CASES ON VAWC
two limiting qualifications for any act or
DABALOS VS QUAIMBAO
GR NO. 193960, JAN. 7, 2013
FACTS:
 Petitioner was charged with
violation of Section 5 (a) of RA
9262.
 After examining the supporting
evidence, the RTC found probable
cause and consequently, issued a
warrant of arrest against petitioner
on November 19, 2009. ||
 Petitioner averred that at the time
of the alleged incident on July 13,
2009, he was no longer in a dating
relationship with private
respondent; hence, RA 9262 was
inapplicable. |||
 In her affidavit, private
respondent admitted that her
relationship with petitioner had
ended prior to the subject
incident. She narrated that on July
13, 2009, she sought payment of
the money she had lent to
petitioner but the latter could not
pay. She then inquired from
petitioner if he was responsible
for spreading rumors about her
which he admitted. Thereupon,
private respondent slapped
petitioner causing the latter to
inflict on her the physical injuries
alleged in the Information. |||
ISSUE: WON ACCUSED CAN BE
CHARGED WITH RA 9262.
RULING. YES.
The law is broad in scope but specifies
series of acts to be considered as a crime
of violence against women through
physical harm, namely: 1) it is
committed against a woman or her child
and the woman is the offender's wife,
former wife, or with whom he has or had
sexual or dating relationship or with
whom he has a common child; and 2) it
results in or is likely to result in physical
harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals, 5 the Court
enumerated the elements of the crime of
violence against women through
harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a
sexual or dating
relationship with the
offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself
or through another,
commits an act or series of
acts of harassment against
the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms
or causes substantial
emotional or psychological
distress to her. 6
Notably, while it is required that the
offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman,
for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence
be a consequence of such relationship.
Nowhere in the law can such limitation
be inferred.
As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is
immaterial whether the relationship
had ceased for as long as there is
sufficient evidence showing the past or
present existence of such relationship
between the offender and the victim
when the physical harm was
committed.
Accordingly, the Information having
sufficiently alleged the necessary
elements of the crime, such as: a dating
relationship between the petitioner and
the private respondent; the act of
violence committed by the petitioner;
and the resulting physical harm to private
respondent, the offense is covered by RA
9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of
the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the
said law.
DEL SOCORRO VS VAN WILSEM
GR NO. 193707
FACTS:
 Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro
and respondent Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September
25, 1990. 2 On January 19, 1994,
they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van
Wilsem, who at the time of the
filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age. |||
 Unfortunately, their marriage
bond ended on July 19, 1995 by
virtue of a Divorce Decree issued
by the appropriate Court of
Holland. 4 At that time, their son
was only eighteen (18) months
old. 5 Thereafter, petitioner and
her son came home to the
Philippines. |||
 respondent made a promise to
provide monthly support to their
son in the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene
(which is equivalent to
Php17,500.00 more or less). 7
However, since the arrival of
petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never
gave support to the son,
Roderigo. |||
 Not long thereafter, respondent
came to the Philippines and
remarried in Pinamungahan,
Cebu, and since then, have been
residing thereat. |||
 On August 28, 2009, petitioner,
through her counsel, sent a letter
demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent
refused to receive the letter |||
ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign
national can be held criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.
RULING: YES.
To determine whether or not a person is
criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it
is imperative that the legal obligation to
support exists.
|||
we agree with respondent that petitioner
cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen,
since Article 15 35 of the New Civil
Code stresses the principle of nationality.
In other words, insofar as Philippine
laws are concerned, specifically the
provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. By analogy, the same principle
applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with
respect to family rights and duties. 36
The obligation to give support to a child
is a matter that falls under family rights
and duties. Since the respondent is a
citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether he is
obliged to give support to his child, as
well as the consequences of his failure to
do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the
respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner's son under Article 195 of the
Family Code as a consequence of the
Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland.
This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner's son altogether. EHaASD
In international law, the party who wants
to have a foreign law applied to a dispute
or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law. 40 In the present case,
respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of
provision of and capacity to support. 41
While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position
that he is not obliged to support his son,
he never proved the same.
We emphasize, however, that as to
petitioner herself, respondent is no
longer liable to support his former
wife.
Finally, we do not agree with
respondent's argument that granting, but
not admitting, that there is a legal basis
for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262
in the instant case, the criminal liability
has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime 52 under Section
24 of R.A. No. 9262.
The act of denying support to a child
under Section 5 (e) (2) and (i) of R.A.
No. 9262 is a continuing offense, 53
which started in 1995 but is still
ongoing at present. Accordingly, the
crime charged in the instant case has
clearly not prescribed. |||
REPUBLIC VS YAHON
G.R. No. 201043. June 16, 2014.
FACTS:
 Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed
a petition for the issuance of
protection order under the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9262, 3 otherwise known as
the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of
2004," against her husband, S/Sgt.
Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon),
an enlisted personnel of the
Philippine Army who retired in
January 2006. Respondent and
S/Sgt. Yahon were married on
June 8, 2003. The couple did not
have any child but respondent has
a daughter with her previous live-
in partner. |||
  On September 28, 2006, the RTC
issued a TPO, as follows: |||
“xxx
To insure that petitioner can
receive a fair share of respondent's
retirement and other benefits, the
following agencies thru their heads
are directed to WITHHOLD any
retirement, pension and other
benefits of respondent, S/SGT.
CHARLES A. YAHON.”
ISSUE: whether petitioner military
institution may be ordered to
automatically deduct a percentage from
the retirement benefits of its enlisted
personnel, and to give the same directly
to the latter's lawful wife as spousal
support in compliance with a protection
order issued by the RTC pursuant to
R.A. No. 9262
RULING: YES.
It is basic in statutory construction that in
case of irreconcilable conflict between
two laws, the later enactment must
prevail, being the more recent expression
of legislative will. 17 Statutes must be so
construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. 18 However, if several
laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier
statute must yield to the later enactment.
The later law is the latest expression of
the legislative will. 19
We hold that Section 8 (g) of R.A. No.
9262, being a later enactment, should be
construed as laying down an exception to
the general rule above-stated that
retirement benefits are exempt from
execution. The law itself declares that
the court shall order the withholding of a
percentage of the income or salary of the
respondent by the employer, which shall
be automatically remitted directly to the
woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to
the contrary.
|||
GO-TAN VS SPS TAN
[G.R. No. 168852. September 30,
2008.]|||
FACTS:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-
Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan
(Steven) were married. 3 Out of this
union, two female children were born,
Kyra Danielle 4 and Kristen Denise. 5
On January 12, 2005, barely six years
into the marriage, petitioner filed a
Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Protective Order (TPO) 6
against Steven and her parents-in-law,
Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L.
Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She
alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with
respondents, were causing verbal,
psychological and economic abuses upon
her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs
(e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5), and (i) 7 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 8
otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004"
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES
PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-
IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE
INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE
ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
"ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN
ACT OF 2004”.
RULING: The Court rules in favor of the
petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines
''[v]iolence against women and their
children'' as "any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result
in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering,
or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty."CScaDH
While the said provision provides that
the offender be related or connected to
the victim by marriage, former marriage,
or a sexual or dating relationship, it does
not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
the principle of conspiracy may be
applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to
achieve a criminal design is shown, the
act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals.
ANG VS CA
[G.R. No. 182835. April 20, 2010.]
FACTS:
 This case concerns a claim of
commission of the crime of
violence against women when a
former boyfriend sent to the girl
the picture of a naked woman, not
her, but with her face on it. |||
 The public prosecutor charged
petitioner-accused Rustan Ang
(Rustan) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of
violation of the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their
Children Act or Republic Act
(R.A.) 9262 |||
 complainant Irish Sagud (Irish)
and accused Rustan were
classmates at Wesleyan
University in Aurora Province.
Rustan courted Irish and they
became "on-and-off" sweethearts
towards the end of 2004. When
Irish learned afterwards that
Rustan had taken a live-in partner
(now his wife), whom he had
gotten pregnant, Irish broke up
with him. |||
 In the early morning of June 5,
2005, Irish received through
multimedia message service
(MMS) a picture of a naked
woman with spread legs and with
Irish's face superimposed on the
figure (Exhibit A). 2 The sender's
cellphone number, stated in the
message, was 0921-8084768, one
of the numbers that Rustan used.
 Irish surmised that he copied the 1.The offender has or had
picture of her face from a shot he a sexual or dating
took when they were in Baguio in relationship with
2003 (Exhibit B). ||| the offended
 After she got the obscene picture, woman;
Irish got other text messages from
Rustan. He boasted that it would 2.The offender, by
be easy for him to create similarly himself or through
scandalous pictures of her. And he another, commits
threatened to spread the picture he an act or series of
sent through the internet. ||| acts of harassment
against the
woman; and
ISSUES: Whether or not a "dating
relationship" existed between 3.The harassment alarms
Rustan and Irish as this term is or causes
defined in R.A. 9262; substantial
emotional or
Whether or not a single act psychological
of harassment, like the sending of distress to her.
the nude picture in this case,
already constitutes a violation of One. The parties to this case agree that
Section 5 (h) of R.A. 9262; the prosecution needed to prove that
accused Rustan had a "dating
RULING: relationship" with Irish. Section 3 (e)
provides that a "dating relationship"
Section 3 (a) of R.A. 9262 provides that includes a situation where the parties are
violence against women includes an act romantically involved over time and on a
or acts of a person against a woman with continuing basis during the course of the
whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
relationship.
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that (e)"Dating relationship"
constitute violence against women and refers to a situation
these include any form of harassment wherein the parties live as
that causes substantial emotional or husband and wife without
psychological distress to a woman. |||
the benefit of marriage or
are romantically involved
over time and on a
The above provisions, taken together,
continuing basis during
indicate that the elements of the crime of the course of the
violence against women through relationship. A casual
harassment are: acquaintance or ordinary
socialization between two
individuals in a business
 or social context is not a
dating relationship.
it seems clear that the law did not use in
|||
its provisions the colloquial verb
"romance" that implies a sexual act. It
did not say that the offender must have
"romanced" the offended woman.
