A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report

Mangal Chandra Jain Kagzi*

ON 26 JANUARY, 1970, two decades of the present constitutional era

were completed. Though a small period in the life of the nation, yet a
great manj constitutional developments were witnessed during this period.
Not only the Constitution established the Union of India, it also provided
the rock bottom foundations for the sovereign democratic republic by
establishing the great institutions of the nation. This is not to say that
the Union of India has entirely got rid of stresses and strains of the new
emerging social order, challenges of the great emerging democratic society,
pains of developmental and planning compulsions, dangers of external
aggression and internal disturbances, and hopes and fears of the people's
resolve to implement the inalienable national objective of territorial and
emotional integration and strivings of the new social order on the ruins of
the old feudal and underdeveloped society under subjection of the British
till 15 August, 1947. In the various aspects of the national life, for
instance, the storms of centre-state relations have been raging in the cup of
the Union; but it is to the intrinsic strength of the constitutional system
that the Union has weathered the storms. Threats to the solidarity and
integrity of the Union might not be imminent; but the debates have
frequently been held wherein often the basic assumptions of the constitu­
tional system have been doubted and the established patterns of the centre-
state relations challenged, if not entirely repudiated. It has been held out
that the Union is federal; and to utter ignorance of history and the proces­
ses of the Constitution-making in the country, the idea of federalism has
been taken to be the same as implemented in the systems of some foreign
lands, in particular, the Constitution of the United States of America.
Even if by and large the authority of the framers to make the Constitution
has not been questioned, the principles and procedures rejected by the
Constituent Assembly after full discussion and earnest deliberation have
often been raised over and over again in certain quarters. Indeed it has
often been witnessed that the true historical and evolutionary perspectives

* Reader. Faculty of Law, Delhi University, Delhi,

256 Constitutional Developments Since Independence

have more often been missed; and it has been more often than not forgot­
ten that the constitutions of no two countries are the same. The compari­
sons do not go far; and should merely help appreciate the unique peculia­
rities of the constitutional systems in the background of the national
history, aspirations, ideals, values and needs for national consolidation,
and the imperatives of social and economic development of the two
countries.

For the major part of the period under review the debate on the
centre-state relations wasless than acrimonious because, the political power
was held, both at the Centre and the state levels by the same party which
could also take the credit to have played a near decisive role in the
Constitution-making. The instances, if any, when this party was out of
office in the states were few, in respect of the States of Kerala and Orissa.
The National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir did not differ much
from the Congress Party and that state too could unmistakenly be said to
be under its sway. The non-Congress parties especially the Communist
Marxist Party after the split in the Communist Party of India in the State
of Kerala, and the state parties like the DMK (Dravida Munnetra
Kazhgam) of Tamil Nadu (formerly, Madras State) in the South and the
Akalis in the North, all post-Independence parties generated heat in the
centre-state relations debate after assuming offices, of course, for brief
periods respectively, in Kerala and West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and the
Punjab. For political reasons they joined hands, and seemingly held out
that the Union which now exists was not the same as contemplated by the
Constituent Assembly. They contended that the Congress Party effected
changes in the centre-state relations in the course of its near monopoly in
political power unquestioned for long. If not by design, by considerations
of functional efficiency and absence of any effective opposition and non-
existence of any viable challenge to i:s exclusive control of power,
it did not make much of a distinction between the state and the party.
The centres of decision-making shifted to the party organs, most notably,
the Congress High Command, and Parliament and the state legis­
lature merely implemented the deiisions and policies approved by it. The
states' governments could have no separate programme, much less any
separate thinking, theory or philosophy. They would be controlled by the
party High Command in mind and action, and would have no separate
political-constitutional identity. The political and constitutional images of
the states were eclipsed by the shadows of the party units.

Be that as it may, the long spell of the Congress Party dominance was
broken following the fourth general elections held in early 1967. The
Congress was reduced to a shambles by the electoral flows. Precariously it
manoeuvred to remain in nower at the Centre: and for the first time, the
 A Critique of the Rajamctnnar Committee Report 257
country was under a government devoid of unquestioned political sway
throughout the land. The non-Congress parties and the dissident factions
of the Congress Party formed a number of coalitions—United Fronts and
Samyukt Vidhayak Dais in Bihar, Kerala, Orissa, the Punjab, Uttar
Pradesh and West Bengal; and the DMK secured an exclusive electoral
mandate in Tamil Nadu. Each one of the non-Congress parties differed
from the other and no two of them shared any common political theory or
had any shared economic programme; but all of them were united in their
anti-Congress posture. They were strange bed follows; but impelled still
to join hands against the Congress, of course, temporarily. When in office
they raised an anti-Centre hue. This was dictated by sheer political expe­
diency and their common political objective to keep themselves in office
only if they were to be suffered in control of the states for any length of
time. They thought they had to make their noisy presence felt and
maintained. The verbalists of the United Fronts in Kerala and West
Bengal raised a clamour of a loud noise and a rhetoric against the Union,
and against the so-called Union colonialism and interference in the states'
domain. Not only they protested angrily against the Union presence in the
states, but they also verbalised the high offices established by the Constitution,
particularly, that of the Governor. They raised hostile slogans against
the Governor, doubted his responsibilities and challenged his obligations and
duties entrusted to him by the Constitution, the President and the Central
Government and as the constitutional head of the state government. They
cried wolf at imaginary threats of central interference and started a quixotic
struggle against the Union for putting an end to the possible central inter­
vention and for getting the so-called states' due share in revenues and
policy formulations. They lodged strong noisy protests against the ab
extra the Central thrust into the states' domain and warned against
such intervention in the states' affairs—political, administrative and
economic.

On the contrary, the DMK had a programme, though this too

was inspired by prejudices against the Centre and by presumed ideals of
Dravidian history, the fictional Northern hegemony, the imagined Hindi
imperialism, etc. The party had a theoretical unrealistic secessionist slogan
as well which it took no time to abandon, even if for expedient reasons,
after the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1963 to be able to
contest elections, which necessitated taking of an oath to the integrity and
sovereignty of India. The. DMK decided to stand forth as an alternative
to the Congress Party in Tamil Nadu, and let its members and candidates
"bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution", as it became the
necessary prerequisite for the candidature in an election and membership
of a legislature. After the party came to power, its government pursued a
258 Constitutional Developments Since Independence

realistic Janus-faced policy in its relations with the Centre. With its front
face it spoke of cooperation and coordination so far as it would advance
the state interests with the Central Government; and did not hesitate to
evolve an electoral understanding with the Congress Party after its split in
the course of the Presidential election in 1969. With its other face, it
evolved an expansive theory of the states' rights and powers under the
Constitution; and raised a murmur against the mounting central inter­
ference in the state affairs with the Damocles' sword hung over the head of
the state government in the shape of the President's rule. It put forth a
demand for restoration of the real constitutional powers of a state govern­
ment which, it maintained, had been eclipsed by the practices and pro­
grammes pursued by the central government since the commencement of
the Constitution. So to say, it made the demand of state autonomy,
which a date remains unarticulated. The DMK spokesmen have spared
no pains to emphasise that the DMK demand for greater autonomy is
more in the nature of restoration of the rights given to the states under
the Constitution. It is different from and must be distinguished from the
autonomy demand raised by certain leaders of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir. M. Karunanidhi, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, said:
"They are not the same, though both of us (Sheikh Abdullah and me)
voice the demand for autonomy, the DMK's demand differed in many
ways." He explained the difference by referring to the rights enjoyed by
Kashmir and the powers conferred on other states by the Constitution.
He further said that no time limit had been fixed to achieve the DMK
autonomy demand. The specific points made by him from time to time
include the following :

