Ferrer v. Spouses Diaz (2010)
Commandante alleges that the waiver of hereditary rights is
Petitioner: Atty. Pedro Ferrer
Respondent: Spouses Alfredo and Imelda Diaz
Ponencia: Del Castillo
DOCTRINE:
No contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered future, the
succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Pedro Ferrer, in his complaint, alleged that
respondent Commandante, daughter of the respondents
Spouses Diaz obtained a P1.2 M loan from him. Such loan was
secured by a Real Estate Mortgage, as well as a promissory
note. In addition, and for a consideration of P600,000, to
offset the loan, petitioner alleges that Commandate executed
an instrument entitled “Waiver of Hereditary Rights and
Interests over a Real Property” (Still Undivided). On the basis
of said waiver, petitioner executed a Affidavit of Adverse Claim
on the TCT of the property. Given that Commandante could
not pay, petitioner filed a case in court to hold Commandante,
Spouses Diaz, and the Pangans solidarily liable.
2. Commandante, for her part, alleges that while she is indeed
indebted to the petitioner, such were only secured by chattel
mortgages over her taxi units. She alleges that it was the
petitioner that presented her with documents such as the Real
Estate Mortgage and Waiver of Hereditary Rights, suggesting
that her SPA from Spouses Diaz is sufficient. Although she was
hesitant to sign these, knowing that she does not own the
property, she was afraid of having her taxi units foreclosed.
3. Spouses Diaz presents that the loan of Commandante is her
personal obligation and that the SPA was not authentic.
4.
useless as its execution is prohibited by public policy. The trial
court resolved the case in favor of the petitioner. When it was
appealed to the CA, the CA affirmed the decision but modified
it to exclude the Pangans (they were the ones who owned the
mortgaged property) from liability. Hence this petition
Issues:
W/M Comandantes waiver of hereditary right valid?
Consequently whether the petitioners affidavit of adverse
claim which was based on the waiver valid?
Held:
No the waiver is invalid for being contrary to public policy,
and consequently the affidavit of adverse claim is frivolous.
The main argument of the respondents is that the Adverse Claim on
the TCT on their property is invalid for it is entirely based on the
waiver of Commandante’s hereditary rights. Petitioner argues
otherwise, but the Supreme Court holds that the adverse claim is
based entirely on the waiver.
The Supreme Court rules that pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil
Code ,no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in
cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered
future, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the
contract.
In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of
Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property
(Still Undivided), succession to either of her parents properties has not yet
been opened since both of them are still living.
 Balus v. Balus (2010)
Petitioner: Celestino Balus
Respondent: Saturnino Balus and Leonarda Balus Vda. De Calunod
Ponente: Peralta, J.
DOCTRINE:
The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment
of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the
property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time
of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the
opening of the succession.
FACTS:
1. Spouses RUFO and Sebastiana are the parents of petitioner
CELESTINO and respondents SATURNINO and LEONARDA.
Sebastiana died earlier than RUFO.
2. In 1979, RUFO mortgaged a parcel of land to Rural Bank of
Lanao del Norte (BANK). He failed to pay, so BANK foreclosed
and the property was sold to him. The property was not
redeemed within prescribed period
a. 1981 – certificate of sale executed in favor of BANK
b. January 1984 – sheriff executed a definite deed of sale,
and eventually a TCT was issued to BANK (so before
RUFO died)
3. Rufo died on July 1984.
4. PETITIONER and RESPONDENTS then executed an
extrajudicial settlement of estate, where 1/3 portion of the
subject property was adjudicated to them. In this settlement,
they admitted knowledge of the fact of mortgage.
5. 3 years after the execution of the extrajudicial settlement,
RESPONDENTS bought the property from the BANK.
6. The BANK then executed a Deed of Sale in favor of
RESPONDENTS, and a TCT issued in their names. However,
PETITIONER continued possession of the subject lot.
7. RESPONDENTS then filed a complaint for recovery of
possession against PETITIONER claiming that the latter
refused to surrender possession of the lot.
8. RTC: Ordered plaintiffs to executed a deed of sale in favor of
the defendant, acknowledging that plaintiffs owned 1/3 of the
property still
9. RESPONDENTS filed an appeal with the CA, which reversed
the RTC’s decision and ordered PETITIONER to immediately
surrender the subject property.
a. CA ruled that when both parties failed to redeem the
property within the redemption period and allowed
consolidation of ownership in name of BANK, the co-
ownership was extinguished.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the co-ownership of petitioner and respondents
subsisted, if the property formed part of the estate of the deceased
father at all
RULING + RATIO: NO. The property did not form part of the
estate of their deceased father, which they may lay claim as
heirs.
• The right to a person’s succession are transmitted from the
moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person
consists of the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those
which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession.
• In the case at bar, Rufo lost ownership of the property during
his lifetime. Hence, when he died, the lot no longer formed
part of his estate. Therefore, the parties herein never inherited
the subject lot from their father.
(Other issue:)
On petitioner’s argument that the extrajudicial settlement
is an independent contract which gives him the right to
enforce his right to claim a portion of the lot:
• There is nothing in the settlement to indicate an express
stipulation for the parties to continue with the supposed co-
ownership. Even a plain reading of the provisions therein
would not reveal the intention of petitioner’s intention to buy
the subject property from the bank.
 • As a matter of fact, petitioner even claims that there were
several instances that he had the chance to purchase the
property back, but he refused to do so.
• Moreover, both the parties clearly manifested their intention to
have the subject property divided by assigning to each a
portion

DISPOSITION
Petition denied.
 Pasco v. Heirs of De Guzman (2010)
Petitioner: Lazaro Pasco and Lauro Pasco
Respondent: Heirs of Filomena De Guzman
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
DOCTRINE:
It is true that a decedent’s estate has a different juridical personality
than that of the heirs. Nonetheless, the heirs certainly have an
interest in the preservation of the estate and the recovery of its
properties, for at the moment of the decedent’s death, the heirs start
to own the property, subject to the decedent’s liabilities. In this
connection, Article 777 of the Civil Code states that “[t]he rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.”
FACTS:
10. Petitioner Lazaro and Lauro Pasco (PASCOS) obtained a loan
of P140k from FILOMENA De Guzman. As security, PASCO
executed a chattel mortgage on his Isuzu Jeep in favor of
FILOMENA.
11. When FILOMENA died, her HEIRS sought to collect from the
PASCOS, but to no avail. Hence, HEIRS filed a collection case
to compel the PASCOS to pay.
12. HEIRS then authorized CRESENCIA to act as their attorney-in-
fact through a Special Power of attorney. She was authorize
to:
a. represent the heirs on all matters concerning the
estate of FILOMENA
b. file cases of collection, including a petition for
foreclosure
c. do and perform all other necessary acts
13. During pre-trial, the parties verbally agreed to settle the case.
So they eventually jointly filed a compromise agreement. This
was approved by the MTC.
a. The compromise agreement included provisions which
said that PASCOS admitted their indebtedness, and
that they undertook to pay the same
b. Moreover, it provided that failure of PASCOS to pay
would entitle the respondents to a Writ of Execution to
enforce the satisfaction of their obligations, with
interest.
14. However, PASCOS moved to set aside this decision, claiming
that the agreement was written in a language they did not
understand. MTC denied this, and granted CRESENCIA’s
prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution.
15. RTC and CA similarly ruled thus:
a. The case within the MTC’s jurisdiction
b. Cresencia had been duly authorized to enter in
the compromise agreement.
c. Resort to Rule 65 was an improper remedy
16. The related argument of the PASCOS to the subject matter is
their argument that CRESENCIA had no authority to represent
the co-heirs because FILOMENA’s estate had a personality of
its own.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not CRESENCIA was authorized to enter into the
compromise agreement, as FILOMENA’s estate has a
personality of its own
2. Whether the release of the funds directly to the heirs by virtue
of the MTC’s writ of execution, was proper
RULING + RATIO:
1. CRESENCIA was authorized to enter such compromise
agreement.
• In the case of Trinidad v. CA, while there was no specific
authority to enter into a compromise agreement, the Court
held that the SPA executed necessarily included the power of
the attorney-in-fact to compromise the case. This was applied
by the Court to the case at bar.
• The Estate does have a different juridical personality from that
of the heirs, but still the heirs have an interest in the
preservation of the estate and the recovery of its properties,
for at the moment of Filomena’s death, the heirs start to own
the property, subject to the decedent’s liabilities.
2. NO, the release of funds to the heirs cannot be made yet.
 • Unfortunately, the records do not show the status of the
proceedings for settlement, if any. But to allow the release of
funds directly to the heirs would amount to a distribution of
the estate. Such distribution should only be made after, not
before, the payment of all debts, charges, expenses, and taxes
of the estate.
• The Court then ordered CRESENCIA to deposit the amounts
received from PASCOS from the petitioners with the MTC, and
the MTC should hold in abeyance the release of amounts until
after a showing the proper settlement has been followed.

Other rulings:
1. The principal claim of P140k was within the MTC’s jurisdiction
2. Certiorari was rightly dismissed as it can’t be said that PASCOS
showed MTC’s approval of the agreement as capricious, whimsical,
and arbitrary
3. The 5% monthly interest is unconscionable, and should be reduced
to 12% per annum

DISPOSITION
Petition denied.
 Cruz v Cruz (2010)
Petitioner: MEMORACION Z. CRUZ, represented by EDGARDO Z.
CRUZ,
Respondent: OSWALDO Z. CRUZ
Ponencia: CARPIO, J.
DOCTRINE: The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased
vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in
the testate or intestate proceedings. When [plaintiff], therefore,
died[,] her claim or right to the parcels of land x x x was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her
death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties
in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There
is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow
their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased
plaintiff.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Memoracion filed a case for Annulment of sale and
reconveyance in RTC against her son, respondent OSWALDO.
2. Petitioner claimed that during her union with her dead
common-law husband, she acquired land in Tondo that was
registered in her name. Sometime in July 1992, she discovered
that the title to the property was transferred to respondent’s
name by virtue of a an allegedly fraudulent Deed of Sale from
1973. Thus, it should be null and void.
3. Memoracion died on October 30, 1996. Memoracion’s counsel,
Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court on January 13,
1997 of the fact of such death.
4. Oswaldo then filed for an MTD, saying that the reconveyance
action is a personal action which does not survive a party’s
death, and to allow the case to continue would result in legal
absurdity whereby one heir is representing the defendant and
is a co-plaintiff in this case. RTC dismissed case.
5. On October 17, 1997, Memoracions son-heir, Edgardo,
manifested to the trial court that he is retaining the services of
Atty. Neri for the plaintiff. Atty. Neri filed for MR but denied.
Rule 45 to CA, denied. Hence this case.
ISSUES:
1. WoN CA erred in ruling that Annulment of Sale is a purely
personal action which did not survive her death
2. WoN CA erred in affirming the RTC Order dismissing the case.
PROVISION:
RULING + RATIO:
1. Yes
• If the case affects primarily and principally property and
property rights, then it survives the death of the plaintiff or
petitioner. In Sumaljag v. Literato, SC held that a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one
relating to property and property rights, and therefore,
survives the death of the petitioner. So yeah.
2. YES
• When a party dies, RoC provisions state that counsel should
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the
fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Deceased may be
substituted by his heirs pending action.
• It was error for the RTC to dismiss the case. The RTC was
informed, albeit belatedlyof the death of Memoracion, and was
supplied with the name and address of her legal
representative, Edgardo. What the RTC could have done was
to require Edgardo Cruz to appear in court and substitute
Memoracion as party to the pending case.
• Edgardo’s manifestation, that he retains Atty. Neri as counsel,
a formal substitution of deceased Memoracion by her heir,
Edgardo Cruz.
• As to the fact that co-heirs are now opposing parties. Sc just
said that Oswaldo, although also an heir of Memoracion,
should be excluded as a legal representative in the case for
being an adverse party therein.
DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED. Case REMANDED to RTC.
 De Belen vda. De Cabalu, et al. v. Sps. Tabu, et al. (2012)
Petitioners: Milagros de Belen vda. De Cabalu, Meliton Cabalu, Sps.
Angela Cabalu and Rodolfo Talabera, Patricio Abus
Respondents: Sps. Renato and Dolores Laxamana-Tabu,
MTCC, Tarlac City, Br. II
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
DOCTRINE: Succession, when effective
The rights to succession are transmitted the moment of death of the
decedent.
FACTS:
1. Faustina Maslum (“Faustina”) is the sole owner of a parcel of
land in Tarlac, covered by TCT No. 16776. During her lifetime,
she bore no children and was never married. Thus, prior to
her death in 1941, she executed a holographic will assigning
and distributing her property to her nephews and nieces, one
of which was Benjamin Laxamana (“Benjamin”). Benjamin
died in 1960, thereby leaving his son Domingo. Faustina’s will
was never probated;
2. On March 5, 1975, Domingo allegedly executed a Deed of Sale
of Undivided Parcel of Land disposing of his 9,000 sq.m. share
of the land in favor of a certain Laureano Cabalu (“Laureano”);
3. In 1994, the forced and legitimate heirs of Faustina executed
a Deed of Extra-judicial Succession with Partition to give effect
to her will. The same deed imparted 9,000 sq.ms. of the land
to Domingo. In 1995, Domingo sold the half of it to his
nephew, Eleazar Tabamo, and the other half was registered
under his name in May 1996, now covered by TCT No.
281353. After 3 months, Domingo died;
4. After 2 more months after he died, Domingo purportedly sold
his half in favor of a Renato Tabu (“Tabu”) under a DOAS.
Thus, the same was registered to the latter under TCT No.
286484. Subsequently, Tabu and his wife Dolores subdivided
the same into 2 other lots;
5. In 1999, Dolores together with the other heirs of Domingo
filed an unlawful detainer case against Meliton Cabalu, Patricio
Abus, Roger Talavera, Jesus Villar, Marcos Perez, Arthur Dizon,
and all persons claiming rights under them, alleging that the
defendants were merely allowed to occupy the subject lot by
their late father, but when asked to vacate, they refused. The
court ruled in favor of the heirs of Domingo;
6. In 2002, herein petitioners filed a case for Declaration of
Nullity of the DOAS, Joint Affidavit of Nullity of the titles
covering the subdivided lots of Sps. Tabu, Quieting of Title,
Reconveyance, Application for TRO, Injunction, and Damages
against Sps. Tabu before RTC Br. 63, Tarlac. They claimed
that they were the lawful owners of the subject property
because it was sold to their father Laureano by Domingo
through the DOAS dated 1975. Respondents countered
claiming that the 1975 DOAS was null because the same was
executed when Domingo was not yet owner of the subject
portion of the property of Faustina, and that Domingo was of
unsound mind during the time of execution. According to
them, Domingo became owner of the land only in 1994, upon
partition of the estate;
7. In 2003, RTC dismissed the complaint and declared the 1975
DOAS void for lack of capacity to sell on the part of Domingo,
declared the 1996 DOAS in favor of Sps. Tabu void for being
executed after his death, and ordering the restoration of TCT
16776 in the name of Faustina subject to partition of the heirs;
8. On appeal, CA modified the ruling, deleting the declaration of
nullity of the 1996 DOAS, cancelling TCT 266583 under
Domingo, and restoring TCT 16776 after upholding that
Domingo was predeceased by his father Benjamin in 1960,
thereby taking the latter’s place as Faustina’s heir. CA further
found Domingo to be of sound mind during 1975, but
sustained the 1975 sale’s nullity on the ground of simulation.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the 1975 DOAS in favor of Cabalu was valid;
 2. WON the title under Domingo was void;
3. WON the 1996 DOAS in favor of Sps. Tabu was void.
PROVISION:
Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent.
RULING + RATIO:
1. No, the 1975 DOAS in favor of Cabalu was void for
being fictitious and simulated.
• Both RTC and CA found the same to be simulated after finding
earmarks of simulation, namely: 1) that there were
discrepancies in the signature of the notary public, his PTR
and document number; 2) that the said DOAS was found only
after Cabalu, et al. were ejected; 3) that they were allegedly
not aware that the property was bought by their father; and
4) that they never questioned the other half of the land not
occupied by them. Thus, the presumption of regularity was
already rebutted. The Court went on to sate:
x x x Even on the assumption that the March 5,
1975 deed was not simulated, still the sale
cannot be deemed valid because, at that
time, Domingo was not yet the owner of
the property. There is no dispute that the
original and registered owner of the subject
property covered by TCT No. 16776, from
which the subject 9,000 square meter lot came
from, was Faustina, who during her lifetime had
executed a will, dated July 27, 1939. In the said
will, the name of Benjamin, father of Domingo,
appeared as one of the heirs. Thus, and as
correctly found by the RTC, even if Benjamin
died sometime in 1960, Domingo in 1975 could
not yet validly dispose of the whole or even a
portion thereof for the reason that he was not
the sole heir of Benjamin, as his mother only
died sometime in 1980.
Besides, under Article 1347 of the Civil Code,
"No contract may be entered into upon
future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law." Paragraph 2
of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered
into upon future inheritance as void. The law
applies when the following requisites concur:
(1) the succession has not yet been
opened; (2) the object of the contract
forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the
promissor has, with respect to the object,
an expectancy of a right which is purely
hereditary in nature.
In this case, at the time the deed was
executed, Faustina’s will was not yet probated;
the object of the contract, the 9,000 square
meter property, still formed part of the
inheritance of his father from the estate of
Faustina; and Domingo had a mere inchoate
hereditary right therein. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
2. Yes, it being undisputed that Domingo was the heir of
Benjamin, and therefore successor to Faustina.
• The Court affirmed CA’s finding that “[b]y representation,
when Benjamin died in 1960, Domingo took the place of his
father in succession. In the same vein, the holographic will of
Faustina mentioned Benjamin as one of her heirs to whom
Faustina imparted 9,000 square meters of her property” and
held:
x x x Domingo’s status as an heir of Faustina by
right of representation being undisputed, the
RTC should have maintained the validity
of TCT No. 266583 covering the 9,000
square meter subject property. As correctly
concluded by the CA, this served as the
inheritance of Domingo from Faustina. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
 3. Yes, 1996 DOAS was undoubtedly void for having been
executed months after Domingo died.
• The Court held:

x x x Regarding the deed of sale x x x in favor

of Renato Tabu, it is evidently null and void.
The document itself, x x x readily shows that it
was executed on August 4, 1996 more than two
months after the death of Domingo.
Contracting parties must be juristic entities at
the time of the consummation of the contract. x
x x Hence, if any one party to a supposed
contract was already dead at the time of its
execution, such contract is undoubtedly
simulated and false and, therefore, null and
void by reason of its having been made after
the death of the party who appears as one of
the contracting parties therein. The death of a
person terminates contractual capacity. x x x

