(B. Senem Çevik, Philip Seib (Eds.) ) Turkey's P (B-Ok - Xyz)

Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy
Series editors:
Kathy Fitzpatrick, Florida International University, USA
Philip Seib, University of Southern California, USA
Advisory Board:
Mai’a K. Davis Cross, ARENA Centre for European Studies, Norway
Nicholas J. Cull, University of Southern California, USA
Teresa LaPorte, University of Navarre, Spain
Donna Lee, University of Kent, United Kingdom
Jan Melissen, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael and
University of Antwerp, Belgium
Abeer Najjar, American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
William A. Rugh, Former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen and United Arab Emirates, USA
Cesar Villanueva Rivas, Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico
Li Xiguang, Tsinghua University, China
At no time in history has public diplomacy played a more significant role in world
affairs and international relations. As a result, global interest in public diplomacy has
escalated, creating a substantial academic and professional audience for new works in
the field.
This series examines theory and practice in public diplomacy from a global per-
spective, looking closely at public diplomacy concepts, policies, and practices in vari-
ous regions of the world. The purpose is to enhance understanding of the importance
of public diplomacy, to advance public diplomacy thinking, and to contribute to
improved public diplomacy practices.
The editors welcome submissions from scholars and practitioners representing a
range of disciplines and fields (including diplomacy, international relations, interna-
tional communications, public relations, political science, global media, marketing/
advertising) and offering diverse perspectives. In keeping with its global focus, the
series encourages non-US-centric works and comparative studies.
Published by Palgrave Macmillan:
Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy

Edited by Philip Seib
Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication
Edited by Jian Wang
Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia
Edited by Sook Jong Lee and Jan Melissen
The Practice of Public Diplomacy: Confronting Challenges Abroad
Edited by William A. Rugh
The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public Diplomacy,
1989–2001
Nicholas J. Cull
Beyond Cairo: US Engagement with the Muslim World
Darrell Ezell
Collaborative Public Diplomacy: How Transnational Networks Influenced American Studies
in Europe
Ali Fisher
Religion and Public Diplomacy
Edited by Philip Seib
Communicating India’s Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood
Daya Kishan Thussu
European Public Diplomacy
Edited by Mai’a K. Davis Cross and Jan Melissen
The Challenge of Public Diplomacy
James Thomas Snyder
Shaping China’s Global Imagination: Branding Nations at the World Expo
Jian Wang
Front Line Public Diplomacy: How US Embassies Communicate with Foreign Publics
William A. Rugh
China and Taiwan in Central America: Engaging Foreign Publics in Diplomacy
Colin R. Alexander
Turkey’s Public Diplomacy
Edited by B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib
US Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain: Selling Democracy?
Edited by Francisco J. Rodr íguez, Lorenzo Delgado, and Nicholas J. Cull
Turkey’s Public Diplomacy
Edited by
B. Senem Çevik
and
Philip Seib
TURKEY’S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
Copyright © B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib, 2015.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-46697-6
All rights reserved.
First published in 2015 by
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ISBN 978-1-349-57957-0 ISBN 978-1-137-46698-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137466983
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Turkey's public diplomacy / edited by B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Turkey—Foreign relations—21st century. I. Çevik, B. Senem,
editor.
JZ1639.T87 2015
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CON T E N T S
List of Abbreviations vii
Introduction: Why Turkey’s Public Diplomacy Matters 1

B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib
One Turkey’s Public Diplomacy: Its Actors, Stakeholders,
and Tools 13
Gaye Aslı Sancar
Two Historical Perspective: Ottomans and the
Republican Era 43
Vedat Demir
Three Engaging with the Middle East: The Rise and Fall of
Turkish Leadership in the 2000s 67
Özlem Tür
Four Dominance in the Neighborhood: Turkey and Iran 85
Melody Mohebi
Five Elsewhere in the Neighborhood: Reaching Out to the
Western Balkans 99
Marija Mitrović Bošković, Dušan Reljić, and Alida Vra čić
Six The Benefactor: NGOs and Humanitarian Aid 121
B. Senem Çevik
Seven Turkish Foreign Policy in a Transatlantic Context:
A Case for Soft Power and Public Diplomacy 153
Kıvanç Ulusoy
vi Contents
Eight Addressing Controversy I: Public Diplomacy between

Turkey and Armenia 173
Burcu Gültekin Punsmann
Nine Addressing Controversy II: Turkey and the Kurds 193
Galip Dalay
Ten Expanding Perspective: Reaching Out to China and
the East 213
Çağdaş Üngör
Eleven Noor and Friends: Turkish Culture in the World 233
M. Selcan Kaynak
Notes on Contributors 255

Index 259
A BBR E V I AT ION S
AA Anadolu Agency
AFAD The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
AK Party/AKP Adalet ve Kalk ınma Partisi
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina
BRICS Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, China, South Africa
EC European Community
EDAM Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies
EU European Union
FIFA The Federation of International Football Associations
FSA Free Syrian Army
GPoT Center Global Political Trends Center
JDP Justice and Development Party (AK Party or AKP)
ICTJ The International Center for Transitional Justice
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies
IfS Instrument for Stability
İ HH The IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation
IKSV Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts
IMF International Monetary Fund
KFOR Kosovo Force
KIZILAY Turkish Red Crescent
KRG Kurdistan Regional Government
MBC Middle East Broadcasting Center
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MINTs Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey
MIT National Intelligence Service
MUSIAD Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s
Association
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
viii Abbreviations
NGO Nongovernmental Organization

