You are on page 1of 8

EQUITABLE BANKING CORP. VS. SPECIAL STEEL PRODUCTS INC.

• The records do not identify the signatory for the checks, or explain how
G.R. No. 175350 (2012) Jose Isidro Uy (Uy), the son-in-law of Interco’s majority stockholder,
By: Lyka G6 came in possession of these checks. He claimed that he had good title
thereto. He demanded the deposits in his personal accounts in
Topic: Crossed check Equitable. The bank did so relying on Uy’s status as a valued client and
Petitioner: Equitable Banking Corporation as son-in-law of Interco’s majority stockholder.
Respondents: Special Steel Products, Inc. and Augusto L. Pardo • SSPI reminded Interco of the unpaid welding electrodes, explaining
Ponente: Del Castillo that its immediate need for payment as it was experiencing some
financial crisis of its own. It replied that it had already issued 3 checks
RECIT-READY SUMMARY: Respondent SSPI sold welding electrodes to payable to SSPI and drawn against Equitable, which was denied by
International Copra Export Corp. (Interco), its regular customer. As payment SSPI.
for the products, Interco issued 3 checks payable to the order of SSPI. Each • Later on, it was discovered that it was Uy, not SSPI, who received the
check was crossed with the annotation, “account payee only,” and was drawn proceeds of 3 checks. Interco finally paid the value of the 3 checks to
against Equitable. Jose Isidro Uy, the son-in-law of Interco’s majority SSPI plus a portion of accrued interests.
stockholder, demanded the deposits in his personal accounts in Equitable. The • Interco refused to pay the entire accrued interest on the ground that it
bank did so relying on Uy’s status as a valued client and as son-in-law of was not responsible for the delay. Hence, Pardo filed a complaint for
Interco’s majority stockholder. Because of this, Interco’s obligation fell due. damages against Uy and Equitable Bank, alleging that the 3 crossed
SSPI demanded from the latter, but it replied it had already issued 3 checks checks, all payable to order of SSPI, could be deposited and encased by
payable to SSPI and drawn against Equitable, which was denied by SSPI. Later SSPI only.
on, it was discovered that it was Uy, not SSPI, who received the proceeds of 3 • RTC: Ruled in favor of SSPI and Pardo.
checks. Interco finally paid the value of the 3 checks to SSPI plus a portion of
• CA: Affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
accrued interests. Interco refused to pay the entire accrued interest on the
ground that it was not responsible for the delay. Hence, SSPI filed a complaint • Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
for damages.
ISSUE(s):
DOCTRINE: A crossed check with the notation “account payee only” can 1. Whether SSPI has a cause of action against Equitable for quasi-
only be deposited in the named payee’s account. It is gross negligence for a delict;
bank to ignore this rule solely on the basis of a third party’s oral 2. Whether SSPI can recover, as actual damages, the stipulated 36% per
representations of having a good title thereto. annum interest from Equitable;
3. Whether speculative fears and imagined scenarios, which cause
FACTS: sleepless nights, may be the basis for the award of moral damages; and
4. Whether the attachment of Equitable’s personal properties was
• Respondent Special Steel Products, Inc. (SSPI) is a private domestic
wrongful.
corporation selling steel products. Its co-respondent Augusto Pardo
(Pardo) is SSPI’s President & majority stockholder. SSPI sold welding
HELD/RATIO:
electrodes to International Copra Export Corporation (Interco), its
regular customer.
1. Yes. SSPI has a cause of action for quasi-delict against Equitable.
• The sale was evidenced by sales invoices and was due on March 16, A. Equitable argues that SSPI cannot assert a right against the bank based
1991. It also provided that Interco would pay interest at the rate of 36% on the undelivered checks. Equitables argument is misplaced and
per annum in case of delay. beside the point. SSPIs cause of action is not based on the three checks.
• As payment for the products, Interco issued 3 checks payable to the Instead, it asserts a cause of action based on quasi-delict. A quasi-
order of SSPI. Each check was crossed with the annotation, “account delict is an act or omission, there being fault or negligence, which
payee only,” and was drawn against Equitable. causes damage to another.
