Cuadra vs Manfort

FACTS:

* Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Mondort were classmates in Gr. 6 at the Mabini Elementary
Sch. In Bacolod City.

* On July 9, 1962, their teacher assigned them with their 3 other classmates to weed the grass.

* While thus engaged, Monfort found a headband- she jokingky shouted that she found an earthworm
and tossed the object to cuadra.

* Cuadra turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Due to the pain, she rubbed
the injured part and treated it with some powder.

* On July 10, 1962, the eye became swollen and the girl related the incident to her parents. Cuadra
underwent surgical operation twice and stayed in the hospital for 23 days, for all of which the parents
spent the sum of P1,703.75.

* despite medical efforts, Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye. Maria Teresa Cuadra's
parents sued Alfonso Monfort(Maria Teresa Monfort's father) based on art.2180 of the civil code.

ISSUE: WON Alfonso Monfort should be held liable under Article 2180.

RULING: No. The defendant is not liable and cannot be sued under art. 2180. This article provides that
the father and, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by their minor children who live in their company. The basis of tgis vicarious liablity is, as in art.
2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act. The
presumption is merely based on the first impression and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear
and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of art. 2180 which states that "the
responsibility treated in this art. shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."

LIBI VS IAC

FACTS:

Respondent Sps are the parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who died in 1979. Petitioners were the parents of
Wendell Libi, a minor between 18 and 19 who also died on the same event. The two children were
sweetheart but Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell. They died, each from a single gunshot
woundinflicted with the same firearm licensed in the name of Petitioner Cresencio.

Due to absence of witnesses, both parties posted their theories. Respondents submitted that Wendell
caused her death by shooting her and thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide.
Petitioners contended that an unknown third party whom Wendell may have displeased by reason of his
work as a narcotics informer of CANU, must have cause Wendell’s death and to eliminate witnessc they
shot Julie Ann.

RTC dismissed the complaint of the Respondents dor insufficiency of evidence. CA reversed and set
aside the decision of RTC.

ISSUE: WON art 2180 of the civil code is applicable to this case to make the petitioners liable for
Vicarious Liability?

HELD: Petitioner Amelia, the mother of Wendell, testified that the father owns a gun which he kept in a
safety deposit box inside a drawer in their room. Each of the petitioners, holds a key to the safety box
and her key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to wendell. She admitted however, that
on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety box.

There are serious doubts that the petitioners had really been exercising due diligence of a good father of
a family.

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a
large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss their duties
as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so
much so that it was only at the time of Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a
CANU agent and that Cresencio’s gun was missing.

PETITION IS DENIED AND CA’s DECISION IS AFFIRMED.

Tamargo vs CA

GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992

FACTS:

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a
complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the
tragic incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was
granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.

ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody
was lodged with the biological parents.
HELD:

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their
parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar,
during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents.
It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. “Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the
civil code”.

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody
over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage
in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority
is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case,
trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting
incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.

BARTOLOME vs SSS

Facts:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the
government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while on board the
vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death
benefits. SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of
John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as
John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s
minority.

Issue:

Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John

Held:

Yes. The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the
right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s
untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death
benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s
sole remaining beneficiary.
People v Darilay

FACTS:

* sps. Pascual and gemma arganda were the parents of five children, the eldest of whom was marilyn
and the second child was ailyn. They are residing in sitio magrimpong sta. Cruz tinambac, camarines sur.

* the couple knew the appellant, Noel darilay, their 15 year old barriomate.

* Marilyn and Ailyn were asked by their parents to buy tinapa from a store about half a km away from
their residence. After buying tinapa, they walked back home. On their way home they saw the appllant
emerge from a catmon tree.

* appellant struck ailyn twice with a piece of woodon her back and face, and all over her body. The
appellant then struck marilyn twice on the back with a piece of wood. When Ailyn regained her bearings,
she looked for marilyn but the appellant and her sister were nowhere to be found.

