CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP.

, vs DSWD
G.R. No. 166494

Facts:

Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines.

Public respondents, on the other hand, include the (DSWD), the (DOH), the (DOF), (DOJ), and the (DILG)
which have been specifically tasked to monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate the
implementing rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the
licenses of erring drugstore establishments.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003.” Section 4(a) of RA 9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for the
Senior Citizens.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act based on the
following grounds:
 The law is confiscatory because it infringes Art. III, Sec. 9 of the Constitution which provides that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation;
 It violates the equal protection clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) enshrined in our Constitution which states that
“no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied of the equal protection of the laws;” and
 The 20% discount on medicines violates the constitutional guarantee in Article XIII, Section 11 that
makes “essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost.”

Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property. The
law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional

Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power
of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-
building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State
considers them an integral part of our society. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that
business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount
as a tax deduction.

Accordingly, it has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs.” It is the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.”

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield
to general welfare.
 Romualdez vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008

FACTS:

COMELEC Law Department filed two separate informations before the RTC Barauen, Leyte against spouses
Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez for knowingly making false or untruthful statement in their
application for voter’s registration relative to their place of residence and non – registration in other areas,
which are violations of Sections 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of RA 8189 or the Voter’s
Registration Act, to wit:

SEC. 10 – Registration of Voters. – xxx The application shall contain the following data: x x x (g) Periods of
residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration; x x x (j) A statement that the application is not a
registered voter of any precinct;

SEC. 45. Election Offense. – The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act: x x x (j)
Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.

Pending the above case, the spouses filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari against COMELEC, on the
ground, among others, of the unconstitutionality of Section 45(j) for being contrary to the fair notice
requirement Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as such penal provision is
vague on its face.

ISSUE:
WON Section 45(j) of RA 8189 is unconstitutional for having uncertain election prohibition.

RULING:

No, the Supreme Court held. Using the void for vagueness doctrine, it the law is said to be facially invalid only
if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

As structured, Section 45 of RA 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j)
clearly specifies that a violation of any of the provisions of RA 8189 is an election offense. The language of
Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no other interpretation and involves no
guesswork.
 Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Vs. Associated Development Corp.
G.r. No. 117263, January 27, 1995
( No Case Digest ;( )

Art. 10 (Civil Code of the Philippines)

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail.
 Alonzo Vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.r. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987

Petition: Petition for review by way of certiorari: Appeal from a decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court
Petitioner: CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO
Respondent: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA
Ponencia: Cruz, J.

DOCTRINE: Statutory Construction: Legislative Intent: The spirit, rather than the letter of a
statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent.
For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and
that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently,
a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the
letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within
the intent of the lawmakers.

FACTS:
1. 5 Brothers and Sisters inherited qual pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the
name of their deceased parents.
2. One of them, through an absolute deed of sale, transferred to petitioners, his undivided
share of the land. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”.
3. Petitioners occupied the two fifths of the land representing the portions sold to them and
thereafter enclosed it with a fence.
4. The son of the petitioners, Eduaro Alonzo and his wife, then built a semi-concrete house
with the consent of the petitioners.
5. One of the heirs to the land sought to redeem the portions that were sold but was
subsequently denied due to him being an American citizen.
6. Another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed
by her brother.
7. The trial court also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had lapsed,
not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was
no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied
the requirement of the law.
8. IAC, in reversing the trial court, the respondent court declared that the notice required by
the said article was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute.
ISSUES:
1. WoN actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Article 1088 of the Civil Code.
PROVISIONS:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any
or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

RULING + RATIO:
1. Yes.
a. While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret
the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read
into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it
the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to
"the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.
b. Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written,
would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice
although it was not in writing. would there be any question that the 30-day period for
redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977? In the face of
the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they
were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By
requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious
truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the
law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the
redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers
and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963
and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
c. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and
ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the
complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.

DISPOSITION
1. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
 ARMANDO BARCELLANO VS DOLORES BANAS
Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation
PONENTE: PEREZ

FACTS:
Respondent Dolores Banās, an heir of Bartolome Banās owned a lot in Bacacay, Albay.
Adjoining the said lot is a property owned by Vicente Medina. In 1997, Medina offered his lot
for sale to the owners of the adjoining lots. The property was eventually sold to Armando
Barcellano. The heirs of Banās contested the sale, and conveyed their intention to redeem the
property. However, according to Medina, the deed of sale has been executed. There was also
mention that the Banās heirs failed to give the amount required by medina for them to redeem
the lot. Action to redeem the property was filed before the RTC. It denied the petition on the
ground that the Banās heirs failed to exercise their right to redemption within the period provided
in article 1623 of NCC. On appeal, such ruling was reversed.
ISSUE:
W/N the RTC decision to deny the Banās heirs of their right of legal redemption is valid

HELD:
The court denied the petition, and affirmed the appellate court decision granting the Banās heirs
the right to redeem the subject property. The decision was based on the provisions of article 1623
NCC. A written notice must be issued by the prospective vendor. Nothing in the record and
pleadings submitted by the parties showed that there was a written notice sent to the respondents.
Without a written notice, the period of 30 days within which the right of legal redemption may
be exercised does not exist.
In this case, the law was clear. A written notice by the vendor is mandatory.

