30.) TEODORO MEDRANA vs.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and SUPREME AGGREGATES CORPORATION

G.R. No. 85904
August 21, 1990

Facts:

In this Special Civil Action for Certiorari, petitioner Teodoro Medrana asks the court to set aside the decision of the
Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 2143. In that decision, the Hon. Magdangal B. Elma, Deputy Executive Secretary,
acting "by authority of the President, set aside a decision of the then Minister of Natural Resources and reinstated a decision
of the Director of Mines.

This controversy, relates to Mining Lease Contract ("MLC") No. V-754 which the then Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources issued to private respondent Supreme Aggregates Corporation. This Mining Lease Contract has a lifetime
of twenty-five (25) years and covers twenty-two (22) mining claims for volcanic cinder, etc., situated in Calamba, Laguna
Province and Sto. Tomas, Batangas Province.

P.D. No. 463 known as "The Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974" was promulgated. Within the period
prescribed, Supreme Aggregates filed with the Bureau of Mines an Application to Avail of Rights and Privileges under P.D.
No. 463 which application was required by Sections 100 and 101 of the decree, from all claimowners and lessees desirous
of maintaining their pre-existing rights under the regime inaugurated by that decree.

The Director of the Bureau of Mines issued an order denying Supreme Aggregates' Application on the ground that
Supreme Aggregates had failed to submit Affidavits of Annual Work Obligations. Subsequently, it issued Quarry Temporary
Permits ("QTPs") Nos. 85, 86 and 87 to petitioner Teodoro Medrana. These permits covered areas within the territory leased
to Supreme Aggregates under MLC No. V-754.

Thus, Supreme Aggregates filed a petition with the Director of Mines praying for reinstatement of its rejected
Application to Avail of Rights and Privileges and for cancellation of Medrana's QTPs Nos. 85, 86 and 87.

After investigation, the Director of Mines rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of Supreme Aggregates'
Application to Avail of Rights and Privileges and the cancellation of Medrana's QTPs Nos. 85, 86 and 87 since these covered
areas within Supreme Aggregates' valid and subsisting MLC No. V-754.

On appeal by Medrana, the Ministry of Natural Resources reinstated Medrana's QTPs Nos. 85, 86 and 87, and
declared that Supreme Aggregates' MLC No. V-754 had lapsed

Supreme Aggregates then filed an appeal with the Office of the President. The Office of the President, as already
noted, in a decision, reversed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources and in essence held that the failure to submit
Affidavits of Annual Work Obligations for two (2) consecutive years did not, by itself and standing alone, result in the
automatic cancellation of MLC No. V-754.

Issue:

WON the Office of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in reinstating
Supreme Aggregates' MLC No. V-754 and cancelling petitioner's QTPs for the following reasons:

1. Private respondent Supreme Aggregates had abandoned its Mining Lease Contract by failing to comply with the
mandatory requirements of Section 27 of P.D. No. 463.

2. The Bureau of Mines had declared the quarry covered by MLC No. V-754 as open for relocation of claims by
virtue of the cancellation of that MLC. Moreover, petitioner Medrana, being registered owner of much of the land covered
by MLC No. V-754, claims a preferential right to exploit the said quarry under Section 67 of P.D. No. 463.

Held:

1. On the issue that Private respondent Supreme Aggregates had abandoned its Mining Lease Contract by failing
to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 27 of P.D. No. 463.

Abandonment may be said to result where there is concurrence of two (2) elements: the first being the intent to
abandon a right or claim and the second being the external act by which that intention is expressed and carried into effect.
There must, moreover, be an actual, as distinguished from a merely projected, relinquishment of a claim or right; otherwise
the right or claim is not vacated or waived so as to be susceptible of being appropriated by the next owner. These two (2)
requirements are clearly lacking in the case at bar. The Director of Mines and public respondent Office of the President had
found that, in point of fact, private respondent Supreme Aggregates had performed its annual work obligations. Supreme
Aggregates could not therefore be said to have intended to abandon its mining claim or lease, notwithstanding the fact that
it had failed to submit the normal documentary proof of performance of annual work obligations that is, the Affidavit of
Annual Work Obligations. The court agrees, therefore, with the conclusion of the Office of the President that in the instant
case, there was no abandonment, whether automatic or voluntary, of MLC No. V-754.