*RTC : convicted the appellant of rape with homicide and ordered to pay the heirs of Marilyn Arganda

ISSUE: WON spouses darilay are primarily and directly liable for the damages incurred by their minor
child.

RULING: Yes. Considering that at the time of the commission of the crime, the appellant was a
minorunder the parental authority of his parents, the sps. Manuel and Julieta Darilay are primarily and
directly liable for the damages sustained by the heirs of the victims Marilyn and Ailyn Arganda. The
spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay, are ordered to pay jointly and severally, to Ailyn Arganda the
amount of 25k for MD and 25k for ED.

GARCIA JR VS SALVADOR

FACTS: Respondent Ranida started working as a trainee in the accounting department of Limay Bulk
Handling Terminal, Inc. As a prerequisite-for regular employment, she underwent a medical examination
at Community Diagnostic Center. Garcia who is the medical technologist, conducted HBs Ag(Hepa B
Surface Antigen) tes and CDC issued the test result indicating that she was HBs Ag: Reactive. The result
bore the signature of Garcia as examiner and the rubber stamp signature of Castro as pathologist. When
Ranida submitted the result to Dr. Sto Domingo, the company physician, she found out that Ranida is
suffering from Hepa B, a liver disease. The company terminated her fir failing the physical exam. When
Ranida informed her father, Ramon, he suffered a heart attack and was confined at Bataan Doctors. She
underwent another test at the said hosp and the result indicated that she is non-reactive. She informed
Sto Domingo but latter said that CDC result is moe reliable because they used a modern method.

She went to CDC for another test and the result indicated negative result. The company rehired Ranida.
Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint against Garcia and unknown pathologist.

Trial court dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: WON Garcia Jr is liable for damages?

HELD: YES. CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by law.
Defendant-Appellee Castro was name as the head of CDC. However, Castro’s infrequent visit to the
clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective administrative supervision and control over the
activities in the laboratory. Garcia conducted the HBsAg test of the respondent without the supervision
of the defendant-appellee Castro. The disputed HBsAG Test result was released without the
authorization of Castro. His failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for the
protection of the public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably prudent
health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.

DECISION OF THE CA IS AFFIRMED.

PACIS v MORALES

Topic: Owners and managers of establishments and enterprises

DOCTRINE: A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his
control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances.
Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business
which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a
higher degree of care.

FACTS: Alfredo Pacis and Cleopatra Pacis filed a civil case for damages against Jerome Jovanne Morales.
Spouses Paceis are the parents of Alfred, 17 y.o. who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun
Firearms and Ammunitions Store (gun store) in Baguio City. Morales is the owner.

Alfred died due to a gunshot wound in the head which he sustained while he was at gunstore. The bullet
which killed Alfred was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the gun store for repair. The gun,
was left by Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store.

Morales as in Manila at the time. His employee Armando Jarnague, who was the regular caretaker of the
gun store was also not around. Jarnague entrusted to Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of keys which
included the key to the drawer where the gun was kept. It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later
brought out the gun from the drawer and palced it in top of the table. Attacted by it, Alfred got hold of
it. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. Alfred followed but it went off the bullet hitting Alfred.

The trial court held Morales civilly liable for the death of Alftred under A2180 in relation to A2176, ruling
that the accidental shooting of Alfred which caused his death was partyl due to the negligence of
Morales’ emplyee – Matibag. CA reversed, ruling that there was no employee-employer relationship
because Matibag was not under the control of Morales with respect to the means and methods in the
performance of his worK, thus A2180 cannot apply. And even if Matibag was an employee, Morales still
cannot be held civilly liable because there is no negligence can be attributed to Morales because he kept
the gun.

ISSUE: WON Morales is civilly liable?

RULING: YES. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside
the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not
loaded, Morales himself was negligent.

Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person
who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic
security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be
suspended or canceled.

As a gun store owner, Morales is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have
known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
others. Morales has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be
stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready access
defensive use.

In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective
gun for repair, Morales should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident.
Indeed, Morales should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open
and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded

Clearly, Morales did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family,
much less the The bullet which killed Alfred was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the gun
store for repair.

