and development of societies, the people’s expectations of their government also
grew. For this reason the government started to intervene into most economic, social, and
cultural affairs of society. This was to meet the ever increasing demands placed upon them, to
plan and regulate their activities in order to stimulate the national economy. This development
continued to the point where, in many countries, a huge and complex governmental bureaucracy
evolved.1

In the last decade, attention was directed towards representation in local institutions through
which public affairs of the localities can be administered through local efforts. Some of the
reasons identified for this “shift” were the realization that the pressure of aggregate national and
local responsibilities placed upon the central government makes inefficiency inescapable, and
that the central authority has demonstrated inability to pay appropriate attention to specific local
issues as they do to national concerns. One of the most crucial debates in the developing
countries was about the degree of control of central governments in development planning and
administration2.

Assessments of the United States–led effort to create a democratically governed Iraq following
the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 have generally been negative. However,
these criticisms have, for the most part, ignored the progress Iraq made on putting in place basic
public administration practices and political processes that better serve its citizens, particularly at
the sub national level. The Local Governance Program has led to strengthening the capacities of

1
Roles and Responsibilities of Local Governments (Councils) in Iran: Analytical Underpinnings, Alekajbaf Hossein
Vol. 3(9), 94-101, September (2014), Research Journal
2
Rondinelli et al., Development and Change, London: SAGE, Newbury Park, 20, 57-87 (2009)

1
sub national councils and provincial offices to develop legislation and to plan and budget for
capital investments.

This project deals with the local governance of Iran and Iraq and also their comparison.

2
 CHAPTER 1
LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN IRAN

Iran is a large country covering an area of 1,622,000 km sq. with a population of 70.49 million
inhabitants (2007). The country has 7780 km of land and sea frontiers and shares borders with 15
countries. Its population density is 43 inhabitants per square kilometer (2007).

Throughout its history, Iran has been ruled by a strong and centralised State. Public
administration in Iran has traditionally been based on a national and local hierarchy of
competences. Decision-making powers relating to all national, regional and sub-provincial
competences have always been held by the central authorities.

The notion of decentralisation and decentralised institutions did not come about until the time of
the Iranian Revolution; the “Constitutional Revolution” of 1906, which for a short period
established a rule of law. It is this revolution that provoked the emergence of decentralisation as
a theme in Iranian politics. Pioneers of the constitutionalist movement insisted that the principle
of administrative decentralisation should appear in the constitutional text itself. Therefore, an
amendment to the Constitution in 1907 included five articles concerning the establishment of
subprovincial and district assemblies elected by the inhabitants of each sub-province or district.
For the period prior to the 1979 Islamic revolution, the history of decentralisation can be divided
into three periods:

1. Before the Constitution was adopted, but during the constitutionalist movement, when local
authorities were spontaneously set up to naturally prolong certain ways of organising civil
society.
2. Following the spread of the first Persian Constitution, when local authorities were recognised by
the Constitution.
3. Today, after many decades of problems facing local authorities and a return to centralism, when
territorial decentralisation is merely a mirage in the Iranian system.
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, revolutionaries were so eager for the reestablishment of local
authorities that they voted on a law for local councils before the Constitution had even been
written. Other than a few general principles mentioned here and there, it is chapter seven of the

3
Iranian Constitution that is dedicated to Councils, and it discusses the organization of local
authorities in a level of detail that sometimes seems excessive.3

Nevertheless, developments up to the present have been characterised by a succession of laws

and stipulations that have never been implemented. It was only in 1999 that legislation relating to
decentralisation began to be implemented. This was one of the main promises of reformer
President Khatami’s programme.

The law currently in place (of 23 May 1996) relates to “the frameworks, allocations and election
of the country’s Islamic councils, and the election of mayors”. This law has been revised many
times. The last revision was at the end of 2007.

LOCAL DEMOCRCY:

The highly reported first council elections finally took place on 8th March 1999, and the first
councils were able to meet on 29th April of that year. This date remains symbolic as “Councils
day”, when many council-related demonstrations take place. The second local council elections
took place on 28th February 2003 and had a poor turnout rate (49.96%) compared to both the
first election (64.42%) and the legislative and presidential elections. Such a lack of interest in an
election that really affects the lives of the people can be explained through political issues, such
as disappointment linked to the first council mandate, which related to the Tehran council in
particular and very quickly plunged into intense political bickering. In the last council elections
in December 2006, a total of 109,536 councillors were elected for 1016 town councils, 31,167
village councils and 522 nomadic councils. The number of female candidates in local elections
was very low, despite the fact that candidacies were open to women. In the last election 3% of
the candidates were women.