2. On the issue that the Bureau of Mines had declared the quarry covered by MLC No. V-754 as open for relocation
of claims by virtue of the cancellation of that MLC. Moreover, petitioner Medrana, being registered owner of much of the
land covered by MLC No. V-754, claims a preferential right to exploit the said quarry under Section 67 of P.D. No. 463.

It is true that under Section 67 of P.D. No. 463, petitioner Medrana, as registered owner of the superficies of the
land here involved, had a "preferential right to exploit the quarry resources found therein". That right, however, was simply
a preferential right, and that right was ineffective to dissolve the pre-existing or subsisting right of private respondent
Supreme Aggregates. The order of the Director of Mines, denying Supreme Aggregates' Application to Avail of Rights and
Privileges, did not have, nor did it purport to have, the effect of cancelling or declaring the automatic abandonment of MLC
No. V-754; as noted above, there simply was no legal basis for so cancelling or declaring it as abandoned.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Office of the
President AFFIRMED in toto.

31.) APEX MINING CO., INC., MT., DIWATA EXPLORATION AND MINING CORPORATION, CAMILO BANAD, PRUDENCIO
SUAREZ, AURORA SUAREZ, RODOLFO BOLO, LEONILA VILLAFLOR, MAURICIA AMACIO, ANITA BITAGAN, APOLINARIO
CANETE, ORLANDO CASTILLO, PAUL GALICIA, and ROSARY V. GALICIA
vs.
HONORABLE CANCIO C. GARCIA ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HON. FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR., SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, and MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 92605

July 16, 1991

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order seeking to nullify and set aside the July 27, 1989 decision of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 3728
dismissing the appeal of Apex Mining Co., Inc. and affirming the April 15, 1987 decision and January 14, 1988 order of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), respectively, declaring that the respective mining claims of
Apex Mining Co., Inc., et al., as well as Small Scale Mining Permits Nos. (X-1) 04 (X-1), 05, are null and void and/or
inoperative and the Permit to Explore No. 133 of Marcopper Mining Corporation as valid and subsisting; and denying the
motion for reconsideration.

The controversy in this case involves conflicting mining claims between herein petitioners Apex Mining Co., Inc., et
al. (Apex for short) and private respondent Marcopper Mining Corporation (MARCOPPER for short). The disputed area is
inside a timberland area located at Moncayo, Davao del Norte and Cateel, Davao Oriental, consisting of 4,941.0 hectares.

Issue:

Whether or not the disputed area is within an established and existing forest reservation.

Held:

Yes.

The disputed areas, being clearly within a forest reserve, are not open to mining location provided by Sections 8
and 13 of P.D. No. 463, as amended by P.D. No. 1385.

Pursuant to P.D. No. 463, as amended, one can acquire mining rights within forest reserves by initially applying for
a permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development (BFD) and subsequently for a permit to explore with the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS). Such procedural requisites were complied with and undertaken by MARCOPPER
after it had ascertained that its mining claims were found to be within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.

On the other hand, the mining claims and SSMPs of APEX being located within said forest reserve, are in violation
of the law and therefore result in a failure to validly acquire mining rights.
 Finally, invariable is the rule that in reviewing administrative decisions of the Executive Branch of the government,
the findings of fact made therein must be respected, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not
overwhelming or preponderant. It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility
of the witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the
evidence. The administrative decision in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross
abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision of the Office of the President is AFFIRMED and the petition for
certiorari is DISMISSED.

