ROSA YAP-PARAS vs. ATTY.

JUSTO PARAS
A.C No. 4947 June 7, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner-movant filed a verified Petition praying for the disbarment of her estranged husband respondent Atty.
Justo J. Paras alleging acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation of oath as a
lawyer committed by the latter. The Court issued a Resolution finding Atty. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in
violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the Court resolved to suspend Atty. Paras
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the
future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Thereafter, Atty. Paras filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit but during its pendency,
complainant-movant filed with the Court the instant Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, alleging thereunder, inter
alia, that Atty. Paras violated the suspension order earlier issued by the Court with his continued practice of law.

After more than a year, Atty. Paras filed with the Court a Manifestation, stating that he had completely and faithfully served
his one (1) year suspension from the practice of law from August 25, 2005, the day after he received the denial resolution
on his motion for reconsideration, to August 24, 2006.

The Court issued another Resolution dated November 27, 2006 requiring Atty. Paras to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt of court for such failure and to comply with the said resolution within ten (10) days from receipt.

Consequently, a Comment on Motion for Contempt and Explanation on Failure to Timely File Required Comment was filed
by Atty. Paras denying all the allegations in petitioner-movants Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment. He likewise
claimed that he had never done nor made any conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice, nor undermine or put to naught or violate any of the pertinent causes enumerated in Section 3,
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON the disbarment case should prosper.

RULING: No. We find no sufficient basis to support petitioner-movants allegation that Atty. Paras violated the Courts
suspension order, what with the fact that Atty. Paras himself took the initiative to inform the lower courts of his one- year
suspension from law practice.

It is clear, however, that all lawyers are expected to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court and obey its lawful
processes and orders. Despite errors which one may impute on the orders of the Court, these must be respected, especially
by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. It is well to emphasize again that a resolution of the
Supreme Court is not be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or
selectively. Court orders are to be respected not because the justices or judges who issue them should be respected, but
because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the government. This is absolutely
essential if our government is to be a government of laws and not of men.

The Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in the instant case, as well petitioner-movants counsels, to avoid
further squabbles and unnecessary filing of administrative cases against each other. An examination of the records reveals
a pervasive atmosphere of animosity between Atty. Paras and petitioners counsels as evidenced by the number of
administrative cases between them. It is well to stress that mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations between
attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive sympathy from this Court. Lawyers should
treat each other with courtesy, fairness, candor and civility.

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment is DENIED. However, Atty. Justo Paras is
hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to observe the respect due the Court in not promptly complying with this Courts
resolution, with WARNING that a more drastic punishment will be imposed upon him for a repetition of the same act.
SO ORDERED.

Today
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

atan, South Cotabato, respondents.

m their parents. The case is complicated by the circumstance that the private respondent's counsel in this petition is the son of the jud

00.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold the same property to Santia

ng with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City. 1 On the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of

as with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.

r dismissing the criminal case on the ground that:

of the respondent Martin Paras and his witnesses, the Court holds and maintained (sic) that there is a prejudicial question to a civil ac
on for Estafa for alleged double sale of property is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged Deed of Sale and def

this Court for relief in this special civil action for certiorari.

ion under BP 129, but decided to resolve the case directly in view of the peculiar circumstances involved.

action may not be dismissed but only suspended. Moreover, this suspension may not be done motu proprio by the judge trying the c
ed under the double jeopardy rule because he has not yet been arraigned.
 lf is the son and namesake of Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. is employed in the Public Attorney's Office. He has ma

n view of the alleged double sale of the property which was being litigated in the regional trial court. He concedes, however, that the o
ment be considered a motion for the suspension of the criminal action on the ground of prejudicial question.

grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio issuing the order of dismissal.

7, 1988, provides as follows:

n of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the
me before the prosecution rests.

the above-quoted rule. The rule is not even new, being only a rewording of the original provision in the Rules of Court before they we
the person who notarized the disputed second sale, Notary Public Alexander C. Barcelona, might be related to the respondent judge.

concept of a prejudicial question.

rejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (

antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the congnizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
e from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 5

e suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the
he accused". 6

criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.

on of Ras v. Rasul. 7 Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision but also wrongly applied it. The facts of that case are not analog

el brought a civil action for nullification of the second sale and asked that the sale made by Ras in his favor be declared valid. Ras's d
on the same double sale that was the subject of the civil action. Ras filed a "Motion for Suspension of Action" (that is, the criminal ca

minal action was in order because:

oner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case
ntiff in the civil case and complaining witnesses in the criminal case) is based on the very same facts which would be necessarily dete
petitioner would be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead) would be

xxx xxx xxx

No. 73 that he had never sold the property in litigation to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in the alleged deed of sale an
property twice and no estafa was committed. The question of nullity of the sale is distinct and separate from the crime of estafa (alleg

e in the civil case — forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale — had to be threshed out first. Resolution of that question would
ad not been informed of the defense Paras was raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the issu

on to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised
e 111, Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended, and even without the accused indicating his defense in the c

udge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence" and "should administer justice impartially." He is hereby reprim

dated April 17, 1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for reconsideratio

rt dated January 13, 1991, substituted by her children, Ruperto, Rustico, Ignacio, Rogelio, Arsenio, Jr., all surnamed Yap, Rainilda Y

ontesa, 114 Phil. 428; Fortich-Celdran vs. Celdran, 19 SCRA 502.