Philippine Coconut Producers Fedration (COCOFED), et al vs.

Republic
FACTS:
 In 1971, RA 6260 was enacted, creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) toadminister
the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF). The fund was to be sourved from a PhP0.55 levy on the sale
of every 100 kg of copra.
 Under the regime of Marcial Law, PD 276 and 582 were enacted creating more funds
,specifically the CCSF (Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund) and CIDF (CoconutIndustry
Development Fund)
 PD 755 was enacted to provide credit facilities to coconut farmers.-
 The Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA) is authorized to handle the funds-
 The PCA were authorized to use the funds to acquire a bank and to deposit theportion of fund
levies. They purchased the First United Bank (FUB), later renamedUCPB, but reimbursed the
money from the funds.-
 The funds were for the benefit of coconut farmers. The funds were used to pay forthe financial
commitments of farmers and provided them with free shares of thebank.-
 The stock certificates for the farmers were in the name of the PCA but weresupposed to be
distributed to the farmers who possessed COCOFUND receipts (PCAAdministrative Order No. 1)
 Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. was one of the mediators of the PCA funds and it was discoveredthat he
caused the issuance of PD 1468 (Revised Coconut Industry Code) throughcollaboration with
Marcos.
 The Aquino Administration initiated the recovery of ill-gotten gains through theimplementation
of the following executive orders-
 EO 1-establishment of the Presidential Committee on Good Governance (PCGG)-
 EO 2-Ill-gotten gains” included shares of stocks
 EO 14-The Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction
 The Sandiganbayan ordered the sequestration against stocks in banks owned by morethan a
million coconut farmers and CIIF companies

ISSUES AND RULING

 W/N the Sandiganbayan abused its power of judicial review?-
No, since the case cannot be solved unless the constitutionality issue is addressed.The case is for the
recovery of shares grounded on the invalidity of the enactmentsand rooted in the nature of the shares
being public.

 W/N Sections 1 and 2 of PD 755, Article 3, Section 5 of PD 961, and Article III, Section 5of PD
1468 are unconstitutional?-
The levy implemented takes on the nature of taxes since they utilized the taxingpower and police power
of the State, thereby making it a public fund.-
The funds were intended for the exclusive benefit of private persons.-

Article VI, Section 29 (3)

“All money collected on any tax levied for a special
Purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only.
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL
v.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNALG.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011,
EN BANC
(Nachura,J.)
To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply
constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the PET in
our country cannot be denied.
Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, through a Motion for Reconsideration reiterates hisarguments that
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of thePresidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) and that the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of theConstitution. In order to strengthen
his position, petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro in
“Barok” C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
that thePhilippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a public office which cannot be created by the president,
thepower to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that if the President,
ashead of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot
createthe PET in the absence of an act of legislature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is Constitutional.
HELD:
Motion for Reconsideration
DENIED
. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the
doctrine of necessary implication
, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to
decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes themeans necessary to carry it into
effect. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which pro
vides that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law." Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of "dealing with
the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that arelegally
demandable and enforceable" is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987Constitution,
judicial power was expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actualcontroversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whetheror not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the partof any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." The power was expanded, but it remainedabsolute. Atty. Romulo B.
Macalintal is going to town under the misplaced assumption that the text of the
provision itself was the only basis for this Court to sustain the PET’s constitutionality. The Court reiterates that the PET is
authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by the
discussions of the Members of the Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present
Constitution. The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing what was
merely statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating the Supreme
Court tocreate a Presidential Electoral Tribunal
Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950
DECISION
(En Banc)
OZAETA, J.:
I. THE FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista
and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent
irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total
sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00,
which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of the
witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner
repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00,
which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition
for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of
the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name
of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which
is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that
mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is
not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the
Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate
Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee,
among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates
deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in
said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The
contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or
materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the
legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or
possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
xxx xxx xxx
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and
the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be
enforced by the committee by imprisonment.