NSC National Security Council
OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference
ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-Operation in
Europe ÖSYM Student Selection and Placement Center
PIC Peace Implementation Council
PKK Kurdish Workers’ Party
PYD PKK’s Syrian offshoot
RCC Regional Cooperation Council
SATR Support to Armenia-Turkey Rapprochement
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDE Institute of Strategic Thinking
SECI Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
SEEBRIG South-Eastern Europe Brigade
SEECP South East European Cooperation Process
SETA Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research
SNC Syrian National Council
TABDC Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council
TARC The Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission
TEDA Translation and Publication Grant Program of Turkey
TESEV The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
THY Turkish Airlines
TIKA The Prime Ministry Turkish Cooperation and
Coordination Agency
TOBB Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of
Turkey
TRT Turkish Radio and Television Corporation
TURSAB Association of Turkish Travel Agents
TUSIAD Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association
TUSKON Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
UEFA The Union of European Football Associations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
VOT Voice of Turkey
WTA Women’s Tennis Association
YETEM Yunus Emre Centre for Turkish Training and Teaching
YÖK Turkish Higher Education Board
Introduction: Why Turkey’s Public
Diplomacy Matters
B. S e n e m Ç e v i k
and
Philip Seib
As the global world order continues its evolution, we are witnessing

the ascendance of middle powers such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
Indonesia, China, South Africa) and the MINTs (Mexico, Indonesia,
Nigeria and Turkey). This book has been written at a time when the
broader Middle East has yet to resolve its internal issues, stabilize
regional security, and sustain democratic principles. The Syrian civil
war, political turmoil in Egypt, and the ongoing tension between Iran
and the Western powers pose many questions for the future of the
region in terms of security, democracy, economic stability, and broader
regional inf luence.
Despite the incessant conf lict and violence in its neighborhood,
Turkey remains a major power in the region, perhaps owing to decades
of political and social progress. This is one of the key reasons why
Turkey’s position in the region is so important. On a more global scale,
Turkey has been proposing value-based policies, regional peace initia-
tives and a broader understanding of the Middle East through what has
been dubbed the “Turkish model,” although Turkey itself has had to
deal with significant domestic turbulence.
Whether or not Turkey can serve as an inspiration and provide an
impetus for changes in neighboring societies has long been discussed in
the West as well as within the Middle East. The Arab revolts that began
in 2011 and their aftershocks have yet to be played out. Nonetheless,
Turkey has been engaging with international organizations more and
2 B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib
more, trying to take an active role within the United Nations (UN)
framework by proposing ways to deal with global crises.
Those who shape Turkey’s foreign policy are aware of the opportuni-
ties and challenges that lie ahead. Turkey is not shy about its leadership
aspirations; its only uncertainty is about finding the most effective way
to exert its inf luence. Increasingly, public diplomacy appears the most
desirable path—as Turkey’s ambitions make necessary and new com-
munications, technologies make feasible the reaching out to regional
and global publics.
Employing effective public diplomacy is intrinsically connected to
Turkey’s realization of its own soft power attributes and capacity. The
opportunity that lies ahead of Turkey’s public diplomacy is contingent
upon the consolidation of a liberal democracy by Western standards.
Turkey’s social and political development provides a venue for sharing
this story.
Relying on public diplomacy conveys a message of maturity that
is least likely to provoke worries among neighbors in a region that is
always fraught with tensions. This approach enhances the perception
of Turkey as an honest broker among contentious parties, a role that
can win respect not only within the greater Middle East but also from
other nations that watch the region nervously. Although some domes-
tic issues at hand and various foreign policy miscalculations/decisions
have swayed Turkey from that role in the short term, the long-term
prospects remain more hopeful.
With its complex political history, strategic location, and determi-
nation to take on a larger role in world affairs, Turkey is a significant
player in the international arena and has been pursuing a more aggres-
sive foreign policy. Key elements of Turkey’s foreign policy, however,
have been little studied in the West, leaving significant gaps in aca-
demic and diplomatic knowledge. This book is designed to fill some
of those gaps by examining Turkey’s public diplomacy—its strategies,
methods, and significance.
Turkey’s Public Diplomacy highlights a field that is demonstrating
increased intellectual traction among scholars and policymakers. Public
diplomacy—concisely defined as state-to-public rather than state-to-
state diplomacy—has come of age in this era of pervasive new media
tools that enable individuals to independently gather and disseminate
information to an unprecedented degree. The mission of this book is
not to define or analyze public diplomacy per se, but rather to exam-
ine the varied ways it is put to use by a nation of growing geostrategic
importance.
Introduction 3
Turkey overlooks the Middle East, and it is literally a bridge between

Europe and Asia. Its population is almost entirely Muslim, and it is a
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is seen
as a regional power capable of being a counterweight to Iran’s growing
strength, and it has aspired to join the European Union (EU).
Although it has a long history, today’s Turkey is a relatively young
republic with deep cultural roots that encompass the Middle East,
Africa, the Balkans, and Asia. Turkey was established upon the ashes of
the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and the Turco-Greek
War. As a new nation that had sustained immense losses of human and
capital resources, the Turkish republic in its early years concentrated on
keeping its borders intact and building its national identity. In response
to the traumas of past wars, Turkey kept the Anatolian plateau for set-
tlement by Muslims exiled from the Balkans and the Caucasus. This
policy was a response to the nation’s losses and its self-assertion as a
modern state. It also shaped perceptions of Turkey’s international role
and foreign policy framework.
For years, Turkish policymakers chose to remain as neutral as pos-
sible during regional or global conf licts in order to sustain Turkey’s
border integrity and national sovereignty. This neutrality was also a
facet of Turkey’s determination to not allow external events to inter-
fere with efforts to strengthen its economy. As Turkey matured into a
modern, secular, and democratic nation, it became a valuable ally to the
West as a NATO member and was a candidate for membership in the
EU. During certain periods, such as the Cold War and the first Gulf
War, Turkey’s westward tilt became particularly pronounced, and this
has led to wariness on the part of many in the Muslim Middle East.
Turkey has since been employing public diplomacy to try to offset such
concerns.
Turkey’s economic development began to f lourish with industrializa-
tion and participation in the world economic system. Perhaps the most
significant period of change in economy and politics was the Özal era
between 1983 and 1992, during which Turkey not only strengthened
its commitment to its market economy and the international economic
system but also strengthened its international alliances. The Özal era’s
domestic industrialization and the expansion of Turkish businesses into
foreign markets enhanced Turkish soft power in the Balkans, Middle
East and the Caucasus. It was then that Turkish business organizations
became more involved in foreign policy decisions.
Despite the devastating economic crises of the 1990s and the recur-
ring debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by the turn of the
century and with the aggressive economic policies of the Justice and
Development Party ( JDP, a.k.a. the AK Party) administration, Turkey
was able to turn its fiscal situation around. The growing percentage of
exports, increased GDP, decreased rate of inf lation, and strengthened
Turkish lira demonstrated its ability to sustain a mature economy. In
relative terms, the Turkish economy has remained stable even in the
midst of global financial storms.
Turkey’s economic growth can partly be attributed to a conservative
business community as well as intensive efforts to promote tourism and
culture. It would not be an overstatement to point out that the Turkish
economy has successfully maneuvered itself away from the global eco-
nomic crisis through foreign investments and growing exports to new
markets. The consolidation of a successful economy can be argued to
depend on a stable political structure and a more mature democracy.
The Turkish economy depends on the country’s political stability and
freedom, as well as liberalizing its democracy to ensure that it includes
not only the secular but also the most religiously orthodox Muslim,
Kurdish, and Christian minorities (a process that some would argue
leaves much to be desired). In turn, the stronger the economy, the more
resources Turkey can devote to its public diplomacy.
Turkey and Israel have been called the only secular democracies in
the Middle East. Turkish democracy is a work-in-progress that has
struggled to maintain the modern and Western precepts of democ-
racy. Issues related to Turkish identity dating back to the Ottoman
modernization and nationalism were present in the young republic and
created fault lines within the developing democratic system. In 1960,
the decade-long rule of the Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party), which
began as a result of the first free multiparty elections, was ended by a
military coup d’etat, resulting in death sentences for Prime Minister
Adnan Menderes and two other ministers. This traumatizing pause in
the democratization process remains vivid in Turkish social and polit-
ical memory.
Turkey has undergone two other military coups d’état and one mil-
itary edict, with another attempted military takeover in 2007. Despite
these events, and although it usually takes generations to advance the
democratic culture of a nation, Turkey has been working on rapidly
improving its democratic credentials since the early 2000s. The deter-
mination to continue with the EU accession process and the JDP’s
confrontation with the military leadership, which has always seen
itself as the ultimate guarantor of the secular state and thus has actively
been involved in politics, have inf luenced the pace of democratization.
Introduction 5
Turkey’s soft power outreach relies on these variables of internal

