1.

SALVADOR LAUREL VS DESIERTO

CHERRY D.BEPITEL

FACTS: President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128,

"reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial
Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the Committee as the "National Centennial
Commission." Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-
President Salvador H. Laurel. He was subsequently appointed as the
Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one of the nine (9) incorporators. On August
5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the
Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. A
controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to
some entities and the petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner was indicted for
alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman, which was denied. He further filed a motion for
reconsideration which was also denied, hence this petition for certiorari.

The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that
he is not a public officer since ExpoCorp is a private corporation.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is a public officer

Yes, A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by
law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of
the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer (Mechem).

The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an

employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office
involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; – that some
portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or
judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit.
Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public
officer.

Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be
described as legislative or judicial. We hold that the NCC performs executive
functions. The executive power “is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance.” The executive function,
therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.

The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a
public officer. The NCC is an office performing executive functions since one
of its mandate is to implement national policies. The fact that the NCC was
characterized by EO 128 as an 'ad-hoc body' does not make it less of a public
office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not receive any compensation
during his tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an incidence and
forms no part of the office.

2. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)

OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S.
ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL

vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance,

HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as
Commissioner of Bureau of Customs

FACTS: Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and

enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC
officials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries"

ISSUE: W/N the implementation of RA 9335 violates the doctrine that public
office is a public trust.
RULING: NO. Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn
BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries"
is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.

Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be
rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives
for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the
concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces
dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of
deserving government personnel.

In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which
awards to officers of the customs as well as other parties an amount not
exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws
against smuggling.

In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled
to a reward when, as a consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax
and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335
establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will
be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of
the irregular performance of official duties. One of these precautionary
measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law:

SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the

BIR and the BOC. – The officials, examiners, and employees of
the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of
negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or
fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of
their duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by
any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of such
violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or
failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.

3. Figueroa v. People, August 9, 2006

FACTS: On March 24, 1992, in the RTC of Davao City, the city prosecutor of
Davao, at the instance of one Aproniano Rivera, filed an Information 2 for libel
under Article 355 in relation to Article 360 of the RPC against the petitioners. It
was alleged that Tony VN. Figueroa, writer under the column entitled
"Footprints" of the People's Daily Forum, and Rogelio J. Flaviano, Publisher-
Editor of the same magazine, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty,
integrity, character as well as the reputation and the social standing of one
Aproniano Rivera and with intent to cast dishonor, discredit and contempt
upon said Rivera published in the People's Daily Forum, a news publication
containing some of following remarks:
“Some leeches, like a certain Aproniano "Rey" Rivera, our sources say, are
lording it over like the city's sprawling vegetable and meat complex has
become an apportioned bailiwick. xxx
"This man, the sources add, is backed by powerful city government hooligans
who, it was reported, have direct hand in the planned manipulation in the
distribution of stalls to privileged applicants. Even if he has reportedly sold his
interest in the public market, which should be reason enough for him to resign
from his position, Rivera still carries the false aura of intimidating poor
vendors and imposing his insensible remarks”
Xxx
"Rivera, however, must be consoled in knowing he's not alone with his dirty
antics. Romy Miclat, a president of a meat vendors group in Bankerohan, and
his board member, Erning Garcia, have tacitly followed the way of the thugs,
floating little fibs to gullible victims.
It is contended by the petitioners that Rivera is a public officer. On this
premise, they invoke in their favor the application of one of the exceptions to
the legal presumption of the malicious nature of every defamatory imputation,
as provided for under paragraph (2), Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions.
RTC found petitioners guilty. CA affirmed RTC’s ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER, HENCE
THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE WITHIN
THE PURVIEW OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.
RULING: YES. The operation of a public market is not a governmental
function but merely an activity undertaken by the city in its private proprietary
capacity.·Rivera cannot be considered a public officer. Being a member of the
market committee did not vest upon him any sovereign function of the
government, be it legislative, executive or judicial. As reasoned out by the CA,
the operation of a public market is not a governmental function but merely an
activity undertaken by the city in its private proprietary capacity. Furthermore,
Rivera’s membership in the market committee was in representation of the
association of market vendors, a non-governmental organization belonging to
the private sector.A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit
of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. The most important
characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is
that the creation and conferring of an office involve a delegation to the
individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the
country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, to be exercised for
the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the
individual is not a public officer.

4. Javier v. Sandiganbayan, September 11, 2009

FACTS: Javier was the private sector representative in the National Book
Development Board (NBDB), which was created by R.A. 8047, otherwise
known as the “Book Publishing Industry Development Act.” R.A. No. 8047
provided for the creation of the NBDB, which was placed under the
administration and supervision of the Office of the President. The NBDB is
composed of eleven (11) members who are appointed by the President, five
(5) of whom come from the government, while the remaining six (6) are
chosen from the nominees of organizations of private book publishers,
printers, writers, book industry related activities, students and the private
education sector.

Petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board for a term of one year.
During that time, she was also the President of the Book Suppliers
Association of the Philippines (BSAP). She was on a holdover capacity in the
following year. On September 14, 1998, she was again appointed to the same
position and for the same period of one year. Part of her functions as a
member of the Governing Board is to attend book fairs to establish linkages
with international book publishing bodies. On September 29, 1997, she was
issued by the Office of the President a travel authority to attend the Madrid
International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-12, 1997. Based on her itinerary
of travel, she was paid P139,199.00 as her travelling expenses. Unfortunately,
petitioner was not able to attend the scheduled international book fair.

ISSUE: Whether or not Javier is a public officer.

RULING: YES, Javier is a public officer.

Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a

member of the NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, so that the purpose of the government is
achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing
industry as it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the
fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other
branches or agencies of the government does not take her position outside
the meaning of a public office.

The Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to

the Anti Graft Law, which provides that a “public officer” includes elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even
nominal, from the government. Thus, pursuant to the Anti Graft Law, one is a
public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office. Petitioner
was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the NDBD.

Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code defines a “public officer” as any person
who, by direct provision of the law, popular election or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in
the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government
or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or classes.

5. Ombudsman v. Regalado, February 7, 2018

FACTS: Regalado was a public employee, holding the position Immigration

Officer I with the Bureau of Immigration(BOI). In October 2006, Carmelita F.
Doromal, the owner and administrator of St. Martha's Day Care Center and
Tutorial Center, Inc. (St. Martha's), went to the BOI-Davao to inquire about its
letter requiring her school to obtain an accreditation to admit foreign students.
There, she met Regalado, who told her that she needed to pay P50,000.00 as
"processing fee". Doromal commented that the amount was prohibitive.
Regalado responded that she could reduce the amount. In January 2007, St.
Martha's Assistant Headmaster, Diaz submitted to the BOI the necessary
papers for the school's accreditation. On April 2007, Regalado called Doromal
asking if the school was "ready." Doromal responded by saying that the school
was ready for inspection, but not to pay P50,000.00. Regalado persuaded
Doromal to pay P50,000.00 directly to her by claiming that the cost of the
inspection could soar as high as P100,000.00 if it were to be done instead by
officers coming from the BOI Manila Office, as Doromal would still have to
spend for the inspectors' plane fares, billeting at the Marco Polo Hotel, and a
special dinner on top of the P50,000.00 "honorarium." She explained,
however, that if Doromal were to tender the P50,000.00, only P10,000.00
would be covered by a receipt. Doromal later sent Regalado a text message,
saying that she could not pay P50,000.00. Regalado replied that it if she were
to decline paying P50,000.00, she would have to go through the entire
accreditation process all over again. Doromal replied that she did not mind re-
applying. On May 21, 2007, Regalado came to inspect St. Martha's. When
Regalado had finished, she reminded Doromal that she would also have to
pay "honorarium." Regalado further instructed Doromal to come to her office
on May 23, 2007 with the cash enclosed in an unmarked brown envelope and
to say that it contained "additional documents," if anyone were to inquire
about its contents. Doromal could not personally come to Regalado's office on
May 23, 2007 as she had to leave for the United States, so Diaz went in
Doromal's stead with Mae Tautho (Tautho), a teacher at St. Martha's. Diaz
carried with her an unmarked brown envelope containing the white envelope
with P1,500.00 inside as "honorarium." Upon finding that the contents were
only P1,500.00. Regalado replied that it should be at least P30,000.00. Diaz
asked what the P30,000.00 was for. Regalado retorted, "It will go to my boss
along with your accreditation papers and endorsement letter . . . Ganyan ang
system dito pag magprocess, actually na lower na nga ang amount because
the inspectors are not from Manila, you will not book them at the Marco Polo
Hotel, you will no longer entertain them, it's cheaper." Diaz asked, "Is this
under the table ma'am?" Regalado brazenly replied, "Yes, my dear, that's the
system ng government." Diaz lamented, "So sad to know that." Regalado
scoffed, "Ganito ang system, ano aka magmamalinis?" Diaz and Tautho
underscored that the transaction was illegal and asked what would happen if
someone were to pry around. Regalado assured them, "I'll be backing you up,
walang gugulo sa inyo."

On May 29, 2007, Doromal, Diaz, and Tautho filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao a Complaint against Regalado.Thus, an
administrative case was filed for Grave Misconduct. In her defense, Regalado
denied ever extorting money from Doromal, Diaz, and Tautho, claiming they
were merely in league with "people who ha[d] a grudge against her."She
admitted asking for P50,000.00 but cited that per Office Memorandum Order
No. RBR 00-57, this was the amount properly due from a school accredited to
admit foreign students.

Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao found Regalado guilty and meted her
the penalty of dismissal from the service, along with the accessory penalties
of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals January 7, 2013 original Decision sustained the
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. However, acting on
Regalado's Motion for Reconsideration, the Court of Appeals issued its
Amended Decision which maintained Regalado's liability but noted that it had
failed to consider the affidavits executed by representatives of other schools
previously assisted by Regalado, expressing their satisfaction with her
service. It added that "this is the very first time that [Regalado] was found to
be administratively liable. On account of the mitigating circumstances it noted,
the Court of Appeals modified Regalado's penalty to only one (1)-year
suspension without pay. Thus this appeal by ombudsman seeking to reinstate
their original decision.

ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in meting upon respondent
Maria Rowena Regalado the reduced penalty of one (1)-year suspension
without pay, in view of the mitigating circumstances it appreciated

RULING: YES. Ombudsman’s original decision is reinstated. In Medina v.

Commission on Audit,this Court emphasized that "a grave offense cannot be
mitigated by the fact that the accused is a first-time offender or by the length
of service of the accused." The fact that an offender was caught for the first
time does not, in any way, abate the gravity of what he or she actually
committed. Grave misconduct is not a question of frequency, but, as its own
name suggests, of gravity or weight. One who commits grave misconduct is
one who, by the mere fact of that misconduct, has proven himself or herself
unworthy of the continuing confidence of the public. By his or her very
commission of that grave offense, the offender forfeits any right to hold public
office. The matter is not a question of whether or not, as respondent mentions
in her Comment to the present Petition, she actually received or profited from
the solicitation of any amount from the complainants. Section 7(d) of RA No.
6713 penalizes both solicitation and acceptance.Most telling of respondent's
audacity and depravity is how she did not mince words in not only professing
her own corruption, but even besmirching the entire government. Asked by
Diaz if she was making demands "under the table," respondent
answered, "Yes, my dear, that's the system ng government." She even
added, "Ganito ang system, ano ako magmamalinis?" Far from demonstrating
considerations that should mitigate respondent's liability, her litany of
transgressions could conceivably be appreciated as even aggravating. Her
case makes it seem like someone breathed life to a caricature of a corrupt
bureaucrat.

OATH

MENDOZA, vs. BARANGAY CAPTAIN MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR.

Digested by: Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts:

On May 27, 1997, respondent took his oath and thereafter assumed office as
the duly proclaimed and elected barangay captain of Barangay Batasan Hills,
Quezon City, in the 1997 Barangay Elections. Meanwhile, Roque Fermo, his
rival candidate, filed an election protest with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City which court a qou granted decision in favour of Fermo.

Respondent filed a notice of appeal with the COMELEC while Fermo filed a
motion for execution pending appeal. An order was issued by the trial court
granting the motion for execution pending appeal. Hence, respondent vacated
the position and relinquished the same to Fermo.

Respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC, which issued a writ of

execution directing Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Batasan Hills. Fermo was served a copy of the writ of execution
but refused to acknowledge receipt thereof.

Respondent appointed Godofredo L. Ramos as Barangay Secretary and he

appointed Rodel G. Liquido as Barangay Treasurer.

Appointees of Roque Fermo to the same position along with other barangay
council members questioned the validity of the appointments made by
respondent as the later did not take oath anew.

Issue: Whether or not the appointments are valid despite respondent having
not taken oath anew.

Ruling of the court:

Taking anew of his oath of office as Barangay Captain was not a

condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office and to the
exercise of the functions thereof
An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a
prerequisite to the full investiture with the office. It is only when the public
officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the
position becomes plenary and complete. However, once proclaimed and duly
sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to exercise the
functions thereof. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to
enjoin him from assuming office or from discharging his functions. Unless his
election is annulled by a final and executory decision, or a valid execution of
an order unseating him pending appeal is issued, he has the lawful right to
assume and perform the duties of the office to which he has been elected.

OATH

Joson vs Ombudsman, et al

Digested by: Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts:
Petitioner questions the validity of appointment made by private respondent
Governor Umali of Nueva Ecija. Governor Umali entered a consultancy
contract with Ferdinand Abesamis who was a former senior prosecutor and
was later dismissed from service. Petitioner contends that Governor Umali
violated RA 3019 and Article 244 of the RPC in doing such appointment since
Abesamis is perpetually disqualified to hold public office by reason of his
dismissal from service.

Issue: Whether or not there is a valid appointment and whether or not

consultancy service a public office?

Ruling:

A contract for consultancy services is not covered by Civil Service Law, rules
and regulations because the said position is not found in the index of position
titles approved by DBM.

