Republic of the Philippines

National Capital Judicial Region

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Branch 27, Makati City

Ana D. Tahimik, Civil Case No. 18–12345

For: Damages for Breach of Contract
Plaintiff, of Carriage

-versus-

Alis Western Airlines Inc.,

Defendant.
x-------------------------------x

DECISION

The facts as fully supported by the evidence of record are:

Plaintiff is a Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Governor, was scheduled to

attend the Association of Government Accountants Financial Systems Summit
on January 15-16, 2018 in Rome. On January 1, 2018, the defendant, Alis
Western Airlines, Inc. issued to plaintiff a “first class” round trip airplane ticket
from Manila to Rome and then from Rome back to Manila. On January 10,
2018, while plaintiff was already on board flight 1237 before departing for
Rome from Manila, the Purser of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate
the "first class" seat that she was occupying because, in the words of the
witness, Irene K. Nakita, there was a "white man", who, the Purser alleged, had
a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate her "first class" seat, the
plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Purser that her
seat would be taken over her dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according
to said Irene K. Nakita, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the
tourist class; when they found out that Ms. Tahimik was having a hot discussion
with the Purser, they all came across to Ms. Tahimik and pacified Ms. Tahimik
to give her seat to the “white man” and plaintiff reluctantly gave her "first class"
seat in the plane. It is conceded in all quarters that on January 1, 2018 plaintiff
paid to and received from defendant company a first class ticket. But defendant
company asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent
and agreement of the parties; that said plaintiff knew that she did not have
confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although she had
tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was
no guarantee that she would have a first class ride, but that such would depend
upon the availability of first class seats.

The issues proposed by the plaintiff were the following:

1. Whether Ms. Tahimik was entitled to the first class seat?
2. Whether plaintiff is entitled to actual damages?
3. Whether plaintiff is entitled to moral damages?
4. Whether plaintif is entitled to exemplary damages?
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees?

1. Yes, Ms. Tahimik was entitled to the first class seat. Defendant company
seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was
no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be
accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff she
had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary
first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot
understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have
the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the
corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the
passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or not the
tickets it issues are to be honored or not. Apart from the testimonies of plaintiff
and her witness, the testimony of the ticketing agent of defendant company also
confirmed plaintiff’s right to the first class seat. Defendant comoany tried to
prove by the testimony of its witnesses Lucky Lakwachero and Jenny Jetsetter
that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the
ticket was subject to confirmation. The court cannot give credit to the testimony
of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and
plaintiff's Exhibits belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that
the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation
whatever.

2. Since the plaintiff was entitled to the first class seat, actual damages must be
awarded to her. Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the
amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven
with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best
evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof (Lufthansa German Airlines
v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 600 (1995)). The claimant is duty-bound to
point out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory
damages are borne (Southeastern College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 126389, July 10, 1998). A court cannot merely rely on speculations,
conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages (Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Lydia Cuba, G.R. No. 118367,
January 5, 1998) as well as hearsay (People v. Gutierrez 258 SCRA 70 (1996))
or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect (Baliwag Transit, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 746 (1996)). In the given case, it was clearly
shown through the testimonies of the plaintiff, plaintiff’s witness, Irene K.
Nakita and the ticketing agent of defendant company, Tickie T. Tikitera and
pieces of evidence that were presented that indeed plaintiff suffered a loss of
P25,000 representing the difference between the price of an economy class
ticket from Manila to Rome from the price of a first class ticket plying the same
route.

