CHAVEV V. PUBLIC ESTATES AND AMARI
Petitioner prays that PEA
Facts: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084
tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged
areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and
all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the
"lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila
Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA
"the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a
total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight
hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently,
on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311,
and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern
portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation
without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of
Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA.
On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their
investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are:
(1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under
the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government
has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot
alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the
Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task
Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of
Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal
Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel, and the Government Corporate Counsel. The
Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the
conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for
brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the
government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of
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the reclaimed lands to AMARI.
publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA,
invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the
1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the
President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and
statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and
void."
Issue: The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as
follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic
because of subsequent events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to
observe the principle of governing the heirarchy of courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes
information on on-going neogtiations BEFORE a final
agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture
agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed
and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether
the amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government
Held: 1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by
PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot
operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its
jurisdiction.
PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA.
The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on
constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its
implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed
one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in
assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of the
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the
government from alienating lands of the public domain to private
corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial
contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to
367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila
Bay to a single private corporation.
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a
wholly government owned corporation performing public as well
as proprietary functions. All previous decisions of the Court
involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its
counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, covered
agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the
lands from private parties.
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the
constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the possible
transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to
portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is
obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent
proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation
progresses, The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage
at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the
reclamation project.
2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of
transcendental importance to the public. The Court can resolve
this case without determining any factual issue related to the
case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls
under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary
jurisdiction over the instant case.
3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the
public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law
obligated PEA make this public disclosure even without demand
from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public
disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was
the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding.
Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make
the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty,
petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or
constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is
the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of
the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the
public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the
instant case.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit
because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its
constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved
here. First is the right of citizens to information on matters of
public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional
provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of
alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating
hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in
violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a
constitutional duty to the nation.
4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute
actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government
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agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of
'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the
social, economic and moral well being of the people.'
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen,
involves the enforcement of constitutional rights — to
information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources —
matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has
the requisite locus standi.
5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions
involving public interest reinforces the people's right to
information on matters of public concern. This State policy is
expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
“Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest."
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the
1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the right to
information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to
the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated
contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if
no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may
be too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the
dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to
the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the
renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to
records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to
inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy
the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise
of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the
integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to
government operations, like rules specifying when and how to
conduct the inspection and copying.
6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of
public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks,
shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without
being of general public use, is employed in some public service,
or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls,
fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and
mines, until granted to private individuals.

Property devoted to public use referred to property open for
use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to public service
referred to property used for some specific public service and
open only to those authorized to use the property.Property of
public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public
use, but also to property not so used but employed to develop the
national wealth. This class of property constituted property of
public dominion although employed for some economic or
commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer
devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory, shall
become a part of the private property of the State." This
provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or
the executive department pursuant to law, must declare the
property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense
before the government could lease or alienate the property to
private parties.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being
neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for
residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other
productive purposes other than agricultural purposes, and shall
be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under
the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for non-
agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for
public service. This is the reason the government prohibited the
sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties.
The State always reserved these lands for some future public
service.
However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although
subject to classification as disposable public agricultural lands,
could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of
Act No. 2874.
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973
Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to
hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As
in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing
the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already
acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public
domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more
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alienable public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could
even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees
as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a
convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on
acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public
domain.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance
of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to
an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Being neither
timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom
Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural
lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution,
agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural
resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties.
All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters .
. . owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and
are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the
reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with the
power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water
whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also
empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable
or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On
the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of
foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the
National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does
not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO
No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely
transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed
from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands
reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's
charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve,
acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any
and all kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or
operated by the government." 87 (Emphasis supplied) There is,
therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands,
whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in
accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional
limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to
the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise
known as the Government Auditing Code, the government is
required to sell valuable government property through public
bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that:... "In the
event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a
private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee
or body concerned and approved by the Commission."
