Republic of the Philippines During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of one Joan Cruz
SUPREME COURT (Joan) and a certain Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez (Dr. Marquez).
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201572 July 9, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RAEL DELFIN, Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated 29 April 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160. In the said Decision, the CA
affirmed, with modification, the conviction of herein appellant Rael Delfin for
murder under Article 248(1) of Act No. 3815 or the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).
The antecedents:
On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio)—a 51-
year-old fisherman from Navotas City—was killed after being gunned down
at a store just across his home.
Suspected of killing Emilio was the appellant. On 13 March 2001, the
appellant was formally charged with the murder of Emilio before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon.3 The information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of November 2000, in Navotas, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction ofthis Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
armed with a gun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
with the said weapon one EMILIO ENRIQUEZ, hitting the victim on his chest,
thereby inflicting upon the victim gunshot wound, which caused his
immediate death. CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter
ensued.
Joan is an eyewitness tothe gunning of Emilio. She is also the live-in partner
of the victim. The substance of her testimony is as follows:5
1. At about 10:45 p.m. of 27 September 2000, Joan was standing
outside Emilio’s house at R. Domingo St., Tangos, Navotas City.
From there, Joan was able to see Emilio talking over the telephone
at a store just across his house. Also at the store during that time
was the appellant who was seated on a bench to the left of Emilio.
2. Joan then went inside Emilio’s house. Almost immediately after
going inside the house, Joan heard the sound of a gunshot. Joan
rushed outside of the house and saw Emilio shot in the head and
sprawled on the ground. Joan then saw the appellant, now holding a
gun, firing another shot at Emilio.
3. Joan said that she was not aware of any previous
misunderstanding between Emilio and the appellant; neither did she
observe any altercation brewing nor hear any word spoken between
Emilio and appellant prior to the shooting.
Dr. Marquez, on the other hand, is a Philippine National Police physician who
examined post mortemthe corpse of Emilio. He issued Medico-Legal Report
No. M-608-00,6 which revealed that Emilio died as a consequence of two (2)
gunshotwounds: one that penetrated the left side of his head and another
that penetrated his chest. Dr. Marquez testified to affirm the contents of his
report.
The defense, for its part, relied onthe testimonies of the appellant 7 and a
certain Rene Villanueva (Rene).8
Appellant offered the alibithat he was fishing on the seas of Bataan on the
date and time of the supposed shooting. According to the appellant, he left
for the seas at about 3:00 p.m. of 27 September 2000 and only returned at
around 4:00 a.m. of the next day. Appellant also testified that he was
accompanied on this fishing trip by three (3) other individuals—one of which
was Rene.
Rene initially corroborated on all points the testimony of appellant. However,
Rene later admitted thathe, the appellant and their other companions actually
left for their fishing trip at 3:00 p.m. of 26 September 2000—not the 27th ;
and returned to shore at 4:00 p.m. of 27 September 2000—not the 28th .
Thus, at the date and time of the supposed shooting, Rene and the appellant
were already in Navotas City.
On 20 July 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision9 finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of murder under Article 248(1) of the
RPC.10 Based on its assessment and evaluation of the evidence on record,
the RTC was convinced that it was the appellant who killed Emilio and who
did so with the use of treachery. Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the
appellant tosuffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay civil indemnity
of ₱50,000.00 and another ₱50,000.00 as consequential damages.
Aggrieved, appellant appealedthe RTC decision with the CA.
On 29 April 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the conviction of the
appellant. The CA, however, deleted the award of ₱50,000.00 consequential
damages and replaced it with an award of ₱50,000.00 moral
damages.11Hence, this appeal.
In this appeal, appellant assails the validity of the information under which he
was tried and convicted. He specifically points out to the discrepancy
between the date of the commission of the murder as alleged in the
information i.e., "on or about the 27th day of November 2000" and the one
actually established during the trial i.e., 27 September 2000. Appellant
protests that the failure of the information to accurately allege the date of the
commission of the murder violated his right to be properly informed of the
charge against him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare an
intelligent defense thereon.
Appellant also insists on the credibility of his alibiover and above the version
of the prosecution.
Lastly, appellant questions the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery against him.
OUR RULING
We deny the appeal.
Variance In the Date of the
Commission of the Murder as Alleged
in the Information and as Established
During the Trial Does Not Invalidate
the Information
We sustain the validity of the information under which the appellant was tried,
and convicted, notwithstanding the variance in the date of the commission of
the crime as alleged inthe information and as established during the trial.
In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like
murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or
certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merelyrequires, for the sake
of properly informing an accused, that the date of commission be
approximated:12
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.– A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be
included in the complaint or information.
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in
the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed
except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be
alleged to have beencommitted on a date as near as possible to the actual
date of its commission. (Emphasis supplied).
Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude,
the allegation in an information of a date of commission different from the
one eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered
as an error fatal to prosecution.13 In such cases, the erroneous allegation in
the information is just deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during
the trial14 or may even be corrected by a formal amendment of the
information.15
The foregoing rule, however, is concededly not absolute. Variance in the
date of commission of the offense as alleged in the information and as
established in evidence becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so greatthat
it induces the perception that the information and the evidence are no longer
pertaining to one and the same offense. In this event, the defective allegation
in the information is not deemed supplanted by the evidence nor can it be
amended but must be struck down for being violative of the right of the
accused to be informed of the specific charge against him. Such was this
Court’s ruling in the case of People v. Opemia.16
In Opemia, an information for theft of large cattle committed on 18 June 1952
was filed against four (4) accused. After all of the accused entered a plea of
not guilty and during trial, the prosecution adduced evidence to the effect that
the purported theft was committed in July of 1947. The prosecution thereafter
moved for the amendment of the information to make it conform to the
evidence with respect to the date of theft. The trial court rejected the motion
and instead dismissed the information altogether. The dispute reaching us in
due course, we sustained the trial court’s dismissal of the information:
The amendment proposed in the present case consists in changing the date
of the commission of the crime charged from June 18, 1952 to July, 1947. In
not permitting the amendment the learned trial Judge said:
"It is a cardinal rule in criminalprocedure that the precise time at which an
offense was committed need not be alleged in the complaint or information,
but it is required that the act be alleged to have been committed at any time
as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the
information or complaint would permit (Rule 106, section 10). The reason for
this rule is obvious. It is to apprise the accused of the approximate date when
the offense charged was committed in order to enable him to prepare his
defense and thus avoid a surprise. In the case at bar, the proof shows that
the carabao was lost on July 25, 1947 and not on June 18, 1952 as alleged
in the information. The period of almost five years between 1947 and 1952
covers such a long stretch of time that one cannot help but beled to believe
that another theft different from that committed by the Defendantsin 1952
was also perpetrated by them in 1947. Under this impression the accused,
who came to court prepared to face a charge of theft of large cattle allegedly
committed by them in 1952, were certainly caught by sudden surprise upon
being confronted by evidence tending to prove a similar offense committed in
1947. The variance is certainly unfair tothem, for it violates their constitutional
right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and
deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover, they
cannot be convicted of an offense with which they are not charged.
"It is also a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that after the Defendanthas
entered his plea, the information or complaint may be amended only as to all
matters of form when the same can be done without prejudice tothe rights of
the Defendant(Rule 196, section 13). An amendment that would change the
date of the commission of the offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a
matter of form. The difference in date could not be attributed to a clerical
error, because the possibility of such an error is ruled out by the fact that the
difference is not only in the year, but also in the month and in the last two
digits of the year.It is apparent that the proposed amendment concerns with
material facts constituting the offense, and consequently it would be
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the Defendants."
His Honor has we think adduced good reasons for considering the
amendment as referring to substance and not merely to form. But even
supposing it to be the contrary, its allowance, after the Defendantshad
pleaded, was discretionary with the court and would be proper only if it would
not prejudice their rights. We are not prepare to say that the court did not
make good use of that discretion in disallowing the amendment, considering
that the variance sought to be introduced thereby would appear to be really
unfair to the Defendants, for as clearly explained by the court "it violates their
constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge
against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend
themselves."17 (Emphasis supplied).
In this case, however, we find applicable, not the exception in Opemia, but
the general rule.
Despite their disparity as to the date of the alleged murder, we believe that
there is no mistaking that both the information and the evidence of the
prosecution but pertain to one and the same offense i.e., the murder of
Emilio. We find implausible the likelihood that the accused may have been
caught off-guard or surprised by the introduction of evidence pointing to
commission of the murder on 27 September 2000, considering that all
documentary attachments to the information (such as the Resolution18 of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon-Navotas sub-station and the Sworn
Statement19 of Joan) all referred to the murder as having been committed on
that date. Indeed, appellant never objected to such evidence during the trial
and was even able to concoct an intelligent alibiin direct refutation thereof.
What clearly appears to this Court, on the other hand, is that the inaccurate
allegation in the information is simply the product of a mere clerical error.
This is obvious from the fact that, while all its supporting documents point to
the murder ashaving been committed on the 27th of September2000, the
information’s mistake is limited only to the month when the crime was
committed.20 Such an error is evidently not fatal; it is deemed supplanted by
the evidence presented by the prosecution.
Hence, we sustain the information for murder, under which the appellant was
tried and convicted, as valid.
Appellant’s Defense of Alibi
Unavailing; Appellant Properly
Convicted of Murder
We also find unavailing the appellant’s insistence on the credibility of his
alibi.1avvphi1 On this point, we quote with approval the following discourse
of the CA, which we find to be consistent with time-honored jurisprudence:21
Time and again, it has been stressed that the factual findings of the trial defend himself, or to retaliate. For this reason, the [RTC] correctly
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment appreciated treachery as a circumstance to qualify the offense as Murder. 25
of their probative weightis given high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless
it is ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood, or misinterpreted cogent facts All in all, we find no error inthe conviction of the appellant.
and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will alter the outcome
of the case.22
Recoverable Damages

