Edward Richardson v. Prince William County Government, Et Al, EDVA 17-cv-761. Cross-Motion and Opposition To Prince William County Motion To Dismiss

Case 1:17-cv-00761-CMH-TCB Document 12 Filed 11/13/17 Page 1 of 43 PageID# 179
f^lLEo
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ;fl/7
Alexandria Division O h- i,n
EDWARD RICHARDSON.
Plaintiff,
V. Civil Action No. l:17-cv-761-CMH-TCB
PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY

GOVERNMENT, Mil,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND

PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF MUNICIPAL
GOVERNMENT COUNSEL AS TO INDIVIDUAL-CAPACITY DEFENDANTS'
Plaintiff, Edward Richardson, hereby submits his Opposition to the defendants' Motion
to Dismiss (the "Motion") the Complaint. Plaintiffs Complaint properly alleges Title VII and
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") claims against Prince William County, Virginia
Government in its official-capacity and Prince William County, Virginia Police Chief Barry M.
Barnard as "agency head" and in his official-capacity; constitutional tort violations against
defendants' Stephan M. Hudson, Charlie T. Deane, Timothy Rudy, Scott A. Vago, Jay Lanham,
and Michael Femald each in their individual-capacities, and the Prince William County, Virginia
Government in its official-capacity; and, pendent jurisdiction Virginia State law claims against
the Prince William County, Virginia Government in its official-capacity. Defendants' dispositive
Motion fails to state sufficient fact that would otherwise support a dismissal pursuant to Federal
Civil Rules 12 (b) (1) or (b) (6). Other than the megillah of purported contentions that plague the
defendants' Motion, quite obviously prepared pell mell, the Motion fails on its merits, and
Plaintiff seeks denial of the Motion in entirety. Moreover, Plaintiff files a Cross-Motion,

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
EDWARD RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff,

GOVERNMENT,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND

PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF MUNICIPAL
GOVERNMENT COUNSEL AS TO INDIVIDUAL-CAPACITY DEFENDANTS'
Plaintiff, Edward Richardson, hereby submits his Opposition to the defendants' Motion
to Dismiss (the "Motion") the Complaint. Plaintiffs Complaint properly alleges Title VII and
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") claims against Prince William County, Virginia
Government in its official-capacity and Prince William County, Virginia Police ChiefBarry M.
Barnard as "agency head" and in his official-capacity; constitutional tort violations against
defendants' Stephan M. Hudson, Charlie T. Deane, Timothy Rudy, Scott A. Vago, Jay Lanham,
and Michael Femald each in their individual-capacities, and the PrinceWilliam County, Virginia
Government in its official-capacity; and, pendent jurisdiction Virginia State law claims against
the Prince William County, Virginia Government in its official-capacity. Defendants' dispositive
Motion fails to state sufficient fact that would otherwise support a dismissal pursuant to Federal
Civil Rules 12 (b) (1) or (b) (6). Other than the megillah of purported contentions that plague the
defendants' Motion, quite obviously prepared pell mell, the Motion fails on its merits, and
Plaintiff seeks denial of the Motion in entirety. Moreover, Plaintiff files a Cross-Motion,

Alexandria Division
EDWARD RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff,

GOVERNMENT, mm.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT COUNSEL AS
TO INDIVIDUAL-CAPACITY DEFENDANTS'
In the Defendants' Roseboro Notice, they allege that Plaintiffs Title VII (Civil Rights
Acts of 1964 / 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e) and Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") claims
dating back to 2009 and as late as 2017 are untimely. Plaintiff respectfully directs the Court to
Exhibit A of the Complaint (Dkt. 1, Attachment 1 EEOC Notice of Sue Rights) and Exhibit A
attached herewith {EEOC regarding Plaintiff's claims and the defendant's continuous retaliatory
conduct under the "continuing violations doctrine.)
Quite contrary to the defendants' attempts to engage in deceptive wordsmithing, the
EEOC's Charge of Discrimination validates Plaintiffs retaliatory continuing violation claims as

earliest as 04-13-2009 and latest as 11-18-2016, all of which are covered under the continuing
violations doctrine and the defendants' inadvertently concede that point.' And even if Plaintiff
' "Agency action reasonablv likelv to deter protected activitv." Complainant claimed that, after
he filed his EEO complaint, his performance rating was reduced. He also averred that agency
officials indicated that complainant and those who testified on his behalf were "whiners" and
"crybabies." EEOC held that such treatment, when engaged in by management, was reasonably
had not brought timely claims before the EEOC or this Honorable Court, a reasonable person
would have carefully considered that facts and evidence of the Complaint and quickly realized
that any reasonable person in fear of life would have delayed any form of whistleblowing due to
the defendants' retaliatory conduct amounting to criminal mischief. In Morsan, the United States
Supreme Court held that Title VII claims, namely, discrimination, hostile working environment,
and retaliation, after consideration of the Courtof Appeals with respect to each category of claim
separately and found that the prelimitations conduct was sufficiently related to the
postlimitations conduct to invoke the continuing violations doctrine for all three. S^ National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morsan. 536 U.S. 101, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002). And the evidence of the
Complaint and attached herewith is explicit.
As long as Plaintiff continued to be victimized by discriminatory, hostile and retaliatory

acts stemming from his employment with the Prince William County Police Department, and
each occurring within the 300 day statutory filing period, constitute continuing violations.
Moreover, the defendants' are imprecise in their analysis with regard to all of Plaintiffs claims.
The 6^'^ Circuit applied the continuing violation doctrine to extend limitations period for
prisoner's Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim. Gonzales v. Hasty. 802
likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity. Pallante v.
Department ofJustice {'Immigration and Naturalization Service). EEOC Appeal No. 01A04996
(July 6, 2001). See also McPherran v. Department of the Treasury. EEOC Appeal No.
OlAl1357 (August 2, 2001) ("adverse actions need not qualify as "ultimate employment actions"
or materially affect the terms and conditions of employment to constitute retaliation") (Emphasis
added).
^ The defendants' falsely and vaguely allege that in 2008, Plaintiff was under suspicion of
abusing anabolic steroids by the Department but states no frirther what in year 2008 lead to such
suspicion, if anything. Plaintiff has never been cited by anyone as having a "temper" problem,
and is in fact quite the opposite of what the defendants' attempt to falsely allege.
^ The defendants' permitted and contributed to pretext conditions of discrimination in
employment so intolerable that Plaintiff, a reasonable person, was forced to resign. Aman v. Cort
Furniture Rental Corp.. 85 F.3d 1074, 1084 ^3*^ Cir. 1996);^ ^so Goss v. Exxon Office
F.3d 212, WL 5155150 (2"^^ Cir. 2015); also Tillman v. Southern Wood Preserving of
Hattiesburs. Inc.. 377 Fed. Appx. 346, WL 1778831 (demonstrating employee obligation to
argue continuing violation doctrine to prevent claim preclusion). But here, Plaintiff claims are
cognizable and properly asserted as a matter of law.
Plaintiff has examined the defendants' Motion liberally, and in responding, Plaintiff, for
the sake of brevity, will not repeat those factual allegations and discussion, but incorporates the
allegations of the Complaint and defendants' Motion to Dismiss by reference in this
Memorandum.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff began his employment with the Prince William County, Virginia Police
Department on June 20, 2005. Plaintiff graduated from the Prince William County Criminal
Justice Academy ("PWCCJA") on January 6, 2006, and was assigned to the Eastern District
Garfield Substation thereafter. Over a course of three years. Plaintiff has reported various
instances of visualized physical abuse against minority citizens by Officer David Burghart,
which he reported to police supervisors and managers ofthe Department. As a direct result ofhis
protected disclosures, inter alia. Plaintiff was subject to a severe and pervasively hostile working
environment by the defendants' who not only targeted Plaintiff because of his protected
disclosures of misconduct, but who also scapegoated Plaintiff as a direct result of their ongoing
surreptitious criminal conduct. Pl.['s] Compl. 5-8.
Here, the defendants' continue to aggravate already widespread malevolent attacks
against Plaintiffs character by falsely purporting..."In late 2008, the Department was suspicious
that the Plaintiff was abusing anabolic steroids, and then, in early 2009, the Plaintiff committed a
serious offense when he lost his temper and severely beat a prisoner.^ Specifically, on January
21, 2009, the Plaintiff used excessive force on a [partially restrained] prisoner at the Garfield
Police Station. The Plaintiff elbowed, choked, and punched the prisoner." Defs. ['] Mot. to
Dismiss 1^1 2-3. Indeed, the defendants' have stated exaggerated material falsifications. If
Plaintiff had "lost his temper and severely beat a prisoner" as the defendants' allege, Plaintiff
undoubtedly would have been placed under immediate suspension pursuant to Va. Code § 9.1-
505. Plaintiff left work that night after processing the subject under felony warrants and after
handwriting his associated report and placing a copy in his Department issued mailbox. Indeed,
Plaintiff ftilly processed the very subject that the defendants' allege Plaintiff "severely beat."
Plaintiff asked defendant Vago directly if he needed to speak with him regarding the use of
force, in which Vago responded "no." Plaintiffproceeded to his residence in full police uniform
and take-home police cruiser with full arrest powers and authority.
Notwithstanding the evidence of the Complaint and herewith, the defendants' clearly fail
to fathom that their malicious allegations falsely purported against Plaintiff are discoverable,
which fatally contradicts the purpose of the defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The defendants'
have failed in every imaginable way to produce any evidence of the falsifications purported in
their dispositive Motion and definitely have not produced the least bit of evidence that would
refute the posited facts of the Complaint. But here, Plaintiff makes notice to this Honorable
Court that during an investigation of the hate crime committed to Plaintiff s Dumfiies, Virginia
("Montclair") residence on April 10 or 11, 2009, Plaintiff gave FBI Agents permission to
^ The defendants' falsely and vaguely allege that in 2008, Plaintiff was under suspicion of
abusing anabolic steroids by the Department but states no fiirther what in year 2008 lead to such
suspicion, if anything. Plaintiff has never been cited by anyone as having a "temper" problem,
and is in fact quite the opposite of what the defendants' attempt to falsely allege.
observe the video footage of the January 21, 2009 attack on Plaintiff. Thedefendants' would not
release the video even under Plaintiffs consent.
Plaintiffs former squad mate, Officer Spencer Wheeler advised defendant Vago that
Plaintiff was in a life and death situation which is why he (Wheeler) had to use physical force
which included slamming the violent and intoxicated subjects head into the metal sink in cell no.
1, with no effect. And the defendants' have validated that the intoxicated and violent subject was
partially restrained when he stood and violently "rammed" his head into Plaintiff deliberately,
trying to cause severe injury or death, placing Plaintiff in a state of incapacitation, resulting in
Plaintiffs immediate single physical force strike to the highly intoxicated and violent subject as
a direct result of police survival skills and instincts Plaintifflearned and was taught by PWCCJA
personnel. Plaintiffs immediate supervisor. First Sergeant Louis Marshall, ruled Plaintiffs use
of force, as well as the uses of force of officers Downey and Wheeler, as justified.
The violent and intoxicated subject repeatedly apologized to Plaintiffs supervisors for
choking and head-butting ("ramming") Plaintiff as a formal criminal warrant was being obtained
fi-om the Magistrate. The subject apologized to Plaintiff directly in front of the Magistrate as the
criminal charge was being read. If Plaintiffs use of force had played out the way the defendants'
have so fictitiously alleged. Plaintiffwould have undoubtedly become the subject of a civil rights
/ deprivation of civil liberties investigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Not only that, the
defendants' would have brought formal criminal charges against Plaintiff Instead, the
Commonwealth of Virginia Prosecutor brought felony charges against the subject in Prince
William CountyGeneral District Court for attacking Plaintiff S^ ExhibitList. (Commonwealth
of Virginia Nolle Prosse 1-21-09 criminal charges on 2-23-11 based on 2 years good behavior).
The subject apologized to Plaintiff in open court following his hearing on February 23, 2009.
The defendants' seek to use the wording of Plaintiffs resignation letter as a mitigation
tool for their prohibited retaliatory conduct. It quite frankly does not matter how Plaintiff worded
his resignation letter, he resigned under the ongoing effects of an intolerable, severe and
pervasively hostile working environment, ongoing harassment, and his resignation was out
constructive discharge as the facts of the Complaint and points alleged herein explicitly proves.
See Defs ['] Mot. ^ 3. Plaintiff formally resigned from the Prince William County Police
Department on January 22, 2009. Defendant Hudson asked Plaintiffif he was sure he wanted to
be taken off the books to which Plaintiff stated "yes." Plaintiff advised both defendants' Hudson
and Rudy that he was resigning under constructive discharge.^ Exhibit List - January 29,
2009, Notice of Charges ^ 2 para. 3. also Compl. Pg. 18 ^ 112. In the defendants' Motion
(Pg. 3, Para.[s] 3-4), they attempt to obfiiscate material facts between January 21, 2009 and
February 6, 2009.
The ongoing life threatening harassment and retaliation Plaintiff has been forced to
endure is quite explicit in the Complaint. The defendants' failed to address the fact that Plaintiff
was never told by any member of the Department that he would be terminated prior to, during, or
immediately following his resignation on January 22, 2009, and the defendants' concede that
point. But Plaintiff presents explicit evidence that proves that his April 13, 2009 termination was
retaliatory for his engaging in protected activity.
^ The defendants' permitted and contributed to pretext conditions of discrimination in