32.) APEX MINING CO., INC., vs. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., (SEM) et. al
G.R. No. 152613

FACTS:

A motion for reconsideration was filed by SEM. The Assailed Decision held that the assignment of Exploration
Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one of the conditions stipulated in the permit. It also ruled that the transfer of EP
133 violated Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of a mining right be made with the prior
approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Moreover, the Assailed Decision pointed out that EP 133 expired by non-renewal since it was not renewed before
or after its expiration. It likewise upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 297 absent any question against its validity.
In view of this, and considering that under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the “Mining Act
of 1995,” mining operations in mineral reservations may be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor, the
Court deemed the issue of ownership of priority right over the contested Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as having been overtaken
by the said proclamation. Thus, it was held in the Assailed Decision that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive
Department to undertake directly the mining operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to private entities
including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and provided that these private
entities are qualified.
Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision, praying that the Court elucidate on the
Decision’s pronouncement that “mining operations, are now, therefore within the full control of the State through the
executive branch.” Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order the Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application
for an exploration permit.
Balite echoes the same concern as that of Apex on the actual takeover by the State of the mining industry in the
disputed area to the exclusion of the private sector. In addition, Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB to accept its
application for an exploration permit.
Camilo Banad, et al., likewise filed a motion for reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to
them.
In the Resolution, the Court En Banc resolved to accept the instant cases.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by MMC to SEM was validly made without
violating any of the terms and conditions set forth in Presidential Decree No. 463 and EP 133 itself.

2. Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. acquired a vested right over the disputed area, which constitutes a
property right protected by the Constitution.

3. Whether the assailed Decision dated 23 June 2006 of the Third Division in this case is contrary to and overturns
the earlier Decision of this Court in Apex v. Garcia (G.R. No. 92605, 16 July 1991, 199 SCRA 278).

4. Whether the issuance of Proclamation No. 297 declaring the disputed area as mineral reservation outweighs the
claims of SEM, Apex Mining Co. Inc. and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative over the Diwalwal Gold Rush
Area.

5. Whether the issue of the legality/constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 was belatedly raised.

HELD:

1. The assailed Decision did not overturn the 16 July 1991 Decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia. The former
was decided on facts and issues that were not attendant in the latter, such as the expiration of EP 133, the violation of the
condition embodied in EP 133 prohibiting its assignment, and the unauthorized and invalid assignment of EP 133 by MMC
to SEM, since this assignment was effected without the approval of the Secretary of DENR;
2. SEM did not acquire vested right over the disputed area because its supposed right was extinguished by the
expiration of its exploration permit and by its violation of the condition prohibiting the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to
SEM. In addition, even assuming that SEM has a valid exploration permit, such is a mere license that can be withdrawn by
the State. In fact, the same has been withdrawn by the issuance of Proclamation No. 297, which places the disputed area
under the full control of the State through the Executive Department;

3. The approval requirement under Section 97 of Presidential Decree No. 463 applies to the assignment of EP 133
by MMC to SEM, since the exploration permit is an interest in a mining lease contract;

4. The issue of the constitutionality and the legality of Proclamation No. 297 was raised belatedly, as SEM questions
the same for the first time in its Motion for Reconsideration. Even if the issue were to be entertained, the said proclamation
is found to be in harmony with the Constitution and other existing statutes;

5. The motion for reconsideration of Camilo Banad, et al. cannot be passed upon because they are not parties to the
instant cases;

6. The prayers of Apex and Balite asking the Court to direct the MGB to accept their applications for exploration
permits cannot be granted, since it is the Executive Department that has the prerogative to accept such applications, if ever
it decides to award the mining operations in the disputed area to a private entity;

33.) PICOP V. BASE METALS

G.R. No. 163509

December 6, 2006

Facts:

In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines
Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator
for the exploration, development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCI's 18 mining claims located in Agusan del
Sur. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining
claims with the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it
to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining
claims was located in petitioner PICOP's logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP
entered into a MOA whereby petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access to its mining claims. In 1991, Banahaw
Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA for brevity).
While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and
interests over 37 mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation. The transfer
included those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI. Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI,
as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals,
thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims. On March 10, 1997, private
respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Mining's pending MPSA applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself
as applicant and to submit additional documents in support of the application. Area clearances from the DENR Regional
Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as required.

On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), an Opposition to private
respondent Base Metals' application because it violate the non-impairment clause and will be prejudicial to herein petitioner.
The Panel Arbitrator initially ruled for petitioner, but upon appeal to the Mines Adjudication Board, judgment was in favor
of respondent, CA affirmed stating that the Presidential Warranty of September 25, 1968 issued by then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber license granted to PICOP and warranted the latter's peaceful and adequate
possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the Board of Investments to
establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The Presidential Warranty did not convert PICOP's timber
license into a contract because it did not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of PICOP. Thus, the
non-impairment clause finds no application.