(emphasis supplied)

DISPOSITION: Partially GRANTED, declaring 1975 DOAS void, 1996

DOAS void, and restoring TCT 281353 under Domingo Laxamana
subject to partition of his heirs.
 Sps Alcazar v. Arante (2012) the alleged date of loan and mortgage, thus cannot mortgage
the same.
Plaintiffs: Sps. Alcazar and Villamayor 12. The CA ruled in favor of Arante. MR was denied.
Defendant: Arante
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject lot was already owned by the Sps
Doctrine: at the time it was mortgaged to Arante on 2003

FACTS: RULING + RATIO: YES

1. Crisanto Alcazar is the sole heir of his deceased parents
(Emilio and Caridad who died 1967 and 2002, respectively). Petitioners admit in the instant petition that petitioner Alcazar's father
2. His parents left a land covered by TCT which was registered at died on December 12, 1967, while his mother died on March 4, 2002
Register of Deeds of Rizal but was transferred to Pasig. and that he is their sole heir. On these bases, the Court agrees with
3. Since the death of his mother, he has been in desire to respondent's contention that upon the death of Alcazar's mother in
transfer in his name the title (being the sole and compulsory 2002, the latter became the absolute owner of the subject lot by
heir). operation of law, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 774 and 777 of
4. Unknowledgeable about the procedures, Crisanto, who was the Civil Code.
living in the province, went to the Land Registration Office in
QC to inquire about the requirements.
5. Unfortunately, he was approached by a group of individuals DISPOSITION: DENY the present petition
who identified themselves as connected with LRA who offered
to help. Said individuals lured Crisanto to have the owner’s
duplicate of title entrusted to them for the alleged transfer.
Since then, he had never seen the group.
6. Crisanto exerted diligent efforts to recover the same but failed.
7. Crisanto thereafter filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost
Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT with the RTC of Pasig.
8. RTC ruled in favor of Crisanto. Said decision had become final
and executory.
9. A year after, Arante filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment
of the RTC’s decision contending that RTC, as land registration
court, had no jurisdiction to entertain Alcazar’s petition
because the subject owner’s duplicate of title was not lost but
actually exists contrary to Crisanto’s claim.
10. Arante alleged that in 2003 Sps Alcazar obtained a loan of
P350k from her and mortgaged their land, covered by the
subject TCT, as a security for the loan. That Crisanto
personally delivered and turned over the TCT to Arante and
Arante did not see the need to annotate the mortgage with
the Register of Deeds.
11. Sps Alcazar denied the allegations stating, among others, that
they are not yet the absolute owners of the land at the time of
Digest Author: Karen Oreo
Reyes v. CA (1997)
Petitioner: MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G.
REYES, LYN AGAPE, MARITES AGAPE, ESTABANA GALOLO,
and CELSA AGAPE
Respondent: CA, Julio Vivares
Ponencia: Torres
DOCTRINE: A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions
have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if
the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations
by word of mouth as they appear in the will.
FACTS:
1. Torcuato J. Reyes in his last will and testament give and bequeath
to his wife Asuncion Oning R. Reyes the following properties:
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among
others of jewelries, coins, antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures,
fixtures and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the
real estates Torcuato own in common with his brother Jose,
situated in Camiguin; real estates in Misamis Oriental.
2. Julio Vivares, the executor, filed a petition for probate of the will.
3. The recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes filed an
opposition with the following allegations:
a) that the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed
and attested in accordance with the formalities of law;
b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper
influence upon the testator at the time of the execution of the
will.
The opposition further averred that Torcuato was never
married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes because she was
married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage
was never annulled. Thus Asuncion cannot be a compulsory heir for
her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals.
4. TC: will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law. But Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of the
witnesses, was never married to the deceased Reyes, and, therefore,
their relationship was an adulterous one.
5. CA: Torcuato’s bequeathal to Asuncion valid because the oppositors
never showed any competent, documentary or otherwise during the
trial to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes marriage to the testator was
inexistent or void, either because of a pre-existing marriage or
adulterous relationship. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy
the presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very
declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his wife.
6. Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
oppositors filed this petition for review.
ISSUES: WON the disposition to Asuncion Reyes should be
recognized
RULING + RATIO: Yes
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass
only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated.
Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or
not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the
testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even
by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the wills provisions.
The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration
thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and
allowed.
EXCEPT: There are notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic
validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is
apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a
useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid.
The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because
practical considerations demanded it as when there is
preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are doubtful
legality. Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be
first determined, the probate court may also do so.
Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and
absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court
is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do
and pass upon certain provisions of the will.
The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the
probate of the will of the late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only
issues to be settled in the said proceeding were: (1) whether or not
the testator had animus testandi; (2) whether or not vices of consent that instrument, permitted them to do so. xxx All doubts must
attended the execution of the will; and (3) whether or not the be resolved in favor of the testators having meant just what
formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court he said.
was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that DISPOSITION: Petition denied.
Asuncion Oning Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized
during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of
Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry
on the wills intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by
the probate court.

The Nepomuceno case relied upon by the trial court is different from
the case at hand. In that case, the very tenor of the will invalidates
the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing of the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
To remand the case would only be a waste of time and money since
the illegality or defect was already patent. This case is different from
the Nepomuceno case. Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in
his will that he was bequeathing some of his personal and
real properties to his wife, Asuncion Oning Reyes. There was
never an open admission of any illicit relationship. In the case
of Nepomuceno, the testator admitted that he was already previously
married and that he had an adulterous relationship with the devisee.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court relied on
uncorroborated testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still
married to another during the time she cohabited with the testator.
The testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay and even
uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the
supposed husband of Asuncion.

In the elegant language of Justice Moreland written decades ago, he

said-

A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have

substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as
if the testator stood before the court in full life making the
declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That
was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the
instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished
to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of
 Ining v. Vega (2013)
Petition: Petition for Review
Petitioner: Heirs of Ining (Gregoria’s heirs)
Respondent: Heirs of Vega (Romana’s heirs)
Ponencia: Del Castillo
DOCTRINE: Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death.
*DISCLAIMER: The case is under Art. 783 according to the case list
but it did not mention anything about the said article nor anything
about wills so I just placed herein details/events related to
succession.
FACTS:
o Leon Roldan married to Menez owned a parcel of land located
in Kalibo, Aklan covered by an OCT. They died without an
issue.
o Roldan’s heirs: Romana Roldan and Gregoria Roldan-Ining
(siblings)
o Romana’s heirs: daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson
Leonardo Vega (both deceased); Leonardo is survived by his
wife Lourdes and their children (Respondents)
o Gregoria’s heirs: 6 children, one of them is Antipolo Ining
(Petitioners)
o Teodora – daughter of Antipolo Ining
1. With ½ claim over the parcel of land, Leonardo Vega as an
heir of Romana filed with RTC for partition as recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against Gregoria’s
heirs w/ the following claims:
a. Gregoria’s heirs refused to heed his demands that they
even reached the level of the Lupon Tagapamayapa
b. Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole ownership over the
property
c. Portions of the property were even sold to Tresvalles
and Tajonera
d. 1979 – Lucimo Sr. husband of Teodora claimed
absolute ownership over the property and transferred
in his name the tax declaration of the property
e. Prayer: to be declared the owner of ½ of the property
and that the property be partitioned, and for Gregoria’s
heirs to be ordered to execute the necessary
documents and agreements + actual damages and
attorneys fees
2. Answer/claims of Romana’s heirs:
a. They have no cause of action against them
b. They have become the sole owners of the property
through a sale (Leon Roldan -> Enriquez -> Lucimo Sr)
c. They have been in continuous, actual, adverse,
notorious, and exclusive possession over the property
w/ just title
d. They have been paying taxes
e. Leonardo’s claim is already barred by estoppel and
laches
f. Prayer: Dismissal of the case and for Leonardo to be
declared to not have any right over the property +
damages
3. RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action
has already prescribed (should be within 30 years) although
the deeds and the sale were found to be spurious. Hence, the
lot was declared to be a common property of Gregoria’s heirs.
4. CA revered the decision giving ½ of the property to Gregori’s
heirs and the other half to Romana’s.
a. CA did not agree on the pronouncements regarding
prescription that the period ran upon Leon’s death
(1962). It should’ve started running when Lucimo
executed an Affidavit of Ownership over the land
(1979) which was tantamount to a repudiation of the
co-ownership with Leonardo.
b. CA does not recognize Lucimo Sr.’s act of repudiation
since the other pary was not ousted nor deprived of his
rights as co-owner and he intention of assuming
exclusive ownership over the property, AND absent a
 showing that this was effectively ownership over the
property (remember Property??)
c. Neither did the payment of taxes proved ownership
d. Laches cannot also apply as against Leonardo since
laches is controlled by equitable considerations and it
cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate fraud,
depriving the other parties of the right over the
inheritance
ISSUE: WoN Gregoria’s heirs are entitled to the property as well (can
partitioned be really still made)
PROVISION: Art. 783 A will is an act whereby a person is
permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control
to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect
after his death. (not mentioned in the case)
RULING + RATIO: YES
o Since Leon died without an issue, his sisters automatically
inherited the property as his heirs during the moment of his
death in accordance with Art. 777.
o Therefore, both set of heirs are entitled to the property as the
sisters during that time became the co-owners of the
property..
o Even if Lucimo’s acts amounted to repudiation, such did not
suffice because Teodora was the heir and was the actual co-
owner.
DISPOSITION: CA decision AFFIRMED.
Pacana v Rovila Water Supply
Rebecca Pacaña-Contreras and Rosalie Pacaña, children of Lourdes
Teves Pacaña and Luciano Pacaña, filed the present case against
Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and Marisa for accounting and damages
Petitioners allege that Lilia, a former employee, claimed ownership of
their family business and was able to place it under the name of
Rovila Water Supply Inc. by using the name of Lourdes Pacana as one
of the incorporators. Thereafter, the respondents used the Pacana
family’s receipts and the deliveries and sales were made to appear as
those of the respondent Rovila.
Petitioners filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie
was authorized by Lourdes through a sworn declaration and SPA. The
respondents filed a first motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over an intra-corporate controversy but it was
denied.
Petitioners’ sister, Lagrimas Pacaña-Gonzales, filed a motion for leave
to intervene and her answer-in-intervention was granted by the trial
court.
At the subsequent pre-trial, the respondents manifested to the RTC
that a substitution of the parties was necessary in light of the deaths
of Lourdes and Luciano. They filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds, among others, that the petitioners are not the real parties in
interest to institute and prosecute the case and that they have no
valid cause of action against the respondents. Such motion was
denied because it was filed out of time.
CA ruled for the respondents and agreed that the petitioners are not
the real parties in interest; and that they had no legal right to institute
the action in behalf of their parents as they had not yet been declared
heirs in a separate proceeding.
Issue: WoN the petitioners are the real parties in interest
Held: YES
At the inception of the present case, both the spouses Pacana were
not impleaded as parties-plaintiffs. The Court notes, however, that
they are indispensable parties to the case as the alleged owners of
Rovila Water Supply. Without their inclusion as parties, there can be
no final determination of the present case. However, the failure to
implead indispensable parties is a curable error, and the Court is of
the view that the proper remedy in the present case is to implead the
indispensable parties especially when their non-inclusion is merely a
technical defect.
Obviously, in the present case, the deceased Pacanas can no longer
be included in the complaint as indispensable parties because of their
death during the pendency of the case. Upon their death, however,
their ownership and rights over their properties were transmitted to
their heirs, including herein petitioners, pursuant to Article 774 in
relation with Article 777 of the Civil Code.
In Orbeta, et al. v. Sendiong, the Court acknowledged that the heirs,
whose hereditary rights are to be affected by the case, are deemed
indispensable parties who should have been impleaded by the trial
court. Therefore, to obviate further delay in the proceedings of the
present case and given the Court’s authority to order the inclusion of
an indispensable party at any stage of the proceedings, the heirs of
the spouses Pacana, except the petitioners who are already parties to
the case and Lagrimas Pacaña-Gonzalez who intervened in the case,
are hereby ordered impleaded as parties-plaintiffs.
 Enriquez vs Abadia (1954) - The requirements under the Civil Code in Article 810 was
Petition: Appeal of decision of RTC not complied with
Petitioner: Severina Vda. de Enriquez, et al. o The back pages of the first two folios were not
Respondent: Miguel Abadia signed by any one and were not numbered
Ponencia: Montemayor o The three front pages were signed only by the
testator
DOCTRINE: The validity of the will is based on the law observed at - Failure to comply with the requirement of signatures on
the time it was made, not at the time of the death of the testator. the left hand margin of each page was a fatal defect
- However, and more importantly, the Courts took notice of
Article 795, which provides that “The validity of a will as to
FACTS: its form depends upon the observance of the law in force
1) In September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of at the time it is made.”
Talisay, Cebu executed a document purported to be his last - The validity of the will is based on the law observed at the
will and testament. He died on January 14, 1943 time it was made, not at the time of the death of the
2) He left properties valued at P8,000. Andres, one of the testator.
legatees, filed a petition for its probate. Some cousins and - Because there was no law permitting holographic wills at
nephews who would inherit if he left no will opposed the the time the will was made, the same is not valid as to
probate. Father Sancho.
3) During hearing, one of the attesting witnesses to the
document (the other two being dead), testified that in his DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED. Order appealed from
presence and in the presence of co-witnesses, Father Sancho REVERSED. Will of Father Sancho DENIED PROBATE.
wrote in longhand the will in Spanish, which he spoke and
understood; and that he signed on the left hand margin of
each of the folios or sheets and numbered them in Arabic
numerals, and signed his name on the last page of the will in
the presence of the witnesses after saying it was his will. The
attesting witnesses signed their names after the attestation
clause. Oppositors submitted no evidence.
4) Trial court found that it was a holographic will. Although at the
time of the making of the will and the death of the testator,
holographic wills were not permitted by law, the court
admitted the probate because during the time of the hearing
the Civil Code was already in force and allowed for holographic
wills. This was under a liberal view to give effect to the will.
Oppositors appealed.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the probate of the will may be admitted

RULING + RATIO:
1. NO
 Jaboneta vs Gustilo (1906)
Petition: Review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner: German Jarboneta
Respondent: Ricardo Gustilo, et al.
Ponencia: Carson
DOCTRINE: True test of vision for the purposes of the testator and
witnesses to be considered as having signed in each other’s presence
is not whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether
he might have seen him sign, considering his mental and physical
condition and position at the time of the subscription
FACTS:
1. Macario Jaboneta, in the house of Arcadio Jarandilla, in Jaro,
Iloilo, ordered that the a document written, and calling Julio
Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses,
executed the said document as his will
2. They were all together, and were in the room where Jaboneta
was, and were present when he signed the document, Isabelo
signing afterwards as a witness, at his request, and in his
presence and in the presence of the other two witnesses
3. Aniceto then signed as witness, in the presence of the testator
and the other two witnesses. At that moment, Isabelo was in a
hurry to leave. As Isabelo was leaving, Julio entered the house
with pen in hand, ready to sign the document.
4. Nevertheless, Julio signed in the presence of the testator and
Aniceto.
5. The probate of Macario Jaboneta’s will was denied because the
lower court opined that one of the witnesses, Julio Javellana, did
not attach his signature to the will in the presence of Isabelo
Jana, another witness, as required by Section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure
a. This was because in Isabelo’s testimony, he stated that
after signing, he saw Aniceto, another witness, sign the
will
b. But after Aniceto, he was in a hurry and left
c. Upon leaving, he saw Julio enter with a pen in his hand
but he was not sure if he actually signed the will
ISSUES:
2. W/N the witnesses signed the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other
RULING + RATIO:
2. YES
- The fact that Isabelo was still in the room when he saw
Julio moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his
signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of
the remaining witnesses which shows that Julio did in fact
there and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that
the signature was affixed in the presence of Isabelo
- The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his
back was turned while a portion of the name of the
witness was being written, is of no importance
- He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had
assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and
were together in the same room for that purpose
- At the moment when Julio signed the document he was
actually and physically present and in such position with
relation to Julio that he could see everything which took
place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction,
and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing
so
- True test of vision is not whether the testator actually saw
the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him
sign, considering his mental and physical condition and
position at the time of the subscription
DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED. Trial court decision
REVERSED. Probate of Jaboneta’s will ADMITTED.
 Cruz vs Villasor (1973)
Petitioner: Agapita N. Cruz
Respondent: Judge Guillermo Villasor, Manuel Lugay
Ponencia: Esguerra
DOCTRINE: The notary public to whom acknowledgment is made by
the testator and the attesting witnesses cannot himself be an
attesting or acknowledging witness.
FACTS:
6. In the execution of the will of Valente Cruz, there were three
attesting witnesses, Deogracias Jamaloas, Dr. Francisco Panares,
and Atty. Angel Teves. Atty. Teves was also a notary public.
7. The will was submitted for probate before the CFI Cebu. Agapita,
the surviving spouse of Valente, opposed the same,
8. Agapita opposed the probate on these grounds:
a. Fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence
b. Instrument was executed without Valente having been
fully informed of its contents, particularly as to what
properties he was disposing
c. Instrument not executed in accordance with law
i. Because the third witness was the notary public,
the result is that only two witnesses appeared
before the notary public to acknowledge the will
9. CFI Cebu admitted the probate of the will of Valente Cruz
the other to acknowledge his participation in the
making of the will
- Function of a notary public is, among others, to guard
against any illegal or immoral arrangement. That function
would defeated if the notary public were one of the
attesting instrumental witnesses
o He would be interested in sustaining the validity of
the will as it directly involves him and the validity of
his act
o Very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to
minimize fraud, would be thwarted
- American cases cited by appellees do not apply because
the notary public in the case at bar was both an attesting
witness (signing of the will) and acknowledging witness
(before a notary public)
- The net effect is that only two witnesses attesting to the
will and acknowledging the will before the presence of the
notary public, in contravention of both Articles 805 and
806.
DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED. Order of CFI REVERSED.
Will of Valente Cruz INVALID.