Rather, it used the noun "romance" to
describe a couple's relationship, i.e., "a
love affair." 9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that
"violence against women . . . refers to
any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman . . . with
whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship." Clearly, the law
itself distinguishes a sexual relationship
from a dating relationship. Indeed,
Section 3 (e) above defines "dating
relationship" while Section 3 (f) defines
"sexual relations." The latter "refers to a
single sexual act which may or may not
result in the bearing of a common child."
The dating relationship that the law
contemplates can, therefore, exist even
without a sexual intercourse taking place
between those involved
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing
|||
between two lovers is a common
occurrence. Their taking place does not
mean that the romantic relation between
the two should be deemed broken up
during periods of misunderstanding.
Explaining what "away-bati" meant,
Irish explained that at times, when she
could not reply to Rustan's messages, he
would get angry at her. That was all.
Indeed, she characterized their three-
month romantic relation as continuous. |||
(Ang y Pascua v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 182835, [April 20, 2010], 632 PHIL
609-624)
the Court cannot measure the trauma that
Irish experienced based on Rustan's low
regard for the alleged moral sensibilities
of today's youth. What is obscene and
injurious to an offended woman can of
course only be determined based on the
circumstances of each case. Here, the
naked woman on the picture, her legs
spread open and bearing Irish's head and
face, was clearly an obscene picture and,
to Irish a revolting and offensive one.
Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not
in the pornography trade, would be
scandalized and pained if she sees herself
in such a picture. What makes it further
terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan
sent the picture with a threat to post it in
the internet for all to see. That must have
given her a nightmare. |||
TUA VS MANGROBANG
[G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.
FACTS:
 On May 20, 2005, respondent
Rossana Honrado-Tua
(respondent) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition 2
for herself and in behalf of her
minor children, Joshua Raphael,
Jesse Ruth Lois, and Jezreel
Abigail, for the issuance of a
protection order, pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the
Anti-Violence Against Women
 and their Children Act of 2004,
against her husband, petitioner
Ralph Tua. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0464-
05 and raffled-off to Branch 22.
Respondent claimed that she and
her children had suffered from
petitioner's abusive conduct; that
petitioner had threatened to cause
her and the children physical
harm for the purpose of
controlling her actions or
decisions; that she was actually
deprived of custody and access to
her minor children; and, that she
was threatened to be deprived of
her and her children's financial
support.|||
 On May 23, 2005, the RTC
issued a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) ) |||
 Petitioner contended that the
issuance of the TPO on May 23,
2005 is unconstitutional for being
violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution. |||
ISSUE: A.) The issue of constitutionality
of RA 9262 was raised by petitioner in
his Comment to respondent's Petition
with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO )||
B. WON there is an invalid delegation of
legislative power to the court and to
barangay officials to issue protection
orders.
SC RULING:
A. In Garcia v. Drilon, 13 wherein
petitioner therein argued that Section 15
of RA 9262 is a violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution, we
struck down the challenge and held:
A protection order is an
order issued to prevent
further acts of violence
against women and their
children, their family or
household members, and to
grant other necessary
reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended
parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in
their daily life and facilitate
the opportunity and ability
to regain control of their
life.AEIHaS
The scope of reliefs in
protection orders is
broadened to ensure that
the victim or offended party
is afforded all the remedies
necessary to curtail access
by a perpetrator to the
victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from
greater risk of violence; to
accord the victim and any
designated family or
household member safety
in the family residence, and
to prevent the perpetrator
from committing acts that
jeopardize the employment
and support of the victim. It
also enables the court to
award temporary custody of
minor children to protect
the children from violence,
to prevent their abduction
by the perpetrator and to
 ensure their financial
support.
The rules require that
petitions for protection
order be in writing, signed
and verified by the
petitioner thereby
undertaking full
responsibility, criminal or
civil, for every allegation
therein. Since "time is of
the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence
Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a
TPO on the date of the filing of the
application after ex parte determination
that there is basis for the issuance
thereof. Ex parte means that the
respondent need not be notified or be
present in the hearing for the issuance of
the TPO. Thus, it is within the court's
discretion, based on the petition and the
affidavit attached thereto, to determine
that the violent acts against women and
their children for the issuance of a TPO
have been committed. ) ||

is to be prevented," the
court is authorized to issue
ex parte a TPO after raffle
but before notice and
hearing when the life, limb
or property of the victim is
in jeopardy and there is
reasonable ground to
believe that the order is
necessary to protect the
victim from the immediate
and imminent danger of
VAWC or to prevent such
violence, which is about to
recur.

B. the issuance of a BPO by the Punong

Barangay or, in his unavailability, by
any available Barangay Kagawad,
merely orders the perpetrator to desist
from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening
to cause the woman or her child physical
harm. Such function of the Punong
Barangay is, thus, purely executive in
nature, in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to "enforce all
laws and ordinances," and to "maintain
public order in the barangay." |||