Genson v Adarle

FACTS:

* arbatin was the successful bidder in a public auction of junk and other unserviceable govt property in
hway district engrs office of roxas city.

* Arbatin hired Adarle to help him haul the junk.

*on a non-working day, when adarle and Buensalido, the driver of the payloader, were at the site
continuing to gather the junk, a bucket from the payloader fell and injured adarle to the point of
paralyzing his lower extremities.

*Adarle instituted an action against Arbatin, Buensalido, Marcelino (civil engineer), and Genson (hway
dist. Engr.).

*RTC: ruled in favor of Adarle

*IAC: Absolved Marcelino from liability and averring that the liability of Genson is based on fault, by
allowing arbatin and his men to work on the premises on a non-working day.

*petitioner Genson appealed to the SC that the basis of his liability averred by IAC is without basis.
Furthermore, he contends that by filing a case against him, Adarle is then filing a suit against the
republic, which violates the non-suability of the state.

ISSUE: WON Genson should be liable personally or officially?

RULING: NO.

* with regard to the non-suability contention, Adarle filed a suit against Genson personally, in his
capacity as the hway dist. Engr, and not the state or his office.

* there was no evidence to prove gensons presence when the accident occured and there was no basis
for the lower courts to hold genson liable for authorizing arbatin and his men to work on a non-working
day.

* the master-servant doctrine in tort law cannot apply either, since despite the fact that buensalido,
Genson's employee, was moonlighting on a non working day, Buensalidos arrangement with arbatin was
private in nature and has nothing to do with his being employed under gerson.

* Absent the showing of malice, bad faith or gross negligence on the part of genson, he cannot be held
liable for the acts committed by Buensalido and arbatin.

MARTIN VS CA

FACTS: Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car. At around 2am, while being driven by Nestor
Martin, it crashed into a Meralco Electric Post. The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged.
Meralco demanded reparation from Ernesto but the latter rejected the demand. Petitioner’s main
defense was that Nestor was not his employee.

RTC’s decision is in favor of the plaintiff Meralco. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON Ernesto is liable for damages as an employer of Nestor?

HELD: NO. ART 2180 is applicable only if there is an employer-employee relationship although it is not
necessary that the employer be engaged in any business or industry. No evidence was adduced by
Meralco to show that Ernesto was the employer of Nestor at the the of the accident. The more plausible
assumption is that Nestor is a close relative of Ernesto and on the date in question borrowed the car for
some private purpose. Nestor would probably not have been accommodated if he were a mere
employee for employees do not usually enjoy the use of their employer’s car at 2am.
CUISON V. NORTON

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM vs CA

Facts:

Clarita Camacho requested Shell to conduct a hydro-pressure test on the underground storage tanks of
her station to determine if the sales losses which she was incurring is due to leakages. One Jessie
Feliciano together eith other workers came to Clarita's station with an order from Shell to perform the
hydro-pressure test. After performing the test, they opened the station, and started selling gasoline.
However, the customers returned, complaining that their vehicles stalled because the gasoline has
water in it. One of the customers filed a complaint against Camacho, and caused it to be published in a
newspaper. Thereafter, Camacho filed a complaint for damages against Shell due to the latter's
negligence in the conduct of the test. Shell denied it, stating that the test was conducted by an
independent contractor.

Issue:

Whether or not Shell should be held liable for the test conducted by Feliciano

Held:

No. Petitioner did not exercise control and supervision over Feliciano with regard to the manner in
which the test was conductes. He is independently maintaining a business which is a duly registered in
the Bureau of Domestic Trade. He does not enjoy a fixed salary, but charges a sum consideration for
every piece of work. If he doesn't finish his work, he doesn't get paid. Also, he utilizes his own tools and
has a complement of workers, neither is he required to work on a regular basis, instead, he merelt
awaits calls from clients whenever repairs and maintenance are requested. And lastly, Feliciano does not
give his service exclusively for petitioner. All of these all hallmarks of an independent contractor.