Issue:

W/N the concession area of petitioner is closed to mining activities and that the conversion of the agreement into
MPSA will run counter to the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. – NO, a Timber license agreement is not a contract,
but a mere privilege.
Held:

We should state at this juncture that the policy of multiple land use is enshrined in our laws towards the end that
the country's natural resources may be rationally explored, developed, utilized and conserved. In like manner, RA 7942,
recognizing the equiponderance between mining and timber rights, gives a mining contractor the right to enter a timber
concession and cut timber therein provided that the surface owner or concessionaire shall be properly compensated for any
damage done to the property as a consequence of mining operations.

Firstly, assuming that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is a government reservation, defined as proclaimed
reserved lands for specific purposes other than mineral reservations, such does not necessarily preclude mining activities
in the area. Sec. 15(b) of DAO 96-40 provides that government reservations may be opened for mining applications upon
prior written clearance by the government agency having jurisdiction over such reservation. Sec. 6 of RA 7942 also provides
that mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral reservations may be undertaken by the DENR, subject to certain
limitations. Secondly, RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves but only those proclaimed as
watershed forest reserves. There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA has been
proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. DENR Memorandum Order No. 03-98, which provides the guidelines in the
issuance of area status and clearance or consent for mining applications pursuant to RA 7942, provides that timber or forest
lands, military and other government reservations, forest reservations, forest reserves other than critical watershed forest
reserves, and existing DENR Project Areas within timber or forest lands, reservations and reserves, among others, are open
to mining applications subject to area status and clearance.

Lastly, PICOP failed to present any evidence that the area covered by the MPSA is a protected wilderness area
designated as an initial component of the NIPAS pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or
executive order as required by RA 7586.

34.) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD (DENR)
vs.
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 137174

July 10, 2000

FACTS:

Respondent MMC was issued a temporary permit to operate a tailings sea disposal system. In the meantime, the
National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) was abolished by EO No. 192 dated June 10, 1987, and its powers and
functions were integrated into the Environmental Management Bureau and into the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB).

On April 11, 1988, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as Chairman of the PAB, issued an Order directing MMC to
"cease and desist from discharging mine tailings into Calancan Bay." This was appealed by the MMC with the Office of the
President (OP).

In line with the directive from the OP, the Calancan Bay Rehabilitation Project (CBRP) was created, and MMC
remitted the amount of P30,000.00 a day, starting from May 13, 1988 to the Ecology Trust Fund (ETF) thereof. However,
on June 30, 1991, MMC stopped discharging its tailings in the Bay, hence, it likewise ceased from making further deposits
to the ETF.

The PAB sought for the enforcement of the order issued by the OP, however, the CA acted on Marcopper’s petition
and ordered the PAB to refrain and desist from enforcing aforesaid Order.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Republic Act No. 7942 repealed the provisions of Republic Act No.
3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, with respect to the power and function of petitioner Pollution Adjudication
Board to issue, renew or deny permits for the discharge of the mine tailings.

HELD:

The SC held that the CA erred in ruling that the PAB had no authority to issue the Order from the
 The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the PAB has been divested of authority to act on pollution-related matters
in mining operations is anchored on the provisions of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995). However, Section 19 of EO
192 vested the PAB with the specific power to adjudicate pollution cases in general. Sec. 2, par. (a) of PD 984 defines the
term "pollution" as referring to any alteration of the physical, chemical and biological properties of any water, air and/or
land resources of the Philippines , or any discharge thereto of any liquid, gaseous or solid wastes as will or is likely to create
a harmful environment.

On the other hand, the authority of the mines regional director is complementary to that of the PAB. While the
mines regional director has express administrative and regulatory powers over mining operations and installations, it has
no adjudicative powers over complaints for violation of pollution control statutes and regulations. Contrary to the ruling of
the CA, RA 7942 does not vest quasi-judicial powers in the Mines Regional Director. The authority is vested and remains
with the PAB. Neither was such authority conferred upon the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board which
were created by the said law. The scope of authority of the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board conferred
by RA 7942 clearly exclude adjudicative responsibility over pollution cases.