B. The checks that Interco issued in favor of SSPI were all crossed, • SSPI did not recover interest payments at the stipulated rate from
made payable to SSPIs order, and contained the notation account Interco because it agreed that the delay was not Intercos fault, but that
payee only. This creates a reasonable expectation that the payee of the defendants. If that is the case, then Interco is not in delay (at
alone would receive the proceeds of the checks and that diversion of least not after issuance of the checks) and the stipulated interest
the checks would be averted. This expectation arises from the payments in their contract did not become operational. SSPI cannot
accepted banking practice that crossed checks are intended for lose something that it was not entitled to in the first place. Thus, SSPIs
deposit in the named payee’s account only and no other. The manner claim that it was entitled to interest income at the rate stipulated in its
of discharge of crossed checks, in banking practice, is restrictive and contract with Interco, as a measure of its actual damage, is fallacious.
specific. • More importantly, the provisions of a contract generally take effect
a. At the very least, the nature of crossed checks should place a only among the parties, their assigns and heirs. SSPI cannot invoke the
bank on notice that it should exercise more caution or contractual stipulation on interest payments against Equitable because
expend more than a cursory inquiry, to ascertain whether it is neither a party to the contract, nor an assignee or an heir to the
the payee on the check has authorized the holder to deposit contracting parties.
the same in a different account.
• It is clear that Equitable’s actions deprived SSPI of the present use of
b. It is important that banks should guard against injury
its money for a period of two years. SSPI is therefore entitled to obtain
attributable to negligence or bad faith on its part. As
from the tortfeasors the profits that it failed to obtain from July 1991 to
repeatedly emphasized, since the banking business is
June 1993. SSPI should recover interest at the legal rate of 6% per
impressed with public interest, the trust and confidence of
annum, this being an award for damages based on quasi-delict and
the public in it is of paramount importance. Consequently,
not for a loan or forbearance of money.
the highest degree of diligence is expected, and high
standards of integrity and performance are required of it.
3. Yes. The Court, however, finds the award of P3 million excessive. Moral
C. Considering that the named payee does not have an account with
damages are given not to punish the defendant but only to give the plaintiff the
Equitable, the bank knowingly assumed the risk of relying solely on
means to assuage his sufferings with diversions and recreation. We find that
Uy’s word. Such misplaced reliance on empty words is tantamount to
the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is reasonable under the
gross negligence, which is the absence or failure to exercise even slight
circumstances.
care or diligence. Equitable did not observe the required degree of
diligence expected of a banking institution under the existing factual
4. Yes. [A] writ of preliminary attachment is too harsh a provisional remedy to
circumstances.
be issued based on mere abstractions of fraud. Rather, the rules require that for
. The banking system is placed in peril when bankers act out of blind
the writ to issue, there must be a recitation of clear and concrete factual
faith and empty promises, without requiring proof of the assertions and
circumstances manifesting that the debtor practiced fraud upon the creditor at
without making the appropriate inquiries. Had it only exercised due diligence,
the time of the execution of their agreement in that said debtor had a
Equitable could have saved both Interco and the named payee, SSPI, from the
preconceived plan or intention not to pay the creditor. No proof was adduced
trouble that the banks mislaid trust wrought for them.
tending to show that Equitable had a preconceived plan not to pay SSPI or had
knowingly participated in Uy’s scheme.
2. Yes. Equitable is solidarily liable with Uy to compensate SSPI for the
damages it suffered at the legal rate of 6% per annum, not 36% per annum
DISPOSITION: The Court hereby REVERSES the dismissal of Equitable
interest rate. (Not relevant to the subject but I added the other issues just in case
Banking Corporation’s counterclaim for damages against Special Steel Products,
Atty. asks)
Inc. This Court ORDERS Special Steel Products, Inc. to PAY Equitable Banking
• SSPI computed its claim for interest payments based on the interest Corporation actual damages in the total amount of P30,204.36, for the wrongful
rate stipulated in its contract with Interco. The Court finds the preliminary attachment of its properties. The rest of the assailed Decision is
application of the stipulated interest rate erroneous. AFFIRMED.
BATAAN CIGAR AND CIGARETTE FACTORY, INC. vs. CA • Respondent filed an action for sum of money against petitioner after
GR No. 93048 failing to collect.