De leon brokerage co., inc. V CA

FACTS:

*Respondent Angeline Steen,16, suffered injuries as a reukt of the collision happened bet. A passenger
jeepney in which she was riding, and petitioners cargo truck recklessly driven by its employee,Luna.

* Respondent had reserved her right to file a separate civil action.

* After judgment of conviction had been rendered, respondent filed in the CFI of manila an action for
recovery of damages against luna and De leon brokerage co.

*Defendants, that is, luna and petitioner, sought to prove that by means of the formers testimony that
he was not engaged in the performance of his duties at the time of the accident.
ISSUES:

1. WON the complaint of the respondent was based on quasi delict? YES

2. WON the action is for civil indemnity under the criminal code? NO

3. WON luna was in the performance of his duties at the time of collision? YES

4. WON the employer only becomes solidarily liable to the driver if he is riding in the car at the time of
the mishap? NO

5. WON the damages should be reduced? NO

RULING:

1. YES. respondent alleged that she suffered injuries because of the carelessness and imprudence of
petitioners chauffeur who was driving the cargo truck, whick collided the passenger jeepney. Since it
was established that there was an Employer-employee relationship, there is a clear statement of a right
under art. 2180. The complaint does not have to allege that petitioner did not exercise due diligence in
choosing and supervising luna, because this is a matter of defense.

2. No. Respondent clearly did not base her suit on the criminal conviction. Mention of the criminal
conviction merely tended to support her claim that luna had been recklessly negligent in driving the
truck.

3. Yes. Luna testified that on the day of the accident he had been instructed to go to pampanga,from
there to proceed to nueva ecija.

4. No. The provision of art. 2184 stating that the owner of the motor vehicle is riding therein at the time
of the mishap to hold the owner liable does not apply to the case. That article refers to owners of
vehicles who are not included in the terms of art. 2180 "as owner of an establishment or enterprise."

5. No. The amounts were justified and not unconscionable for the disfigurement suffered by the
respondent.

VALENZUELA VS CA

FACTS: Plaintiff Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant to her home. She
noticed something wrong with her tires, she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to
verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people that her
rear right tire was flat and that-she cannot reach home in that car’s condition. She parked along the
sidewalk, about 1 1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the
rear to open the trunk.

She was standing at the left side of the rear of her cad pointing tools to a man who will help her fix the
tire when she was suddenly bumped by car driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
Alexander Commercial Inc. Plaintiff’s leg was severed up to the middl of her thigh. She was eventually
fitted with an artificial leg.

Trial Court found defendant Li guilty of negligence and held Alexander as an employer jointly and
severally liable for damages. CA affirmed RTC’s Decision but absolved Alexander Commercial Inc from
any liability.

ISSUE: WON Alexander Commercial Inc is also liable for damages?

HELD: Yes. Alexander Commercial Inc has not demonstrated, to the Court’s satisfaction, that it exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations
were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the
driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having
been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting
its company car to Li, said company, based in the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly
and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Valenzuela during the accident.

DECISION OF THE CA IS MODIFIED WITH THE EFFECT OF REINSTATING THE JUDGMENT OF RTC.

Maria Benita A. Dulay, et al., v. The Court of Appeals, et al.

Lesson Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

December 7, 1988: Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at Big Bang
Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay

Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her
minor children filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge
of the firearm and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security
Corp. (Superguard) as employers for negligence having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father
of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury

Superguard:

Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and was committed with deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which
states:

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.

civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code
CA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of Dulay

ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard commited an actionable breach and can be civilly liable even if
Benigno Torzuela is already being prosecuted for homicide

HELD: YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the merits

Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives
the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article
2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine
that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional.

Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but
also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate
civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary

extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused

It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the
latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD
and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts.
UMALI vs BACANI

Facts:

In 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana
plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on
the electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post
and the other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a
laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but
that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8
months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road,
went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted
and he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.