Representative bodies: Article 100 of the Iranian Constitution sets out the decentralised
structures, their names and how many there are.

The Constitution lists the village, town, sub provincial and provincial councils, as well as the
Provincial High Council. These are the territorial authorities across the country that must ensure
they fulfil their set requirements. The 1996 law added another council, which did not conform to

3
https://www.britannica.com/place/Iran/Government-and-society

4
the text of the Constitution: the small town council. These councils were never established on the
ground and were removed in September 2003 by means of a revision.

All councils fall into two categories: minor councils, which include village, town and nomadic
councils; and major councils, which include sub-provincial and provincial councils and the
Provincial High Council. This distinction is based on the council’s training methods and
competences. In Iranian law, universal suffrage is limited to the election of minor councils.
Major councils are assigned through indirect voting, involving those elected by decisionmaking
authorities directly below them.

The number of counsellors varies according to the population of each town and village. It ranges
from 3 to 5 persons for village councils and between 5 and 11 persons for town councils. Tehran
council has 15 counsellors. Such a limited number of counsellors makes it difficult for councils
to function as participative bodies

The Provincial High Council is the only council of its type in Iranian administrative and
Constitutional law. Composed of representatives from provincial councils (whereby each
province sends one of its members to it), the Provincial High Council is a unique assembly that
resembles neither a senate nor a national assembly. Even though it meets at the national level, it
is only concerned with local affairs. Article 102 of the Constitution states that “the Provincial
High Council has the right, within the limits of its power, to develop projects and submit them
directly, or through the government, to the Islamic Consultative Assembly. These projects should
be subject to examination by the Assembly”, thereby establishing this council’s importance in
Iranian decentralisation processes.

Elections: The Constitution gives power to the ordinary legislator to set the conditions to be
eligible for the right to vote (law of 1996 and implementing decree of 20th December 1998).

Village and town councillors are elected via direct universal suffrage by a relative majority.
Voting is secret. It is a four-year mandate.

Article 25 of the council law states that “voters are male and female Iranians over the age of 15
who have lived in the area in which they want to vote for at least one year”. The minimum voting
age has just been increased to 18 for local elections, rather than 15.

5
All Iranians over the age of twenty-five who have lived for at least one year in the place where
they want to present themselves as candidates and who can read and write may be elected to the
Islamic councils so long as they fulfil two other very ambiguous and non-legal conditions. These
conditions are that firstly, the potential candidate must believe in Islam and be a practicing
Muslim. He or she must also believe in the concept of “the authority of a jurisconsult (Velayate-
Faghih)”. Secondly, the potential candidate must declare his or her dedication to the Constitution
of the Republic of Iran. Members of other minority religious groups must believe in and practice
their respective religions. These conditions introduce a subjective element to the exercise of
citizens’ rights. Each election, many candidacy applications are turned down. In local elections,
it all rests on the personal opinions of the officers of the committees overseeing the election.

The prevention of overlapping mandates applies to the posts of minister, vice minister, deputy,
member of the Council of Guardians of the Constitution, military service member, director of a
public governmental institution, bank manager, etc.

Although the Constitution does recognise the freedom to form political parties, their impact is
brief and very limited due to the country’s political structure. New political parties appear before
each election, only to disappear into the country’s political landscape shortly thereafter.
However, we must not underestimate the role played by certain political groups. The first local
election took place a year after the reformist movement took force. Reform candidates won the
majority of seats at local councils, particularly in large cities such as Tehran. The current
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, started out as part of a group
formed at the time of the second local election. The group nominated him as Mayor of Tehran, a
very sought-after position which opened the way to winning the presidency of the Republic. In
the third election, the spread of seats between the different authorised political trends in Iran was
more balanced.