2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of
every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very
reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its
constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are
performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing
investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is
recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is
but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body
and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to
time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to
sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of
authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is
not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his
liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the
witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct
answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show
that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment
for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for
protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case whether
the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own
declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.
ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Case Digest: Dante O. Casibang vs. Honorable Narciso A. Aquino
20 August 1979
FACTS:
Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan. Casibang,his only
rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies andirregularities and others.
During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came intoeffect. Respondent Yu moved to
dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the ground thatthe trial court had lost jurisdiction over the
same in view of the effectivity of the new Constitutionand the new parliamentary form of government.
ISSUES:
1.Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the protest moot andacademic; and
2.Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of theentire local government structure.
RULING:
1.As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, “the constitutional grant of privilege to continue inoffice,
made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbentofficials or
employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot befairly construed as indiscriminately
encompassing every person who at the time happenedto be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit
under protest or contest" and that"subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the
TransitoryProvisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our newfundamental
law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for electiveposition who, within the time-frame
prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commencedproceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a
judicial forum of a proclaimedcandidate-elect's right to the contested office.”
2.Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with apolitical color.
For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power toenact a local government code
"which may not thereafter be amended except by a
majorityo f a l l i t s M e m b e r s , d e f i n i n g a m o r e r e s p o n s i v e a n d a c c o u n t a b l e l o c a l g o v e
r n m e n t allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities,
andresources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries,p
owers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to t
h e organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the existing form of local
government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose."
***********************************************************************************************************************
**********************
Title: Casibang v. AquinoGR L-38025 August 20, 1979Makasiar, J.:
Facts:
Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinanin the 1971 local elections, by
a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner,Dante Casibang who seasonably filed
on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on
the grounds of (1) anomalies andirregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in
specified electoralprecincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessivecampaign
expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.Proceedings therein continued with respect to the
election protest of petitioner before theCourt of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, presided by respondent
Judge, who initiallytook cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable controversy.In the meantime or on
September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of thePhilippines issued Proclamation No. 1081,
placing the entire country under Martial Law;
andt w o m o n t h s t h e r e a f t e r , m o r e o r l e s s , o r s p e c i f i c a l l y o n N o v e m b e r 2 9 , 1 9 7 2 , t
he 1971Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to suppl
a n t t h e 1 9 3 5 Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign
people of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this
Courtdeclared that "there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered inforce
and effect" (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 [1973]).The petitioner had already completed presenting
his evidence and in fact had rested hiscase, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the
ground that thetrial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973
Constitutionby reason of which — principally (Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2of Article XI) — a
political question has intervened in the case.
Issue:Whether or not the case is under the purview of political question.
Held:
No, the case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political questionhas ever been
interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or theLegislative Department to be indirectly
reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judgedecides the election protest. The term "political
question" connotes what it means in
ordinaryp a r l a n c e , n a m e l y , a q u e s t i o n o f p o l i c y . I t r e f e r s t o t h o s e q u e s t i o n s w h i c h
u n d e r t h e Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to whichfull
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of thegovernment.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of aparticular measure. The
trial under the Court of First Instance should proceed.
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF PHILIPPINES, GR No. 196231, 2014-01-28
Facts:
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and
ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i)... found Gonzales guilty of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on him the
penalty of dismissal.
Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary proceedings
against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to disciplinary proceedings. The
Court affirmed the continuation of the proceedings against her... after upholding the constitutionality of
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.
In view of the Court's ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG).
In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several others,
before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia filed an Urgent
Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed. The
Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent petition for bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the strength of the
prosecution's evidence against Garcia.

Issues:
Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.
On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from GIPO Garcia on April 27,
2010. On May 6, 2010, he completed his review of the draft, approved it, and transmitted it to the Office
of the Ombudsman for final approval. Since the draft... order on Mendoza's motion for reconsideration
had to undergo different levels of preparation, review and approval, the period it took to resolve the
motion could not be unjustified, since he himself acted on the draft order only within nine (9) calendars
days from his receipt of... the order.