ISSUES:
3. W/N the last will and testament of Valente was made in
accordance with law (Articles 805 and 806)

RULING + RATIO:
3. NO
- The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged
cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness
since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having
signed the will
- If the third witness were the notary public himself, he
would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the
will in front of himself
o This cannot be done because he cannot split his
personality into two so that one will appear before
 Echavez vs Dozen Construction (2010)
Petitioner: Manuel Echavez
Respondent: Dozen Construction and Development Corporation,
Register of Deeds of Cebu City
Ponencia: Brion
DOCTRINE: The law contemplates two distinct acts that serve
different purposes when speaking of attestation and acknowledgment.
In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves
under Article 805, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in
the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
FACTS:
10. Vicente Echavez was the absolute owner of the subject lots
located in Cebu City
11. On September 7, 1985, Vicente donated the subject lots to
Manuel through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa, which was
accepted.
12. March 1986 – Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the lots in
favor of Dozen Construction
13. October 1986 – Execution of two Deeds of Absolute Sale over the
subject lots
14. Vicente died on November 1986. Emilio Cabanig, nephew of the
deceased, filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate. Manuel filed a petition to approve the Donation Mortis
Causa and an action to annul the contracts of sale
15. RTC dimissed Manuel’s petition and action, finding that the act of
entering into the Contracts of Sale constituted Vicente’s revocation
over the donation
16. CA affirmed and also found that since a donation mortis causa
must comply with the formalities of a will (Articles 805 and 806),
the Deed of Donation’s lack of an attestation clause rendered the
Donation Mortis Causa void
17. Manuel claims that the CA should have applied the rule on
substantial compliance in the construction of a will to the Donation
Mortis Causa because there was an Acknowledgement Portion
which contained the “import and purpose” of an attestation clause
ISSUES:
4. W/N the CA erred in finding that the Donation Mortis Causa
did not comply with the formalities of a will required by law
RULING + RATIO:
4. NO
- CA correctly ruled that the rules in Articles 805 and 806
should apply to donations mortis causa
- The purported attestation clause embodied in the
Acknowledgment portion does not contain the number of
pages on which the deed was written
- Also, the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve
different purposes when speaking of attestation and
acknowledgment
- Acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed,
declaring before competent officer or court that the deed
or act is his own
- Attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental
witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the
instrument before them and to the manner of its execution
- Although the witnesses acknowledged the execution of the
Deed before a notary public, still this is not what the law
requires of instrumental witnesses to the execution of a
will
- Attestation must contain all the details under the third
paragraph of Article 805
o In the absence of what is required under said
paragraph, there is no attestation clause deemed
embodied in the acknowledgment
DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED. Decision of CA AFFIRMED.
 Ajero v. CA (1994)
Petitioners: Spouses Roberto and Thelma Ajero
Respondents: The Court of Appeals and Clemente Sand
G.R. No. 106720
Digest Author: Billy Alcid
Ponencia: Puno, J.
Doctrine: Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations
or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on
testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself.
The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such
changes.
FACTS:
1. Decedent, Annie Sand, left a holographic will naming as
devisees the following: petitioners Ajero, respondent Clemente
and others all surnamed Sand and Dr. Jose Ajero.
2. Spouses Ajero instituted special proceedings for the allowance
of the will alleging that at the time of execution, decedent was
of sound mind, not acting under dures, fraud or undue
influence, and was capacitated to dispose her estate by will.
3. Respondent opposed the will on the grounds that:
a. Neither the will’s body nor the signature was in
decedent’s handwriting
b. Will contained alterations and corrections not duly
signed by decedent
c. Will was procured through pressure and undue
influence
4. Trial court admitted probate of the will. CA however reversed
the decision ruling that the will failed to meet the
requirements for validity. It ruled that certain dispositions
were unsigned and undated and that the erasures, alterations
and corrections had not been authenticated by the decedent.
ISSUES:
WON the will is still valid
PROVISION/s:
Article 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (678, 688a)
Article 813. When a number of dispositions appearing in a
holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last
disposition has a signature and a date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
(n)
Article 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or
alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the
same by his full signature. (n)
RULING + RATIO:
YES
• In the case at bar, the will was not executed in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law (specifically Articles
813 and 814 of the Civil Code).
• In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity
is the requirement that they be totally autographic or
handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under
Article 810 of the New Civil Code.
• Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in
the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
• A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that
its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions
contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the
testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the
result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated.
Such failure, however, does not render the whole
testament void.
• Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to
probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814.
• When a number of erasures, corrections, and
interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will
have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is
not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as
respects the particular words erased, corrected or
interlined.
 • Note also that the requirements of authentication of
changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in
provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which
provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the
holographic will (Article 810).
• This separation and distinction adds support to the
interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of
the New Civil Code — and not those found in Articles 813
and 814 of the same Code — are essential to the probate
of a holographic will.

DISPOSITION:
The Trial Court ruling was reinstated hence admitting the probate of
the will.
Digest Author: Mangaser
In Re: Will of Ruperta Palaganas (2011)
DOCTRINE: A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction.
FACTS:
1. Ruperta Palaganas is a Filipino who became a naturalized U.S
citizen, who died single and childless.
2. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she
designated her brother SERGIO, as the executor of her will for
she had left properties in the PH and in the US.
3. ERNESTO, another brother of RUPERTA, filed with the RTC of
Malolos Bulacan, a Petition for the probate of RUPERTA’s will
and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.
4. MANUEL and BENJAMIN, nephews of RUPERTA, opposed the
petition on the ground that RUPERTA’s will should not be
probated in the PH but in the US where she executed it.
Should the will be probated in the PH, it will be rendered
invalid for having been executed under duress. Also, they
claimed that ERNESTO is not qualified to act as administrator.
5. Since GLORIA and SERGIO, RUPERTA’s foreign-based siblings,
were on separate occasions in the PH for a visit, ERNESTO
filed a motion for leave to take their deposition, which was
granted.
6. The RTC admitted RUPERTA’s will for probate, appointing
ERNESTO as special administrator at the request of SERGIO.
7. MANUEL and BENJAMIN, appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed
the RTC’s decision.
DISPOSITION: Petition to deny probate is denied.
ISSUES:
WON a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed
in the country where it was executed
PROVISION: Article 816
RULING + RATIO:
• Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by
foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been
probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.
• Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may
take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
• Our rules merely require that the petition for allowance of a
will must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
o The jurisdictional facts (refer to the fact of death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in
such province)
o The names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent
o The probate value and character of the property of the
estate
o The name of the person for whom letters are prayed
o If the will has not been delivered to the court, the
name of the person having custody of it.
• The Rules do not require proof that the foreign will has
already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.
• Rules on reprobate, or reauthentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country, will not apply in
this case, as RUPERTA’s will is presented for the first time
before a competent court.
Digest Author: Karen Oreo
Opulencia v. CA (1998)
Petitioner: Natalia Carpena Opulencia
Respondent: CA, Aladin Simundac, Miguel Olivan
Ponencia: Panganiban
DOCTRINE: Art. 838
FACTS:
1. Aladin Simundac and Miguel Olivan filed a complaint for
specific performance against Natalia Carpena Opulencia on the
ground that the latter executed in their favor a 'contract to
sell' of lot in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
2. Opulencia, despite demands, failed to comply with her
obligations under the contract.
3. Opulencia contends that where the estate of the deceased
person is already the subject of a testate or intestate
proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any
transaction involving it without prior approval of the Probate
Court. She maintains that the Contract to Sell is void because
it was not approved by the probate court, as required by
Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.
SEC. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or
otherwise encumber estate. The court having jurisdiction of
the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or
administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real
estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it appears
necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations
4. Opulencia, instead of submitting evidence, filed a demurrer.
5. Meanwhile, the court a quo granted the demurrer and
dismissed the complaint.
6. On appeal, the appellate court set aside the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint holding that Sec. 7 Rule 89 does not
apply in this case because she entered into the Contract to Sell
in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or
administratrix of the estate.
ISSUE: WON Contract to sell without the requisite court
approval is valid
RULING + RATIO: YES.
Contract to Sell is valid
● Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because
petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an
heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the
contract, she represented herself as the lawful owner and seller of the
subject parcel of land.
● Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of
the decedent’s death.
● Opulencia, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary
share the moment her father died.
● Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the
Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive
right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of
her late father.
Administration of Estate not prejudiced by Contract to sell
● The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioners offer to sell is
contingent on the complete clearance of the court on the Last Will
Testament of her father.
● Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner’s apprehension
that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition
and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is
settled that the sale made by an heir of his share in an
inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise
stands in the way of such administration.
Estoppel
● She had already received P300,000 as initial payment of the
purchase price. She may not renege on her own acts and
representations, to the prejudice of the private respondents who have
relied on them. Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the
courts will extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable contract he
or she entered into with all the required formalities and with full
awareness of its consequences.
Disposition: Petition denied.

Uy Kiao Eng v. Nixon Lee (2010)
Petitioner: Uy Kiao Eng
Respondent: Nixon Lee
Ponencia: Nachura
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
1. Respondent Nixon Lee alleges that his father passed away and
left a holographic will, which is now in the custody of Uy Kiao
Eng, his mother. Respondent filed a petition for Mandamus to
compel the petitioner to produce the will so that probate
proceedings could be instituted.
2. Petitioner asserts that respondent failed to prove that she had
custody of the holographic will, and that all the evidence
presented as hearsay, as well as being irrelevant and
immaterial. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. Also she
asserts that respondent has possession of a photocopy
of the holographic will.
3. Respondent sought review from the appellate court, the CA
initially denied, it ruled that mandamus would only issue in
instances when no other remedy and sufficient to afford
redress. Under Rule 76, in an action for settlement of estate,
respondent could ask for the presentation or production and
for approval of the holographic will.
4. When respondent sought for reconsideration it was granted,
and issued the Writ of Mandamus and ordered the production
of the will.
Hence this petition
Provision:
Sec. 3 Rule 65
When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use enjoyment of aright or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
may file a verified petition in the proper court…
Rule 76, Section 1:
Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at anytime, after the death of the
testator petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Issue:
WON Mandamus may lie in this case?
Held:
No, it is recognized in our jurisdiction that mandamus cannot
be used to enforce contractual obligations, and furthermore
there are other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies
available.
Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely contractual rights,
and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the
nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not
appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.
Moreover, mandamus cannot issue should there be a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case
respondent Lee has other remedies available. It is to be noted that
respondent has a photocopy of the will that he seeks the production.
The Rules of Court does not prevent him from instituting probate
proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his
possession or not.
Disposition: PETITION GRANTED
 Testate Estate of Pilapil (1941)
Petitioner: Leticia Valmonte Ortega
Respondent: Josefina Valmonte
Ponencia: Panganiban, J.
Note: Sorry guys this was a full Spanish case and translating it to
English was of little help. I got most from an online digest which
made sense, but in case you want to read the original, it’s found
here: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1941/jun1941/gr_l-
47931_1941.html
(translate to English nalang)
FACTS:
1. FATHER PILAPIL was a parish priest in Cebu. He died in 1935.
2. Absent a will, his brother CALIXTO filed a case for intestacy.
The court then heard the case.
3. It was on March 1939 that a case was filed by a certain
MENDOZA (nephew of testator) for the probate of the last will
and testament of FATHER PILAPIL.
4. In said will, MENDOZA was appointed administrator of the
estate. And in case MENDOZA fails or becomes negligent, it
was stipulated that CABATINGAN replace him.
5. The probate of this will was opposed by PILAPIL and others,
on several grounds:
a. documents contained erasures and alterations
b. it was not proven that decedent possessed knowledge
of the Spanish language in which the documents were
written
c. there was a provision which prohibits the
probate of the will in courts
d. both documents were not prepared, signed, and
witnessed in accordance with the Rules.
ISSUE:
WoN the will may be admitted into probate
RULING + RATIO:
YES.
• The disposition of the testator that his “last will and testament
not be heard by the court” can not strip courts of their
authority to determine whether the will is valid or not.
• The law requires that wills made by a testator should be
delivered to the Court after the person dies, by the person to
whom custody has been entrusted, so that the court can
determine whether the will is valid and at the same time
determine the disposition of the testator so that the estate my
be disposed of as instructed.
• If it be found that the testator died intestate, the said will then
cannot be capable of being legalized.
(Or however you understand this phrase: or if the contract
must be declared died intestate, not be subject to legalization
which has been granted.)
NOTE FROM ONLINE DIGEST:
The important issue here is that whatever defects there are in the last
will and testament of the testator, as long as there is substantial
compliance of the basic requirements of the law, the same should be
given effect in the absence of fraud. It can be gleaned in the poorly
translated original text that the testator had given instructions as to
how his property should be disposed of. This could not be given effect
unless the court has passed upon its validity in probate proceedings,
because of Article 838.
Resource digest here:
https://www.scribd.com/doc/167498343/Digest-838-844-Succession
DISPOSITION: CFI decision affirmed.
 Ortega v. Valmonte (2005)
Petitioner: Leticia Valmonte Ortega
Respondent: Josefina Valmonte
Ponencia: Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
6. PLACIDO lived for a long time in the US until he finally
reached retirement.
7. He came home to stay in the Philippines and lived in a house
in San Antonio Village in Makati, which he owned in common
with sister CIRIACA.
8. Two years after his arrival in the Philippines, at the age of 80,
he wed JOSEFINA who was then 28 years old.
9. In a little more than two years of wedded bliss, PLACIDO died
of “COR PULMONALE.”
10. It appears that prior to such, PLACIDO had executed a notarial
last will and testament dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged
only on August 9, 1983.
11. In this will, he bequeathed to JOSEFINA ½ portions of
properties he owned as co-owner, and the rest of his real and
personal properties. He further appointed JOSEFINA as sole
executrix.
12. When JOSEFINA sought to have this will probated, a certain
LETICIA opposed on several grounds, the pertinent ones being
that there was non-compliance with the legal solemnities in
the execution and attestation of the will, and the mental
incapacity of testator at the time of execution.
13. JOSEFINA presented as witnesses the notary public and the
instrumental witnesses, who all attested to the due execution
of the will and PLACIDO’s mental capacity.
14. LETICIA’s argument is that JOSEFINA alone should not inherit
as there are other children from the siblings of PLACIDO, and
that PLACIDO had asked to live with LETICIA’s family where
they took care of him – and it was herein that they witnesses
his physical and mental condition which showed deterioration,
aberrations and senility.
15. The CA eventually allowed probate.
16. LETICIA now contends that it was highly dubious for a
woman at the prime of her young life to almost
immediately plunge into marriage with a man who was
thrice her age, who happened to be a Fil-American
pensionado, thus casting doubt on the intention of
respondent in seeking the probate of the will.
Moreover, it supposedly defies human reason, logic
and common experience for an old man with a severe
psychological condition to have willingly signed a last
will and testament.
ISSUE:
WoN the signature of PLACIDO in the subject will was procured by
fraud or trickery, and that he never intended that the instrument
should be his last will and testament
RULING + RATIO:
NO.
• Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by
which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character
that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or
contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate
to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception
regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will
which, but for the fraud, he would not have made
• The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the
existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to
show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a
showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this
case, other than the self-serving allegations of
petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
• That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently
established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was
more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and
disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who
had taken the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his
twilight years.
As to PLACIDO’s testamentary capacity:
Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the
kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and
even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it
was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The
omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal
validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its
disposition becomes irrelevant.

DISPOSITION: Petition denied; CA affirmed.