governance.
Despite several unsuccessful attempts to oust the current govern-
ment, which has been perceived as Islamist and antisecular by the
majority of the military cadres, the role of the military has gradually
diminished. This is probably one of the major democratic advances in
modern Turkish history. It differentiates the country from most of its
neighbors in the sense that Turkey in the last decade or so has pushed
for a more advanced civilian democracy. These democratic credentials
provide another basis for Turkey’s soft power.
Turkey’s EU bid and the Copenhagen Criteria that were set forth by
the EU as steps toward Turkey’s membership have been instrumental
in efforts to introduce more civil rights and rights for religious minor-
ities and the large Kurdish population. The stagnant Turkish-EU rela-
tionship during the last several years has not stopped the government
from offering further rights and proposing political opportunities for
Turkey’s Kurds and Christians. Although much more work is necessary
to build a system that is participatory and fully democratic in nature,
these steps have indicated that Turkey is willing to deepen its demo-
cratic process.
The May-June 2013 Gezi Park protests that began in Istanbul and
spread to other parts of the country were caused by discontent with the
tendency of the government to interfere with citizens’ personal lives
and dictate social norms. The disproportionate use of force to crush the
protests was widely viewed on international television broadcasts, cast-
ing a shadow over Turkey’s soft power and raising doubts about Turkey’s
democratization and the whole concept of the Turkish model. The sup-
pression of these protests underscored the limits of Turkish democracy.
Partly to offset negative domestic and international response to the use
of force against protestors, the Turkish government introduced reforms
in September 2013 that were designed to benefit the Kurdish popula-
tion and expand civil rights generally. Turkey’s leadership seemed to
recognize that the sustainability of the Turkish model is based on the
actual democratic values that Turkey will support and the whether it
can close the gap between its rhetoric and actions.
While sustaining a growing economy and stabilizing the political
structure by reducing the inf luence of the military, Turkey has been
slowly establishing state and nonstate institutions that serve as Turkey’s
public diplomacy tools. One of the earliest public diplomacy agents cre-
ated in Turkey is the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
(TIKA), which was established in 1992. It works toward eradicating
poverty, and assists thirty countries to reach world standards in educa-

tion, health, and employment. Besides TIKA, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Disaster and Emergency
Management Presidency (AFAD), Directorate of Religious Affairs,
Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), Turkish Red
Crescent (K ızı lay), and the Anadolu News Agency (AA) are govern-
mental public diplomacy tools.
On a nongovernmental level, NGOs have been highlighting a new
instrument in the foreign policy toolkit. Since the late 1990s, NGOs
with a predominantly Islamic outlook and some affiliated with the
Gü len Movement—the Hizmet Movement—have been dominating the
humanitarian aid arena. Among the most inf luential Turkish NGO’s
are Cansuyu Derneği (Cansuyu Charity and Solidarity Foundation),
Kimse Yok Mu? Derneği (Is Anybody There?), Deniz Feneri Derneği
(Lighthouse Association), and İ nsan Haklar ı ve Hizmet Derneği ( İ HH
or the Foundation for Human Rights and Humanitarian Relief ).
In 2010, the Directorate for Public Diplomacy was established under
the Prime Minister’s Office to formulate and oversee Turkey’s offi-
cial public diplomacy strategy. This innovation in Turkey’s state-pub-
lic relations can be attributed to the changing dynamic and structure
of the more assertive foreign policy. It is still too early to determine
whether the Directorate for Public Diplomacy will prove effective in
fostering respect for Turkey’s values and “brand,” but the fact that the
institution is a fully functioning unit can be taken as a meaningful step
toward building a more sophisticated public diplomacy strategy for the
nation.
Turkey’s institutions that directly or indirectly work in establishing
a public diplomacy strategy are interconnected so that the work of one
inf luences the work of the others. In some cases the NGOs are the first
to take action, while in other situations the governmental institutions
take the first step. However, Turkey’s public diplomacy is still not sys-
tematic and is yet to feature an overall strategy.
Today, Turkey’s foreign policy and soft power are highly dependent
on visibly maintaining democracy, as well as economic and political
stability, at home. Beyond domestic matters, Turkey’s public diplomacy
is based on the country being seen as a trustworthy partner in finding
solutions to disputes within the region by not becoming aligned with
one or several states to the exclusion of others.
Turkish foreign policy gained significant momentum with the
appointment of Ahmet Davutoğlu as the foreign policy adviser to the
prime minister and then in 2009 as the foreign minister. (He has since
Introduction 7
become prime minister.) Davutoğlu devised the “zero-problems with