3 March 1994
By: Kim Michael de Jesus ISSUE(s): W/N SIHI, a second indorser, a holder of crossed checks, is a holder
in due course, to be able to collect from the drawer, BCCFI, NO
Topic: Cashier’s Check
Petitioners: Bataan Cigar and Cigarette Factory, Inc. RULING:
Respondents: CA & State Investment House, Inc. • A check is defined by law as a bill of exchange drawn on a bank
Ponente: Nocon payable on demand. There are a variety of checks, the more popular
of which are the memorandum check, cashier's check, traveler's check
RECIT-READY SUMMARY: George King, petitioner’s supplier, sold at a and crossed check.
discount series of crossed check issued to him by petitioner to respondent. • Crossed check is one where two parallel lines are drawn
Believing that it was a holder in due course of the subject checks, respondent across its face or across a corner thereof. It may be crossed
filed a collection case against petitioner after petitioner issued a stop payment generally or specially. According to commentators, the
order for the said checks. negotiability of a check is not affected by its being crossed,
whether specially or generally. It may legally be negotiated
DOCTRINE: The negotiability of a check is not affected by its being crossed, from one person to another as long as the one who encashes
whether specially or generally. It may legally be negotiated from one person to the check with the drawee bank is another bank, or if it is
another as long as the one who encashes the check with the drawee bank is specially crossed, by the bank mentioned between the
another bank, or if it is specially crossed, by the bank mentioned between the parallel lines.
parallel lines. • In order to preserve the credit worthiness of checks, jurisprudence has
pronounced that crossing of a check should have the following
FACTS: effects:
• Petitioner, Bataan Cigar & Cigarette Factory, Inc. (BCCFI), a a. the check may not be encashed but only deposited in the
corporation involved in the manufacturing of cigarettes, engaged one bank;
of its suppliers, King Tim Pua George (referred to as George King), to b. the check may be negotiated only once — to one who has an
deliver 2,000 bales of tobacco leaf starting October 1978. account with a bank;
• In consideration thereof, BCCFI, on July 13, 1978 issued c. and the act of crossing the check serves as warning to the
crossed checks post dated sometime in March 1979 in the holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose
total amount of P820,000.00. so that he must inquire if he has received the check pursuant
• Petitioner agreed to purchase additional 2,500 bales of tobacco leaves, to that purpose, otherwise, he is not a holder in due course.
despite the supplier's failure to deliver in accordance with their earlier • Crossing of checks should put the holder on inquiry and upon him
agreement. devolves the duty to ascertain the indorser's title to the check or the
• Again petitioner issued post dated crossed checks in the total nature of his possession.
amount of P1,100,000.00, payable sometime in September • There being failure of consideration, SIHI is not a holder in due
1979. course. Consequently, BCCFI cannot be obliged to pay the checks.
• George King simultaneously dealt with private respondent and sold at
a discount the checks petitioner had drawn DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED, RTC and CA reversed.
• Petitioner issued a stop payment order for all of the checks it had
issued to George King due to non-delivery of the goods
EQUITABLE PCI BANK VS. ONG • PCI Bank contended that the check issued to Sarande was returned on the
GR NO. 156207 ground that the account against which it was drawn was already closed.
September 15, 2006
By: Race Del Rosario ISSUE(s): W/N PCI Bank should pay the manager’s check issued to Rowena
Ong.
Topic: Manager or Cashier’s Check
Petitioners: Equitable PCI Bank HELD/RATIO: YES
Respondents: Rowena Ong • The PCI Bank’s contention that if it would be compelled to make good the
Ponente: J. Chico-Nazario managers check it had issued, it will unjustly enrich the respondent is
without merit. The main objective of the doctrine is to prevent one to
RECIT-READY SUMMARY: enrich himself at the expense of another. It is well to stress that the check
of Sarande had been cleared by the PCI Bank for which reason the former
Sarande issued a check in favor of the respondent Rowena Ong which was issued the check to Ong. Having cleared the check earlier, PCI Bank,
subsequently converted into a manager’s check by the PCI bank. Said check therefore, became liable to Ong and it cannot allege want or failure of
was dishonored by the same bank saying that the account it was drawn from consideration between it and Sarande. Under settled jurisprudence, Ong is
was already closed. SC held that the issuance of the manager’s check is as good a stranger as regards the transaction between PCI Bank and Sarande.
