LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

52 Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals (239 SCRA 341)

FACTS:
Ong Joi Jong, sold a parcel of land located at Fundidor Street, San Nicolas to private respondent Soledad
Parian on 23 July 1947. The sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale, written in English, and was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila which in turn issued TCT no. 9260 dated 2 September 1947
in the name of private respondent. According to private respondent, she entrusted the administration of
the lot and building to Ong Ching Po when she and her husband settled in Iloilo, however when her husband
died she demanded that the lot be vacated since she was going to sell it, petitioners refused to vacate said
premises. On 19 March 1984, Parian filed a case for unlawful detainer against Ong Ching Po. The MTC
dismissed her case and was reaffirmed by both the RTC and CA.

On the other hand, on 6 December 1983, Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the
same property to his children Jimmy and David Ong. On 12 December 1985, the Ong’s filed an action for
reconveyance and damages against Parian in RTC, Manila. Upon the private respondent’s motion, this was
consolidated with her action for quieting of title against the petitioners. The RTC rendered a decision in
favor of private respondent and was confirmed by the CA, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ong Ching Po could legally acquire the property?

HELD: No. Petition is dismissed.

RATIO: Ong Ching Po cannot legally claim ownership of the disputed property since the capacity to acquire
private lands is dependent on the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may
be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities “qualified to acquire lands of the public domain”.
Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen and therefore is disqualified from acquiring and owning real
property. Further, despite the documentary evidence provided by petitioners, they failed to provide evidence
as to the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale. Likewise, the tax receipts, tax declaration,
rental receipts, deed of sale and TCT were in Ong’s possession, these were not reflective of dominion or
ownership as even a mere administrator or manager may lawfully perform payment duties relative to his
appointment as such. It was also noteworthy that the tax receipts and rental receipts were in the name of
Parian’s husband. Hence, petition was dismissed.
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

53 Frenzel vs Catito (GR No. 143958, July 11, 2003)

DOCTRINE:
A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come
into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out

 FACTS: Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He was so enamored
with Ederlina that he bought her numerous properties such as house and lot in Quezon City and in Davao
City. He also put up a beauty parlor business in the name of Ederlina. Alfred was unaware that Ederlina
was married until her spouse Klaus Muller wrote a letter to Alfred begging the latter to leave her wife
alone.
 
 When Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to
secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter could charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who
himself was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off
all contacts with her.

On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlinas father, complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life
savings and because of this, he was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring
for themselves the properties he had purchased with his own money. He demanded the return of all the
amounts that Ederlina and her family had stolen and turn over all the properties acquired by him and
Ederlina during their coverture.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner could recover the money used in purchasing the several properties

 HELD: No, even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him as the
real vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio. A
contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come
into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by
knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain
an action for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is unyielding. The
law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

54 Muller vs. Muller (GR no. 149615, August 29, 2006)

FACTS: Elena Buenaventura Muller and Helmut Muller are husband and wife in this case. They wed and
resided in Germany until they decided to permanently reside in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, they
bought a house in Antipolo, Rizal using the proceeds that they got from selling the house the Helmut Muller
inherited from his parents in Germany.
The marriage, however, did not last. They were eventually separated and Helmut Muller filed for separation
of their properties. The trial court then dissolved the absolute community of property and ordered the equal
partition of their personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title
during marriage. As to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using the paraphernal funds
of Helmut, however, he cannot recover said property, nor have a right to recover the funds used to buy it
since it was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. Upon appeal, the Court of
Appeals granted Helmut Muller’s prayer for reimbursement for the Antipolo property.

ISSUE: WON Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used to acquire the Antipolo property.

HELD: NO. Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge
thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because
of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot
be sustained. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity
where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not
allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law.
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

55 Lee vs. Director of Lands (GR No. 128195, October 3, 2001)

FACTS:
Sometime in March 1936, the Dinglasans sold to Lee Liong (Chinese citizen) a parcel of land situated at
the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City. In 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu
Lee filed with the RTC of Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of the lot. (Alleging that the transfer
certificate of title issued to Lee Liong was lost or destroyed during World War II.) Petitioners Elizabeth and
Pacita alleged that they were the widows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were
the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the lot. The RTC approved reconstitution of the lost or destroyed
certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of an approved plan and technical description.
Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the RTC decision alleging
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners were
not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not
acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the
subject land. CA declared the reconstitution void. Hence this petition.

