May 30, 1899, and remained absent therefrom during the
[ G.R. No. 666, January 14, 1902 ]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF J. GARCIA BOSQUE FOR
ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS.
DECISION
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The cession of the Philippine Archipelago having been agreed
upon by the parties to the treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898,
the compulsory subjection of the subjects of the ceding power
to the new sovereign followed as a logical consequence. The
status, of these subjects was not uniform, as in addition to the
natives there were others who were merely residents but who,
equally with the natives, had interests and rights inherent in the
nationality of the territory. With respect to these the special
agreement contained in article 9 was established, by virtue of
which it was agreed to accord them the right of electing to leave
the country, thus freeing themselves of subjection to the new
sovereign, or to continue to reside in the territory, in which case
the expiration of the term of eighteen months without their
making an express declaration of intention to retain their
Spanish nationality resulted in the loss of che latter, such
persons thereby becoming subjects of the new sovereign in the
same manner as the natives of these Islands. The period of
eighteen months began to run from the date of the exchange
of the ratifications of the treaty that is to say, from April
11,1899, and expired on the corresponding day of October,
1900. The petitioner absented himself from these Islands on
whole period. It was in January, 1901, that he returned to these
Islands.
From this conduct on the part of the petitioner it is evident that
he elected to take the first of the two courses open to him
under his right of option. Neither the Government nor the
courts can place any other construction upon the facts above
related. Having left the Islands he had no occasion,to make any
declaration of his intention to preserve his Spanish nationality,
which he carried with him on his departure. This nationality
could be forfeited only by a continued residence in the ceded
territory and a failure to make a declaration of intention to
preserve it within the term fixed therefor. The conditions which
gave rise to the presumptive change of nationality were
residence and the lapse of eighteen months without express
declaration to the contrary; these two conditions not being
fulfilled there was no change of national status. Neither by the
Government of Spain nor by that of the United States could the
petitioner be regarded as a Filipino subject. By absenting
himself from the territory he continued to be a Spaniard.
To native-born subjects of the territory no such right of option
was accorded; it was expressly refused tllem upon the rejection
by the American Commissioners of the proposition in favor of
the inhabitants of the ceded territories made by the Spanish
Commissioners in Annex No. 1 to the twenty-second protocol.
(Conference of December 10, 1898.) The native subject could
not evade the power of the new sovereign by withdrawing from
the Islands, nor while continuing to reside therein make
declaration of his intention to preserve the Spanish nationality
enjoyed under the former sovereign. Neither the Government
of the United States nor that of Spain can consider them as
other than Filipino subjects. This is expressly stated by the
Spanish Government in article 1 of its royal decree of May 11,
1901.
The dates fixed by the treaty by which the sovereignty of one
nation is ceded to another are of the highest importance, they
being part of the contract, and are not within the control of the
subjects as are those relating to their individual rights by reason
of the fact that the political rights of the contracting nations
themselves are the subject of the agreement. It is for this
reason that the Government of Spain in the royal decree above
cited has always taken the dates fixed in the treaty of Paris as
the starting point, and, moreover, expressly declares therein
that persons who are natives or residents of the ceded or
relinquished territories can not, in their relations with the
Government or authorities of such territories, lay claim to
Spanish nationality preserved or recovered by virtue of said
decree, except with the consent of such Government, or under
treaty stipulations. (Art. 5.) The Government and courts of
these Islands should not act with less circumspection in the
matter, and invade the sovereign rights of Spain by giving the
presumptive nationality established by Article IX of the treaty
of Paris an extent not warranted by the conditions upon which
it depends, to wit, residence coupled with failure to make an
express declaration to the contrary. The ordinary provisions of
local laws in their normal operation with regard to the effect of
absence upon the retention of a residence or domicile can not
therefore be relied upon, nor the presumption as to the
intention of an absentee recognized by civil codes and
international treaties, although the most general and almost
the only proof allowed by statute as evidence of an intention to
preserve a residence or domicile in a country is the
maintenance of a dwelling or commercial establishment
therein, upon which point, as also upon the fa,ct that the
petitioner became a member of the bar of Barcelona upon his
arrival in that city, we make no decision, not regarding it as of
any moment in view of the conclusions above expressed. The
fact is thai one is not to be regarded as having submitted to the
new sovereign by the mere failure to make an express
declaration, inasmuch as without a residence de facto the
declaration is of no significance, having been established for
the express purpose of overcoming the effect of a continued
residence, an act which in itself implies subjection to the new
sovereign by giving rise to the presumption of waiver of Spanish
nationality and the adoption of that of the territory.