The Court notes that Ferdinand did not take an oath of office prior to his
rendition of consultancy services for the Provincial Government of Nueva
Ecija. All public officers and employees from the highest to the lowest rank are
required to take an oath of office which marks their assumption to duty. It is
well-settled that on oath of office is a qualifying requirement for public office, a
prerequisite to the full investiture of the office. Ferdinand was not required to
take an oath of office because he rendered consultancy services for the
provincial government not by virtue of an appointment or election to a specific
public office or position but by a contractual engagement. In fine, those who
have rendered services with the government, without occupying a public office
or without having been elected or appointed as a public officer evidenced by a
written appointment and recorded with the Civil Service Commission, did so
outside the concept of government service.
Power of Congress to prescribe qualifications/disqualifications

Pimentel, et al vs Ermita

Digested by: Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts:

Petitioners are members of the Commission on Appointments. They contend

that President Arroyo’s manner of appointments violate their rights as
members of the CA. The President, on August 15-23, 2004 while congress
has not yet organized the commission, made several appointments to
Department Secretaries positions but to only serve as acting secretaries.
Then a day after congress adjourned, President Arroyo appointed them as ad
interim Department Secretaries. The petitioners question the constitutionality
of President Arroyo’s appointments as acting secretaries without the consent
of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session.

Issue: Whether or not such appointments violate the power of congress to

consent to the nomination of the President.

Ruling:

President Arroyo’s issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in

session impairs no power of Congress.

Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing

qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President
the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature

may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those
instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on
the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature.
The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint
is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office.
Three-term limit; term of office of elective local officials

Albania vs COMELEC and EDGARDO A. TALLADO

Digested by: Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts:

Petitioner is a voter contending that private respondent violated the three term
limit rule after he successively hold office as Governor of Camarines Norte on
March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010, the end of the 2007-2010 term and again in
the 2010 and 2013. On October 2015, private respondent again filed a COC
for the same position. Petitioner further contends, that private respondent is
disqualified for having been suspended from office as a result of an
administrative case.

The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for being filed out of
time. It ruled that a violation of the three-term limit rule and suspension from
office as a result of an administrative case are not grounds for disqualification
of a candidate under the law; that the alleged violation of three-term limit rule
is a ground for ineligibility which constituted false material representation
under Section 78 of the OEC; and such petition must be filed within 25 days
from the time of filing of the COC, which petitioner failed to do.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a violation of the three-term period.

Ruling:

There was no violation of the three-term limit rule when he ran again in the
2016 elections.

While respondent ran as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections,

he did not win as such. It was only after he filed a petition for correction of
manifest error that he was proclaimed as the duly-elected Governor. He
assumed the post and served the unexpired term of his opponent from March
22, 2010 until June 30, 2010. Consequently, he did not hold the office for the
full term of three years to which he was supposedly entitled to. Thus, such
period of time that respondent served as Governor did not constitute a
complete and full service of his term. The period when he was out of office
involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his service as Governor. As he had
not fully served the 2007-2010 term, and had not been elected for three
consecutive terms as Governor, there was no violation of the three-term limit
rule when he ran again in the 2016 elections.
Three-term limit; term of office of elective local officials

Abundo vs COMELEC and EDGARDO A. TALLADO

Digested by: Sandra Mae Bonrustro

Facts:

Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes for four
(4) successive regular elections - in 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and
local elections. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was
proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor.
In the 2004 election, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially
proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed
the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004
mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office
starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or
for a period of one year and one month.
He again won again in 2010 as Mayor. But by the opposition of the other
party and a subsequent quo warranto petition against him, he was declared
ineligible to serve.

Issues:

Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms.

Ruling:

The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three

successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-
2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably
disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings,
was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is
found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR.,, et al vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009

APRIL JOY F. BORERES

FACTS:
Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) ,respondent, was elected councilor
of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004,
and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-
2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90
days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. The Court however
subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he
resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.

In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position. Thereafter, his disqualification was sought by Simon B. Aldovino, Jr.,
Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (petitioners) herein on the ground
that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, and his
candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the prevention suspension interrupts the three-term
limitation rule of COMELEC?

RULING:
 NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt
their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and
the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay

officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.

Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision. As

worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and
limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive
terms.

“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective

interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a
reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that
preventive suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the
voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the
three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an
easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon
after a preventive suspension has been imposed.

CONCLUSION:
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth
term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of
Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted
by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of
Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking
Asilo’s disqualification
URBANO M. MORENO vs. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006

April Joy F. Boreres

FACTS:

Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Urbano M. Moreno

(petitioner) from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter
was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two
(2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of
Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.

The Comelec en banc granted her petition and disqualified Moreno.

Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action
because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of
Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that
under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final
discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for
any fine imposed.

However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec. 40(a) of the Local

Government Code which provides that those sentenced by final judgment for
an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are
disqualified from running for any elective local position. Since Moreno was
released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall
commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation
to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect
his disqualification from running for an elective local office.

On his petition, petitioner argues that the disqualification under the

Local Government Code applies only to those who have served their
sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the
adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an
exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law which
applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified,
his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied
pardon of his previous misconduct.

ISSUE:
 A. Whether or not Moreno is disqualified from running for a local elective
office within two (2) years from his discharge from probation after having been
convicted by final judgment for an offense punishable by Four (4) Months and
One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months?

B. Does Moreno’s probation grant him the right to run in public office?

HELD:

Issue A: No.

The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of

the phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence found in Sec. 40(a) of
the Local Government Code, which reads:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified

from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense

involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]

...

The crime of which Moreno was convicted by final judgment, involves

moral turpitude falling under the first part of the above-quoted provision.

In Dela Torre v. Comelec, the phrase within two (2) years after serving
sentence should have been interpreted and understood to apply both to those
who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude and to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. The placing of
the comma (,) in the provision means that the phrase modifies both parts of
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.

The phrase service of sentence, understood in its general and common

sense, means the confinement of a convicted person in a penal facility for the
period adjudged by the court. This seemingly clear and unambiguous
provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Courts attention
because the Comelec, in the assailed resolutions, is alleged to have
broadened the coverage of the law to include even those who did not serve a
day of their sentence because they were granted probation.

The period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated

with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law
specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the
sentence. During the period of probation, [12] the probationer does not serve
the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply
with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.

Issue B: Yes

Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the
probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as
a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed
as to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno was
finally discharged upon the court's finding that he has fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil
rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him,
including the right to run for public office.

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the

Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite
of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running
for a local elective office.

Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local

Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which
sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the
Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is
a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and
not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the
special provisions of such earlier statute.

Conclusion:

In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that

broadens the scope of the disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec
committed an egregious error which we here correct. We rule that Moreno
was not disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao,
Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections.

Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at

the time of his conviction of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. He claims to
have obtained a fresh mandate from the people of Barangay Cabugao,
Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 elections.

Petition is GRANTED.

Mercado v. Manzano
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999

April Joy F. Boreres

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for
Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of
votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition
for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US
citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for

said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the

disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have
renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and
registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on

August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the
Philippines.

RULING:
 The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40
(d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.

Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a

person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an
individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time

forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and
thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point
of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath

that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The
determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the
provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an
exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent

sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate
of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution
of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does
so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of
this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship
and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the

Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and
taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough
sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.

CONCLUSION:

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

RODRIGUEZ versus COMELEC

G.R. No. 120099. July 24, 1996

APRIL JOY F. BORERES

FACTS:

In May 1992, petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez and respondent

Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. ran for Governor of Quezon Province. Rodriguez
won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez challenged
Rodriguez’ victory via a Quo Warranto on the ground that there is a charge
pending against him at the Los Angeles Municipal Court
for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft, attempted grand theft of personal
property. Thus, he is a fugitive from justice which is ground for his
disqualification/inegibility under Secton 40 (e) of the Local Government Code
(RA 7160).

The following persons are disqualified from running for any local
elective position…

(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or

abroad.

COMELEC then promulgated a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No.

92-28 (quo warranto case filed by Marquez in 1992 elections) and SPA No.
95-089 (present disqualification case), where it found Rodriguez a fugitive
from justice in line with the MARQUEZ Decision’s (1995) definition of "fugitive
from justice.” With Rodriguez’s walk-out during the hearing of the case,
COMELEC considered him as having waived his right to disprove the
authenticity of Marquez' documentary evidence.

Nevertheless, Rodriguez emerged as the victorious candidate in the

May 8, 1995 election for the position of governor. However, COMELEC also
made a report entitled "EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S
EVALUATION" wherein the COMELEC, after calibrating the parties' evidence,
declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main
opinion of the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-degree turnaround
from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution.

COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the

MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez'
case because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the
Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was instituted in
the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).

ISSUE:

Whether or Not Rodriguez, at the time of filing his certificate of

candidacy, is said to be a fugitive from justice as provided for in section 40 of
the Local Government Code which is ground for disqualification?

HELD:

No. A fugitive from justice is defined as “not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to
avoid prosecution.” This indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling
factor that makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and there can only
be intent to evade prosecution or punishment when the fleeing person knows
of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore
be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a
charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be applied in
the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985,
five months before the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court
on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same
foreign court. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about
such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there
was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to
speak of yet at such time.

Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be
denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post. (G.R. No. 120099. July 24,
1996)
CONCLUSION:

To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the

disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local
position under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be
understood according to the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision, to
wit:

"A 'fugitive from justice' includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution."

Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by

proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has
already been filed, at the time of flight. Not being a "fugitive from justice"
under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province
gubernatorial post.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby

GRANTED.

SOBEJANA-CONDON VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012

APRIL JOY F. BORERES

FACTS:
The petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon, is a natural-born Filipino
citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December
13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage
to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine

citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." The application was approved and the petitioner
took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5,
2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration
and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order
dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizen.
 The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the
2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the
May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained
the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate.
She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P.
Pagaduan and Luis M. Bautista, (private respondents) all registered voters of
Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the
petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC.
The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from
holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she
failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as
imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since
September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that
the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in
Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her
act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian
citizenship.

The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon

disqualified and ineligible to hold office of vice mayor of Caba La union and
nullified her proclamation as the winning candidate. After that the decision
was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was dismissed the second
division and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian

citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was
only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as
the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking
elective office does not apply to her.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due
to failure to renounce her Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2)
of R.A 9225?

HELD:

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino

citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this

Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
 The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s
Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant
therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5.

Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualification for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective

public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra,
Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the
exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must
be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.

The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian

citizenship was invalid due to it was not oath before any public officer
authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon void.

CONCLUSION:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is

hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the
Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE).

GR NO. 191644 FEBRUARY 19, 2013

DENNIS FUNA vs ACTING SEC ALBERTO AGRA

On March 1, 2010, President Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting

Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Devanadera. Then
on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor
General in a concurrent capacity.

Funa, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer,

challenged the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or
designations.

The Supreme Court found the designation of Agra as Secretary of

Justice and concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General did not
come within the definition of an ex officio capacity and that incompatibility
between the offices exists, thus, declared the designation unconstitutional and
void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
 In its decision, the Supreme Court elucidated the de facto officer
doctrine vis-a-vis the Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality of Agra’s
concurrent appointment.

Held :

In view of the application of the stricter prohibition under Section 13,

Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, Agra did not validly hold the position of
Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his holding of the position of
Acting Solicitor General. Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de
jure officer for the entire period of his tenure as the Acting Secretary of
Justice. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally
appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired. 49

That notwithstanding, Agra was a de facto officer during his tenure as

Acting Secretary of Justice. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, the
Court said:

During their tenure in the questioned positions,

respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such
entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been
held that "in cases where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto
officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and
has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to
the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action
recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to
the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable
grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by
the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all
liability to pay any one for such services. Any per diem,
allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by
virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions
may therefore be retained by them.

A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of
an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is
meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal,
so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the
de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in
so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.

In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of
Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later
designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the
officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is
necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with
persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. Agra's official
actions covered by this clarification extend to but are not limited to the
promulgation of resolutions on petitions for review filed in the Department of
Justice, and the issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars
relative to the prosecution of criminal cases.

G.R. No. 203372 June 16, 2015

ATTY.VELICARIA-GARAFIL, vs.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Arroyo
issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several
government offices.

The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution reads:

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up

to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

For purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date
for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the
ban on midnight appointments.

The paper evidencing Atty. Velicaria-Garafil's appointment as State

Solicitor II at the OSG was dated 5 March 2010. There was a transmittal letter
dated 8 March 2010 of the appointment paper from the Office of the President
(OP), but this transmittal letter was received by the Malacañang Records
Office (MRO) only on 13 May 2010. There was no indication as to the OSG's
date of receipt of the appointment paper. On 19 March 2010, the OSG's
Human Resources Department called up Atty. Velicaria-Garafil to schedule
her oath-taking. Atty. Velicaria-Garafil took her oath of office as State Solicitor
II on 22 March 2010 and assumed her position on 6 April 2010.

On 30 June 2010, President Benigno Aquino III took his oath of office
as President. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Arroyo which
violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.

On 5 August 2010, Cadiz assumed office as Solicitor General. On 6

August 2010, Sol. Gen. Cadiz instructed a Senior Assistant Solicitor General
to inform the officers and employees affected by EO 2 that they were
terminated from service effective the next day.

Atty. Velicaria-Garafil and other appointees affected by EO 2, filed a

petition for certiorari praying for the nullification of EO 2, and for her
reinstatement as State Solicitor II without loss of seniority, rights and
privileges, and with full backwages from the time that her salary was withheld.

HELD :

The petitions have no merit. All of petitioners' appointments are

midnight appointments and are void for violation of Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. EO 2 is constitutional.

Facts in all these cases show that "none of the petitioners have shown
that their appointment papers (and transmittal letters) have been issued (and
released) before the ban." The dates of receipt by the MRO, which in these
cases are the only reliable evidence of actual transmittal of the appointment
papers by President Macapagal-Arroyo, are dates clearly falling during the
appointment ban. Thus, all the appointments in these cases are midnight
appointments in violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment to a government post

is a process that takes several steps to complete. Any valid appointment,
including one made under the exception provided in Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the President signing an appointee's
appointment paper to a vacant office, the official transmittal of the
appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the appointment
paper by the appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee
evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or her assumption to office.

The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid

(which should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment:

(1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;

(2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal;

(3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and

(4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by

the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.

The concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless

of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the
appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should always
concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the
process lacks even one step.
 Excluding the act of acceptance from the appointment process leads
us to the very evil which we seek to avoid (i.e., antedating of appointments).
Excluding the act of acceptance will only provide more occasions to honor the
Constitutional provision in the breach. The inclusion of acceptance by the
appointee as an integral part of the entire appointment process prevents the
abuse of the Presidential power to appoint. It is relatively easy to antedate
appointment papers and make it appear that they were issued prior to the
appointment ban, but it is more difficult to simulate the entire appointment
process up until acceptance by the appointee.

Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a

valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment
papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other
hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the
appointment ban.

G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987

ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO vs. SALVADOR MISON

In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers,

lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of
Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from
performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the
Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's
salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its
not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The
respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent
Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.

HELD :

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the

Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
 alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments,
agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.

It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution,

just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to
time, are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,

other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose

appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to

appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress

may by law vest in the President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by
nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, the President appoints.
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of
contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments?
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two
(2) major changes proposed and approved by the Commission. These were
(1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the
requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the
exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence of the section
from the same requirement. It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the
second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of

Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. As a matter of fact, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of
bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand,
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments
that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within

her constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador
Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus
entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive
all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA vs.SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA

On 27 August 1987, President Cory Aquino designated Mary

Concepcion Bautista as Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights.
Realizing perhaps the need for a permanent chairman and members of the
Commission on Human Rights, befitting an independent office, as mandated
by the Constitution, President Aquino on 17 December 1988 extended to
petitioner Bautista a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission.

On 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista received a letter from the

Secretary of the Commission on Appointments requesting her to submit to the
Commission certain information and documents as required by its rules in
connection with the confirmation of her appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights.

On 13 January 1989, petitioner Bautista wrote to the Chairman of the

Commission on Appointments stating, for the reasons therein given, why she
considered the Commission on Appointments as having no jurisdiction to
review her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights.

The Commission on Appointments disapproved petitioner Bautista's

"ad interim appointment' as Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights
in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Appointments.

President Aquino has named replacement for Presidential Commission

on Human Rights Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista whose appointment
was rejected anew by the Congressional commission on appointments.

On 20 January 1989, or even before the respondent Commission on

Appointments had acted on her "ad interim appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights" Bautista filed with a petition for certiorari with
a prayer for the immediate issuance of a restraining order, to declare "as
unlawful and unconstitutional and without any legal force and effect any action
of the Commission on Appointments as well as of the Committee on Justice,
Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights, on the lawfully extended
appointment of the petitioner as Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights, on the ground that they have no lawful and constitutional authority to
confirm and to review her appointment."

HELD :

This Court, drawing extensively from the proceedings of the 1986

Constitutional Commission and the country's experience under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, held that only those appointments expressly mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII are to be reviewed by the Commission
on Appointments, namely, "the heads of the executive department,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution." All other appointments by
the President are to be made without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments.

Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is

not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of
the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it follows that the
appointment by the President of the Chairman of the (CHR), is to be made
without the review or participation of the Commission on Appointments.

When Her Excellency, the President converted petitioner Bautista's

designation as Acting Chairman to a permanent appointment as Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights on 17 December 1988, significantly she
advised Bautista (in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of such
appointment, she could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties
of the office (of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights). All that
remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the appointment.
Obviously, she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of office before
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan and
assuming immediately thereafter the functions and duties of the Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights. Bautista's appointment therefore on 17
December 1988 as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights was a
completed act on the part of the President.

G.R. No. 91636 April 23, 1992

PETER JOHN D. CALDERON vs. BARTOLOME CARALE

 This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of
the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to
the respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as
amended by said RA 6715.

Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has

in its favor the presumption of validity. RA 6715 is not, according to petitioner,
an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in
Section 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed
by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section
16 of Article VII of the Constitution. Petitioner claims that
the Mison and Bautista rulings are not decisive of the issue in this case for in
the case at bar, the President issued permanent appointments to the
respondents without submitting them to the CA for confirmation despite
passage of a law (RA 6715) which requires the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of such appointments.

HELD :

The only issue to be resolved by the Court in the present case is

whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government
officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

To resolve the issue, we go back to Mison where the Court stated:

. . . there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer
from time to time, are:

First, the heads of the executive departments,

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government

whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;

Third, those whom the president may be

authorized by law to appoint;
 Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments
the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone. 7

Mison also opined:

In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there

were two (2) major changes proposed and approved by the
Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments
of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of
appointments made under the second sentence of the section
from the same requirement. . . .

The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of
the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
and those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.

Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the

second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more
specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e.
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably,
the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments
requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that
RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor
Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:

1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and

2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the
President.

Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining

their constitutionality is a judicial function. The Court respects the laudable
intention of the legislature. Regretfully, however, the constitutional infirmity of
Sec. 13 of RA 6715 amending Art. 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it
requires confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over appointments
of the Chairman and Member of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond redemption if we are to render fealty to the
mandate of the Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof.

Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it

requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of
appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal force
and effect.

26. JESUS ARMANDO A.R. TARROSA, petitioner,

vs.

GABRIEL C. SINGSON and HON. SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ III,

respondents

Bernadette C Esmael
Facts:
The petitioner was questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel
Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The petition seeks to enjoin
respondent Singson from the performance of his functions as such official
until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments and
respondent Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management,
from disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of
respondent Singson.

Issue: Whether or not the Appointment as Governor of the Bangko Sentral

ng Pilipinas requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Ruling:
No.
Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission
on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other
government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section
16 of Article VII of the Constitution.

27. JESUS ARMANDO A.R. TARROSA, petitioner,

vs.

GABRIEL C. SINGSON and HON. SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ III,

respondents

Bernadette C Esmael
Facts:
Petitioners question the constitutionality and legality of the permanent
appointments issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino to the
respondent senior officers of the Philippine National Police who were
promoted to the ranks of Chief Superintendent and Director without their
appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation
under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act 6975
otherwise known as the Local Government Act of 1990.

Issue:
Whether or not the President’s appointments made to officers of Philippine
National Police requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Ruling:
No.
The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under
Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution,

The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed

force which shall undergo military training and service, as may be provided by
law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State.

On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains
that:

The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be
national in scope and civilian in character to be administered and controlled
by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the
police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.

To so distinguish the police force from the armed forces, Congress enacted
Republic Act 6975.
Therefore, PNP officers are not subject to presidential appointments that
needs to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointment.
28. MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J.
CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge,
Finance Services Department of the Commission on Elections, respondents.

Bernadette C Esmael

Facts:
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim,
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman,[3] and Borra[4] and Tuason[5] as
COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on
February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the position
of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of office
and assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The Office of the
President submitted to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the
ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmation.[6]
However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments.

On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of

Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for the same term of
seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008.[7] They took their oaths of office
for a second time. The Office of the President transmitted on June 5, 2001
their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.[8]

Petitioner questions the appointment and the right to remain in office of

Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the
COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.
Issue: Whether or not the appointments of COMELEC Commissioners
(Benipayo, Borra and Tuason) are unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No.
The President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent
appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee
Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac[34] and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in
Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.[35] The ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes
the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take
effect immediately.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC shall be

independent[36], this provision should be harmonized with the Presidents
power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of
the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the
Presidents power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule
on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the
law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution.

29. Pimentel vs Ermita

Bernadette C Esmael

Facts:

The Senate and the House of Representatives (Congress) commenced their

regular session on 26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments,
composed of Senators and Representatives, was constituted on 25 August
2004.
Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments[2] to respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective departments.

A petition for certiorari and prohibition[1] with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments
issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) through
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary Ermita) to Florencio B.
Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M.
Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents)
as acting secretaries of their respective departments.

Issue:

Whether or not the appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without

the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session
is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

No.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in

session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the
acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents
confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary,
the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even
while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent
appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting
appointee will also be the permanent appointee.

The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment.
Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President
may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any
other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive
branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person
not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person
competent.
30. Quirog vs Aumentado

Bernadette C Esmael

Facts:

On May 28, 2001, Bohol Provincial Governor Rene L. Relampagos

permanently appointed[3] Liza M. Quirog as Provincial Government
Department Head[4] of the Office of the Bohol Provincial Agriculture (PGDH-
OPA). The appointment was confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in
Resolution No. 2001-199[5] on June 1, 2001. On even date, Quirog took her
oath of office.

On December 10, 2001, incumbent Bohol Governor Erico B. Aumentado filed

an amended Motion for Reconsideration[16] of the CSC Resolution No.
011812. He insisted that Quirogs appointment was a midnight appointment.
Aumentado added that the selection board which screened Quirogs
qualifications was not validly constituted and that the subject appointment was
made more than six months from the time it was published on July 23, 2000 in
violation of CSC Resolution No. 010114[17] dated January 10, 2001.
Aumentado insisted that Relampagos made 97, not 46, mass appointments
on the eve of his term, 95 of which were invalidated by the CSC Bohol Field
Office and two, including that of Quirog, by the CSCROVII.

Issue:

Whether or not the appointment of Quirog is a midnight appointment.

Ruling:

No.

The appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a midnight appointment.

For it is beyond dispute that Quirog had been discharging and performing the
duties concomitant with the subject position for a year prior to her permanent
appointment thereto. Surely, the fact that she was only permanently appointed
to the position of PGDH-OPA after a year of being the Acting Provincial
Agriculturist more than adequately shows that the filling up of the position
resulted from deliberate action and a careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications. The fact that Quirog had been
the Acting Provincial Agriculturist since June 2000 all the more highlights the
public need for said position to be permanently filled up.

31. De Rama vs CA
Bernadette C Esmael

Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner
Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service
Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14)
municipal employees.
De Rama justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of
the said employees were midnight appointments of the former mayor, Ma.
Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

Issue:
Whether or not the appointments of Municipal Employees by the former
mayor was done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling:
No.
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42896 affirming CSC
Resolutions Nos. 96-2828 and 96-7527 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
The CSC cited Rule V, Sections 9 and 10 of the Omnibus Rules, and
declared that the appointments of the said employees were issued in
accordance with pertinent laws. Thus, the same were effective immediately,
and cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority until
disapproved by the CSC. The CSC also dismissed petitioners allegation that
these were midnight appointments, pointing out that the Constitutional
provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by
an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials.
Thus, the CSC opined, the appointing authority can validly issue
appointments until his term has expired, as long as the appointee meets the
qualification standards for the position.[4]

The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had
already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City,
and for petitioners failure to present evidence that would warrant the
revocation or recall of the said appointments.

Daplas v. Department of Finance, April 17 2017

MARK A. GERONIMO

FACTS
 Petitioner failed to declare some properties in her SALNs for the years
1997 to 2003 despite the legal obligation to do so. Both the Ombudsman and
the CA held that such omission provides substantial basis to hold petitioner
liable for the administrative offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and
violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713, warranting the supreme penalty of
dismissal from service, with all its accessory penalties.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner is liable for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and

violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713?

RULING

No.

Here, the Court finds that there is no substantial evidence of intent to commit
a wrong, or to deceive the authorities, and conceal the other properties in
petitioner's and her husband's names. Petitioner's failure to disclose in her
1997 SALN her business interest in KEI is not a sufficient badge of dishonesty
in the absence of bad faith, or any malicious intent to conceal the truth or to
make false statements. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.

Records reveal that the element of intent to commit a wrong required under
both the administrative offenses of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct are
lacking to warrant petitioner's dismissal from service.

Dishonesty is committed when an individual intentionally makes a false

statement of any material fact, practices or attempts to practice any deception
or fraud in order to secure his examination, registration, appointment, or
promotion. It is understood to imply the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
betray or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity
or integrity in principle; and the lack of fairness and straightforwardness.

On the other hand, misconduct is intentional wrongdoing

or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior.

To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be

connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public
officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
an established rule must be manifest. 41 Without any of these elements, the
transgression of an established rule is properly characterized as simple
misconduct only. Most importantly, without a nexus between the act
complained of and the discharge of duty, the charge of grave misconduct shall
necessarily fail.

Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the
public officer or employee, and would normally amount to
dishonesty.1âwphi1 It should be emphasized, however, that mere non-
declaration of the required data in the SALN does not automatically amount to
such an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or
to make false statements. In addition, a public officer or employee becomes
susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-declaration results in the
accumulated wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income,
and income from other sources, and he/she fails to properly account or
explain these sources of income and acquisitions.44

Office of the ombudsman v. Nacho, January 31, 2011

MARK A. GERONIMO

FACTS

DYHP Balita Action Team (DYHP), in a letter dated November 9, 2001,

reported to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, Primo Miro, a concerned
citizen’s complaint regarding the alleged unexplained wealth of Racho, then
Chief of the Special Investigation Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR, Cebu City. To support the allegation, the complainant attached copies of
bank certifications, all issued in June of 1999, by Metrobank Cebu (Tabunok
Branch),6 BPI Cebu (Mango Branch),7 and PCI Bank (Magallanes Branch).8 In
total, Racho appeared to have an aggregate bank deposit of ₱5,798,801.39.

From the records, it is undisputed that Racho admitted the bank

accounts, but explained that the deposits reflected therein were not entirely
his. Racho proffered that some of the money came from his brothers and
nephew as part of their contribution to the business that they had planned to
put up. He presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), dated January 28,
1993, and Joint Affidavit of his siblings that echoed his explanation.

ISSUE

Whether or not Racho’s non-disclosure of the bank deposits in his SALN

constitutes dishonesty

RULING

Yes.
1. By mandate of law, every public official or government employee is required
to make a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth in order
to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth because the latter
usually results from non-disclosure of such matters. Hence, a public official or
employee who has acquired money or property manifestly disproportionate to
his salary or his other lawful income shall be prima facie presumed to have
illegally acquired it.

2. Section 7 and Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 explain the nature and
importance of accomplishing a true, detailed and sworn SALN, thus:

Sec. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. — Every public officer,

within thirty days after assuming office, and thereafter, on or before
the fifteenth day of April following the close of every calendar year, as
well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his
resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the
office of corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head
Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the
President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming
office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may
file their first statement on or before the fifteenth day of April following
the close of said calendar year.