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not
only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to
be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim
another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract,
enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of
public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84
hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750
hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned.
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or
issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the public
domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to
government units and entities like PEA.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in
accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not
automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into
private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public
domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to
government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before
these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise,
the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can
declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands
in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public
lands.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to
be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross
violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This
scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of
lands."
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name
of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease
these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations.
7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab
initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the
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Court is not the trier of facts, and this last issue involves a
determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public
Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which
is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 708)
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR, respondents. G.R.
No. 83609; October 26, 1989
Facts:
On July 20,1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar filed their joint
application for the registration of two parcels of land,
located in the province of Capiz, in the CFI of Capiz.
They claimed that they inherited those parcels of land. The
Director of Lands and Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development opposed the application on the ground that said
parcels of land were part of a timberland, a public dominion, so it
cannot be the subject of the registration proceedings. After the
hearing, the CFI ordered the registration of the title of the lots in
the names of the applicants, herein private respondents
after finding that the applicants and their predecessors- in-interest
have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse
possession of the subject parcels of land under bona
fide claims of ownership for more than 80
years. The CA affirmed the CFI’s decision,
holding that the classification of the lotsas timberland by the
Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that
the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as
agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10).
Issue/s:
Whether or not the possession of forestlands or timberlands for
80 years can ripen to private ownership.
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that possession of forestlands, however
long, cannot ripe ninto private ownership. It emphasized that
a positive act of the government, particularly the Executive
Department is needed to declassify land, which is classified as
forest, and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes before registration of which may
proceed. The Court, citing various cases, stated that a parcel of
forestland is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry, an office under the Executive Department, and beyond
the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under
the Torrens System.
SABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL vs. THE INSULAR
GOVERNMENT, ET AL.
Facts: :
Isabelo Montano presented a petition to the Court of Land
Registration for the inscription of a piece of land in the barrio of
Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery having a
superficial area of 10,805 square meters, and bounded as set out
in the petition; its value according to the last assessment being
$505.05, United States currency. This petition was opposed by
the Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands, and by
the entity known asObras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the former on
the ground that the land in question belonged to the Government
of the United States, and the latter, that it was the absolute owner
of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the said fishery.
The Court of Land Registration in its decision of December 1,
1906, dismissed the said oppositions without costs and decreed,
after a general entry by default, the adjudication and registration
of the property described in the petition, in favor of Isabelo
Montano y Marcial. From this decision only counsel for the
Director of Public Lands appealed to this court. and precisely
Isabelo Montano sought title thereon on the strength of 10 years'
occupation pursuant to paragraph 6, section 5 of Act 926 of the
Philippine Commission
Issue:
Whether or not the land in question can be acquired by Montano
Held:
Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are not
synonymous items. The first includes not only the second, but
also other lands of the Government already reserved or devoted
to public use or subject to private right. In other words, the
Government owns real estate which is part of the "public lands"
and other real estate which is not part thereof. Government
property was of two kinds — first, that of public use or service,
said to be of public ownership, and second, that of having a
private character or use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.) Lands
of the first class, while they retain their public character are
inalienable. Those of the second are not. Therefore, there is much
real property belonging to the Government which is not affected
by statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale of public lands.
Examples in point are properties occupied by public buildings or
devoted to municipal or other governmental uses.
It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect to
public lands does not extend to tide lands. It provided that the
scrip might be located on the unoccupied and unappropriated
public lands. As said inNewhall vs. Sanger(92 U.S. 761, 763.) A
marshland which is inundated by the rise of tides belong to the
State and is not susceptible to appropriation by occupation, has
no application in the present case inasmuch as in said case the
land subject matter of the litigation was not yet titled.
G.R. No. L-3714 January 26, 1909
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ISABELO MONTANO Y MARCIAL vs. THE INSULAR
GOVERNMENT, ET AL.