3. Yes, plaintiff is entitled to moral damages. Defendant company claims that

Tahimik’s action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award
for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith based on
Article 2220 of the Civil Code. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing
on this issue are that: (1) plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the
Alis Western Airlines, Inc. for a valuable consideration, under which said
contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First
Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's trip
from Manila to Rome and from Rome back to Manila, (2) defendant company
failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only Tourist Class accommodations from Manila to Rome, (3) the plaintiff was
compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class accommodation
berths before leaving for Rome from Manila after he was already seated and (4)
as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations
aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations,
thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings,
social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount
of P5,000,000. The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That
there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst
others, the Manila to Rome leg; Second, That said contract was breached when
petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Manila; and Third, that
there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave
his first class accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a
seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint.
But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and
circumstances set forth therein (Copeland vs. Dunehoo et al., 138 S.E., 267,
270. See also 25 C.J.S., pp. 758-759; 15 Am. Jur., pp. 766-767). The contract
was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the
action is put on wrongful expulsion. The plaintiff was forced out of his seat in
the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Alis Western
Airlines while in Manila, and was transferred to the tourist class not only
without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by
plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the testimonies of
the purser, Jenny Jetsetter, the cabin crew, Lucky Lakwachero, and the eye-
witness, Irene Nakita, who was a co-passenger. Neither was evidence as to
whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. Hence, if the
employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all
the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been
picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the
humiliation and indignity of being ejected from her seat in the presence of
others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by
defendant's employees, the purser adopted the more drastic step of ousting the
plaintiff who was already then safely seated in his rightful seat. Given the
foregoing, the recital of facts therein points to bad faith. The purser not only
prevented Ms. Tahimik from enjoying her right to a first class seat; worse, she
imposed her arbitrary will; she forcibly ejected her from her seat, made her
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment just to
give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established.
Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning
different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-
interest or will or for ulterior purpose” (Words & Phrases, Perm. Ed., Vol. 5, p.
13, citing Warfield Natural Gas Co. vs. Allen, 59 S.W. (2d) 534, 538). The
responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be
essayed. It is well settled in law (Article 2180, Civil Code). For the willful
malevolent act of the Purser, defendant company, her employer, must answer.
Article 21 of the Civil Code says: Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In parallel circumstances, we
applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of
Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.
Furthermore, the plaintiff was able to prove that she is indeed, the current
Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas who was scheduled to attend a
Conference in Rome to represent the Philippines. International carriers like
defendant know the prestige of such an office. For the Bangko Sentral or
Central Bank is the entity that is responsible for the monetary policies of a
country and the Governor as is head is the one who leads the planning and
implementation of such. In a way, it can be said that the Central Bank and its
head is responsible for the large chunk of a country’s economy. Governor
Tahimik was going to Rome to attend the Association of Government
Accountants Financial Systems Summit on January 15-16, 2018 but her
aforesaid rank and position were by no means left behind. For the moral
damages sustained by her, therefore, an award of P2,000,000 is appropriate.

4. Yes, plaintiff is entitled to exemplary damages. The Civil Code gives the
court ample power to grant exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi-
contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner” (Article 2232, Civil
Code). The manner of ejectment of the plaintiff from her first class seat fits into
this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages (Article 2229, Civil
Code). Therefore, the Court awards the plaintiff P50,000 in exemplary
damages.

5. Given the presence of bad faith as aptly explained above, the right to
attorney's fees has been fully established. The grant of exemplary damages
justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that
the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given
(Article 2208, (1) and (11), Civil Code). The general rule is that attorney’s fees
cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time
a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article
2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant
is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of
bad faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause (ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 528, 529 (1999)). The
award of attorney’s fees to the winning party lies within the discretion of the
court, taking into account the circumstances of each case. This means that such
an award should have factual, legal, and equitable basis, not founded on pure
speculation and conjecture. In addition, the court should state the reason for the
award of attorney’s fees in the body of the decision. Its unheralded appearance
in the dispositive portion, as a rule, is not allowed (Alcatel Philippines, Inc. v.
I.M. Bongar & Co., Inc., G.R. No. 182946, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 741,
744). Therefore, plaintiff is awarded P50,000 in attorney’s fees.

Wherefore, plaintiff is awarded the following: (1) P25,000.00 as actual

damages; (2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P50,000 as exemplary or
corrective damages with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on the moral
and exemplary damages aforestated, from final order of the trial court until said
damages are fully paid; (4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (5) the costs. So
Ordered.

Honorable Elma H. Angtibay

Presiding Judge