Elizabeth and Pacita emphasized that the ownership of the land had been settled in two previous cases of
the Supreme Court, where the Court ruled in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Lee Liong. They also
pointed out that they acquired ownership of the land through actual possession of the lot and their consistent
payment of taxes over the land for more than sixty years. On the other hand, the Solicitor General
submitted that the decision in the reconstitution case was void; otherwise, it would amount to
circumventing the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring ownership of private or public
agricultural lands.

ISSUES:
• WON Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the Philippines. NO
• WON the reconstitution was valid. NO

HELD:
Lee Liong was not qualified but the ownership of the lot was already acquired by Filipino citizens Lee
Liong was disqualified to acquire the land under the 1935 Constitution. The sale of the land in question
was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.

Under the 1935 Constitution aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary
succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question.

The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate the transaction. It was
still contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of the public or private domain.

The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General. This was what was done in this case when
the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of reconstitution of title. While it
took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such action.
Prescription never lies against the State.

The land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has
been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens,
a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.

The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to
protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public
policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land.

“If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen,
the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.”

Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis
of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

hands has been achieved.

Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certificate of title must be based on an
owner’s duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the title to be reconstituted.

• Reconstitution was void for lack of factual support

In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan and technical description approved by the Land
Registration Authority. This renders the order of reconstitution void for lack of factual support. A judgment
with absolutely nothing to support it is void.

As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or
destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the
lost or destroyed title.

Any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate suit. Thus, although
petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of
ownership of the land.

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROSCRIPTION ON SALE OF REAL ESTATE TO ALIENS; DOCTRINE OF

PARI DELICTO APPLICABLE TO VENDOR AND VENDEE THEREIN; CASE AT BAR. — "In sales of real
estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both the
vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari
delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party." The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor
General. This was what was done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment
of judgment of reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not
barred from initiating such action. Prescription never lies against the State. Although ownership of the land
cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate
an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth.
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in
the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by
his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor
General does not dispute.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY

TRANSFEREE; CASE AT BAR. — The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public
or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case,
however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified
to acquire and own such land. "If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid." Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no
longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. ASCTac

3.CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE; VALID SOURCES OF THE TITLE
TO BE RECONSTITUTED; CASE AT BAR. — Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the
original certificate of title must be based on an owner's duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid
sources of the title to be reconstituted. In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan and technical
description approved by the Land Registration Authority. This renders the order of reconstitution void for
lack of factual support. A judgment with absolutely nothing to support it is void.
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

56 Ramirez vs. Vda de Ramirez (111 SCRA 704)

FACTS:

Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a French. In the project
partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1st part to the widow, and 2nd part to the grandnephews the
naked ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2 nd part, 1/3 was given to the widow and 2/3 to
Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews opposed on the ground that usufruct to Wanda is
void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.

ISSUE:

WON the ground for the opposition is correct.

HELD:

No, it is not correct.

The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not
extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. The
SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does not vest title to the land
in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution.

The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void because
it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.

The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)

The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution
covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion
that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien
would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a
devise of a piece of land.

This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real
right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens
which is proscribed by the Constitution.
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

57 Republic vs CA 235 SCRA 567

On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m.
situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen. At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses
where then natural-born Filipino citizens.

On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land
before the RTC of San Pablo City. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted
to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.

RTC rendered a decision confirming the title of the Spouses. Republic filed an opposition to the decision of
RTC. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

Republic submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject properties
before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their
favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the
principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before
the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land
since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land
to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same
proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.

ISSUE: WON a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by
purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)? YES

HELD:
Since the spouses’ predecessor in interest has been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
for at least 30 years of alienable public land, such possession ipso jure converts the same to private
property (Recall ruling of Director of Lands v. IAC). This means that occupation and cultivation for
more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public.

What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as
transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8,
Article XII of the Constitution.

In the case at bar, the spouses were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process,
the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-
interest under the Public Land Act.

But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself
allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article
XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:

Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided
by law.

Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then
1973 Constitution which reads:

Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the
Batasang Pambansa may provide.
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:

Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the
legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a
maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of
rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the
privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not
exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled
to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those
already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.

From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the
legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-
born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.

Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the
properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there
could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution
ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are
already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12,
1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban,
or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).

It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not
significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or
registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that
private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their
predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be
approved.
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

Remedies to Recover Private Land from Disqualified Alien: Action for reversion
• Who can initiate
• When proper. Improper
• Reversion vs Action for Nullity of Land Titles

Remedies to Recover Private Land from Disqualified Alien: Action for reversion
• Who can initiate
• When proper. Improper
• Reversion vs Action for Nullity of Land Titles

58 Republic vs Animas GR No L-37682

ORIGINAL CASE: Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Isagani Du Timbol and the Register of Deeds of
General Santos City,
NOW Director of lands instituted to
• declare null and void Free Patent issued in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol;
• to order the aforesaid defendant to surrender the owner's duplicate of O.C.T. and the
• defendant Register of Deeds to cancel the same;
• to decree the reversion of the land in question to the mass of public domain
The land was originally applied for by Precila Soriain 1966, who transferred her rights to the land and its
improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol who filed his application on1969,
In 1969, free Patent No. was issued and City, (O.C.T.) No. P-2508 in the name of defendant Isagani Du
Timbol.
In 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint in to
declare free patent and Original Certificate of Title of Isagani Du Timbol null and void ab initio and to order
the reversion of the land in question to the mass of public domain.

Grounds
• land covered thereby is a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act;
• in a reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity of the land in question made by the Bureau of
Forestry on March 7, 1958, was reverted to the category of public forest,
• the application for free patent by Isagani Du Timbol more than eleven years thereafter were obtained
fraudulently as private respondent Isagani Du Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land
applied for.
RTC -dismissed the complaint on the ground that Certificate of Title based on the patent had became
indefeasible in view of the lapse of the one-year period prescribed under Section 38 of the Land Registration
Act for review of a decree of title on the ground of fraud.
CA- grants the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title is not a disposable public
land, it being a part of the forest zone and, hence the patent and title thereto are null and void.

Issue: WON LAND CAN BE REVERTED BACK TO THE STATE

Held: YES. A certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and void ab initio when fraud consisted in
misrepresenting that the land covered by the application is part of the public domain when it is not
As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under either the Constitution of
1935 or the Constitution of 1973.

When the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his application for free patent over the land in question on June
3, 1969, the area in question was not a disposable or alienable public land but a public forest.
It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection,
management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest reservations and over the
granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth. Given that the area in
question is a forest or timber land is clearly established, then, the Bureau of Forest Development has
jurisdiction.
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

Since it was Bureau of Lands who issued the patent and since it had no jurisdiction to issue a patent
because the land involved was still inalienable forest land when granted, then it may be plausibly contended
that the patent title would be ab initio void, subject to attack at any time by any party adversely affected.
A patent is void at law if the
• officer who issued the patent had no authority to do so
• If a person obtains a title by FAME under the Torrens System
• Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does
not, by virtue of said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included.
In the case at bar the party seeking the nullity of the title and reversion of the land is the state itself which
is specifically authorized under Section 101 of the Public Land Act to initiate such proceedings as an
attribute of sovereignty.

The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the
state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of
a forest reservation. The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for
fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by
registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height
of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title. It is the state is seeking the
cancellation of the title, therefore, it has not become indefeasible for prescription cannot be invoked against
the state. A title founded on fraud may be cancelled, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the
issuance thereof, through a petition filed in court by the Solicitor General.

The land covered thereby may be reconveyed to the state in an action for reconveyance under Section 101
of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act).

