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abstr a c t : Bitterly anti-Marxist though it was, fascism now appears to have been
in some sense revolutionary in its own right, but this raises new questions about the
meaning of modern revolution. In a recent essay Roger Griffin, a major authority
on fascism, challenges Marxists and non-Marxists to engage in a dialogue that would
deepen our understanding of the relationship between the Marxist-communist and
fascist revolutionary directions. Although he finds openings within the Marxist
tradition, Griffin insists that, if such dialogue is to be possible, the Marxists must
give up any a priori claim to the unique validity of the Marxist revolutionary project.
However, Griffin’s way of framing the issues proves too limited, first because his
understanding fascism as revolutionary is not rich enough, but also because he
too often forces his argument to make the fascist revolution seem the archetypal
20th-century revolution. The alternative starts with a deeper understanding of the
basis of the fascist claim to be spearheading, as Marxism could not, a revolutionary
departure appropriate to contemporary challenges and possibilities. In asking about
the commonality of the fascist and Marxist revolutions, Griffin convincingly accents
a certain mode of historical consciousness that seemed to warrant a totalitarian
direction. But the historical sense he draws from Walter Benjamin, and then attributes
to Marxism and Leninism, misconstrues the area of commonality. Through a different
way of conceiving fascism as revolutionary, and of understanding fascist-communist
convergence, we can challenge the Marxists more deeply – but also suggest the basis
for a more fruitful mode of dialogue around fascism, Marxism and modern revolution.
The interplay between communism and fascism, as each emerged from the cru-
cible of the First World War, has been central to our understanding of European
history, the political spectrum, and even the ongoing possibilities and dangers
of modern politics. The outcome of the Soviet experiment, together with some
fresh thinking about fascism, raises new questions about the meaning of ‘revo-
lution’, specifically modern revolution that, in response to the liberal capitalist
mainstream, seeks an alternative modernity, a qualitatively superior realization of
human possibilities.
Contact address: David D. Roberts, Department of History, LeConte Hall, University of
Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602 USA.
Email: droberts@uga.edu 183
Through historical materialism, we are in control of our powers, able ‘to blast
open the continuum of history’.21
Following Benjamin, Griffin finds adumbrations of such ‘now time’ even in
Marx himself, who stressed that when revolutions invoke a mythologized past,
they do so within an entirely ‘futural’ imagined temporality. Although Marx
went on to claim that the socialist revolution would be different, would entail
no such mythic use of the past, Griffin sees Marx’s image of the utopia of primi-
tive communism as contradicting that claim.22 As Griffin puts it, ‘For Marx, too,
“remembrance” is treated as a precondition for socialism’s ability to transform
187
But though ‘totalism’ and historical consciousness are indeed crucial, even taken
in combination Griffin’s way of adducing these elements proves inadequate.
Although Popper’s use of ‘historicism’ was idiosyncratic, it is clear what he
intended – and opposed – and Griffin clearly believes that Popper has pinpoint-
ed one of the essential bases of the totalitarian departure. Totalitarianism was
wound around an assumption of historical predictability based on a privileged
grasp of the movement of history. Even as he invokes it, however, Griffin notes
that Popper’s notion of historicism entails a ‘curious reversal of the connotations
given the term by Benjamin’.52 Indeed, their disparate usages point to a tension,
but one that Griffin fails to probe as he simply leaves it at that – as a ‘curious
reversal’. How could revolution based on palingenetic now-time, exploding the
continuum of history, yield regimes putatively relying on assumptions of histori-
196 cal predictability?
Notes
1. Stanley G. Payne (1995) A History of Fascism, 1914–1945, p. 494. Madison, WI: University
of Wisconsin Press.
2. Roger Griffin (1993) The Nature of Fascism. London: Routledge.
3. Roger Griffin (2002) ‘The Primacy of Culture: The Current Growth (or Manufacture) of
Consensus within Fascist Studies’, Journal of Contemporary History, 37 (Jan.): 21–43.
4. Roger Griffin (2007) Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and
Hitler. Houndmills, Macmillan. I treat this book in my review essay (2009) ‘Fascism,
Modernism, and the Quest for an Alternative Modernity’, Patterns of Prejudice, 43(1)
(Feb.): 91–5.
5. Roger Griffin (2008) ‘Exploding the Continuum of History: A Non-Marxist’s
Marxist Model of Fascism’s Revolutionary Dynamics’, in A Fascist Century, pp. 53, 67.
Houndmills: Macmillan. I am grateful to Professor Griffin for his courtesy in making the
proofs of this essay available to me prior to its publication.
6. Ibid. p. 67.
7. Those who could be considered are of course legion. Nicos Poulantzas, Alex Callinicos,
Tim Mason, and Geoff Eley are among those whom I myself have found it helpful to
engage over the years. Eley has used my own work on Italian fascism as I would not
have, but in a way that I found stimulating – and that suggests the scope for dialogue.
See Geoff Eley (1986) From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past, ch. 10.
Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin.
8. See Griffin (n. 5), pp. 56, 61–2, on Gramsci’s limits and on the sense in which first
Laclau, then Osborne, go beyond.
9. Ernesto Laclau (1977) Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism – Fascism
– Populism, p. 109. London: NLB.
10. Ibid. p. 111.
11. Griffin (n. 5), p. 55. See pp. 55–8 for Griffin’s account of Laclau.
12. Ibid. p. 57.
13. Peter Osborne (1995) The Politics of Time: Modernity and the Avant-Garde, p. 164.
London: Verso.
14. Ibid. pp. 163–4, 166. Griffin especially appreciates Osborne’s way of featuring the futural
use of past; see Griffin (n. 5), pp. 60–2.
15. Griffin (n. 5), p. 62.
16. Walter Benjamin (1969) ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, in his Illuminations, ed.
Hannah Arendt, VII, p. 256. New York: Schocken. See also XVII (p. 262) and XVIII (p.
264). See also Griffin (n. 5), pp. 58-59.
17. Benjamin (n. 16), XIV (p. 261).
18. Ibid. XV (p. 261).
19. Ibid. XV (pp. 261–2).
200 20. Ibid. XVIII (p. 263).
201