 HERACIO R. REVILLA v. COURT of APPEALS, et al. (1993)
Petitioner: Heracio R. Revilla;
Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals, Fortunato Revilla, Luz
Revilla David, Loreto Revilla Gutierrez, Veneranda
Revilla Maniquez, Nicasio Revilla, Perfecta Revilla
Balacania, Justinia Revilla del Rosario, and Agripina
Revilla Chacon;
Ponente: Griño – Aquino, J.
DOCTRINE: Conclusiveness of the allowance of a will
Art. 838. x x x Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of a
will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his
death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
FACTS:
9. Don Cayetano Revilla (“Testator”) owned 2 parcels of land
with buildings on Calle Azcaraga, Manila, and 6 parcels in San
Miguel, Bulacan (“Properties”);
10. On 28 January 1978, Testator executed a will bequeathing all
his properties to his 9 nephews and nieces (herein parties who
are full-blood siblings), each getting an undivided 1/10 share
of his estate, reserving the last tenth for masses to be said
after his death, and for the religious images which he kept in a
chapel in Bulacan, where masses could be held also;
11. Testator sough the probate of his own will before CFI Manila
Br. X, which the latter allowed in 21 March 1980. However,
Manila City Hall was destroyed by fire in 18 November 1981,
burning the records of the said case with it. Thus, a
reconstitution of the records was instituted, the Testator
testifying therefore resulting to the grant thereof;
12. Testator died on 11 November 1986. 8 days thereafter,
Heracio Revilla (“Heracio”) filed a petition for probate of
another will, allegedly executed by Testator on 13 September
1982 wherein he was instituted as sole heir and executor of
his uncle’s estate. The same proceeding was opposed by his 8
brothers and sisters on the ff. grounds:
a. A prior will was already allowed and probated, and
that Testator never informed anyone that he
revoked the same will;
b. The 1982 will was not executed in accordance with
law and that Testator’s signature was different
form his usual and customary signature;
c. Testator was of unsound mind at the time the
alleged will was executed, Testator being incapable
of taking care of his properties;
d. Testator’s consent was procured by undue and
improper pressure & influence, duress & influence
of fear, and by mistake, fraud & trickery, the
instrument not being his intended will;
13. As Heracio’s appointment as executor was also opposed,
the same was ordered to be held in abeyance by the trial
court, with order for the parties to present evidence on the
second will. On 1 December 1987, the same court
disallowed the will, charging costs of suit to Heracio;
14. Court of Appeals affirmed the disallowance, hence the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45).
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in disallowing the will.
PROVISION: Art. 838, New Civil Code
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules
of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the
court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such
case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the
allowance of wills after the testator’s death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of
Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on
petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of a will, either
during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.
RULING + RATIO:
No. The second will was properly disallowed.
• The Court gave credence to the trial court’s finding that
Testator’s own testimony during the reconstitution case
categorically belied Heracio’s allegation that the second will
was executed in 13 September 1982, with Testator testifying
himself that he was hospitalized at that time and could not
sign any document due to his illness. Further, his
declaration that the first will was his true and only will
was categorically made in 27 November 1982, 2
months after the supposed execution of the second
will;
• Heracio’s claim that Testator’s denial was a negative denial
was misplaced, as explained by the Court. Thus:
x x x Evidence is negative when the witness
states that he did not see or know the
occurrence of a fact, and positive when the
witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur
(2 Moore an Facts,
p 1338). Don Cayetano's declaration that he did
not execute a second will, constitutes positive
evidence of a fact personally known to himself:
that he did not make a second will. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
• Court also found that although Heracio opposed the
reconstitution proceedings for the first will, he did not reveal
the second will supposedly made by Testator which could have
been his strongest piece of evidence in such opposition.
Neither did the Court subscribe to Heracio’s argument that
Testator’s testimony was not cross-examined since his lawyer
had every opportunity to do the same. Further, the Court
ruled:
x x x If Don Cayetano's testimony was "an
honest mistake due to a misapprehension of
fact" as the petitioner insists (p. 35, Rollo), that
mistake would have been rectified by inviting
his attention to the second will. It seems,
however, that Attorney Layosa was under
constraint not to disclose the second will to Don
Cayetano. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
• Further, the Court held that since Testator could not
have executed the will at the alleged date, he must
have made the same while he was incommunicado in
his house. The trial court had to issue an order
commanding Heracio to allow his siblings to visit
Testator, therefore belying his allegation that Testator
disliked Heracio’s siblings. Thus, the finding that the
second will was executed in an environment of secrecy
and seclusion strengthened the conclusion that the
same was employed with undue influence, thereby
defrauding Heracio’s siblings. Thus, the Court found:
x x x There was fraud because Don
Cayetano was not apprised that the
document he was signing with Co, Barredo
and Lim was a second will revoking the
dispositions of property that he made in his
first will. Had he been aware that it was a
second will, and if it were prepared at his
own behest, he would not have denied that
he made it. He would probably have caused
it to be probated while he was still alive, as
he did with his first will. But apparently, the
instrument was foisted on him without his
being aware of its true nature which the
petitioner assiduously concealed, not only
from the court and the private respondents,
but from Don Cayetano himself. That the
dispositions in the second will were not
 made by Don Cayetano is proven by the
omission therefrom of Don Cayetano's
reservation of one-tenth of his properties
and the income thereof to pay for holy
masses for the repose of his soul and to be
spent for the maintenance of his family
chapel which houses the religious images
he owned in San Miguel, Bulacan. That
provision in his first will, for his personal
benefit, would not have been deleted by
Don Cayetano if his only purpose in making
a second will was to disinherit his eight
nephews and nieces. But Heracio overdid
himself. He wanted everything. x x x

(emphasis supplied)

• Finally, the Court found Heracio’s witnesses to be incredible in

view of their contradicting testimonies as to Testator’s
knowledge of the English language.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court
of Appeals, the petition for review is DENIED. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Miciano vs Brimo (1927)
Petitioner: Testate estate of Joseph G. Brimo, Juan Miciano -
Administrator
Respondent: Andre Brimo
Ponencia: Romualdez
DOCTRINE: Rules on legal and testamentary succession are
governed by the nationality of the person whose succession is being
considered. Any clause stipulating the application of any other law is
invalid.
FACTS:
18. Miciano, as administrator of Joseph Brimo’s estate, filed a scheme
of partition.
19. Andre opposes the following:
a. The approval of the scheme
b. Denial of his participation in the inheritance
c. Denial of the MR of the order approving the partition
d. Approval of the purchase made by Pietro Lana of the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
business
e. Declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this
cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the
scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's
business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions
requested in reference to the Turkish laws
20. The opposition is mostly anchored on the fact that the partition
puts into effect the provisions of Brimo's will which are not in
accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which
reason they are void as being in violation or Article 10 of the Civil
Code (rules on legal and testamentary succession are based on
nationality of the deceased)
21. Also, Andre opposes the fact of his exclusion from the partition
despite being designated as a legatee
a. “Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a
Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon
me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality
and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable
length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded
in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my
wish that the distribution of my property and everything in
connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or
persons who fail to comply with this request.”
22. Trial Court approved the scheme of partition.
ISSUES:
5. W/N the trial court erred in approving the scheme of partition
6. W/N the trial court in approving the exclusion of Andre
RULING + RATIO:
5. NO
- Andre did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are
not in accordance with the Turkish laws
o Did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are
o In the absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines
6. YES
- Although the second clause is in the nature of a conditional
institution of heirs, and Andre not having complied with
said condition by insisting on the application of Turkish
laws lead to his exclusion from partition, the same is
invalid because it expressly ignores the testator's national
law – Article 10 NCC
o Thus, said provision is deemed not written in the
will
o All of the remaining clauses in the will are valid,
though
DISPOSITION: Petition PARTLY GRANTED. Distribution of
estate MODIFIED to INCLUDE ANDRE as one of the legatees
 Llorente v CA
Petitioner: PAULA T. LLORENTE
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE
Ponente: Pardo, J.
DOCTRINE:
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit
from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed
in accordance with the formalities required is answered by
referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.
FACTS:
17. In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the
U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and Paula Llorente got married in
Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American citizen.
18. In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He
discovered that Paula was already living illicitly with Ceferino
Llorente (brother of Lorenzo). Ceferino and Paula even had a
son.
19. Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to
give her monetary support. Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula
agreed in writing Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula if
the latter agrees to waive all monetary support from Lorenzo.
Later, Lorenzo returned to the United States.
20. In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in
California. Paula was represented by an American counsel. The
divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce became final.
21. Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married
Alicia Fortuno. They had three children.
22. In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where
he left all his estate to Alicia and their children (nothing for
Paula). In 1983, he went to court for the will’s probate and to
have Alicia as the administratrix of his property. In 1985,
before the probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo
died. Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration
over Lorenzo’s estate.
23. The trial court ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia is void
because the divorce he obtained abroad is void. The trial court
ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a Filipino hence divorce is not
applicable to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in
disregarding the will. (This might be the pertinent
issue)
2. Whether or not the divorce is valid.
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES. The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete
disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal,
especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here
obtaining.
a. Art. 17 of the Civil Code provides that the forms and
solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they
are executed.
b. When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established
by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
c. The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his
property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not
wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.
 d. Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall
inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.
Whether the will was executed in accordance with
the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
e. As a guide however, the trial court should note that
whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the
decedent's national law.[45]
f. Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the
other issues raised.
2. Other Issue: Yes, the Divorce is valid because Llorenzo was no
longer a Filipino citizen and therefore is not governed by the Civil
Code. (Divorce is allowed by the United States of America.)

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is
SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial
Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in
favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of
the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final
on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and
determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the
framework of the Rules of Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Dorotheo v. CA (1999)
Petition: Petition for Review
Petitioner: Lourdes Dorotheo
Respondent: CA, Quintana
Ponencia: Ynares-Santiago
DOCTRINE: A final and executory decision or order can no longer be
disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be; A final
judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole
world.
FACTS:
1. Nilda Quintana et. al. were the legitimate children of Alejandro
Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. Aniceta died without her estate
being settled while Alejandro died thereafter.
2. Lourdes Dorotheo filed a special proceeding for the probate of
Alejandro’s estate, claiming that she was the one who took
care of him before he died.
3. The court admitted the will without the children filing an
appeal from said order. After 2 years, they filed a “Motion to
Declare the Will Intrinsically Void.”
4. Hence, an ORDER was issued declaring Lourdes not the wife
of Alejandro and the children as the only heirs of the spouses.
It also directed the distribution of the estate according to the
laws on intestacy (explanation: dispositions conveying part of
the estate to Lorudes was void so law of intestacy shall apply).
5. Lourdes filed an MR arguing that she is still entitled to some
compensation since she took care of Alejandro despite not
being her married to him. The MR and her appeal to CA were
dismissed.
6. Upon becoming final and executory, a writ of execution was
issued by the lower court.
7. The said orders (judgment and execution) were later on set
aside on the ground that the ORDER was just interlocutory
and not final in character.
ISSUE: WoN the court’s ORDER constituted allowance of the
will (WoN the order has already attained finality)
PROVISION: Art. 838 (It was not mentioned at all in the case but I
think Atty. Mison placed the case under this provision because of the
procedural issues)
RULING + RATIO: YES
• Probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic and
intrinsic validity of the will. It does not necessarily follow that
an extrinsically valid will ais always intrinsically valid. It is
possible that a will is validly executed but its dispositions
deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of the right legitimes or
rights under the estate.
• Unlawful dispositions cannot be given effect to and such
determination having attained finality is already binding.
• It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit
erroneous, is binding on the whole world. (for doctrinal
purpose only. The will here was probated correctly.) If no
appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the
trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time.
(hence the ORDER was really final already)
• The ORDER constitutes res judicata even to all parties in the
probate proceedings.
o As to Lourdes’ claim that the order is just interlocutory
and therefore, it can still be set aside – Court ruled
that it was not, since the Order also even said that the
estate should be distributed according to the laws of
intestacy. (Explanation: Hence there is nothing to
proceed with anymore. It’s already final because it
already ruled on the intrinsic validity of the will)
• As to the will’s validity, Court ruled that the will was
extrinsically valid but intrinsically void due to some provisions
so rules on intestacy shall apply.
• Apparently, Alejandro even described Lourdes as his “only
beloved wife”; however, the Court stated that it is not a valid
reason to reverse a final and executory order.
• The only ground for setting aside such order is when he is left
out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake, inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
DISPOSITION: DENIED

Ablaza v. Republic (2010)
Digest Author: Falgui
Petitioner: Isidro Ablaza
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines
Ponencia: Bersamin, J
DOCTRINE: The right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges
upon a prior determination of whether decedent had any
descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and
of whether the petitioner was the decedent’s surviving heir
FACTS:
1. Petitioner filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother, Cresenciano, with Leonila.
2. The petitioner alleged that the marriage had been celebrated
without a marriage license thereby rendering the marriage
void ab initio. He insisted that his being the surviving brother
entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death.
3. Such action was dismissed by the RTC and CA on the grounds
that petitioner was not the proper party to bring the case and
that he had failed to implead Leonila who was an
indispensable party to the case.
ISSUE: WoN petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek
the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
RULING + RATIO:Case remanded for factual determination.
The law in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage was
the old Civil Code. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to
the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration
of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely
no application to the petitioner.
However, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for
it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he
has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be
adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like
the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of
succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased
brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of
the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action
hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any
descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and
of whether the petitioner was the late Cresencianos surviving heir.
Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the
inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
The omission to implead Leonila and Leila (the daughter of Leonila)
was not immediately fatal to the present action.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
granted.
We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30,
2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals.
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of
Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato;
Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are returned to
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further
proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend
his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her
daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine
whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants,
descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the time of his
death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving
heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of
said deceased; and thereafter to proceed accordingly.
 CHING & PO WING INC. vs. HON. RODRIGUEZ (2011)
Petitioner: Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties Inc.
Respondent: Judge Rodriguez of the RTC, Joseph Cheng, Jaime
Cheng, Mercedes Igne, Lucina Santos
Ponencia: Reyes, J.
Digest Author: Gullas, J.
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction of the Probate Court
Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
The allegations in this complaint pertain to the declaration of nullity of
certain documents, which is an ordinary civil action, rather than
determination of one’s status as an heir or the disinheritance of an
heir, which is within the jurisdiction of the probate court via a special
proceeding. Hence, the action is within the jurisdiction of the RTC and
not the probate court.
FACTS:
15. Parties:
a. Deceased is Antonio Ching, a relatively wealthy man who owns
a real estate company as well as properties in Hong Kong and
Manila including a 10 storey building in Binondo.
b. Petitioner Ramon is his adopted son
c. Respondents are Antonio Ching’s common law wife and her
children
16. Respondents filed a complaint in the RTC for Disinheritance,
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-
Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of
Title with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
17. The complaint set forth 7 causes of action, the important parts of
which are:
a. That Ramon used undue influence on his sick father to illegally
have some properties, including one in Hong Kong, transferred
to his name
b. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, was sweet-
talked by Ramon into surrendering to him a Global Business
Bank Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name
of Antonio, and the certificates of title covering two
condominium units in Binondo which were purchased by
Antonio using his own money but which were registered in
Ramon's name.
c. Ramon misrepresented to Mercedes and her kids that they
would get their share from Antonio’s estate, and deceived
them into signing an agreement and waiver of their claim, in
consideration for P22m, which they never received
d. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which constitute 60% of
the latter's total capital stock, were illegally transferred by
Ramon to his own name through a forged document of sale
executed after Antonio died.
e. There was a P4M Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition
(CPPA) issued by PhilBank to Antonio which Mercedes and
children wanted to be declared the rightful owners of,
premised on Mercedes’ prior possession thereof and not on
the premise that they were the heirs of Antonio
18. Ramon answered with a Motion to Dismiss, stating that the
allegations in the complaint pertain to declaration of heirship or
dishinheritance, hence they should be threshed out in a special
proceeding via a probate court, not with the RTC via an ordinary
civil action.
ISSUES:
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over this case? Yes. RTC has
jurisdiction, not the probate court.
PROVISION: Article 839 of the Civil Code
RULING + RATIO:
The RTC has jurisdiction because the case is not one for declaration
of heirship or disinheritance, as claimed by Ramon, but an ordinary
civil action for declaration of nullity of documents and reconveyance,
which is cognizable by the RTC.
Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought,
among others, the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of
the respondents of the CPPA now under Metrobank's custody, the civil
case continues to be an ordinary civil action, and not a special
proceeding pertaining to a settlement court.
Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonio’s estate executed by Ramon, and
the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and
void as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised
shall first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a
mere defense which is not determinative of which court shall properly
exercise jurisdiction.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a

civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED. RTC has jurisdiction
deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for
in the Rules of Court.

Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only

through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. The
Supreme Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the
respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the
disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly
effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned.
Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No.
02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and
does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they
be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA, which was in
Mercedes' possession prior to the execution of the Agreement and
Waiver. It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to
the CPPA was premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their
alleged collective ownership of the same, and not on the declaration
of their status as Antonio's heirs.