employment so intolerable that Plaintiff, a reasonable person, was forced to resign. Aman v. Cort
Furniture Rental Corp.. 85 F.3d 1074, 1084 (3"^^ Cir. 1996): see also Goss v. Exxon Office
Systems Co.. 747_F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir.1984). Using an objective test to determine whether the
employee was constructively discharged from employment, the Third Circuit asks whether 'the
conduct complained of would have the foreseeable result that working conditions would be so
unpleasant or difficult that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would resign. Gray v.
York Newspapers. Inc.. 957 F.2d 1070, 1079 (3*^ Cir. \992)." Bgttgglio v. General Electric
Company. Civ. No. 94-4675, WL 11980 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
On the morning of January 28, 2009, Plaintiff filed his initial Intake Questionnaire with
the EEOC Washington Field Office. Also on January 28, 2009 at 1 pm. Officer Kucera took
Plaintiffs stolen firearm report when the defendants' placed Plaintiff under duress and
unlawfully entered his residence at stole his personal property almost immediately following his
resignation on January 22, 2009. See Exhibit D - Compl. Pr. Will. Cty P.D. Case No. 09-
015813. Plaintiff has obtained various excerpts from defendant Vago's Internal Affairs reports
regarding the January 21, 2009 assault against Plaintiff in the station lockup and the dates and
times of several interviews between defendant Vago and Officers Wheeler and Downey.
Plaintiff respectfully directs this Honorable Court to the Exhibit List ... Wheelers
Interview shows that Vago's initial interview of Wheeler took place on January 21, 2009 at 2:43
am and the results thereof But on January 28, 2009 at 4:30 pm, defendant Vago interviewed
Wheeler a second time, which happened to be almost immediately after Vago had been alerted
by his colleague and good fnend, Brandon Dudley, that Plaintiff filed a stolen firearm report,
taken by Officer Kucera. Brandon Dudley was Officer Kucera's road supervisor, and responded
to Plaintiffs residence as Kucera was finishing out the call for service.
Plaintiff respectfully directs this Honorable Court to Wheeler's January 28, 2009 report
where the severe level of discrepancies are visible. Defendant Vago threatened Wheeler to
change his testimony into his own. As a direct result. Wheeler resigned from his job as a Prince
William County Police Officer and moved far from the Commonwealth of Virginia. The courts
are known to frown upon law enforcements officials who falsify reports and fabricate evidence
in actions brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Cossins v. County ofNassau, 988 F. Supp.2d 231,
WL 6224631 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).

Officer Downey was interviewed by defendant Vago on January 21, 2009 at 1:50 am
where he informed Vago that it was Plaintiff who was attacked by the subject. On January 30,
2009 at 7:00 am, Vago made an aggressive attempt for Downey to change his prior statement,
but Downey refused and would not engage in the unlawful conduct. Wheeler and Downey are
both White. In defendant Vago's own testimony, he states that Plaintiff was "rammed" in the
chest by the intoxicated and violent subject, therefore refuting his (Vago's) own materially false
allegations. What also stood out from defendant Vago's report in Plaintiffs eyes is that he refers
to Plaintiff as "anti-agnostic".
It is also well established fact that [no one] had even made a complaint that Plaintiffhad
used excessive force, and it is unheard of that an I.A.D. investigator would come off the street
from an off-duty detail and take over an in-progress use of force investigation from a street
supervisor who had already deemed the use of force justified, and then attempt to reverse the
circumstance of events. See Exhibit List (General Order 10.04). Plaintiff clearly had been
targeted due to his prior disclosure of misconduct as well as the defendants' own criminal
activities.
It was only after Plaintiff filed his January 28, 2009 stolen firearm report and had made
notification to Officer Kucera about the initial EEO complaint did Plaintiff receive a Notice of
Charges on January 31, 2009 in the mail dated January 29, 2009.
Excerpt from April 1, 2009 Letter from defendant Charlie T. Deane: "I find
the allegation that you violated General Order 2.01 - C(16), 2.01 - C(31) and
27.04 - E, as enumerated in the Notice of Charges provided to you on ["January
31,2009"], is Sustained."^
^ The defendants' have engaged in conspiracy of systemic racism and selective targeting of
minority members within the Police Department to conceal their White Supremacy and major
criminal activities where the Police Department itself is used as a store front as well as a tool of
corruptive enforcement, that results in serial continuing retaliatory violations. By bringing
falsified allegations and fabrications against (scapegoating) unsuspecting sworn and unsworn
Plaintiff complained of illegal discrimination and ongoing workplace harassment long