Ruling:
On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales' petition and to
declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman.
a. The Philippine Ombudsman
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be
the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function
essentially as a complaints and action bureau.[36] This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman
practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills,
abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the Constitution.
Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive
officers, during their tenure.
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful government
constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling investigative
bodies."[39] It has powers, both constitutional... and statutory, that are commensurate with its daunting
task of enforcing accountability of public officers.[40]... b. "Independence" of constitutional bodies... vis-a-
vis the Ombudsman's independence
Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but
are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal... autonomy. In general terms, the
framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies be insulated from political pressure
to the extent that the absence of "independence" would result in the impairment of their core functions.
the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the... developments in
the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure.
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior but is
similar in degree and kind to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the
Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political... interstices of a republican democracy
that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.
c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting... disciplinary authority in the President... over the Deputy
Ombudsman violates... the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman and is thus... unconstitutional... we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline
and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are
subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the... independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate,
includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the... constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the
Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and...
balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents
of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place
her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as... independent as she is, if only because
they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is true in
an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still
a major problem... for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that
the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.
he statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the Executive power
to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over
them, would result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the
Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons who can
remove or suspend its members.
e. Congress' power determines the... manner and causes for the removal... of non-impeachable officers is
not... a carte blanch authority
Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,[53] Congress is empowered to determine the modes
of removal from office of all public officers and employees except the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, who are all impeachable officials.
he intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that "[a]ll other public officers and employees may
be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment" in the second sentence of Section 2,
Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more... stringent rule of "removal only by
impeachment" to favored public officers
While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be
consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and substantive
due process; the constitutional guarantee of security... of tenure; the principle of separation of powers;
and the principle of checks and balances.
a. The Office of the President's... finding of gross negligence has... no legal and factual leg to... stand
on... b. No gross neglect of duty or inefficiency
Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the records of the case were already
pending before Ombudsman Gutierrez.
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally,
with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other... persons may be affected. In the case of
public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.[71]
Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the case
forwarded to him within nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP[72] relied on Section 8, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 7 (or the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, series of 1990, as amended) in ruling that Gonzales
should have acted on Mendoza's Motion for Reconsideration within five days:
Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds Whenever allowable, a motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the
decision or order by the party on the basis of any of... the following grounds:
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the Hearing Officer shall
resolve the same within five (5) days from the date of submission for resolution. [emphasis and
underscore ours]
Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to Gonzales since
he is a Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not simply a Hearing Officer
tasked with the initial resolution of the motion.
c. No actionable failure to supervise subordinates
The facts do not show that Gonzales' subordinates had in any way been grossly negligent in their work.
While GIPO Garcia reviewed the case and drafted the order for more than three months, it is noteworthy
that he had not drafted the initial decision and, therefore, had to... review the case for the first time.[77]
Even the Ombudsman herself could not be faulted for acting on a case within four months, given the
amount of cases that her office handles.
The point is that these are not inordinately long periods for the work involved: examination of the records,
research on the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and exercise of legal judgment and discretion.
d. No undue interest... he fact that Gonzales had Mendoza's case endorsed to his office lies within his
mandate, even if it were based merely on the request of the alleged victim's father. The Constitution
empowers the Ombudsman and her Deputies to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or... manner
against any public official or employee of the government.[78] This provision is echoed by Section 13 of
RA No. 6770,[79] and by Section 3, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1990, as
amended.[80]
Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not resolve the complaint only on the basis of the unverified
affidavit of Kalaw.
we cannot deduce undue interest simply because Gonzales' decision differs from the decision of the
PNP-IAS (which dismissed the complaint against Mendoza).
Basic strictures of fair play dictate that we can only be held liable for our own misdeeds; we can be made
to account only... for lapses in our responsibilities. It is notable that of all the officers, it was Gonzales
who took the least time nine days followed by Cecilio, who took 21 days; Garcia the writer of the draft
took less than four months, and the Ombudsman, less than four months... until the kidnapping incident
rendered Mendoza's motion moot.
D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue
Thus, by constitutional design, the Special
Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the
Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in
the Executive Department.
Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition of the
Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of that Office militates against a
differential treatment between the Ombudsman's Deputies, on one... hand, and the Special Prosecutor
himself, on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies
but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the Ombudsman herself in
the performance of... her duties.
Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special Prosecutor to be at par
with the Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned, and
must also enjoy the same grant of independence under the
Constitution.
n the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,[108] the Court resolved to reverse its September
4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section
8(2) of RA
No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy
Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
However, by another vote of 8-7,[109] the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be
constitutionally within the
Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III
unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to... conduct an administrative
investigation, if warranted, into the possible administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio
Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
Principles:
Lorenzo Tañada vs Mariano
Cuenco
October 30, 2011

103 Phil. 1051 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Political Question Defined – Members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the
Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s
Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was
contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to
choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the
following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the
minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to
come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court.
So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a
member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco
et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because
it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the
Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts
but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The
term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers
to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada
to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the
elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a
separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members)
must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already
appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority
party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting)
concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such
rules comply with the Constitution.