Executive bodies: The town hall is the executive body of the council. The council elects the
mayor for a four-year period. People external to the council can be elected as mayor. As a local
institution, the town hall, which existed in practice before the implementation of local councils,
is central to local life in Iran.

6
CENTRL LOCAL RELATIONS

Councils are managed on two levels: administrative and jurisdictional.

In terms of administrative management, each council is responsible to the council above it within
the limits of its competences, and each upper council acts as a trustee to each lower council. Of
the upper councils, the Provincial High Council has overall power over the lower councils. This
is how an institutional monitoring system is implemented.

The law has allocated retrospective control over local authority activities to central bodies.
Central authorities have ten days to object to council decisions. Where there is a dispute,
provincial arbitration committees have the final say.

The dissolution of councils comes under jurisdictional control. Thus, Article 106 of the Iranian
Constitution stipulates, “Councils may only be disbanded when they have deviated from their
legal duties. The body responsible for determining such deviation, as well as the manner for
dissolving the councils and re-forming them, will be specified by law. When dissolution is
appealed, the court must investigate immediately”. Ordinary law sets out the procedure for
appealing council decisions in those cases where their dissolution would be necessary. Three
arbitration committees are created on three levels to implement this: at the sub-provincial,
provincial and central levels. The central arbitration committee is composed of the Vice
President of the Republic, the Director of political and social management of the Ministry of the
Interior, one of the Vice Presidents of the legal authorities, one of the assistants to the public
prosecutor and three deputies. The corresponding arbitration committee agrees dissolution and
the council has one month to appeal the decision.

The Minister of the Interior (in the case of cities) and the Provincial Prefect (in the case of small
towns) must approve the election of the Mayor by the council. This approval gives
unsubstantiated control and particularly restricts the council’s actions. It has been a source of
conflict between central authorities and local bodies on many occasions and very recently led to
the dissolution of the town of Kermanshah’s council.

7
COMPETENCES

Article 100 of the Constitution grants local authority bodies a certain degree of authority with
regard to health, education, culture, town planning, and social and economic programmes “in
order to ensure that social, economic, town planning, public health, cultural and educational
programmes, and other activities of general interest involving the population, are established
quickly and take local issues into consideration, and that the management of issues relating to
villages, towns, sub-provinces, or provinces is under the control of a council known as the
village, district, town, sub-provincial or provincial council, whose members are elected by the
local population…” The term "control" is ambiguous in the Constitution with regard to the role
of councils. It does not indicate the specific scope of the powers they have. Even within the
clauses of the Iranian Constitution itself, it is not clear whether councils are actual decision-
making bodies that can implement changes to local life in Iran or not. Although they are
established now, there is no guarantee that one day certain trends do not oppose the idea of local
democracy and undo all the partial work achieved to date.

Either way, it is very hard to consider this article as establishing a general clause of competence
and as a way of making a distinction between local and national affairs. Therefore, we must use a
second technique: listing the competences of each local body. Although these are listed in the
1996 law, many issues are ambiguous and vague. Also, the reference in Article 68 of the 1996
ordinary law to: “the justification and explanation of the government’s policies” and to
“cooperation with the State’s authorities” demonstrates the limits of the Iranian concept of
decentralisation. The distinction between affairs regulated by the State and those that rely on the
competence of local authorities has resulted in contingent legislative requirements, and for each
level of local authorities it is impossible to identify a concept of local affairs that corresponds to
a general and a priori competence at that level. Indeed, the authorities appear to be merely a
simple shift from the central administration.

With regard to village council duties, the 1996 law uses terms that are ill-suited to
decentralisation. These terms, such as “the explanation and justification of State policies and
support to villagers to implement them” (Article 68, paragraph 4), “cooperation with State
administrators” (Article 68, paragraph 6), “control over village development projects” (Article
68, paragraph 5), etc., do not even allow for relative decentralisation to be achieved.

8
 The competences of town councils are less misleading than those of village councils, as there are
fewer terms that contradict the decentralisation process and the clauses are more specific. Town
councils have competence over the immediate area. They elect the mayor for four years. The
town council also has competence over the public service duties in the town. There are many
such duties in various different areas:

 Culture, such as overseeing cinemas, concerts, theatres and other cultural public areas, whether
managed by the private or public sector.
 -Regulation of billposters and advertising in towns.
 Public transport issues, particularly pricing. - Green spaces and public places.
Overall, the law mentions various areas relating to the particular duties of local councils, yet it
lacks order and clarity – such as the frequent use of the term “control” in Article 100 of the
Constitution.