Sec. 8. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal Due to Unexplained

Wealth. — If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act
Numbered One Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Nine, a public
official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency,
whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of
property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and
to his other lawful income, that fact shall be ground for dismissal or
removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and dependents of
such public official may be taken into consideration, when their
acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown.
Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly excessive expenditures
incurred by the public official, his spouse or any of their dependents
including but not limited to activities in any club or association or any
ostentatious display of wealth including frequent travel abroad of a
non-official character by any public official when such activities entail
expenses evidently out of proportion to legitimate income, shall
likewise be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this
Section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. The
circumstances hereinabove mentioned shall constitute valid ground
for the administrative suspension of the public official concerned for
an indefinite period until the investigation of the unexplained wealth is
completed.
2. Complimentary to the above-mentioned provisions, Section 2 of R.A.
1379 states that "whenever any public officer or employee has
acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed
prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired."

GSIS & Winston F Garcia v. KMG

MARK A GERONIMO

FACTS

KMG, thru its President, Albert Velasco, commenced a suit on November

2, 2004, with the filing of the Petition for Prohibition at the CA on the ground
that its members should not be made to explain why they supported their
union's cause. On June 16, 2005, the CA rendered the herein assailed
decision7 holding that Garcia's "filing of administrative charges against 361 of
[KMG's] members is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion which may be
the proper subject of the writ of prohibition."

Petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural
consequence of the service-disrupting rallies and demonstrations staged
during office hours by the absenting GSIS employees, there being appropriate
issuances outlawing such kinds of mass action. On the other hand, the CA,
agreeing with the respondent's argument, assumed the view and held that the
organized demonstrating employees did nothing more than air their
grievances in the exercise of their "broader rights of free expression" and are,
therefore, not amenable to administrative sanctions.

ISSUE

Whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by GSIS

employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass action

RULING

Yes.

1. Citing Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, SC held that the right of civil servants to
organize themselves was positively recognized in Association of Court of
Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights of
free expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable
limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the
overriding considerations of national security . . . .
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with
the provision "in accordance with law." This is a clear manifestation that the
state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors
such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of
the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed
an earlier CSC circular which "enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions,
all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service" by stating that the Civil
Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in
government service shall be observed.

2. Employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass

leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass action that will lead in the
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of
government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike, adding that public
employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass
actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.

Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez June 16, 2015

Mark A. Geronimo

FACTS

Members and officers of NAMADACWAD have been staging pickets in

front of the DCWD Office during their lunch breaks to air their grievances
about the non-payment of their Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA)
incentives and their opposition to DCWD’s privatization and proposed One
Hundred Million Peso Loan.

On 31 October 2007, GM Gamboa issued an Office Memorandum

addressed to all department managers concerning the different activities that
would take place during DCWD’s then upcoming anniversary celebration. On
8 November 2007, the officers and members of NAMADACWAD held an
Emergency General Assembly and they agreed to wear NAMADACWAD t-
shirts with inscriptions stating, "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza
Pahawa Na!" on the day of the anniversary.

Came the anniversary, officers and members sported t-shirts with

inscriptions "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza Pahawa Na!" at the
beginning of the Fun Run at VictoriaPlaza at around 6:30 in the morning and
continued to wear the same inside the premises of the DCWD office during
the office hours. Also, one of the members of the Board of Directors of
NAMADACWAD Gregorio S. Cagula (Cagula), with the help of some of its
members, attached similar inscriptions and posters of employees’ grievances
to a post in the motor pool area, an area not among the officially designated
places5 for posting of grievances.

As a consequence of their actions, GM Gamboa sent a Memorandum

dated 14 November 2007 addressed to the officers and members of
NAMADACWAD, requiring them to explain the reasons for the attire they wore
during the anniversary celebration. On 2 May 2008, Aranjuez, et al., filed an
appeal before the CSC bringing up, among other issues, the violation of their
constitutional rights to assemble and petition for redress of grievances. 20

In its Comment, DCWD defended the Orders on the basis of Section 6 of CSC
Resolution No. 02131621 which provides that the concerted activity like the
participation of the officers and employees during the fun run wearing t-shirts
with inscriptions was prohibited because it was done during office hours.
Moreover, the act of Cagula in posting papers with grievances outside the
designated areas was a clear violation of MC No. 33 in relation to 8 February
1996 Office Memorandum. On the other hand, and contrary to the assertions
of DCWD, the violations committed by the private respondents are not serious
in nature due to the lack of any abusive, vulgar, defamatory or libelous
language.

ISSUE

Whether or not the mass action staged by Aranjuez et al are prohibited under
law?

RULING

No.

DCWD primarily contends that CSC and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the concerted mass action on 9 November 2007 is not prohibited under
Resolution No. 021316. We disagree. DCWD relies on Resolution No.
021316, which states:

Section 6. Permissible Concerted Mass Action.– A

concerted activity or mass action done outside of
government office hours shall not be deemed a
prohibited concerted activity or mass action within the
contemplation of this omnibus rules provided the
same shall not occasion or result in the disruption of
work or service.38

DCWD argues that since the concerted or mass action was done within
government office hours, such act was not permissible, therefore prohibited.
Otherwise stated, a concerted activity done within the regular government
office hours is automatically a violation of Section 6 of the Resolution.
Notably, however, a prohibited concerted mass action is defined not in Sec. 6
of Resolution No. 021316 but in Sec. 5 thereof. Thus:

Section 5. Definition of Prohibited Concerted

Mass Action. - As used in this Omnibus Rules,
the phrase ‘‘prohibited concerted activity or
mass action’’ shall be understood to refer to
any collective activity undertaken by
government employees, by themselves or
through their employees organizations, with
the intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands of
force concession, economic or otherwise, from
their respective agencies or the government. It
shall include mass leaves, walkouts, pickets
and acts of similar nature.39(Emphasis ours).

The operative phrases are "any collective activity" and "work stoppage or
service disruption." Without the intent at work stoppage or service disruption,
the concerted activity is not prohibited. The time and place of the activity are
not determinative of the prohibition. Whether done within government hours, a
concerted activity is allowed if it is without any intent at work stoppage.

GSIS v. Villaviza July 10, 2008

MARK A. GERONIMO

FACTS

That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some
employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the
office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and
support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having
surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises.

On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded
decisions finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting
out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties
appurtenant thereto.

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents

guilty of the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and
Regulations and reduced the penalty to reprimand.
ISSUE

Whether or not respondents actions on May 27, 2005 amounted to a

prohibited concerted activity or mass action.

RULING

No.

As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves

to regulate the political rights of those in the government service, the
concerted activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the intent
of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands of force concession. Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a
public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets,
clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia,
are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service
disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force
concession.

Pertinently, the said provision states:

Section 5. As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase

prohibited concerted activity or mass action shall be understood
to refer to any collective activity undertaken by government
employees, by themselves or through their employees
organizations, with intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession,
economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies or the
government. It shall include mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and
acts of similar nature. (underscoring supplied)

In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the
GSIS-IU office wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to
a concerted activity or mass action proscribed above. CSC even added that
their actuations can be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to
freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.

Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC

Resolution No. 02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application of such
prohibition. Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of government
employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers
and sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression.

Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any

person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a
violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of
their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the
government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this
basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be
taken away.

Baculi vs Office of the President

MARK JAMILLO
FACTS:On July 16, 1988, the petitioner was appointed as Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO) II of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) -
Cagayan by then President Corazon C. Aquino. In 1991, acting in his capacity
as PARO II, he entered into several contracts with various suppliers for the
lease of typewriters, computers, computer printers, and other accessories.
Separate reports from the DAR Commission on Audit and the DAR Regional
Investigating Committee of Cagayan, however, revealed that the foregoing
transactions were tainted with irregularities. he executed and approved
contracts of lease without the corresponding Certificate of Availability of Funds
as provided in Section 86 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known
as the Auditing Code of the Philippines; and that there was no public bidding
held for the purpose in violation of the Commission on Audit Circular No. 85-
55-A.

a formal charge against the petitioner for gross dishonesty, abuse of authority,
grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Simultaneous to the charge, the petitioner was placed under preventive
suspension for ninety (90) days pending the investigation of the complaint. He
was also required to submit his answer in writing and to state therein whether
or not he elects a formal investigation. his defense that he acted purely for the
benefit of the DAR Provincial Office. In support of his prayer for dismissal of
the complaint, he alleged that the formal charge issued by Secretary Garilao
was null and void because it was based on the report of the DAR Regional
Investigating Committee, a body bereft of authority to investigate
administrative complaints against presidential appointees like him pursuant to
DAR Memorandum Order No. 5, Series of 1990.

Thereafter, acting on the formal charge, the DAR Legal Affairs Office
conducted a formal investigation on November 16, 17, and 18, 1992. On May
17, 1994, then DAR Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Hector D. Soliman
issued an order dismissing the petitioner from the service. Secretary Garilao
affirmed the said order on August 2, 1994.

Civil Service Commission affirmed the dismissal of petitioner. CA reversed the

decision of the CSC. decision promulgated on August 31, 2000

On the strength of the foregoing decision, the petitioner, through a letter dated
January 9, 2001, requested from then DAR Secretary Horacio Morales to
issue an order of reinstatement in his favor. But, as thus appear on record, he
failed to be formally reinstated. Meanwhile, in line with this Court's decision,
succeeding DAR Secretary Hemani A. Braganza forwarded his findings and
his recommendation to dismiss the petitioner from the service, as well as
records of the case, to the Office of the President for proper disposition
through a memorandum dated July 4, 2002.

Armed with the decision of the Court of Appeals [promulgated on August 31,
2000], petitioner demanded from the DAR Secretary that he be reinstated.
According to the petitioner, he was not reinstated.

The DAR Secretary forwarded his findings and recommendations to the Office
of the President on July 4, 2002. On June 26, 2003, the Office of the
President in its Order in OP Case No. 03-11-488, dismissed petitioner from
the service. For reference, the dismissal order of the Office of the President is
being referred to by petitioner as his "SECOND Dismissal".

ISSUE: G.R. No. 188681 is whether or not the order of dismissal issued by
the Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs was valid?

RULING:

Dismissal by Sec. Garilao was void. charges against Baculi for gross
dishonesty, abuse of authority, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service based on the reports issued by the Regional
Investigating Committee of the DAR (DAR-RIC) and the Commission on Audit
(COA) abouthaving violated Presidential Decree No. 1445 (Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines) as well as relevant DAR rules and
regulations. He was immediately placed under preventive suspension for 90
days (i.e., from September 4 to December 3, 1992) as a consequence.

Thus, Baculi, as a presidential appointee, came under the disciplinary

jurisdiction of the President in line with the principle that the "power to remove
is inherent in the power to appoint."13 As such, the DAR Secretary held no
disciplinary jurisdiction over him. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 807 has
expressly specified the procedure for disciplinary actions involving presidential
appointees.

By law, Baculi should have been automatically reinstated at the end of the
90-day period of his preventive suspension because his case was not finally
decided within the said period.

We have to point out that preventive suspension is of two kinds. The first is
the preventive suspension pending investigation, and the second is the
preventive suspension pending appeal where the penalty imposed by the
disciplining authority is either suspension or dismissal but after review the
respondent official or employee is exonerated. The nature of preventive
suspension pending investigation has been explained in the following manner:

x xx Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a

measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges
against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way
influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a
decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and
the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation,
respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be
reinstated.

Preventive suspension pending investigation is not violative of the

Constitution because it is not a penalty. It is authorized by law whenever the
charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, or whenever there are reasons to believe that the
respondent is guilty of charges that would warrant removal from the service. If
the proper disciplinary authority does not finally decide the administrative case
within a period of 90 days from the start of preventive suspension pending
investigation, and the respondent is not a presidential appointee, the
preventive. suspension is lifted and the respondent is "automatically
reinstated in the service." In the case of presidential appointees, the
preventive suspension pending investigation shall be "for a reasonable time
as the circumstances of the case may warrant."

Nonetheless, there shall be no indefinite suspension pending

investigation, whether the respondent officials are presidential or
nonpresidential appointees. The law abhors indefinite preventive suspension
because the indefiniteness violates the constitutional guarantees under the
due process and equal protection clauses, as well as the right of public
officers and employees to security of tenure.

Gonzales vs Office of the President

MARK JAMILLO

Facts:
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The Court, however,
reversed the OP ruling that: (i)... found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of
Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii)
imposed on him the penalty of dismissal.
Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the
disciplinary proceedings against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the
OP to subject her to disciplinary proceedings. The Court affirmed the
continuation of the proceedings against her... after upholding the
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.
In view of the Court's ruling, the OP filed the present motion for
reconsideration through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F.
Garcia and several others, before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and
money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia filed an Urgent Petition for Bail
which the prosecution opposed. The
Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent petition for bail on January 7, 2010, in
view of the strength of the prosecution's evidence against Garcia.
Issues:
Whether or not the office of the President has administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction over the deputy ombudsman.

Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary

jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it
is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over
the Deputy Ombudsman.
On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from
GIPO Garcia on April 27, 2010. On May 6, 2010, he completed his review of
the draft, approved it, and transmitted it to the Office of the Ombudsman for
final approval. Since the draft... order on Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration had to undergo different levels of preparation, review and
approval, the period it took to resolve the motion could not be unjustified,
since he himself acted on the draft order only within nine (9) calendars days
from his receipt of... the order.

Ruling:
On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant
Gonzales' petition and to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional
with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman.
a. The Philippine Ombudsman
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the
Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the
inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a
complaints and action bureau.[36] This constitutional vision of a Philippine
Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to
directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses of the
bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the
vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of
the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed
only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts
of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including
Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure.
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a
very powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch
above other grievance-handling investigative bodies."[39] It has powers, both
constitutional... and statutory, that are commensurate with its daunting task of
enforcing accountability of public officers.[40]... b. "Independence" of
constitutional bodies... vis-a-vis the Ombudsman's independence
Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by
the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics they do not owe
their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution
itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal... autonomy. In general terms, the
framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies be
insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of
"independence" would result in the impairment of their core functions.
the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit
highlighted the... developments in the past Constitutions geared towards
insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure.
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly
cannot be inferior but is similar in degree and kind to the independence
similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions
since all these offices fill the political... interstices of a republican democracy
that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.
c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting... disciplinary authority in the
President... over the Deputy Ombudsman violates... the independence of the
Office of the
Ombudsman and is thus... unconstitutional... we rule that subjecting the
Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own
alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the...
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the
Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all
of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the... constitutionally-granted independence is
what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly
collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to
the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and...
balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her
Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their
duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust
in her subordinate officials who are not as... independent as she is, if only
because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office.
This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young
democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major
problem... for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman)
should be declared void.
he statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical
principle: the Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the
Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them, would result in
an absurd situation wherein the Office of the
Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence
of the very persons who can remove or suspend its members.