(i) The state legislative assembly is 'sovereign' in all matters coming

within the State List.
O'O The state government is responsible to the legislature; and that
there is no provision in the Constitution which makes the state
cabinet accountable to the Union, and, as such, it would be subver­
sion of the entire scheme of the Constitution and the system of
responsible government, if a state cabinet is sought to be subject­
ed to a commission of inquiry constituted by the Union.
(Hi) The recommendation of the Administrative Reforms Commission
for appointment of the Lokpal would impinge on the state auto­
nomy as envisaged in the Constitution.
(iv) There is, nevertheless, no stage of confrontation between the
Centre and the State of Tamil Nadu.
For trying to articulate the demand for state autonomy the Government
 A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report 259

of Tamil Nadu constituted an inquiry committee in 1969 (hereinafter

referred to as the Rajamannar Committee.) This committee consisted of
three members, P.V. Rajamannar (Chairman); A.L. Mudaliar; and
P. Chandra Reddy.
The chairman is an ex-Chief Justice of the Madras High Court and a
distinguished jurist. According to the terms of reference, the committee
was to consider the entire question regarding the relationship that should
subsist between the Centre and the states in a federal set-up." They were
required to examine the constitutional provisions that had a bearing upon
the centre-state relations, their functional experience of the past years, and
also into the factors, events, circumstances and developments which in any
manner affected the centre-state relations, or else led to serious conflicts
between the Central Government and the state governments in the past
years, particularly after the fourth general elections held in the beginning
of 1967. They were directed to investigate into the attitudes, practices
and conventions Relevant to the subject-matter of the terms of reference
and adopted by the Central Government and their functionaries towards
the state governments and the responses and reactions of the state govern­
ments. Their scope of investigation included the study of the institutions,
the machineries and the procedures evolved by the Centre for excercising
their powers. Lastly, they were called upon to suggest measures, methods
and means, both formal and informal including constitutional amendments
which they would deem necessary "to secure for the States fullest extent of
autonomy within the general framework of the Constitution, without in
any way impairing the integrity of the country".

The Rajamannar Committee submitted its report on May 27, 1971.

The subject of the centre-state relations was investigated and examined
at various other levels as well. A national convention was held in New
Delhi in April 1970; and later a symposium was organised on the same
subject in the same year. The various issues having a bearing on the
subject were studied by the Study Team of the Administrative Reforms
Commission (ARC), which too submitted a report.

Therefore, it is incumbent on us in this Seminar on "Constitutional

Developments Since Independence" that the subject be discussed at length.
The national interest demands that the opinions, views and reactions
expressed at various forums are not suppressed, but, even if unpopular, are
discussed and debated in an objective manner. The genuine doubts
should be removed, and wherever deviations from the true constitutional
mandate are noted, they be corrected on the basis of the national consen­
sus and in accordance with the procedures established by the Constitution
and law. Because the Report of the Rajamannar Committee was not
260 Constitutional Developments Since Independence
available at the time the national convention or the seminar referred to
above were held in 1970, or else at the time the matter was under consi­
deration of the ARC, it is but proper that a discussion is held over the
report of this committee which, in an important way, expresses the view
held by a party on the state powers and its government in a composite
state of the Union. The views expressed in this report should receive due
attention in the perspectives developed by the functional experience, the
felt imperatives, the conducted studies and investigations carried out by
the ARC. As the report surveys a wide area, an attempt is made in
this paper to delimit the study, and to confine the discussion only to
certain issues pertaining to three heads, namely, (i) legislative relations;
(i7) financial relations, and (iii) administrative relations.

II
The scheme and the pattern of distribution of legislative powers
detailed in Part XI chapter 1 of the Constitution by and large stood the
test of times. The plan sets the guidelines for the power structure and
relations—legislative as well as the executive between the Union and the
states. It lays stress more on power sharing than upon power distribu­
tion—a concept deemed essential by the conformist federalists. Under the
plan the power is shared; and the manner of sharing, it must be conceded,
allots the larger share to the Union. The decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Hight Courts wherein the contentions based upon ultra vires of
legislation passed by Parliament, or as the case was on occasions, by the
various state legislatures were raised, and the questions of law as to the
interpretation of the List entries were decided, clearly brought out this
aspect of the matter.1 The so-called 'sovereignty' of the states is the sove­
reignty of the enumerated powers which find articulation in the State List
entries and their judicial construction and interpretation. Within the
span of these entries, the state powers are plenary, subject only to the
opening phrases, respectively, of clause (1) of article 246 and clause (3) of
the same article. The entries are enumeratio simplex of broad categories
of legislative powers; and the state legislatures can enact laws with respect
to the subject-matters covered by such entries to the exclusion of
Parliament. Any parliamentary legislation with respect to such matters
can be enacted only under conditions and circumstances permitted and

I. Union of India v. U.S. Dhillon, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1068; Asst. Commr., Madras
v. B.C. Co., A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 162; Second G.T. Officer, Mangalore v. DM.
Hazereth, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 999; Harak Chand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970
S.C. 1453; Gujarat University v. Sri Krishna. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 703; K.C.G.
Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 375; State of Bombay v.
Narottamdas, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 69; State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, A.I.R.
1951 S.C. 318; Manofiar v. S(ate, A.I.R. Í95I S.C. 315.
 A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report 261
envisaged in the Constitution, e.g., articles 249, 250, 252, 253 (b), 356 (1)
(c) and 357. The exhaustive enumeration, the definitive precision of
66 entries of the State List, the non-obstante clauses of article 246 and the
mention of specific circumstances permitting parliamentary initiative in
respect of the State List matters leave no scope for any judicial contribution
or interpretational expansion of the state legislative powers. This does
not, in any way, mean that states' exclusive legislative powers can be
restrictively construed. The maxims and techniques evolved and applied
by the Supreme Court underlie its judicial concern for a constructive,
purposive and liberal attitude. It has received an ultra vires contention
in relation to a state law only with care and on clear cogent and substan­
tive grounds. The presumption that a state legislature passes a law that
is intra vires its powers is strong indeed; and the onus to displace it falls
squarely on one who asserts to the contrary. In aid of this presumption, the
court has habitually applied the doctrines and principles of interpretation
evolved by the Federal Court of India and the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in the Australian, Canadian and Indian matters. Under
clear specific circumstances it has, consistent with the public policy inferrable
from the Union List entries, found fit to invalidate certain state laws on
the ground, say, the coordination power in respect of determination of
educational standards in institutions of higher learning.2

The exclusive character of the Union legislative powers with respect to

the Union List matters, and the matters not enumerated in the Concurrent
List or the State List, and the preferential powers of Parliament in respect
of the matters of the Concurrent List were not only recognised, but also,
wherever possible, were extended through judicial construction of the List
entries and other constitutional limitations. For instance, in the Gujarat
University case3 the Union List power with respect to "Coordination and
determination of standards in institutions for higher learning or research"
was preferred to the state legislative power with respect to the changeover
of the medium, of instruction in the Gujarat University under entry 11 of
the State List. It was contended that the state initiative, if allowed and
practised unregulated, would create confusion in higher education with
consequent repercussions felt on an all-India level. The higher education
imparted in different media in different states would bring variations in
educational standards and would make the Union a powerless spectator
with its power of coordination completely blunted. This would be opposed
to the express public policy declared in the relevant Union List entry, and
therefore, would not be allowed. The controlling rule was that List I
should be preferred to Lists II and III, and List III to List II.