before his January 22, 2009 constructive discharge. From December 22-26, 2008, Plaintiff was
placed on desk duty as a form ofpunishment and without explanation. Prior to. Plaintiffhad been
hospitalized with food poisoning and had been home on leave and on bed rest for several weeks
and therefore, had no contact with the defendants' but the drastic change in Plaintiffs work
assignment explicitly established the retaliatory scheme.
Here, the defendants' allege that Plaintiff didn't begin making complaints of
discrimination until February 6, 2009, but are directly refuted by their own Exhibit A, as well as
Plaintiffs EEOC intake questionnaire dated January 28, 2009. Regarding Plaintiffs 2016-2017
EEO Complaint, the Intake Questionnaire explicitly outlines the vile and outright psychotic
retaliatory and harassing continuing violations stemming 2009 through 2016. Indeed. The
defendants' colluded with a Fairfax County Police Officer, T.C. Owens who along with the
defendants' altered surveillance footage to make it appear as though Plaintiff had committed a
heinous criminal act when the reality is that Plaintiff was brutally assaulted and beaten by
approximately 10 heavily intoxicated males, and if the video footage had not been altered would
have shown that fact.
Plaintiff required hospitalization and was released on crutches. It is a material fact that
the defendants' assisted Owens in using Plaintiffs attackers as witnesses and assisted Owens in
minority members of the Police Department, the defendants' allow themselves to appear
intolerant against internal misconduct, when in actuality their actions are twofold: (1) the
defendants' completely destroy the personal and professional characters of the targeted member,
as they have done Plaintiff (2) the defendants' conduct is so violent and so severely harassing
and retaliatory that they place the targeted member in a state of fear of loss of life and emotional
duress that would dissuade the targeted member from taking administrative and / or civil action;
or, after having filed an administrative or civil action, from pursuing the claim any further, as
Plaintiff. Plaintiff has supplied the FBI with a list of minority former Prince WiUiam County
Police Officers forwarded to the appropriate Division.
preparing fabricated testimonies. It is material fact that Plaintiff served 10 days in the Fairfax
County Detention Center, where friend of the defendants' and Plaintiffs former D-Squad
supervisor, Jeff King, served as a look-out and reported back to the defendants' the status of
Plaintiffs case. Therefore, the facts of Plaintiffs case are well posited and his claims cognizable
as matter of law. And if the defendants' believe that Plaintiffs EEO claims only surround
matters form 2009, they are advised to reexamine Plaintiffs most recent EEO complaint. The
defendants', from 2008 to present day, have committed continuous discriminatory, harassing and
retaliatory acts violative of Title VII and ADA and stemming from Plaintiffs employment with
the Department.^
Additionally, Plaintiff utilized every exhaustive method to his disposal to mitigate the
April 13, 2009 termination and was severely denied due process under the Virginia Law
Enforcement Officer Procedural Guarantee Act ("LEOPGA"). Page 2 paragraph 3 is very
valuable to Plaintiffs point. The defendants' make a critical error when they state "Nevertheless,
^ The courts do not reference continuing violations vaguely. "The continuing violations doctrine
is meant to protect plaintiffs from losing the ability to file suit for Title VII claim that might by
nature, take time to materialize..." Avala v. Shinseki, 780 F.3d 52, WL 993345 (1^' Cir.
2015). Under the continuing violations doctrine, a Title VII hostile working environment claim
may appropriately extend to acts that occurred before the relevant limitations period if the hostile
work environment continued within the limitations period as well. Gilliam v. South Carolina
Dept. of Juvenile Justice. 474 F.3d. 134, WL 92900 (4^'' Cir. 2007V See. Berry v. Bd. of
Supervisors ofLS.U.. 715 F.2d 971, 979 (5'*' Cir. 1983) ("[T]he precise contours and theoretical
bases of [continuing violations] are at best unclear .... "). The California Supreme Court has
discerned that the doctrine "refers not to a single theory, but to a number of different approaches,
in different contexts and using a variety of formulations, to extending the statute of limitations ....
Richards v. CH2MHill. Inc.. 29 P3d 175, 183 (Cal. 200n: see also Elliott v. Sperrv Rand Corp..
79 F.R.D. 580, 585-86 (D. Minn. 1978) (describing the doctrine as "a conglomeration of several
different ideas"). White v. Bloom. 621 F.2d 276, 280-81 (8^^ Cir. 1980) (detennining that a
conspiracy to violate civil rights is a continuing violation that accrues for limitations purposes
upon the final act in furtherance of the conspiracy).
10
the process of your separation will be ongoing and will continue." "If you choose not to
participate in this process, it will continue without you and a notice with the outcome will besent
to you." The aforementioned establishes clearpretext retaliatory conduct.
Plaintiff elected to have a Loudermill Hearing as to preserve his due process rights.
During the Loudermill Hearing with defendants' Vago and Deane, defendant Lanham appeared
to stand guard by Deane's office door, where the hearing was held. Defendant Vago called
Plaintiff prior stating that Plaintiff could not bring an attorney or any form of representation to
the hearing. Plaintiff recorded Vago saying this pursuant to Va. Code § 19.2-62. Va. Code § 9.1-
502(3) clearly allows for legal representation at Loudermill Hearings. Vago reiterated this on
several occasions. Vago even called Plaintiff specifically on one occasion prior to the hearing to
remind him that he could not have legal representation.
Due to the fact that Plaintiff was in a state of distress, he used his BlackBerry as an open
line and allowed a third-party to record the hearing while on speaker. Plaintiff stated facts and
shut down every materially falsified allegation that Vago and Deane presented. Plaintiffwas told
he could leave thereafter. Several days later, Vago called Plaintiff to come back for second
Loudermill Hearing, and again without legal representation. Plaintiffonce again met with Deane
and Vago inside Deane's office. It was another ambush. The defendants' deliberately and
maliciously took the evidence from Plaintiffs first Loudermill Hearing and used it as a regroup
tactic, only to see what evidence Plaintiff had to support his case, then create materially false and
fabricated circumstances to be used against Plaintiff in the second Loudermill Hearing. Deane
yelled at Plaintiff during the hearing.
Thereafter, Deane and Vago both tried to coerce Plaintiff into the backseat of an
unmarked cruiser to go to an unknown destination. Plaintiff refused and proceeded to leave 1
11
County Complex Court. Shortly thereafter between April 10 and 11, 2009, Plaintiffs home was
victimized by a hate crime believed to be carried out by the defendants'. On April 13, 2009,
Plaintiff was alerted by County Benefits Manager Donna Schneider that the County had
terminated Plaintiffs employment that day and that what the defendants' had done was not right.
Because Plaintiff was unaware of the grievance procedures, he drove to the County
Human Resources Office where he was given a group a grievance forms. The HR Director
assigned Plaintiff Grievance No. 432. Plaintiff called Vago and requested to meet with Louis
Marshall as to Grievance Form A - First Step: Immediate Supervisor Level. Louis Marshall was
the only managing official Plaintiff had a small level of trust in at that point, but Vago rejected
the meeting with Marshall and instead arranged the meeting with Jeff King. King has recently
been found to have conspired with the defendants' during all relevant times. Plaintiff met with
King and a day shift supervisor at the Ferlazzo Building on April 15, 2015, upheld Plaintiffs
termination, and reftised to fill-in the response section of the first step so it would appear as
though Plaintiff had never taken the first step, and therefore, preventing him fi-om proceeding to
step two, violating Plaintiffs due process.
As a direct and proximate cause of the defendants' retaliatory conduct, Plaintiffhas been
denied approximately 150 job opportunities since 2009 as a result of a concealed filed in the
defendants' control bearing Plaintiffs name containing 225 materially false and defamatory
documents that is not in the possession of County's HR, but is used nonetheless as a tool to deter
Plaintiffs career prospects. Plaintiff learned of this only on November 17, 2016 through
undersigned counsel to the defendants' who sent Plaintiff and Dropbox link after the file was
given to the Federal Reserve Board (the "Board") in November 2016 under subpoena, as well as
in June of 2010, to terminate Plaintiffs employment as a direct result. The defendants' have
12
engaged in ongoing retaliatory conduct that has deprived Plaintiff ofhis clearly established rights
under state and federal laws, as well as Prince William County Anti-Discrimination Ordinances.
Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts herein.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the
court's subject matter jurisdiction. McElmurrav v. Consol. Gov't of Aususta-Richmond Cntv..
501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007). On a Rule 12(b)(1) facial attack, the court evaluates
whether the plaintiff "has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction" in the
complaint and employs standards similar to those governing Rule 12(b)(6) review. Houston v.
Marod Supermarkets. Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1335 (11th Cir. 2013).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) challenges
the adequacy of a complaint on its face. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). All reasonable inferences must
be made in favor ofplaintiffs. Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354 (4^*^ Cir. 1969); MacKethan v.
Peat. Marwick. Mitchell & Co.. 439 F. Supp. 1090 (E.D. Va. 1977). A complaint must be
sufficient "to give a defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests." Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twomblv, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to
provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for
relief that is "plausible on its face." A court must treat the complaint's factual allegations as true,
"even if doubtful in fact." Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Franks v. Ross, 313
F.3d 184, 192 (4*'' Cir. 2002). Ashcroft v. labal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In deciding a motion
13
under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached
to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference, and matters about which the court may
take judicial notice. Abhe &Svoboda. Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Under
Ashcroft V. labaL to overcome a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must have alleged facts in a
complaint which also "'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. labaL 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotingBellAtI. Corp. v. Twomblv, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF MUNICIPAL

COUNSEL AS TO THE SIX INDIVIDUAL-CAPACITY DEFENDANTS
Prince William County, Attorney's Office Concurrent Representation

of the Individual-Defendants' Violates ABA 1.7 & VSB 1.7
Plaintiff has made it clear fact that he has exposed a furtive corruption scandal involving
the individual-defendants' that he has reported with tangible evidence to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI"). It has been brought to Plaintiffs attention that the same FBI Unit received
intelligence regarding conversion of monetary fund's against several members of the Prince
William County Board of County Supervisors, where Chairman Corey A. Stewart have been
named. By no stretch of the imagination can the County Attorney's Office or any firm designated
by the Prince William County, Virginia Government represent either of the individual-
defendants' sued in their individual-capacities under this cause of action, and doing so is a direct
conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 of the American Bar Association ("ABA") and the Virginia
State Bar ("VSB").
An inherent conflict of interest arises in a § 1983 action when co-defendants in a suit are
a local government and police officers or other employees in their individual capacity, as
differing theories of liability and defenses are applicable to each defendant. "In Monell v. New
14
York City Dept. ofSoc. Sen'.. 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 56 L.Ed.2d 611, when execution of a
government's policy orlocal custom, whether made by its lawmakers orby those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury [on a plaintiff]...the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Id. 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2038.
Consequently, to avoid liability, the municipality must show that the employee acted
outside the scope ofhis duties, and thereby beyond the scope ofmunicipal policy. Mansanella v.
Keves. Jr.. et al., 613 F.Supp. 795 (D. Conn. 1985). It is well established in ABA and VSB
1.7(l)(a) and that representation of one client that will adversely affect another chent is
expressly prohibited. But the County Attorney's Office was well aware of the criminal conduct
of its Board members as well as that of the individual-defendants', and by representing the
individual-capacity defendants in this action, the Prince William County, Virginia Government
seeks to control the individual-defendants' testimony in the event this case proceeds into
discovery.
The courts universally held that the moving party bears the initial burden of going
forward with evidence sufficient establish a prima facie case that disqualification is warranted.
However, the Prince William County Attorney's Office bears the ultimate burden of proof as to
why disqualification should not take place. Arthur v. City of Galena. Kansas, et al. Not
Reported in F.Supp.2d, WL 2331920 (D. Kan. 2004). In the context of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil
rights action, Rule 1.7(b) may require different attorneys represent a municipality and
municipality officials as codefendants. Defendant County has not officially certified if the
individual-defendants were acting within the boundaries of his employment, but must do so one
way or the other in response to Plaintiffs Cross-Motion. However, an educated inference can be
15
made based on examination of the defendants' dispositive Motion. See Defs. ['] Mot. to Dismiss
"The Johnson court went on to emphasize the importance of adequately informing