The competences of upper councils (the district, sub-provincial and provincial councils and the
Provincial High Council) include more general duties, such as studying and approving town
planning proposals put forward by lower councils. They play the role of guardian to each of the
lower councils. Moreover, a hierarchy exists between these councils themselves. The duties of
the Provincial High Council are split into three categories: controlling and coordinating council
affairs, developing bills and working with State administration.

LOCAL FINANACE AND MANAGEMENT

The annual budget of each municipal region is voted on at town and village councils. In line with
legislative requirements, resources for local authorities in Iran come from three sources: output
from the many public services, output from public lands, local taxes and support from the State.
The main municipal resource still comes from local taxes on products and services in the local
area. Tenancy and construction charges also bring a large amount of income to towns. In 2004
they made up around 70% of Tehran town hall’s revenue.

Municipal law includes nearly 90 types of charges and taxes implemented at the local level. In
practice, most of these never actually generate income for local authorities. Local finances in
Iran are just as disorganised when it comes to revenue as they are in terms of expenditure.

9
Municipal regions can also take out loans. Only the Mayor can make the decision to take out a
loan, yet this decision is passed to the council for prior approval at the Mayor’s request.

Council laws also include another form of financial resource linked to religion - alms (zakavât).3
This is very unclear in legal terms and is not considered a significant financial resource. Also,
positive law has no mention of how purely religious taxes should be deducted.

Clauses regulating local authority resources are ambiguous and chaotic. Local authorities are
restricted on two levels: on one hand, they do not benefit from State help and on the other, they
do not have the necessary autonomy to legally make decisions on their financial situation, which
is a prerequisite for true decentralisation.

Before the Iran-Iraq war, State money made up 70% of municipal budgets. As the State had to
channel its funds into defence, it implemented a financial autonomy policy for municipal
regions. By the start of the 1990s, State support had decreased to 3% of local spending. This
amount was almost zero in Tehran. To understand the reasons for this decrease, we must
recognise that in preceding years there had been a very large financial resource in large
metropolises such as Tehran. This took the form of sales revenues, known as “increased
density”, which was rife in certain areas of the city. Although “increased density” brought huge
sums to Teheran town hall’s budget, it was an illegal practice and created problems in terms of
the social and economic balance between different areas of the city.

ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS

At the end of 2007, following a year of discussion and debate, an amendment was voted in at the
Islamic Assembly (the Iranian Parliament) to revise the 1996 law. As feared, this amendment did
not relate to increasing the autonomy of, and trust in, local authorities. Methods of control were
increased and the influence of the State on these authorities can be felt more and more.

The current President, who started out in a local authority, gave false hope following his election
with regard to strengthening the decentralisation movement in Iran. His ultra-conservative beliefs
soon showed his limitations in this domain.

The issue of decentralisation in Iran relates first and foremost to a lack of political resolve to
release control of power at the local level. Also, the culture of democracy is not yet entrenched in

10
this country. In addition, there is also a lack of experience, resources and staff able to move the
reforms forward.

There is no doubt that Iran is currently moving towards deep-seated reforms that will affect the
State’s current foundation. During the reform process, decentralisation and local democracy
should be placed at the forefront.

Despite these issues, this movement, which has been going on for ten years, is beginning to take
its place in political and administrative life in Iran.4

4
www.cities-localgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/Iran.pdf

11
 CHAPTER 2
LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN IRAQ

Iraq has a history of a repressive national government under the Ba'ath Party and Saddam
Hussein. As a result, the devolution of substantial authority to provincial and district/city
governments is a new concept in Iraq.

After the 2003 invasion, Coalition military units across Iraq worked to restore local
government. They did so under a loose plan, developed after the invasion started, in which
Governorate Support Teams composed of civil affairs personnel and USAID contractors
assisted military commanders in forming local councils. The plan, however, reflected an
unresolved tension in U.S. policy over how to connect the councils formed in neighborhoods,
cities, and provinces to the national government in Baghdad. The United States had begun the
war without any notion of how the new councils it was installing - and attempting to empower
- at the community level of Iraqi society would integrate with existing institutions at the top.
The councils immediately found themselves at odds with the provincial directors general, who
reported to national ministries in Baghdad and jealously guarded their prerogative to oversee

public services and disburse funding.