Issue:

Whether or not boy’s parents’ negligence exempts petitioner from liability

Held:

Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim) was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' (petitioners’) lack of due care,
the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law
may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury
caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Secosa v Heirs of erwin suarez francisco

FACTS:

* Francisco an 18 year old 3rd year physical therapy student was riding a motorcycle. A sand and gravel
truck was travelling behind the motorcycle, which in turn was being tailed by the Isuzu truck driven by
Secosa.

*The Isuzu cargo truck was owned by dassad warehousing and port services, inc.

* The three vehicles were traversing southbound at a fairly highspeed.

* secosa overtook the sand gravel truck, he bumped the motorcycle of francisco causing francisco to fall.
The rear wheels of the Isuzu truck ran over francisco causing his instantaneous death.

* secosa left the truck and fled the scene of collision.

* The parents of francisco, filed an action for damages against secosa, dassad warehousing and port
services, Inc and dassads president, El BuenasucensoSy.

* RTC: ruled in favor of the respondents.

 CA: affirmed

ISSUES:

1.WON Dassads president, El BuenasucensoSy, can be held solidary liable with co-petitioners.

2. WON CA erred when it affirmed the decision of RTC that Dassad did not exercise the diligence of a
good father of family in the selection and supervision of its employees.

RULING:

1. No. A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its members and stockholders. The
Isuzu truck which ran over francisco was registered in the name of Dassad and not in the name of Sy.
Secosa is an employee of Dassad and not Sy.

2. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption that
there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the
supervision over him after such selection.

The presumption however may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.

MERCURY DRUG VS BAKING

FACTS: Respondent Baking went to the clonic of Dr. Sy for a medical check-up. Dr. Sy found out that
respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal levels. Dr Sy then gave respondent two
medical prescription-Diamicron and Benalize. Respondent then proceeded to Petitioner Mercury Drug
to buy the prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a
prescription for Dormicum. Dormicum is a sleeping tablet. Unaware, that the medicine given to him was
wrong, respondent took one pill on three consecutive days. On the 3rd day, respondent figured in a
vehicular accident. Respondent fell asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about the
collision. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and mental state. He
returned to Dr Sy. Dr Sy was schocked to find that what sold to Respondent was Dormicum instead of
Diamicron.

Respondent filed complaint against Petitioner. Trial Court is in favor of the respondent. CA affirmed the
decision.

ISSUE: WON the negligence of Petitioner was the proximate cause of Respondent’s accident?

HELD: Yes. Proximate Cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred
otherwise. Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee been careful
in reading Dr. Sy’s prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was
unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and AURMELA GANZON vs. RAUL DE LEON

G.R. No. 165622 [ October 17, 2008]

Facts:

Respondent Raul T. De Leon, a judge, noticed that his left eye was reddish. He also had difficulty reading.
On the same evening, he met a friend who happened to be a doctor, Dr. Charles Milla. The latter
prescribed the drugs “CortisporinOpthalmic” and “Ceftin” to relieve his eye problems. Before heading
to work the following morning, De Leon went to the Betterliving, Parañaque, branch of Mercury Drug
Store Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. He showed his prescription to petitioner
AurmelaGanzon, a pharmacist assistant. At his chambers, De Leon requested his sheriff to assist him in
using the eye drops. As instructed, the sheriff applied 2-3 drops on respondent’s left eye. Instead of
relieving his irritation, respondent felt searing pain. He immediately rinsed the affected eye with water,
but the pain did not subside. Only then did he discover that he was given the wrong medicine,
“CortisporinOtic Solution.” De Leon returned to the same Mercury Drug branch, with his left eye still red
and teary. When he confronted Ganzon why he was given ear drops, instead of the prescribed eye
drops, she did not apologize and instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully read the
prescription and it was her supervisor who apologized and informed De Leon that they do not have
stock of the needed CortisporinOpthalmic. De Leon wrote Mercury Drug, through its president, Ms.
Vivian K. Askuna, about the day’s incident. Instead, two sales persons went to his office and informed
him that their supervisor was busy with other matters. Having been denied his simple desire for a
written apology and explanation, De Leon filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug.