2. Gujarat University v. Sri Krishna, supra note 1.

3. Ibid.
262 Constitutional Developments Since Independence

The residuary legislative powers mark the outer space of the exclusive
powers of the Union. These powers are unlimited by any categorisation
or enumeration, and for that matter, include all matters which the framers
excluded from the list enumeration of the Seventh Schedule, or could not
comprehend in the world they lived in, e.g., outer space and trips to the
moon. The all-inclusive contents of residuary power was brought out
in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Dhillon's case.4 The Court
recognised that the List enumerations of the Seventh Schedule were unique
in their comprehension, lengths and details, but were not, after all, all
exhaustive. It then declared that the framers excluded nothing from the
legislative power of the Union; and the Union Parliament could enact all
laws on all matters whether known to the framers or not. Its powers were
limited only in one manner, that is, it would normally not enact laws with
respect to the State List matters and would let the state legislatures take
the initiative in the state field. Because the Concurrent List was inflexibly
set, the dimensions of the exclusive powers of the Union were unmapped;
and the exclusive powers embraced all matters uncovered by the State
List and the Concurrent List. The Union List enumeration was not
exhaustive; and in no way affected the generality of the exclusive legislative
powers of the Union. Any inclusion or exclusion from the Union List did
not put any matter beyond the reach of Parliament, unless, of course, it
was included in an entry in the State List. A matter excluded, from a
Union List entry, but not included in the relevant entry of the State List
was not put out of the reach of Parliament. It must be included within
the unlimited scope of its residuary power. The matters found to fall
under the residuary head include : wealth tax on agricultural land and
assets,5 gift tax,6 expenditure tax,7 tax on postal articles,8 and under Golak
Math's9 case constitutional amendments.

The apex of the Union legislative powers was reached in the Golak
Math case. Herein the Supreme Court declared that power to pass a
constitutional amendment was residuary legislative power of Parliament,
subject to the condition of its exercise in accordance with the procedure
established by article 368. This power was, so to say, subject to the express
constitution.il limitations of clause (2) of article 13. The declaration of
this residuary power was an innovation in the theory of written constitu­
tions known to stress upon the distinction between the legislative powers
sinipliciter and the constituent (organic) legislative power. It approxi-
4. Supra note 1.
5. Second G.T. Officer, Mangalore v. D.H. Hazereth, supra note 1.
6. The Gift Tax Act, 1958.
7. The Expenditure Tax Act, 1957.
8. The Tax on Postal Articles Act, 1971.
9. L.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1943.
 A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report 263

mated the Indian written Constitution to the unwritten Constitution of

Britain built up of the one time transcendental doctrines of supremacy of
Parliament and the rule of law. The first of these is clearly eclipsed by,
among other factors, the Treaty of Rome. The British Parliament cannot
provide for any alteration or change in the machinery, procedures and
functions of the European Economic Community of which Britain is now
a member. The norm of unrestricted unamendability of the constitution
expanded the span of the residuary legislative power; and in measure
constricted the amending power. The decision raised a cloud of dust
of controversy. The parliamentarians (those asserting the supremacy
of Parliament and the Parliamentary prerogative of plenary amendatory
power) wielding absolute majority through the mid-erm poll of 1971
adopted the (Twenty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1971. In contravention
of the Golak Nath's decision, this Amendment stressed the intrinsic nature
of the constituent amendatory power, at once different and distinct from
the legislative pcrwer. A constitutional amendment was declared to be
constitutional measure, which after its adoption was a part of the Consti­
tution, any constitutional limitations to the contrary notwithstanding. The
Amendment is sustained in the Kesavananda's case.10

The States' concurrent legislative powers are axiomatically limited in

a two-fold manner, firstly, they extend to the enumerated matters of List
ΙΠ, which contains 47 entries, secondly, they are restricted by the rule
for preference of parliamentary legislation to the state law with respect
the same matter referable to List III.

The second of these limitations is restrictively lifted only under the

circumstance envisaged in clause (2) of article 254.

On the contrary the scope of concurrent legislation by Parliament is

more or less unrestricted; and approximates to be the sole prerogative of
the Centre. 11 Not only the Union concurrent powers are not restricted in
the manner of the state powers, but they are also extended beyond, even if
temporarily, the Concurrent List under the emergency powers (articles 250
and 352) and the provisions of articles 249, 252 and 253. The encroachment
of the states' exclusive powers was permitted by resort to the provisions
of article 252 with respect to levy and collection of estate duty in respect
of agricultural land under the Estate Duty Act, 1953. It is recommended

10. Ibid. The decision has since been overruled in Kesavananda v. State of Kerala,
A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461; see Kagzi, The Kesavananda's case (1973).
11. Article 246(2) and article 254, The Constitution of India. Zarerbhai v. State of
Bombay, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 752.
264 Constitutional Developments Since Independence

that the same procedure may be tried in respect of income tax on agric­
ultural income. It is said that it could have obviated the extreme remedy
of constitutional amendment in respect of inter-state sales taxation.
The transcendental character of the Union concurrent legislation is
witnessed most prominently in the area of economic and planning legisla­
tion. The states seem to have lost initiative in respect of economic and
social legislation, and laws pertaining to public control of trade, control
of essential commodities, development and regulation of industries, labour
legislation, social security, social control, etc.
Not only the near unlimited lengths of the legislative powers of the
Union surveyed, but the full lengths of such powers were also stretched out
to reach the stale owned land and property. The Union laws, for instance,
the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, was held
to reach the land under the state ownership. The Act provided for acqui­
sition of land in coal belt areas by the Central Government. In exercise of
their statutory powers under this law, the Central Government took steps
to acquire certain land which was the property of the State of West
Bengal. The state government claimed immunity in respect of such land
and contended that a central law would not per se apply to the state
property. Any ether view, it was contended, would violate the recognised
'sovereignty' of the state as a constituent unit of the Indian Union which
was declaredly a federation. The federal concept and the state's sovereignty,
it was argued, could not be impaired. Neither Parliament could
legislate with respect to acquisition of the state property, nor the Central
Government could acquire such property under its authorisation. With
a view to seeking the enforcement of its contentions based upon the so-
called true theory of federal government, the state filed a suit against the
Union of India, for restraining the Central Government from going ahead
with the land acquisition proceedings against the suit property. The
defendant, the Union of India, denied the state's claim for immunity
against the central laws. It was submitted that no such immunity could
be founded on any federal theory which must be alien to the provisions of
the Constitution. The Union was not, it was submitted, founded upon
any federal compact to which the plaintiff state was a party with the defen­
dant. The true historical perspective proved that there was no such
compact. The Union was established by "We, The People of India" who
alone were sovereign and was not based upon any compact wherein the
states could be said to have reserved certain immunities. The powers of
the Union were in no way impaired by any theory of implied powers
known to the American Constitution and other constitutions which sought
inspiration from that. The Indian Constitution was a complete code and
no extrinsic theories could be invoked to restrict the powers of the Union.
 A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report 265

The Supreme Court dismissed the suit, and declared that the state's
contentions were not supported by the letter and spirit of the Constitu­
tion.12 A Union law, if enacted in general terms bound a state as well,
unless it was provided that it would not be so applied within a'state.
There should be clear expressis verbis statutory immunity extended to the
state and its property, if at all.