The debate over how to make central ministries accountable to local communities, and thereby
decentralize the power of a formerly tyrannical regime, played out during the CPA era. As
Ambassador Bremer sought to usher Iraq into a democratic era, the extent to which Iraq's
central and provincial governments would share power remained contested. The CPA put
enormous resources into electing councils across Iraq, envisioning a system in which they

held most of the power in each province.

Iraqis were divided over Bremer's plan to radically devolve power from Baghdad to the
provinces. The Shi'a in the south and the Kurds in the north wanted an even greater devolution

12
 of power, one that maximized local control in regions with Kurdish and Shi'a majorities.
Sunnis and many leaders in the national ministries in Baghdad, however, preferred continued
concentration of power in the central government. This struggle was at the heart of what the
new Iraqi state was to be. Bremer's actions-including enshrining the decentralization of power
in the TAL-marked the opening gambit in what became an extended imbroglio over Iraqi

federalism.5

On January 30, 2005, Iraq held its first open election and chose members of the transitional
275-member National Assembly, establishing its legislature. In the January 2005 election, the
people voted for political parties, representatives of which were designated to the Provincial
Council (PC). The political parties have a pro-rata share of the seats depending on the election
results. Within the PC, 25 percent of the members must be female. Once the PC is elected, it

appoints the governor.

After the January 2005 elections, the Shi'a parties took full advantage of the Sunni boycott to
consolidate their influence, especially in the capital. A primer on city politics written by the
Baghdad PRT chronicles what happened next. "The lopsided nature of political power, with
SCIRI/Badr domination, has created a desperate chemistry for the province," it states. A
"political Darwinism" prevailed in which the Shi'a party elite centralized authority. The result
of the Sunni boycott was that Iraq's capital was ruled by what one official characterized as a
"Shi'a dictatorship." During this period, SCIRI deposed Baghdad's mayor and took over the

Amanat.

The Shi'a takeover opened rifts between provincial councils, stacked with SCIRI supporters,
and many of the 437 neighborhood, 195 sub-district, and 96 district councils that USAID had
established across Iraq as part of its LGP.23 Although provincial councils were supposed to

5
https://www.britannica.com/place/Iraq/Government-and-society

13
represent a province's entire population, the Sunni boycott of the 2005 election yielded Sunni-
majority provinces ruled by Shi'a councils. Projects and services came to be distributed along
sectarian lines, reflecting the "Shi'a first" mentality that Lieutenant Colonel Busher witnessed
at the Amanat. By mid-2006, the party grip was entrenched. "SCIRI/ Badr has worked
diligently to maintain and increase their hold on power," the primer continues, "trying to delay

new elections or any structural changes that might weaken their position."

One of USAID's local governance advisors took an even bleaker view of the effect of the
elections. During 2004, the LGP had worked to "solidify and extend the role of sub-national
governmental institutions to prevent, or at least discourage, a recentralization of power." "The
party list system sabotaged [the LGP]," the advisor said, laying waste to two years of diligent
work fostering authentic local governance in Iraq. USAID had helped create a mechanism in
Iraq for local representation that was undermined both by the electoral formula and a
disregard for decentralization that dated back to the CPA.

Issues of federalism and provincial government that would directly impact reconstruction
were again on the negotiating table when the constitution was drafted during the late spring
and summer of 2005. Ambassador Khalilzad pressured the constitutional drafting committee
to clearly demarcate federal from provincial responsibilities, but the issue proved too
explosive to settle. The draft constitution deferred until a later time the question of provincial
powers - and thereby how public administration would be controlled at the local level.