Issue:

Whether or not the Mercury Drug and Ganzon are liable.

Ruling:

Yes. Mercury Drug and Ganzoncannot exculpate themselves from any liability. As active players in the
field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them.
Likewise, numerous decisions, both here and abroad, have laid salutary rules for the protection of
human life and human health. In the United States case of Tombari v. Conners, it was ruled that the
profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists must exercise care of a specially high
degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. In other words, druggists must exercise the
highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards
consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly be
exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines.

In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection
or supervision of one’s employees. This presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing that the
employer has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to
overcome such presumption.

Petitioners Mercury Drug and Ganzon have similarly failed to live up to high standard of diligence
expected of them as pharmacy professionals. They were grossly negligent in dispensing ear drops
instead of the prescribed eye drops to De Leon.

As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of Mercury Drug and its employees in
dispensing to him the right medicine. This Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the
buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There exists an imperative duty on the seller or the
druggist to take precaution to prevent death or injury to any person who relies on one’s absolute
honesty and peculiar learning.

HEIRS OF COMPLETO vs ALBAYDA

Facts:

Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force, and Completo was the taxi driver of a Toyota Corolla
which was owned by Abiad. Albayda was riding a bike on his way to the office, when Completo's taxi
bumped and sideswept him, causing serious physical injuries. Albayda was brought to the hospital, and
confined for 7 months. Albayda alleged that Completo's negligence is the proximate cause of the
incident. On the other hand, Completo alleged that he was carefully driving the taxicab when he heard a
strange sound from the taxicab's rear right side. Furthermore, Abiad, the taxicab operator, said that
when Completo applied as a taxicab driver, Abiad required him to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and
driver's license. Completo never figured in a vehicular accident since he was employed, and according to
Abiad, he was a good driver and good man.

Issue:

Whether or not Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of the family

Held:

Yes. In the selection of employees, emplouers are required to examine them as to theie qualifications,
experience, and service records. With respect to supervision, employers should formulate SOPs and
monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches. To establish these factors
in atrial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence. Abiad's evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence, and rhis is
insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that he was negligent in the selection and supervision of
Completo.
Ortaliz v Echarri

FACTS:

* Winston Ortaliz is the son of Jose Ortaliz and Elena Lucasan

*on or about dec. 18, 1953, winston was hit by a sedan at the corner of washington and justicia streets,
causing upon him physical injuries as a result of which he was taken to the occidental negros provincial
hospital.

* The sedan was driven by segundo estranda, a driver under the employ of echarri.

* An information was filed against estanda in the municipal court of bacolod for the crime of slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence.

* estanda pleaded guilty and has already served his penalty.

* Jose Ortaliz prayed that his family be awarded moral damages. Echarri refused to pay.

*Echarri filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that his liability is based on the rpc and not civil code.
He also argued that there is no allegation in the complaint that he was engaged in some kind of industry
and the employee had committed the crime in the discharge of his duties in connection with such
industry, and he cannot be held liable, even subsidiarily.

ISSUES:

1. WON Echarri can be held liable for the negligence of his employee. Yes

2. WON it was necessary for Ortaliz to reserve their right to file a civil action. No

RULING:

1. YES. art. 2180 (5) refutes his contention. The civil code provides that employers shall be held liable for
damages caused by their employees w/in the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
employersare not engage in any business or industry.

2. NO. Art. 33 of the civil code provides that civil action for damages arising in a case of physical injuries
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only preponderance of evidence.

66. Child learning center, inc v tagorio

FACTS:

* Timothy Tagoria was a gr. 4 student at marymount sch, an academic institution operated by child
learning center.
* one afternoon, tagoria found himself locked inside the boy's cr in marymount. He started to panic so
he banged and kicked the door and yelled for help.No help arrived.

* He opened the window and called for help. Tagoria went right through and fell down 3 stories. He was
hospitalized for serious multiple physical injuries.