Isagani Du Timbol was never in possession of the property prior to his filing the application, contrary to the
provisions of law that
• the applicant must have been in possession or cultivation thereof for at least 30 years;
• no existing signs of improvements found in the area in question as it is not under cultivation but covered
with grasses, bushes and small trees;
• that it is being used as ranch for grazing cows by the heirs of Hermogenes Chilsot;
• that no monuments were placed on the area surveyed which goes to show that there was no actual
survey thereof;
• inside the forest zone;
• the signature of then Acting District Land Officer Elias de Castro of South Cotabato has been forged
The above alleged circumstances are indicative of fraud and the misrepresentations of the applicant that
he had been occupying and cultivating the land and residing thereon are sufficient grounds to ipso facto
nullify the grant of the patent and title under Section 91 of the Public Land Law which provides as follows:
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled.
A title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the
land under his name although the property belongs to another.
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

59 MALTOS VS HEIRS OF BORROMEO

DOCTRINE: Reversion of the parcel of land is proper. However, reversion under Section 101 of the
Public Land Act is not automatic. The Office of the Solicitor General must first file an action for
reversion.

FACTS:

On February 13, 1979, Eusebio Borromeo was issued Free Patent No. 586681 over a piece of agricultural
land located in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-9053. On June
15, 1983, well within the five-year prohibitory period, Eusebio Borromeo sold the land to Eliseo Maltos.
Eusebio Borromeo died on January 16, 1991. His heirs claimed that prior to his death, he allegedly told his
wife, Norberta Borromeo,3 and his children to nullify the sale made to Eliseo Maltos and have the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-5477 cancelled because the sale was within the five-year prohibitory period. On
June 23, 1993, Norberta Borromeo and her children (heirs of Borromeo) filed a Complaint for Nullity of Title
and Reconveyance of Title against Eliseo Maltos, Rosita Maltos, and the Register of Deeds of Agusan del
Sur. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 946. EliseoMaltos and Rosita Maltos (Maltos Spouses) filed
their Answer, arguing that the sale was made in good faith and that in purchasing the property, they relied
on Eusebio Borromeo's title. Further, the parties were in pari delicto. Since the sale was made during the
five-year prohibitory period, the land would revert to the public domain and the proper party to institute
reversion proceedings was the Office of the Solicitor General. The Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur
also filed an Answer, arguing that the deed of sale was presented for Registration after the five-year
prohibitory period, thus, it was ministerial on its part to register the deed. The heirs of Borromeo countered
that good faith was not a valid defense because the prohibitory period appeared on the face of the title of
the property.

ISSUE: W/N reversion is a proper remedy? YES

HELD:

Reversion is a remedy provided under Section 101 of the Public Land Act:

SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his stead, in the
proper courts, in the name of Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The purpose of reversion is "to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private
individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. The general rule is that reversion of lands to the
state is not automatic, and the Office of the Solicitor General is the proper party to file an action for reversion.
The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the cancellation of the certificate of title an|l the
resulting reversion of the land covered by the title to the State| This is why an action for reversion is
oftentimes designated asj an annulment suit or a cancellation suit. Since an action for reversion
presupposes that the property in dispute is owned by the state, it is proper that the action be filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, being the real party-in-interest.

There is, however, an exception to the rule that reversion is not automatic. Section 29 of the Public Land
Act provides:

SECTION 29. After the cultivation of the land has begun, the purchaser, with the approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce, may convey or encumber his rights to any person, corporation, or association
legally qualified under this Act to purchase agricultural public lands, provided such conveyance or
encumbrance does not affect any right or interest of the Government in the land: And provided, further,
That the transferee is not delinquent in the payment of any installment due and payable. Any sale and
encumbrance made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling the acquisition and reverting the property and all
rights to the State, and all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the Government shall be
forfeited. After the sale has been approved, the vendor shall not lose his right to acquire agricultural public
lands under the provisions of this Act, provided he has the necessary qualifications.

In this case, a free patent over the subject parcel of land was issued to Eusebio Borromeo. This shows that
he already had title to the property when he sold it to petitioner Eliseo Maltos. Thus, Section 101 of the
Public Land Act applies.

60 Republic vs Umali (GR No. 80687, April 10, 1989)

FACTS:
The land situated in Tanza, Cavite which consists of 78,865 square meters was originally purchased on
installment from the government on July 1, 1910 by Florentina Bobadilla, who allegedly transferred her rights
thereto in favor of Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio and Julio, all surnamed Cenizal, in 1922. 2 Tomasa and Julio
assigned their shares to Martina, Maria and Gregorio. In 1971 these three assignees purportedly signed a
joint affidavit which was filed with the Bureau of Lands to support their claim that they were entitled to the
issuance of a certificate of title over the said land on which they said they had already made full payment.
On the basis of this affidavit, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources executed Deed No. V-10910
(Sale Certificate No. 1280) on September 10, 1971, in favor of the said affiants.

A complaint for reversion was filed on October 10, 1985 when the registered owners of the land,
following several transfers, were Remedios Micla, Juan C. Pulido, and Rosalina, Luz and Enrique Naval. They
asked to return the property to the State on the aforestated grounds of forgery and fraud. The plaintiff
claimed that Gregorio Cenizal having died on February 25, 1943, and Maria Cenizal on January 8, 1959, they
could not have signed the joint affidavit dated August 9, 1971, on which Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate
No. 1280) was based.

In their answer, Pulido and the Navals denied any participation in the join affidavit and said they had
all acquired the property in good faith and for value. By way of affirmative defenses, they invoked estoppel,
laches, prescription and res judicata. For her part, Miclat moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that
the government had no cause of action against her because there was no allegation that she had violated
the plaintiff’s right, that the government was not the real party-in-interest because the subject land was
already covered by the Torrens system, and that in any event the action was barred by prescription or laches.

ISSUE

Whether or not the land under the new owners are obtained thru forgery and fraud and subject to return
the property to the State
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HELD

We agree with the contention that there is no allegation in the complaint 13 filed by the petitioner
that any one of the defendants was privy to the forged joint affidavit or that they had acquired the subject
land in bad faith. Their status as innocent transferees for value was never questioned in that pleading. Not
having been disproved, that status now accords to them the protection of the Torrens System and renders
the titles obtained by them thereunder indefeasible and conclusive. The rule will not change despite the flaw
in TCT No. 55044.
Section 39 of the Land Registration Act clearly provided: Every person receiving a certificate of title
in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a
certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrance except those noted on
said certificate.
The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration
in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem
that once the title was registered, the owner might rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals
of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
The difference between them and the private respondents is that the latter acquired the land in
question not by direct grant but in fact after several transfers following the original sale thereof to Bobadilla
in 1910. The presumption is that they are innocent transferees for value in the absence of evidence to the
contrary. The petitioner contends that it was Pedro Miclat who caused the falsification of the joint affidavit,
but that is a bare and hardly persuasive allegation, and indeed, even if true, would still not prove any collusion
between him and the private respondents. The mere fact that Remedios Miclat was the daughter and heiress
of Miclat, without more, would not necessarily visit upon her the alleged sins of her father.
The land being now registered under the Torrens system in the names of the private respondents,
the government has no more control or jurisdiction over it. It is no longer part of the public domain or, as
the Solicitor General contends — as if it made any difference — of the Friar Lands. The subject property
ceased to be public land when OCT No. 180 was issued to Florentina Bobadilla in 1910 or at the latest from
the date it was sold to the Cenizals in 1971 upon full payment of the purchase price. As private registe red
land, it is governed by the provisions of the Land Registration Act, now denominated the Property
Registration Decree, which applies even to the government.

1. LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; PROTECTS INNOCENT TRANSFEREES FOR VALUE; TITLES
OBTAINED RENDERED INDEFEASIBLE AND CONCLUSIVE. — There is no allegation in the complaint filed by
the petitioner that any one of the defendants was privy to the forged joint affidavit or that they had acquired
the subject land in bad faith. Their status as innocent transferees for value was never questioned in that
pleading. Not having been disproved, that status now accords to them the protection of the Torrens System
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

and renders the titles obtained by them thereunder indefeasible and conclusive. The rule will not change
despite the flaw in TCT No. 55044. Section 39 of the Land Registration Act clearly provided: "Sec. 39. Every
person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser
of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all
encumbrance except those noted on said certificate."