Expressis- unius est exclusio alterius : The one and the only one
instance of immunity based on the federal principle of inter-governmental
immunity known to our system is provided in the area of direct taxation.
The state property and income are exempted from the Union taxation.
The state property is not subject to the wealth tax and capital tax of the
Union. No income tax or corporation tax can be levied in respect of
income derived from the state owned property, investments, securities, etc.
or in respect ef the budgetary receipts of a state government. The scope
of the exemption is inflexibly fixed by definition and express words of
restrictions, leaving no scope of its extension by judicial legislation on the
basis of any implied restrictions upon the Union tax powers. For avoidance
of doubt, the President referred certain aspects of the matter to the
Supreme Court for its opinion. The opinion of the court makes an instru­
ctive essay on the doctrine of immunity of instrumentalities.13

The Rajamannar Committee devoted full one chapter, namely, chapter

IV to 'Legislative Field', and noted that the Uuion List "had stolen a
number of items" from the Provincial List and the Concurrent List of the
Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935. They, for that reason,
arrived at the conclusion that the states' legislative powers were curtailed
under the Constitution. Consequently, they observed that the legislative
lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution should be 'modified' on
the lines suggested by them,14 although they, at the same time, made a
very helpful recommendation that the question of redistribution of legis­
lative powers should be reexamined by a high power committee, consis­
ting of eminent lawyers, jurists and statesmen. They themselves recommended
that certain entries of the Union List should be transferred to the State
List;15 and the Concurrent List should also be cut down to reinforce the
State List. They felt that the Concurrent List should "be confined to

12. State of West Bengal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1241.
13. In re the Sea Customs Act, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1760.
14. The Report of the Centre-State Relations Inquiry Committee 25-56 (1971).
15. Union List entries suggested to be transferred to the State List ; 40 (state lotte­
ries); 48 (futures markets); 53 (mineral and oil resources); 54 (mines and
minerals); 55 (labour regulation and labour safety in mines and oil fields); 67
(historical monuments and records); 76 (state audits), and 84 (excises on medic­
inal and toilet preparations); see the Report, supra note 14 at 28-32).
266 Constitutional Developments Since Independence

entries which are of interest to the country as a whole or of an all-India

base, and the other entries should be transferred to the State List." They
thought that the Concurrent List matters were essentially state matters;
and, therefore, the states should be closely associated with the legislation in
this field. They suggested that the state governments should bs consulted
upon the legislative proposals with respect to the Concurrent List matters,
and their views should be ascertained in respect of the clauses of a Bill.
They also wanted that the Bill be referred to the Inter-State Council;
and recommended that a statement reciting the fact of such reference
should be appended to the Bill. On the top of these recommendations,
the committee recommended that the residuary legislative powers should
be vested exclusively in the states. To bring this about they suggested that
entry 97 of List I should be transferred to List II; and article 248 should
be amended consequently.

The committee found that the provisions whereunder the Union

legislation was permitted with respect to the State List matters were wholly
unwarranted without any precedent, and "wholly deiogatory to the
conception of a federation and...serious inroad into State authority." 15 "
Accordingly, they recommended the repeal of article 249 which per­
mitted the Union legislative initiative in respect of a State List matter in
the national interest, if the Council of States has declared by resolution
supported by not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting
that it is necessary or expedient. They found it to be a radical deviation
from the accepted notions of federalism and an undoing of the principle
of distribution of powers recognised and implemented in the Constitution.
They also turned to article 252; and found fault with the possibility of any
parliamentary legislation for two or more states even with the consent of
such states "if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the Houses of
the Legislatures of those States." They objected to this enabling provision
in its present form; and recommended an amendment so as to enable a
state legislature to amend it if it might think fit to repeal the Union
legislation. The recommendation, if accepted, must frustrate the very
purpose of having a uniform legislation on certain matters, e.g., estate
duty law in respect of agricultural land with prior consent and for the
advantage of the states. If one state is allowed to amend it, it might be
rendered disadvantageous to the other consenting states; and the
uniform legislative measure must become uncertain and the desirability
of the parliamentary regulation through it must remain unfulfilled.

The provisions requiring reservation of the state Bills for consideration,16

15a. Supra note 14 at 47.

16. Second Proviso to article 200, article 201 and article 31, The Constitution of
India.
 A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report 267

previous sanction,*' or assent.18 of the President were particularly

criticised by the committee. Such criticism was not without an iota of
substance. Their fear that these provisions might create a situation of
confrontation if a state government is made up by a party other than the
party in power at the Centre, was a little far-fetched in view of the expe­
rience gained in this regard during the period under review. The Central
Government seldom advises the President against the state Bills. An
instance of some sort of a mini confrontation in this respect arose
regarding the Kerala Education Bill sponsered by the Kerala Leftist
Government; but the matter was not decided in accordance
with the executive advice of the Central Government; but the
President made a reference under article 143 to the Supreme Court, and
then acted accordingly. The Bill was assented· to after it was suitably
modified in the light of the opinion of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless,
it cannot be said that a state Bill reserved for the President's assent will
always be assented to a s a matter of course. Therefore, the committee
was not wholly unreasonable in giving their criticism in this respect. They
thought that a state Bill might not be assented, or just might be put in
the cold storage on the ground of any conflicting state policy contrary to
the economic programme and ideology of the Central Government. The
state government would in that situation receive a set-back; and the state
legislative prerogative even in the state field would be subordinated to
the decisions of the Central Government. This the committee thought
would cause an irritant in the centre-state relations. Consequently, they
characterised the reservation provisions as a needless superfluity;
and recommended repeal of article 31 (3), second provisD to Article 200
and the proviso to article 304(6).

Ill
The financial relations between the Centre and the states present a
two-fold problem, namely, (i) distribution of tax powers bstween the Union
and the states; and (//') the issues relating to assignment of taxes levied
and collected by the Union; distribution and sharing of the revenues of
the unassigned Union taxes; and the grants in aid to the revenues of the
states. The pattern of the distribution of tax powers constituted an
important strand in the centre-state relationship. During the period
under survey the states have frequently agitated about the unfair deal
in the distribution of tax powers. However, the distribution plan set
forth in the Constitution has largely stood the test of times. The
alterations were made in the main only in respect of sales taxation. The