individual defendants about the workings of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the potential
conflict between defenses for each defendant. The court noted that it is the
responsibility ofthe attorney and the district court to ensure that such an official is
not under the impression that representation of the individual in his official
capacity (or, as here, representation of the municipality) automatically will protect
his or her individual interest sufficiently."
"To serve these stated interests, the Johnson court "embraced" the Second
Circuit's procedure regarding conflicts of interest in section 1983 claims. This
procedure requires counsel to notify the district court and the defendants of the
potential conflict and submit to the district court for determination the issue of
whether the defendants fully understand the potential conflict and, if so, whether
the defendants choose joint representation. The court went on to note that that the
individual defendants should be told it is advisable that he or she obtain
independent counsel on ["any individual capacity claim"]. Arthur v. City of
Galena, Kansas, et al.. Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, WL 2331920 (D. Kan. 2004)
{quoting) Johnson v. Board of County Com 'rs County of Fremont, 868 F. Supp.
1226 (D. Colo. 1994).
The Sixth Circuit has held that district courts must rule on motions for disqualification
prior to ruling on dispositive motions because the success of a disqualification motion has the
potential to change the proceedings entirely. See Bowers v. Ophthalmology Group. 733 F.3d 647,
WL 5763173 (6*'^ Cir. 2013) {Conflict of interest required disqualification of opposing counsel).
Thus, justice so requires the disqualification of municipal counsel under the instant cause of
action alleging § 1983 constitutional tort violations against the County in its official capacity and
the individual defendants each in their individual capacities. Manânella v. Keves, 613 F.Supp.
795, (D. Conn. 1985)
"A municipality may avoid liability by showing that the employee was not acting
within the scope of his official duties, because his official duties would be
pursuant to municipal policy. The employee, by contrast, may partially or
completely avoid liability by showing that he was acting within the scope of his
official duties. If he can show that his actions were pursuant to an official policy,
he can at least shift part of his liability to the municipality, if he is successful in
16
asserting a good faith immunity defense, the municipality may be wholly liable
because it [c]annot assert the good faith immunity of its employees as a defense to
a section 1983 action." Owen v. Citv ofIndependence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S. Ct.
1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). See alsoDunton v. County ofSuffolk 729 F.2d 903,
907 (2"'' 1984); Ricciuti. et al. v. New York Transit Authority, et ai, 796
F.Supp.84 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Plaintiffs Cross-Motion is procedurally required under consequential circumstances such
as this where it is a plaintiffs duty to put an Honorable Court on notice of defendants['] fiirtive
conduct. The DC Circuit held that "because a claim of counsel's conflict of interest calls into
question the integrity of the process in which the allegedly conflicted counsel participates, the
court should resolve a motion to disqualify counsel before it turns to the merits of a dispositive
motion." Grimes v. District of Columbia, 794 F.3d 83, WL 4430157, (D.C. Cir. 2015). "The
grant of a motion to disqualify counsel serves to "resolve an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action." S^ In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum
Products Antitrust Litisation, 658 F.2d 1355,1981-2 Trade Cases P 64,323 (1981).
Co-Defendants' Charlie T. Deane, Stephan M. Hudson,

Timothy Rudy, Scott A. Vago, Jay Lanham, Michael A. Femald
Are Sued In fOlnlv In Their Individual-Capacities
Here, each of the individual-defendants' are either current or former Departmient officials
sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, each in his personal capacities. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
237-238, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1686-1687, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). In contrast, defendant County is sued
in its official-capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. S^ Compl. 3-4. Monell v. New York City
Dept. ofSocial Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035, n. 55, 56 L.Ed.2d 611
(1978). "As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an
official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as suit against the entity."
Kentucky, dba Bureau of State Police v. Graham, et al., 473 U.S. 159, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87
L.Ed2d 114, 53 USLW 4966 (1985); {quoting) Brandon v. HoU, 469 U.S. 464, 105 S. Ct. 873, 83
17
L.Ed.2d 878 (1985); Garcia v. Dallas Police Dept.. Not Reported in F. Supp.2d, WL 5433502
(2013) holding that "an official capacity claim is merely another way of pleading an action
against the entity." The Supreme Court has held that "there is no longer a need to bring official-
capacity actions against local government officials, for under MonelL infra, local governments
can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief. S^, e.g., Memphis Police
Dept. V. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).
The defendants' diversionary tactic of preposterously alleging that they are unaware of
which of Plaintiff s claims are intended for which defendant is fatally rebutted by the irrefutable
facts of the Complaint. See Compl.Û 3-5, 34-54. In Owen, the court held that the municipality
[cjannot assert a good faith immunity defense on the behalf of the individual-capacity defendant
in a § 1983 action. See supra note. All defendants' have been implicated in a criminal conspiracy
that warrants disqualification as to individual-capacity defendants'. Moreover, additional
witnesses are likely to come forward regarding this civil action that would create additional
conflicts of interests. The individual-capacity defendants have not asserted any such defense to
immunity unlike Defendant County who has attempted to assert sovereign immunity defenses as
to Plaintiffs state law claims. County can assert no such defense immunities on the individual-
defendants' behalf because they are being sued only in their personal capacities. Here, the
individual-capacity defendants' are each represented by municipal government attomey[s]
personally, and a deliberate conflict of interest is established in direct violation of ABA and VSB
Model Rule 1.7.^
^ In Monell v. Dept. ofSoc. Serv. of City ofNew York, the Supreme Court concluded that local
government units are "among those persons to whom section 1983 applies.... [and] can be sued
directly under section 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here,the
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers."
18
"A suit against a government official in his or her personal capacity cannot lead to
imposition of fee liability on the government under civil rights attorney fee
statute; victory in a personal-capacity action is a victory against the individual
defendant, rather than against the entity that employs him and unless a distinct
cause of action is asserted against the entity itself, the entity is not even a party to
a personal-capacity lawsuit and has not opportunity to present the defense."
Velazauez-Velez v. Molina-Rodri2uez, 235 F.Supp.3d 358, WL 395105 (D.P.R.
2017).
Defendants' sued in their individual-capacities cannot undermine clearly established
rulings of the courts and the Model Rules of the ABA and the VSB by undergirding their
personal-capacity claims to those of official-capacity defendants' under joint municipal
government representation. Disqualification of counsel is appropriate considering the various
circumstances and claims situated within the instant cause of action. Novce v. Citv of lola.
Kansas, Not Reported in F. Supp. WL 41399 (D. Kan. 1990).
II. PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS^
436 U.S. 658, 690, S. Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). In MonelL the plaintiffs were a
class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Education of
the City of New York suing under section 1983 for injunctive and monetary relief for being
forced as a matter of official policy to take unpaid leave of absence when pregnant but before
such leaves were required for medical reasons. The complaint named as defendants the Board
and its chancellor, and the City of New York and its Mayor. The individual defendants were sued
solely in their official capacities.
As a corollary to its holding that local governments may be sued under section 1983, the
Supreme Court [e]xpressly recognized that "local government officials sued in their official
capacities are [also] 'persons' under section 1983 in those cases in which, as here, a local
government would be [suable in its own name]." Id. at 690 n. 55, 98 S. Ct. at 2035 n. 55. In so
doing, it found that official capacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an
action against an entity of which an officer is an agent," particularly at the local level "where
Eleventh Amendment considerations do not control [the] analysis." Id. Goldberg v. Whitman Jr..
as Town Manager, et ai. 740 F. Supp. 118 (D. Conn. 1989).
^ Because the six individual-capacity defendants' each have failed raise a qualified immunity
defense in their dispositive Motion, the Court would not have to consider evaluation of an
immunity prior to denying the defendants' Motion. The defendants' have requested that the
Court ["not"] covert their Motion to Dismiss into one for summary judgment. Murphv v. Bitsoih.
320 F.Supp.2d 1174, WL 1237275 (D.N.M. 2004). Defs ['] Mot. to Dismiss H 3. ^ notes.
19
The defendants' have, in every regard, failed to challenge or directly refute the
allegations ofthe Complaint and they now forfeit that right. The defendants' dispositive Motion
makes a direct request that their Motion [n]ot beconsidered for conversion to summary judgment
on the merits. ^ infra notes. The 17 causes of actions are properly distributed amongst the
defendants' as Counts 1-8 are Title VII and ADA claims against County and Prince William
County, Virginia Police Department "agency head" Barry M. Barnard, Chief of Police, in their
official-capacities as the [o]nly proper defendants', and which is requisite by law under 42
U.S.C. 2000e. et seq. See Compl. 34-41. Plaintiffs Section 1983 constitutional tort claims
alleging deprivations of his civil liberties under color of law are properly posited against
defendants' Deane, Vago, Hudson, Lanham, Femald and Rudy in their individual-capacities, and
County in its official-capacity. InMonelL the Supreme Court made it perfectly clear that naming
govermnent officials in their official-capacities was no longer required to bring suit against the
municipality in its official-capacity under section 1983, but instead the municipality could be
sued undersection 1983 in its own name. Seesupra. Plaintiffhas donejust that in his Complaint,
and all he needed was to establish that the six individual-capacity defendants' were acting on the
behalfof Defendant County. See Compl. 41-46. That leaves the Commonwealth of Virginia
state law claims against Defendant County. S^ Compl. 46-52. Even the defendants'
themselves actually address as to which defendants' the claims belong, because from County's
Fennell v. Marion Independence School Dist.. 804 F.3d 398, WL 5944434 (5^*^ Cir. 2015)
(Individual-capacity defendants failing to assert qualified immunity, thus waiving that defense).
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges continuing conduct of the individual-capacity defendants so