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PIÑERO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 57 SCRA 386, NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The
decision in Piñero v. Director of Lands is not applicable to the present proceeding because the lands involved
in that case had not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. They were still held by the
Piñeros. The action for reversion was filed by the government against them as the original transferees of the
properties in question. They were the direct grantees of the free patents issued by the government pursuant
to which the corresponding certificates of title were issued under the Torrens system. The fraud alleged by
the government as a ground for the reversion sought was imputable directly to the Piñeros, who could not
plead the status of innocent purchasers for value.The difference between them and the private respondents
is that the latter acquired the land in question not by direct grant but in fact after several transfers following
the original sale thereof to Bobadilla in 1910. The presumption is that they are innocent transferees for value
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

3. ID.; ID.; SUBJECT LAND NO LONGER PART OF PUBLIC DOMAIN; LAND REGISTRATION ACT, NOW CALLED
"PRIVATE REGISTRATION DECREE" GOVERNS. — The land being now registered under the Torrens system
in the names of the private respondents, the government has no more control or jurisdiction over it. It is no
longer part of the public domain or, as the Solicitor General contends — as if it made any difference — of
the Friar Lands. The subject property ceased to be public land when OCT No. 180 was issued to Florentina
Bobadilla in 1910 or at the latest from the date it was sold to the Cenizals in 1971 upon full payment of the
purchase price. As private registered land, it is governed by the provisions of the Land Registration Act, now
denominated the Property Registration Decree, which applies even to the government. The pertinent
provision of the Land Registration Act was Section 122, which read as follows: Sec. 122. "Whenever public
lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the Government of
the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations,
the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands." This
should be related to Section 12 of the Friar Lands Act, providing thus: "Sec. 12. . . . upon the payment of the
final installment together with all accrued interest, the Government will convey to such settler and occupant
the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective
in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two (Sec. 122) of the Land Registration Act."

4. ID.; ID.; ORIGINAL TRANSFER OF LAND, MERELY AVOIDABLE, NOT VOID AB-INITIO; LAND CEASES TO BE
PUBLIC UPON REGISTRATION AND ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. — The petitioner errs in arguing
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

that the original transfer was null and void ab initio, for the fact is that it is not so. It was only voidable. The
land remained private as long as the title thereto had not been voided, but it is too late to do that now. As
the Court has held in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals. (30 SCRA 301): "A certificate of title fraudulently secured
is not null and void ab initio, unless the fraud consisted in misrepresenting that the land is part of the public
domain, although it is not. In such case the nullity arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that
the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Inasmuch as the land involved in the present
case does not belong to such category. OCT No. 282-A would be merely voidable or reviewable. . . . Once a
patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of public
domain and becomes private property over which the director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.
A public land patent, when registered in the corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens Title,
and becomes as indefeasible as Torrens Title upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance
thereof."
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61 Pinero vs Director of Lands GR No L-36507 12/14/1974

DOCTRINE: The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim
of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of
another.

FACTS:
Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija. He took advantage
of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and was registered as such. Parcel
No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio Ramos,
herein petitioner. Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
 Director of Lands
opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government. Director
of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land.
 It has been seen however
that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title
sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?

HELD:
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership
of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

 The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and notorious
possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was
for his enjoyment.

 Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the
requirements of the law on supposition that the premises consisted of agricultural public land.

On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the
claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit
to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.

 In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry,
unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant. 
 Petitioner
and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked for registration.
 Registration
in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.
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Additional Notes:
Whether or not the Director of Lands had authority to order the investigation of the patents and title
YES. The Director of Lands had authority to order the investigation.

Doctrine
It is not only the right but the DUTY of the Director of Lands to conduct investigation of any alleged fraud in
securing a free patent, and the corresponding title to a pubic land. He may also file the corresponding court
action for the reversion of the public land to the State

Sec. 91 of the Public Land Act states: “It shall be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and
whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the material facts set out in the application are true, or whether they continue to exist and are
maintained and preserved in good faith.”

Reversion vs Action for Nullity of Land Titles

62 Kionisala vs Dacut GR No 147379, 2/27/2002

FACTS:
Private respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles, reconveyance and damages
against petitioners involving two parcels of land – Lot No. 1017 and Lot No. 1015. Said lots were registered in
their respective names. They claimed absolute ownership of Lot 1015 and 1017 even prior to the issuance of
the corresponding free patents and certificates of title.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint filed by private respondents was sufficient.
HELD:
YES. A cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require
allegations of the plaintiff’s ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and
certificate of title as well as the defendant’s fraud or mistake; as the case may be, in successfully obtaining
these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. Private respondents allege in their
complaint all the facts necessary to seek the nullification of the free patents as well as the certificates of title
covering Lot 1015 and Lot1017. Clearly, they are the real parties in interest in light of their allegations that they
have always been the owners and possessors of the two (2) parcels of land even prior to the issuance of the
documents of title in petitioners’ favor, hence the latter could only have committed fraud in securing them.