Facts:
Isabelo Montano presents a petition to the Court of Land
Registration for the inscription of a piece of land in the barrio of
Libis, municipality of Caloocan, used as a fishery. This petition
was opposed by the Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of
Lands on the ground that the land in question belonged to the
Government of the United States, and the latter, that it was the
absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of
the said fishery. The Court of Land Registration in its decision of
December 1, 1906, dismissed the said oppositions without costs
in favor of Isabelo Montano y Marcial.
Issue:
W/N the property in question is an agricultural land.
Held:
The property is an agricultural land
The section quoted is section 54, paragraph 6, Act No. 926, in
which the phrase used is "agricultural public lands."
Throughout the opinion the phrase "public lands" is repeatedly
and exclusively used. The entire discussion was directed to the
question as to whether the property there in question being
"public land," it could be considered as agricultural public land
and the conclusion reached is stated at page 182, as follows:
In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land," as used in Act
No. 926, means those public lands acquired from Spain which
are not timber or mineral lands.
In that case the land in question was a long distance from the sea.
In fact, the entire town of Molo was between it and the water. It
could in no sense be called tidal land. Therefore, the opinion was
devoted to a consideration of not what were "public lands" but
whether this particular tract was or was not agricultural public
land. The question what the phrase "public lands" meant neither
considered nor decided in that opinion, for its resolution was not
necessary. In the concurring opinion, however, that question was
discussed and it was stated that the phrase "public lands" used in
Act No. 926 must be interpreted according to the American
understanding of the words employed and the meaning of the
terms as definitely fixed by the decrees of the United States
Supreme Court.
IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND VALERIANO
108 SCRA 335
FACTS
Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of land
(mangrove) which he alleged he acquired by right of accretion
since it adjoins a parcel of land owned by the Ignacio. His
application is opposed by the Director of Lands, Laureano
Valeriano, contending that said land forms part of the public
domain. The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that
said land formed part of the public domain. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain
HELD: YES
1. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the
present case because it refers to accretion or deposits on the
banks of rivers while this refers to action in the Manila Bay,
which is held to be part of the sea
2. Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands
added to shores by accretions caused by actions of the sea form
part of the pubic domain when they are no longer necessary for
purposes of public utility, only the executive and the legislative
departments have the authority and the power to make the
declaration that any said land is no longer necessary for public
use. Until such declaration is made by said departments, the lot
in question forms part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO,Respondents. [G.R.
No. 156117. May 26, 2005]
Facts:
This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the
CA, affirming the decision of the MTC granting the application
for land registration of the respondents.
Respondents filed a single application for two parcel of
lands located at Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu. They claim to
be the owner of said lots by virtue of its purchase from
respondents’ parents. They also submitted pertinent documents to
prove their claim and with emphasis on the Certifications by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are
alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative
Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963.
An initial hearing was set on Sept. 3, 1999 and
notifications were posted in conspicuous places on the subject
lots and on the municipal hall. The notice was also published in
the official gazette on Aug. 2 1999 and on the Freeman and
Banat news on Dec. 19, 1999.
MTC rendered a decision granting title to the
respondents. Petitioner assailed said decision on the grounds of:
1.) Jurisdiction, since there was a procedural defect in the filing
of a single application for two parcels of land; 2.) Respondents
6
failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject
Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Issue:
1.) Does the MTC have the jurisdiction?
2.) Did the respondents had open, continuous, and
adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the
concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Held:
1.) On Jurisdiction – the procedural defect or the
misjoinder, wherein two or more distinct or
contradicting rights or demands are joined, does not
remove the court’s jurisdiction. HOWEVER, in the case
at hand there was indeed a lack of jurisdiction not
because of the misjoinder but because of: a.) THE
REQUIREMENT FOR PUBLICATION, it is mandatory
that the publication be made in the official gazette and
in a newspaper of general circulation before the initial
hearing. As we can notice the publication on the
Freeman and the Banat News was only done 3 months
after the hearing which renders inutile the intention of
the mandatory publication.
2.) Respondents failed to comply with the required
period of possession of the Subject Lots for the
judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or
incomplete title.