17. Proviso to article 304(¿>)—Atiaban Tea Co. v. Stale of Assam, A.I.R. 1961 S.C.
232.
18. Article 200; see also article 254(3), The Constitution of India.
 268 Constitutional Developments Since Independence

difficulties were caused by judicial construction of the original unamended

provisions of clause (2) of article 286.19 The true dimensions of the states'
power in respect of inter-state sales tax could not be determined and fixed
without the extreme remedy of a constitutional amendment—the Sixth
Amendment—and the enactment of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The
states' tax power was curtailed; and the inter-state sales tax was made a
Union tax for purposes of levy and collection only, the gross proceeds of
which were assigned to the states. Nevertheless, under this arrangement
the states lost a power without, of course, in any way loosing revenues
derived therefrom. The states have been voicing their grievances about
their generally weak tax powers with less revenue yield and no revenue
potential. On the contrary, the Central Government and other agencies
consistently pointed to the glaring anomalies of the Indian tax system, in
the bifurcation and subdivision of power to levy and collect income
taxes under the distribution plan of the Constitution. The states have
exclusive powers with respect to taxation of agricultural land and income.
The Union taxes on income can be collected in respect of non-agricultural
income only. This tax distribution situation is found to be anomalous
and disadvantageous both to the Union and the states, also, for the
national interests as well. The states would not levy and collect direct
taxes, except land revenue at old and unrevised rates devoid of any prog­
ression. The yield from land revenue decreased over the years; and in
certain states this old levy was, for politically inspired slogan-dusted
agrarian welfare programme withdrawn as well. This was done without
imposition of any new levies to make up the revenue loss. The
states' agricultural income tax was not levied and collected on any uniform
patterns, what to say, at the rates comparable to the tax rates for the
Union income taxes. In no state the tax was ever administered even
with half the efficiency of the Union income tax. The consequences of
this attitude have been most damaging to the tax system and the national
economy. The aggregate proceeds from the direct state taxes remained asrlow
as 0.85 per cent of the agricultural produce; while personal income tax on
non-agricultural income alone yielded 2.6 per cent of the non-agricultural
produce. The aggregate proceeds of such state taxes never went up beyond
11 per cent of their own revenues. The main source of the state budgetary
receipts were sales taxes levied in different states at different rates. The
states became more and more dependent upon the doles from the Union.
The figures of revenue devolution to the states became staggering over the
years. The successive quinquennially constituted Finance Commissions
sounded alarm at the irresistible trends in the centre-state relations.

19. Article 286(2) Explanation to cl. (1) (a); Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of
Bihar, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 661; State of Bombay v. United Motors, A.I.R. 1953
S.C. 252.
 A Critique of the Rajctmannar Committee Report 269

The non-taxation of agricultural income at comparable rates and

relative efficiency has caused serious problems of avoidance and evasion of
taxes on income under the Union Income Tax Act, 1961, besides occasi­
oning the loss of much needed revenue for the Union purposes and also
for allocations to the states. The matter has been considered on a number
of occasions and by a number of commissions and committees besides
a few private agencies and experts in public finance. Of late the
Wanchoo Committee, and thereafter, the Raj Committee, examined the
various issues involved in taxation of agricultural income by the Union.
The former recommended the levy and collection of an income tax on
agricultural income, even if, it necessitated a constitutional amendment.
Alternatively.it recommended the use of the machinery provisions of article
252, requiring the states to give consent formally by resolutions passed by
all the Houses of their legislatures for levy of income tax on agricultural
income on the principles on which and the manner in which the Union
taxes on non-agricultural incomes are levied and collected,20 The latter
committee was in full agreement with these recommendations; but being
aware of the present prevailing mood of the states of not parting with
their powers, more so, tax powers, they put forth their scheme for a
partially integrated taxation of non-agricultural income with income
derived from agriculture.21 They also submitted proposals for a new tax;
an agricultural holdings tax. The scheme of partial integration has
already been accepted by the Central Government.22 The issues involved in
the matter as to the legislative power of Parliament should now engage
our attention, because, a challenge based on an issue being ultra vires the
Constitution, must be made in the High Court or the Supreme Court.
The Raj Committee envisaged no serious challenge on this account.

The scheme recommended by the Raj Committee envisaged that a

person's total income for a given previous year should be computed
including his agricultural income. The latter should be aggregated with
the taxable non-agricultural income for purposes of making up the tax
base, if the non-agricultural income exceeded the exemption limit for the
relevant year as fixed by the appropriate Finance Act, say, Rs. 5,000/-.
The suggested manner in which the agricultural income should be added
to the non-agricultural income was that the former type of income was
put in between the exempted portion of Rs. 5,000/- and the excess over
that amount of the latter income. The middle portion of agricultural

20. Final Report of The Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee 40-42 (1971).
21. The Report of the Committee on Taxation of Agricultural Wealth and Income
64-75 (1972).
?2. The Finance Minister's speech in the L °!i s<|bha on 28-?-1973.
270 Constitutional Developments Since Independence
income was not taxable; but it pushed up the slab or slabs, as might be of
the taxable non-agricultural income. The inevitable result was the
assessment of tax at higher slab-rates; otherwise it should have been at
the lower slabs. The pushing up of non-agricultural taxable income to
the higher income slabs and tax collection in larger amounts for that
reason was entirely due to the agricultural income. The excess over the
tax amount which would have been collected had the total income not
included agricultural income could be attributed indirectly to non-taxable
agricultural income. Indirectly it would be a tax on the non-taxable
agricultural income; and hence it might be argued that it was an ingenious
attempt to tax indirectly what could not be taxed directly. This would
be so, because the excess tax would not have been assessed, had the
assessee had no agricultural income to include in his total income. There­
fore, in the real economic sense it was a liability accrued due to agricul­
tural income, nay, a false-faced tax on agricultural income. This would
be in accord with the principle of tax equity and progression in a tax
system. An argument based on colourable exercise of tax power could
be raised; but in view of tax power of the Union to tax non-agricultural
income at any rate whatever, it would not most probably be sustained.

The contentions based on the ultra vires character of the scheme and
the amendments consequent to its implementation in the Income Tax Act,
1961, may be raised in the days to come. The opinion given by the Law
Commission to the Raj Committee was favourable.

The second fact of the centre-state financial relations was the subject-
matter of inquiry and investigation quinquennially by the successive
Finance Commissions. The reports submitted by these commissions provide
a great deal of information on developing trends in federal finance. The
commissions have investigated into the causes and ills of the imbalance
between the functional responsibilities of the states and their inelastic
limited financial resources. They made careful periodical studies of the
estimates and forecasts of revenue receipts of the various state govern­
ments and their non-plan expenditure, and examined the information given
and views expressed by the state governments.23 They felt that the states'
own revenue resources were not only not exploited, but were also not
properly assessed and comprehended. Cynically their tax potential
was allowed to decrease for narrow immediate political reasons.
Therefore, quite a few of the states lost financial credibility and

23. See the Report of the Finance Commission (Fifth) 1969; the Report of the Finance
Commission (Fourth) 1965; the Report of the Finance Commission (Third) 1961;
the Report of the Finance Commission (Second) 1957; the Report of Finance
Commission (First) 1952.
 A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report 271

were exposed to a situation of financial breakdown which generated a sort

of damaging necessitarianism, giving rise to the casual dependence upon
the Union. The Union had to find revenues to bridge the budgetary gaps
of the states, in accordance with the recommendations of the successive
Finance Commissions. Not only this, it also provided wherewithal for
the developmental and plan expenditure. In this the role of the Planning
Commission was uniquely decisive and exclusive. The Planning
commission—a non-statutory body with no states' representation in it—
assumed a pivotal position in the centre-state financial relations. It eclipsed
totally the machinery of the Finance Commission.
The Finance Commission has been concerned with the shortfall in the
revenue resources; and then how that should be covered by devolution of
tax revenues, and by grants under article 275. It has felt that the budgetary
gaps should in the main, as far as possible, be filled by devolution of tax
revenues; and the grants should be deemed necessary as residuary means
to meet extraordinary revenue needs, after having taken into consideration
the states' own tax efforts, their tax potential and their attempts to practise
utmost economy in expenditure in the context of their budgetary forecast
for a given quinquennium after reducing them to a standard form. For
purposes of article 275, the five-year plan requirments should not be
taken into consideration; that should be the exclusive domain of the
Planning Commission. The plan grants should be made under article 282
separately. Often the states have pleaded that their total revenue needs—
the plan and the non-plan needs—should be considered in totality for
estimation of revenue gaps and resources mobilisation as also fresh
borrowing. They have asked the commission to construe article 275
broadly to cover 'not only revenue and non-plan capital gaps' but also
for giving them 'a comparable surplus after repayment'.