As correctly found by the trial court, the testimony of prosecution witness,
Joan, was clear, candid, straightforward, positive and credible, as against the
denial and alibi of the [appellant]. She positively identified the [appellant] as
the perpetrator of the crime. x x x.
It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single eye-witness, if positive
and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even in a charge of
murder.23 Considering that Joan’s account of how the [appellant] killed
[Emilio] was clear, credible, and positive, there is, thus, no compelling reason
to disturb the trial court’s reliance on her testimony.
As to the [appellant’s] defense ofdenial and alibi, the same are unavailing
and worthless in the face of the positive identification by the prosecution’s
witness x x x.
x x x. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be proven that the
[accused] was at some other place at the time the crime was committed and
that it was physicallyimpossible for him to be at the locus criminisat the time
[the offense was committed].24 x x x.
At bench, the [appellant] has not shown the impossibility of his committing
the crime as even, Rene, the witness who was supposed to corroborate his
alibi, admitted that theywent back home at 4:00 o’clock in the morning of
September 27, 2000 and were already at Navotas City at the time the
incident occurred. Thus, it was certainly possible for him to be present at the
crime scene despite his allegations to the contrary. Hence, based on all the
foregoing evidence, he is, without a doubt, the perpetrator of the crime.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence,26 we increase the amount of civil
indemnity and moral damages payable by the appellant from ₱50,000.00 to
₱75,000.00.
In addition to the foregoing, we require the appellant to also pay exemplary
damages in the amount ₱30,000.00.27
The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages payable by the
appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 29 August 2012 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) that the amount of civil indemnity is
increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00; (2) that the amount of moral
damages is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00; and (3) that the
appellant must pay, in addition to civil indemnity and moral damages,
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00. The civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages payable by the appellant are subject to
interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the finality of this
decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

Anent the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery against the WE CONCUR:
appellant, we find it to befully justified by the evidence on record. Again, we
approve of the CA’s observations on this matter:

Concededly, the [appellant’s] attack on the unarmed [Emilio] was sudden,

unprovoked, unexpected and deliberate. Before the attack was made,
[Emilio] was merely conversing with another on the phone. He was
undoubtedly in no position and without any means to defend himself. By all
indications, [Emilio] was left with no opportunity to evade the gunshots, to
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA, Petitioners, v. COURT
OF APPEALS, 21ST DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION,
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, AND MOISES
ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN.� The CA reversed and set aside the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del
Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No.
21-1211, and acquitted private respondents Raymund
Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime of
rape for the prosecution�s failure to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private
respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged,
together with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel
Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for
allegedly raping AAA,3 to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about 10:30 o�clock in the evening of March 25, 2004
at Alson�s Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with
an intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated, brought said AAA at
about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging house,
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in
having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA while accused
MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her against her will
and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels,
entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged.5cralawlawlibrary
Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued.� Accused Christian
John Lim, however, remains at-large.
The factual antecedents follow:
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high
school graduation ceremony.� Afterwards, they had a luncheon
party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte.� AAA
then asked permission from her mother to go to the Maranding
Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for an
election campaign.� She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the
plaza.� At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she would be
attending a graduation dinner party with her friends.� AAA,
together with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the
house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding.� After
eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson�s Palace, which was
merely a walking distance away from Gemeno�s house.� Outside
the Alson�s Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver
Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel.� After a while, they went inside
and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again
saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela
Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one Angelo.� Rudinas
suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate their
graduation, to which the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the
drinks � two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy.� Then they
arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree.� Two (2)
glasses were being passed around: one glass containing the
sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass containing the liquor.� At
first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor
before.� During the session, they shared their problems with each
other.� When it was AAA�s turn, she became emotional and
started crying.� It was then that she took her first shot.� The
glasses were passed around and she consumed more or less five
(5) glasses of Emperador Brandy.
Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto�s
lap.� Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove
her baseball cap.� This angered her so she told them to stop, and
simply tried to hide her face with the cap.� But they just laughed
at her.� Then, Roda also kissed her.� At that time, AAA was
already sleepy, but they still forced her to take another shot.�
They helped her stand up and make her drink.� She even heard
Lim say, �Hubuga na, hubuga na,� (You make her drunk, you
make her drunk).� She likewise heard someone say, �You drink
it, you drink it.�� She leaned on Oporto�s lap again, then she fell
asleep.� They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador
Brandy bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside.� She tried to
refuse but they insisted, so she drank directly from the bottle.�
Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her
down the stairs, and then she was asleep again.� When she
regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the
Alquizola Lodging House.� She recognized that place because she
had been there before.� She would thereafter fall back asleep and
wake up again.� And during one of the times that she was
conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different
parts of her body, and having intercourse with her.� She started
crying.� She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals.�
She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room,
watching as Oporto abused her.� At one point, AAA woke up while
Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ.� She
cried and told him to stop.� Alquizola then joined and started to
kiss her.� For the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day.� She
was all alone.� Her body felt heavy and exhausted.� She found
herself with her shirt on but without her lower garments.� The
upper half of her body was on top of the bed but her feet were on
the floor.� There were also red stains on her shirt.� After dressing
up, she hailed a trisikad and went home.� When AAA reached their
house, her father was waiting for her and was already furious.�
When she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting
her.� They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a
report.� Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her
medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA
in the morning of March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal
laceration at 5 o�clock position and hyperemia or redness at the
posterior fornices.� The vaginal smear likewise revealed the
presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA.�
According to the defense witnesses, in the evening of March 25,
2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had dinner at
Gemeno�s house.� Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the
graduation party hosted by Montesco at Alson�s Palace, owned by
the latter�s family.� When they reached the place, Oporto told
Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one
Arcie Ariola.� At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana
returned to Alson�s Palace but could not find AAA and Lim.� The
party subsequently ended, but the group agreed to celebrate
further.� AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for
two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi.
Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana,
Oporto, Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim.�
Also present but did not join the drinking were Gemeno, Montesco,
Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one
Caga, and a certain Bantulan.� Gemeno told AAA not to drink but
the latter did not listen and instead told him not to tell her aunt.�
During the drinking session, AAA rested on Oporto�s lap.� She
even showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks.� And when her
legs grazed Batoctoy�s crotch, she remarked, �What was that,
penis?�� Roda then approached AAA to kiss her, and the latter
kissed him back.� Oporto did the same and AAA also kissed him.�
After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises
Alquizola was at the Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer with his
cousin, Junver, and Fiel.� They stopped drinking at around
midnight.� Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany her to
Alson�s Palace to see her friends there.� They proceeded to the
second floor and there they saw AAA lying on Oporto�s lap.� Fiel
told AAA to go home because her mother might get angry.� AAA
could not look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, �I
just stay here.�� Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging
house.� After thirty minutes, they went to Alson�s Palace again,
and saw AAA and Oporto kissing each other.� AAA was lying on his
lap while holding his neck.� Subsequently, they went back to the
lodging house to resume drinking. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered:
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home.� But she
a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond
refused and instead instructed them to take her to the Alquizola
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and the Court hereby
Lodging House because she has a big problem.� AAA, Lim, and
sentences him to suffer the indivisible prison term of reclusion
Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house.� When they
perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 for and by way of
arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and told him, �Kuya, I want to
civil indemnity;
sleep here for the meantime.�� Alquizola then opened Room No.
4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana stayed.� There were two
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable
beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized bed.� AAA lay down
doubt of the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to
on the single bed and looked at Carampatana.� The latter
suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
approached her and they kissed.� He then removed her shirt and
mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years also of prision mayor as
AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give way.� Carampatana
maximum; to pay AAA the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages
likewise removed her brassiere.� All the while, Oporto was at the
and another amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
foot of the bed.� Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants.�
AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull her
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable
underwear down.� Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the
doubt as ACCOMPLICE in the commission of the crime charged, and
lips.� Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in between
the court hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison
AAA�s legs and had intercourse with her.� When he finished, he
term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
put on his shorts and went back to Alson�s Palace to get some
to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
sleep.� When he left, Oporto and AAA were still kissing.� Alquizola
maximum; to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as moral
then entered the room.� When AAA saw him, she said, �Come
damages and another sum of P30,000.00 for and by way of civil
Kuya, embrace me because I have a problem.�� Alquizola thus
indemnity;
started kissing AAA�s breasts.� Oporto stood up and opened his
pants.� AAA held his penis and performed fellatio on him.� Then
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen
Oporto and Alquizola changed positions.� Oporto proceeded to
Roda, Harold Batoctoy and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the
have sexual intercourse with AAA.� During that time, AAA was
crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
moaning and calling his name.� Afterwards, Oporto went outside
therefor beyond reasonable doubt.� Accordingly, the Court acquits
and slept with Alquizola on the carpet.� Oporto then had
them of said charge; and
intercourse with AAA two more times.� At 3:00 a.m., he went
back to Alson�s Palace to sleep.� At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto
and Carampatana went back to the lodging house.� They tried to e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay,
wake AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney�s fees
home.� Alquizola had gone outside but he came back before 7:00 and expenses of litigations; and the costs of suit.
a.m. However, AAA was no longer there when he arrived.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola shall be credited to them and
Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt deducted from their prison terms provided they comply with the
of the crime of rape.� It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.� The dispositive portion of Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26
the Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary March 2004 and detained since then up to the present.� Accused
Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and
detained since then up to this time, while accused Joefhel Oporto
who likewise surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 was
ordered released to the custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del
Norte on 31 March 2004, and subsequently posted cash bond for
his provisional liberty on 17 September 2004 duly approved by this
court, thus resulted to an order of even date for his release from
the custody of the DSWD.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without
prejudice on the prosecution to prosecute the case against accused
Christian John Lim as soon as he is apprehended.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the
case to the CA.� On June 6, 2008, the appellate court rendered
the assailed Decision reversing the trial court�s ruling and,
consequently, acquitted private respondents.� The decretal portion
of said decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on
appeal is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.� For lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are
instead ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.8
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private
respondents� guilt beyond reasonable doubt.� It gave more
credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA
consented to the sexual congress.� She was wide awake and
aware of what private respondents were doing before the
intercourse.� She never showed any physical resistance, never
shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers.�
The appellate court further relied on the medical report which
showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAA�s
genitalia, giving the impression that she has had some carnal
knowledge with a man before.� The CA also stressed that AAA�s
mother�s unusual reaction of hitting her when she discovered
what happened to her daughter was more consistent with that of a
parent who found out that her child just had premarital sex rather
than one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition
for Certiorari9 under Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which
reversed private respondents� conviction and ardently contending
that the same was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her
petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The private respondents present the following arguments in their
Comment dated November 7, 2008 to assail the
petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND
EXECUTORY AND THE PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE
ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.
III.
CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED.
IV.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE
COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL
CASES.11
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on
April 1, 2009.� It assigns the following
errors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 I.
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF
ACQUITTAL AS TO THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR
HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN
EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.12
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant
to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings.�
Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving
substantial justice.� As long as their purpose is sufficiently met
and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules
should be liberally construed.13� Liberal construction of the rules is
the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.� The
relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of a
case from their operation, is warranted when compelling reasons
exist or when the purpose of justice requires it.� Thus, litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
sheer technicalities.14cralawlawlibrary
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in
a criminal case.� The reason is that a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred
from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy be violated.15� Section 21, Article III of the Constitution
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense.� If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the
accused may appeal, but only with respect to the civil aspect of the
decision.� Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed through
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing
that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a
denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null
and void.16� If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting
petitioner�s prayer is not tantamount to putting private
respondents in double jeopardy.17cralawlawlibrary
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action,
the Court said in People v. Santiago:18cralawlawlibrary
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is
the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private
offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that
of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by
the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended
party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the
acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack of
jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state
that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In
such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the
private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an
interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special
civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in
[the] name of said complainant.19
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by
the State through the OSG.� True, in criminal cases, the acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be
appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.�
This is because the authority to represent the State in appeals of
criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely
vested in the OSG.20cralawlawlibrary
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the
instance of her private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted private
respondents.� As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to
bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal
prosecution.� She has an immense interest in obtaining justice in
the case precisely because she is the subject of the violation.�
Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the Court sustained
the private offended party�s right in a criminal case to file a
special civil action for certiorari to question the validity of the
judgment of dismissal and ruled that the Solicitor General�s
intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the complainant to
the Court is proper since it was brought in her own name and not
in that of the People of the Philippines.� In any event, the OSG
joins petitioner�s cause in its Comment,22 thereby fulfilling the
requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor.23cralawlawlibrary
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for
the sake of argument, that AAA can file the special civil action
for certiorari without violating their right against double jeopardy,
still, it must be dismissed for petitioner�s failure to previously file
a motion for reconsideration.
True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for
the filing of a petition for certiorari.� Its purpose is for the court to
have an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case.� This rule, however, is not absolute
and admits well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is
a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b)
where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is
an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of
the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved.24cralawlawlibrary
Here, petitioner�s case amply falls within the exception.� AAA
raises the same questions as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court, essentially revolving on the guilt of the private
respondents.� There is also an urgent necessity to resolve the
issues, for any further delay would prejudice the interests, not only
of the petitioner, but likewise that of the Government.� And, as
will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of
due process and for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be
shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.� An acquittal is considered tainted
with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the
prosecution�s right to due process was violated or that the trial
conducted was a sham.� The burden is on the petitioner to clearly
demonstrate and establish that the respondent court blatantly
abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very power to
dispense justice.25cralawlawlibrary
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave
abuse of judicial discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as
well as the trial court�s findings of fact, thereby adopting hook,
line, and sinker, the private respondents� narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning.� An
act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave
abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.� It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility.26� There is grave abuse of
discretion when the disputed act of the lower court goes beyond
the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice.27cralawlawlibrary
The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the
burden of proving that the respondent appellate court committed
grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on
the evidence presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that
of the prosecution.� At first, it may seem that its narration of the
facts28 of the case was meticulously culled from the evidence of
both parties.� But a more careful perusal will reveal that it was
simply lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the
accused, especially that of Oporto,29 Carampatana,30 and
Alquizola,31 the accused-appellants in the case before it.� The
appellate court merely echoed the private respondents�
testimonies, particularly those as to the specific events that
transpired during the crucial period - from the dinner at Gemeno�s
house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House.�
As a result, it presented the private respondents� account and
allegations as though these were the established facts of the case,
which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must
consider the entire evidence presented, regardless of the party who
offered the same.32� It simply cannot acknowledge that of one
party and turn a blind eye to that of the other.� It cannot
appreciate one party�s cause and brush the other aside.� This
rule becomes particularly significant in this case because the
parties tendered contradicting versions of the incident.� The victim
is crying rape but the accused are saying it was a consensual
sexual rendezvous.� Thus, the CA�s blatant disregard of material
prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the
defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation
of petitioner�s right to due process.33cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the
observations of the RTC and made its own flimsy findings to justify
its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious
during the whole ordeal.� The fact that she never showed any
physical resistance, never cried out for help, and never fought
against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter
that the sexual acts were indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at
the time of the assault.� Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. � Rape is
committed�
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
cralawred
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned
in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into another person�s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person.
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was
accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is
under twelve years of age.34� Here, the accused intentionally
made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle.�
They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously
inebriated.� They never denied having sexual intercourse with
AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious
at the time the private respondents ravished her.� The CA,
however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act
simply because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance,
disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy
by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the
crime.35� The appellate court never provided any reason why
AAA�s testimony should deserve scant or no weight at all, or why
it cannot be accorded any credence.� In reviewing rape cases, the
lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to
warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible.� Also, it
has been established that when a woman declares that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that
she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of
credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis alone.� This
is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that
can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the
complainant�s testimony itself.36� The trial court correctly ruled
that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have
opened herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial.� AAA was
certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening
as she narrated her harrowing experience.37cralawlawlibrary
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who
violated her.� She tried to resist, but because of the presence of
alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The RTC found AAA�s
testimony simple and candid, indicating that she was telling the
truth.� The trial court likewise observed that her answers to the
lengthy and humiliating questions were simple and straightforward,
negating the possibility of a rehearsed testimony.38�
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):
xxxx
Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went
asleep, when did you regain your consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine
inside the bottle of Emperador Brandy.cralawred
xxxx
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the
remaining contained (sic) of the bottle of Emperador Brandy?
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they
insisted.
Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?
A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.
Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: When did you regain your consciousness?
A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were
carrying you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.
Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold
Batoctoy carry you?
A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:
xxxx
Q: After that, what happened, if any?
A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.
Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?
A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I
was awakened by the flash of light.
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were
awakened that (sic) flash of light.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.cralawred
xxxx
Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light,
what happened?
A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.
Q: So, you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.cralawred
xxxx
Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?
A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.
Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?
A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir. A: I went asleep again, sir.