The said lots are public lands classified as alienable and
disposable only on June 25, 1963
and the respondents were seeking for a confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title through judicial
legalization. Under Sec.48 of the Public Land Act,
which is the ruling law in this case, Respondents were
not able to prove their continuous ownership of the land
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, because said lands were
only classified as alienable and disposable only on June
25, 1963.
Application for land registration was dismissed.
BALBOA V. FERRALES
Facts
(1)in the year 1913, the plaintiff Buenaventura Balboa filled with
the Bureau of Lands an application for homestead, No. 10619,
under the provisions of Act No. 926, covering a tract of land
situated in the barrio of Culis, municipality of Hermosa, Province
of Bataan, containing 14 hectares, 49 ares and 77 centares.(2)
Five years thereafter, or in 1918, Balboa submitted proof,
showing his residence upon, and cultivation of said land, as well
as his compliance with all of the other requirements of section 3
of said Act No. 926, which final proof was approved by the
Director of Lands on February 15, 1918. On July 1, 1919, said
Act No. 926 was repealed by Act No. 2874.(3) On September 10,
1920, or over a year after Act No. 2874 had gone into effect, the
homestead patent for said land, otherwise known as certificate of
title No. 91 was issued nfavor of Buenventura Balboa by the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.(4) On August 11,
1924, said Buenaventura Balboa, for and in consideration of the
sum of P950, sold said land to the defendantCecilio L. Farrales;
and on October 16, 1924, the latter secured in his name transfer
certificate of title No. 650 of said land.On March 6, 1926, the
plaintiff commenced the present action for the purpose of having
said sale declared null and void on the ground of lack of consent
on his part and fraud on the part of the defendant, and on the
further ground that said sale was contrary to, and in violation of
the provisions of section 116 of Act No. 2874.The lower court
Judge rendered a decision on the basis that the said sale was null
and void since, The sale was done before the lapse of five years
upon the issuance of the certificate, which in accordance with act
no. 2874.
ISSUE Whether or not Act 2874 and not act 926 shall be
applicable to Balboa.
Ruling: No, Since the acquisition of the land and final
completion of the requirements was done by Balboa prior to the
repeal of Act 926 by act no. 2874, also upon the submission of
the final requirement by Balboa, he acquire vested right over the
patent granted unto him. The fact the homestead patent or
certificate of title No. 91 was issued on September 10, 1920, after
the repeal of Act No. 926, and under the provisions of section
116 of the repealing Act No. 2874, cannot prejudice the vested
right acquired by Balboa under the provisions of the former Act.
The issuance of the certificate of title was a mere ministerial act.
The only prohibition contained in Act No. 926 against alienation
of homestead acquired under said law, appears in section 4
thereof, which reads as follows: "No lands acquired under the
provisions of this chapter shall in any event become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the issuance of a
patent therefor." It follows, therefore that the sale of the land in
question by the plaintiff Balboa to the defendantFarrales does not
infringe said prohibition and consequently said sale is valid and
binding, and should be given full force and effect of law. Section
116 of Act No. 2874, which prohibits the sale of homestead land
during the period of five years subsequent to the issuance of the
patent or certificate of title upon which rests the decision of the
court a quo, cannot be invoked to annul the sale in question. Said
prohibition, if applied in the present case, would impair and
diminish the vested rights, hence the court reversed the decision
of the lower court.
SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL,
and CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE BUENAVENTURA,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAUSTINO J.
PERFECTO, RAFFY SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO,
LORENZO BROCALES, SALVADOR DOE, and other
DOES, respondents.; 266 SCRA 392; [G.R. No. 95608.
January 21, 1997]; ROMERO, J.
FACTS:
7
The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of
land in Tiwi, Albay which form part of the "Tiwi Hot Spring
National Park." On June 13, 1913, Executive Order No. 40 was
issued which reserved for provincial park purposes.