The chapter on 'Financial Relations' in the Rajamannar Committee

Report is comparatively comprehensive and well written. 24 The committee
was of the view that the scheme of chapter I of Part XII was not 'fair to
the States'. It forced them to depend largely upon discretionary grants,
or else overdrafts. This caused impairment and erosion of their political
and constitutional powers and generated a tension in their relation with the
Union. The committee might be right in saying that the framers could not
fully realise the implications of a future developing society, although they
were wholly aware of the need for planned economic development. But they
felt' that not only the scheme was 'not fair to the States' but also it was
not without some scope for discrimination in the treatment of the states by
the Union. They recalled that it was suggested by many of the states'
spokesmen, particularly, by the representatives of the Government of
24. The Report, supra note 14 at 57-10?.
272 Constitutional Developments Since Independence

Tamil Nadu Cold Madras State) that the corporation tax should be made
a shared tax and be treated on the footing of the tax on personal income
for purposes of article 270. They also found no reason for the state not
sharing export and customs duties; and recommended their complusory
distribution between the Union and the states. They further recommended
that wealth tax should be deemed a tax which was levied and collected by
the Union, but the whole net proceeds were given to the states as was
done in the case of estate duty proceeds. They also suggested that article
272 should be amended to make excises complusorily divisible. Their
idea was that the revenue devolution should be enlarged so much so that
the need for grants-in-aid under article 275 'either disappears or is
minimised.' Ex facie in this they seemed to be thinking not very unlike
the Administrative Reforms Commission.
IV
The issues which assumed wide proportions and often raised contro­
versies in the area of administrative relations between the Union and the
states during the period under review, and, particularly, in the last quin­
quennium centred round, amongst others, the following matters :
(¿) Governors' appointments, responsibilities and discretion generally,
and their position of being so many arches in the structure of the
centre-state masonry.
(i'() States' obligations to carry out the directions of the Central Govern­
ment and the central laws generally, and in particular, to so
exercise their own powers as not to impede the exercise of the
executive power of the Union under articles 256-257.
(///) The presence of the Union Government within the states, say,
deployment of the units of Central Reserve Police (hereinafter
referred as the C.R.P.).
(i'v) Powers of the Central Government in the event of accrual of a
situation "in which the government of the State cannot be carried
on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution",
including the discretion to extend the President's rule to a state.
These are really formidable matters and the space and scope of this paper
are too limited to permit any near exhaustive reference of all the aspects,
much less, their treatment exhaustively. Only a brief mention of certain
limited issues which interest the writer of this paper may be mentioned
for discussion in the present Seminar. Though an appointee of the
President, and required to hold office during his pleasure, a Governor,
as made out above, is a link and an arch joining the Central Government
 A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report 273

and the state government. At the same time he is the head of the state
as well, and lex litera the executive power of the state is declared to be
vested in him. He has, so to say, too faces, one in front turned to the
state, and the other at his back turned towards New Delhi. His Janus­
like position invests his office with much opportunity and responsibility,
although less of initiative and action. He is the constitutional head of the
state; and must act on aid and advice of the state council of ministers
in the affairs of the state. At the same time he must report to the President
to help him discharge his obligation to ensure the functioning of the state
government in accordance with the Constitution. In this latter capacity
he seems to be under attack at the state level. The convention seems to
exist that before the final selection for appointment in this position, the
Union home minister ascertains the views of the concerned state chief
minister and his ministerial colleagues without making it a formal affair
requiring consideration of the state council of ministers. The final choice
in the matter rests with the Central Government and does not require the
approbation of the state council of ministers. It is also possible that a
decision is made in consultation with one government, but before the
Governor designate assumes his office, the government goes out and a
new council of ministers is sworn in by the Acting Governor who is
generally, by practice the Chief Justice of the state High Court. This
new ministerial team may not approve of the selection. Howsoever
embarrassing, the decision of the Central Government, if already
announced, cannot be changed by the new government. The
fear of incompatability of temperament, likely to arise between the
Governor designate and the state government for the time being is no
ground to make any decisional change in the gubernatorial selection and
appointment. In one case the Governor designate actually arrived in the
state capital and assumed his august office amidst cold sociality and
immodest cordiality. There were instances, notably, in West Bengal, wherein
the relations between the Governor and the state council of ministers of
the United Front were unseemly hostile, so much so the latter went to the
forbidden limits of asking for the former's recall. In any such case the
President is not under any obligation to respond. The office of the
Governor is established by the Constitution and the person appointed to
this office is not a mere dignity. Instead, he is entrusted with clear
inalienable duties; and must play an important, if not deliberative, part
in the centre-state relations.85
The gubernatorial office was devalued during the long spell of the
Congress Party rule, because the chances of realisation of its true opera-
25. See Kagzi, M.C.J., "Governor's Discretion—Making and Unmaking of the SVD
and UF Ministries Induced by to and fro Defections'', Vol. I, No. 1, Delhi Law
Review (1972).
274 Constitutional Developments Since Independence

tional equation between the Governor and a state chief minister were
non-existent. The Governor was usually an ageing Congressman defeated
at the polls, or else a non-political man chosen by the Central Government
for his known quality of inaction or conformist conduct. The result was
that the high office lay in desuetude. The chief minister who would be
an active politician would have his way reducing the Governor to a
figurehead. The importance of the gubernatorial office was realised
overnight after the general elections of 1967 when the sway of the Congress
Party was broken. The Raj Bhawans in the state capitals came to be
known more. In the selection of Governors too, the Centre became
a little more careful; and appointed good administrators and other able
persons to these positions. It dawned upon the Union home ministry
that the Central Government must act through him to be able to discharge
their constitutional duty of security of the state amidst unusual situations
of mass agitations or violence with consequent breakdown of the state
government and administration, and also when the state government
could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Consti­
tution necessitating the central intervention and the imposition of the
President's rule.

The new non-Congress governments did not welcome this new, rather
inevitable, development. The gubernatorial office came under attack in
a number of states, notably, in the States of Bihar, Kerala, Orissa, the
Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. A Governor was
decried as an officer of the central government posted at a state capital to
keep a watch over the state's popular governments and to report on the
affairs of the state to the Union home minister, more often than not,
behind the back of the state chief minister and the council of ministers.
He would intermeddle with the ministry-making in the state, would be
invited to inspect parades of the members of the state assembly under the
command of the 'king' among defectors, laying their numerical claim to
the ministerial office, and in marginal circumstances would be accused
of having turned the scales in favour of the Congress Party. Worse
still, he would be charged for currying favour with New Delhi by sending
a report, and recommend, thereby, the central take-over and the President
rule for the state. The non-Congress chief minister would protest and
question the propriety of such report and recommendation. He would
deny any such prerogative of the Governor and would insist that he had
no discretionary functions. He was merely a nominal head; and could act
only and exclusively on the chief minister's advice.