Ifurong vs Carpio Morales

MARK JAMILLO

FACTS: Petitioner in this case wanted to declare the positions of the

Ombudsman and its deputy ombudsman vacant.

The consolidated petition filed by Al Vitangcol and Nathaniel Ifurong was filed
that the term of office of Ombudsman Conchita carpio Morales would end in
November 2012 and that she will only serve for the unexpired term of her
predecessor Merciditas Gutierez.
Morales was appointed by Aquino III to a seven-year term on July 25, 2011
following the resignation of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez over
allegations of incompetence and inaction on various cases

According to him, the SC should declare Section 8 (3) of Republic Act 6770 or
the Ombudsman Act of 1989 as unconstitutional for contravening the
legislative intent that in case of vacancy, the new appointee should only serve
the unexpired term of his or her predecessor.

Ifurung pleaded the SC to declare unconstitutional Section 8 (3) of Republic

Act No. 6770, also known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, for being contrary
to Section 11 in relation to Sections 8 and 10, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution.
Besides Morales, Ifurung also sought the ouster of Morales deputies: Melchor
Arthur Carandang (Overall Deputy Ombudsman), Gerard Mosquera (Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon), Paul Elmer Clemente (Deputy Ombudsman for
Visayas), Rodolfo Elman (Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao) and Cyril
Ramos (Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement
Offices).

ISSUE

Whether or not Ombudsman Carpio Morales and its deputy ombudsman are
entitled to a fresh 7 year term?

RULING:

The court dismissed the petition.

The quoted provision of the constitution is clear and explicit; a. the

ombudsman and its deputies shall serve the term of seven years, b, that the
ombudsman and its deputies shall not be reappointed, c, that the ombudsman
and its deputies should not run in any office.

Contrary to the petition of the petitioner, Section 11 article XI is clear and can
stand on its own. Notably the framers plainly provided for a seven year full
term for the ombudsman and its deputies. Nowhere in the constitution can it
be gathered that the appointment to the vacancy of the position of
ombudsman and its deputies shall be only for the unexpired term of its
predecessor. Whether it be for the expired or the unexpired term of the
predecessor, shall always be for a full term of seven years.
JOSON III v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

MARK JAMILLO

FACTS

A Special Audit Team (SAT) of the COA conducted an audit of an award made
by the Province of Nueva Ecija for the construction of the Friendship Hotel to
A.V.T. Construction (A.V.T.). Thereafter, the SAT issued a notice disallowing
the payments made to A.V.T.

SAT held petitioner in his capacity as provincial governor liable for entering
into the contract with A.V.T. and for approving the payment vouchers to the
latter despite the absence of the eligibility documents of A.V.T. The COA held
petitioner liable and alleged that petitioner is presumed to know the infirmity of
the contract.

Did COA gravely abused its discretion in holding petitioner liable for the
disallowance?

Yes. COA gravely abused its discretion when its judgment rendered is not
based on law and evidence. Under, R.A. No. 9184, the presence of the
eligibility documents for pre-qualification are the obligations and duties of the
Bids and Awards Committee (BAC). The absence of such documents are the
direct responsibility of the BAC. Petitioner cannot therefore be held liable for
its absence.

Is petitioner presumed to know the infirmities of the contract?

No. Mere signature does not result to a liability of the official involved without
any showing of irregularity on the document's face. Moreover, petitioner can
invoke the Arias Doctrine where the Court held that all heads of offices have
to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith.

In the present case, there was no other evidence that was presented to show
that petitioner had actual prior knowledge of the ineligibility of A.V.T.
Furthermore, it would be counterproductive to require petitioner to
meticulously examine each document that passes his office considering that
he is the head of the province. Hence, petitioner, in good faith, have to rely on
his subordinates.

ARRIANE JOY Y. INSULAR

Political Review
Class of Atty. JP Leo Asong

SAUNA v EXECUTIVE
Law on Reinstatement and Backwages

FACTS:

 Saunar was a former Regional Director of the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI) and eventually became the Chief of the Anti-Graft Division.
 During his time as chief of the said division, Saunar conducted an official
investigation regarding the alleged corruption relative to the tobacco excise
taxes and involving then Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, former President
Joseph E. Estrada (President Estrada), and former Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
President Estrada's assailed involvement in the tobacco excise tax issue
became one of the predicate crimes included in his indictment for plunder.

 In Special Order No. 40035, Saunar was reassigned as regional director for
Western Mindanao based in Zamboanga City. During his stint as such, he
received a subpoena ad testificandum from the Sandiganbayan requiring him
to testify in the plunder case against President Estrada. After securing
approval from his immediate supervisor Bautista, Saunar appeared before the
Sandiganbayan on several hearing dates.

 NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco (Wycoco) issued Special Order No. 0050337
informing Saunar that he was relieved from his duties as regional director for
Western Mindanao and was ordered to report to the DDROS for further
instructions. Pursuant thereto, he reported to Bautista on the first week of
November 2004. Bautista informed Saunar that an investigation was being
conducted over his testimony before the Sandiganbayan and that he should
just wait for the developments in the investigation. In the meantime, Bautista
did not assign him any duty and told him to be available at any time whenever
he would be needed. He made himself accessible by staying in
establishments near the NBI. In addition, he also attended court hearings
whenever required.8

 Saunar received an order from the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission

(PAGC) requiring him to answer the allegations against him in the PAGC
Formal Charge. The charge was based on a letter from Wycoco
recommending an immediate appropriate action against Saunar for his failure
to report for work since 24 March 2005, without approved leave of absence
for four (4) months.

 On 23 October 2006, Saunar was reassigned as regional director of the Bicol

Regional Office. On 29 January 2007, he received a copy of the OP decision
dismissing him from service which was also affirmed by CA.

ISSUE:

 Illegally dismissed government employees entitled to full back wages and

retirement benefits.

RULING:

 YES. Jurisprudence (Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan) states that an

illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is
entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of her illegal
 dismissal up to her reinstatement. This is only fair and just because an
employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is
considered as not having left her office and should be given the
corresponding compensation at the time of her reinstatement

 However, Saunar reached the compulsory age of retirement from government

service. In view of Saunar’s retirement, reinstatement to his previous position
had become impossible. Thus, the only recourse left is to grant monetary
benefits to which illegally dismissed government employees are entitled.

 We rule that employees in the civil service should be accorded this same
right. It is only by imposing this rule that we will be able to uphold the
constitutional right to security of tenure with full force and effect. Through this,
those who possess the power to dismiss employees in the civil service will be
reminded to be more circumspect in exercising their authority as a breach of
an employee's right to security of tenure will lead to the full application of law
and jurisprudence to ensure that the employee is reinstated and paid
complete backwages.

 As it stands, Saunar should have been entitled to full back wages from the
time he was illegally dismissed until his reinstatement. In view of his
retirement, however, reinstatement is no longer feasible. As such, the back
wages should be computed from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his
compulsory retirement.43 In addition, Saunar is entitled to receive the
retirement benefits he should have received if he were not illegally dismissed.

ARRIANE JOY Y. INSULAR
Political Review
Class of Atty. JP Leo Asong

ARIAS v SANDIGANBAYAN
Liabilities of Public Officer

FACTS:

 Petitioners Arias Arias (District Engineer) and Data (Chief Auditor), were
found guilty by SB for violating sec. 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft Practices Act:

SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts

or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxxxxxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the

Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices
or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions

 Arias and Data were convicted by SB violating the above provision together
with their 3 subordinates & 1 private citizen Gutierrez (seller of land).

 The background of the story dates back in year 1975, when the Bureau of
Public Works planned the “Mangahan Floodway Project” to ease the
perennial floods in some parts of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. This
floodway project will traverse certain portions of Ortigas, where the land sold
by Gutierrez to the Govt (subject matter in this case) was located.

 The implementation of this floodway project was entrusted to the Pasig

Engineering District headed by Data (District Engineer). In this regard, Data
formed a committee headed by Fernando (Supervising Civil Engr) as over-all
in-charge (Fernando did not face trial and remains at-large) and 3 other
subordinates. The subordinates were Mendoza & Hucom, for acquisition and
improvements, and Jose the Instrument man for surveys (Mendoza & Jose
are 2 other convicted co-accused). This committee was tasked to inform
affected lot owners affected by the floodway project and to receive and
process payments.

 Among the lot owners affected was a 19, 004 sq.m. riceland (subject matter in
this case) owned by Agleham, which was previously owned by parents of
Gutierrez (private citizen & convicted co-accused) from whom Agleham
acquired his property. Gutierrez was one of those who filed an application for
payment, holding with her a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed by
Agleham. In her application, she submitted fake and falsified documents i.e.
 Tax Declaration Certificate purporting that the land was residential with fair
market value of P80/sq m.

 These documents were submitted to 2 other convicted co-accused --

examined by Arcaya (Admin. Officer) while Cruz (Senior Engineer) initialed
the documents & prepared a Deed of Sale. Cruz later transmitted them to
District Engineer Data. Data and Gutierrez both later signed the Deed of
Sale. These documents were sent to Director Anolin of Bureau of Public
Works, who recommended approval of the Deed of Sale and later returned to
Data’s office. Hence the sale was registered and a TCT was issued in the
name of the Govt.

 For this sale, a General Voucher was prepared, for the amount of P1.5M plus
with certifications of Data and his 3 subordinates (Fernando ,Cruz, and one
accountant). This general voucher and other supporting documents were
pre-audited and approved for payment by Arias (Chief Auditor), petioner and
convicted co-accused. Arias then later issued 16 PNB checks for total sum of
P1.5M plus for Gutierrez as payment of property in 1978.

 In 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense

on this alleged gross overpricing of Agleham’s property. Several Government
employees denied signing the certification and gave sworn statements. One
of them is Oco, an Assistant Mun. Assessor who provided the genuine Tax
Declaration Certificate, showing among others that the subject property is
actually a riceland (but classified as residential) and overpriced at P80/sq.m.
(instead of appraised value of P5/sq.m.) -- showing that the officials of the
District Engineering Office falsified them. The investigators also found that
the Deed of Sale was approved by Arias for payment of P1.5, who didn’t
question the altered amount (snowflaked and amount superimposed) nor
checked the veracity of the fake documents.

 The case was on trial for 6 years, and SB found 2 petitioners ARIAS & DATA,
their 3 subordinates (CRUZ, JOSE, & ARCAYA) & private citizen GUTIERREZ
guilty of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

 Among the 6 convicted accused, only the 2 petitioners, Arias (District

Engineer) and Data (Chief Auditor) appealed.

ISSUE:

Petitioners ARIAS and DATA are guilty as co-conspirators in the conspiracy to

cause injury to the Government through the irregular disbursement and expenditure
of public funds.

RULING:

 No.Under the Sandiganbayan's decision, a department secretary, bureau

chief, commission chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors would be
equally culpable for every crime arising from disbursements which they have
approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of conspiracy
simply because he was the last of a long line of officials and employees who
acted upon or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised
 on a more knowing, personal, and deliberate participation of each individual
who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.

 The Basic reason of the SC is that: We would be setting a bad precedent if a

head of office plagued by all too common problems-dishonest or negligent
subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain
incompetence is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because
he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every
step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a
transaction before affixing, his signature as the final approving authority.

 There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval

appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.
ARRIANE JOY Y. INSULAR
Political Review
Class of Atty. JP Leo Asong

ALBERT v GANGAN
Liabilities of Public Officer

FACTS:

 An inter-agency committee was formed to conceptualize and prepare the

guidelines and procedures for the Community Mortgage Program (CMP), a
sub-program of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP).

 The COA finding petitioner as among the persons liable for the amount
representing the payment of the loan proceeds obtained by AMAKO. COA
disallowed the plan payment because it found the payment irregular and an
excessive expenditure, and held petitioner primarily liable pursuant to Section
103 of P.D. 1445

 Petitioner is contending that he cannot be held personally liable for the

amount of P36,796,11.55 representing the loan proceeds to AMAKO,
because the questioned COA decisions do not have any findings that he has
knowingly participated in the alleged fraudulent transaction.

 He claims that there is no clear showing that he acted in bad faith, with
malice, or gross negligence when he approved the loan transaction. The
approval of the loan was based on the certification of the duly authorized
officers of the Community Mortgage Program Task Force.

 While the petition is pending , NHMFC filed a petition for extra-judicial

foreclosure of real estate mortgage against AMAKO which was represented
by its president, Mr. Mario J. Mamawan, before the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City

ISSUE:

 COA committed a grave abuse of its discretion when it held petitioner

personally liable for the subject disallowance.

RULING:

 YES.There is no evidence on record to show that petitioner had knowledge of

the fraudulent scheme perpetrated by some employees of the NHMFC. In
fact, petitioner immediately filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against
 the subordinate employees who appeared to be responsible for the fraud. He
also directed the filing of a civil case against the originator and other persons
responsible for misrepresentation. All these acts are indicative that he had no
knowledge of the fraudulent scheme perpetrated by certain officials or
employees of his agency. No less than Lakambini Q. Razon, State Auditor IV
of the Commission on Audit, in her letter dated January 8, 1991 to the
Director of the Corporate Audit Office, wrote that:

"In the said memorandum, we informed Mr. Albert that we had considered his
participation in the AMAKO transaction, but we cannot lift his liability as head
of the Corporation pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, P.D. 1445 and
Section 32 of the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances. This
prompted Mr. Albert to request for reconsideration on the action taken by this
Office on the appeal submitted previously.