Q: He was on top of you? Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?
A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering) A: When I feel (sic) pain something inside my private part (sic), I
saw Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto
was on top of you? Q: On top of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir. A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.

Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction? Q: What was your reaction?
A: I was saying don�t because I feel pain my private organ (sic). A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him don�t.

Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he
Raymund Carampatana?
sexually abused me.
A: Only the three of them, sir.
ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor,
Q: Including Moises Alquizola?
that the witness is crying.cralawred
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: What was he doing?
A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.
ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.
Q: Where in particular?
COURT: Continue.
A: In my face, sir.
ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on
Q: Then after that, what happened?
top of you, who else was there inside that room?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel
Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?
when you said that you feel (sic) something in your private part
A: He was at my feet while looking at us.
when you saw Raymund Carampatana?
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.
Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?
A: Dressed up, sir.
Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?
A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.
Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?
A: I woke up at about 7:00 o�clock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir.39
Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A: I could not remember, sir.cralawred
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation
of the defense.� It noted that their account of the events was
xxxx
seemingly unusual and incredible.40� Besides, the defense of
consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to have
Q: After that, what happened?
been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability.� The accused never
mentioned about the same at the pre-trial stage.� The trial court
only came to know about it when it was their turn to take the
witness stand, catching the court by surprise.41� More importantly,
it must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims
that the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was
consensual, as in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to him,
such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove
the relationship.� Being an affirmative defense that needs
convincing proof, it must be established with sufficient evidence
that the intercourse was indeed consensual.42� Generally, the
burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every
element of the crime and that it is the accused who is responsible
for its commission.� This is because in criminal cases, conviction
must rest on a moral certainty of guilt.43� Burden of evidence is
that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time
during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to
overthrow one when created against him.� A prima facie case
arises when the party having the burden of proof has produced
evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of
the issue in litigation.44� However, when the accused alleges
consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as
love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the
romantic or sexual relationship between the offender and his
supposed victim.� Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the
complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to prove his
defense by substantial evidence.45cralawlawlibrary
Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge
of AAA but unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required of
them.� Carampatana narrated that upon reaching the room at the
lodging house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked at him.� He
then approached her and they kissed.� He removed her shirt and
brassiere.� Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAA�s lower
garments and then went to kiss AAA.� Carampatana then placed
himself in between AAA�s legs and had intercourse with her.46�
On the other hand, Oporto himself testified that he had sexual
intercourse with AAA three times.� While Carampatana was
removing AAA�s shirt and brassiere, Oporto was watching at the
foot of the bed.� Then he removed her pants and underwear, and
AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the
clothes down.� When Carampatana left after having sexual
intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he then stood up,
opened his pants, and took out his penis so that AAA could
perform fellatio on him.� Then he proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with AAA.� Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept
with Alquizola on the carpet.� After a few minutes, he woke up
and went back to the room and again had intercourse with AAA.�
He went back to sleep and after some time, he woke up to the
sound of AAA vomitting.� Shortly thereafter, he made love with
AAA for the third and last time.47� Despite said shameless
admission, however, the accused failed to sufficiently prove that
the lack of any physical resistance on AAA�s part amounts to
approval or permission.� They failed to show that AAA had sexual
intercourse with them out of her own volition, and not simply
because she was seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore
could not have given a valid and intelligent consent to the sexual
act.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was
showy and exaggerated when testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up
to some of the accused after her testimony, an indication of a
rehearsed witness.48� To be believed, the testimony must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible
in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the attending
circumstances.49cralawlawlibrary
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves
great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted
with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence.� The reason is obvious.� Having the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses� deportment and
manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the
appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.50�
Matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who
is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the
weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who
have personally appeared before him.51� The appellate courts are
far detached from the details and drama during trial and have to
rely solely on the records of the case in its review.� On the matter
of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court
acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the
trial court whose findings must be given due deference.52� Since
the CA and the private respondents failed to show any palpable
error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the
trial court, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed
conclusive and binding.53cralawlawlibrary
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining
physician found old hymenal laceration on AAA�s private organ.�
The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is expected to be
present when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary, could
mean that AAA actually consented to the fornication.� According to
Dr. Acusta, when sex is consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated
and the insertion of the penis will not cause any laceration.� It
presumed that complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent
considering the presence of old hymenal laceration that could have
resulted from her previous sexual encounters.� The defense,
however, failed to show that AAA was sexually promiscuous and
known for organizing or even joining sex orgies.� It must be noted
that AAA was a minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the
incident, having just graduated from high school on that same
day.� In a similar case,54the Court
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to have
sexual intercourse with two men � or three, according to
Antonio Gallardo � in the presence of each other, unless she
were a prostitute or as morally debased as one. Certainly, the
record before Us contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year
old, first-year high school student, can be so characterized. On the
contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity and candor
peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not even suggest
any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the
commission of the crime charged.55
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and be
subjected to public trial and humiliation if her claim were not
true.56� And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a
young age, the same could still not prove that no rape was actually
committed.� Even a complainant who was a woman of loose
morals could still be the victim of rape.� Even a prostitute may be
a victim of rape.� The victim�s moral character in rape is
immaterial where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim was
deprived of reason or was rendered unconscious through
intoxication to enable the private respondents to have sex with
her.� Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a
woman against her consent.57� A freshly broken hymen is not one
of its essential elements.� Even if the hymen of the victim was still
intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled out.� Penetration of
the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture
or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for
rape.� To repeat, rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of
the woman�s genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for
rape.58cralawlawlibrary
Neither does AAA�s mother�s act of hitting her after learning
about the rape prove anything.� It is a truism that �the workings
of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable, and the people react differently.�59� Different
people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no
standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with
a strange, startling or frightful experience.60� At most, it merely
indicates the frustration and dismay of a mother upon learning that
her daughter had been defiled after partying late the night
before.� It is a settled rule that when there is no showing that
private complainant was impelled by improper motive in making
the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full
faith and credence.61� So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual
act, why did she still need to immediately tell her parents about it
when she could have just kept it to herself?� Why did she ever
have to shout rape?� She was not caught in the act of making love
with any of the private respondents,62 nor was she shown to have
been in a relationship with any of them of which her family
disapproved.63� She never became pregnant as a result of the
deed.� And if AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why would
she have to drag the private respondents into the case and identify
them as her rapists?� Absent any circumstance indicating the
contrary, she brought the charge against the private respondents
simply because she was, in fact, violated and she wants to obtain
justice.� Her zeal in prosecuting the case, even after the CA had
already acquitted the private respondents, evinces the truth that
she merely seeks justice for her honor that has been debased. 64�
Unfortunately, the CA chose to ignore these telling pieces of
evidence.� Its findings are against the logic and effect of the facts
as presented by AAA in support of her complaint,65contrary to
common human experience, and in utter disregard of the relevant
laws and jurisprudence on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the
conspiracy because his participation in the crime was
uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67� It found that his
participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit
the crime of rape.68� The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred
in ruling that Alquizola�s liability is not of a conspirator, but that of
a mere accomplice.� To establish conspiracy, it is not essential
that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it
being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective.� Conspiracy is proved if there is
convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors
committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective
pursued in concert.69� Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on
direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective
conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the
crime indicating a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense.70cralawlawlibrary
In Lobrigo, the Court declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to
Gregorio's and Dominador's participation in the crime conflict on
material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were
carrying weaponsduring the mauling and whether they
participated in the mauling by more than just boxing the
victim. Noel stated that they did not, Domingo stated that
they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is
not necessary.� In this case, the rule is not applicable because
conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven.
Their exact participation in the crime is uncertain.71� (Emphasis
Supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the
lower courts that there was conspiracy:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually
ravished the victim based on the testimony of the private
complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis to her
private parts and that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie
Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled her private parts,
accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the bestial acts
of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three of them conspired
and mutually helped one another in raping the young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his
tacit and spontaneous participation and cooperation of pulling her
towards the parked jeep, molesting her and doing nothing to
prevent the commission of the rape, made him a co-
conspirator. As such, he was properly adjudged as a principal in
the commission of the crime.73
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizola�s
participation in the crime is not at all uncertain.� As the caretaker
of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape
could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness.� He was likewise
inside the room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana
sexually abused AAA.� He did not do anything to stop the bestial
acts of his companions.� He even admitted to kissing AAA�s lips,
breasts, and other parts of her body.� Indubitably, there was
conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually
abuse AAA.� Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each
of them, Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape.�
While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as mere
accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial
court,74 he waived the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment
as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
accused-appellant.75cralawlawlibrary
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a
single Information, it, however, actually charged the accused of
several rapes.� As a general rule, a complaint or information must
charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. 76� The
rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or
informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the
charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his
defense.� The State should not heap upon the accused two or
more charges which might confuse him in his defense.77� Non-
compliance with this rule is a ground78for quashing the duplicitous
complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to
quash before he enters his plea,79 otherwise, the defect is deemed
waived.80� The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this
defense simply because they did not file a motion to quash
questioning the validity of the Information during their
arraignment.� Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to
question the same.� Also, where the allegations of the acts
imputed to the accused are merely different counts specifying the
acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there
is no duplicity to speak of.81� There is likewise no violation of the
right of the accused to be informed of the charges against them
because the Information, in fact, stated that they �took turns in
having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA� on March 25,
2004.82� Further, allegations made and the evidence presented to
support the same reveal that AAA was indeed raped and defiled
several times.� Here, according to the accused themselves, after
undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in between her
legs and had intercourse with her.� On the other hand, Oporto
admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times.�
When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the
court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and
proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each
offense.83� Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held
liable for more than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4) counts
in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of them during the
commission of each of the four violations.� Each of the accused
shall thus be held liable for every act of rape committed by the
other.� But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his
sexual organ into AAA�s mouth, the Court cannot convict him of
rape through sexual assault therefor because the same was not
included in the Information.� This is, however, without prejudice
to the filing of a case of rape through sexual assault as long as
prescription has not yet set in.
Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by
two or more persons is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
under Article 266-B of the RPC.� But in view of the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of
an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon them,84 for each
count.� With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper
imposable penalty upon him is reclusion temporal, being the
penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua to death.� Being a
divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.�
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall
be within the range of prision mayor (the penalty next lower in
degree to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which shall be
within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there
being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
and there being no aggravating circumstance.85� With that, the
Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, for each count of rape committed.86� However, Oporto
shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51, R.A.
No. 9344,87 which extends even to one who has exceeded the age
limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime
when he was still a child,88and provides for the confinement of
convicted children as follows:89cralawlawlibrary
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural
Camps and Other Training Facilities. � A child in conflict with
the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made
to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that
may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the
foregoing provision should be taken into consideration by the judge
in order to accord children in conflict with the law, who have
already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper
treatment envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral
damages, in each case.� Exemplary damages of P30,000.00 shall
likewise be imposed by way of� an example and to deter others
from committing the same bestial acts.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE.� The Court hereby renders judgment:
a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund
Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4)
counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case;
 b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, in each case; and
c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in each case.