The Rajamannar Committee in their chapter on 'The Governor' recom-

meded that it should be made obligatory that a Governor was appointed
by the President op the advice of the state council of ministers, instead
 A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report 275

of on the advice of the Union council of ministers. Or else, he should

be appointed on recommendation of an expert body consisting of eminent
jurists, lawyers and administrators. The Governor should discharge his
functions as the head of the state and not as an instrumentalityof the Central
Government. For this purpose the President should issue him an Instrument
of Instructions laying down the guidelines as to the matters in respect of
which he should seek instructions from the Central Government. Neither
he should seek any instructions in the matter of ministry-making, nor he
should have much of discretion in the matter of selection of the chief
minister. He must call upon the majority party to form the government;
or if the situation demads, he must let the state assembly elect a person
to be the chief minister. In any case he should have no discretion to
dismiss the chief minister, or for unmaking of a state council of ministers.
In the event of a doubt he should let the question of legislative majority
be decided by a meeting of the state assembly. He should have only one
term in office; and should be disqualified from any future appointment.26

v The Constitution insists upon executive harmony between the Union

and the states by requiring the states to exercise their executive powers as
not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union;
and also permitting the Central Government to -gjve directions to the
states with a view to ensuring compliance with the Union laws. Not only
this but it also obliges the states to carry out the directions of the Union,
and declares that the non-compliance with this obligation may give rise to
a situation wherein the President may hold that a state government is not
being carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. This
decision may mean the imposition of the President's rule. During the period
under review certain delicate situations were witnessed. For instance, the
Central Government took strong measures to prevent a strike of its
employees posted in various states. While the strike was in the offing, the
President promulgated an ordinance—the Maintenance of Essential Services
Ordinance, 1967. Under the provisions of the ordinance a strike by the
Central Government employees was declared illegal. The state governments
were directed by the Central Government to enforce the provisions of the
ordinance. The leftist Government of Kerala headed by E.M.S. Namboodi-
ripad was hesitant and perceptibly unwilling to act strongly as directed
by the Union home ministry. Happily, the controversy over the matter
was not given disproportionate dimensions, because, willy nilly the state
government did the minimum necessary to put the ordinance into effect;
and the Central Government did not construe the attitude of the state
government very unhelpfully, in view of the desired improvement of the.
situation.

36, The Report, supra note 14 at 1J9-131.

276 Constitutional Developments Since Independence

The Rajamannar Committee found fault with the constitutional provi­

sions permitting the Central Government to give directions. They felt that
these provisions impinged on the executive authority of the states; and
enabled the Union to "effectively assume to itself the executive power of
the State". They observed that the provisions of articles 256-257 were
inconsistent with the so-called accepted theory of federalism; and for that
reason recommended their repeal. Alternatively, they suggested that the
directions should be issued in consultation with the Inter-State Council.
Yet another issue of great controversy between the Union and the
states concerned the presence of the Central Government in the states
through the C.R.P. The non-Congress governments particularly were
very sore over this. They maintained that the C.R.P. did not constitute a
unit of armed forces of India. It was a mere police force the like of which
could be raised only by the state government. The Central Government
could not raise it, much less they could deploy the C.R.P. units within the
state without the consent of the state. Any such action would be a
violation of the states' exclusive power with respect to their obligation for
maintenance of law and order. The controversy over the matter generated
some strains in the relations of the Centre with the Governments of
Kerala and West Bengal particularly. The matter was even taken to the
courts.

The most vocalised criticism in the area of centre-state relations has

been witnessed with respect to the power1 of the Central Government
to look over the functioning of the state governments. Often the President
receives a memorandum containing charges against cartain state ministers
including a chief minister levelled by a section of the dissident legislators
and defectors from the party in power for the time being. The recent
instances of such practice included memoranda against the Chief Minister
of Haryana, and more importantly in the pretent context against the DMK
Government of Tamil Nadu. A memorandum containing charges of
political corruption and abuse of office for undue benefits to the family
members and near relatives was submitted by a group of defectors
from the DMK Parliamentary Party led by M.G. Ramachandran and their
sympathisers in the state legislature. The immediate reason for such a
course might be an effort to show off and attract wider attention and to
gain publicity for their political move, or else to make an appeal to the
Centre for intervention. It might also be directed to forestall any strong
disciplinary and retaliatory action by the state government. Anyway it
was an appeal to the Centre over the head of the Governor who was
immediately responsible for good and constitutional government in the
state, and nothing short of a political move bypassing the state legislature to
which the state council of ministers was collectively responsible, The
 A Critique of the Rajamannar Committee Report 277

practice, if not checked, will embolden the defectors and aid 'operation-
toppling' at the instance of persons from outside the state. It was not
without reason that Karunanidhi, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, lodged a
protest wifh the Central Government, although he went a little too far
while he disputed their power to entertain a memorandum, much more,
their power to appoint any commission of inquiry.

Confining ourselves to the question of power to appoint a commis­

sion of inquiry by the Central Government to inquire into the charges
levelled against the members of a state council of ministers, we cannot
hold that the power does not exist in each and every case. Not only the
Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, permits it, but the power has on occasions
been exercised as well. The notable instance was the Kairon Inquiry. For
our present purposes we may formulate the following questions, namely,
(i) Is the practice of bypassing the Governor, and the state legislature,
and making an appeal to the President commendable as a measure
to ensure harmonious relations?
(//') Does the Constitution envisage such a practice?
(///) Should the President refer a memorandum against a state chief
minister and ministers to the Union council of ministers?
O'v) Should the President act and appoint a commission of inquiry or
refer it back to the state Governor in the first instance?
(v) Should a commission of inquiry be appointed at all so long as the
state government enjoys the confidence of the state legislative
assembly?
These questions may not be new; but have recently been raised consequent
to the M.G.R.-led defections from theDMK rank and file and thedefectors'
memorandum to the President. Karunanidhi, the Chief Minister, question­
ed the power of the President, with or without advice of the Union
council of ministers, in the matter of functioning of a state council of
ministers which is collectively responsible to the state assembly, if it
continues to command the majority support in that assembly. He wrote
to the prime minister over the matter; and had taken the opportunity to
question the power of the Union to intermeddle with the state affairs by
appointing a commission of inquiry. The Rajamannar Committee, however,
did not express their opinion on this, perhaps because, the matter had not
by the time of writing their report assumed so much importance.
However, they had strong views to express about the powers of the
Centre to take over the governance of a state by a proclamation under
article 356.
278 Constitutional Developments Since Independence

The President's power to take over the governance of a state indispu­

tably exists in the event of a breakdown of the constitutional machinery
of government caused by to and fro defections and consequent political
instability due to unpredictability and changing strength of the political
parties and their inability to form a government, or mass agitation and large-
scale public violence caused by popular disquiet, the failure of the govern­
ment to maintain law and order and persistent unabated danger to life and
property as in Andhra Pradesh on the demand for bifurcation of the State
or in Kerala over the question of school takeover in the late fifties. The
President decides to issue a proclamation after he is so advised by the
Governor, the prime minister and the Union council of ministers
who have fuller information as to the existing situation in the state and
also have the state Governor's report before them. It is not wholly
untrue to say that the machinery of the President's rule has been put into
operation much too frequently. It was first .extended to now erstwhile
State of East Punjab in the summer of 1951. Since the coming into force
of the Constitution it seems to have been put into operation more than 34
times. The frequency of the President's rule increased perceptibly after
the general elections of 1967. It is no wonder that a state government, if
politically unstable, must live under the advancing shadows of the Presi­
dent's rule. This is the reason that the issues relating to the central
intervention in the event of a breakdown—actual or otherwise—have
generated a good deal of discussion and clashof opinions. The United
Front Governments of Kerala and West Bengal, the DMK Government of
Tamil Nadu, and on certain occasions even the Congress governments, for
instance, the Government led by Narasimha Rao of Andhra Pradesh have
resisted the moves for central intervention. The DMK Government's
opposition is more basic inasmuch as they question the power of the
President on the basis of their theory of states' rights and state autonomy.
Often the strong utterances of the CPM leaders and the DMK theoreti­
cians smell the rat of political helplessness and frustration and are nothing
short of expressions of their anti-Centre cry dictated by political strategy.