neighbors”(komşularla sıfır sorun) doctrine, a policy approach that draws
from Turkey’s historical, geographic, and cultural ties to nearby states;
in other words, policy that relies on soft power. As the zero-problems
policy was put into action, Turkey gained substantial regional inf lu-
ence, at least through the initial stages of the Arab Spring. Turkey’s
political stance at that time posed an opportunity to bring change to
the way regional relationships are created and maintained.
The zero-problems with neighbors policy may, however, be more
a product of wishful thinking than of realistic regional strategy. It has
been called into question both inside and outside Turkey because of the
lack of diplomatic representation with Israel, Egypt, and Syria as well
as political disputes with Iraq’s central government. In the post–Arab
Spring Middle East, neighbors seem certain to have problems with each
other, and so Turkey has had to find a more realistic foundation for its
approach to regional issues. The conf lict that began in 2014 related to
the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) illustrated the
fragility of the zero-problems concept.
Critics of Turkish policy in these matters point to the government’s
following a sectarian path in response to strong political and emotional
ties between the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey’s JDP. The shifts
in the Middle East and their repercussions have nearly isolated Turkey
in the short term, where the zero-problems doctrine was supplanted by
the “precious loneliness” (değerli yalnızlık) approach. This was defined
as Turkey adopting an uncompromising value-based political stance
in a region where willingness to make deals is an essential element of
diplomacy. Realizing that Turkey was becoming more isolated rather
than more inf luential, the government, in late 2013, reassessed the
zero-problems policy and reached out to Iraq, Russia, and Iran, and
also started a mending process with Israel. This book is being written
while Turkey is trying to reposition itself as a key player in regional
politics by being as neutral as possible (except toward Syria) but still an
active broker in the region’s complicated relationships. As it does so,
public diplomacy will be a tool that it consistently uses.
Turkey has numerous public diplomacy mechanisms at its disposal.
On the conventional, governmental side are the Prime Ministry’s Office
of Public Diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry for EU
Affairs, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, Directorate
General of Press and Information, Presidency for Turks Abroad and
Related Communities, Undersecretary for Defence Industries, Anadolu
Agency, and the Prime Ministry’s Disaster and Emergency Management
Presidency. Among nongovernmental tools are think tanks, NGOs,

national brands, opinion leaders and celebrities, and international cul-
tural and sports events. For Turkey, as for other countries, coordinating
the work of all these is a daunting task, requiring commitment at the
top of the government and sustained interest on the part of those who
lead nongovernmental entities and projects.
The history of Turkish public diplomacy displays a mix of enthusi-
asm and nonchalance. Turkey’s public diplomacy framework is rather
oriented toward crisis management and is within the lines of reac-
tive public diplomacy. The Ottoman Empire benefited from elements
of soft power beyond its reliance on hard power. In the republic era,
after 1925, a single ideology dominated the political atmosphere of the
empire, which was broadly viewed as relying on authoritarian measures
and with little of the “power of attraction” that is at the heart of soft
power. Recognizing the importance of globalization during the 1980s
and 1990s, Turkey widely opened its economic, political, and social
practices to the world, and, by the time the new century began, was
more reliant on using soft power and public diplomacy.
As part of its new assertiveness, Turkey worked to establish itself as
a more inf luential power broker within the region, maintaining func-
tional relationships with Arab states and Israel. This was encouraged
by the United States and other countries that saw the value of having
a local stabilizing power near the core of the always-tense situation in
that part of the world. Predictably, Turkey has had its ups and downs
in this role. The Gaza Flotilla incident in May 2010 did considerable
damage to Turkish-Israeli relations, which were only partially repaired
through the mediation of US president Barack Obama in 2013.
Yet another delicate balancing act can be seen in how Turkey main-
tains its connections to the West and its socioeconomic ties to Iran.
Turkey has been able to use Iran’s isolation from the West and strict
domestic controls for its own economic advantage. Turkey is also a
bridge to the West for Iranian citizens, through Iranian tourism to
Turkey and the export of Turkish popular culture into Iran. But the
impact and sustainability of this soft power diplomacy on Turkey’s
security and economy is uncertain. Issues to consider include Turkey’s
treatment of Iranians (particularly refugees), Iran’s apparent change of
direction in foreign policy related to its nuclear capability, and Turkey’s
own political dynamics related to balancing Islamism and secularism.
Turkey’s Ottoman past is another factor in the country’s modern
public diplomacy, and this is particularly evident in the Balkans. After
the end of the Cold War, many channels of political communication
Introduction 9
and economic cooperation reemerged between Turkey and south-

east Europe. In addition, the disintegration of Yugoslavia triggered a
regional geopolitical reset. To attain more inf luence in the Balkans,
Turkey initiated bilateral meetings, took active part in regional ini-
tiatives, and presented itself as a mediator in regional disputes and an
advocate of the region’s interests. Turkey also fostered investments in
the region involving state institutions, business interests, and religious
and civil society organizations. The binding narrative for Turkey’s
endeavors is the assertion of regional interconnectedness based on com-
mon Ottoman history that is mostly presented in a positive light.
As a middle power, Turkey has demonstrated proactive policies in
various areas—including humanitarian assistance—that are designed to
bring change as well as exert inf luence. It has been pursuing a value-
based policy in Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East where NGOs
play a major role in shaping Turkey’s image in the region. Through the
NGOs, Turkey is not only trying to establish herself as a humanitarian
assistance provider but also as a mediator in regional conf licts by grad-
ually building trust. In many ways, Turkey is providing an example of
niche diplomacy through its humanitarian, value-based policies.
Some of Turkey’s most delicate public diplomacy concerns its mem-
bership in NATO and its aspiration to join the EU. As a NATO mem-
ber in an exceptionally volatile region, Turkey must step carefully in
dealings with Syria, Iraq, Iran, and other neighbors, all the while rec-
ognizing that NATO’s other members, which are geographically more
distant, can deal more dispassionately with some of the issues that keep
unsettling the region.
Although NATO appreciates Turkey’s location and its military capa-
bility, the same cannot be said of the EU. Concerns that are unspo-
ken officially are nevertheless significant: principally, Turkey being a
Muslim country with a large number of emigrants who have resettled
throughout Europe. As numerous EU members endured economic
hardship during the Eurozone crisis that began in late 2009, Turkey
felt less pressure to gear its public diplomacy to winning support for
joining the EU. When economic stability returns, it will be interesting
to see if and how Turkey renews its quest for membership.
Closer home, Armenia is Turkey’s immediate neighbor, but there is
minimal formal communication between them. Their common bor-
der has been closed for two decades, and formal diplomatic relations
do not exist. The lack of channels of communication has become all
the more worrisome since dealing with the past and its legacy weighs
heavily on bilateral relations. The tensions between the two countries
have drawn in other nations that have domestic constituencies with