"Considering the reasons given and circumstances surrounding the case, we

believe that the President cannot determine the irregularities committed in
this transaction. As a matter of fact, an administrative case was filed by the
President of NHMFC against several officials of the Corporation and other
government agencies to the office of the Ombudsman on October 1, 1990. x x
x"

 The actions taken by petitioner involved the very functions he had to

discharge in the performance of official duties. He cannot, therefore, be held
civilly liable for such acts unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice
or gross negligence.34 Inasmuch as no evidence was presented to show that
petitioner acted in bad faith and with gross negligence in the performance of
his official duty, he is presumed to have acted in the regular performance of
his official duty. Similarly, it is a basic tenet of due process that the decision of
a government agency must state the facts and the law on which the decision
is based. The COA decision merely stated conclusions of law. Facts and
circumstances, as well as the why's, the what's and the how's of the
disallowance, were patently missing, inaccurate or incomplete. The COA
cannot just perform its constitutional function of disallowing expenditures of
government funds at sheer discretion. There has to be factual basis why the
expenditure is alleged to be fraudulent or why was there a misrepresentation.
Liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being
the head of a government agency. The COA even mentioned the anti-graft
law which imputes liability for a grossly disadvantageous contract entered into
by a government functionary. But as to why and how the disbursement of
funds in this case was considered disadvantageous must be duly supported
by findings of facts.

 Consequently, respondent COA committed a grave abuse of its discretion

when it held petitioner personally liable for the subject disallowance.
ARRIANE JOY Y. INSULAR
Political Review
Class of Atty. JP Leo Asong

CRUZ v SANDIGANBAYAN
Liabilities of Public Officer

FACTS:

 Following the May 1992 local elections and his proclamation as mayor-elect
of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, Victor Miranda sought an audit
investigation of the municipalitys 1991-1992 financial transactions. Petitioner
Buencamino Cruz served as municipal mayor of the town in 1991 until his
term ended in the middle of 1992.

 Acting on the request, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued COA Order No.
19-1700 constituting a Special Audit Team. In the course of the investigation,
the Special Audit Team discovered that certain anomalous and irregular
transactions transpired during the covered period, the most serious being the
purchase of construction materials evidenced by Sales Invoices No. 131145
and 131137 in the aggregate amount of P54,542.56, for which payment out of
municipal funds was effected twice.

 The double payments were made in favor of Kelly Lumber and Construction
Supply (Kelly Lumber, for short) and were accomplished through the issuance
of two (2) disbursement vouchers (DVs), i Petitioner signed the vouchers and
encashed the two (2) corresponding PNB checks, both of which were payable
to his order.

 The findings of the Audit Team were embodied in a 336-page SAO Report No.
93-28, on the basis of which petitioner was charged with violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019.

 Petitioner acknowledges signing the DVs which paved the way for the double
payment situation. He also admits encashing the checks corresponding to the
DVs in question. He nonetheless urges the setting aside of the assailed
decision, anchoring his virtual plea for acquittal on four (4) basic issues, to
wit: (1) the fatally flawed Information filed against him; (2) the applicability in
his favor of what he tagged as the Arias Doctrine; (3) the absence of bad faith
on his part; and (4) the refund of the amount representing overpayment.

ISSUE:

 The penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan is inappropriate as Republic Act

3019 which is a special law and does not provide for a penalty of prision
mayor for any of the acts punishable therein.

RULING:
 In the case, refund of the amount subject of the prosecution is not one of
those enumerated under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code which would
totally extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
applies in a suppletory character as provided for under Article 10 of the same
Code.

 As regards the penalty imposed by the respondent court, we find the same to
be proper in point of severity, albeit its employment of the term prision
mayor is inappropriate. It is proper because Section 9 of R.A. 3019 provides:

SECTION 9. Penalties for violations

(a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful
acts or omission enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall
be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and one
month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from
public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government
of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and other lawful income.

 In the same breath, however, the use of the same term is inappropriate
because the penalty of prision mayor is imposable only for felonies
punishable under the Revised Penal Code or when a special law specifically
provides for such penalty for a given crime. As we have said in People vs.
Simon:

With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the
special law are different from and are without reference or relation to
those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory
effect of the rules for the application of penalties under said Code or
by other relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to
said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the
legislative intendment is clear.

The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example,
Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the
duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical
term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for
carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by
the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to
those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore,
cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of
the same formulation. (Italics in the original; Underscoring supplied)
ARRIANE JOY Y. INSULAR
Political Review
Class of Atty. JP Leo Asong

DE JESUS v GUERRERO
Liabilities of Public Officer

FACTS:

 Nilo A. Bareza, Records Officer III of the Philippine Council for Aquatic and
Marine Research and Development (PCAMRD), made out a check payable to
himself and drawn against the Asean-Canada Project Fund, a foreign-
assisted project being implemented by PCAMRD. To avoid being caught,
Bareza stole Land Bank Check No. 070343 from the trust fund of the
PCAMRD from the desk of Arminda S. Atienza, PCAMRD Cashier III.

 He filled out the check for the amount ofP385,000.00, forged the signatures of
the authorized signatories, made it appear that the check was endorsed to
Atienza, and with him as the endorsee, encashed the check that was drawn
against the PCAMRD Trust Fund. Then, he deposited part of the money to
the Asean-Canada Project Fund and pocketed the difference.

 Atienza discovered that the check in question was missing. Not finding the
check anywhere in her office, Atienza called the bank to look for the same.
She was shocked to learn from a bank employee that the check had been
issued payable in her name. When Atienza went to the bank to examine the
check, she noticed that her signature and the signature of Dir. Rafael D.
Guerrero III (Guerrero), PCAMRD Executive Director, were forged. She also
found out that Bareza appeared to be the person who encashed the check.

 Bareza admitted his wrongdoings when he was confronted by Atienza about

the incident, but begged that he be not reported to the management. Bareza
also promised to return the money in a few days. Against her good judgment,
Atienza acquiesced to Barezas request, seeing Barezas remorse over his
transgressions.

 But Atienza also felt uneasy over her decision to keep silent about the whole
thing, so Atienza persuaded Bareza to inform Fortunata B. Aquino (Aquino),
PCAMRD Director of Finance and Administrative Division, about what he did.
Bareza, however, decided to confess to Carolina T. Bosque, PCAMRD
Accountant III, instead.

 When Bareza revealed to Bosque what he had done, he was also advised to
report the matter to Aquino, but, Bareza became hysterical and threatened to
commit suicide if his misdeeds were ever exposed. Due to his fervent
pleading and his promise to repay the amount he took, Bosque, like Atienza,
assented to his plea for her to remain silent.
 True to his word, Bareza deposited back P385,000.00 to the PCAMRD
account .

 Following rumors that an investigation will be conducted concerning

irregularities in the said project, Bareza set fire to the PCAMRD Records
Section in order to clear his tracks.

 A fact-finding committee was thus created by virtue of PCAMRD to investigate

the burning incident and forgery of checks by Bareza. After investigation, the
fact-finding committee found sufficient evidence to charge Bareza with
dishonesty, grave misconduct and falsification of official document.The fact-
finding committee likewise found sufficient evidence to charge Atienza with
inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties and
Bosque with simple neglect of duty.

 Concomitant to the above findings, Guerrero formed an investigation

committee to conduct formal investigations on the charges filed against
Bareza, Atienza and Bosque.The investigation committee found Bareza guilty
of dishonesty and grave misconduct and recommended his dismissal from the
service. It also found sufficient basis to uphold the charge filed against
Atienza and Bosque, and recommended a minimum penalty of six (6) months
and one (1) day suspension for Atienza, and a maximum penalty of six (6)
months suspension for Bosque.

 Not convinced with the results of the investigation and the

penalties imposed on Bareza, Atienza and Bosque, petitioner
exerted efforts to obtain a copy of the complete records of the
proceedings had.Upon reading the same, petitioner was of the
opinion that the investigation conducted by the fact-finding
committee and investigation committee was perfunctorily and
superficially done, and made only to whitewash and cover-up the
real issues because the report exonerated other persons involved
in the crimes and omitted other erroneous acts. According to him,
these circumstances led to partiality in deciding the
charges. Hence, petitioner filed with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon (Ombudsman) a complaint against
Guerrero, Cesario R. Pagdilao (Pagdilao), PCAMRD Deputy
Executive Director, and Aquino, among others, for incompetence
and gross negligence.

 the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the Decision and Order of
the Ombudsman in OMB. The appellate court found that the Ombudsman
correctly dismissed the complaint against the respondents. The appellate
 court held that petitioner questioned the handling of the PCAMRD finances
without specifying the particular acts or omissions constituting the gross
negligence of the respondents.The charges, being broad, sweeping, general
and purely speculative, cannot, by their nature, constitute a prima facie case
against the respondents.

Ombudsman vs Espina

MARK JAMILLO

FACTS:
The charges stemmed from the anomalous repair of several light armored
vehicles (LAV) and fictitious payments for repairs and purchases of police
vehicles.
Aside from Espina, former PNP Chief Avelino Razon was also implicated,
including former and incumbent PNP officials, former comptrollers Geary
Barias, Eliseo dela Paz, among others.
Based on the case filed by the Ombudsman, Razon and the other officials,
including Espina, had allocated Php400 million supposedly for the repair of 28
V-150 LAVs.
In a joint resolution in 2012, the Ombudsman indicted Espina and several
other PNP officers for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Section 65 (b) (4)
of RA 9184, and for Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification under
Article 217 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC.
The Ombudsman also found them guilty of grave misconduct and serious
dishonesty and, accordingly, recommended their dismissal from government
service.
Specifically, the Ombudsman held that Espina executed indispensable acts
which led to the completion of the illegal transactions. It likewise found it
incredulous that the repair and refurbishment works on the LAV s were
completed in only seven days, i.e., from Dec. 20, 2007 to Dec. 27, 2007,
considering the magnitude of the work involved, which included the delivery of
the LAV s for repair, the inspection and acceptance of materials to be used.
But the CA found respondent Espina administratively liable only for simple
misconduct, prompting the Ombudsman to seek redress with the high court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Espina should be held administratively liable?

RULING:
The petition is partly granted. The decision dated February 27, 2014 and the
resolution dated July 15, 2014 of the Court of Appeals are hereby set aside. A
new one is entered finding respondent Rainier A. Espina guilty of gross
neglect of duty. Accordingly, he is dismissed from government service with all
accessory penalties.

Given the amounts involved and the timing of the alleged deliveries, the
circumstances reasonably impose on Espina a higher degree of care and
vigilance in the discharge of his duties. Thus, he should have been prompted
to make further inquiry as to the truth of his subordinates’ reports. Had he
made the proper inquiries, he would have discovered the non-delivery of the
procured items and the non-performance of the procured services, and
prevented the unlawful disbursement. However, he did not do this at all.
Instead, he blindly relied on the report and recommendation of his
subordinates and affixed his signature on the IRFs. Plainly, Espina acted
negligently, unmindful of the high position he occupied and the responsibilities
it carried, and without regard to his accountability for the hundreds of millions
in taxpayers’ money involved.

Verily, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored rule that a
“[p]ublic office is a public trust [and] [p]ublic officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest
lives.”74 This high constitutional standard of conduct is not intended to be
mere rhetoric and taken lightly as those in the public service are enjoined to
fully comply with this standard or run the risk of facing administrative
sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service.75 Erring public officials may also be held personally liable for
disbursements made in violation of law or regulation, as stated in Section
52,76 Chapter 9, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987.77 Thus, public officers, as recipients of public trust, are under obligation
to perform the duties of their offices honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their
ability.78 Unfortunately, Espina failed miserably in this respect.

De Lima vs. Guerrero

The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on

the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison
(NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of their
testimonies.3 These legislative inquiries led to the filing of the following
complaints with the Department of Justice:

a) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00313, entitled "Volunteers against Crime and

Corruption (VACC), represented by Dante Jimenez vs. Senator Leila M. De
Lima, et al.;"

b) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00315, entitled "Reynaldo Esmeralda and Ruel

Lasala vs. Senator Leila De Lima, et al.;"

c) NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00331, entitled "Jaybee Nifio Sebastian, represented

by his wife Roxanne Sebastian, vs. Senator Leila M De Lima, et al.;" and

d) NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00336, entitled "National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI) vs. Senator Leila M. De Lima, et al. "

ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the
jurisdiction over the violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed
Information.

HELD:

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION.

In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to
"exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." This is an
exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule
under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of
statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law and the
latter is to be considered as an exception to the general.105

Parenthetically, it has been advanced that RA 10660 has repealed Section 90

of RA 9165. However, a closer look at the repealing clause of RA 10660 will
show that there is no express repeal of Section 90 of RA 9165 and well-
entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. It is only accepted
upon the clearest proof of inconsistency so repugnant that the two laws
cannot be enforced.106 The presumption against implied repeal is stronger
when of two laws involved one is special and the other general.107 The
mentioned rule in statutory construction that a special law prevails over a
general law applies regardless of the laws' respective dates of passage.
Inocentes vs. People

Inocentes, together with four (4) others, was charged with violating Section
3(e) or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,4 as amended. The informations read:

That on or about October 2001 or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in

Tarlac City, Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Amando A. Inocentes, Celestino
Cabalitasan, Ma. Victoria Leonardo and Jerry Balagtas, all public officers,
being the Branch Manager, Division Chief III, Property Appraiser III, and
Senior General Insurance Specialist, respectively, of the Government Service
Insurance System, Tarlac City Field Office, committing the crime herein
charged in relation to and in taking advantage of their official functions,
conspiring and confederating with Jose De Guzman, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally [gave] undue preference, benefit or
advantage to accused Jose De Guzman by processing and approving the
housing loans of Four Hundred Ninety-One (491) borrowers of [Jose De
Guzman] 's housing project under the GSIS Bahay Ko Program, with a total
amount of loans amounting to Two Hundred Forty-One Million Fifty-Three
Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (Php241,053,600.00), knowing fully well that
the said borrowers/grantees were not qualified and were not under the
territorial jurisdiction of the Tarlac City Field Office, thereby giving said
borrowers/grantees unwarranted benefit and causing damage and prejudice
to the government and to public interest in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

and

[...] processing, approving and granting loans under the GSIS Bahay Ko
Program to Fifty-Three (53) borrowers of [Jose De Guzman]'s land
development project known as Teresa Homes amounting to Fifty-Two Million
and One Hundred Seven Thousand Pesos (Php52,107,000.00), despite the
knowledge of the fact that the lots covered were intended for commercial
purposes and by causing the over-appraisal in the amount of Thirty-Three
Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Pesos and
Thirty-Six Centavos (Php33,242,848.36) of the land and buildings offered as
collaterals, thus causing undue injury to the Government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
On May 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a minute resolution finding
probable cause and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the
accused.7 To avoid incarceration, Inocentes immediately posted hail.