In the more recent case of Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of Honorio Dacut, 30 the difference between
an action for declaration of nullity of land titles from an action for reversion was more thoroughly discussed
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

as follows:

An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the same as an
action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of
the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the
complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land. Hence, in Gabila vs. Barriga [41 SCRA 131],
where the plaintiff in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment
of the defendant's title because even if the title were canceled or amended the ownership of the land
embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment would revert to the public domain, we ruled
that the action was for reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of
Lands. On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title
would require allegations of the plaintiff's ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free
patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant's fraud or mistake, as the case may be, in successfully
obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity
arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefore is consequently void
ab initio. The real party-in-interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of
ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant.
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

63
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64
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

65 Republic vs. Hachero ( G.R. No. 200973, May 30, 2016)

Facts:
In 1996, Amor Hachero (Hachero) filed his Free Patent Application No. 045307-969 covering Lot No. 1514,
CAD-1150-D (subject land) before the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of
Palawan. The said application for free patent was later approved by the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (PENRO) of Palawan based on the following findings, among others that the land applied
for had been classified as alienable and disposable and, therefore, subject to disposition under the Public
Land Law;

On October 15, 1998, Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384 was issued to Hachero and the subject land was
registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. E-18011 on May 7, 1999.

After an inspection and verification were conducted by the CENRO in 2000, it was discovered that the
subject land, covered by OCT No. E-18011, was still classified as timberland and so not susceptible of
private ownership under the Free Patent provision of the Public Land Act. Hence, the Republic filed the
Complaint for the Cancellation of Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384 and OCT No. E-18011 and for
Reversion, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 3726.

The RTC rendered its decision in favor of Hachero on the ground that the free patent and title had already
been issued after Hachero was found to have complied with all the requirements; that it was the Republic
itself thru the DENR-CENRO, Coron, which brought the subject land under the operation of the Torrens
System. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue:
1. Won the petition for cancellation of the title and reversion of the subject lot is meritorious.
2. WON the Government is estopped by its previous acts.

Ruling:
1. Cancellation of title and reversion proper where there exists a mistake or oversight in granting free
patent over inalienable land

Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the government under
the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the
government, its cancellation therefore is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. xxx. In Estate of
the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic (Yujuico case), reversion was defined as an action which seeks to
restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass
of public domain. It bears to point out, though, that the Court also allowed the resort by the Government to
actions for reversion to cancel titles that were void for reasons other than fraud, i.e., violation by the grantee
of a patent of the conditions imposed by law; and lack of jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant a
patent covering inalienable forest land or portion of a river, even when such grant was made through mere
oversight.

In the case at bench, although the Republic's action for cancellation of patent and title and for reversion
was not based on fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Hachero, his title could still be cancelled and
the subject land reverted back to the State because the grant was made through mistake or oversight. This
could probably be the reason why, shortly after one (1) year from the issuance of OCT No. E-18011 to
Hachero, the DENR personnel conducted another investigation and verification on the subject land. It would
appear that they suspected that a mistake was made in their issuance of the patent as the subject land had
not been reclassified or released as alienable or disposable land. It remained plotted within the timberland
classification zone.
 LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES CASES

2. Prescription and estoppel cannot lie against the State At any rate, it is a time-honored principle that the
statute of limitations or the lapse of time does not run against the State. Jurisprudence also recognizes the
State's immunity from estoppel as a result of the mistakes or errors of its officials and agents.
It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a
homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial
registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the
contemplation of the Public Land Law. Yet, we emphasize that our statement in the aforequoted case that
a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent becomes indefeasible after one year, is subject
to the proviso that "the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation
of the Public Land Law."

But then again, the Court had several times in the past recognized the right of the State to avail itself of the
remedy of reversion in other instances when the title to the land is void for reasons other than having been
secured by fraud or misrepresentation.

Be that as it may, the mistake or error of the officials or agents of the BOL in this regard cannot be invoked
against the government with regard to property of the public domain. It has been said that the State cannot
be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.