atrocious, so vile, that the continuing conduct violates Plaintiffs clearly establishedstatutory and
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known or know to be wrongful.
The individual-capacity defendants are guaranteed no qualified immunity defense. Hublick v.
County ofOtseso, Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, WL 495403 (E.D. Mi. 2014).
20
dispositive Motion, they seek a sovereign immunity defense on those claims that Plaintiff will
thoroughly address in this Opposition. infra.
1. Plaintiffs Title VII And ADA Claims Are Cognizable As A Matter Of Law
Examining the Motion to Dismiss liberally, defendants' are arguably purporting that
Plaintiffs Title VII and ADA claims have been brought against the individual defendants', in
which those claims are only against defendants' County and Barry M. Barnard.
Here, the defendants' rely on jurisdictional prerequisites, but Plaintiff meets and or
exceeds that threshold. See Compl. Pg. 35 232, '^Plaintiffhasfiled this action under Title VII
within ninety (90) days of "receipt" ofhis "Notice ofSue Rights" from the EEOC. " S^ Tiberio
V. Allergy Asthma Immunolosy ofRochester, 664 F.3d 35, 25 A.D. Cases 629 (2"^^ Cir. 2011). In
Tiberio, the Court issued a presumption notice that plaintiffs are presumed to have ["received"]
their notice of sue right letters in the mail 3 days from the date on the letter, giving plaintiffs 93
days to file their claims into court. In this case, Plaintifffiled the instant action on day ninety two
(92), well within the boundaries of the statute of limitations for his claims.^ Additionally,
Plaintiff has alleged discriminatory, retaliatory and harassing conduct all throughout his
^ In order to be timely, a claim under the ADA must be filed in federal district court within 90
days of the claimant's receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1) (specifying that a Title VII action must be brought within 90 days of the claimant's
notification of her right to sue); id. § 12117(a) (applying the Title VII limitations period to
claims brought under the ADA).^ There is a presumption that a notice provided by a government
agency was mailed on the date shown on the notice. S^ Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84
F.3d 522, 526 (2"^^ Cir.1996) (citing Baldwin Cntv. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 &
n.l (1984)). There is a further presumption that a maileddocument is received three days after its
mailing. See id. at 525. The initial presumption is not dispositive, however, "[i]f a claimant
presents sworn testimony or other admissible evidence from which it could reasonably be
inferred either that the notice was mailed later than its typewritten date or that it took longer than
three days to reach her by mail." Id. at 526.
21
Complaint dating before his January 22, 2009 constructive discharge to the present, and those
facts are well posited.
The dispositive Motion now gets widely counterproductive and critically insufficient on
the misrepresentation offacts it seeks to allege. Although Plaintiff asserts only his Title VII and
ADA claims under EEOC Charge No. 570-2017-00449, it is axiomatic that both Plaintiff and the
defendants' have provided evidence that exhaustion of administrative remedies has taken place
prior to Plaintiff filing those claims into this Honorable Court. See Compl. ^ Exhibit A.
Therefore, dismissal of the claims under either Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) would not apply.
A. Plaintiffs Title VII And ADA Claims Are Covered Under The "Continuing
Violations Doctrine^' Burlinston Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.. v. White, (2006)
Due to the sporadic nature of the defendants' dispositive Motion, Plaintiff is unaware
which EEOC charge the defendants' are referring to, or are seeking relief from. However,
Plaintiff will address both although he only brings his Title VII and ADA claims under the
continuing violations doctrine under the latter EEOC charge (570-2017-00449). Where, the
defendants' seek to allege that Plaintiff failed to bring suit in 2009 after having received the
December 2009 "right-to-sue letter", they fail on the merits. Here's why: (1) the defendants'
violent and hostile conduct against Plaintiff was ongoing and which placed Plaintiff in direct fear
of his life. The defendants' would go to the workplace (federal contractor) of Plaintiffs
girlfriend in Ballston Commons 2009, and harass her so badly until she was removed from
employment with good reference and at no fault of her own. The relationship between Plaintiff
and his girlfriend quickly eroded following her loss of employment as a direct result of the
defendants' vile and malicious conduct. Immediately following her job loss, Plaintiffs girlfriend
immediately fled to another state in fear and as a direct result of the defendants' vile and
malicious conduct toward her and Plaintiff In more direct terms. Plaintiff was and still is in
22
direct fear of his life and the lives of his family members and at all relevant times was and still is
under state of severe emotional distress requiring psychological treatment. The EEOC and the
courts have all expressly recognized that retaliatory conduct can be so pervasive and severe that
it would otherwise prevent complainants/plaintiffs from either filing a complaint or moving
forward in the process. See supra notes H1. The defendants' placed GPS tracking devices on
Plaintiffs personally owned vehicle and the personally owned vehicle of his ex-girlfriend
without probable cause and without warrant(s) signed by a judge of competent jurisdiction. The
defendants' through conspiracy have run physical (dynamic) surveillance as late as March of
2017 and static surveillance on residence located at 393 Malvem Lakes Circle, Apt., 101,
Fredericksburg, Virginia 22406 ofthe same month. The defendants' have not reftited the facts of
the Complaint.
(2) The defendants' explicitly admit that the 2009 events did if fact occur and chose not
to challenge the merits of the Complaint, considering the fact that the defendants' pretextual
discriminatory and prohibited retaliatory actions continued beyond 2008-2009, and into 2010-
2017, thereby precluding dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Defs [*]
Mot. to Dismiss 110. ["Therefore, there are no actionable Title VII or ADA claims arising (from
the events in 2009.)] Emphasis added.
(3) Next, the defendants dispositive Motion in inconceivably inconclusive due to the fact
that they do not draw from the facts upon which the Complaint is posited. Plaintiffs Complaint
displays a complete timeline of facts alleging prohibited discrimination, retaliation, and
harassment even before his constructive discharge occurred, to present time. The defendants'
Motion makes reference to 2009 claims under EEOC charge no. 846-2009-16423, when they
have altogether failed in every regard to address the 2009 and subsequent Title VII and ADA
23
continuing violation claims associated with EEOC charge no. 570-2017-00449 . But here, the
defendants' now attempt to falsely purport that Plaintiffs latter EEOC charge (2017) relates to
records they gave to Plaintiffs former employer back in 2010. Plaintiff will now address the
innumerable inadequacies of the defendants' dispositive Motion.
"In order to establish a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in
a protected activity; (2) her employer was aware of this activity; (3) she suffered an adverse
action; and (4) a causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and the protected
activity. Kessler v. Westchester County Dep't ofSocial Services, 461 F.3d 199, 205-206 (2"^ Cir.
2006). Filing a claim to complain of a violation is a "protected activity" (see e.g. Devine v.
Whelan, 1993 WL 350049 *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1993, Preska, J)). The causal relationship element may
be established by circumstantial evidence, including that the adverse action followed closely in
time after the plaintiffs engaged in protected activity. Gordon v. New York City Board of
Education.. 232 F.3d 111,117 (2"'' Cir. 2000)." Plaintiff has met this threshold.
In Burlinston Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. the Supreme Court enhanced the ruling
of the Robinson court by holding that the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964 extend post-employment. See Burliniston Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.
V. White, 548. U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.. 519
U.S. 337, 346, 117 S. Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808. The fatal flaw that plagues the defendants'
dispositive Motion is that Robinson (1997) and Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co
(2006) both predates the defendants' illegal conduct as alleged in the Complaint and is
prohibitive by clearly established law. Plaintiff has met the burden of showing that the
defendants' actions are materially adverse and pretextual. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White. 548. U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006); {quoting) Rochon
24
V. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The prohibited retaliatory conduct based on
Plaintiffs whistleblowing and protected activity did not stop after Plaintiffs January 22, 2009
constructive discharge. It is a severe and ongoing matter to the date of this Opposition, and to
prove this point Plaintiff respectfully refers this Honorable Court to the Plaintiffs Exhibits
attached herewith.
From the very beginning, the defendants' admit that they issued a Notice of Charges
dated January 29, 2009, the day after Plaintiff filed the stolen firearm report with County Officer
Kucera, and the day after Plaintiff notified Kucera of the filed EEOC Intake Questionnaire. The
defendants' admit that Plaintiff was given the Notice of Charges on January 31, 2009. The
defendants' have failed to refute the facts of the Complaint alleging that the adverse action
against Plaintiff after he filed the stolen firearm report and had contacted the EEOC was
retaliatory.
Plaintiffs pretext retaliatory termination took place on 4-13-2009 and the defendants'
concede that point. But now Plaintiff move to Exhibit A1 showing that on 8-17-2009 gave
Plaintiff a negative reference to the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department and
provided a strike-through on all sections that require comments. Exhibit A2 shows that on 11-17-
2009, the defendants' supplied the Office of Personnel Management ("0PM") with fabricated
and materially false reference materials in retaliation for Plaintiffs protected activity. Exhibit A3
dated June 4, 2010 is explicit in showing that the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (the
"Board") terminated Plaintiff on June 7, 2010 as a direct result of the false reference the
defendants' submitted to Plaintiffs former employer. Not only that. Exhibit A3 continues to
show that Plaintiff was visibly placed on restriction and the Board sought to have Plaintiffs
unemployment benefits denied based on the fabricated materials it received from the
25
defendants'. Exhibit A4 shows that on September 27, 2010 and after a favorable interview,
Plaintiff was denied an employment opportunity with GEICO who conducted a prior
employment background inquiry with the defendants', who provided a retaliatory and materially
false reference.
Exhibit A5 proves that Plaintiffs former employer, Norfolk Southern Railway, refused to
rehire Plaintiff in an email dated October 15, 2011, citing background issues after it received a
materially false reference from the defendants'. Exhibit A6 proves that the D.C. Dept' of
Corrections reftised to hire Plaintiff due to the defendants retaliatory and materially false job
reference after Plaintiff had passed all other hiring criteria. Dated January 4, 2012, Exhibit A7
proves that based on the defendants' retaliatory job reference of Plaintiff, his former employer,
G4S (formerly Wackenhut), deemed him ineligible for reemployment. Plaintiffresigned from the
Wackenhut (G4S) U.S. Dept' of Justice contract as a Special Deputy U.S. Marshal in good
standing to become a police officer for Prince William County. Plaintiff reminds this Honorable
Court that the exhibits listed under Exhibits A all cover 2009 to 2017 and are all within 300 days
of the other, making them continuing violations as the law allows. However, Plaintiff has in no
way provided [all] of those records, as there are over 200 documents spanning 2009 to 2017.
The court reasoned that "[a] provision limited to employment-related actions would not
deter the many forms that effective retaliation cantake. Hence, such a limited construction would
fail to fully achieve the anti-retaliation provision's "primary purpose," namely, "[m]aintaining
unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms." Id. at 64 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil
^ In Coles V. Deltaville BoatyardLLC, et ai, 2011 WL 666050 (E.D. Va. 2011), the court found
that plaintiff s allegations that his former employer engaged in an outright campaign to ensure
that the plaintiff never worked in this proverbial town (here, industry) again constituted a prima
facie case of retaliation under both Title VII and 42 USC. 1981.
26
Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346,117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)). The defendants' fail in that
regard as previous noted.
See, e.g., Bill Johnson's Rests. Inc., v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743-44 (1983);
Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 157 (3"^ Cir. 1999) (employer
engaged in post-employment retaliatory conduct where employer filed lawsuit
against employee for breach of non-competition agreement after employee
resigned because of sex discrimination). Hernandez v. Data Svs. Int'l. Inc., 266 F.
Supp. 2d 1285 (D. Kan. 2003); Gill v. Rinker Materials Corp., No. 3:02-CV-13,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2986 *13 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (collecting cases); Blistein v.
St. John's Coll., 860 F. Supp. 256, 268 n*16 (D. Md. 1994); Stanerson v.
Colorado Boulevard Motors. Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80124 (D. Colo. 2006)
(Plaintiff allowed to amend the complaint to claim that the filing of a
counterclaim may constitute retaliation under Burlinston Northern. Court did not
address whether a non-fnvolous counterclaim may be deemed to be retaliatory);
Torres v. Gristede's Qperatins Corp., 628 F. Supp. 2d 447, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(The court held that "baseless claims or lawsuits designed to deter claimants from
seeking legal redress constitute impermissibly adverse retaliatory actions, even
though they do not arise strictly in an employment context"); Darveau v. Detecon
Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 343 (4 Cir. 2008) (Holding plaintiff asserting FLSA
retaliation claim need only allege that his employer retaliated against him by
engaging in an action "that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable
employee" because the "employer's actions ... could well dissuade a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." (citing Burlinston
Northern. 126 S. Ct. H 2409) and finding that plaintiffs allegation that his
employer filed a lawsuit against him alleging fi"aud with a retaliatory motive and
without a reasonable basis in fact or law constituted actionable retaliation).
The continuing violations doctrine is tempered by the courts equitable powers, which be
exercised to honor Title VII's remedial purpose. S^ Steward v. Mississippi Transportation
Com'n., 586 F.3d 321, WL 3366930, (5'*' Cir. 2009). Retaliatory conduct after Plaintiffs adverse
action and separation from the Department could only be reasonably related to his employment,
thus establishing causality. The courts have recognized and expressly settled such matters. In
Petroskv. the court was firm in holding that the defendants' exhibited no sufficient evidence that
the plaintiff"delayed seeking relief and the factors that ultimately defeat her attempt to invoke
the continuing violations doctrine are absent..." The court also held that "the continuing
violations doctrine Petroskv seeks to invoke for her Title VII claim is equally applicable to
27
claims brought pursuant to the ADA..." Petroskv v. New York State Dept. ofMotor Vehicles^ 72
F. Supp.2d 39, WL 1041533 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
Here, the defendants' briefly mention something regarding Plaintiffs 2017 EEOC charge
but are very vague in their attempts to elude the facts of the Complaint. Exhibit A8 is the
November 17, 2016 emails from defendants' legal counsel Jeff Notz, establishing clear and
irrefutable proof that the defendants' maintained hidden files in Plaintiffs name with one of
those files containing 225 pages of falsified and fabricated documents that the defendants' was
using to keep Plaintiff unemployed and for other retaliatory reasons. Plaintiff had never before
seen documents contained within this particular file maintained in the defendants' custody and
control prior to November 17, 2016. Undersigned Counsel to the defendants' submitted those
documents to the Board only days prior.
Even Andrea Bremier of County's Human Resources was unaware of the file as is
witnessed by the emails between her and Plaintiff in Exhibit A8. Exhibit A9 are the
commendations in Plaintiffs possession that were not contained in the files he received from the
defendants' in 2017. The defendants' also maintained several other separate files on Plaintiff
One file holds his signed and stamped resignation letters and the other holds his complaint of
discrimination dated February 6, 2009 from former legal representative Matthew Estes.
The defendants' have alleged "the Plaintiff knew that the supposedly false statements
existed, and that the statements were shared with his new employer, seven years before he filed
the 2017 EEOC charge." Defs ['] Mot. to Dismiss K 12. The manner of analysis extruded by
the defendants is proscribed as a matter of law. The defendants' fabricated and falsified
circumstances documents, files and reports, maintained a complete and separate file containing
225 documents that not even Human Resources was aware existed, and from 2009 to present.
28
used that obfuscated file to damage Plaintiffsjob prospects in retaliation for Plaintiffs protected
activity. The defendants' should recognize that each time the materially false records are
transferred to another party, it constitutes a continuing violation, even if they records were given
to the same party once before, as is the case with the Board. When defendants' Counsel gave the
hidden file containing 225 materially false character damaging documents to the Board in
November of 2016, it was out of ongoing severe retaliation, harassment, discrimination due to
Plaintiffs race, disability and protected activity.
The defendants' are infatuated with Plaintiff; they are in fact obsessed with Plaintiff, as if
they have a blood thirst for pure enjoyment of torture and the thrill of the hunt. The defendants'
will not stop their retaliatory assault on Plaintiff out of pure evil, callousness and some
misguided sense of self worth. This Honorable Court can draw upon the inference of what it
must have been like when Plaintiffwas employed with by the defendants'; the aggravated torture
and retaliation of being assigned to desk duty for a week at a time without explanation, when
other similarly situated White officers were not.
Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, WL 1879011 (3"* Cir. 2003) {''Constructive discharge
resultingfrom supervisor harassment is "tangible employment action."")', "[C]o-workers, as well
as supervisors, can cause the constructive discharge of an employee." Cherry v. Menard. Inc.,
101 F.Supp.2d 1160, WL 789599. Moreover, Plaintiffs ADA claims are encompassed in the
latter EEOC charge of discrimination. The defendants' were on notice of Plaintiffs disability
since his date of hire. Exhibit B. (Disability displayed on Prince William County, Virginia
Police Department identification card).
Defendant's County and Barnard may have one availing affirmative defense that could
shield them from liability. In Burlington Industries. Inc. v. Ellerth. the Supreme Court held that
29
the employer could avoid liability by showing by preponderance of evidence that it exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly and sexually harassing behavior and employee
unreasonably failed to use preventive or corrective measures provided by employer. Burlinston
Industries. Inc. v. Ellerth. 524 U.S. 724, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). But County and Barnard never
asserted an affirmative defense alleging such fallacies, and even if they did, the pleading
standards would be too great for such a defense to survive the merits of the Complaint, as well as
the facts alleged herein.
2. Plaintiffs Section 1983: 1985 And 1986 Claims Are Cumulative Under The Continuing
Violations Doctrine. Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont. Illinois, et aL
520 F.3d 797. 801 (7^'' Cir. 2008)
Plaintiffs constitutional tort law claims enjoy the same cumulative shield from dismissal
as the Title VII and ADA claims and are directlyrelated. Each individual act of retaliation by the
defendants' constitutes a trespass on Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional rights, and
where the defendants' would assume that Plaintiffs statute of limitations has run its course as to
his constitutional tort claims, they fail in their analysis.
When the continuing violations doctrine is applied to Title VII and ADA claims, the
courts automatically apply the doctrine to constitutional tort claims that are proximate cause of
the ongoing retaliatory conduct. S^ Cornwell v. Robinson. 23 F.3d 694, WL 172299, (2"'' Cir.
1994). The same is true for Plaintiffs claims under sections 1985 and 1986. See Stron2 v. HMA
Fentress County General Hospital. LLC.. 194 F.Supp.3d 685, WL 3688888 (M.D. Tenn. 2016)
[holding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct for IIED].
Here, Plaintiff has established that on January 28, 2009 when he filed the stolen firearm
report and had noticed Officer Kucera that he had filed his EEOC intake questionnaire, the
defendants' were on notice of Plaintiffs protected activity. Also, in Plaintiffs Complaint, he
30
respectfully reminds this Honorable Court that on January 23, 2009, defendant Vago, through
Plaintiffs immediate supervisor, Louis Marshall, threatened to get larceny arrest warrants and to
withhold Plaintiffs last paycheck, if Plaintiffdid not return the three remaining uniform items
and active cases thatsame day. See Compl. ^ Exhibit C. Therefore, Plaintiff could not have been
employed with the Department because on January 22, 2009, the day Plaintiff constructively
discharged and immediately following the illegal search of his residence, the defendants'
forcefully removed [all] of Plaintiffs Department issued uniforms from his residence, minus the
three items that were in the trunk of Plaintiffs car that he returned the night of January 23, 2009.
See Compl. Exhibits. After the January 28, 2009 protected activity and stolen firearm report is
when the defendants' generated the fabricated Notice of Charges dated January 29, 2009, which
Plaintiff received on January 31, 2009 by United States Postal Service.
The courts have long recognized that ongoing retaliation as a direct result of employees
who engage in protected activity, and under those dire circumstances gave birth to the anti-
relation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and applicable case law. When the
defendants' altered Wheelers report on January 28, 2009 and fabricated the Notice of Charges on
January 29, 2009, they did so out of retaliation and it direct violation of Plaintiffs
constitutionally protected rights protected by the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court says
so. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 578 U.S. , 194 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2016).
Heffernan was a landmark case where on April 26, 2016, the Supreme Court expressly held that
"In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be 'affirmatively shown that the
official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs rigjits.'" Wrisht v.
Collins. 166 F.2d 841. 850(4"' Cir. 1985) (quoting Vinnedee v. Gibbs. 550 F.2d 926. 928 (4"'
Cir. 1977)). When the constitutional violation at issue is termination without sufficient process,
the plaintiff must prove that the named defendants "singly or in combination caused or
contributed to [the] denial of [the plaintiffs] property rights without due process of
law." Garraffhtv v. Virginia. Deo't of Corrections. 52 F.3d 1274. 1280 (4*'' Cir. 1995).
31
public employees who engage in protected activity can bring actions against employers that
retaliate as a direct result of the employees engagement in protected activity. But defendants'
County and each of the individual-capacity defendants' are not shielded from Plaintiff bringing
his First Amendment claims under amendment."
In Heffernan, the Supreme Court relied on one of its prior cases, Waters v. Churchill
(1994), which predates the defendants' retaliatory conduct. The Supreme Court held, ["We
conclude that, as in Waters, the government's reason for demoting Heffeman is what counts
here. When an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from
engaging in political activity that the First Amendment protects, the employee is entitled to
challenge that unlawful action under the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983—even if, as
here, the employer maJces a factual mistake about the employee's behavior."] Heffernan v. City_
of Paterson. 136 S. Ct. 1412, 578 U.S._, 194 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2016); ^ Waters v.
ChurchilL 511 U.S. 661, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 128 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1994). From the very time that
Plaintiff began reporting internal misconduct during his employment at the Department and had
filed his stolen firearm report and Intake Questionnaire with the EEO on January 28, 2009, he
had engaged in protected free speech under Waters. The fact that the Prince William County
Human Rights Commission claims to have alleged to have lost Plaintiffs complaint and file "in
the shuffle" and not even notify Plaintiff, was another deliberate act to suppress Plaintiffs
protected free speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Plaintiff
" During the Loudermill Hearing with defendants' Vago and Deane, Plaintiff was not allowed to
have any legal representation present in Deane's Office. Defendant Deane unprovokedly yelled
at Plaintiff who was in direct fear of his physical safety. Vago and Deane both then tried to lure
Plaintiff into the backseat of an unmarked police cruiser to which Plaintiff rejected. By law.
Plaintiff repeatedly attempted to take advantage of processes that were available to him, but
Plaintiffs circumstances are severe and life threatening. Root v. County ofFairfax. 371 F.Appx.
432, 434 (4"^ Cir. 2010).
32
has a right to amend to reflect those claims on motion. Each cumulative event where the
defendants' had engaged in retaliatory conduct to the present represents continuing violations,
especially since knowledge of the hidden file in the defendants' custody and control has become
known.
Now, Plaintiff addresses Fourth Amendment violations causal to the Title VII and ADA
claims. As explicitly address in the Complaint, the defendants' attached global positioning
devices ("GPS") to Plaintiffs from 2008 to as late as March 2017. That is factual. Plaintiffs
next door neighbor identified a White blond haired male retrieve what she regarded as a "black
box" from underneath the driver's side of Plaintiffs personally owned vehicle in June 2009.
Plaintiff immediate moved to Stafford County wherejurisdictional boundaries have not thwarted
the defendants' ongoing vile and malicious retaliatory conduct. The defendants' themselves
allege that in 2008, they were under suspicion that Plaintiff was abusing "anabolic steroids" in
their dispositive Motion but state nothing further on that subject and have provided no evidence
to support it as fact. It is fact that in February 2009, the defendants accessed Plaintiffs private
email after gaining the password during the illegal search of Plaintiffs residence on January 22,
2009. The defendants' downloaded a photograph of a prior female acquaintance of Plaintiff and
placed it on the front door of Plaintiffs current (at that time) girlfriend. The neighbor identified a
White blond haired male, wearing blue jeans, tan jacket, firearm on right hip, driving a late
model Ford Explorer.
"Generally, courts recognize two types of continuing violations: serial or systemic. The
serial continuing violation is manifested in a series of related and continuing discriminatory acts,
whereas the systemic continuing violation is usually found in an ongoing discriminatory policy
or system." S^ Moseke v. Miller & Smith. Inc.. 202 F.Supp.2d 494 (E.D. Va. 2002) quoting
33
Deck V. City of Toledo. 56 F.Supp.2d 886 (N.D. Ohio 1999). In Havens, the Supreme Court
applied the continuing violations doctrine to violations that fell outside the statute of limitations
because they manifested in a number of relate incidents. See Havens Realty Corporation v.
Coleman. 455 U.S. 363, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). As a direct, the defendants'
joint Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
3. Plaintiffs State Law Claims Are Properly Posited
A. The defendants' misinterpret legal prescription set forth in the Virginia Human Rights
Act ("VHRA"). Plaintiffs VHRA claims are properly alleged against Defendant County.
Plaintiff respectfully request that this Honorable Court notice of Virginia Code Ann. § 15.2-965
which derives its authority from the VHRA and so does the Prince William County Human
Rights Commission. •
Virginia Code Ann.§ 15.2-965. Human flights Ordinances and Commissions.