Inocentes contends that the informations filed against him should be quashed
because the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the case. At the
time of the commission of the alleged offense, Inocentes held a position with a
Salary Grade of 26. He likewise claims that he cannot fall under the
enumeration of managers of GOCCs because his position as department
manager cannot be placed in the same category as the president, general
manager, and trustee of the GSIS.

HELD:

On the issue on jurisdiction, it is of no moment that Inocentes does not occupy

a position with a salary grade of 27 since he was the branch manager of the
GSIS' field office in Tarlac City, a government-owned or -controlled
corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense, which position falls
within the coverage of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.

The applicable law provides that violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
-controlled corporations, and state universities shall be within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.18 We have clarified the provision
of law defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by explaining that the
Sandiganbayan maintains its jurisdiction over those officials specifically
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
regardless of their salary grades.19 Simply put, those that are classified as
Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided they hold the positions enumerated by the law.20 In
this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.21chanrobleslaw

Furthermore, as the Sandiganbayan correctly held, even low-level

management positions fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We
settled this point in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan22 and Geduspan v. People23.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the Sandiganbayan was correct in

denying Inocentes' motion to quash; hence, there was no grave abuse in the
exercise of its discretion regarding this matter.
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan

Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as
classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. On March 24, 2009, the Office
of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal
case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No.
6713, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in

Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused DANILO DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being the
Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is under an obligation to accomplish and
submit declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth and
financial and business interests, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and
Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business
interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading
of which he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993
Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT
LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and
prejudice of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner.

Held:

No. The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article

XIII of the 1973 Constitution. By virtue of the powers vested in him by the
Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21,
1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486. The
decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, and P.D. No. 1861.

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as
provided for in Section 4, Article XI thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos.
14 and 14-a, and R.A. 7080, which expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975, R.A.
No. 8249, and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.

For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No.
8249.

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions
enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary
grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The specific
inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to
“officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e),
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and
employees occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary
Grade “27” or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied

the position of Director II with Salary Grade “26” under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the
Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner
from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.

Disini vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

June 30, 2004 The Office of the Ombudsman filed an information against
Herminio Disini for corruption of public officials, Art 212 in rel. to Art 210 (RPC)
and violation of RA 3019 by conspiring together and confederating with former
Pres. Marcos and t aking advantage of close personal relation, intimacy and
free access

Disini challenged the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan stating that the

information did NOT allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to and
in connection with EO 1, 2, 14, 14-01; (2) allegations neither pertained to the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth nor involved sequestration cases; (3) cases filed
by the OMB instead of PCGG; (4) private individual, NOT charged as co-
principal, accomplice, accessory of a public officers, should be in regular
courts.

HELD:

Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the offense

charged because the criminal cases were filed within the purview of SEC.
4(C) of RA 8242 and both complaints were initially filed by the PCGG
pursuant to its mandate.

➤ He is involved in the same transaction, specifically the contacts awarded

through his and Marcos’ intervention in favor of Burns and Rose to do
engineering and architectural design, and Westinghouse to do the
construction of the PNPPP.

➤ Sec. 2, EO 1

The offense have NOT yet prescribed. In resolving the issue of prescription,
the following must be considered:

1) The period of prescription for the offense;

2) The time when the period of prescriptions starts to run; and

3) The time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.

People vs Morales
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the
government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its
capital stock must be owned by the government.

Facts:

The National Centennial Commission (NCC) and the Bases Conversion

Development Authority (BCDA) organized the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98
Corporation or Expocorp whose primary purpose was to operate, administer,
manage and develop the Philippine Centennial International Exposition 1998.
The Philippine Centennial project was marred by numerous allegations of
anomalies, among them, the lack of public biddings. Both the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee and the AHICC recommended to the Office of the
Ombudsman that a more exhaustive investigation of the Philippine Centennial
project be conducted. The investigation resulted in the filing in of an
Information by the Ombudsman’s Fact-Finding and Investigation Bureau
against respondent Luis J. Morales (Morales), the acting president of
Expocorp at the time relevant to the case. In the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan, Morales moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction over his person and over the offense charged.

Issue:

Whether Expocorp was organized and created for the sole purpose of
performing the executive functions of the National Centennial Commission
and the sovereign functions of the government, and should be considered as
a public office

Held:
No. The Court here ruled that Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation is a
private corporation. It was not created by a special law but was incorporated
under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. It is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Although the Bases Conversion Development Authority owned
almost all of the shares of Expocorp at the time of the latter’s incorporation,
the Board of Directors of Expocorp allowed a private corporation to buy its
shares constituting 55.16% of its outstanding capital stock two months after
incorporation. With the BCDA as a minority stockholder, Expocorp cannot be
characterized as a government-owned or controlled corporation. A
government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the
government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its
capital stock must be owned by the government. Since Expocorp is not a
GOCC, its officers and employees are private individuals who are outside the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

MADOCELLE LEGUIP

FACTS:

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the

University of the Philippines-Cebu and was appointed as a student regent by
the then Pres. Estrada.

During her term, petitioner discussed with the President the renovation of
the Vinzon’s Hall and was given a budget of P 15,000,000.00. However, the
renovation failed to materialize. The succeeding student regents consequently
filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office
of the Ombudsman. The OMB found probable cause to indict petitioner and
her brother, Jade Ian D. Serana, and filed an estafa case in the
Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the

Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or
over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent; that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime estafa; and that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she
was not a public officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner as a student regent.

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is

placed there by express provision of law.

In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a

public office:

"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual
is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
The individual so invested is a public officer."

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan

with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As
the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those
of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential

element of public office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An

investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a
public officer.

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV

of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by
providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts,
and giving professional and technical training. Moreover, UP is maintained by
the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created
for profit.

ALEXIS C. CANONIZADO, EDGAR DULA TORRES, and ROGELIO A.

PUREZA
vs.
HON. ALEXANDER P. AGUIRRE, as Executive Secretary, HON. EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, as Secretary of Budget and Management, JOSE PERCIVAL
L. ADIONG, ROMEO L. CAIRME and VIRGINIA U. CRISTOBAL

G. R. No. 133132 January 25, 2000

MADOCELLE LEGUIP

FACTS:
Petitioners were appointed Commissioners of the NAPOLCOM, created
under RA 6975 entitled "An Act Establishing The Philippine National Police
Under A Reorganized Department Of The Interior And Local Government, And
For Other Purposes."

They assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8551 (RA 8551),
otherwise known as the "Philippine National Police Reform and
Reorganization Act of 1998," by virtue of which petitioners herein, were
separated from office.

Section 8 of the said act provides that, “Upon the effectivity of this Act, the
terms of office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired which shall
constitute a bar to their reappointment or an extension of their terms in the
Commission except for current Commissioners who have served less than
two (2) years of their terms of office who may be appointed by the President
for a maximum term of two (2) years.”

Petitioners argue that their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA

8551 violates their security of tenure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition of
their office by Congress.

RULING:

Yes.

Petitioners herein are members of the civil service, which embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
As such, they cannot be removed or suspended from office, except for cause
provided by law. The phrase "except for cause provided by law" refers to
"reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient
warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the
appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient."

The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative

function. It is acknowledged that Congress may abolish any office it creates
without impairing the officers right to continue in the position held and that
such power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack of funds
or in the interest of economy. However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it
must be made in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to
circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees.

An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office

wholly and permanently, as the word "abolished" denotes. Where one office is
abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the
abolition is a legal nullity.

RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners positions. In order to

determine whether there has been an implied abolition, it becomes necessary
to examine the changes introduced by the new law in the nature, composition
and functions of the NAPOLCOM.’

No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by

Congress, RA 8551, insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent
Commissioners, petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in their removal
from office, removes civil service employees from office without legal cause
and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES, AND

JOCELYN P. CELESTINO
vs.
MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and as
Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, and
RONALDO ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary

G. R. No. 138965 June 30, 2006

MADOCELLE LEGUIP

FACTS:

Respondent Elma was appointed and took his oath of office as Chairman
of the PCGG. Thereafter, on 11 January 1999, during his tenure as PCGG
Chairman, respondent Elma was appointed CPLC. He took his oath of office
as CPLC the following day, but he waived any remuneration that he may
receive as CPLC.
 Petitioners contends that respondent Elma’s concurrent appointments as
PCGG Chairman and CPLC contravenes Section 13, Article VII and Section
7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners also maintained that
respondent Elma was holding incompatible offices.

Respondents claim that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987

Constitution that should be applied in their case. This provision, according to
the respondents, would allow a public officer to hold multiple positions if (1)
the law allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and (2) the
primary functions of either position allows such concurrent appointment.
Respondents also alleged that since there exists a close relation between the
two positions and there is no incompatibility between them, the primary
functions of either position would allow respondent Elmas concurrent
appointments to both positions. Respondents further add that the appointment
of the CPLC among incumbent public officials is an accepted practice.

ISSUE:
Whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls
under the prohibition against multiple offices imposed by Section 13, Article
VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.

RATIONALE:

The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits
an appointive official to hold more than one office only if allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position. In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this
Court ruled that, [t]here is no legal objection to a government official
occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as
long as there is no incompatibility. The crucial test in determining whether
incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People v. Green -
whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has
the right to interfere with the other.

Incompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the

functions of the two; x x x Where one office is not subordinate to the
other, nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent
and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law
declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other.
The force of the word, in its application to this matter is, that from the
nature and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not to
be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism
which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and
impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the
other. x x x The offices must subordinate, one [over] the other, and they
must, per se, have the right to interfere, one with the other, before they
are incompatible at common law. x x x

RULING:
 Yes.

In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG

Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent
and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive
departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of
executive departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential
appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive
Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the
review of the CPLC.

While Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution applies in general to

all elective and appointive officials, Section 13, Article VII, thereof applies in
particular to Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. It
is clear that said provision is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the
CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant
secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.

It must be emphasized, however, that despite the non-applicability of

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to respondent Elma, he
remains covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, Article IX-B and
his appointments must still comply with the standard of compatibility of officers
laid down therein; failing which, his appointments are hereby pronounced in
violation of the Constitution.

DENNIS A. B. FUNA
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Office of the President,
SEC. LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, in his official capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications, USEC. MARIA
ELENA H. BAUTISTA, in her official capacities as Undersecretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications and as Officer-in-
Charge of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA)

G.R. No. 184740 February 11, 2010

MADOCELLE LEGUIP

FACTS:

On October 4, 2006, PGMA appointed respondent, Maria Elena H.

Bautista, as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC). She was designated as Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171
dated October 23, 2006.

On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA

Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-
Charge, Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary.

Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and

lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies
and assistants to hold any other office or employment.

On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was

appointed Administrator of the MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. and she
assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.

Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC

Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. He further contends that even if Bautista’s appointment
or designation as OIC of MARINA was intended to be merely temporary, still,
such designation must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition.
Petitioner likewise asserts the incompatibility between the posts of DOTC
Undersecretary and MARINA Administrator. The reason is that with respect to
the affairs in the maritime industry, the recommendations of the MARINA may
be the subject of counter or opposing recommendations from the
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. In this case, the DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport and the OIC of MARINA have become
one (1) and the same person.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of the respondent falls under the
prohibition against multiple offices imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.

RULING:

Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to

impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices
or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this
prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of
Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended
to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the
constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive
and unequivocal negation.

Respondent’s failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such

OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her
office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.

The court further ruled that respondents’ submission that her designation
as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to
her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It
appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a
member of the Maritime Industry Board.

BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 177131

Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Promulgated:

Respondent.
June 7, 2011

CJ RABARA
FACTS:

This case arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99-011on August
19, 1999 (‘the COA Resolution”), with the subject “Defining the Commissions
policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scout of the Philippines.” In its
whereas clauses, the COA Resolution stated that the BSP was created as a
public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scout of
the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court
ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a “government-
controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX (B)(2)(1) of the
constitution”, and that “the BSP is appropriately regarded as a government
instrumentality under the 1987 administrative code.” The COA Resolution also
cited its constitutional mandate under Section 2(1), Article IX (D).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (“BSP”) fall under the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

RULING:

The BSP contends that it is not a government-owned or controlled

corporation; neither is it an instrumentality, agency, or subdivision of the
government. The Supreme Court, however, held that not all corporations,
which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be
considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of
corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as “public
corporations.” These corporations are treated by law as agencies or
instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of
ownership or control and economic viability but to a different criteria relating to
their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and
their administrative relationship to the government or any of its departments or
offices. As presently constituted, the BSP is a public corporation created by
law for a public purpose, attached to the Department of Education Culture and
Sports pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a
private corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the
government and be economically viable to justify its existence under a special
law. The economic viability test would only apply if the corporation is
engaged in some economic activity or business function for the government,
which is not the case for BSP. Therefore, being a public corporation, the
funds of the BSP fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Boy
Scouts of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 177131. June 7,
2011.

[GR No. 159110, Dec 10, 2013]

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI v. CITY OF CEBU

FACTS:

On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu

enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to
immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions
defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City).

On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban, Sr.) and his son Atty.
Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban, Jr.) brought suit in the RTC
in Cebu City against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia,
its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding
Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osmeña, and the chairman and operatives or officers
of the City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM), seeking the declaration
of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due
process and for being contrary to law, and damages. Their complaint alleged
that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying
parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and
documents from his office; hat upon his return after less than 10 minutes, he
had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp, and a notice being
posted on the car to the effect that it would be a criminal offense to break the
clamp; that he had been infuriated by the immobilization of his car because he
had been thereby rendered unable to meet an important client on that day;
that his car was impounded for three days, and was informed at the office of
the CITOM that he had first to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of
Cebu City for the release of his car; that the fine was imposed without any
court hearing and without due process of law, for he was not even told why his
car had been immobilized; that he had undergone a similar incident of
clamping of his car on the early morning of November 20, 1997 while his car
was parked properly in a parking lot in front of the San Nicolas Pasil Market in
Cebu City without violating any traffic regulation or causing any obstruction;
that he was compelled to pay P1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the
clamping and P1,000.00 for the violation) without any court hearing and final
judgment; that on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded
place where there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was
immobilized by CITOM operative Lito Gilbuena; and that he was compelled to
pay the total sum of P1,400.00 for the release of his car without a court
hearing and a final judgment rendered by a court of justice.

