REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-20620

August 15, 1974

FACTS:
In 1947, a parcel of land owned by Carmen M. VDA. DeCastellvi had been occupied by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) on a lease agreement on a year-to-year basis. Before the
expiration of the contract in June 30, 1956, a renewal of contract was sought by the Republic
but Castellvi refused. Castellvi sent notices to vacate with a demand to return and deliver the
property but the AFP refused on the ground that permanent installations and other facilities had
been erected and already established on the property making it difficult for them to vacate the
property. On August 10, 1959, the republic was placed in possession of the land through an
expropriations proceedings as recommended by the President of the Republic.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the taking of the property under expropriation commenced at 1947.

HELD:
The requisites for taking are: the expropriator must enter a private property; the entry must be
for more than a momentary period; it must be under warrant or color of authorities; the
property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Only the first, third and fourth requisites are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of
Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place
in 1947 when the republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof, and that the
just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi’s property should not be determined on the basis
of the value of the property as of that year.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the
property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the
just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR., in his capacity as Project Manager of the National
Irrigation Administration v. CLARITA VDA. DE ONORIO
G.R. No. 146062
June 28, 2001

FACTS:
Clarita Vda. de Enorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nio, South Cotabato with
an area of 39,512 square meters. On October 6, 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager
of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), approved the construction of the main irrigation
canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. Respondents
husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the
government for the area taken. Sometime in 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed
where NIA then paid respondent the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way
damages. Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees which
waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to construction of the right of way. On
December 10, 1990, respondent demanded payment of P111,299.55 taking of her property, but
petitioner refused to pay. Petitioner argued that the government had not consented to be sued,
the total area used by the NIA for its irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square
meters, and respondent was not entitled to compensation for the taking of her property
considering that she secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under C.A.
No. 141

ISSUE:
Whether or not the value of just compensation shall be determined from the time of the taking
or from the time of the finality of the decision.

HELD:
With respect to the compensation, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should
be paid or that sum of money which a person is willing to buy, and an owner is willing to sell,
would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor. Further, just compensation means
not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
just for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait before actually receiving the amount necessary to
cope with his loss. Nevertheless, as noted in Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., there are instances where
the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case
just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of
the action of eminent domain.

Rule 67, Sec. 4. Order of expropriation provided that if the objections to and the defense
against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party
appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for
the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property
may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the
court from determining the just compensation to be paid.

The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not
intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only
the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation
to be paid can be truly just not only to the individual whose property is taken, but to the public,
which is to pay for it.
CELESTINO TATEL v. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A. SURTIDA, in his
capacity as Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 40243
March 11, 1992

FACTS:
Celestino Tatel is a businessman engaged in the import and export of abaca and other
products. On March 18, 1966, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to
investigate on the complaints of the residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the disturbance
caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse operated and
owned by Tatel which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke,
obnoxious color and dust emitted by the machine. On April 22, 1966, Resolution No. 29 was
passed by the municipality of Virac declaring the warehouse of Tatel a public nuisance within
the purview of Art. 694 of the New Civil Code. Tatel then filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction. Respondent municipal official allege that petitioner’s warehouse was
constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, s-52 prohibiting the construction of warehouses
near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary
distance of 200m from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental
fire.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning of Art. 694 of
the New Civil Code.
2. Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, s-52 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional
and void.

HELD:
1. The warehouse which stored abaca and copra is not only in violation of the provisions of
the ordinance but poses a grave danger to the safety of the lives and properties of the
residents in case of accidental fire and constitutes a public nuisance under the provisions
of Article 694 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 694 defines nuisance as
any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else
which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the
senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes
with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5)
hinders or impairs the use of property.

2. Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952 is constitutional and valid. Said ordinance was passed
in the exercise of the municipality’s police power. Municipal corporations are agencies of
the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are
endowed with the police powers to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared
objects of their creation. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established
and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal
ordinance: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive, (3) must not be partial or discriminatory, (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade, (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must
not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, s-52 meets these criteria.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC.
G.R. No. 148339.
February 23, 2005

FACTS:
The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses
and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby
directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their
passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared
inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-
buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the
city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid
exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power on lawful
subject and lawful means.