The petitioner can not, therefore, be considered to have lost his
Spanish nationality by reason of his residence in the territory
after the 11th of October, 1900, and his failure to make
declaration of his intention to preserve it within the period
agreed upon by the high contracting parties to the treaty of
Paris, and to have adopted the nationality of the native subjects
under the presumption arising from the conditions expressed.
He can only acquire it through voluntary renunciation of his
present nationality by seeking to become naturalized in these
Islands; but upon this matter this court can decide nothing,
there having been no legislation upon the subject up to the
present
The status of the petitioner with respect to the new sovereignty
of the territory having been defined, it remains to determine
the question raised as to whether Spanish subjects resident
therein constitute an intermediate class between other foreign
residents and the natives of the country in whose behalf some neither can Spanish subjects do so, they being in every respect
specially favorable conditions have been stipulated. Upon this upon the same footing as other foreigners.
point no proposition was made, even incidentally, nor was any
If, then, the petitioner upon his departure from these Islands
reference made to it in the discussions which preceded the
on May 30,1899, did not take with him the nationality of the
treaty of Paris. The American Commissioners, referring to
native inhabitants impressed by the treaty of Paris, which had
Spanish subjects, natives of Spain, simply said: "Such persons
been in force from the 11th of April of the same year; if he
have the fullest right to dispose of their property and remove
departed as a Spaniard and continued to be a Spaniard, by
from the territory or remain therein to continue to be Spanish
taking the first course left open by the right of option stipulated
subjects or elect the nationality of the new territory."
in the treaty of Paris, without being affected by the
(Memorandum annexed to Protocol No. 22.) "They shall also
presumptive nationality of the territory arising from the fact of
have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and
residence and the lapse of the time fixed; if he had not elected
profession, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
to adopt this nationality of the territory by express declaration
applicable to other foreigners." (Art. 9 of the treaty of Paris.)
within the same period; if after the expiration of that period it
The laws applicable to other foreigners were, prior to that
is expressly provided that the right of option shall no longer be
treaty, the Law of Foreigners for the Ultramarine Provinces of
available, and that the only course is naturalization, as to which
July 4, 1870, and article 27 of the Civil Code. The first of these
there has been no legislative enactment; if as a Spanish subject
laws in its thirty-ninth article authorized all foreigners to
upon equal footing with other foreign residents he can not
engage in any kind of industry in the Spanish ultramarine
practice the legal profession under the law either prior or
provinces subject to the laws prevailing therein, and to practice
subsequent to the treaty of Paris, it is evident that this court
any profession for which the laws did not require a diploma of
can not regard the petitioner as possessed of the qualifications
proficiency granted by the Spanish authorities. No one can
alleged.
doubt that the legal profession is one of those for the practice
of which the law required a diploma of proficiency granted by The new petition presented by him for admission to the bar of
the Spanish authorities. The second law cited provides that these Islands must therefore be denied, and it is so ordered.
foreigners in Spain shall enjoy the rights which the civil laws
accord to Spaniards, subject to the provisions of article 2 of the Torres, Cooper, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
constitution of the State. Article 2 of the constitution of 1876 ___________________________________________________
establishes the same restriction or limitation as the law of ___________________________________________________
foreigners. Hence if other foreigners could not then engage in ___________________________________________________
the practice of law, and by the express prohibition of the Code ___________________________________________________
of Civil Procedure in force can not do so at the present time, ___________________________________________________
Ladd, J., did not sit in this case.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, PETITIONER
In 1998, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay went to Canada to seek
medical help. In order for him to take advantage of Canada’s
free medical aid program he became a Canadian citizen in 2004.