stakes in one or both countries. This situation provides an opening for
public diplomacy, especially initiated by Turkish and Armenian civil
society actors to help heal the broken relationship and rebuild trust.
Such efforts could provide both governments with tools to commu-
nicate bilaterally and internationally as they try to build positive and
constructive relations.
An even more complicated relationship exists between the Turkish
government and Kurdish people within and beyond Turkey’s bor-
ders. Regional uprisings have complicated Turkey’s Kurdish question
by feeding Kurdish national ambitions in the region and breaking
the once-robust alliance between Turkey, Iran, and Syria against
the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). Capitalizing on the regional
chaos and deteriorating relations between Ankara and Syria’s Assad
regime, the PYD, the PKK’s Syrian offshoot, took de facto control
of northeastern Syria. Turkey’s subsequent concern over the advance
of the PYD toward its southern border was one of the major fac-
tors that triggered the so-called “Imrali Process”—or the Solution
Process—in which it held peace talks with the PKK’s jailed leader
Abdullah Ocalan in an effort to solve the three-decade-old Kurdish
problem. If the initiative eventually proves successful, it will have
major domestic and regional implications. Part of the process, from
Turkey’s standpoint, will involve public diplomacy outreach to its
neighbors who are also trying to resolve Kurd-related issues, and to
the larger community of nations to which Kurds have directed their
own public diplomacy. By mid-2014, however, the rise of ISIL and
its battles with Kurds in Syria and Iraq disrupted Turkey’s plans for a
gradual solution to problems related to Kurdish self-governance, and
as of this writing, the fighting has threatened to spill across Turkey’s
borders.
Farther afield, in the Asia-Pacific region, Turkey’s growing eco-
nomic ties and military cooperation with China, and its willing-
ness to participate in regional organizations, such as the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization and ASEAN, are evidence of Turkey’s
eagerness to extend its inf luence beyond its neighborhood. Public
diplomacy activities include cultural and artistic exhibitions, academic
and student exchanges, radio broadcasts, and other low-key projects.
Problems remain; Turkey lacks the high-end educational facilities that
would attract students and academics from Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan. Further, Turkey’s “soft power” efforts have largely focused on
the country’s Ottoman heritage, which resonates well with African,
Introduction 11
Balkan and Middle Eastern audiences, but has little appeal in the Asia-
Pacific region.
Turkey is not lacking, however, in one soft power export: entertain-
ment television, specifically the “soap opera” programs that have legions
of devoted fans around the world. Shows such as Gumus (Noor, 2008),
Kurtlar Vadisi (Valley of the Wolves, 2009), and Ask-ı Memnu (Forbidden
Love, 2008) became immensely popular, first in the Middle East, and
then in wider markets, reaching as far as Latin America. Response to
the shows has not been unanimously positive: they have stirred anger
among some religious leaders for glorifying behavior some might
consider unseemly. They have also been accused of pushing a neo-
Ottomanist political agenda of trying to convince Arabs to buy into
Turkish leadership in the region. Despite the criticism, the Turkish
series remain enormously popular; they are embraced in diverse set-
tings and their appeal may be partly linked to a “neo-Ottoman cool”
that parallels Turkey’s foreign policy aims.
These are some of the many pieces of a fascinating case study of
a nation with growing power and expanding public diplomacy. The
chapters in this book discuss these and related matters, answering many
questions—and raising many others—about Turkey’s public diplomacy,
which is still in its very early stages, and has not mastered the method
of timely communication with foreign publics prior to a crisis or dur-
ing times of peace. Consolidating Turkey’s public diplomacy strategy
would require Turkey to bring more sophistication to the intricate rela-
tionship between domestic and foreign policy and how they inf luence
one another.
As a result, Turkey’s dedication to political reforms lies at the heart of
its soft power and will be essential in employing a grand public diplo-
macy narrative and strategy. Nonetheless, Turkey’s more aggressive
foreign policy stance and its involvement in the international system
as a stable Muslim ally to the West have been invaluable in recogniz-
ing the potential of rising regional powers. Turkey’s strategic inf luence
must be taken seriously, and so must the ways that public diplomacy
contributes to that inf luence.
CH A P T E R ON E
Turkey’s Public Diplomacy: Its Actors,

Stakeholders, and Tools*
Gay e A s l i Sa nc a r
With its strategic geographical location and complex historical back-

ground, Turkey has always been in the foreground of international pol-
itics. Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, various modes
of communication were employed to project the country’s image. The
disruptions within Turkish democracy due to military coups, military
memoranda, and foreign policy concerns such as Cyprus and the EU
accession process also required a more effective communication policy
with foreign countries. Hence, Turkey has been utilizing numerous
tools in communicating its foreign policy messages through govern-
mental and nongovernmental entities in the hope of shaping global
public opinion on Turkey. Although one can find some early examples
of public diplomacy in the 1990s, professionalized public diplomacy
efforts began only after 2000 along with Turkey’s growing regional
role.
This chapter discusses Turkey’s public diplomacy actors, stakehold-
ers, and tools and examines their role in the message Turkey is aiming
to project in line with its nation branding.
Turkey’s Public Diplomacy and Soft Power
Turkish public diplomacy is overwhelmingly concentrated on the

country’s national image, and thus with the nation brand. Creation
14 Gaye Aslı Sancar
and sustainment of Turkey’s brand has been twofold. Turkey’s offi-

cial public diplomacy emerged in the early days of the young repub-
lic. This identity-based public diplomacy is the first and initial layer
of Turkey’s communication activities. Following the downfall of the
Ottoman Empire, the new Republic of Turkey needed to convey its
messages and new identity to shape international public opinion. In
this regard, Mustafa Kemal Atat ürk’s reforms on the political system,
education, women’s rights, and the legal and economic system were the
main components of Turkey’s new identity, and they also inspired offi-
cial public diplomacy activities.1 Following this early period, numerous
methods of communication were employed to situate Turkey in the
modern West and establish the country as a major Western ally during
the Cold War.
The second layer of Turkey’s public diplomacy is political. Today,
Turkey possesses numerous soft power advantages owing to its unique
central location and its cultural and historical background. Turkey’s
contemporary foreign policy issues have required meticulous commu-
nication efforts in reaching out to international audiences. A great deal
of its political public diplomacy activities are derived from negative pub-
licity or lack of publicity. According to Kemming and Sand ıkçı, Turkey
does not have a well-run nation brand. Their analysis on Turkey’s EU
accession underlines a truly complicated positioning dilemma for the
country’s nation brand.2 Within the same trajectory, Turkey is gearing
toward both domestic and international audiences in establishing itself
as a moral country guided by humanitarian principles and one that is a
major donor state. In doing so, Turkish governmental and nongovern-
mental institutions have been engaging with various regions through
numerous public diplomacy activities.
According to the former coordinator of the Prime Ministry’s Office
of Public Diplomacy, İ brahim Kal ın, contemporary Turkish pub-
lic diplomacy is building on Turkey’s expanding soft power in the
Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. As Turkey engages with
new regions and emerging actors as well as continues relations with
its old allies, it develops new capacities for the various elements of
soft power and strategic communication in regional and global con-
texts.3 With its cultural values, historical heritage, and location-wise
advantages, Turkey has achieved a great deal of progress with its soft
power. Cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, citizen diplomacy,
developmental aid, and humanitarian diplomacy are part and parcel
of Turkey’s public diplomacy activities. Despite this variety and seem-
ingly improved soft power, Turkey’s public diplomacy is still a work
Turkey’s Public Diplomacy 15
in progress. The ability to reach out to a number of audiences is being

undermined by the scattered framework of Turkey’s public diplomacy
stakeholders and the lack of a grand public diplomacy strategy. More
importantly, the degree of political involvement of some of the actors
undermines their credibility. Despite these shortcomings, the diversity
of Turkey’s public diplomacy actors and their semicollaborative efforts
will hopefully help improve the public diplomacy framework in the
next few years. The next sections will take a deeper look into parties
that partake in Turkey’s public diplomacy.
Turkey’s Public Diplomacy’s Actors
Turkey has not been involved in war-like situations in the last few
decades. For that reason, its public diplomacy framework is crafted in
such a way that it expands the peacetime position of Turkey, acting as
proactively as possible. Turkey’s public diplomacy apparatus encom-
passes its institutions as well as its democratic experience.4 This expe-
rience is the way in which the country’s image has been projected in
the last decade. Former president Abdullah Gü l described Turkey’s soft
power as a major component of its foreign policy toolkit.5 Within this
perspective, Kal ın highlights that Turkey has a new societal imagi-
nation that translates into explaining its new story to the world and
shaping international public opinion. The country’s historical and geo-
graphical heritage determines the content of these activities. Justice,
sharing, legitimacy, equality in representation, transparency, account-
ability, respect for differences, virtuous society, freedom of religion and
conscience, protection of human self-respect, and the constitutional
guarantee of fundamental rights and liberties are the components of
Turkey’s new societal imagination.6
Turkey employs strategic communication to reach this new imagina-
tion. The public diplomacy actors employ strategic communication in
projecting Turkey’s story and nation brand. These actors and their roles
in public diplomacy activities will be further analyzed.
The Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy
The Office of Public Diplomacy was established in 2010.7 “The main

objective of the Office of Public Diplomacy is [to provide] the coordi-
nation between the public agencies and NGOs in their effort to promote
Turkey in international arena and to enhance its credibility.”8 The mis-

sion of the office is to establish the country’s new foreign policy and
introduce a soft power approach toward foreign publics. The Office of
Public Diplomacy is responsible for coordinating between public agen-
cies and civil organizations to ensure an accurate and effective promo-
tion and presentation of Turkey.9 The vision of the office is to manage
strategic communication for various stakeholders considering Turkish
customs. Its main purpose is to coordinate public diplomacy practices,
share Turkey´s new story effectively, establish communication with dif-
ferent sectors, and carry out activities on a multilateral communication
basis.10
The Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy operates in three
main areas: university programs, political communication activities,
and media promotion activities. These activities target both foreign
and domestic publics. University programs include public diplomacy
panels, foreign policy promotion programs, foreign policy workshops,
and youth programs.11 The Foreign Policy Promotion Programs aim
to bring together the students of foreign policy and related fields at
graduate, postgraduate, and doctoral levels, along with academicians
and experts, agencies, and decision makers that shape Turkish foreign
policy; to set up a network of relations between different segments; and
to constitute grounds for dialogue.12 Finally, university programs also
include youth programs that aim at exchanges in establishing long-
term relations among communities.13 All of the university programs
conducted by the office aim to offer students insight into understand-
ing Turkish foreign policy and public diplomacy strategies. The uni-
versity programs can be considered to be public affairs, which aim to
guide future citizen diplomats.
Political communication activities are another part of the work of
the Office. Meetings abroad aim to bring the foreign researchers and
experts working on Turkey together with the ones from Turkey and
establish a link between them. The meetings are organized with the
leading think tanks of the host country. Within the framework of the
program, the relations between the two countries are discussed and
ways to advance these relations are sought through an exchange of
views. Such programs have been carried out in numerous countries.14
The Wise People Conference series is a program hosted in Turkey
where individuals, statesmen, politicians, intellectuals, journalists, and
experts, who are respected internationally and who rose to prominence
with their knowledge and experience15 discuss developments in the
world, the challenges that emerge, and the solutions thereof. The aim
of these conferences is mutual understanding and dialogue. Another

element of political communication activities is the “Idea of Europe
Conference Series.” This program aims to discuss Europe’s philosoph-
ical, cultural, artistic, and ethnic dimensions and carry out discussions
on European identity.16
It is important that the media promotion activities of the Prime
Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy give the utmost priority to
managing the perception of Turkey by foreign publics, and media
relations should be the first strategy to be employed. The Journalist
Committees Program allows bilateral exchanges among Turkish and
foreign journalists. Within the scope of the program, journalists from
numerous countries have visited Turkey. Another significant media
relations activity carried out by the office is meeting with interna-
tional media representatives stationed in Turkey. This program regu-
larly brings together foreign media representatives and Turkish officials
to facilitate a more direct line of communication.17
Another tool employed by the office includes culture and promotion
activities. Some examples of these activities are a concert to support the
people of Syria, and documentaries on Somalia, and Istanbul’s Nizam
Mosque.
The office also uses digital diplomacy by means of social media.
It includes a Turkish Twitter account @BasbakanlikKDK, an
English Twitter account @TRofficeof PD, a French Twitter account
@DiploPubliqueTR and an Arabic Twitter account @PDTurkeyArabic.18
The office also has Facebook, Instagram and YouTube accounts. However,
the number of followers on all digital media outlets remains low, in
turn, hampering the desired results of reaching a wider audience.
The office also coordinates various communication activities of
the prime minister, such as delivering critical messages to communi-
cate strategically and manage crises. The former prime minister’s press
release on the events of 1915 is exemplar of such activities.19
Public diplomacy is still a fairly new concept in Turkey. Perhaps
because of its very recent articulation in official statecraft, public diplo-
macy is used rather interchangeably with public affairs within the
domestic target audience. This misperception is perhaps the most sig-
nificant f law of the office. Also, its affiliation with the Prime Ministry
rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is somewhat controversial
in regard to questions revolving around the office being too politi-
cized or too domestically involved. In November 2014, the office was
restructured under the Directorate General of Press and Information.
This change has the capacity to put its activities in the limelight.
Aside from the discussion on its position as a purely bureaucratic

or political institution, the Office of Public Diplomacy faces opera-
tional challenges in performing its activities. The utmost importance
and immediate concern for the office is the lack of consistent, long-
term strategy and shifting from public affairs to new public diplomacy.
It is imperative that the organizational structure of the office is care-
fully crafted in order to facilitate the process of drawing a roadmap for
a new Turkish public diplomacy. The dialogue established will likely
pave the way for the development of future strategies for Turkish pub-
lic diplomacy. However, in order to do so, the office’s future strate-
gies must incorporate in-depth research on foreign perceptions and a
steady focus on activities that facilitate genuine dialogue. The current
organizational structure of the Office of Public Diplomacy may not
be able to deliver the results desired by Turkey’s policy makers in the
short term. However, significant changes in the structure, function,
and activities of the office bear the potential of facilitating the desired
policy outcomes.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
A key actor in Turkey’s public diplomacy is the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. Apart from actively promoting Turkey’s interests in interna-
tional organizations and networks, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
is involved in cultural diplomacy. In line with Turkey’s more active
foreign policy framework, the Department of Information and Public
Communication was founded in 2011. The Ministry places utmost
importance on Turkey’s promotion and practices public diplomacy
under the auspices of the Overseas Promotion and Cultural Affairs.
The ministry collaborates with all relevant institutions and organiza-
tions in its public diplomacy activities. To this end, Turkey bases its
promotion activities on its cultural and historical values. The focus of
promotional activity is to introduce to the world, the values, history,
language and literature, archaeological assets, scientific achievements,
art, architecture, cuisine, traditions, beliefs, role models, and sports
peculiar to Turkey. Hence, Turkey’s approach is to realize activities that
will leave a lasting impression in the minds of foreign people.20
The ministry’s promotion activities are based on cultural diplomacy
and international events, collaboration with nongovernmental orga-
nizations, and humanitarian aid. Some examples of recent cultural
activities are the 2010 World EXPO21 and cultural years and seasons
organized in numerous countries such as France, Russia, China, and

Japan.22 The ministry also makes tremendous efforts to establish chairs
of Turkish studies in foreign higher educational institutions, such as
the establishment of a chair in Contemporary Turkish Studies in the
London School of Economics (LSE).23 Through these chairs, Turkey
aims to raise awareness on Turkish policy-related issues and Turkish
culture while at the same time creating an educational lobby.
The foreign ministry’s most important cultural diplomacy tools are
the cultural centers that promote Turkish culture and create under-
standing with other cultures. These centers are established with the
objective of promoting Turkish culture, language, and arts. The cen-
ters also work to help Turkish citizens living abroad in their accultur-
ation process with their host societies.24 Exhibitions and festivals are
other public diplomacy activities of the ministry. Festivals have been
organized in Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Germany, and South Korea
among other countries.25 These cultural events are considered to be
of great importance in eliminating misunderstandings and perceptions
by sharing Turkish culture, arts, and historical heritage in addition to
building strong relations with foreign audiences.
In sum, public diplomacy activities of the Ministry’s Department of
Cultural Diplomacy predominantly rely on the projection of cultural
values, whereas the ministry’s activities further aim to advance Turkey’s
foreign policy objectives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is actively
involved with the public diplomacy activities of other organizations as
well. Therefore, although the Office of Public Diplomacy is under the
Office of the Prime Ministry, in fact, much of the public diplomacy
activities are either overseen by or in collaboration with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
The Ministry for European Union Affairs
Turkey has had a long process of European Union accession which has
yet to become actualized. Turkish policy makers perceive Islamophobia
as a leading obstacle in Turkey’s accession to the European Union. For
that reason, Turkey has been taking appropriate steps to ensure sus-
tainable relations with the EU. In this light, the ministry’s Directorate
for Civil Society, Communication and Culture has been focusing on
domestic and international public opinion. It is responsible for inform-
ing domestic and international publics about the EU and Turkey’s acces-
sion process while facilitating the accession through civic initiatives.26
The main goal behind the communication strategies of the ministry