HELD:
The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if
the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed
are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful
subject and lawful method. The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective
of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, involve public interest warranting the
interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus
present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena
Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by
overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem.
Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the
users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly
found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the
problem lies and then to stop it right there. The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an
equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of
the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its reasonableness, not its
effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were
measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they
happen to be effective.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA, as representative of the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church v. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ILOCOS NORTE, ET
AL.
G.R. No. L-27588
December 31, 1927

FACTS:
The plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, represented by the Bishop of Nueva
Segovia, possesses and is the owner of a parcel of land in the municipality of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, all four sides of which face on public streets. On the south side is a part of the
churchyard, the convent and an adjacent lot used for a vegetable garden, containing an area
off 1,624 square meters, in which there is a stable and a well for the use of the convent. In the
center is the remainder of the churchyard and the church. On the north is an old cemetery with
two of its walls still standing, and a portion where formerly stood a tower, the base of which
still be seen, containing a total area of 8,955 square meters. On July 3, 1925 the plaintiff paid,
under protest, the land tax on the lot adjoining the convent and the lot which formerly was the
cemetery with the portion where the tower stood.
The plaintiff filed this action for the recovery of the sum paid by to the defendants by way of
land tax, alleging that the collection of this tax is illegal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the collection of land tax on the lot adjoining the covenant and the lot which
formerly was the cemetery was illegal.

HELD:
The collection of land tax on both lots is illegal. The exemption in favor of the convent in the
payment of the land tax (sec. 344 [c] Administrative Code) refers to the home of the parties
who presides over the church and who has to take care of himself in order to discharge his
duties. In therefore must, in the sense, include not only the land actually occupied by the
church, but also the adjacent ground destined to the ordinary incidental uses of man. Except in
large cities where the density of the population and the development of commerce require the
use of larger tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden belongs to a house and, in the
case of a convent, it use is limited to the necessities of the priest, which comes under the
exemption.

In regard to the lot which formerly was the cemetery, while it is no longer used as such, neither
is it used for commercial purposes and, according to the evidence, is now being used as a
lodging house by the people who participate in religious festivities, which constitutes an
incidental use in religious functions, which also comes within the exemption.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. ROMEO F. EDU in his capacity as Land Transportation
Commissioner, and UBALDO CARBONELL, in his capacity as National Treasurer
G.R. No. L- 41383
August 15, 1988

FACTS:
The Philippine Airlines (PAL) is a corporation engaged in the air transportation business under a
legislative franchise, Act No. 42739. Under its franchise, PAL is exempt from the payment of
taxes.
Sometime in 1971, however, Land Transportation Commissioner Romeo F. Elevate (Elevate)
issued a regulation pursuant to Section 8, Republic Act 4136, otherwise known as the Land and
Transportation and Traffic Code, requiring all tax exempt entities, among them PAL to pay
motor vehicle registration fees.
Despite PAL's protestations, Elevate refused to register PAL's motor vehicles unless the amounts
imposed under Republic Act 4136 were paid. PAL thus paid, under protest, registration fees of
its motor vehicles. After paying under protest, PAL through counsel, wrote a letter dated May
19,1971, to Land Transportation Commissioner Romeo Edu (Edu) demanding a refund of the
amounts paid. Edu denied the request for refund. Hence, PAL filed a complaint against Edu and
National Treasurer Ubaldo Carbonell (Carbonell).

ISSUE:
Whether or not motor vehicle registration fees are considered as taxes.

HELD:
Yes. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and
substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax. Such is the case of motor
vehicle registration fees. The motor vehicle registration fees are actually taxes intended for
additional revenues of the government even if one fifth or less of the amount collected is set
aside for the operating expenses of the agency administering the program.
Indeed, taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power (Lutz v. Araneta, 98
Phil. 148).
If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial
purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax. Such is the case of motor vehicle
registration fees. The conclusions become inescapable in view of Section 70(b) of Rep. Act 587
quoted in the Calalang case. Though nowhere in Rep. Act 4136 does the law specifically state
that the imposition is a tax, Section 591-593 speaks of "taxes" or fees ... for the registration or
operation or on the ownership of any motor vehicle, or for the exercise of the profession of
chauffeur ..." making the intent to impose a tax more apparent. Thus, even Rep. Act 5448 cited
by the respondents, speak of an "additional" tax," where the law could have referred to an
original tax and not one in addition to the tax already imposed on the registration, operation, or
ownership of a motor vehicle under Rep. Act 41383. Simply put, if the exaction under Rep. Act
4136 were merely a regulatory fee, the imposition in Rep. Act 5448 need not be an "additional"
tax. Rep. Act 4136 also speaks of other "fees," such as the special permit fees for certain types
of motor vehicles (Sec. 10) and additional fees for change of registration (Sec. 11). These are
not to be understood as taxes because such fees are very minimal to be revenue-raising.

It is quite apparent that vehicle registration fees were originally simple exceptional intended
only for rigidly purposes in the exercise of the State's police powers. Over the years, however,
as vehicular traffic exploded in number and motor vehicles became absolute necessities without
which modem life as we know it would stand still, Congress found the registration of vehicles a
very convenient way of raising much needed revenues. Without changing the earlier deputy of
registration payments as "fees," their nature has become that of "taxes."