In 2006 however, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to Republic Act 9225 of the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. In the same year, he returned to the
Philippines and he now intends to resume his practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his
practice of law.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other professions
in the Philippines are reserved and limited only to Filipino
citizens. Philippine citizenship is a requirement for admission to
the bar. So when Dacanay became a Canadian citizen in 2004,
he ceased to have the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. However, under RA 9225, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have
lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship in accordance with RA 9225. Hence, when Dacanay
reacquires his Filipino citizenship in 2006, his membership to
the Philippine bar was deemed to have never been terminated.
But does this also mean that he can automatically resume his
practice of law right after reacquisition?
No. Dacanay must still comply with several conditions before
he can resume his practice of law, to wit:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership
dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is especially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws
and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind
him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an
officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing
as a member of the Philippine bar.
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
5 SCRA 661 – Legal Ethics – Conditional Pardon will not bar
disbarment
Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of
one Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was sentenced to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of the
penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President.
He was released on the condition that he shall not commit any
crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment
case against Gutierrez by reason of the latter’s conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt,
such a crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering
the fact that he was granted pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but
conditional. It merely remitted his sentence. It does not reach
the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his
conviction for murder without regard to the pardon (which he
invoked in defense). The crime was actually qualified by
treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in
hand, by taking advantage of his official position (Gutierrez
being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor
vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to
justify his being purged from the profession.
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking
of a successful bar applicant. Argosino was previously involved
with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but was
sentenced withhomicide through reckless imprudence after he
pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with 2 years imprisonment
where he applied for a probation thereafter which was granted
by the court with a 2 yr probation. He took the bar exam and
passed but was not allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to
allowhim to take the attorney’s oath of office averring that his
probation was already terminated. The court notethat he spent
only 10 months of the probation period before it was
terminated.ISSUE: WON Argosino may take oath of office.
RULING: The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good
morals of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of
legal learning. Hence he was asked by the court to produce
evidence that would certify that he has reformed and have
become a responsible member of the community through
sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation
for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a
significant period of time to certify he is morally fit to the
admission of the law profession. The court also ordered that
said a copy of the proceeding be furnished to the
family/relatives of Raul Camaligan.
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging
Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and
misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having been
a public school teacher for a number of years. The respondent
took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the
hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage.
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual
intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and
not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of
voluntariness and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to
a baby boysupported by a certified true copy of a birth
certificate and to show how intimate the relationship between
the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified
that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked
from her.
The respondent denied all the material allegations of the
complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations
therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension
under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be
disbarred/suspended.
HELD: YES. One of the requirements for
all applicants for admission to the Bar is that
the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court). It is essential during the continuance
of the practice and the exercise of the privilege to maintain
good moral character. When his integrity is challenged by
evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against
him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the
relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected
of him. With respect to the special defense raised by the
respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant
that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of
the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules
of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory
enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is
not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts
to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court
over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number,
our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also
for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of court
states that:
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has,
thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his
profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient
and learned profession of law must conform themselves in
accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in
paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against
the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or
unqualified because deficient in either moral character or
education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and
to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not
only the law but the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred
and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from
the Roll of Attorneys.
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
SEBASTISAN VS. CALIS A.C. NO. 5118/314SCRA1; SEPTEMBER
9, 1999 J.
FACTS:
Sometime in November 1992, one Marilou Sebastian, herein
complainant, was referred to Atty. Dorotheo Calis, herein
respondent, for the latter to process all the documents needed
for the former to travel to the United States of America with
the consideration of P150,000.00. With the respondent’s
promise to return the complainant’s money if there would be
trouble with the documents for her travel. In 4 separate
payments, complainant paid the entire consideration receiving,
however, only 3 receipts for the payments. Respondent, Calis,
provided the complainant with spurious documents which
resulted for complainant to be detained in Changi Prisons upon
arrival in Singapore and thereafter, the complainant was
deported back to the Philippines. Upon arrival in the
Philippines, the respondent promised to secure new travel
documents for the complainant. However, the complainant
opted to demand for the return of her money. Calis made
partial payments of 15,000, 6000, and 5000 to the complainant
but was unreachable when the complainant demanded for the
rest of the payment. Calis also failed to attend the hearings with
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) despite being issued summons and being
required to answer or comment on the complaint. Therewith,
the IBP recommended the disbarment of herein respondent.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Atty. Dorotheo Calis is guilty of violation of
Canon 1, Rule 101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which thereby constitutes his disbarment.