The Rajamannar Committee were of the view that the power of the
President under article 356 was 'being used to deprive the States of their
autonomy'. While they were happily prepared to accept the position that
the power was not 'so far' used in an unjustified manner, they expressed
their disapproval of its use except on occasions on which 'the government
of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this
Constitution'. The necessity for this should be felt not only by the Central
Government, but at the other end as well. They seemed to think that any
action at the instance of the Union council of ministers might bring out
an 'inherent conflict between the Centre and the States'. They recom­
mended for their unfounded apprehension the outright repeal of articles
 A Critique of the Rajctmannar Committee Report 279

356 and 357. Alternatively, they pressed that steps should be taken 'to
provide safegards to secure the interests of the States against the arbitrary
and unilateral action.' They recommended appropriate amendments in these
articles, which should ensure that the state governments functioned 'without
fear' of being toppled over. They insisted that the President should not
act exclusively on the recommendation of the Governor. His report
should be referred to the state assembly for expressions of its views. They
suggested that the word 'otherwise' should be dropped from clause (1) of
article 356, thus making any unilateral action under it impossible.
The most debatable aspect of action under the article is as to the
circumstances giving rise to a situation which impelí the President to feel
'satisfied' that 'the government of the State cannot be carried on in accor­
dance with this Constitution'. Placed as he is, he must be helped in the
matter by the Governor's report containing his assessment of the situation
and his recommendations. In the nature of things the circumstances
necessitating central action must vary from situation to situation. Its
necessity must, finally, be determined on the President's satisfiction, arrived
at constitutionally on the advice of the Union council of ministers. The
Governor's report is despatched from the state capital to New Delhi by a
special courier; and is considered by the Union cabinet or in practice
first by the Internal Affairs Committee of the cabinet. The President is
advised in accordance with the Governor's appreciation of the prevailing
political situation in the state, his apprehensions of worsening political con­
ditions, his informed assessment of the situation and his recommendations.
The Governor's report is not published in full, although at the option of
the government, it is placed on the tables of the Houses of Parliament
along with the instruments of the President's proclamation and other
papers of follow-up action. The questions which we may consider here in
this Seminar are the following :—
(/) Should the Governor's report, except that part which the govern­
ment considers to be against the public interest to disclose, be
published, as soon as may be, after the proclamation of emergency?
(») Should the Governor's recommendations be not debated in the
House of the People and the Council of States before the Presi­
dent's action pursuant thereto.
(Hi) Should the function of the state legislature be not discharged by
the Council of States instead of their being delegated to the Presi­
dent under article 357?
V
The Rajamannar Committee Report befittinglyhas failed to attract much
attention, because in the main it expresses one sided narrow thinking held
280 Constitutional Developments Since Independence
by a political party which can never become a national party. The com­
mittee failed to articulate any constructive and purposeful theory of centre-
state relations. Their report singularly lacks any originality, intrinsic merit
and force nece ssary to initiate a debate at national level to build up any
opinion in accordance with their recommendations. A major defect in
the report is an abject disregard of views other than the views held by their
patrons. The report opens with a terse recitation of the terms of reference
put forth inexhaustively in the government notification; and deals with the
topics they thought would concern the state government most in a rather
inarticulate manner. The views noted, if at all, are not such as support
their position over the narrow state autonomy idea. Occasionally the
treatment of certain topics is not at all properly balanced or up-to-date,
and it may not be too much to say, it is abjectly incomplete and not worth
the pages devoted to it. The committee ascribed certain merit to the
provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, enacted by the British
Parliament and on that basis made suggestions frequently. They did not
like the alterations and changes effected by the Constituent Assembly and
the Drafting Committee, and unashamedly termed them 'deviations'. They
seem to have overlooked the fact that the Constitutent Assembly worked
hard and enacted a Constitution of the people and for the people. To
maintain that the Government of India Act gave India a better Constitu­
tion and to run down the provisions of the Constitution is not a very
healthy exercise. The committee pleaded for a backward looking ap­
proach to the problems of the new emerging social order after indepen­
dence. Their recommendations for amendments to the Constitution were
very often, supported by the views and stray ideas held by certain
individual persons albeit the members of the Constitutent Assembly, its
committees or at other forums. The speeches of individual members
selected by the committee in their own way are referred even though they
were discussed and overwhelmingly rejected by the Constituent Assembly.
Any approach developed on the basis of the views already rejected by the
bulk of the people cannot be a constructive approach to the national
problems. Over-reliance on foreign constitutions also is out of
context and outrageous to the peculiar genius of the Indian people. Some
of their recommendations are ex facie damaging to the national objectives
of unity and emotional integration, and the institutions of our constitu­
tional and legal system. For instance, the committee suggested that the
appeals—criminal and civil—to the Supreme Court should be abolished;
and appeals should be permitted only in constitutional matters. If
accepted, the change in pursuance to this recommendation must spell a
ruin of our legal system. One has to, be in the United States of America
to feel the pitfalls of a non-uniform system of civil and criminal laws which
vary from state to state. The whole uniformity and certainty which our
 A Critique of the Rctjamannar Committee Report 281

system has acquired is a matter of envy to any informed citizen in that

country. Not only this, the recommendation, if implemented, must mean
that laws must be interpreted variously in various states, and must be
spoken understandably in the different languages in the different states.
The views held by the committee on langauge should particularly be noted.
They categorically state that when compared with other scheduled langua­
ges it cannot be said that Hindi "is the only language suited for adoption
as the sole language of the Union". They have thrown a new argument
unheard of so far, that is, the constitutional provisions in respect of official
langauge were adopted 'at a time when the States had no effective say'.
This argument of theirs is perfectly in accord with their theory of the
states' rights, which on their own terms, is an after-thought following the
commencement of the Constitution. They stood for complete revision of
the provisions of Part XVII of the Constitution. This they unfortunately
do with a veiled fist when they say that this could not be put off "if the
unity of the country is to be strengthened." Their own solution of the
acrimonious language problem is set forth in these words :"...we are afraid
there is no alternative, except to continue the English language". This
they seem to say with their tongue in their cheeks; and it is satisfying they
admit that the Official Language Act, 1963-68, furnished 'the necessary
guidance'. But their recommendations that these "be incorporated in the
Constitution itself with suitable modifications" seem to be based on an
argument of distrust. At the same time, they rightly observe that there
was 'no great advantage' in continuing English as the language for transac­
tion of business with the public in the offices of the Union Government
situated in the various states. This they did as they very much desired to
bring the public emotionally near the administration, and make the people
feel that the Central Government "is as much their own as the administ­
ration at the State level".