The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA,

jointly and severally, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each of the four (4) counts of rape.� The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in
accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for
the execution of judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Chanroblesvirtuallawlib
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992
CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitioner
principally seeks: (1) to nullify the order 1 of respondent judge admitting the
amended information for murder filed in Criminal Case No.
91-4606; (2) to nullify the arraignment and the plea of not guilty entered by
order of respondent judge when petitioner refused to be arraigned on the
amended information for lack of preliminary investigation therefor; (3) to
nullify the appointment of a counsel de oficio/PAO lawyer to represent
petitioner; (4) to prohibit respondent judge from "over-speedy and preferential
scheduling of the trial of the aforementioned criminal case;" and (5) to
compel respondent judge to order preliminary investigation of the crime
charged in the amended information.
Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information 2 for the
crime of frustrated murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of July 1991, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
one Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, thereby
inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have
caused the death of said Maureen Navarro Hultman, thereby
performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or causes
independent of her will, that is, due to the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said Maureen Navarro
Hultman which prevented her death.
After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a
motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said
motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.
Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus
motion 3 for leave of court to file an amended information and to admit said
amended information. The amended information, 4 filed on October 31, 1991,
reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. y. Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent
to kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro
Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal
wounds which directly caused the death of said Maureen
Hultman.
Petitioner filed an opposition 5 thereto, as well as a rejoinder 6 to the reply 7 of
the prosecution. On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued the questioned
order admitting the amended information.
At the scheduled arraignment on November 26, 1991, petitioner refused to
be arraigned on the amended information for lack of a preliminary
investigation thereon. By reason of such refusal, respondent judge ordered
that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner.
Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the prosecution to present its
evidence. When petitioner's counsel manifested that he would not take part
in the proceedings because of the legal issue raised, the trial court appointed
a counsel de oficio to represent herein petitioner.
Petitioner now raises the following issues before us:
(a) Whether or not an amended information involving a
substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation,
after the prosecution has rested on the original information,
may legally and validly be admitted;
 (b) Whether or not a counsel de oficio may legally and validly
be appointed to represent an accused who is represented by
counsel of choice who refuses to participate in the
proceedings because of a perceived denial of due process
and after a plea for appellate remedies within a short period
is denied by the trial court; and
(c) Whether or not a particular criminal case may legally and
validly be rushed and preferentially scheduled for trial over
and at the expense and sacrifice of other, specially older,
criminal cases. 8
In our resolution of January 14, 1992, we required the Solicitor General to file
a comment to the basic petition. It appearing from a further review of the
record that the operative facts and determinant issues involved in this case
are sufficiently presented in the petition and the annexes thereto, both in
regard to the respective positions of petitioner and respondents, the Court
has decided to dispense with the aforesaid comment to obviate needless
delay in fairness to petitioner.
I. Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in the amended information,
as herein underscored, that the accused ". . . did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said
handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby
inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said Maureen
Hultman . . ." constitutes a substantial amendment since it involves a change
in the nature of the offense charged, that is, from frustrated to consummated
murder. Petitioner further submits that "(t)here is a need then to establish that
the same mortal wounds, which were initially frustrated (sic) by timely and
able medical assistance, ultimately caused the death of the victim, because it
could have been caused by a supervening act or fact which is not imputable
to the offender." 9 From this, he argues that there being a substantial
amendment, the same may no longer be allowed after arraignment and
during the trial.
Corollary thereto, petitioner then postulates that since the amended
information for murder charges an entirely different offense, involving as it
does a new fact, that is, the fact of death whose cause has to be established,
it is essential that another preliminary investigation on the new charge be
conducted before the new information can be admitted.
We find no merit in the petition. There are sufficient legal and jurisprudential
moorings for the orders of the trial court.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may
be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at
any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and
during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing
of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with
Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy and may also require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or
complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the
information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the
information may be made before or after the defendant pleaded, but they
differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while
substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original
charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of
court, but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the
original information has to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another
preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in
substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and
the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original
information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the
information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection
of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the
accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution
requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense
which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge,
hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the
first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under
the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information
involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information, and amendment of the
information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an
offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution
is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a
conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the
other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when
the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the
first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-
versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter. 10
Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a
stage in the execution of the crime of murder, hence the former is necessarily
included in the latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of intent to
kill, as well as qualifying circumstances such as treachery or evident
premeditation, be alleged in both an information for frustrated murder and for
murder, thereby meaning and proving that the same material allegations are
essential to the sufficiency of the informations filed for both. This is because,
except for the death of the victim, the essential elements of consummated
murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein
petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.
In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both
the original and the amended information. What is involved here is not a
variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the
stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated
murder. This is being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original
information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended
information for murder is proper.
Petitioner would insist, however, that the additional allegation on the fact of
death of the victim Maureen Navarro Hultman constitutes a substantial
amendment which may no longer be allowed after a plea has been entered.
The proposition is erroneous and untenable.
As earlier indicated, Section 14 of Rule 110 provides that an amendment,
either of form or substance, may be made at any time before the accused
enters a plea to the charge and, thereafter, as to all matters of form with
leave of court.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other
matters are merely of form. 11 Thus, the following have been held to be
merely formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only to the
range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction; 12 (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense
different or distinct from that charged in the original one; 13 (3) additional
allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any
substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription. 14
We repeat that after arraignment and during the trial, amendments are
allowed, but only as to matters of form andprovided that no prejudice is
caused to the rights of the accused. 15 The test of whether an amendment is
only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment has been
said to be whether or not a defense under the information as it originally
stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether
or not any evidence the accused might have would be equally applicable to
the information in the one form as in the other; if the answer is in the
affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. 16
Now, an objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed
against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense
originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional
allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely
supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime.
That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim
continues to be the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever
defense herein petitioner may adduce under the original information for
frustrated murder equally applies to the amended information for murder.
Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended
information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed
even during the trial of the case.
It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and
introduced in the second information, a preliminary investigation is
unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing of the
amended information without the requisite preliminary investigation does not
violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public
accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a
public trial. The amended information could not conceivably have come as a
surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it charges
essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information.
Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime originally charged is
related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one would elicit
substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new
preliminary investigation is not necessary. 17

We find nothing irregular in the appointment by the trial court of a counsel de

oficio for herein petitioner whose counsel of record refused to participate in
the proceedings because of an alleged legal issue. Such issue having been
demonstrated herein as baseless, we apprehend his refusal to participate in
the trial as causative of or contributive to the delay in the disposition of the
case. And, finally, for as long as the substantial rights of herein petitioner and
other persons charged in court are not prejudiced, the scheduling of cases
should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, it being clearly apparent that respondent judge did not

commit the errors speciously attributed to him, the extraordinary writs prayed
for are hereby DENIED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ.,
concur.