as the money it represents and is on the same footing as a certified check. PCI • PCI Bank next insists that since there was no consideration for the issuance
bank did not exercise due diligence in issuing the manager’s check so they are of the managers check, ergo, Ong is not a holder in due course. This claim
liable to pay the respondent the amount in the check plus damages. is equally without basis. Pertinent provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Law are: (1) Sec 52 which defines a holder in due course; (2)
DOCTRINE: A managers check is an order of the bank to pay, drawn upon itself, Sec 42 on the presumption of consideration; (3) Sec 26 on what constitutes
committing in effect its total resources, integrity and honor behind its issuance. By its a holder for value; and (4) Sec 28 on the effect of want of consideration.
peculiar character and general use in commerce, a managers check is regarded • Easily discernible is that what Ong obtained from PCI Bank was not just
substantially to be as good as the money it represents. any ordinary check but a managers check. A managers check is an order of
the bank to pay, drawn upon itself, committing in effect its total resources,
FACTS: integrity and honor behind its issuance. By its peculiar character and
• Warliza Sarande deposited in her account at Philippine Commercial general use in commerce, a managers check is regarded substantially to be
International (PCI) Bank Magsaysay Davao City Branch, a PCI Bank as good as the money it represents. A managers check stands on the same
General Santos City Branch Check in the amount of P225,000.00. footing as a certified check. The effect of certification is found in Section
• 5 days after, Sarande inquired whether the check had been cleared and she 187, Negotiable Instruments Law.
received an affirmative answer. Relying on this assurance, she issued two • From the foregoing, it is palpable and readily apparent that PCI Bank
checks drawn against her account. One of which was issued to Rowena failed to exercise the highest degree of care required of it under Republic
Ong for P132,000.00 as payment for a business transaction. Act No. 8791, The General Banking Law of 2000.
• Instead of encashing, Ong requested to convert the proceeds into a • Therefore, the petitioner is made to pay the amount specified in the check
manager’s check, to which the PCI bank obliged. and moral and exemplary damages because the respondent suffered
• She then deposited said check to her account with Equitable bank but she humiliation arising from the dishonor of the check.
received a check-return slip saying that PCI stopped the payment on the
ground of irregular issuance.
• Despite several demands, PCI refused to pay said amount which prompted
Ong to file a complaint against PCI Bank for the sum of money and
damages.
HSBC v CIR instructing HSBC to debit their local or foreign currency accounts and
G.R. No. 166018 to pay the purchase price therefor upon receipt of the securities.
June 4, 2014 • Pursuant to the electronic messages of its investor-clients, HSBC
By: Diana Demmel purchased and paid Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) from September
to December 1997 and also from January to December 1998 amounting
Topic: Written form and signature to ₱19,572,992.10 and ₱32,904,437.30.
Petitioners: THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING • On August 23, 1999, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), thru its
CORPORATION LIMITED-PHILIPPINE BRANCHES then Commissioner, Beethoven Rualo, issued BIR Ruling No. 132-99 to
Respondents: COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE the effect that instructions or advises from abroad on the management
Ponente: Maria Lourdes Sereno of funds located in the Philippines which do not involve transfer of
funds from abroad are not subject to DST.
RECIT READY SUMMARY: HSBC received emails from its clientele located While the payor is residing outside the Philippines, he maintains a
abroad to debit funds from their accounts for the payment of shares and local and foreign currency account in the Philippines from where he
securities in the Philippines. After paying the sums of 19.5 million in 1997 and will draw the money intended to pay a named recipient. The
32.9 million in 1998 to the CIR, HSBC then requested that the latter rule on instruction or order to pay shall be made through an electronic
whether or not such email transactions were negotiable instruments subject to message, i.e., SWIFT MT 100 or MT 202 and/or MT 521.
documentary stamp tax (DST). The BIR responded in the negative, holding that Consequently, there is no negotiable instrument to be made, signed
such emails were not transactions contemplated in Sec. 181 of the 1997 Tax or issued by the payee. In the meantime, such electronic instructions
Code. On the strength of this response, HSBC proceeded to demand the return by the non-resident payor cannot be considered as a transaction per
of their tax payments advanced on the presumption that DST was applicable. se considering that the same do not involve any transfer of funds
However, as BIR did not heed HSBC’s requests for the return of the payments, from abroad or from the place where the instruction originates.