A. Any locality may enact an ordinance, not inconsistent with nor more stringent
than any applicable state law, prohibiting discrimination in housing, employment,
public accommodations, credit, and education on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, national origin, age,
marital status, or disability. B. The locality may enact an ordinance establishing a
local commission on human rights which shall havethe powers and duties granted
by the Virginia Human Rights Act (§ 2.2-3900 et seq.). 1987, c. 569, § 15.1-
37.3:8; 1997, cc. 404, 587.
Virginia Code Ann. § 2.2-3900. Short Title; Declaration of Policy.

A. This chapter shallbe known and cited as the Virginia Human Rights Act. B. It
is the policy of the Commonwealth to:
1. Safeguard all individuals within the Commonwealth fi*om unlawful
discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions, age, marital status, or disability, in places
of public accommodation, including educational institutions and in real estate
transactions; in employment; preserve the public safety, health and general
welfare; and further the interests, rights and privileges of individuals within the
Commonwealth; and 2. Protect citizens of the Commonwealth against unfounded
charges of unlawful discrimination. 1987, c. 581, §§ 2.1-714, 2.1-715; 1997,
c. 404; 2001, c. 844.
Virginia Code Ann. § 2.2-3901. Unlawful Discriminatory Practice and

Gender Discrimination Defined.
34
Conduct that violates any Virginia or federal statute or regulation governing

discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, age, marital status, or
disability shall be an "unlawful discriminatory practice" for the purposes of this
chapter.
The terms "because of sex or gender" or "on the basis of sex or gender" or terms
of similar import when used in reference to discrimination in the Code and acts of
the General Assembly include because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth
or related medical conditions. Women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all purposes as persons not so
affected but similar in their abilities or disabilities.
1987, c. 581, § 2.1-716; 1991, c. 457; 1997, c. 404; 2001, c. M4; 2005, c. m.
The defendants' escape to only a single section of the VHRA where they seek dismissal
of the state law claims against County. The construct of the VHRA is rather encompassing and
Prince William County Ordinances infra revert back to state law provisions covered under the
VHRA.
Prince William County Code, Chapter 10.1, Human Rights

Sec. 10.1-4. Unlawful discriminatory practice defined.
Conduct that violates any Virginia or federal statute or regulation goveming
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age,
marital status, familial status or disability shall be an "unlawful discriminatory
practice" for the purposes of this chapter. (Ord. No. 92-79, 9-1-92; No. 99-30, 5-
4-99)
Sec. 10.1-5. Unlawful discrimination.

Pursuant to the authority contained in § 15.1-37.3:8, (§ 15.2-965) Virginia Code
Ann. it shall be unlawful and a violation of this chapter for any person,
partnership, corporation or other entity as may be defined in any applicable
Virginia or federal statute or regulation goveming discrimination to engage in an
unlawfiil discriminatory practice. The human rights commission created by this
chapter shall have jurisdiction to enforce this chapter and all state and federal
laws and regulations goveming discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, age, marital status or disability. (Ord. No. 92-79, 9-1-92)
As mentioned in the Complaint, the Prince William County Human Rights Commission
("HRC") deliberately sidetracked Plaintiffs formal complaint against the defendants' then
alleged the file to be lost in the shuffle. It wasn't until October of 2009 that Plaintiff leamed that
the HRC had not even initiated an investigation against the defendants'. The defendants'
35
collectively prevented Plaintiffs HRC claims from moving forward in the process and Plaintiff
properly alleges his VHRA claim against Defendant County.
B. Plaintiffs State Law Whistle Blower Protections
Here, Defendant County could enjoy relief Plaintiffs state law whistle blower is one for
dismissal or amendment as a matter of right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, and due to the fact
that Virginia whistleblower protections under the stated statutes only extend to state employees.
C. Defendant County Has No Privilege To Sovereign Immunity Under Virginia Defamation
Law
The Defendant County claims thatbecause the materially false statements and documents
were provided to the Board in 2010, it would now be shielded from suit. County's logic fails for
several reasons. (1) County and co-defendants' created the falsified documents and file out of
retaliation for Plaintiffs protected activity and for the very purpose of sabotaging Plaintiffs
career prospects. S^ Exhibit A. (2) County obfuscated the fabricated file that contained 225
materially false documents that was given to prospective employers but was not in the custody of
its HR. (3) From 2009 to 2017, County, has sabotaged Plaintiffs career prospects by provided
retaliatory references that have kept Plaintiff unemployed since he was terminated by the Board
on June 7, 2010 as a direct result of the same fabricated records. The Board did not supply
Plaintiffwith the documents it received from County in 2010. (4) On June 7, 2016, Plaintiffwas
falsely arrested and maliciously prosecuted as a direct result of the fact that County and the co-
defendants' used the materially false employment records to coerce and conspire with a Fairfax
County Police Officer the resulted in Plaintiffs unlawful 10 day detention in the Fairfax County
Detention Center. Ni^ro v. Virginia Commonwealth University/Medical Collese of Virsinia. 492
Fed. Appx. 347, WL 2354635 (4^'^ Cir. 2012) (denying motion to dismiss on defamation claims).
By contrast to the defendants' contentions. Title VII and the ADA abrogate sovereign immunity
36
and any bad faith conduct that occurs as a direct result that violates other local, state and federal
laws would definitely not be immune from suit under bad faith, Kincaid v. Anderson, Not
Reported in F.Supp.3d, WL 3546066. The defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
D. LEOPGA Is A Matter Of Federal Question Jurisdiction 42 U.S.C. $ 1331 Violation Of