Bellosillo, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 96766 September 20, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO JARALBA and JALANDONI CORREGIDOR, accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ildefonso G. Mantilla for accused-appellant Antonio Jaralba.
Deodiro Ravelo for accused-appellant Jalandoni Corregidor.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao
City, Branch 30, finding herein appellants Antonio Jarabla and Jalandoni
Corregidor guilty of the crime of Murder, alleged to have been committed in
the amended information as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of October, 1986, in the City of
Surigao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another,
armed with deadly weapons, that is, sharp-pointed
instruments, without any justifiable cause and with intent to
kill Joselito Baltar and with treachery and cruelty did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack
and stab the said Joselito Z. Baltar several times, thereby
inflicting upon the latter twenty-three (23) wounds in the
different parts of his body as indicated in the post
mortem findings hereto attached, causing the instantaneous
death of said Joselito Z. Baltar, to the damage and prejudice
and his heirs in such sum as may be allowed under the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and cruelty. (Rollo, p. 7)
Upon arraignment, appellants Jalandoni Corregidor and Antonio Jaralba
entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On November 24, 1989,
the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, from all the foregoing, the Court finds the
accused, ANTONIO JARALBA and JALANDONI
CORREGIDOR, both guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, lacking in aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, imposes the medium penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA (People v. Jutie, Jr., G. R.
72975, 31 March 1989, First Division, Medialdea).
To indemnify the heirs of Joselito Baltar, jointly and
severally, the amount of P30,000.00; moral damages of
P10,000.00; funeral expenses of P5,000.00 without any
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer the
accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.
In view of the foregoing findings of guilt, the bonds filed is
(sic) ordered CANCELLED, and accused to be (sic) confined
at the Provincial Jail.
The case with respect to John Doe is placed in ARCHIVE
until such time that the police authorities shall be able to
identify and apprehend said person.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 73)
As summarized by the Solicitor General, the facts of the case are as follows:
On October 30, 1986, at around 7:00 o' clock in the evening,
witness Diomedes Guibao, then seventeen (17) years old,
was inside the campus of the Surigao del Norte National
High School waiting for his friend Fernando Digol (TSN, July
7, 1988, pp. 2-3). He decided to go to the toilet (Id.). On his
way to the toilet, he saw, ahead of him, his classmate
Joselito Baltar followed by appellants Antonio Jaralba and
Jalandoni Corregidor and another person whom he did not
recognize also on their way to the toilet (TSN, July 7, 1988,
pp. 3, 13). Diomedes Guibao had already known appellants
for about a year having seen them hang around the school's
premises (TSN, July 7, 1988, pp. 4, 12).
As Diomedes was about to enter the toilet, he saw
appellants and the unidentified companion inside the toilet
taking turns stabbing Joselito Baltar with a "sundangay"
(small bolo) while holding the victim's arms (TSN, July 7,
1988, pp. 3, 8-10).
The toilet was located at the first floor of a two-storey
building. Although the light inside the toilet itself was not
working, the twenty (20) watt fluorescent light hanging on the
ceiling outside illuminated the toilet through the iron grills
(TSN, July 25, 1988, pp. 35-38; TSN, July 7, 1988, pp. 4,
11).
At around 10:30 in the evening, Romeo Bulabog, security
guard on duty at the Surigao National High School, was
making his rounds, checking the premises using his
flashlight and closing doors, when he noticed drops of blood
on the cement floor which he traced back to the school toilet
and found inside the toilet the dead body of Joselito Baltar
(TSN, July 25, 1988, pp. 31-32). Romeo reported the matter
to the police (Id.).
Responding to Romeo Bulabog's report, police investigator
Cpl. Cipriano Iligan, together with Pat. Jamil, Cpl. Gonzaga,
Cpl. Lisondra and commercial photographer Roger Martinez,
proceeded to the scene of the crime (TSN, June 1, 1988, pp.
3-6). At the Surigao del Norte National High School campus,
Cpl. Iligan and his men followed the trail of blood from the
school toilet and found that it led to appellant Jaralba's store
which was right beside the latter's residence along the
national highway (TSN, June 1, 1988, pp. 5-9). Drops of
blood and other bloodstains were found on the cemented
steps leading to the national road and on the door of
appellant Jaralba's store (TSN, June 1, 1988, pp. 8-12).
Commercial photographer Roger Martinez took pictures of
the toilet, the trail of blood and of the bloodstains on the door
of appellant Jaralba's store (TSN, June 1, 1988,
p. 8; TSN, August 17, 1988, pp. 44-47).
The policemen woke up appellant Jaralba's father, Jorge
Jaralba, and asked the latter about the bloodstains and
appellant's whereabouts (TSN, January 24, 1989, pp. 81-
85). But Jorge Jaralba did not know where his son was but
asked the policemen to wait while he looked for him (TSN,
January 24, 1989, pp. 85-86). When he returned, Jorge
Jaralba told the policemen that he could not locate appellant
Antonio Jaralba (Id., p. 85).
The following day, an autopsy performed by Dr. Alice
Ensomo-Gonzaga at the Saviour Funeral Parlor where
Joselito Z. Baltar's body was taken (TSN, July 26, 1988, p.
17). She found that Joselito sustained no less than twenty
three (23) wounds: seven (7) in the anterior or front part of
the body (above the left eyebrow, on the mandible, on the
neck and on the chest) and fourteen (14) on the posterior
side or the back (TSN, July 26, 1988, pp. 17-25; Exhibit "G").
She determined the cause of death to be shock and internal
hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds (TSN, July 26,
1988, p. 22).
On November 3, 1986, appellant Antonio Jaralba,
accompanied by his father, Jorge Jaralba, went to the police
station and was investigated (TSN, February 13, 1989, pp.
99-100).
On March 6, 1987 or four (4) months and six (6) days after
the incident, Diomedes Guibao decided to tell his teacher
Mrs. Beltran that he witnessed the killing of Joselito Beltran
(sic) (TSN, July 7, 1988, p. 6).
Accused Antonio Jaralba denies having conspired with Jalandoni Corregidor
and the unidentified person in the murder of Joselito Baltar. He testified that
on October 30, 1986, he went to the comfort room of the Surigao del Norte
High School. While there, he heard moanings coming from the adjoining
cubicle. Curious, he took a closer look and saw a person slumped on the
side thereof. Before he could clearly see the victim, a man rushed out of the
cubicle and stabbed him twice. Jaralba claims that he was hit in the palm of
his right hand, below the little finger. Thereafter, he ran home and attended
to his wound. Later, he went to the store of Paramede where he met his
friends, namely, Virgel Tomate, Jalandoni Corregidor, Lolong Abadilla and
Titing Castillo. They were drinking liquor. The store-owner, Policeman
Paramede, asked him about his wound to which he replied that he was
stabbed in school. On November 3, 1986, Jaralba also told his father that he
was stabbed in school. His father brought him to the police station where he
was investigated. He identified a written statement as the one prepared by
the police investigator and signed by him (Exhibit 2, pp. 485-487).
Accused Jalandoni Corregidor likewise denies the charge against him. He
claims that he was in Placer Cemetery the whole day of October 30, 1986,
working on the mausoleum of former Mayor Canda, together with Dionisio
and Lolong Abadilla. He testified that he left for Placer in the morning and
returned to Surigao City at 7:30 in the evening. He took supper in the house
of Dionisio Abadilla and went home at around 8:00 in the evening.
Thereafter, he went with Andrew Abadilla to the Surigao del Norte High