The continuing disagreements between Iraq's Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurdish populations, over how
much power the central government should have nearly caused the constitutional referendum
to fail. In the electoral formula governing the referendum process, a simple majority was
required for approval, but the constitution could also have been defeated by a "no" vote with a
two-thirds majority in three or more governorates. When Iraqis went to vote on October 15,
2005, Kurdish- and Shi'a-dominated provinces supported the constitution by overwhelming
14
margins, while Sunni-dominated provinces voted against it in equal measure. A simple
nationwide majority was achieved, but the constitution narrowly missed defeat by the
governorate rule. Two predominantly Sunni provinces - Anbar and Salah Al-Din - voted
against the constitution by more than the required two-thirds majority. Although a majority of
voters in a third province-Ninewa-rejected the constitution, it fell short of the two-thirds

majority required to qualify as a "no" vote, allowing the constitution to be passed.

In response to the fragmentation of the Iraqi state, military and civilian officials used USAID
soft programs, PRTs, and brigade combat teams to strengthen local administrative capacities
and connect provincial governments with national ministries. The sheer logistics of setting up
the PRTs and assessing the status of reconstruction and institutional development in each
province was difficult. All PRTs were explicitly tasked to bridge the local-national disconnect,
but it was often the larger and more powerful brigade combat teams who made the most
difference. By 2006, brigade commanders came to see improving local governance as an
essential part of their mission. In addition to their primary tasks of securing the battle space,
brigades often would provide security for local government facilities and at times for local
officials. They also used their CERP funds and civil affairs brigades to support local
government initiatives.

Both brigade commanders and PRT leaders found that pushing past Ba'athist practices and
transforming the roles and responsibilities of local officials was difficult. One PRT official
commented, "It's still 'big man' diplomacy," in which people rather than institutions wield
power.35 Provincial council members, not used to discretionary authority, were often
reluctant to act independently on behalf of their constituencies. "In a post-authoritarian
society, where you have to be told what you are allowed to do (not what you aren't),
provincial and local government leaders are not going to be risk takers," a PRT political
officer explained. "In the end, if people do not know what they are allowed to do, or what they

15
are supposed to do-they will end up either doing nothing, or they will do what is in their best

interest."

In Diyala province, relations deteriorated so badly that the governor resorted to arresting
directors general to force them to attend council meetings. Despite the trying conditions, PRTs
and brigade commanders helped create legitimacy for the provincial governments and had
some success at uniting officials from different sects. One PRT leader said, "Without our

presence you would have a full-scale civil war."

Coaxing local officials to work together productively was only half the battle. Relations had to
be nurtured between municipal governments and the provinces, and between the provinces
and Baghdad. In many places, relationships were so lacking that provincial leaders wanting to
meet with ministerial officials transmitted their requests through the embassy. Many also
relied on Coalition commanders for transportation to and from Baghdad, a practice that
military commanders came to call "helicopter diplomacy." "Making the lack of ground rules
even worse," a political officer remarked, "is the incredibly poor communication between and
among all levels of the Iraqi government. If, by some stroke of luck or hard work, there are
clear and comprehensive rules for something, it is highly likely that they have not been

transmitted to all of the appropriate people in an effective or open manner."

The efforts of the PRTs and brigades slowly opened a conversation between provincial and
national officials. In the late summer of 2007, five governors from the northern non-Kurdish
provinces arrived in Baghdad to attend a conference arranged by the office of the Deputy
Prime Minister. It was one of the first meetings of its kind. Governors from some of the most
violent provinces of Iraq were allowed to air their concerns. They complained that some
ministry directors general were operating in the provinces outside the control of provincial
authorities. The governor of Diyala stood up and said that he did not even have the phone
numbers for ministry officials in Baghdad. It was clear that provincial and local governments
16
were not yet ready to govern, and that focused PRT support to build local and provincial

capacity would be necessary for an extended period.

Despite the Coalition's best efforts, the provision of government services became more rather
than less politicized in the years following the CPA. By 2006, the U.S. approach to
democratizing Iraq, while simultaneously is federalizing its government structures, yielded
mixed results. The local and district councils created immediately after the invasion had not
become formally linked to the directors general who administered services using funding
provided by the central government. Soon, ministries were deeply riddled with partisan
infighting. The elections that were to be the capstone of a new democracy were based on a
formula that only increased the forces driving Iraqis apart. The failure to hold new provincial
elections also compromised the legitimacy of provincial councils through with which power

was to be shared.