* his parents filed a civil action against child learning, its BODs wc includes sps limon.

* they claim that the sch was negligent for not installing iron grills at the window of the boys cr.

*CLC contends: nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the door and it had exercised due
care and diligence of a good father of a family.

ISSUE: WON the school was negligent for the boy's accidental fall.

RULING:

YES. In every tort case filed under art. 2176 of the civil code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence:

1. The damages suffered by the plaintiff

2. Fault or negligence of the defendant

3. Tge connection of the cause and effect bet. The fault or negligence and the damages incurred.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where:

1. The accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened
except for the defendants negligence.

2. The accident must have caused by an agency w/in the exclusive mgmt and of the person charged with
negligence complained of.

3. The accident must not have been due to any voluntary action of the person injured.

* petitioners argument that CLC observed due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees is applicable only where the employer is being held liable for the acts or
omissions under art. 2180 and not. Art. 2176
Cerezo v Tuazon

FACTS:

Noontime, June 26, 1993 -- A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle in Pampanga. The
driver of the tricycle Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, the owner of the bus
lines, her husband, Atty. Cerezo, and bus driver Foronda.

According to the facts alleged in the complaint, Tuazon was driving on the proper lane. There was a
"Slow Down" sign which Foronda ignored. After the complaint was filed, alias summons was served
upon the person of Atty. Cerezo, the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor.

In their reply, Mrs. Cerezo contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction because there was
no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate
civil action for damages in the criminal action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mrs. Cerezo is liable for damages

HELD:

Mrs. Cerezo's contention is wrong. Tuazon's case is not based on criminal law but on quasi-delict under
the Civil Code.

The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Art. 103, RPC, or may give
rise to an action for quasi-delict under Art. 2180, C.C. An aggrieved party may choose between the two
remedies. An action based on quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. There
is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-
delict. The choice of remedy whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and
jurisdictional issues of the action.

Tuazon's action is based on quasi-delict under Art. 2180: Employer's liability.

Foronda is not an indispensable party, contrary to Mrs. Cerezo's contention. An indispensable party is
one whose interest is affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final
resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in action for quasi-
delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a
solidary liability on the part of the debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation.
Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of
rights, but only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the
parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available
from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect from Mrs.
Cerezo alone.

Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer's
liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with
"subsidiary," refers to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the
character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Art. 2180 originates from the negligent act
of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes
damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not
preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly
liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee's criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable
directly and separate for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and
supervising his employee. The idea that the employer's liability is wholly subsidiary is wrong.

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another) without including the
author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence
of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but is not subsidiary in the sense that it cannot be
instituted till after the judgment against he author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the
principal action; action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action.

In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the
criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Art. 103, RPC. To hold the employer liable in a
subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the
employee's delict and corresponding primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds
from a delict, then the trial court's jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.

However, the action filed by Tuazon was based on a quasi-delict, which is separate and independent
from an action based on a delict. Hence, there was no need to reserve the filing of a separate civil
action.
PETITION IS GRANTED. DECISION OF CA IS REVERSED AND DECISION OF RTC IS DISMISSED.

THE PETITION IS DENIED.

Africa vs Caltex

Facts: In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of
Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into
the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted. The fire spread to and burned several houses. The owners, among them petitioner spouses
Africa and heirs of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo
Boquiren, the agent in charge of its operation, for damages. The CFI and CA found that the petitioners
failed to prove negligence of the respondents, and that there was due care in the premises and with
respect to the supervision of their employees.

Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of the respondents.

Held: Yes. Res ipsa loquitur literally means “the thing or transaction speaks for itself.” For the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur to apply, the following requisites should be present: (a) the accident is of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing
conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In the case at bar, the gasoline
station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of respondents. A fire
occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could
have known how the fire started were respondents and their employees, but they gave no explanation
thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of
care. The negligence of the employees was the proximate cause of the fire, which in the ordinary course
of things does not happen. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the award for damages.