CIR vs ESSO Standard Eastern (G.R. No. L-28502-03. April 18, 1989)

Ponente: NARVASA

FACTS:
Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax by P221,033.00. It was granted a tax credit by the
Commissioner accordingly on 1964. However, ESSOs payment of its income tax for 1960 was
found to be short by P367,994.00. The Commissioner (of Internal Revenue) wrote to ESSO
demanding payment of the deficiency tax, together with interest thereon for the period from 1961
to 1964. ESSO paid under protest the amount alleged to be due, including the interest as
reckoned by the Commissioner. It protested the computation of interest, contending it was more
than that properly due. It claimed that it should not have been required to pay interest on the total
amount of the deficiency tax, P367,994.00, but only on the amount of P146,961.00—
representing the difference between said deficiency, P367,994.00, and ESSOs earlier
overpayment of P221,033.00 (for which it had been granted a tax credit). ESSO thus asked for a
refund. The Internal Revenue Commissioner denied the claim for refund. ESSO appealed to the
Court of Tax Appeals which ordered payment to ESSO of its refund-claim representing overpaid
interest.

The Commissioner argued the tax credit of P221,033.00 was approved only on year 1964, it
could not be availed of in reduction of ESSOs earlier tax deficiency for the year 1960; as of that
year, 1960, there was as yet no tax credit to speak of, which would reduce the deficiency tax
liability for 1960. In support of his position, the Commissioner invokes the provisions of Section
51 of the Tax Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the interest on delinquency should be applied on the full tax deficiency of
P367,994.00 despite the existence of overpayment in the amount of P221,033.00.

HELD:

NO. Petition was denied. Decision of CTA was affirmed.

RATIO:
The fact is that, as respondent Court of Tax Appeals has stressed, as early as 1960, the
Government already had in its hands the sum of P221,033.00 representing excess payment.
Having been paid and received by mistake, as petitioner Commissioner subsequently
acknowledged, that sum unquestionably belonged to ESSO, and the Government had the
obligation to return it to ESSO That acknowledgment of the erroneous payment came some four
(4) years afterwards in nowise negates or detracts from its actuality. The obligation to return
money mistakenly paid arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time that
the payee admits the obligation to reimburse.The obligation to return money mistakenly paid
arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the
obligation to reimburse. The obligation of the payee to reimburse an amount paid to him results
from the mistake, not from the payee’s confession of the mistake or recognition of the obligation
to reimburse.
A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Statutes
should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so
as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.
 LLUZ v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 172840; June 7, 2007

FACTS:

Private respondent was a candidate for the post of punong barangay of Barangay 2, Poblacion,
Catubig, Samar in the 15 July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections. In his certificate of candidacy, private respondent misrepresented himself as a certified
public accountant (CPA) as his profession or occupation. Private respondent won in the
elections.

Thus, he was charged for an election offense before the COMELEC. In his Answer, private
respondent argued that he could not be held liable for an election offense because his alleged
misrepresentation of profession was not material to his eligibility as a candidate.

ISSUE:

Is an alleged misrepresentation of profession or occupation on a certificate of candidacy

punishable as an election offense under Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of B.P. 881?

HELD:

No elective office, not even the office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines,
requires a certain profession or occupation as a qualification. For local elective offices including
that of punong barangay, Republic Act No. 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government Code of
1991 prescribes only qualifications pertaining to citizenship, registration as a voter, residence,
and language. Section 39 of R.A. 7160 states: x x x x Profession or occupation not being a
qualification for elective office, misrepresentation of such does not constitute a material
misrepresentation. Certainly, in a situation where a candidate misrepresents his or her profession
or occupation in the certificate of candidacy, the candidate may not be disqualified from running
for office under Section 78 as his or her certificate of candidacy cannot be denied due course or
canceled on such ground.
 Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The
recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no
recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one
year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

ISSUE:
W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD:
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be
considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to
subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par.
(b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the
phrase “regular local election” to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for
there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the
Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should
be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.

City of Davao vs. RTC

G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005

o tax exemption rules governing GSIS and exceptions

o the plenary powers of Congress cannot be limited by passage of un-repealable laws

FACTS:

GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public bidding
of its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum total of
Php 295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline extension
given by Davao City.

On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of land
it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that same year, GSIS filed a
petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City
RTC.

During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local Government
Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also withdrawn from the
GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax.

RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC
W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC

HELD:

Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing powers of
LGUs cannot extend to the levy of “taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs.”

However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or
juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said section, are withdrawn upon
effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been
withdrawn.

Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting exemption,
Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the amendatory second
paragraph.

Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact
future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the plenary power
of the legislature to amend or repeal laws.

Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal
laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting
the powers of Congress.

Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of sec.
33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through
legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two
conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt status
of GSIS.

Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that “any tax exemption,
incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code shall be construed
strictly against the person claiming it.”

The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored by the GSIS
Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-1994 were assessed
against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the City of
Davao.

De Guia Vs. Guingona, Et al.

(G.r. No. 119525, April 18, 1995)
( No case Digest ;( )