By the end of 2006, U.S. officials agreed that the single most important governance challenge
was to strengthen the connection between Iraq's national and provincial institutions, so
services could be delivered and government properly administered in the new decentralized
framework. "Capacity building"-ensuring the ability of the Iraqi government to handle its own

affairs - became the catchword for reconstruction's next phase.

17
 CHAPTER 3
COMPARISON BETWEEN LOCAL GOVERNANCE OF IRAN AND IRAQ

Both Iran and Iraq have different types of government. Iran is a theocratic republic where as Iraq
has a parliamentary democracy.6 The politics of Iran take place in a framework of a theocracy in
a format of syncretic politics that is guided by an Islamic ideology. Theocracy is a form of
government in which a deity is the source from which all authority derives and Syncretic politics
refers to politics outside the conventional left–right political spectrum. Hence, the full
conventional name of Iran is Islamic Republic of Iran and that of Iraq is Republic of Iraq.7

1. The local government system in Iran started in 1999 when first council elections finally took
place. It was through a legislation relating to decentralization which began to be implemented in
1999. In Iraq it was only after the 2003 invasion, Coalition military units across Iraq worked to
restore local government. That year, RTI (Research Triangle Institute) International began
implementing the first of three consecutive U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
contracts to build local government policy and capacity, and increase citizen participation during
Iraq’s transition to democracy. On January 30, 2005, Iraq held its first open election and chose
members of the transitional 275-member National Assembly, establishing its legislature. In the
January 2005 election, the people voted for political parties, representatives of which were
designated to the Provincial Council (PC).
2. Local Government system in Iran started well because it was implemented through legislation
but Iraq’s local government had to go through many controversies and problems because of lack
legislation and presence to three different groups of people. Therefore Local Governance
Programs (LGP) was set up. LGP 1 helped strengthen local government by training 85% of the
council members on their new roles and responsibilities. The project also helped spur public
participation through civic dialogue events that drew 750,000 Iraqi citizens. When LGP 2 began
in May 2005, Iraq was operating under an interim elected government and writing its
constitution. To assist local governments voice views on their future role, LGP 2 held regional
workshops involving all 18 provinces, allowing local council members to convene with the
constitution’s drafters to provide input.

6
http://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/iran.iraq
7
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-iraq

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3. The annual budget of each municipal region is voted on at town and village councils. In line with
legislative requirements, resources for local authorities in Iran come from three sources: output
from the many public services, output from public lands, local taxes and support from the State.
The main municipal resource still comes from local taxes on products and services in the local
area.8 Where as in Iraq, following ratification of the constitution, the national government began
transferring a portion of its budget to provincial governments to finance capital investments in
infrastructure and public works. Provincial governments had limited experience handling
budgets and contracting for capital projects, so LGP 2 assisted them in developing a budget
execution process and created a customized computer-based information system.9

8
Roles and Responsibilities of Local Governments (Councils) in Iran: Analytical Underpinnings, Alekajbaf Hossein
Vol. 3(9), 94-101, September (2014), Research Journal
9
RTI International, Report on Building Foundations for Local Governance in Iraq.

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 CONCLUSION

After the Revolution, the Iranian government found that establishing the councils was the best
way to transfer of power and resources from the central to local government. But the problem in
Iran as in other countries with historically strong central government is that the central
government continues to play a key role in local level politics even after decentralization. In
conclusion, the concept of local governance in Iran is fully enshrined in the Constitution Law in
conjunction with other existing laws and most importantly, within the bounds of Islamic Law.
Where as in Iraq, in the governance arena, they should consider getting smarter about
recognizing and incorporating the interpenetration of politics and administration is critical to
supporting transitions that contribute to achieving peace, stability, and an effective state.
Therefore it can be concluded that Iran has a better system of local governance than Iraq.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY
 Rondinelli et al., Development and Change, London: SAGE, Newbury Park, 20, 57-87 (2009)
 Roles and Responsibilities of Local Governments (Councils) in Iran: Analytical Underpinnings,
Alekajbaf Hossein Vol. 3(9), 94-101, September (2014), Research Journal
 RTI International, Report on Building Foundations for Local Governance in Iraq.
 http://www.indexmundi.com
 http://iranprimer.usip.org
 www.cities-localgovernments.org
 https://www.britannica.com

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