School at around 8:40 in the evening to attend classes. On the way home,
Corregidor and Abadilla stopped and joined Antonio Jaralba and Tomate in
their drinking session at the Paramede store at the capitol road, from 9:00 to
9:30 in the evening. The following day, October 31, 1986, he was picked up
by the police for investigation.
As aforesaid, both the accused were convicted of the crime charged. They
now assign the following as errors:
1 The trial court erred in ordering orally the amendment of
the information after arraignment;
2 The trial court erred in proceeding with the trial without the
accused being re-arraigned in (sic) the amended information;
3 The trial court erred in giving weight and credence without
the testimony of Diomedes Guibao, the truth that his
behavior after the alleged incident is indicative of guilt;
4 The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused on
reasonable doubt;
5 The trial court erred in not giving weight and credence to
the testimonies of the accused and its witness. (Rollo, p. 42)
Appellants seek to capitalize on the supposed grave error committed by the
court a quo in orally amending the description of the victim's wounds from
"lacerated" to "stab" in the autopsy report attached to the information to
conform with the testimony of the examining physician. Accordingly,
appellants contend that they were placed in double jeopardy for not having
been re-arraigned.
It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, an accused must, among
others, first be acquitted or convicted and is being charged anew for the very
same offense for which he was previously prosecuted (Rule 117, Section 7,
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). Here, appellants were yet to be
convicted or acquitted of the crime charged. Hence, no double jeopardy has
attached. Besides no information was filed.
What is clear on the record is that the trial court merely ordered a change in
the description of some of the victim's wounds from "lacerated" to "stab" in
the information in order to conform with the description of the victim's wounds
in the autopsy report. Furthermore, a re-arraignment is necessary only where
the change or amendment of the information involves a mistake in the
charging of the proper offense (Rule 110, Section 14, par. [2], 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure). In the case at bar, the change in the information, i. e.,
the change in the description of some of the victim's wounds from "lacerated"
to "stab" was not effected to correct a mistake in charging the proper offense.
It did not have the effect of changing the offense charged in the information,
which was, and correctly remained as, murder.
In their third assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court should
not have given credence to the testimony of eyewitness Diomedes Guibao
because he allegedly harbored a grudge against appellant Corregidor. In
addition, Guibao failed to reveal his knowledge of the incident until after the
lapse of a considerable period of time.
Insofar as credibility is concerned, it is well settled that the findings of the trial
court on credibility of witness merit the highest degree of respect. The trial
court is the best judge of whether or not a witness is credible. Its findings on
the credibility of a witness are entitled to great weight and respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances were
overlooked that will effect the outcome of the case, none of which obtain in
the incident under view (People vs. Moreno, Jr., 208 SCRA 87 [1992];
People vs. Villanueva, 211 SCRA 602 [1992]; People v. Uy, 206 SCRA 270
[1992]).
Still, the alleged ill-motive of Guibao against appellant Corregidor cannot be
sanctioned considering that this could not logically explain why Guibao would
likewise implicate appellant Antonio Jaralba and the other unidentified
person. No reason has been imputed as to why said witness would implicate
other persons against whom he had no grudges. In any event, the delay on
the part of Diomedes Guibao in divulging the names of perpetrators of the
crime neither impairs his credibility nor his testimony. The initial reluctance of
Diomedes Guibao to volunteer information on a crime he witnessed and his
unwillingness to be involved in criminal investigation for fear of reprisal is
common and has been judicially declared not to affect the credibility of a
witness (People vs. Pascua, 206 SCRA 629 [1992]).
As this Court emphasized in People v. Mandapat (196 SCRA 157 [1991]):
 As a general rule, the failure of a witness to report at once to
the police authorities the crime he had witnessed cannot be
taken against him (People v. Demate, 113 SCRA 353 [1982])
for "it is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show
some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case.
The natural reticence of most people to get involved in a
criminal case is of judicial notice" (People v. Pacabes, 137
SCRA 158 [1985]; People v. Coronado, 145 SCRA 250
[1986]) and the fear of eyewitnesses when townmates are
involved in the commission of the crime is understandable
for they may provide reprisals from the accused (People v.
Rosario, 134 SCRA 496 [1985]). The delay, when
adequately explained, does not impair the credibility of the
witness, as in the case at bar (People v. Cabinit, 139 SCRA
94 [1985]; People v. Millora, 119 SCRA 417 [1984]); neither
will it render his testimony biased (People v. Itura, 129 SCRA
127 [1984]; nor will it destroy its probative value (People v.
Millora, supra); . . .
Neither can we lend credence to the claims of appellants that Diomedes
Guibao was the real killer and that the police investigators merely framed
them up. In the first place, there was not a scintilla of evidence to support the
same. Allegations sans proof deserve no merit. Appellants never specified
what the police investigators did or had against them. Secondly, the police
officers are presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the absence
of evidence to the contrary (Rule 131, Section 3 [m], Rules of Court). From
the attendant circumstances, the Court sees no reason why the police
officers would falsely concoct a serious charge against accused herein if they
really did not commit the offense charged. Absent a showing that the police
officers were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to
full faith and credit (People vs. Fernandez, 209 SCRA 1 [1992]).
Furthermore, it is firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the defense of
alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses
and their clear identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.
This is so because, as we have invariably but patiently reiterated, alibi is a
defense that is inherently weak since it can easily be fabricated or contrived
(People vs. Pascua, 206 SCRA 628 [1992]). As against the positive and clear
identification by eyewitness Diomedes Guibao, appellants' defense of alibi
cannot stand. It has been ruled time and against that for the defense of alibi
to proper, it must be established by clear evidence that not only must the
accused be somewhere other than the place of the commission of the crime
but that it was also physically impossible for him to be at the situs of the
crime at the time of its commission (People vs. Magallanes, G.R. No. 89036,
Jan. 29, 1993, citing People vs. Urquia, Jr., 203 SCRA 735 [1991]).
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification as to the indemnity which is hereby increased from P30,000.00
to P50,000.00. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

With regard to the unsubstantiated claim of appellant Corregidor that he

could not have participated in the stabbing of Joselito Baltar since he was in
Placer working on the mausoleum of the Canda family, We find the same to
be untenable.

In People v. Arbolante (203 SCRA 85 [1991]), We held that "denial, like alibi,
is inherently a weak defense and can easily be defeated by the affirmative
and credible testimonies of prosecution witnesses pointing to the accused as
the perpetrators of the crime for which they are charged." Denial of guilt,
uncorroborated by any reliable evidence, cannot overthrow the clear and
convincing testimonies of prosecution witnesses as to the culpability of the
accused (People vs. Arceo, 202 SCRA 170 [1991]).