On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the
City of Cebu, T.C. Sayson, Ricardo Hapitan and John Does to demand the
delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu
City, and damages. He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had
left his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk and the street outside the gate
of his house to make way for the vehicle of the anay exterminator who had
asked to be allowed to unload his materials and equipment from the front of
the residence inasmuch as his daughter's car had been parked in the carport,
with the assurance that the unloading would not take too long; that while
waiting for the anay exterminator to finish unloading, the phone in his office
inside the house had rung, impelling him to go into the house to answer the
call; that after a short while, his son-in-law informed him that unknown
persons had clamped the front wheel of his car; that he rushed outside and
found a traffic citation stating that his car had been clamped by CITOM
representatives with a warning that the unauthorized removal of the clamp
would subject the remover to criminal charges; and that in the late afternoon a
group headed by Ricardo Hapitan towed the car even if it was not obstructing
the flow of traffic.

The cases were consolidated before Branch 58 of the RTC, which, after trial,
rendered on January 22, 1999 its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as
null and void. On June 16, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,
overturning the RTC and declaring Ordinance No. 1664 valid, to wit:

The principal thrust of this appeal is the constitutionality of Ordinance 1664.

Defendants-appellants contend that the passage of Ordinance 1664 is in
accordance with the police powers exercised by the City of Cebu through the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and granted by RA 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code. A thematic analysis of the law on municipal
corporations confirms this view. As in previous legislation, the Local
Government Code delegates police powers to the local governments in two
ways. Firstly, it enumerates the subjects on which the Sangguniang
Panlungsod may exercise these powers. Upon the denial of their respective
motions for reconsideration on August 4, 2003, the Jabans and Legaspi came
to the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals were
consolidated.

ISSUE:
Based on the submissions of the parties, the following issues are decisive of
the challenge, to wit:

1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit of the
legislative powers of the City of Cebu; and
2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the requirements for
validity and constitutionality, particularly the limitations set by the
Constitution and the relevant statutes.

RULING:

The petitions for review have no merit.

Tests for a valid ordinance

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court restates the tests of a valid ordinance
thusly:

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
[19]

As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether
the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and
whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law),
and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the
ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well
as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with
public policy).

Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the formal requirements

Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within the corporate powers of the
LGU of the City of Cebu?
The answer is in the affirmative. Indeed, with no issues being hereby raised
against the formalities attendant to the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664, we
presume its full compliance with the test in that regard. Congress enacted the
LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the
State's great powers, namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain,
and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific
parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in the exercise of
these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully functioning
subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations.

In particular, police power is regarded as "the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers, extending as it does 'to all the great public needs.'" It
is unquestionably "the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to
make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subject of the same."According to Cooley: "[The
police power] embraces the whole system of internal regulation by which the
state seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offences
against itself, but also to establish for the intercourse of citizens with citizens,
those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to
prevent the conflict of rights and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment
of his own, so far as it is reasonably consistent with the right enjoyment of
rights by others."

Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664with the substantive requirements

The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the adherence to the
constitutional guaranty of due process of law. The guaranty is embedded in
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which ordains:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.

The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any

arbitrariness on the part of the Government, whether committed by the
Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a protection essential to every
inhabitant of the country, for, as a commentator on Constitutional Law has
vividly written:

x x x. If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty, or

property, he is denied the protection of due process. If the enjoyment of his
rights is conditioned on an unreasonable requirement, due process is likewise
violated. Whatsoever be the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself
or merely a statute, its unjustified withholding would also be a violation of due
process. Any government act that militates against the ordinary norms of
justice or fair play is considered an infraction of the great guaranty of due
process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation merely of the
procedure prescribed by the law or affects the very validity of the law itself.

Finally, Legaspi's position, that the final decision of the RTC rendered in the
Astillero case declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional bound the City of
Cebu, thereby precluding these consolidated appeals from being decided
differently, is utterly untenable. For one, Legaspi undeservedly extends too
much importance to an irrelevant decision of the RTC irrelevant, because the
connection between that case to these cases was not at all shown. For
another, he ignores that it should be the RTC that had improperly acted for so
deciding the Astillero case despite the appeals in these cases being already
pending in the CA. Being the same court in the three cases, the RTC should
have anticipated that in the regular course of proceedings, the outcome of the
appeal in these cases then pending before the CA would ultimately be
elevated to and determined by no less than the Court itself. Such anticipation
should have made it refrain from declaring Ordinance No. 1664
unconstitutional, for a lower court like itself, appreciating its position in the
"interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation,"
should have exercised a "becoming modesty" on the issue of the
constitutionality of the same ordinance that the Constitution required the
majority vote of the Members of the Court sitting en banc to determine.[34]
Such "becoming modesty" also forewarned that any declaration of
unconstitutionality by an inferior court was binding only on the parties, but that
a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court would be a precedent binding
on all.[35]

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitions for review on certiorari for
their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 16, 2003 by
the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 213953

ENGR. OSCAR A. MARMETO, Petitioner

 vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent

FACTS:

On January 21, 2013, Marmeto filed in behalf of the Muntinlupa People

Power4 (MPP) a proposed ordinance with the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Muntinlupa.5 The proposal sought the creation of a sectoral council and the
appropriation of the amount of ₱200 million for the livelihood programs and
projects that would benefit the people of Muntinlupa City.

For failure of the Sanggunian Panlungsod to act on the proposition

within 30 days from its filing, Marmeto filed a petition for initiative with the
same body to invoke the power of initiative under the Republic Act (RA) No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). On
July 31, 2013, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 13-0904 setting aside
Marmeto' s initiative petition because the propositions therein were beyond
the powers of the Sanggunian Panglunsod to enact and were not in
accordance with the provisions of existing laws and rules.

Marmeto sought reconsideration of COMELEC's Resolution No. 13-

0904 by contending that the sectoral council sought to be created would not
constitute as a legislative body separate from the Sanggunian Panlungsod.
He clarified that the sectoral council would merely act as the people's
representative, which would facilitate the exercise of the people's power of
initiative and referendum.

However, the COMELEC did not find Marmeto's motion for

reconsideration meritorious and issued Resolution No. 13-1039 dated
September 17, 2013, affirming its earlier ruling dismissing the initiative
petition. It ruled that the issues Marmeto raised in his motion were mere
reiterations of his petition which it had already addressed. Nonetheless, it
noted that Marmeto might opt to re-file his initiative petition, since the then
newly-elected members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Muntinlupa might
be more sympathetic to Marmeto's propositions. On April 1, 2014, Marmeto
filed a Supplemental Petition to comply with the requirements of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, which provided the Rules and Regulations Governing
the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on
National and Local Laws.

The Assailed COMELEC Resolution

 On July 22, 2014, the COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No.
14- 050911 which effectively dismissed Marmeto's second initiative petition for
lack of budgetary allocation. The pertinent portion of the assailed resolution
reads as follows:

Considering the absence of any provision in the Commission's FY 2014

budget for the expenses for local initiative or any other election activity x x x
the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the foregoing
recommendation x x x that the power of local initiative cannot be invoked by
Engr. Oscar A. Marmeto x x x for the passage of an ordinance for the
appropriation of funds for livelihood projects for the residents of Muntinlupa
City since the setting up of signature stations, verification of signatures, the
certification of the number of registered voters, and all other acts to be done in
exercise thereof will entail expenses on the part of the Commission.
Disagreeing with Resolution No. 14-0509, Marmeto filed the present certiorari
and mandamus petition contending that the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it '
dismissed his second initiative petition.

THE COURT'S RULING

The Court dismisses the Petition.

The COMELEC is mandated to enforce and administer the laws on local

initiative and referendum

Initiative has been described as an instrument of direct democracy

whereby the citizens directly propose and legislate laws.17 As it is the citizens
themselves who legislate the laws, direct legislation through initiative (along
with referendum) is considered as an exercise of original legislative power, as
opposed to that of derivative legislative power which has been delegated by
the sovereign people to legislative bodies such as the Congress.

The COMELEC cannot defeat the exercise of the people's original

legislative power for lack of budgetary allocation for its conduct

In Goh v. Hon. Bayron, the Court has definitely ruled the question of
whether the COMELEC may prevent the conduct of a recall election for lack
of specific budgetary allocation therefor. In as much as the issue resolved in
Goh is similar to the present one before the Court, a brief summary thereof is
necessary.
 In 2014, Alroben Goh commenced the proceedings for the conduct of
recall elections against Puerto Princessa City Mayor Lucilo Bayron. Although
the COMELEC found Goh 's petition sufficient in form and substance, it
resolved to suspend the recall election because there was no appropriation
provided for the conduct of recall elections in the FY 2014 General
Appropriations Act (GAA). As there was no line item in the GAA for recall
elections, there could likewise be no augmentation according to the
COMELEC. The Court also notes that, aside from the ₱1.4 billion
appropriation for the "conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall
votes and plebiscites," the COMELEC was also given ₱1.6 billion in the FY
2014 GAA for the "management and supervision of elections and other
electoral exercises."Thus, as in Goh , the COMELEC was provided with
budgetary allocation for the conduct of initiative elections. The COMELEC,
therefore, committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Marmeto' s
second initiative petition on the ground that there were no funds allocated for
the purpose.

The COMELEC has the power to review whether the propositions

in an initiative petition are within the power of the concerned
Sanggunian to enact

The resolution of the present case, however, does not end in applying
the Court's ruling in Goh to the present case. In its Comment and
Memorandum, the COMELEC defends the dismissal of Marmeto's second
initiative petition on the ground that the propositions raised therein were
matters that were not within the powers of the Sangguiang Panlungsod to
enact. This petition purportedly proposed the creation of another legislative
body separate from the Sanggunian, composed of 12 appointive sectoral
representatives. Not only does the LGC denies to the Sanggunian the power
to create a separate legislative body, but it also limits the number of sectoral
representatives in the Sanggunian itself to only three elected members. For
these reasons, the COMELEC argues that the dismissal of Marmeto's second
initiative petition was proper.

Marmeto 's propositions in his initiative petition are beyond the powers
of the Sanggunian Panlungsod ng Muntinlupa to enact

Accordingly, a review of the propositions put forth by Marmeto in his

second initiative petition becomes imperative.

Unfortunately, the records do not contain a copy of the proposed

ordinance itself. Nevertheless, Marmeto's pleadings and the annexes thereto
(particularly the Supplemental Petition39) refer to the significant propositions
put forth in his second initiative petition.
 The Court also notes that the propositions in Marmeto' s second
petition are closely related to those in his first petition, which are mentioned in
the COMELEC Resolution Nos. 13-0904 and 13-1039. As Marmeto never
denied that the propositions in his second initiative petition are completely
different from those in his first petition,40 it is not implausible to presume that
the propositions contained in both petitions are more or less the same. Since
the COMELEC had already ruled on the propriety of these propositions in its
Resolution No. 13-0904 and to avoid a remand of the case that will prolong
these proceedings, the Court will proceed to rule on the issue of whether
Marmeto's propositions are within the power of the Sanggunian to enact and
thus be valid subjects of an initiative petition.

ISSUE:

Whether Marmeto's propositions are within the power of the

Sanggunian to enact and thus be valid subjects of an initiative petition.

RULING:

Initiative and referendum are the means by which the sovereign people
exercise their legislative power, and the valid exercise thereof should not be
easily defeated by claiming lack of specific budgetary appropriation for their
conduct. The Court reiterates its ruling in Goh that the grant of a line item in
the FY 2014 GAA for the conduct and supervision of elections constitutes as
sufficient authority for the COMELEC to use the amount for elections and
other political exercises, including initiative and recall, and to augment this
amount from the COMELEC's existing savings.

Nonetheless, as the Court ruled in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority,

the COMELEC is likewise given the power to review the sufficiency of
initiative petitions, particularly the issue of whether the propositions set forth
therein are within the power of the concerned Sanggunian to enact. In as
much as a sanggu,nian does not have the power to create a separate local
legislative body and that other propositions in Marmeto's initiative petition
clearly contravene the existing laws, the COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing
the petition and cannot be ordered to conduct and supervise the procedure for
the conduct of initiative elections.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari and mandamus is

DISMISSED. The Resolution No. 14-0509 of the Commission on Elections
dated July 22, 2014 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 210551 June 30, 2015

JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner,

vs.

CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,

CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, and CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON
CITY, Respondents.

FACTS:

Respondent Quezon City Council enacted an ordinance, Socialized

Housing Tax of Quezon City, which will collect 0.5% on the assessed value of
land in excess of Php 100,000.00. This shall accrue to the Socialized Housing
Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special assessment shall go
to the General Fund under a special account to be established for the
purpose. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235 and S-2013 was
enacted collecting garbage fees on residential properties which shall be
deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked special account under the
general fund to be utilized for garbage collections. Petitioner, a Quezon City
property owner, questions the validity of the said ordinances.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Socialized Housing Tax is valid.

2. Whether the ordinance on Garbage Fee violates the rule on double

taxation.

RULING:

1. The SHT is valid. The tax is within the power of Quezon City
Government to impose. LGUs may be considered as having properly
exercised their police power only if there is a lawful subject and a lawful
method. Herein, the tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to
raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in
the exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is
greatly imbued with public interest. On the question of inequality, the
disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as two
distinct classes are too obvious and need not be discussed at length. The
differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is
not discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution. Notably, the public
purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the
legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over another. Further, the
reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It is not
confiscatory or oppressive since the tax being imposed therein is below what
the UDHA actually allows. Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance
grants a tax credit.

2. No. Pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper exercise of its
corporate powers under Section 22 of the same, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local legislative bodies, is empowered
to enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. In this regard, the LGUs shall
share with the national government the responsibility in the management and
maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction. The
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, affirms this authority as it
expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the implementation
and enforcement of its provisions. Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily
sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for
services rendered. The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance
No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the regulation of an activity as provided by
the same. As opposed to petitioner’s opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax.
Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance
No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double taxation must necessarily fail.