Further, it also has to be emphasized that the respondents were

parties to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver prayed to be
nullified. Hence, even without the necessity of being declared as heirs
of Antonio, the respondents have the standing to seek for the
nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there
was no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised
undue influence and committed fraud against them.
 Romero v Romero
Petitioner: LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO
Respondent: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO
and VITTORIO C. ROMERO,
Ponente: Sereno, J.
DOCTRINE:
The acts of a person as the administrator of the estate are
subject to the sole jurisdiction of the probate court.
Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly
orchestrated by petitioners’ co-heir, Vittorio, can only be
determined by the probate court, because it is the probate
court which is empowered to identify the nature of the
property, and that has jurisdiction over Aurora’s actions and
dispositions as administrator
FACTS:
24. On 1974, when Judge Romero died his wife, Aurora was
appointed as legal guardian. During the pendency of
Settlement Proceedings of the estate of their deceased father,
Leo and David Romero filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Sale, Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title against
their mother Aurora C. Romero and brother Vittorio C. Romero
alleging that their brother Vittorio - through fraud,
misrepresentation and duress – succeeded in registering the
several properties in his name through of Deeds of Sale
executed by their mother, Aurora.
25. The RTC dismissed the complaint. Likewise, the RTC denied
their MR, citing Section 3, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
which bars an heir or a devisee from maintaining an
action to recover the title or possession of lands until
such lands have actually been assigned.
26. The court ruled that “plaintiffs must first cause the termination
of settlement proceedings to its logical conclusion before their
case could be entertained by the Court.
27. Leo and David filed Petition for Certiorari before the CA
alleging grave abuse of discretion in the Resolutions issued by
the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan.
28. The CA dismissed the petition because the intestate
proceeding has not yet terminated.
29. Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as
a probate or intestate court relates only to matters having to
do with the settlement of the estate of deceased persons or
the appointment of executors, but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings and that Rule 87 is not applicable in this
case. Hence this appeal.
PROVISION:
1. Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned. When an
executor or administrator is appointed and assumes the trust,
no action to recover the title or possession of lands or for
damages done to such lands shall be maintained against him
by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the court
assigning such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time
allowed for paying debts has expired.
ISSUES:
3. Whether or not Section 3, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
is applicable.
4. Whether or not the RTC sitting as a probate court has
the power to determine questions of ownership in this
case.
RULING + RATIO:
3. YES.
a. Petitioners believe that the above rule is subject to certain
exceptions. They invoke the doctrine that while heirs have
no standing in court to sue for the recovery of property of
the estate represented by an administrator, these heirs
may maintain such action if the administrator is unwilling
to bring the suit, or has allegedly participated in the act
complained of.
b. On this contention, petitioners theory must again fail.
There is nothing on the record that would prove
that Aurora defied the orders of the probate court
or entered into sale agreements in violation of her
trust. In fact, petitioners are really accusing a co-heir,
their brother Vittorio, of having acquired certain properties
which they allege to be properties of their parents.
 c. Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, judgments relating to the sale do not render the
part of the estate, Aurora Romeros acts as the issue of title res judicata.
administrator of the estate are subject to the sole d. In any case, there is no merit to petitioners claim that the
jurisdiction of the probate court. issues raised in the case at bar pertain to title and
d. Indeed, implicit in the requirement for judicial approval of ownership and therefore need to be ventilated in a
sales of property under administration is the recognition separate civil action. The issue before the court is not
that the probate court has the power to rescind or nullify really one of title or ownership, but the determination of
the disposition of a property under administration that was which particular properties should be included in the
effected without its authority. That petitioners have the inventory of the estate.
prerogative of choosing where to file their action
for nullification whether with the probate court or
the regular court is erroneous.
e. Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, DISPOSITION
allegedly orchestrated by petitioners’ co-heir, WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. As the properties herein
Vittorio, can only be determined by the probate are already subject of an intestate proceeding filed on 6 January
court, because it is the probate court which is 1976, the 14 April 2009 judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
empowered to identify the nature of the property, SP No. 104025 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
and that has jurisdiction over Aurora’s actions and RTC is AFFIRMED.
dispositions as administrator.
4. Other Issue: Yes, the RTC may determine questions of ownership
albeit provisionally.
a. In Coca v. Borromeo,[ this Court allowed the probate court
to provisionally pass upon the issue of title, precisely
because the only interested parties are all heirs to the
estate, subject of the proceeding.
b. While it is true that a probate courts determination of
ownership over properties which may form part of the
estate is not final or ultimate in nature, this rule is
applicable only as between the representatives of the
estate and strangers thereto.
c. In Bacquial v. Amihan, the Court stated that:
i. That the probate court is without jurisdiction
to try the title to property as between the
representatives of an estate and strangers
thereto is too well established by the
authorities to require argument.
ii. There is also authority abroad that where the court
is without jurisdiction to determine questions of
title, as for example, as between the estate and
persons claiming adversely, its orders and
 Nuguid v. Nuguid (1966)
Petition: Appeal
Petitioner: Remedios Nuguid (sister)
Respondent: Felix Nugid and Paz Salonga Nuguid (parents)
Ponencia: Sanchez
DOCTRINE: Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will
of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.”
FACTS:
1. Rosario Nuguide died single without descendants. She was
survived by her parents and her 6 siblings (including
Remedios).
2. Remedios filed a holographic will allegedly executed by
Rosario that was made 11 years before her death.
3. The holographic will instituted Remedios as the universal heir
of Rosario. Their parents opposed this because such
constitutes as preterition.
4. The lower court declared the dismissed the petition and
declared the will in question is a complete nullity since it will
perforce create intestacy.
5. MR was filed but it was denied so Remedios appealed to the
SC.
ISSUE: WoN the will is intrinsically a nullity
DISPOSITION: Order affirmed.
PROVISION: Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one,
some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of their; but
the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.
RULING + RATIO: YES
• The word “annul” means to abrogate or make void. It also
means to reduce to nothing, to annihilate, obiliterate, to make
no effect.
• Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are
so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854
suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will
— void because of preterition — would give the heir so
instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is
inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a
testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies
apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir.
• Taking all of these into consideration, it means that annulling
the institution of Remedios as the universal heir is a total
abrogation of the will since it is the only disposition contained
in the will.
• Remedios claims that this case is actually of an ineffective
disininheritance rather than preterition.
o Preterition - consists in the omission in the testator's
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited.
o Disinheritance - is a testamentary disposition depriving
any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a
cause authorized by law.
• The Court ruled that this is a case of preterition since the will
did not explicitly disinherit the other heirs but just simply omits
their names.
Digest Author: Terence John Ardolph. L Ang
Acain v. IAC (1987)
Petitioner: Constantino C. Acain
Respondent: IAC, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson
Ponencia: Paras, J.
DOCTRINE: Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and
annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance when there is no other testamentary disposition.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Constantino Acain filed for the probate of the will of
the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance of letters of
testamentary on the belief that he and his siblings were
instituted as heirs.
2. The will was in Bisaya and translated in English; containing
burial rights, payment of debts and a disposition stating that
the shares received by the deceased from his joint properties
with his wife shall be given to the decedent’s brother Segundo.
Should Segundo pass before Nemesio, all of Nemesio’s
properties in Bantayan and Cebu shall be given to Constantino
and his siblings.
3. Segundo predeceased Nemesio.
4. Respondents, Virginia and Rosa are the legally adopted
daughter and the widow of the deceased, respectively.
5. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings,
that he is merely a universal her, and that the daughter and
widow have been preterited.
6. The Trial judge denied the motion.
7. The IAC ordered the Trial court to dismiss the action.
ISSUES:
1. WON there was preterition; annulling the institution of
the petitioner and his siblings as heirs of Nemesio.
2. WON petitioner may be allowed to probate the will of
Nemesio
3. WON certiorari was proper
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES
a. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will
of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited.
b. With regard to the wife, Article 854 on preterition does
not apple because the law specifically states that
preterition is the omission of compulsory heirs in the
direct line. Since a wife does not ascend or descend
from the testator, Article 854 cannot apply as to her.
c. In the case of Virginia, she was preterited from the
will. Under the law, an adopted child becomes a legal
heir. Since she was not expressly disinherited, but only
totally omitted, which resulted in being deprived of her
legitime, she was considered preterited from the will.
d. It is important to note that the properties disposed of
in the will consisted of the entire estate of the
decedent.
e. The result of preterition is that it annuls the institution
of an heir and throws open intestate succession. Since
preterition undoubtedly occurred, the institution of
Constantino and his siblings as heirs is void.
f. There being no other testamentary disposition aside
from the void one, it is as if
2. NO
a. Since petitioner was not a legally instituted her, he has
no interest in the will and thus had no legal standing to
probate the said will.
3. YES
a. Although petitioners could have appealed the case
after the ruling had been attained, such would not
afford speedy and adequate relief since on its face the
will is intrinsically void. The probate of the will would
have been an exercise in futility and thus certiorari
may be granted, in the broader interests of justice.
Disposition: Decision of the CA is affirmed.

Digest Author:
NERI v AKUTIN (1941)
Petitioner: Eleuterio Neri
Respondent: Ignacia Akutin and her children
Ponencia: Moran, J.
DOCTRINE: Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be
valid in so far as they are not inofficious" (art. 814 of the Civil Code),
preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate
succession.
FACTS:
19. Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on December 12, 1931, had
by his first marriage six children and by his second marriage
with Ignacia Akutin, five children.
20. In Agripino Neri's testament, which was admitted to probate,
he willed that his children by the first marriage shall have no
longer any participation in his estate, as they had already
received their corresponding shares during his lifetime.
21. At the hearing for the declaration of heirs, the trial court
found, contrary to what the testator had declared in his will,
that all his children by the first marriage, except Eleuterio, had
not received any advancement of inheritance during his
lifetime.
22. Upon this finding it rendered judgment declaring the children
by the first and second marriages intestate heirs of the
deceased without prejudice to one-half of the improvements
which belonged to Ignacia.
23. CA affirmed with modification stating that the will is valid as to
the 2/3 of the estate which the testator could freely dispose
ISSUES:
W/N the omission of the children of the first marriage annuls the
institution of the children of the second marriage as sole heirs of the
testator
RULING + RATIO:
YES.
• Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
• In the instant case, while the children of the first marriage
were mentioned in the will, they were not accorded any share
in the hereditary property, without expressly being
disinherited.
• This is a clear case of Preterition
• The omission of the forced heirs or anyone of them, whether
voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to
disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least manifest.
• Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid
in so far as they are not inofficious" (art. 814 of the Civil
Code), preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise
to intestate succession.
• In the will here in question, no express betterment is made in
favor of the children by the second marriage; neither is there
any legacy expressly made in their behalf consisting of the
third available for free disposal.
• The whole inheritance is accorded the heirs by the second
marriage upon the mistaken belief that the heirs by the first
marriage have already received their shares.
• Were it not for this mistake, the testator's intention, as may be
clearly inferred from his will, would have been to divide his
property equally among all his children.
DISPOSITION: Judgment Reversed
 Viado Non vs. CA (2000) The Court held that absent any fraud or bad faith, preterition of th
eir sister Delia does not avoid the otherwise valid extrajudicial sett
Petition: 45 certiorari lement, since such extrajudicial settlement already lead to the issu
Petitioner: Rebecca Viado Non ance of TCT in favor of the Heirs of Nilo.
Respondent: Court of Appeals,
Ponente: Vitug
DISPOSITION: Petition denied.

DOCTRINES:
• When preterition is not attended by bad faith, the remedy is pr
ovided by Art. 1104 of the Civil Code which is to account for h
er share and to pay her such.

FACTS:
1. Julian and Virginia owned parcels of land. When Virginia died, half
of the land went to Julian and the other half to the children: Nilo,
Leah, Rebecca and Delia. Julian died. Leah and Rebecca later on
waived their rights and interest over the land in favor of Nilo. Julia
n also donated his share of the land to Nilo.

2. The Heirs of Nilo and Rebecca lived on such property until they ha
d a dispute on how such land should be divided to accomodate th
e growing kids.

3. Heirs of Nilo won in RTC and CA, even though Rebecca contested
the document's registration only after 5 years after execution. Re
becca also said that since the Extrajudicial settlement did not incl
ude Delia, a retardant, it should be void for preterition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not such preterition makes the extrajudicial settlement

void.

RULING + RATIO:

1. No. It does not avoid it.

Ureta vs. Ureta
Petitioner: Heirs of Policronio Ureta
Respondent: Heirs of Liberato Ureta
Ponencia: Mendoza
DOCTRINE:
Preterition is defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir from
the inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to
a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not
mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary
property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is
mentioned in the will in the latter case.
Preterition is then a concept of testamentary succession and
requires a will. The silence of the testator with regard to his
heirs in other documents is NOT a preterition.
FACTS:
5. In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta begot 14 children. One of these
children is Policronio.
6. The heirs of Policronio are opposed to the rest of Alfonso’s
children and their descendants.
7. Alfonso was well-off during his lifetime, owning several
fishpens, ponds, stores, etc.
8. Policronio, the eldest son failed to finish schooling and worked
on his father’s lands.
9. One day during October, Alfonso and his children along with
Policronio met with Liberato (who was also Alfonso’s son, and
at the time was a municipal judge) who suggested that in
order to reduce the inheritance taxes, Alfonso should make it
appear that he had sold some of his lands to his children.
10. Due to the statement made by Liberato, Alfonso executed 4
deeds of sale covering several parcels of land in favor of
Policronio and his 3 siblings.
11. Since the sale was only for taxation purposes, Alfonso
continued to own the lands.
12. When Alfonso died on October 1972, Liberato acted as
administrator of his father’s estate. The parcels of land
transferred to Policronio were tenanted by the Fernandez
Family. The tenants never turned over the produce of the
lands to policronio or any of his heirs, but only to Alonso and
his heirs.
13. Alfonso’s heirs then executed a deed of extra judicial partition
which included that lands which were sold by Alfonso for
taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son,
representing his heirs signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition on their behalf.
14. Policronio’s heirs found tax declarations in his name covering
the six parcels of land. They also eventually learned of the
deed of extra judicial partition involving Alfonso’s estate.
15. The heirs believed that the six parcels of land belonged to
their father and tried to settle the matter with the heirs of
Alfonso
16. Amicable settlement failed, and so Policronio’s heirs filed a
petition for recovery with the RTC. One of the grounds raised by the
heirs of policronio is that CONRADO DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY
TO ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT OF PARTITION ON THEIR
BEHALF. Thus, the partition should be considered void as they
would be considered as not having participated in it. RTC
Rules in favor of Alfonso’s heirs. On appeal CA rules in favor of the
heirs of Policronio.
Issues:
W/N the Extra-Judicial Partition should be annulled on the
ground of preterition of the heirs of Policronio.
Held:

No. The heirs of Alfonso argue that the absence of the Heirs of
Policronio in the partition or the lack of authority of their
representative results in their preterition. Under 1104 of the Civil
Code, they aver that a partition made with preterition of any of the
compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, but their heirs shall be
proportionately obliged to pay the share of the person omitted. Thus,
they claim that the Extra-judicial partition should not have been
annulled by the CA, but instead should have ordered the shares
omitted to be given to them.

However, the SC found that the heirs of Policronio were validly

represented by Conrado, and thus were included in the
partition of Alfonso’s estate.
However, assuming that they were indeed misrepresented,
PRETERITION IS STILL NOT APPLICABLE.

Preterition is defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir from

the inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to
a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not
mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary
property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is
mentioned in the will in the latter case.

Preterition is then a concept of testamentary succession and requires

a will. In the case at bench, there is no will involved, but instead
an Extra-Judicial Partition therefore preterition cannot apply.

Implication is that should if the heirs of Policronio were excluded from

the partition, then the partition would be considered void. The only
reason why the court upheld the validity of the partition in this case,
is because Conrado was deemed to be a valid representative of
Policronio’s heirs in the partition.
 NIEVA VS ALCALA (1920)
Petitioner: SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL
ALCALA
Respondent: MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO
Ponencia: Johnson, J.
DOCTRINE: Reserva troncal applies only to legitimate children.
FACTS:
1. Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff
Segunda Maria Nieva (illegitimate child), married Francisco De
ocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.
2. Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son,
Alfeo Deocampo, inherited by way of intestacy two parcels of
land.
3. Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7,
1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned
passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate
succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married Manuela
Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo.
4. Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his
widow and son, took possession of the parcels of land in
question, under the claim that Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had
inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.
5. Segunda instituted the an action to recover from the Alcala the
parcels of land in question. She claims to be an acknowledged
natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva.
6. The lower court held that even if Segunda was an
acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not
entitled to the property because, in its opinion, an illegitimate
relative has no right to the reserva troncal under the
provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
1. WON the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the
deceased Juliana Nieva - Yes
2. WON an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled
to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil
Code.
RULING + RATIO:
Yes.
• Testimonial evidence proves that Juliana Nieva exhibited her
publicly, as a legitimate daughter. While unmarried, Juliana
gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the
Segunda was duly baptized as her natural daughter, of
unknown father. Segunda lived with her said mother until the
latter was married to Francisco Deocampo.
NO.
• Under said article 811 of the Civil Code, Segunda would be
entitled to the property in question if she were a legitimate
daughter of Julian Nieva. But in said article 811 the legislator
uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and
"relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to be
legitimate.
• Commentators on the Spanish Civil Code are unanimous in the
opinion that the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply
only to legitimate relative. Manresa opined that if the
commission intended it to apply to illegitimate chidren, the law
should have stated “natural child” or “natural mother or
father”.
o When it desires to make a provision applicable only to
natural relationship, it does not say father or mother,
but natural father or natural mother; it does not
say child, but natural child; it does not speak of
ascendants, brothers or parents in the abstract, but of
natural ascendants, natural brothers or natural parents.
• Manresa also referred to Article 943 which provides:
o A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed
ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall
such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or
legitimated child.
o Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to
succeed the natural child and vice versa, from which it
must be deduced that natural parents neither have
the right to inhering from legitimate ones; the
law in the article cited established a barrier between
the two families; properties of the legitimate family
 shall never pass by operation of law to the
natural family.
o To hold that Segunda is entitled to the property left by
her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of
law, would violate the express provision of article 943.

