Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under
the Party-List System.[6]
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-
List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041
(PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because [t]he Chairman and the
Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that
the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is,
would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.[7] There were no
intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on
19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution
No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners
in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan
Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party
(Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher,
Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party
(BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis,
Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-
60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National
Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July
2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total
of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred
fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of
Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections
conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of
the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum
total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven
hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one
(16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far
garnered at least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred
sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:
No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes of first party
first party
SO ORDERED.[9]
Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on
3 August 2007, which reads as follows:
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION:
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting
as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution
and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.[11]
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the
COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties
entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector
Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),[12] Anak Mindanao (AMIN),[13] and An
Waray.[14] Per the certification[15] by COMELEC, the following party-list
organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
Issues
3. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same
Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues
in their petition:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional
seats for the First Party violates the principle of proportional
representation under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the
First Party and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of
RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different
from those required under RA 7941;
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these
cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on
22 April 2008:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of
the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum
of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number
of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that
is, one qualifying and two additional seats;
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives shall be composed of district
representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature
to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of
party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the
number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative
districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available
for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since
the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55
seats available to party-list representatives.
220 x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total
number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats
available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved
under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed
seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list
votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No.
7941 on the allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,[20] and Justice Vicente V.
Mendozas dissent in Veteranspresented Germanys Niemeyer formula[21] as an
alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the
seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a)
and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,[22] the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List
Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to
the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each
party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast
for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to
allocate party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the
2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure
as follows:
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every
two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided,
that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11,
RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the
party-list groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after
deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the
remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups
which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2%
threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.[23]
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote
requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list
representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the
COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to
the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition
as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.[24]
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the
proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total
nationwide party-list votes, and the other is by making the votes of a party-list with
a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of
seats.[25] Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs second
interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the
COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically
preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas
do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List
System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept
the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is
generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified
parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by
multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will
be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the
equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the
qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation
is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from
highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated
until all the seats are filled up.[26]
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes garnered during the elections.[27]
Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
2 BAYAN 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
MUNA
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544
9 COOP- 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846
15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751
16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612
21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835
26 SENIOR 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098
CITIZENS
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938
28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA 33,903
ILONGGO
29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691
30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
31 ANG 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
KASANGGA
32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA 29,130
PILIPINO
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271
34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946
36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744
37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916
38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729
39 ABANSE! 130,356 86 APO 16,421
PINAY
40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG 16,241
BUKID
41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161
42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD 8,915
FILIPINA
44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471
45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221
47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900
The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties, organizations,
and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This clause guarantees a seat to the two-
percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration
purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing
the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes
cast for all party-list candidates.
Votes Garnered
Votes over Total Guaranteed
Rank Party
Garnered Votes for Party- Seat
List, in %
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS[29] 385,810 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
Total 17
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2%
from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-
list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are entitled to
one seat each, or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we
distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes. This is where petitioners and
intervenors problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause
in proportion to their total number of votes to be in proportion to the votes of the
first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list
seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further
assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat
despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent
threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list
seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if
the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as
long as the two percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.[30]
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional
seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in
R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
(Second
(First Round)
Round)
Total 17 55
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are
55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55
available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with
sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three
seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not
limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify
for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political
parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under
the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the
Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as
for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of
the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district
candidates and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list
system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the
party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates
who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list
system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether
he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO
na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang
saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party
list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang reserve. Hindi ito reserve
seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats,
reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But
my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to
Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned
from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral
candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to
register for the party list system.
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for
political parties and mass organizations to seek common ground. For
example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why
they should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations
so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the
participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the
administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan
which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be
attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which
we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so
that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically
transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will
challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come
together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is
open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll
of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations
affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent
system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and
cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social
Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and
their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies
and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO
always vote with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of
them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no
reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not
combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very
objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are
achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way.
Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs
sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it
challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives
later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become
actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider
constitutional arena for major political parties.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party
from dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections
through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission
voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.[33] In defining a party that
participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A.
No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the
party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and
R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list
elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form
coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There
should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-
list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth
wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a
fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can
field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the
same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No.
7941:
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations
nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity[34] as there is no financial status
required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors,[35] that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a
fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior
citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution,
in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the
members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives
is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The
three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party
from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall
thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice