CSSE –May 29, 2010 – June 1, 2010

Session 4.08 Saturday, May 29, 2010

Jeannie Kerr
Cultivating Teachers’ Wise Professional Judgment:
On Phronesis and Refined Perception

This is what “learning” and “teaching” are like here. - What one acquires here
is not a technique; one learns correct judgements. There are also rules, but
they do not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them right.
Unlike calculating-rules. What is most difficult here is to put this
indefiniteness, correctly and unfalsified, into words.
Ludwig Wittgenstein

Introduction

A key challenge in teaching is addressing the complexity of educational contexts affected by new

technologies, economic and cultural globalization, and social diversity. In order to address these

complexities in a way that promotes just, caring and sustainable ways of life, teachers must be able

to exercise wise professional judgment informed by attention to the moral appropriateness of

educational ends and the moral nature of teaching. A key consideration in teacher education is

thus how to prepare teachers for the challenges and opportunities of the complex contexts of

professional practice.

In this paper, I will argue as does Trotman (2008) that the expertise teachers require cannot be

codified in routine forms of performance training (p. 159), but must come from the development

of practical wisdom. In this paper, I will draw on Aristotle’s writings in the Nicomachean Ethics,

as well Joseph Dunne and other neo-Aristotelian authors to provide my conception of phronesis or

practical wisdom that I believe should inform teacher education. Finally, I will provide an

understanding of the role of refined perception in practical wisdom and consider how its
 2

cultivation can be supported within programs of teacher education. In this regard, I will draw

principally from Martha Nussbaum.

I would also point out at this early stage in my paper than I have a passionate interest in this

concept of wise professional judgment that is not limited to purely academic pursuits. While I am

currently in my PhD program at the University of British Columbia and immersed in considering

the relation of aspects of moral intuition to teachers’ wise professional judgement, I am also

approaching this topic with 12 years of public school teaching experience. My experience as a

teacher, which still continues on a part-time basis, is a large part of my personal and professional

identity. It is my lived experience of being a teacher combined with an evolving sense of

academic identity that drives my interest in coming to more in-depth understandings on how we

can cultivate wise professional judgment in teacher education.

To many people it seems unusual or perhaps a little misdirected that I believe Aristotle’s ideas are

relevant to our educational concerns in the present day. Aristotle is not a name that comes up very

often in public schools and only occasionally in university classes. It may seem somewhat

counter-intuitive to seek out the words of ancient scholars to address our modern educational

problems. Although I acknowledge that there are difficulties in sourcing ancient scholars, I do

believe that Aristotle has a great deal to offer us today – both through his own words, and the

words of modern scholars working in the Aristotelian tradition. I think Aristotle’s guidance is

particularly useful in addressing the pervasive and misdirected trend in education of framing

teaching as an activity that can be primarily understood and developed through codification.
 3

In his book Back to the Rough Ground: Practical Judgment and the Lure of Technique (1993)

Joseph Dunne sees this reductionist trend in education as being a part of a larger western cultural

trend to rationalize societal practices through applying a constrained model of rationality to human

practices (pp. 7-8). Dunne (2005) argues that in education we have been lured into a technical

orientation that promises objectivity from the subjective; transparency of its procedures;

replicability of its operations; generalisability of its findings; predictability which we can use to

control; and the provision of unambiguous criteria for establishing accountability (p.377). To

some degree we can also see that this rationalizing of teaching practice is an attempt to render

teaching teacher proof. In this rational model, teachers do not make wise judgments in the very

complex reality of teaching, but employ models, rubrics and checklists. Something is terribly

wrong with this technical version of teaching, and I believe that Aristotle’s concept of phronesis

can assist us in revealing the inherent problems in a technical perspective and also provide a more

appropriate orientation to teaching practice.

In this paper my first objective is to portray the Aristotelian concept of phronesis through the

words of Aristotle and neo-Aristotelian authors in a way that brings these voices together to enrich

our understanding of the concept. While it is clear that I am fully sympathetic to the concept of

phronesis, at least as I conceive it, there are difficulties in sourcing an ancient scholar that require

certain considerations. Since Aristotle is not here to respond to questions or elaborate his ideas, or

to recontextualize his ideas in a historical sense, Neo-Aristotelian authors take up that challenge.

Rarely, if ever are these authors working on just one concept but are often touching on and refining

various concepts in relation to the wider Ethic. Further as Jana Noel (1999) points out, various

authors translate words differently in line with the focus with which they approach the topic. Noel

identifies the key perspectives as rational, moral and situational (p. 275). In this endeavour, I am
 4

not merely summarizing neo-Aristotelian literature on phronesis. I am attempting to identify,

understand and elaborate key understandings, as well as the defend some of the key claims of

phronesis, which have been argued by various authors with differing emphases, and bringing them

back into a coherent understanding which takes account of the rational, moral and situational

elements of phronesis.

Phronesis – Finding the Key Themes

In this section I will be starting out with Joseph Dunne and his investigations of phronesis in Back

to the Rough Ground as well as clarifications and extensions in his writings that have been

produced since 1993. I think it is appropriate to focus on Dunne as his work on phronesis is the

most comprehensive available on the specific topic. As I outline Dunne’s interpretation, I will

bring in authors that provide refinements, departures, and defensive arguments to create a more

developed concept.

Dunne is able to give phronesis a comprehensive development through comparing it to techne as a

form of productive rather than practical knowledge. Rather than recreate that method here, I will

be pointing out some key features of phronesis as brought out by Dunne and highlighting the

differences to techne where needed for clarification. The key features of phronesis that I will

focus on are as follows: 1) the kind of practical matter with which phronesis is concerned; 2) its

role in uniting intellect and morality through experience; and 3) the place of sensitivity and

perceptiveness related to identifying the ultimate particular.

Phronesis – Original Location and Basic Understandings

 5

The concept of phronesis is introduced in Chapter 6 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as one of

the intellectual virtues and one of the five states by virtue of which the “soul possesses truth” (NE

VI, 3, 1139b). In this introductory section, Aristotle marks the importance of looking to the

possessor of phronesis to more fully understand the concept as being about the person who is able

to deliberate well and make appropriate judgments about the things that are important to leading a

good life.

Today, the ideas put forward in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are commonly referred to as

Aristotelian Virtue Ethics (AVE). In order to position phronesis in a comprehensible way, we need

to consider briefly where it sits within AVE. In AVE, the virtues are divided into two basic

categories – the moral and the intellectual. Phronesis is officially categorized as being an

intellectual virtue. Although, as Randall Curren (1999) points out, this distinction is not as clear

cut as it might appear. Aristotle distinguishes the moral virtues as being associated with the

nutritive non-rational part of the soul, but these are not considered in the Aristotelian sense to be

non-rational, as they are intertwined with the rational part. Aristotle writes that

the moral virtues thus come to be defined as dispositions to feel and be

moved by our various desires or emotions neither too weakly nor too

strongly, but in a way that moves us to choose and act as reason would

dictate, and allows us to take pleasure in doing so. NE II, 5, 6, as cited in

Curren, 1999, p.67.

In contrast, the intellectual virtues are capacities which enable the rational part of the soul to attain

truth (p. 68).

Phronesis - The Kind of Practical Matter

 6

Dunne (1993) interprets Aristotle as conveying that phronesis is concerned specifically with

human affairs in relation to living a good and fulfilling life. He argues that phronesis is a “mode

of knowledge” needed in relation to praxis (living out in the polis) and the subject matter with

which it is concerned is human affairs. Dunne contrasts this with techne as being a mode of

knowledge needed in relation to producing or manufacturing and the subject matter with which it

is concerned is art and craft (p. 250). Dunne points out that for Aristotle the distinction between

the two “types of knowledge” originates in the difference between the two types of activity:

“making and acting are different… [in that] that the reasoned state of capacity to act [i.e.

phronesis] is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make [techne]” 1140a2-5 (p.244).

Dunne (2005) argues that for Aristotle the method should be directed by the subject matter with

which it is concerned (p. 378) and quotes the following section:

As we said at the very beginning that the accounts we demand must be in

accordance with the subject-matter; matters concerned with conduct and
questions of what is good for us have no fixity…the agents themselves
must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion. (NE II, 2,
1104a)

Dunne (1993) argues that it is the difference in ends and means that leads Aristotle to make this

distinction. He contrasts the idea that in production we have an end in mind outside of the maker

and we work toward that end through planning and account for our steps in a logical fashion. In

contrast, in human affairs there is no blueprint for our complex engagements with others and

understanding of ourselves. In human affairs, the ends are internal to the engagement and are in

fact the end. Aristotle states: “while making has an end other than itself action cannot, for good

action (eupraxia) itself is its end” NE VI, 5, 1140b6-7 (as cited in Dunne, p.262).
 7

Phronesis – Uniting Intellect and Morality

Phronesis is officially an intellectual virtue yet Dunne (1999) points out that it does not sit

comfortably on either side of the divide between the moral and intellectual virtues as it is a

necessary component of each virtue (p. 49). Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) states that the moral

virtues are considered in the Aristotelian view to be excellences of character, and each of the

virtues requires phronesis to complete it (p. 12). Hursthouse provides the example of the virtue of

generosity to illustrate the importance of phronesis to completing each virtue. “In the case of

generosity this involves giving the right amount, of the right sort of thing, for the right reasons, to

the right people, on the right occasions” (p. 12). Hursthouse goes on to argue that phronesis is

what contrasts natural virtue from actualized virtue – it is this ability to deliberate about one’s

actions (p. 102).

Dunne (1993) points out that the role of experience answers some circularity in how knowledge

and virtue give rise to each other in AVE. Dunne notes that virtue cannot be about mere cleverness

or naïve goodness. But, the idea that you need to have one to get the other brings a circularity that

needs to be addressed (p. 279). Dunne believes that the idea of experience answers this circularity.

He argues that completed virtue arises from experience and “returns into experience” to provide a

constant reconstruction and enrichment of experience, and this in turn gives rise to a sensitivity

which develops an “eye” for the particular (p. 293). Dunne (1999) goes on to argue that phronesis

is not simply knowledge of practical matters, but also more advanced knowledge of the particulars

of situations and hence informs at the level of universal knowledge as well (pp. 51-52). Dunne

provides the example of the virtue of courage to demonstrate that the real “nerve” of moral

knowledge is not just to understand the universal concept of what courage is, but also to know
 8

what might count as courage in the multitude of contexts in which a person might find herself (pp.

51-52).

Nancy Sherman (1999) asserts that the concept of phronesis makes evident that Aristotelian virtue

ethics is a particularist ethic, but not necessarily a relativistic ethic. Sherman states that

Aristotelian particularism emphasizes that a person “has an obligation to know the facts of the

case, to see and understand what is morally relevant and to make decisions that are responsive to

the exigencies of the case” (p. 38). In the Aristotelian view, Sherman argues that moral decision

making requires both a “top down” account of general ends, and a “bottom-up” narrative of

specific circumstances (p. 39). She notes that moral decision making in virtue ethics does not

preclude moral rules, but that such rules will only be “rough guides or summaries” viewed in light

of the particulars of the case (p. 38). In a continuation of this theme, Martha Nussbaum (1990)

argues that the lack of formal rules does not bring relativism, but more constraint through a double

responsibility – a responsibility to historical commitments and to the context which brings

continuing obligations and newly forged commitments to which a person must respond

intelligently (p. 94).

Phronesis - Intuitive Reasoning and Perception

Dunne, Sherman and Nussbaum suggest the need for perceptiveness as being required in relation

to discerning the particular to inform our moral judgments and actions. Dunne (1993) argues that

finding the ultimate particular is unavailable in formal syllogistic reasoning because phronesis is

really about finding the ultimate minor premise to inform that reasoning (p. 296). Dunne also

argues that phronesis, through the concept of nous (intuitive reason) is able to apprehend both the

ultimate particular and the ultimate major premise. He states: “there is an intuitive character to
 9

both of them insofar as they lie at the limits of argument” (p. 297). Nussbaum (1990) perhaps

addresses this point best when she states that intuitive reasoning “is like perceiving in the sense

that it is noninferential, nondeductive; it is an ability to recognize the salient features of a complex

situation” and “practical perception is gained only through a long process of living and choosing

that develops the agent’s resourcefulness and responsiveness” (pp. 74-75). Anne Phelan (2001)

adds to this discussion in capturing that perceptiveness requires us to dwell in experience to gain

understanding, in contrast to the detachment required of a purely rational approach which misses

the essential knowledge being offered in the experience (p. 47).

Aristotle spoke directly to this idea of perception and states clearly that perception is intuition:

The intuitive reason involved in practical reasoning grasps the last and
variable fact, i.e. the minor premise. For these variable facts are the
starting-points for the apprehension of the end, since the universals are
reached from the particulars; of these therefore we must have perception,
and this perception is intuitive reason. (NE VI, 11, 1143b3-5)

Aristotle highlights that the variables in our human interactions are not subject to inferential

justification or arrived at by argument, but are in fact perceived directly through intuition.

I believe we can conclude that phronesis is a form of knowledge specifically concerned with

human affairs that relies on a decidedly intuitive mode of knowledge. I believe the source of

knowledge for phronesis is an immersed and dialectical engagement with experience which acts to

refine and reconstruct knowledge through repeated yet qualitatively different experiences. The

complexity of human affairs resists the type of technical approaches that work well with knowable

ends, and phronesis is a form that can address human complexity. It is a form of knowledge that is
 10

at once intellectual, but completely intertwined with the emotions, and as such captures the

essence of what it is to be human. As a result of this complexity, phronesis requires a heightened

sensitivity that relies on our intellectual, emotional and intuitive capacities. These capacities and

our repeatedly reconstructed experiences in which we completely immerse ourselves are equally

called on to inform our judgment in human affairs.

Cultivation of Refined Perception in Teacher Education Programs

All of this elaboration on phronesis was undertaken in order to provide some insight into a concern

that education and related teaching practices have become dominated by a focus on technique. I

believe that the concept of phronesis can help us understand why the pervasive focus on technique

in teaching is problematic and also offer more appropriate alternatives. The concept of phronesis

was shown to be a way of interacting in human affairs that acknowledges the complexity of human

engagement. It has been shown to be a capacity that embodies both reason and the emotions to

inform context sensitive judgment, action and feeling. Consequently, practical wisdom is a more

appropriate primary orientation toward teaching than technical mastery. While I acknowledge that

technique is involved in teaching, I believe the person of practical wisdom discerns that technique

should not be the primary orientation in the engaged action of teaching, and is able to distinguish

the occasions that require phronetic versus technical responses.

Through exploring the concept of phronesis it is clear that it is an appropriate orientation for the

study and practice of teaching and is also reliant on refined perception. This leaves the following

question: How do we cultivate the refined perception that is so foundational to phronesis in

teacher education programs?

 11

Cultivating Perception – The Emotions and the Imagination

I believe that Hursthouse (1999) represents Aristotle’s conception of the nature of the human soul

in a way that clearly demonstrates that reason and the emotions are inseparably intertwined in

practical wisdom and thus also related to perception. Hursthouse explains that in Aristotle’s

conception, the human soul consists in a desiderative part (associated with reason) and nutritive

part (associated with the emotions) and that both of these parts are again constitutive of each other

(p. 110). I believe that the foundational role of the emotions in practical reasoning related to

Aristotle’s conception of the soul is suggestive that the emotions are also intimately involved with

perception.

Martha Nussbaum (1990) takes up this consideration of the role of emotions in refining

perception. Nussbaum points out that good perception requires that the whole personality must

see a situation for what it is. Nussbaum argues that “the emotions are themselves modes of vision,

or recognition. Their responses are part of what knowing, that is truly recognizing or

acknowledging, consists in” (p.78). Nussbaum provides the example of the nature of moral

deliberation concerning a friend. She points out that a purely intellectual appraisal of the

friendship and related obligations as the features of the moral situation would miss the mark

without the emotions – similar to providing a manual for telling jokes the essence would be lost.

Nussbaum argues that one cannot be said to truly apprehend the relevant particulars of the moral

situation when the “emotional part of cognition is lacking” (p.79). Therefore, Nussbaum suggests

that the cultivation of emotional openness and responsiveness to situations is required to refine

perception.
 12

Clearly, there is a strong tradition that views the emotions as potentially troublesome to moral

judgment. Nussbaum points out that a cognitive view of the emotions as discerning and educable

is a stark contrast to the influential Platonic view of the emotions as disruptive urges (p.78). For

Nussbaum (1990), our emotions are about objects in the world, and not unthinking forces that

sweep over us (p. 27). Further, an object is viewed from our own “window”, and the emotional

assessment of that object may be accurate or not, but is necessarily invested with value and

importance in our perception of the object’s relation to our own life and well being (pp. 27-32).

For example, fear would not be fear without an object of fear, and a corresponding belief that the

object threatened my life or well being. Whether there is truly anything to be afraid of, and my

belief is correct, is another matter. I would argue that the fact that beliefs may or may not

influence the accuracy of emotions is a reason to examine beliefs more closely and not a reason to

discard emotions as being disruptive of perception.

I believe that the disposition of being emotionally open and responsive suggests the ability to

perceive the particularities of situations in a rich and deeply subjective, yet unobstructed manner.

Vokey (2005) states that the notion of correct moral discernment is most common in the spiritual

and religious traditions, and it is there that we can find thinking and ideas on the cultivation of the

“innate human capacity of moral apprehension” (p. 132). Vokey point out that in both religious

and non-religious texts is the idea that correct apprehension arises when “habitually self-centred

ways of thinking, feeling and acting are unlearned” (p. 132). While acknowledging there are

important implications in what I am introducing, I would like to suggest that the Mahâyâna

Buddhist traditional practices of mindfulness and awareness as discussed and contextualized by

Vokey (2008) are particularly applicable to our current discussion (pp. 20-24).
 13

David Trotman (2008) and Terry Atkinson (2000) are both academics working in teacher education

that also discuss this idea of mindfulness awareness as being particularly useful in encouraging the

development of capacities for practical wisdom as well as intuitive perception in teaching. I would

suggest that it is the attempt to remove obstructions to clear vision that make mindfulness

awareness practices particularly relevant for cultivating perception. While a full discussion of

these ideas, as well as the implications of Buddhist and other spiritual practice in teacher

education, is needed, it is not possible within the scope of the current discussion.

Nussbaum also looks to the cultivation of the imagination as another avenue for cultivation of

perception. Nussbaum argues that the classical repudiation of the imagination on Kantian and

Utilitarian grounds (i.e. lack of impartiality and over concern with particularities at the expense of

generalities) provides corresponding motives for its cultivation (p. 77). Nussbaum calls on

Aristotle’s concept of phantasia as a capability of focusing on concrete particulars so as to

perceive the particulars as something of meaning, but to understand the meaning more fully

through considering the relations to which these concrete particulars are connected. This

capability is seen as working closely with memory enabling a person to focus on absent aspects

and newly combined imaginative possibilities (p 77).

Nussbaum suggests a method of cultivation of the imagination, and thus perception, through

literature: “When we examine our own lives, we have so many obstacles to correct vision …A

novel, just because it is not our life, places us in a moral position that is favourable for perception.

(Nussbaum, 1990, p. 163). From this example, I believe it becomes suggestive that there may be

important relations to consider between aesthetic perception and moral perception. Perhaps

refining our aesthetic perception might in fact refine our moral perception. I believe this is a very
 14

important topic, but again one that will need to be explored more fully at another time with all of

its potential richness and with all of its implications.

Nussbaum seems to suggest that literature can provide us with enriched examples of the

complexity of particular contexts and place us in some sort of position that allows us to think and

imagine variations and possibilities of the context as a way to refine perception. From this point,

we need to consider what types of literature are suited to this task. In his discussion of inductive

technique in rhetorical examples, Paul Schollmeier (1991) suggests that universals are drawn from

particularities by rhetorical example focused on means instead of ends. I would suggest that the

same holds true for examples from literature. Literature that is richly detailed in the messy

complexity of the particularities of situations, rather than suggesting a straight forward

generalisability and neatly packaged end, would seem to offer more opportunity to refine

perception.

Cultivating Perception - Moral Sensitivity and Language

Lawrence Blum (1994) in his book Moral Perception and Particularity raises the point that

perception of particulars is often a sensitivity to particular sorts of moral features, such as

dishonesty, injustice, racism, etc. (p. 45). The ability to refine perception would involve moving

from using moral language such as good and bad to using more refined categories, as Blum notes.

I would argue that a teacher’s refinement of his or her ideas on morality and having refined moral

language would also encourage more refined understanding of the moral features of the teaching

context. I would also extend this idea more generally to argue that the ability to discuss and reflect

on the moral features of the teaching context would be coextensive with the ability to distinguish

the moral particulars found in the context. These points suggest that cultivating moral perception
 15

of the particularities of the teaching context would need to involve having dialogue with teachers

or teacher candidates about the particular contexts in which they work and contributing to a

dialectic which allows an individual to consider her or his context in a refined manner.

Cultivating Perception – Being Awake

I want to leave this discussion of the cultivation of perception on this final point. I find it difficult

to conceive how refined perception can be cultivated unless one is actually awake. Particularly, I

have in mind Maxine Greene’s notion of being “wide awake”. Greene quotes Henry David

Theoreau – “to be awake is to be alive” (Greene, 1978, p. 42). Greene points out that we can live

our lives immersed in the daily mechanics and demands of life, but life is best lived when we are

awake – when we think about the condition of ourselves and the world, and inquire into the forces

that impact us, and develop a sense of agency (p. 44).

In teaching, these ideas are particularly important, as some of the forces found in educational

bureaucracy can sap life and agency. In another sense, this idea of being awake also means to be

awake to oneself in terms of one’s own identity and integrity. To have and develop refined

perception of the particularities of the classroom context, teachers need to be wide awake and

completely present - to the context and to themselves. In my view, this is the foundation of refined

perception and perhaps the most difficult aspect to develop and discuss. I believe there needs to

be a focus in teacher education on this notion of being awake and a dialogue and exploration in

teacher education on how teachers can remain awake to the classroom context and themselves.

From my experience, it is a deeply personal journey and one that is most rewardingly engaged in

with others.
 16

References

Aristotle (trans. D. Ross, Rev. J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson) (1998). The Nicomachean ethics. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Atkinson, T. (2000). Learning to teach: Intuitive skills and reasoned objectivity. In T. Atkinson
and G. Claxton (Eds.), The intuitive practitioner: On the value of not always knowing what one
is doing (pp. 69-83). Buckingham: Open University Press.
Blum, L.A. (1994). Moral perception and particularity. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Curren, R. (1999). Cultivating the intellectual and moral virtues. In D. Carr and J. Steutel (Eds.),
Virtue ethics and moral education (pp. 67-81). London: Routledge.
Dunne, J. (1993). Back to the rough ground: Practical judgment and the lure of technique. Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Dunne, J. (1999). Virtue, phronesis and learning. In D. Carr & J. Steutel (Eds.), Virtue ethics and
moral education (pp. 49-64). London: Routledge.
Dunne, J. (2005). An intricate fabric: Understanding the rationality of practice. Pedagogy,
Culture and Society, 13, 367-389.
Greene, M. (1978). Landscapes of learning. New York: Teachers College Press.
Hodgkinson, G.P., Fox, J.L. & Sadler-Smith, E. (2008). Intuition: A fundamental bridging
construct in the behavioural sciences. British Journal of Psychology, 99, 1-27.
Hursthouse, R. (1999). On virtue ethics. New York: University of Oxford Press.
Noel, J. (1999). On the varieties of phronesis. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 31, 3, 273-
289).
Nussbaum, M.C. (1990). Love’s knowledge: Essays on philosophy and literature. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Phelan, A. (2001). The death of a child and the birth of practical wisdom. Studies in Philosophy
and Education, 20, 41-55.
Schollmeier, P. (1991). Practical intuition and rhetorical examples. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 24,
2, 95-104.
Sherman, N. (1999). Character development and Aristotelian virtue. In D. Carr & J. Steutel (Eds.),
Virtue ethics and moral education (pp. 35-48). London: Routledge.
Trotman, D. (2008). Liberating the wise educator: Cultivating professional judgment in
educational practice. In A. Craft, G. Gardner & G. Claxton (Eds.), Creativity, wisdom, and
 17

trusteeship: Exploring the role of education (pp. 158-166). Thousand Oaks, Ca: Corwin Press, A
SAGE Company.
Vokey, D. (2005). Teaching professional ethics to educators: Assessing the "Multiple Ethical
Languages" approach. In Philosophy of Education Yearbook, 125-133.
Vokey, D. (2008). Hearing, contemplating, and meditating: In search of the transformative
integration of heart and mind. In C. Eppert and H. Wang (Eds.) Cross-Cultural Studies in
Curriculum: Eastern Thought, Educational Insights (pp. 287-312). New York: Lawrence
Erlbaum.
Wittgenstein, L. (Trans G.E.M. Anscombe) (1968). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.