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Calis is guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 101 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The practice of law is not a
right but a privilege carrying with it the condition of continuous
good moral character. The gross misconduct of a lawyer
subjects him unfit to practice law..Canon 1, Rule 101 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility states that Rule 1.01 - A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. In the case at bar, Calis guaranteed to secure
all the necessary documents for
Sebastian’s travel to the United States with the promise to
return the money if anything goes wrong with her travel. Calis’s
acts of giving the complainant spurious documents constitutes
deception and unlawful conduct on his part. Adding to it is
respondent’s refusal to honor the summons of the IBP which
reflects his unprofessional conduct. The court views Calis’s
conduct and continuance in service as a threat to the
administration of justice. Therefore, Calis is deemed disbarred
and is ordered to immediately return the rest of the
complainant’s money.
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
(In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency) Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILLION, petitioner
Reinstatement of a Disbarred Member of the Bar
FACTS:
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978,
the vote being unanimous with the late. On November 29,
1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board
of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to
pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice. From the time the
decision was rendered, there were various pleadings filed by
respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for
reconsideration dated August 19, 1978.
RULE:
Effect of non-payment of dues: Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues
for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall
be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Marcial A. Edillon shall be disbar and strick
out his name in the
Roll of Attorneys due to his stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues.
Whether or not refusal to pay his IBP member dues invade his
constitutional rights.
HELD:
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.
On the petition of Mr. Marcial Edillon for reinstatement to the
Roll of Attorneys, appearing that he had fully paid his
delinquent membership fees due the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and submitted to the IBP Board of Governors a
verified application for reinstatement together with an
undertaking to abide by all By-laws and resolutions by said
Board in the event of reinstatement, the Court Resolved to
grant the petition of Mr. Marcial A. Edillon to be reinstated as
a member of the Philippine Bar. He was allowed to take anew
the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys after payment
of the required fees.
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
Adm. Case No. 4749 January 20, 2000. 322 SCRA 529
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant
Vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent
Misrepresentation and Non-payment of Bar Membership Dues
FACTS:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment
of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas. In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997,
complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar,
alleged that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not
indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings.
If at all, he only indicated IBP Rizal 259060 but he has been using this
for at least 3 years already. On the other hand, respondent, who is
now of age, averred that he is only engaged in a limited practice of
law and under RA 7432, as a senior citizen, he is exempted from
payment of income taxes and included in this exemption, is the
payment of membership dues.
CANON 7: A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated
bar.
CANON 10: A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about
his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his
pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.
Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his
membership dues owing to limited practice of law and for being a
senior citizen.
HELD:
Guilty. Respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year, or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later. Rule 139-A requires that every member of
the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment
covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the
delinquent’ s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter
whether or not respondent is only engaged in limited practice of law.
Moreover, the exemption invoked by respondent does not include
exemption from payment of membership or association dues.
In addition, by indicating in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP
dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility that provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His
act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall
not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
NARAG VS. NARAG (291 SCRA 451 06/29/1998)
FACTS: Atty. Narag’s spouse filed a petition for disbarment in
the IBP alleging that her husband courted one of his students,
later maintaining her as a mistress and having children by
her. Atty. Narag claims that his wife was a possessive, jealous
woman who abused him and filed the complaint out of spite.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Narag should be disbarred.
HELD: Atty. Dominador Narag failed to prove his innocence
because he failedto refute the testimony given against him and
it was proved that his actions were of public knowledge and
brought disrepute and suffering to his wife and children. Good
moral character is a continuing qualification required of every
member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the
exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may
withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7,
Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only a condition
precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification
for all members. Hence when a lawyer is found guilty of gross
immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. Grossly
immoral means it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree
or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. As a
lawyer, one must not only refrain from adulterous relationships
but must not behave in a way that scandalizes the public by
creating a belief that he is flouting those moral standards.