HSBC filed with the Court of Tax Appeals. CTA ruled in their favor. CA Insofar as the local bank is concerned, such instruction could be
reversed, holding that Sec. 181 does not apply to the instrument or bill of considered only as a memorandum and shall be entered as such in
exchange per se, but on the acceptance or payment of said order. Hence, this its books of accounts. The actual debiting of the payor’s account,
petition for review on certiorari before the SC. local or foreign currency account in the Philippines, is the actual
transaction that should be properly entered as such.
DOCTRINE: An instrument to be negotiable must be in writing and signed by • On the strength of this letter, HSBC filed an administrative claim for a
the maker or drawer. [Derived from Section 1(a) of the Negotiable Instruments refund of the DST that they erroneously paid to the CIR.
Law]
ISSUE: Whether or not the electronic instructions are negotiable instruments
FACTS: subject to DST

• As a custodian bank, HSBC serves as the collection/payment agent HELD/RATIO:


with respect to dividends and other income derived from its investor-
clients’ passive investments (shares of stocks in domestic corporations). • No. Under Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments law, the emails fail to
• HSBC’s investor-clients maintain Philippine peso and/or foreign conform to all the requirements listed therein. Ergo, the emails are not
currency accounts, which are managed by HSBC through instructions negotiable instruments. They are not written and signed by the maker or
given through electronic messages. The said instructions are standard drawer; they do not contain an unconditional order to pay a sum certain in
forms known in the banking industry as SWIFT, or "Society for money as the payment is supposed to come from a specific fund or account
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication." of the investor-clients; and, they are not payable to order or bearer but to a
• In purchasing shares of stock and other investment in securities, the specifically designated third party. Thus, the electronic messages are not
investor-clients would send electronic messages from abroad bills of exchange. As there was no bill of exchange or order for the
payment drawn abroad and made payable here in the Philippines, there
could have been no acceptance or payment that would trigger the
imposition of the DST under Section 181 of the Tax Code.
• Indeed, there had been no acceptance of a bill of exchange or order for the
payment of money on the part of HSBC. To reiterate, there was no bill of
exchange or order for the payment drawn abroad and made payable here
in the Philippines. Thus, there was no acceptance, as the electronic
messages did not constitute the written and signed manifestation of HSBC
to a drawer's order to pay money. As HSBC could not have been an
acceptor, then it could not have made any payment of a bill of exchange or
order for the payment of money drawn abroad but payable here in the
Philippines. In other words, HSBC could not have been held liable for DST
under Section 230 of the 1977 Tax Code, as amended, and Section 181 of
the 1997 Tax Code as it is not "a person making, signing, issuing, accepting,
or, transferring" the taxable instruments under the said provision. Thus,
HSBC erroneously paid DST on the said electronic messages for which it is
entitled to a tax refund.
• WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED and the Decisions
dated May 2, 2002 in CTA Case No. 6009 and dated December 18, 2002 in
CT A Case No. 5951 of the Court of Tax Appeals are REINSTATED.
JIMENEZ V. BUCOY • Jimenez filed the suit against Dr. Bucoy. In court, Dr. Bucoy argues
103 PHIL 40 that the notes contained no express promise to pay a specified amount.
February 28, 1958 • The lower court held that that the notes should be paid in the currency
By: Justine Limjoco prevailing after the war. Hence, this appeal.

Topic: Unconditional Order or promise to pay ISSUE(s):


Petitioners: Intestate of Luther Young and Pacita Young, Pacifica Jimenez 1. Whether or not the promissory note contained an express promise to
Respondents: Dr. Jose Bucoy pay a specified amount.
Ponente: Bengzon, J. 2. Whether or not the amount should be paid in peso for peso or whether
a reduction should be made in accordance with the Ballantyne
schedule.
RECIT-READY SUMMARY:
Petitioner Pacifica Jimenez presented four promissory notes to respondent Dr.