DISPOSITION: For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

lower court is hereby affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So
ordered.
Digest Author: Coco Navarro
Sumaya vs IAC (1991)
DOCTRINE: Reserva Troncal; prescriptive period. Upon the
death of a reservor, the “reserva” is extinguished and the reservees
acquire the right to the ‘reserved’ properties. They have a period of
30 years to claim the said properties.
FACTS
1. Raul Balantakbo inherited the following:
A 1/3 interest in a parcel of land from his father, Jose Balantakbo
Sr and
B. 1/7 share in 10 parcels of land from his maternal grandmother.
He died intestate & single, leaving the said property to his mother
Consuelo Vda. De Balantakbo as sole surviving heir.
2. Consuelo adjudicated the properties to herself. In the Affidavit (of
Self-Adjudication recorded in the Registry of Deeds1), she mentioned
the fact that her son inherited the properties from his father and
grandmother.
3. Consuelo sold property A to her long time acquaintance Mariquita
Sumaya who sold the property to Villa Honorio Development
Corporation. Villa Honorio assigned its rights to Agro-Industrial
Coconut Cooperative (family corporations of the Sumayas). She also
sold property B to Billa Honorio who again assigned its rights to Agro-
Industrial Coconut Cooperative.
4. Consuelo died. Brothers and nephews/nieces of Raul Balantakbo
sought to recover the properties claiming that they were subject to
reserva troncal. The lower courts found in favor of the Balantakbos
and ordered Agro-Industrial to convey the properties to them.
5. In this current petition, Agro-Industrial argues the following:
l They are innocent purchasers for value/in good faith
1
In case sir asks, it was written in Spanish.
l The reservable interest should have been annotated
l The cause of action has prescribed
ISSUE
W/N properties are subject to reserva troncal and whether the
properties were correctly adjudicated in favor of the Balantakbos (#5
of facts as sub-issues to build up this issue)
PROVISIONS
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit
of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came.
RULING + RATIO:
Yes. The properties are subject to reserva troncal and should be
conveyed in favor of the Balantakbos.
Agro-Industrial which is a family owned corporation of the Sumayas is
not an innocent purchaser for value. The affidavit of self-adjudication
made by Consuelo noting the line of inheritance showed the
reservable character of the properties. This served as an annotation
and constructive notice binding to the whole world, and is sufficient to
bind third parties like Agro-Industrial. Furthermore, Mariquita
Sumaya is a long time acquaintance of Consuelo who knew how the
properties were inherited.
The cause of action hasn’t prescribed. The cause of action of the
Balantakbos (reservees) did not commence at the death of Raul but
at the death of the reservor Consuelo. They only had right to the
property upon the reservor’s death. The reserva is extinguished upon
the death of the reservor, which gives right to the reservees to bring
a reivindicatory suit to be exercised within 30 years (10 years in the
old civil code). The action for recovery was brought in by the
reservees within this period (less than two years after Consuelo died.'

NOTES TO CLARIFY: Reserva Troncal - happens when an

ascendant inherits from a descendant (aka as in this case mom
inherits from son). The ascendant becomes the full owner but by
operation of law, is obliged to “reserve” the property for third degree
relatives of the descendant (called reservees). When ascendant dies,
properties under reserva troncal does not become part of her estate
but instead should be given to the reservees.
 Mendoza v. Delos Santos (2013)
Petitioner: MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-
in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all
surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA,
JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA MENDOZA
Respondent: JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by
her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENA VENTURA,
ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS
SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P.
DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P.
DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS,
JR., and CECILIA M. MENDOZA
Ponencia: REYES, J.
FACTS:
24. Petitioners are the grandchildren of Placido and Dominga. The
two had four children, Antonio, Exequiel, married to Leonor,
Antonio and Valentin. Petitioners are nephews and nieces of
Exequiel. According to them, the properties subject of this
case were part of the properties of Placida and Domingo,
which were given to Exequiel as part of an oral partition. After
his death, it passed on to his spouse, Leonor, and only
daughter, Gregoria. Leonor died, leaving her share to Gregoria
who died without any issue. Upon Gregoria’s death, the
property was adjudicated unto herself by Julia, the sole
surviving sister of Leonor. Hence, the properties should have
been reserved in their behalf by Julia and must now revert
back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserve
troncal. In her defense, Julia denied that the property came
from the estate of Placido and Dominga.
25. The RTC ruled in favour of the petitioners and ordered the
property’s reconveyance to the petitioners.
26. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, reversed the RTC’s
decision. It ruled that reserve troncal is not applicable in this
case as neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga,
nor did Gregoria predeceased Exequiel, assuming the
properties were part of the estate of Placido and Domingo,
which it did not. Hence this petition.
ISSUES: W/N reserva troncal is applicable in this case
RULING + RATIO: There are three (3) lines of transmission in
reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title, whether
by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a
descendant called the prepositus. The second transmission is by
operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or
reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is
from the reservista to the reservees or
reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree from
which the property came.
The lineal character of the reservable property is reckoned
from the ascendant from whom the prepositus received the
property by gratuitous title. It should be pointed out that the
ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiel’s
as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or
from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does
not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the
lineal character of the property.
First cousins of the descendant/prepositus are fourth degree
relatives and cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as
they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom
the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be
reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line
from which the property came and upon whom the property last
revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are
Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First
cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not
reservees or reservatarios. Also, a reservista acquires ownership of
the reservable property until the reservation takes place or is
extinguished.

The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the

properties are reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit from
reserva troncal. First, because Julia, who now holds the properties in
dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article 891
of the Civil Code and second, because petitioners are not Gregoria’s
relatives within the third degree. Hence, the CA’s disposition that the
complaint filed with the RTC should be dismissed, only on this point,
is correct. If at all, what should apply in the distribution of Gregoria’s
estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code.
Digest Author: Roge Ramirez
Arellano v. Pascual (2010)
Petitioners: Amelia P. Arellano, represented by her duly appointed
guardians, Agnes P. Arellano and Nona P. Arellano
Respondents: Francisco Pascual and Miguel Pascual
G.R. No. 189776
Ponencia: Carpio-Morales, J.
Doctrine:
Collation takes place only when there are compulsory heirs since one
of its purpose is to determine the legitime and the free portion. If
there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.
FACTS:
5. ANGEL PASCUAL died intestate leaving as heirs his siblings:
petitioner AMELIA ARELLANO, and respondents FRANCISCO
PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL.
6. In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate,
respondents assail the validity of a parcel of land located in
Teresa Village, Makati, which was donated to Arellano. They
contend that this is an advance legitime of Arellano.
7. The trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was
precluded from determining the validity of the donation.
a. Provisionally passing, however, only for the purpose of
determining if such donated property forms part of the
decedent’s estate, it ruled that the donation was valid
based on the presumption of validity of notarized
documents.
b. It further ruled that it is subject to collation following
Art 1061.
8. It partitioned the properties of the estate declaring that the
donated property shall be given to Arellano alone. The
respondents were given two other real properties.
9. CA sustained that the donated property is subject to collation.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the donated property to Arellano is subject to collation
2. WoN the property of the estate should have been ordered
equally distributed among the parties
RULING + RATIO:
2. NO. There being no compulsory heir, the donated property
is not subject to collation.
• Two distinct concepts of collation:
• It is a mere mathematical operation by the
addition of the value of donations made by the
testator to the value of the hereditary estate
• It is the return to the hereditary estate of
property disposed of by lucrative title by the
testator during his lifetime.
• Collation takes place when there are compulsory
heirs. One of its purposes is to determine the legitime and
the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no
legitime to be safeguarded.
• Records do not show that the decedent left any primary,
secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only
survived by his siblings, who are his collateral
relatives and therefore, are not entitled to any
legitime.
• Primary compulsory heirs - those who have
precedence over and exclude other compulsory
heirs; ex. legitimate children and descendants
• Secondary compulsory heirs - those who succeed
only in the absence of the primary heirs; ex.
legitimate parents and ascendants
• Concurring compulsory heirs - those who succeed
together with the primary or the secondary
compulsory heirs; ex. illegitimate children and
surviving spouse
• The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is
entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his
properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-
collateral relatives to inherit.
• His donation to Arellano, assuming that it was valid,
is deemed as donation made to a stranger,
chargeable against the free portion of the
estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the
donated property is not subject to collation.
3. YES. It should be partitioned equally.
 • The decedent’s remaining estate should be partitioned
equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives.
• This is based on the following provisions of the Civil Code:
• Art. 1003: If there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance
with the following articles.
• Art. 1004: Should the only survivors be brothers
and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in
equal shares.

Disposition: Petition is granted. Order to collate property is set

aside.
Pecson v. Mediavillo 1914
Petitioner: FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and
testament of Florencio Pecson
Respondent: ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO,
Ponencia: Johnson, J.
DOCTRINE: Disinheritance of an heir must be based on valid
grounds allowed by law.
FACTS:
1. Last will and Testament of Florencio Pecson was presented for
probate.
a. ONE PARAGRAPH STATED- “I declare that one of
my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a
legitimate daughter named Rosario Mediavillo. I also
declare that I disinherit my granddaughter, the said
Rosario Mediavillo, because she was grossly
disrespectful to me and because on one occasion,
when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand
against me. Therefore, it is my will that the said
Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my property.”
2. 18 Septemer – Atty Lorayes representing Basiliso and Rosario
Mediavillo filed a motion
a. Granddaughter was disinherited by her
grandfather because she failed to show him due
respect and raised her hand against him
b. Rosario did not commit such and act or if she did
it was due to derangement of her mental
faculties from which she suffers periodic
attacks.
3. CFI DECLARED - Teresa Pecson married Basiliso
a. Two children Rosario and Joaquin (deceased) no heirs.
b. Rosario is the only living daughter of Teresa and
husband Basiliso is still alive.
c. Rosario became insane in 1895 when she went to
college.
i. Proved that she disobeyed her Grandfather
raised her hand against him and he in turn
disinherited her.
d. CFI understands that this Rosario, who was then 14
years of age, and who shortly afterwards became
insane, was not responsible for her acts and should not
have been disinherited by her grandfather.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Rosario was validly disinherited? NO
RULING RATIO:
1. The Civil Code provides that disinheritance shall only take
place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. It also
provides the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in other
words, the cases or causes in which the ancestors may by will
disinherit their heirs. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that
the disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in
which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such
disinheritance.
2. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether
there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems
to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Article
850 provides that "the proof of the truthfulness of the reason
for disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of the
testator, should the disinherited person deny it." It would
appear then that if the person disinherited should deny the
truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be
permitted to support his allegation by proof.
3. It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was
about 14 years of age, she had received some attentions from
a young man — that she had received a letter from him — and
that her grandfather, Florencio Pecson, took occasion to talk
to her about the relations between her and the said young
man; that it was upon that occasion when, it is alleged, the
disobedience and disrespect were shown to her grandfather,
and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her
grandfather. The record shows that very soon after said event
she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has never
regained them, except for very brief periods, up to the present
time
4. SC – Agrees with CFI that she was not responsible for her acts
and should not have been disinherited.
(OTHER INFO)
5. Teresa Pecson, the mother of Rosario Mediavillo, at the time
of her death left two children, Rosario and Joaquin, and her
 husband Basiliso Mediavillo, and that said Joaquin Mediavillo
died without heirs. The lower court gave one-half of the
inheritance of the said Teresa Pecson to Rosario Mediavillo
and the share that would have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo, and
the share that would have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo, to his
father Basiliso Mediavillo. In that conclusion of the lower court
we think error was committed.
6. It will be remembered that the whole argument of the
appellants with reference to the first assignment of error was
that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court
evidently believed that there were no "legitimate children,
descendants of the deceased, surviving," and that therefore
the father or mother of said legitimate children would inherit
as ascendants. Inasmuch, however, as there was a
descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could
not ascend, and for the reason the lower court committed an
error in declaring that Basiliso Mediavillo was entitled to inherit
that share of the estate that would have belonged to Joaquin
Mediavillo, had he been living. Therefore, and for all the
foregoing, that part of the judgment of the lower court
nullifying and setting aside paragraph 3 of the will is hereby
affirmed, and that art of said judgment which decrees to
Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the estate of Florencio Pecson,
belonging to Teresa Pecson and which would have been given
to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving, is hereby
revoked
Digest Author: Roge Ramirez
Sayson v. Sayson (1992)
Petitioners: MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA,
BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C.
BAUTISTA
Respondents: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA
SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO
SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON
G.R. No. 89224-25
Ponencia: Cruz, J.
Doctrine:
Both legitimate children and adopted children succeed to the
properties of the parents and other ascendants.
FACTS:
10. Eleno and Rafaela Sayson (grandparents) had five children:
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios, and Teodoro
(petitioners). Both Eleno and Rafaela died.
11. Teodoro married Isabel (parents). Both of them died already.
Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo,
and Doribel (children/respondents) who claim to be their
children.
12. A complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate
of Teodoro and Isabel was filed by Teodoro’s four siblings and
Isabel’s mother. This was resisted by the children of Teodoro
who alleged that they were the decedents’ lawful descendants.
13. The children – Delia, Edmuno, and Doribel – filed their own
complaint for the accounting and partition of the intestate
estate of Eleno and Rafaela, their grandparents, against the
couple’s four children or the petitioners.
14. The petitioners countered that Delia and Edmundo were
adopted children and Doribel was the only legitimate
daughter. Thus, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro’s share
in his parents’ estate by right of representation.
15. TC: Both cases were decided in favor of the respondents. All
three children were entitled to share in their grandparents’
estate by right of representation.
16. CA: Affirmed but stated that only Doribel had the right of
representation.
ISSUES:
3. WoN Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel are the exclusive heirs and
are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents
with the petitioners
RULING + RATIO:
4. YES.
Re: Adoption
• The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and
Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already
had a legitimate daughter, Doribel, at the time (runs
contrary to Article 3352) and at the same time they allege
that Doribel was not a legitimate child.
• It is now too late to challenge the decree of adoption years
after it became final and executory. Also, a challenge to
the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally but
must be in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the
issue. Doribel’s birth certificate is a formidable piece of
evidence.
Re: Intestate Succession (Art. 960)*
• Thus, Doribel (as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and
Isabel), as well as Delia and Edmundo (as their adopted
children), are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of
the deceased couple in conformance to Article 9793.
• The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's
love descends first to his children and grandchildren before
it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his
collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them
eventually to his children as a token of his love for them
and as a provision for their continued care even after he is
gone from this earth.
Re: Right of representation (Art. 970)
• As the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to
2
Person cannot adopt when they already have a legitimate child.
3
Legitimate children (as well as adopted children) succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
 represent her deceased father in the distribution of the
intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981,
she is entitled to the share her father would have directly
inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the
shares of her grandparents' other children.
• But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of
Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total
strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right
as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is
between only the adopting parents and the adopted child
and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

DISPOSITION: The petition is denied and the decision of the CA is

affirmed.
Bagunu vs Piedad (ART 960)
Petitioner: Ofelia Bagunu
Respondent: Pastora Piedad
Ponencia: Vitug, J.
DOCTRINE: The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the
relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the
more distant ones except when and to the extent that the
right of representation can apply
FACTS:
4. Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in the Estate of
Augusto Piedad
5. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late
Augusto H. Piedad, Bagunu assailed the finality of the order of
the trial court awarding the entire estate to Pastora Piedad
contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural
infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the notice of
hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and
irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and
withdrawals by the administrator of the estate.
6. Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or
ascendants. Pastora is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a
third-degree relative of the decedent, while Bagunu is the
daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree
relative of the decedent.
7.
8.
ISSUE:
W/N intervenor-appellant as a collateral relative
within the fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate
proceeding which would justify her intervention?
RULING:
1. The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody
an almost complete set of law to govern, either by will or by
operation of law, the transmission of property, rights and
obligations of a person upon his death. Each article is
construed in congruity with, rather than in isolation of, the
system set out by the Code.
2. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives
nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more
distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code
provides:
a. "ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in
degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the
right of representation when it properly takes place.
b. "Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal
shares, subject to the provisions of article 1006 with
respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of
article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between
the paternal and maternal lines."
3. By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a
decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place
and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of
the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the
shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the
latter, but from the person to whose estate the person
represented would have succeeded.
4. In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the
descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line,
the right of representation may only take place in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such
children survive with their uncles or aunts.
5. The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral
relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both
petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order
of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and
descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants,
thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the
surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews
and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except
only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity,
expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an
absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the
collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil
Code gives direction.
 6. Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of
the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of
the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of
the decedent.
7. In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle,
and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a
first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a
third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent,
being in the fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn,
would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.
 F ERNANDEZ V . F ERNANDEZ (2001)
ISSUE:
Petitioner: Rodolfo Fernandez And Mercedes Caranto Fernandez,
Husband And Wife, Eddie C. Fernandez And Luz Fernandez, Spouses
Resondent: Romeo Fernandez, Potenciano Fernandez, Francisco
Fernandez, Julita Fernandez, William Fernandez, Mary Fernandez,
Alejandro Fernandez, Gerardo Fernandez, Rodolfo Fernandez And
Gregorio Fernandez
Ponente: Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
RULING + RATIO:
DOCTRINE: A partition which includes a person believed to be an
heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
FACTS:
1. The late Spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez were the
registered owners of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City,
and the two-storey building constructed thereon. The spouses
had a son who died at the age of 12.
2. Being childless by the death of their son, the spouses
purchased for P20.00 a one month baby boy who later on
identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein petitioner. He was
taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and
became a dental technician. He lived with the couple until they
became old and disabled.
3. When Jose died intestate and his estate (consisting of ½ of
the above properties) were left with his wife Generosa and
Rodolfo. They then executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
4. On the same day, Generosa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over her share of the estate in favor of Eddie Fernandez,
Rodolfo’s son.
5. After learning the transaction, respondents who were nephews
and nieces of the deceased Jose filed an action to declare the
Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab
initio.
6. Respondents allege that Rodolfo does not have any basis of
heirship or any iota of rights to succession or inheritance. Also
that the latter took advantage of the incapacity of Generosa in
executing the contracts.
7. RTC and CA both ruled that Rodolfo cannot be considered a
legitimate nor a legally adopted child.
1. WoN Rodolfo Fernandez was the son of the deceased
spouses Fernandez for the purpose of determining
what legal right Rodolfo arising from intestate
succession.
2. WoN Respondent niece and nephews have rights to the
conjugal property of the deceased spouses Fernandez.
1. No Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the
deceased spouses Fernandez.
• The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft of any
records of the birth of appellant Rodolfo Fernandez to the
spouses.
• While the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights filed
by Jose stating that Rodolfo was his child is a public
document, nevertheless, it was not executed to admit the
filiation of Jose Fernandez with Rodolfo. The public document
contemplated refer to the written admission of filiation
embodied in a public document purposely executed as an
admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case
wherein the public document was executed as an application
for the recognition of rights to back pay.
• Similarly, the while baptismal certificate presented may be
considered public document, it is evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified, but not the veracity of the statements or
declarations made therein.
• Neither the family portrait offered in evidence establishes a
sufficient proof of filiation. Pictures do not constitute proof of
filiation.
• Open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the position and
privileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate child.
However, it must be noted that possession of status of a child
does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a
ground for a child to compel recognition by his assumed
parent.
Considering the foregoing findings, Rodolfo is not a child by
nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Jose,
thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the
estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa and Rodolfo
is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned pursuant to
Art.1105 of the New Civil Code which states: “A partition
which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is
not, shall be void only with respect to such person.”