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR
EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004
Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed
with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify
Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations
and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in
his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three
(3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case
No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which
occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked
and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the
title “Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that
Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been
received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on
November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002,
Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal
cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge
Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the
case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the
College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually
arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as
“closed and terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies the charges
and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral
turpitude.
As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some
of his communications really contained the word “Attorney” as they
were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the
OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in
this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed
against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are
ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent
jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law
professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were
already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the
Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the
Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken
lightly by an applicant.
Issue: WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron
S. Meling is proper and shall subsequently barred him from taking
his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys
Held:
The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of
appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S.
Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until
further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S.
Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Rationale:
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is
not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also
known to possess good moral character. The requirement of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine
whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of
the applicant. The nature of whatever cases are pending against
the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is
endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By
concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks
the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be
unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral
character of the applicant.
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
Ong vs Delos Santos A.C. No. 10179 March 04, 2014
Facts: In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was
introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos Santos by Sheriff
Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After
several calls and personal interactions between them, Ong and
Atty. Delos Santos became friends.
In time, according to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked him to encash
his postdated check inasmuch as he was in dire need of cash. To
reassure Ong that the check would be funded upon maturity, Atty.
Delos Santos bragged about his lucrative practice and his good
paying clients. Convinced of Atty. Delos Santos’ financial stability,
Ong handed to Atty. Delos Santos on January 29, 2008 the amount
of P100,000.00 in exchange for the latter’s Metrobank Check No.
0110268 postdated February 29, 2008.
However, the check was dishonored upon presentment for the
reason that the account was closed. Ong relayed the matter of the
dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and demanded immediate
payment, but the latter just ignored him. When efforts to collect
remained futile, Ong brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos Santos.
Ong also brought this disbarment complaint against Atty. Delos
Santos in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which
docketed the complaint as CBD Case No. 11-2985.
Issue: By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos Santos
violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
Ruling:
Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and
responsibility to maintain his good moral character. In this regard,
good moral character is not only a condition precedent relating to
his admission into the practice of law, but is a continuing imposition
in order for him to maintain his membership in the Philippine Bar.
The Court unwaveringly demands of him to remain a competent,
honorable, and reliable individual in whom the public may repose
confidence. Any gross misconduct that puts his moral character in
serious doubt renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief
it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can
very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest.
lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their
professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders
them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.
That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did not matter. His
being a lawyer invested him – whether he was acting as such or in
a non-professional capacity – with the obligation to exhibit good
faith, fairness and candor in his relationship with others. There is
no question that a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a
malpractice in his profession, but also for any misconduct
committed outside of his professional capacity. His being a lawyer
demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the highest moral
and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others.
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
B.M. No. 850 (Re: Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education for Active Members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines)
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court en bane issued a Resolution
dated FEBRUARY 17, 2015, which reads as follows:
"B.M. No. 850 (Re: Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education for Active Members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines). - Acting on the Letter dated January 13, 2015 of
Hon. Bernardo P. Pardo, Chairperson, MCLE Governing Board,
submitting for the Court's approval the MCLE Governing Board
Resolution No. 007-2014, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE all
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to file a written
entry of appearance indicating their MCLE exemption or
compliance number for the current or immediately preceding
compliance period and date of issuance thereof before appearing
as counsel or engaging in oral argument in open court or before
a quasi-judicial body. However, counsels who affixed their
signatures in- their pleadings and indicated their MCLE
exemption or compliance number in their pleadings need not file
a separate entry of appearance. Henceforth, all counsels,
including partners of law firms whose names appear in the said
pleadings, shall also indicate their MCLE exemption or
compliance number.
This resolution shall take effect on March 1, 2015 following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation." Brion, J., on
leave. Jardeleza, J., on official leave. (adv36)
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND
HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS
Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his father, Mariano
Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student,
justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of
the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-
lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or
friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that
his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing
him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied
permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the
ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court
(Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the
ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case
for continuation of trial.
Issue:
whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an
inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before
an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively
simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section
34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a
justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party
may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney,
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member
of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU), Enrique Entila and Victoriano Tenazas vs.
Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, Court of
Industrial Relations and Quintin Muning
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU),
Enrique Entila and Victoriano Tenazas vs. Binalbagan
Isabela Sugar Company, Court of Industrial Relations and
Quintin Muning
FACTS:
 1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ORDERED
REINSTATEMENT WITH BACKWAGES FOR ENTILA AND
TENAZAS.
1. Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of Entila and Tenazas filed a notice
of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages.
i. Entila and Tenazas filed manifestation indicating their non-objection to an
award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages
ii. Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered"
equivalent to 20% of the backwages.
1. Opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
a. Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as
compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned
as follows:
i. Cipriano 10%
ii. Quintin Muning 10%
iii. Atanacio Pacis 5%
iii. CANON 34: condemns an agreement providing for the division of attorney's
fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said
fees with lawyers
1. Sec 5(b) of RA 875 that —No justification for a ruling, that the person
representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if
he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees
a. Duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross
examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly
presentation of evidence.
b. Representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members
of the bar.
2. The permission for a non-member does not entitle the representative to
compensation for such representation.
1. Sec 24, Rule 138 Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees:
i. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than
a reasonable compensation for his services.
a. Petition to take the Bar Exam in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar
Examination.
b. His uncle, TAPEL, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a
person of good moral character for having misrepresented, sometime in
1950, when he was 16 years old, that he was eligible for 3rd year high
school by utilizing the school records of his cousin and name-sake, Juan
M. Publico.
ii. PUBLICO has not completed Grade 4
iii. Tapel instituted an administrative case against his nephew for falsification
of school records or credentials.
3. PUBLICO PASSED THE BAR, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the
Roll of Attorneys.
4. Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., investigated and reported:
1. September 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel dropped the complaint on the ground
that his witnesses had turned hostile.
i. Motion denied, his witnesses had already testified.
2. Recommended PUBLICO’s name to be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
i. Respondent falsified his school records
ii. Thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5 and 6, Rule 127 of the Rules
of Court, which require completion by a bar examinee or candidate of the
prescribed courses in elementary, high, pre-law and law school, prior to
his admission to the practice of law.
5. 11 years later, PUBLICO filed a Petition for Reinstatement alleging that
he had never received, for had he been informed, nor did he have any
knowledge of the Resolution of the Court ordering the Bar Division to
strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
1. He was advised to inquire into the outcome of the disbarment case against
him.
2. He resigned from all his positions in public and private offices, and
transferred to Manila.
3. Prayed that Court allow reinstatement taking into consideration his
exemplary conduct from the time he became a lawyer, his services to the
community the numerous awards, resolutions and/'or commendations he
received,
i. Court denied the Petition.
ii. Petitioner moved for reconsideration was denied by the Court for lack of
merit.
4. 5th plea avers that his enrollment in Third Year High School in Manila
was through the initiative of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who
accompanied him to school and enrolled him in a grade level above his
qualifications in spite of his demonstrations
 i. Misrepresentation committed was precipitated by his uncle; that being bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not
merely 16 year old, he could not be expected to act with discernment as amenable to disciplinary measures.
he was still under the influence of his uncle, who later on caused his 4. In response to UNION may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
disbarment deductible from the backpay of some of its members:
ii. No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions. 1. YES because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an
action in the industrial court on behalf of its members
ISSUE: 2. If an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Sec 6, RA 875:
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to i. Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved
the order, is sought to be voided in the present petition. by any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines.
WON a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are 3. Usually, individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial
deductible from the backpay of some of its members. YES. burden of litigations.
It was PAFLU that moved for an extension of time to file the
___________________________________________________
present petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not
ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present ___________________________________________________
petition. Their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated. ___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
HELD:
ORDERS UNDER REVIEW ARE SET ASIDE AS THEY ARE
AWARDED 10% OF BACKWAGES AS ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR
MUNING. COSTS AGAINST MUNING.
1. Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since
respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU,
and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
2. Public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant
should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications, for the
ethics of the profession and for the protection of courts, clients and the
public.
3. The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be
violated:
1. Acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which
is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,
2. Law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act
done in violation of law
3. If were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless
confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the