Due Process
Violations of the LEOPGA are subject to matter of Federal Question Jurisdiction for due
process violations actionable under section 1983. In the Background of this document as well as
the Complaint, Plaintiff allege facts and submits irrefutable evidence herewith. The defendants'
even admit that Plaintiffengaged in the Loudermill Hearing process although it wasjust another
set-up by the defendants' to sabotage Plaintiff.
"The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "no state shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend.
XIV § 1. "[I]n order to claim entitlement to the protections of the due process clause ~ either
substantive or procedural - a plaintiff must first show that he has a constitutionally protected
'liberty' or 'property' interest, and that he has been 'deprived' of that protected interest by some
form of 'state action.'" Stone v. Univ. ofMd. Med. Svs. Corp.. 855 F.2d 167. 172 (4^'^ Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted). If the plaintiff makes such showing, the court considers what process was
required and whether any provided was adequate in the particular factual context". Id.
Plaintiff was a non-probationary employee and had property right in employment with
County. Plaintiff was denied due process by being subjected to two separate Loudermill
Hearings, one of which was only to gather information from Plaintiff to create false
circumstances for the second hearing. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill. 470 U.S.
532, 547-48 (1985). Moreover, the fact that Jeff King upheld defendant Deane's termination of
Plaintiff and refused to sign or comment on the grievance form which would have allowed
37
Plaintiff to proceed to the next step in the grievance procedures process directly violated.
Plaintiffs due process undersection 1983. The defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
E. Plaintiffs I.I.E.D. Claim Defeats The Four-Prong Test
Plaintiffalleges and realleges the facts of the Complaint and those facts alleged herewith.
Plaintiff has alleged severe, atrocious, vile, outrageous and intolerable acts that the defendants'
have subjected him to that has cause him to undergo psychological therapy. Because of the
defendants' and the fact that they have kept Plaintifffrom employment, Plaintiffhas beensubject
to ongoing financial hardship. Plaintiffs I.I.E.D. claim is ongoing and the County has no claim
to immunity or statute of limitation. Pennell v. Vacation Reservation Center. LLC. 783
F.Supp..2d 819, WL 1791935 (E.D. Va. 2011); Daniczek v. Spencer. 156 F.Supp.3d 739, WL
153086 (E.D. Va. 2016); Marcantonio v. Duzinski. 155 F.Supp.3d 619, WL 9239009 (W.D. Va.
2015). The defendants' joint Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court deny
the defendants' Motion to Dismiss and grant his Cross-Motion Disqualifying Municipal
Government Counsel from representation of individual-capacity defendants'.
A proposed order is attached.
Date: November 13, 2017

Respectfully submitted.
/s/ Edward Richardson

Edward Richardson, Plainti
Anti-Corruption Investigat^^^ Paralegal
1819 Meadow Drive
Fredericksburg, Virginia 22405
P. 540/207-1666
E. edwardrichardson27@yahoo.com
38
CERITIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY DECLARE that on this 12^^ Day of November 2017, I sei-ved the foregoing
Plaintiffs Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for
Disqualification of Municipal Government Counsel as to Individual-Capacity Defendants' on the
following by United States Postal Service and/or electronicmail:
MICHELLE R. ROBL, ESQ.

County Attorney
JEFFREY R.B. NOTZ, ESQ.

Asst. Coimty Attorney
1 County Complex Court
Suite 240
Prince William, Virginia 22192
Legal Counselfor the Defendants^
Prince William County, Barry M.
Barnard, Stephan M. Hudson,
Timothy Rudy, Scott A. Vago,
Jay Lanliam, Michael A, Femald,
Charlie T. Deane
/s/ Edward Richardson

Edward Richardson. Plaintiff^j^
39

Alexandria Division
EDWARD RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff,
V. Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-761 -CMH-TCB

GOVERNMENT, MaL,
Defendants.
fPROPOSEDl ORDER
Defendants' have filed a joint Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffhas filed an Opposition to
the Defendants' Motion and also a Cross-Motion for Disqualification of Municipal Counsel as to
the Individual Capacity Defendants'.
Whereas the Court has considered the parties Motions, THE COURT FINDS that
Plaintiff has demonstrated that good cause exists and justice requires the grant of the Cross-
Motion, and denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Therefore, Plaintiffs Cross-Motion is GRANTED and the Defendants' Motion is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this ^day of 2017
United States District Court Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTER DISTRICT OF VIRIGINIA
DIVISION
IrL I-£rU PIaintiff(s),
V.
Civil Action Number: / 7 7<^
nveh);IhrîO^^/LA'k/
Defendant(s).
LOCAL RULE 83.1(M) CERTIFICATION
I declare under penalty ofperjury that: , zi ) • y /)

No attorney has prepared, orassisted in the preparation air/r-i r/n
, /// / • A'
aptcirl UP-i-
Name ofPro Se P2 itcrTyge)
Signatur^^^Prâ^^^
Executed on: /J"/^ (Date)
OR
The following attorney(s) prepared or assisted me in preparation of

(Title ofDocument)
(Name of Attorney)
(Address of Attorney)
(Telephone Number of Attorney)

Prepared, or assisted in the preparation of, this document
(Name of Pro Se Party (Print or Type)
Signature of Pro Se Party
Executed on: (Date)

Edward Richardson v. Prince William County Government, Et Al, EDVA 17-cv-761. Cross-Motion and Opposition To Prince William County Motion To Dismiss

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Edward Richardson v. Prince William County Government, Et Al, EDVA 17-cv-761. Cross-Motion and Opposition To Prince William County Motion To Dismiss

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Case 1:17-cv-00761-CMH-TCB Document 12 Filed 11/13/17 Page 1 of 43 PageID# 179

V. Civil Action No. l:17-cv-761-CMH-TCB

PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

V. Civil Action No. l:17-cv-761-CMH-TCB

PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

V. Civil Action No. l:17-cv-761-CMH-TCB

PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S

conduct under the "continuing violations doctrine.)

Quite contrary to the defendants' attempts to engage in deceptive wordsmithing, the

EEOC's Charge of Discrimination validates Plaintiffs retaliatory continuing violation claims as

Complaint and attached herewith is explicit.

As long as Plaintiff continued to be victimized by discriminatory, hostile and retaliatory

surreptitious criminal conduct. Pl.['s] Compl. 5-8.

Here, the defendants' continue to aggravate already widespread malevolent attacks

release the video even under Plaintiffs consent.

William CountyGeneral District Court for attacking Plaintiff S^ ExhibitList. (Commonwealth

retaliatory for his engaging in protected activity.

^ The defendants' permitted and contributed to pretext conditions of discrimination in

WL 6224631 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).

Plaintiff complained of illegal discrimination and ongoing workplace harassment long

have shown that fact.

Enforcement Officer Procedural Guarantee Act ("LEOPGA"). Page 2 paragraph 3 is very

remind him that he could not have legal representation.

yelled at Plaintiff during the hearing.

unmarked cruiser to go to an unknown destination. Plaintiff refused and proceeded to leave 1

step two, violating Plaintiffs due process.

Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts herein.

court's subject matter jurisdiction. McElmurrav v. Consol. Gov't of Aususta-Richmond Cntv..

I. PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF MUNICIPAL

Prince William County, Attorney's Office Concurrent Representation

State Bar ("VSB").

"The Johnson court went on to emphasize the importance of adequately informing

795, (D. Conn. 1985)

Plaintiffs Cross-Motion is procedurally required under consequential circumstances such

from the merits of the action." S^ In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum

Co-Defendants' Charlie T. Deane, Stephan M. Hudson,

that warrants disqualification as to individual-capacity defendants'. Moreover, additional

individual-capacity defendants' are each represented by municipal government attomey[s]

Model Rule 1.7.^

Defendants' sued in their individual-capacities cannot undermine clearly established

personal-capacity claims to those of official-capacity defendants' under joint municipal

government representation. Disqualification of counsel is appropriate considering the various

Kansas, Not Reported in F. Supp. WL 41399 (D. Kan. 1990).

II. PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS^

Plaintiffs Complaint alleges continuing conduct of the individual-capacity defendants so

thoroughly address in this Opposition. infra.

innumerable inadequacies of the defendants' dispositive Motion.

regard as previous noted.

exercised to honor Title VII's remedial purpose. S^ Steward v. Mississippi Transportation

documents to the Board only days prior.

Plaintiffs race, disability and protected activity.

other similarly situated White officers were not.

resultingfrom supervisor harassment is "tangible employment action."")', "[C]o-workers, as well

Police Department identification card).

the facts alleged herein.

defendants' constitutes a trespass on Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional rights, and

his constitutional tort claims, they fail in their analysis.

[holding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct for IIED].