2. YES but only as to the ½ share of Jose Fernandez.

• As an heir, Generosa, during her lifetime, had the right to
enjoy and dispose of her property without other limitations
than those established by law, which right she exercised by
executing a deed of sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez.
• The respondents had not presented any convincing proof to
override the evidentiary value of the duly notarized deed of
sale.

Disposition: premises considered, the assailed judgment is

hereby Affirmed with Modification, as follows:

1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are

entitled to the share of the conjugal lot and building of the
deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez who died
childless and intestate;

2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as

the share of petitioner Rodolfo in the conjugal lot is
concerned and the title issued pursuant thereto in the name
of Rodolfo Fernandez;

3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the

share of Generosa sold to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT No.
54693 is cancelled and a new title should be issued in the
names of petitioner Eddie Fernandez and respondents as co-
owners of the and shares respectively in the conjugal
building.

4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorneys

fees are deleted.
 Zaragoza v. CA (2000)
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari
Petitioner: Spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda Enriquez-
Zaragoza
Respondent: Court of Appeals, Alberta Zaragoza Morgan
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.
DOCTRINE:
Partition can be done during the lifetime of the decedent as long as
legitimes are not prejudiced.
FACTS:
1. Flavio Zaragoza owned a parcels of land and had four
children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino, and Alberta. He died
without a will and his four children survived him.
2. Alberta filed a complaint against Spouses Florentino for
delivery of her inheritance consisting of two parcels of land
(lot 1 and 2 for easier reference) and for damages.
• She alleged that during the lifetime of their father, the
properties were partitioned among his four children.
• She stated that the shares of her other siblings were
given to them in advance by way of deed of sale
without adequate consideration while hers was not
conveyed.
• That because of her marriage she became an American
citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands except by
hereditary succession. It was for this reason that no
deed of conveyance was executed in her favor during
her father's lifetime.
3. Spouses Florentino denied the alleged distribution by way of
deed of sale to them by their father. They stated that lot 1
was still registered in their father's name, and lot 2 was sold to
Florentino for a valuable consideration. All other allegations
were also denied.
4. Trial Court made a decision adjudicating lot 1 to Alberta but
dismissed her claim as to lot 2.
5. RTC found that there was a partition of properties during his
lifetime among his three children by deeds of sales. That lot 2
was distributed among the three children, and that lot 1 was
intended to be the share of Alberta.
6. CA reversed such finding and stated that lot 2 did not belong
to the Spouses Florentino, but affirmed their pronouncement
as to lot 1. This finding was based on an admission made by
Florentino in his letter to Alberta's counsel that their father
had given them their inheritance. CA also found that the
alleged sale was fictitious and void, the signature of their
father was marked differently.
ISSUES:
Whether partition of the lands during the father's lifetime was valid
Whether the Deed of Sale was valid, and if such is valid, can be a
valid subject matter for the delivery of inheritance share
RULING + RATIO:
Partition of lands was valid, it is basic law in succession that
partition inter vivos may be done as long as legitimes are not
prejudiced.
To be able to determine whether legitimes were prejudiced, collation
can be done. However collation cannot be done in this case because
in the original petition for delivery of inheritance share, the other
compulsory heirs were not impleaded. Petition must be dismissed
without prejudice to institution of a new proceeding where all
indispensable parties should be impleaded to rightfully determine their
respective legitimes and to determine whether any of the heirs were
prejudiced.
Deed of sale is presumed valid because the validity of a title
cannot be collaterally attacked.
Another action expressly instituted for attacking the validity of the title
should be instituted. (There was no pronouncement made as to
whether the object of a valid deed of sale can be the subject matter
of a petition for delivery of inheritance share.)

DISPOSITION:

Petition is GRANTED. Complaint in RTC also dismissed for failure to

implead indispensable parties.
 De Jesus v. Dizon (2001)
Petitioner: Jinkie Christie A. De Jesus and Jacqueline De Jesus et al
Respondent: Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon, et al.
Ponente: Padilla, J.
Doctrine: This case tells us when court action is necessary or not
when it comes to the recognition of an illegitimate child in intestate
proceedings:
• NOT NECESSARY: when proof of illegitimacy appears in a
record of birth, will, statement before a court, any authentic
writing
• NECESSARY: if the claim for recognition is predicated on other
evidence
There is a presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latters
heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child
born to his wife.
FACTS:
1. DANILO De Jesus and CAROLINA Aves were married in 1964.
2. During this marriage, JACQUELINE and JINKIE DE JESUS
(PETITIONERS) were born.
3. A certain JUAN Dizon, in a notarized document, acknowledged
JACQUELINE and JINKIE as his own illegitimate children by
CAROLINA.
4. JUAN died intestate, leaving some assets (shares of stocks and
real property).
5. By virtue of the notarized document, JACQUELINE and JINKIE
filed a complaint for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of
the Dizon estate.
6. RESPONDENTS, the surviving spouse and legitimate children
of JUAN, sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it
would entail altering the status of PETITIONERS from being
legitimate children of DANILO and CAROLINA to being
illegitimate children of CAROLINA and JUAN.
7. RESPONDENTS argue that the ground instituted is in fact one
to compel recognition of petitioners as illegitimate children of
DIZON, the partition sought being merely an ulterior relief
once their status has been established.
8. The trial court ultimately dismissed the complaint for lack of
cause of action and for being improper.
9. Now, PETITIONERS argue that their recognition as being
illegitimate children, embodied in authentic writing, is in itself
sufficient to establish their status and no separate action is
required.
ISSUE:
WoN a separate judicial action is required to establish the status of
PETITIONERS as illegitimate children of JUAN is required
HELD+RATIO: YES
• The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established:
(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
• WHEN NO COURT ACTION IS REQUIRED: The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child
• WHEN JUDICIAL ACTION IS NECESSARY: If the claim
for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely
tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing.
• A scrutiny of the records would show that PETITIONERS were
born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of
live birth would also identify DANILO as being their father.
 • There is perhaps no presumption of the law more
firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate.
o This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth
of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b)
the fact that the husband and wife are living separately
in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely
prevents sexual intercourse.

• In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to JUAN,

petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as
being children of DANILO and CAROLINA. This step cannot
be aptly done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents.

• The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for

the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in
exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in
an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife.

• This issue whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged

illegitimate children of JUAN, cannot be aptly adjudicated
without an action having been first been instituted to impugn
their legitimacy as being the children of DANILO and
CAROLINA born in lawful wedlock.
o Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount
declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked
collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that
purpose.

Disposition: Petition denied.

 Pilapil v. Heirs of Briones (2006)
Petitioner: Erlina Pilapil et al.
Respondent: Heirs of Maximino
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.
Doctrine: This Court, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, can
only presume that the intestate proceeding in this case was fair and
regular, which would consequently mean that the CFI complied with
the procedural requirements for intestate proceedings such as
publication and notice to interested parties, and that the CFI had
carefully reviewed and studied the claims of creditors, as well as the
rights of heirs to the estate, before issuing the Order.
FACTS:
10. MAXIMINO was married to DONATA, but they did not have
any children.
11. When MAXIMINO died, DONATA instituted intestate
proceedings. This was around the year 1952.
12. The CFI awarded the real properties in the estate to DONATA,
and she eventually received new TCTs.
13. When DONATA died, ERLINDA, one of her nieces, instituted a
petition for the administration of the intestate estate of
DONATA. She and her husband GREGORIO were appointed as
administrators.
14. In 1985, a certain SILVERIO, a nephew of MAXIMINO, filed a
petitioner for the administration of the intestate estate of
MAXIMINO. This was initially granted.
15. GREGORIO sought to set aside the order aforementioned,
claiming that the said properties were under his and
ERLINDA’s administrator already – as part of the intestate
estate of DONATA.
16. The HEIRS OF MAXIMINO then filed a complaint with the RTC
for partition, annulment and recovery of possession of real
property.
a. In an amended complaint, they further claimed that
DONATA used fraud or misrepresentation to register in
her name the real properties belonging to the intestate
estate of MAXIMINO.
17. RTC and CA ruled that the HEIRS of MAXIMINO were entitled
to ½ of the real properties, and also ordered ERLINDA to
reconvey the properties to the heirs of MAXIMINO.
ISSUE:
WoN the HEIRS OF MAXIMINO have a right to the properties in the
case at bar
HELD+RATIO: NO.
• MAXIMINO left no will at the time of his death in 1952, and his
estate was to be settled in accordance with the rules on legal
or intestate succession.
• The HEIRS OF MAXIMINO claim the right to inherit based on
Articles 995 and 1001.4
• The HEIRS OF MAXIMINO claim that DONATA had fraudulently
excluded them from the intestate proceedings of the estate of
MAXIMINO since they were allegedly not given notice of the
proceedings thereof.
o The RTC found that there was an implied trust made in
favor of the HEIRS OF MAXIMINO. The SC does not
agree.
• Since it was the HEIRS OF MAXIMINO who claimed the
existence of an implied trust, they bear the burden of proving
that DONATA registered in her own name the real properties
belonging to the estate of Maximino either by fraud or
mistake, pursuant to Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. This
the HEIRS OF MAXIMINO failed to do.
• AS TO DONATA:
o DONATA was able to secure the TCTS covering the real
properties in controversy. While unable to present a
copy of the CFI Order, it must be noted that 35 years
had passed since the filing.
o Even then, the CFI Order was recorded in the Primary
Entry Book of the RD.
o It was even annotated on the TCTs
4
ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and
illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of
brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under article 1001.
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
 • AS TO THE HEIRS OF MAXIMINO: • The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued,
o Note that the Letters of Administrator in favor of declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of
DONATA and the Inventory submitted by DONATA Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the
were actually produced before the RTC by the HEIRS entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties, and
of MAXIMINO not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased
o This jus shows that the had access to the Special husband.
Proceedings pertained to by DONATA
• There was also no evidentiary basis for the other Disposition: RTC and CA decision reversed and set aside.
pronouncements of the lower courts/claims of HEIRS OF
MAXIMINO:
o No showing the CFI failed to send notices of Special
Procedings
o The fact that HEIRS OF MAXIMINO lived near DONATA
only shows that they had ample opportunity to discuss
with DONATA the estate of their deceased brother.
o Some properties pertaining to the estate were in the
same area, so they could have observed DONATA’s
behavior as to such properties.
• ALSO, the HEIRS OF MAXIMINO knew that the later died in
1952. They even attended his wake. There was no explanation
given as to why they waited for 33 years before filing for
administration.
• It is granted that the heirs of Maximino had rights to his
intestate estate upon his death on 1 May 1952, by virtue of
Articles 995 and 1005 of the New Civil Code.
• Nonetheless, the CFI had declared Donata as the sole,
absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino in its Order in 1952.
The SC can only presume that the proceedings therein were
regular.

Summary of SC ruling:
• HEIRS OF MAXIMINO failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the
real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino,
registered in her name.
• In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established
between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456
of the New Civil Code.
• Donata was able to register the real properties in her name
pursuant to the 1952 Order issued by the CFI
 Pilapil v Heirs of Briones (2006 MR)
Petitioner: ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ
BRIONES
Respondent: HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO J.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
30. MR of previous case. Maximino Briones was married to Donata
but they didn’t have children. When Maximino died on 1 May
1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her
Maximino’s estate. CFI appointed Donata as the administratrix
of Maximino’s estate. She submitted an Inventory of
Maximinos properties, including some pieces of land.
31. The CFI awarded ownership of the land to Donata. This was
recorded in the Register of Deeds, and thus Donata now had
TCTs.
32. Donata died on 1 November 1977. Petitioner ERLINDA, one of
Donata’s nieces, filed to RTC a petition for the administration
of the intestate estate of Donata. She was appointed.
33. Respondent Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino,
filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of Administration for
the intestate estate of Maximino, which RTC granted. Gregorio
opposed, claiming that the said properties were already under
his and his wife’s administration as part of the intestate estate
of Donata. RTC ruled for Gregorio
34. Heirs of Maximino then filed a Complaint with the RTC against
the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery
of possession of real property, They alleged that Donata, as
administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and
misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the
knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her
name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of
Maximino.
35. SC ruled for Petitioners, saying that respondents failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata managed,
through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the
intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. In the
absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between
Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the
New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real properties
in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an
Legal Order.
36. Respondents then file this MR, still raising fraud, the
imprescriptibility of an action against an implied trust, and
that the Order granting Donata to register the title was a void
order producing no legal effect.
ISSUE:
WoN Decision Should be reversed
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. On the finding of fraud
• Article 1456 Civil Code provides if property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust.
• In the previous case, SC ruled for the regularity of the
TCTs even if the CFI order was not reproduced. In the MR,
Respondents found a copy of the Order, but the SC did not
find anything that would overturn its decision.
• While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that
Maximino still had surviving siblings, it did not order that
the siblings be given personal notices of the intestate
proceedings, it should be known that settlement of an
estate is a proceeding in rem. Thus, publication in a
newspaper is a notice to the whole world.
• Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI that she
was her husbands sole heir, it was not established that she
did so knowingly, maliciously and in bad faith. Worse,
since Donata is now dead, the SC has ruled in another
case that the degree of proof to establish fraud in a case
where the principal actors to the transaction have already
passed away is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. On prescription of the right to recover based on implied
trust
• Even assuming that there was an implied trust,
jurisprudence has ruled that since an implied trust is an
obligation created by law, respondents had 10 years within
which to bring an action for reconveyance based on Art
 1144. In this case, it was filed 27 years after Donata’s
registration in 1960. Prescribed.
3. On void judgment or order
• Respondets argue that the CFI Order awarding the
properties is void and, thus, it cannot have any legal
effect. Consequently, the registration of the disputed
properties in the name of Donata pursuant to such Order
was likewise void.
• SC ruled that the alleged fraud and misrepresentation
fostered by Donata did not deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case, as fraud
would merely render the order voidable, but not void on its
face. Hence, the said Order, which already became final
and executory, can only be set aside by direct action to
annul and enjoin its enforcement. It cannot be the subject
of a collateral attack as is being done in this case.
• Note that respondent’s Complaint was one for partition,
annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed
properties. The annulment sought in the Complaint was
not that of the CFI Order, but of the certificates of title
over the properties issued in Donatas name. So until and
unless respondents bring a direct action to nullify the CFI
Order, and attain a favorable judgment therein, the
assailed Order remains valid and binding.
• Even then, since the registration was way back in 1960,
action has already prescribed. (action to annul an order or
judgment based on fraud must be brought within four
years from the discovery of the fraud.)
DISPOSITION
Petition denied.
Digest Author: Karen Oreo
Francisco v. Francisco-Alfonso (2001)
Petitioner: Regina Francisco, Zenaida Pascual
Respondent: Aida Francisco-Alfonso
Ponencia: Pardo
DOCTRINE: (Art. 960 is not mentioned but I think the case is
relevant with respect to paragraph 2 of said article.)
Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the
property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession
shall take place only with respect to the property of which
the testator has not disposed;
FACTS:
1. Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso is the sole legitimate
daughter of Gregorio Francisco while Petitioners are daughters
of the latter with his common law wife Julia Mendoza.
2. Gregorio Francisco owned two parcels of residential land
situated in Bulacan. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital
in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificate
of title of his property were in the possession of the
petitioners.
3. When Gregorio died, Aida inquired about the certificate
of title from petitioners and they informed her that
Gregorio had sold the land to them in 1983 as
executed by a “Kasulatan”.
4. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of petitioners.
5. In 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, a
complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with
damages.
6. In their joint answer, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or
simulation of the Deed of Sale.
7. The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
while upon appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the lower court. Hence, this petition
ISSUE: WON the Kasulatan/Deed of Sale is valid
RULING + RATIO: NO. It is null and void.
• The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for
the contract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the
Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco
did not have any source of income in 1983, when they bought
the property, until the time when Felicitas testified in 1991.
o Zenaida’s Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the
amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw money
from her bank account at the Rural Bank of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had
personal savings other than those deposited in the
bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW for three years
was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the
club.
o Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market
vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income of
P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from
the deceased for P15,000.00. She had no other source
of income.
o We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell
could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or that earnings
in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in
cash for the land.
• Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the
Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected
respondent’s legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when
the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code.
• Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to transfer the property
to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate
daughter.
• The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from
claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property.
• Before his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and
informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-
half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the
rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as
hereinafter provided.

• Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed

the parcels of land involved were the only property left by
their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her
share in her father’s estate. By law, she is entitled to half of
the estate of her father as his only legitimate child.
• The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be
determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for
settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be
deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as
prescribed by law.

DISPOSITION: Petition denied.

Digest Author: Mao Santos
Republic v. Guzman (2000)
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: David Rey Guzman
Ponencia: Bellosillo
DOCTRINE: The repudiation being of no effect whatsoever the
parcels of land should revert to their private owner, Helen, who,
although being an American citizen, is qualified by hereditary
succession to own the property subject of the litigation
FACTS:
1. David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of
the spouses Simeon Guzman, a naturalized American citizen, and
Helen Meyers Guzman, an American citizen. In 1968 Simeon died
leaving to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of
several parcels of land located in Bulacan.
2. On 29 December 1970 Helen and David executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and
adjudicating to themselves all the property belonging to the estate of
Simeon. Subsequently, Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning,
transferring and conveying to her son David her share of the land.
3. Years later, a certain Atty. Batongbacal wrote to the Solicitor
General alleging that the ownership of David in ½ of the land is
defective. On the basis thereof, the Government a petition for
Escheat praying that one-half (1/2) of David's interest in each of the
subject parcels of land be forfeited in its favor.
4. The trial court dismissed the petition holding that the two (2) deeds
of quitclaim executed by Helen Meyers Guzman had no legal force
and effect so that the ownership of the property subject thereof
remained with her. The appellate court likewise affirmed the
judgment.
Provision:
Article 1056
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made
is irrevocable and cannot be impugned, except when it was
made through any of the causes that vitiate consent or when
an unknown will appears.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent David, being an American Citizen,
can claim ownership over the land which he received from his
mother?
RULING + RATIO:
No, acceptance by Helen is irrevocable hence she could only
repudiate such when her consent was vitiated during
acceptance.
The petitioner contends that being an American Citizen, the
respondent can only obtain land by means of hereditary succession.
In this case the petitioners raise that the quitclaim by Helen in favor
of David operated as a donation, rendering the latter’s ownership over
that portion defective.
The Supreme Court disagrees and explains that one of the elements
of donation; an act of liberality, was not present. The SC explains that
there is lack of evidence showing that Helen acted out of pure
liberality and donated her share. Therefore the court rules that Helen
merely intended to waiver her rights to the share.
However this does not mean that the respondent is indeed entitled to
the land.
There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already
accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with David,
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon
Guzman on 29 December 1970 dividing and adjudicating between the
two (2) of them all the property in Simeons estate. Therefore Article
1056 applies.
There is no evidence that Helen’s consent was vitiated at the time of
acceptance. Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly
execute an instrument which has the effect of revoking or impugning
her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the subject
property from Simeons estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim deeds
which she executed eleven (11) years after she had accepted the
inheritance have no legal force and effect.

Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso

facto operate to convert the parcels of land into res nullius to be
escheated in favor of the Government. The repudiation being of no
effect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their private
owner, Helen, who, although being an American citizen, is qualified by
hereditary succession to own the property subject of the litigation.

DISPOSITION: Judgment Affirmed

SPOUSES MARIANO v. Zuniga
Petitioner: SPOUSES MARIANO (a.k.a. QUAKY) and EMMA BOLAÑOS
Respondent: ROSCEF ZUÑIGA BERNARTE, CLARO ZUÑIGA,
PERFECTO ZUÑIGA, and CEFERINA ZUÑIGA-GARCIA
Ponencia: Nachura, J.
DOCTRINE: 9. Roman Zuñiga, Sr. having passed away
the Lot now forms part of his estate In the absence of
whatever evidence that he executed a will his legitimate
children by his first and second marriages inherit such lot in
equal shares as intestate heirs (Article 980, The Civil Code).
FACTS:
9. Respondents and Flavia and Cresencia are legitimate half-
blood brothers and sisters, all children of the deceased Roman
Zuñiga, Sr. (Roman) from his second and first marriages,
10. Roman owned a residential land with improvement. Roman
had the lot declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Flavia, Sisters and Brothers, per a Sworn Statement
11. Roman died, and his heirs did not settle or partition the
subject property
12. Flavia without authority, executed a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale over it in favor of Cresencia; Cresencia, in turn,
also without authority from the said co-owners, executed on
the same day a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
petitioner-spouses.
13. Cresencia denied the material allegations of the complaint,
and alleged that Flavia was the sole owner of the lot, thus
making her a buyer and seller in good faith and for value.
Cresencia also averred that Roscef, et al., as children of
Roman by his second wife, do not have any share in the
subject property since Roman had already orally partitioned it
during his lifetime.
ISSUE: W/N the lot in question was co-owned by all the
brothers and sisters?
RULING: YES
8. Petitioner-spouses argue that the CA gravely erred when it
concluded that Lot No. 1-P is owned in common by the
children from the first and second marriages of Roman. They
posit that the brothers and sisters mentioned in the Tax
Declaration refer only to Roman’s children from his first
marriage, when the property was bequeathed to them by their
father, then still a widower, and prior to the celebration of his
marriage to Ceferina.
9. Petitioner-spouses’ contention cannot be sustained.
10. Roman Zuñiga, Sr. during his lifetime married twice. His first
wife was Flavia while Ceferina became his second wife. Flavia
died sometime in the year 1944 or 1945. Roman Sr. and Flavia
begot seven children
11. Roman Zuñiga, Sr. married Ceferina Bendaña and had four
children.
12. Second wife died ahead of him. His 11 children by his first and
by his second marriage survived him. In the face of the sworn
statement he executed he declared the lot in question as
among the several properties that belonged to him.
13. Such lot under such tax declaration was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Flavia A. Zuñiga, brothers and sisters
14. Flavia A. Zuñiga admitted that her parents always declared the
properties they acquired in her name – Flavia A. Zuñiga,
sisters and brothers – since she was a 7-year-old lass. She
never acquired the properties on her own as she would always
recognize her father Roman, Sr. as the actual owner of such
lot when he was alive.
15. This Court finds the Tax Declaration that became effective in
the year 1949 as the credible ancient documentary evidence
that speaks of the true date Roman Zuñiga, Sr. acquired the
Lot. As earlier noted, his first wife died in the year 1944 or
1945 while he married his second wife on 1954. Roman, while
still a widower in the year 1948, acquired the lot. Clearly such
lot was his capital property.
16. Roman Zuñiga, Sr. having passed away the Lot now forms
part of his estate In the absence of whatever evidence that he
executed a will his legitimate children by his first and second
marriages inherit such lot in equal shares as intestate heirs
(Article 980, The Civil Code). It follows that Lot No. 1-P has to
be divided among them into eleven equal shares.
17. Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed
the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex
or age, and even if they should come from different
marriages.
18. Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit
from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal
shares.
19. The validity of the deed of absolute sale Cresencia Zuñiga-
Echague executed in favor of the spouses Mariano and Emma
Bolaños is limited to her ideal share and the other ideal share
she acquired from Flavia A. Zuñiga. In effect, the spouses
acquired 2/11th of the lot.
 Sps. BOLAÑOS v. ZUÑIGA, et al. (2010)
Petitioners: Sps. Mariano (a.k.a. “Quaky”) and Emma Bolaños
(hereinafter referred to as the “Sps. Bolaños”);
Respondents: Roscef Zuñiga Bernarte, Claro Zuñiga, Perfecto
Zuñiga, Ceferino Zuñiga – Garcia (“Roscef, et al.”);
Ponente: Nachura, J.
DOCTRINE: Succession, Intestate
Article 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from
him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. (932).
FACTS:
27. Sps. Bolaños bought a 238-meter parcel of land from
Cresencia Zuñiga – Echague on June 20, 2001 and registered
the title under their name;
28. Roscef, et al. filed a complaint for declaration of partial nullity
of the sale and transfer with prayer for preliminary injunction
against Flavia and Cresencia Zuñiga, alleging the ff.: that –
a. they are half-blood siblings with the former under
Roman Zuñiga (through the latter’s 2nd wife);
b. the subject property was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Flavia, Sisters and Brothers as
per sworn statement of Roman,
c. Roman died in 1976 and the property was never
partitioned or settled;
d. Without authority from the other heirs as co-owners,
Flavia sold the property to Cresencia, and Cresencia to
Sps. Bolaños;
e. Sps. Bolaños demolished Roscef, et al. family home in
the process of constructing a new building thereon;
29. Flavia answered with a cross-claim denying genuineness and
due execution of the sale in favor of Cresencia, but claimed
that the sale from Cresencia to Sps. Bolaños was valid but only
as to Cresencia’s aliquot share in the property. She also
claimed that she told Sps. Bolaños not to demolish the family
home but the latter forcibly entered the property and
demolished a large portion thereof;
30. Cresencia claimed that she was a buyer in good faith from
Flavia, the latter being the sole owner of the property, and
that Rosecf, et al. had no share in the property due to
Roman’s prior oral partition during his lifetime;
31. RTC ruled for the partial nullification as to Rosecf, et al.’s
shares, but upheld the validity as to the share of Flavia and
Cresencia. CA affirmed the decision in toto. Hence, the instant
petition (Rule 45).
ISSUES:
WON CA erred in applying rules on co-ownership pursuant to Arts.
484, in relation to 980 of the Civil Code.
PROVISION: Articles 484 & 980, New Civil Code of the
Philippines
Article 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.
xxx
Article 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from
him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. (932).
RULING + RATIO:
No. Courts a quo were correct.
• As to Roman’s acquisition of the subject property, the Court
held in respecting the findings of facts made by the trial court
and the CA that the lot was acquired while he was a widower
and prior to his 2nd marriage with Ceferina. Hence, it was
purchased from his capital property and therefore rightfully
inherited by the 11 heirs as co-owners. Thus, the Court held:
x x x Roman Zuñiga, Sr. having passed away on
9 August 1976, Lot No. 1-P now forms part of
his estate. Except for Lot No. 1-P, the record
has not shown any other property left by
Roman Zuñiga, Sr. at the time of his death. In
the absence of whatever evidence that he
executed a will his legitimate children by his
first and second marriages inherit such lot in
equal share[s] as intestate heirs (Article 980,
The Civil Code). It follows that Lot No. 1-P has
to be divided among them into eleven equal
shares.
Until such time that Lot No. 1-P has been
partitioned among Roman Zuñiga, Sr.’s eleven
legitimate children, as co-owners being co-heirs
their shares remain ideal (Article 1078, The Civil
Code). Not one of the eleven children can claim
as his or hers a specifically identified portion of
Lot No. 1-P. x x x
Considering that Roman died on August 9,
1976, the provisions of the Civil Code on
succession, then the law in force, should apply,
particularly Articles 979 and 980, viz.—
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and
other ascendants, without distinction as
to sex or age, and even if they should
come from different marriages. x x x
Cresencia, the transfer stands as valid and
effective. Consequently, what Cresencia
sold to petitioner spouses was her own
share and Flavia’s share in the property
that she acquired by virtue of the
notarized deed of sale, which is only 2/11
of Lot No. 1-P. Therefore, the restitution
of the property in excess of that portion
by petitioner spouses is clearly
warranted. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
Other findings:
• Sps. Bolanos were not purchasers in good faith since they
acquired the property from Cresencia at the same date of
acquisition of the latter from Flavia. Neither was the
contention of Flavia that her sale to Cresencia was invalid
since no evidence was shown to prove any forgery of her
signature.
DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED.

Art. 980. The children of the deceased

shall always inherit from him in their
own right, dividing the inheritance in
equal shares.

Thus, the RTC correctly ruled that Lot No. 1-P

rightfully belongs to the 11 children of Roman,
seven (7) from his first marriage with Flavia
and four (4) from his second marriage with
Ceferina, in equal shares. As there was no
partition among Roman’s children, the lot
was owned by them in common. And
inasmuch as Flavia did not successfully
repudiate her sale of her aliquot share to
 I N T HE M ATTER O F T HE I NTESTATE E STATES O F T HE D ECEASED
J OSEFA D ELGADO A ND G UILLERMO R USTIA (2006)
Petitioner: CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other
HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO
Resondent: HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN
Ponente: Corona, J.
DOCTRINE: Succession should be allowed when the illegitimate
brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling
the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and
illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration.
FACTS:
1. The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa
Delgado and Lucio Campo, both of whom were never married.
Five other children were born to the couple who are full-blood
siblings of Josefa and natural children of Felisa. Felisa also had
another son named Luis Delgado with another man, Ramon
Osorio.
2. Josefa Delgado without a will. She was survived by a certain
Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives.
3. Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa but whether a marriage
in fact took place is disputed. It was alleged by petitioners that
the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but
were never married.
a. No record of the contested marriage existed in the civil
registry
b. A baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one
of the sponsors referred to her as an unmarried
woman.
c. They never had any children but took into their home
Guillermina who was alleged to be the illegitimate child
of Guillermo with another woman
4. Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the absence of a
marriage certificate did not mean that no marriage transpired
and that Guillermina was never duly acknowledged as an
illegitimate child and such right had prescribed upon the death
of Guillermo. They maintain that Guillermo and Josefa were
married. To support their proposition, they presented the
following pieces of evidence:
a. Different government documents which were issued to
a Mrs. Josefa Rustia as well as an acknowledgment by
Gullermo that he was married to Josefa.
5. The daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition
for letters of administration of the intestate estates of
the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia"
with the RTC. This petition was opposed by the
following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia; (2) the
heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia,
Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia.
a. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa
Delgado and the other claimants were barred under
the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood
relative Josefa Delgado.
ISSUE:
1. WoN there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado
2. Who the legal heirs of the decedent Josefa Delgado?
[RELEVANT DOCTRINE]
RULING + RATIO:
1. Yes, there is a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado.
• In this case, several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50
years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them
to be married.
• Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage.
2. The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
• Since Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married.
Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her
relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis
and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,
Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,
were her natural children.
The SC ruled that succession should be allowed, even when
the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-
blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal
successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does
not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition
has for its basis the difference in category between
illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such
difference when all the children are illegitimate children of
the same parent, even if begotten with different persons.
They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like
legitimate children of half-blood relation. The court ruled that
the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and
sisters should be applicable to them.

Disposition: the petition is hereby DENIED

 Suntay v. Suntay (2010)
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari
Petitioner: Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay, Emilio A.M. Suntay
III
Respondent: Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
Ponente: Nachura, J.
DOCTRINE:
Illegitimate children can inherit from relatives of their natural parents
when the circumstances reveal a normal relationship of legitimate
relatives defeating the ratio of the successional bar of having
animosity and antagonism.
FACTS:
1. Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Federico
Suntay (Federico), died inestate. Their only son Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I) predeceased both of them.
2. Cristina was survived by Federico, several grandchildren
including Emilio Suntay III (Emilio III) the petitioner and
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (Isabel) the respondent.
3. During his lifetime Emilio I married Isabel Cojuangco and
begot three children: Isabel (the respondent), Margarita and
Emilio II. This marriage was annulled and Emilio I had two
other children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita, by two
different women.
4. Emilio III and Nenita were reared by Federico and Cristina
since he was 9 months old and was an acknowledged natural
child of Emilio I. Both of them after the death of Cristina were
adopted by Federico.
5. Federico and Cristina were granted visits by the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court for their other grandchildren (Isabel,
Margarita, Emilio II) but such visits were stopped because
there mother did not want such.
6. Isabel filed a petition for letters of administration in her favor.
Federico opposed this saying that as the surviving spouse he is
capable of administering her estate and must be accorded
legal preference. Federico also nominated Emilio III as
administrator in case it would be adjudged that Federico has
better right.
7. Federico died pending proceeding and trial court appointed
Emilio III as administrator. Trial court stated that a surviving
spouse has preference, and that the family of Isabel has
already been estranged.
8. The CA reversed and named Isabel as administratix. This was
mainly because Emilio III was an illegitimate child, being
barred from inheriting inestate from the legitimate relatives of
his father or mother.
ISSUES:
Whether Emilio III is better qualified to act as administrator of
Cristina's estate.
RULING + RATIO:
Emilio III is better qualified, Article 992 does not apply in this
case.
The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron
curtain bar rule, is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining
herein for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on
one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal
relationship of legitimate relatives.
Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her
husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild.
Also, Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share
in the distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree
from Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate
father, Emilio I.
Article 992 does not apply in this case where facts indubitably
demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the
decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as
their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their
businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedents husband, the
original oppositor to Isabel's petition for letters of administration.

The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by

counsel for Emilio III, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992
of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between
legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

DISPOSITION:

Petition is GRANTED.