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th
Judicial District, USA, ordered the registration of 15 parcels of
land covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego
Palomo. Diego Palomo donated these parcels of to his heirs,
herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo
On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive
Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the
control, management, protection and administration of the
defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the
Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and,
therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable
under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property,
paid real estate taxes thereon and introduced improvements by
planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971,
petitioner Carmen vda.de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio
Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land
The Republic of the Philippines filed for annulment and
cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of
land registered in the name of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and
conquest in the 16th century. Before the Treaty of Paris in April
11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were
under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish
Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could only be acquired
through royal concessions which were documented in various
forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concession
Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by
Purchase and (4) InformacionPosesoria or Possessory
Information title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or
under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners'
predecessors in interest derived title from an old Spanish grant.
Petitioners placed much reliance upon decisions of the Court of
First Instance which were not signed by the judge but were
merely certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing
the signature of the clerk of court.
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were
really issued, the lands are still not capable of appropriation. The
adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable
lands of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not
alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by the District
Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the subject
lands were never declared as alienable and disposable and
subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the present.[16]
Moreover, as part of the reservation for provincial park purposes,
they form part of the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest
land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into
private property, unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable.
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence
prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of
authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of
ownership in land registration cases.
PALOMO v. CA
G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997
FACTS:
Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land
covered by Executive Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the
registration of these lands and donated the same to his heirs,
Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in
April 1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title
were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a
petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of
Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914
sometime in October 1953. Sometime in July 1954 President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the
area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot
Spring National Park," under the control, management,
protection and administration of the defunct Commission of
Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest
Development. The area was never released as alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither
susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land
Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act. The
Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid
real estate taxes thereon and introduced improvements by
planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971,
petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo
and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee
a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
ISSUE:
8
Whether or not forest land may be owned by private
persons.
HELD:
The adverse possession which may be the basis of a
grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only
to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law governing
natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. It is not registerable and possession thereof, no matter
how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such
lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
There is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest
zone were not alienable lands of the public domain. As to the
forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact
that the government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in
question is no justification for petitioners to plead good faith in
introducing improvements on the lots.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, and EMILIO BERNABE, SR., EMILIO
BERNABE, JR., LUZ BERNABE, AMPARO BERNABE,
and ELISA BERNABE; G.R. No. L-40402. March 16, 1987;
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Lot No. 622 of the MarivelesCadastre was declared public land
in a decision rendered before the last war. On July 6, 1965, Lot
622 was segregated from the forest zone and released and
certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for
disposition under the Public Land Act.On April 26, 1967,
Respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of Bataan a
petition to perfect their rights and register their titles to said lots,
having allegedly acquired ownership and possession of said
parcels of land by purchase from the original owners thereof,
whose possession of the same including that of the herein
Respondents, has always been continuous, open, active,
exclusive, public, adverse, and in the concept of owners thereof
for more than 30 years. The Acting Provincial Fiscal of Bataan,
for and in behalf of the Director of Lands, filed his opposition to
the petition alleging that the land is still, in truth and in fact,
public land and as such cannot be the subject of a land
registration proceeding under Act 496.
ISSUE: Whether the lots claimed by respondents could legally
be the subject of a judicial confirmation of title under the
aforequoted provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended.
RULING: No.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively
to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with
forests are excluded. They are incapable of registration and their
inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued during the
Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of
registration, nullifies the title. Thus, possession of forest lands,
however long, cannot ripen into private. A parcel of forest land is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and
beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to
register under the Torrens System.

Thus, even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at

all possible, private respondents have not qualified for a grant
under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, the facts being that
private respondents could only be credited with 1 year, 9 months
and 20 days possession and occupation of the lots involved,
counted from July 6, 1965, the date when the land area in sitio
San Jose, barrio Cabcaban, Mariveles, Bataan, known as Bataan
PMD No. 267, which includes the lots claimed by respondents,
had been segregated from the forest zone and released by the
Bureau of Forestry as an agricultural land for disposition under
the Public Land Act. Consequently, under the above mentioned
jurisprudence, neither private respondents nor their predecessors-
in-interest could have possessed the lots for the requisite period
of thirty (30) years as disposable agricultural land.