HELD/RATIO
Bucoy. During the Japanese occupation, respondent manifested willingness to
pay provided that he pay in line with the Ballantyne schedule. Petitioner
1. YES. The notes amounted in effect to “a promise to pay P10,000 six
objected to adjustment and insisted that he pay full amount in accordance with
months after the war without interest. Dr. Bucoy’s contention is
the notes. Note that the promissory note stated that the amount was “payable six
without merit.
months after the war”. Petitioner files the case against respondent. In court, Dr.
Bucoy argues that the notes contained no express promise to pay a specified • An acknowledgement may become a promise to pay by adding
amount. The SC finds Dr. Bucoy’s argument is without merit. It may be words by which a promise of payment is naturally implied.
inferred from the words used that there is a promise to pay. Examples of these words are: “payable”, “payable on a given
day”, “payable on demand”, or “paid…when called for”.
• To constitute a good promissory note, no precise words are
DOCTRINE: The instrument is a promissory note if over and above the mere
necessary, provided they amount, in legal effect, to a promise
acknowledgment of the debt, it may be inferred from the words used a promise to pay.
to pay.
No precise words are necessary.
• The instrument is a promissory note if over and above the mere
FACTS: acknowledgment of the debt, it may be inferred from the words
used a promise to pay.
2. The notes should be paid in the currency prevailing after the war.
• Petitioner Pacifica Jimenez presented for payment four promissory
notes all signed by Pacita Young (deceased) amounting to Php 21,000 • The Ballantyne Conversion does not apply.
to respondent Dr. Bucoy. The Ballantyne Conversion Table does not apply where the
monetary obligation, under the contract, was not payable during
• The first promissory note read as follows:
the Japanese occupation but until after one year counted for the
“Received from Miss Pacifica Jimenez, the total amount of Php 10,000
date of ratification of the Treaty of Peace concluding the Greater
payable six months after the war.”
East Asia War. (Arellano vs. De Domingo, 101 Phil., 902.)
• The other three notes were couched in the same terms, except as to
• The notes are promise to pay six month after the war. Therefore,
amounts and dates.
the Ballantyne schedule cannot be applied.
• Acknowledging receipt by Pacita during the Japanese occupation, in
the currency then prevailing, the administrator, Dr. Bucoy,
manifested willingness to pay provided that the adjustment be
made in line with the Ballantyne schedule.
• Jimenez objected to the adjustment and insisted that he pay the full
amount in accordance with the notes.
NACAR VS. GALLERY FRAMES HELD: YES
703 SCRA 439 (2013)
By: Nico Nunez • SC ruled that the petitioner shall be entitled to interest. According to
Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. V. CA, when the judgment of the court
Topic: Sum Payable Must Be Certain awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
Petitioners: Dario Nacar interest shall be 12% per anum from such finality until its satisfaction.
Respondents: Gallery Frames and Felipe Bordey • Moreover, the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board, in its Resolution
Ponente: Peralta, J. No. 796 dated May 16, 2013 declared that the rate of interest for the loan or
forebearance of any money, goods, or credits and the rate allowed in
DOCTRINE: No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest,
damages, except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. shall be 6% per annum. Consequently, the 12% per annum legal interest
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall apply until June 30, 2013 while the new rate of 6% per annum shall be
shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. the prevailing rate of interest when applicable.
1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the • As to the running of interest, when an obligation, not constituting a loan or
time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
judgment of the court is made. awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
FACTS: damages, except when or until the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
• Petitioner Dario Nacar filed a complaint for constructive dismissal before reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim
the NLRC against Respondent Gallery Frames. The Labor Arbiter decided is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such
in favour of Nacar, finding that he was dismissed from employment certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
without a valid or just cause. Thus, petitioner was awarded back wages made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the
and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the amount of ₱158,919.92. court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed
Respondent sought appeals all the way up to the SC, but they were all to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation
dismissed, making the judgment final. of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
• During the execution of the final judgment, the petitioner filed for a motion
for the re-computation of the damages. The original amount previously
awarded only includes separation pay and back wages up to the time of
his dismissal. But it is argued that the damages should cover the period
until the date of final judgment. A re-computation was made, and the
damages was increased to ₱471,320.31.
• Respondent moved to quash the motion, claiming that the judgment made
by the SC became final, and the amount should not be further altered.
Petitioner filed another motion, praying that the respondent pay the
appropriate legal interest of the damages from the date of judgment until
full payment.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is entitled to interest.