regarding the European Union is sharing Turkey’s messages and quali-
fications as a candidate country in a positive light to the EU’s member
states and to enhance public opinion in support of Turkey’s EU mem-
bership. In doing so, Turkey projects itself as an intercultural bridge, a
cradle of civilizations and religions, and a country with a secular and
modern face.27
The tools and events to project these messages include research,
image management, developing the “Turkey Brand,” cooperation
with think thanks and authorities from private sector and nongovern-
mental organizations, military organizations, academics, students, and
Turkish people living in EU states. The activities also involve focus on
media relations, and international events like concerts, Turkish sea-
sons and special days, lobbying, and public relations.28 Although the
ministry’s communication strategies are well established, the solutions
or roadmaps to tackle major problems are not yet clear. More impor-
tantly, Turkey’s relations with the EU have been rather stagnant since
2008 coupled with the lack of public enthusiasm for joining the union.
For that reason, while its international outreach is well thought out, a
deeper domestic fault line persists in Turkey’s EU membership process.
Such a fault line is ultimately correlated with Turkey’s nation brand and
its perceived and projected image.
The Ministry of Culture and Tourism
The Ministry of Culture and Tourism is perhaps one of the most active
actors in Turkey’s public diplomacy with tourism, cinema, and his-
tory as its denominators. The ministry contributes to Turkish public
diplomacy through the realm of tourism in two ways, one of which is
its “Go Turkey” campaign with the slogan “Home of ” in which the
ministry holds an executive role; the other is the “Come See Turkey”
campaign of which the ministry is a partner.
Go Turkey is an interactive Internet site where visitors can learn
about Turkey and the components of this “attractive destination”—
its culture, places, and historical sites. Through goturkey.com, pro-
spective visitors are able to plan and book trips. In coordination with
the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and all the variables of tourism,
goturkey.com aims to promote the natural, cultural, artistic, and his-
torical values of Turkey in a digital environment and share its diverse
heritage with the world.29
Similarly, the Ministry’s “Home of ” campaign also promotes Turkey

through different slogans created to generate different images of the
country such as “Home of Turquoise,” “Home of Blue Voyage,” “Home
of Two Continents,” “Home of Troy,” “Home of the Blue Mosque,”
“Home of Cappadocia,” “Home of Golden Horn,” “Home of Grand
Bazaar,” “Home of the Silk Road,” and “Home of Ancient Gods.”
According to its project managers, “Home of ” aims to create an image
of Turkey that that represents the home and country of the target audi-
ences. “Thanks to its strategic location connecting Asia, Europe and
Africa, Turkey has been a cradle of many civilizations since the begin-
ning of history from the Hittites to the Byzantines and the Ottomans
to Turkey. In addition, Anatolia is home to Mevlana, Christianity,
Noah’s Ark and Trojan Horse considered to be world heritage sites.
Lastly, identifying Turkey with the notion ‘home’ underlines Turkish
hospitality.”30
Another recent campaign in promoting Turkey has been the “Come
See Turkey” initiative. With partners such as the Ministry of Culture
and Tourism and the Photo Journalist Association of Turkey, the cam-
paign is conducted by the Presidency of the Turkish Republic. The main
sponsor of the campaign is the Union of Chambers and Commodity
Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB). The project hosts 20 photographers
from 13 different countries, will last 24 days, taking place on two sep-
arate journey routes. The photographers will travel and visit 23 cities,
sharing their photos on social media, acting as cultural ambassadors.
Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Pinterest, Vine, and blogs
are the social media tools used in the campaign. Nearly two thousand
photos have been shared from the official Instagram account of the
campaign and from individual accounts. As of late 2014, the photos
had 25 million likes and 500,000 comments.31 According to the early
results of the campaign, “Come See Turkey” is a successful example of
Turkish digital diplomacy. Consequently, the promotional activities of
the Ministry indirectly serve Turkish public diplomacy and contribute
to the improvement of its international image.
The Prime Ministry’s Turkish Cooperation

and Coordination Agency
The Prime Ministry’s Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency

(TIKA), Turkey’s official development agency, was founded at the end
of the Cold War to assist central Asian states with their social, economic
and cultural development. To coordinate the operations to be carried

out in this area, TIKA was established in 1992.32 TIKA’s success and
Turkish foreign policy have since been contingent upon one another.
The agency is focused on technical cooperation, education, health,
water and sanitation, improvement of public and civil infrastructures,
cultural cooperation, restoration activities of buildings, housing, and
agriculture.33 TIKA aims to provide development aid and technical
assistance to developing countries. Today, it operates in 30 countries in
five continents with 33 offices34 sponsoring a wide range of projects.35
The Turcology Project, which aims to spread Turkish language
and culture, is a successful example of cultural diplomacy. Since the
2000–2001 academic calendar, Turcology projects have set goals for
the reconstruction of old cultural bonds with neighbors, friends, and
kin, the expansion of Turkish language education, the enhancement of
communication, and, accordingly, the formation of Turkish-speaking
societies in those countries. Libraries, classes, and language laborato-
ries are established within centers under the auspices of the Turcology
Project and those centers are provided with many tools such as course
books, computers, Internet, television, and satellite systems. Within
the context of the project, collaboration with 32 universities has been
realized and 12 Turkish Language and Literature departments have
been opened and 18 Turkish Language and Culture centers have been
initiated.36
The Turcology Project of TIKA is thus a significant cultural diplo-
macy project. As a result, TIKA which has refrained from openly
advocating public diplomacy or describing its activities as such, has
indeed been a pioneer of Turkish public diplomacy since 1992 enabling
cultural dialogue via assistance projects. TIKA’s activities have been
on the foreground to reconnect Turkey with some of the historical
Ottoman provinces and posit Turkey as a major actor in development
aid in Africa, Asia, and recently Latin America.
The Prime Ministry’s Directorate General of

Press and Information
The main objective of the Directorate is to communicate with media

representatives, giving priority to foreign media relations. Through
its 39 international offices, the Directorate General of Press and
Information contributes to the promotion policy of the state and to
the strategies implemented by the government on this matter, provides
accurate and timely information to the public and relevant state author-
ities, ensures government activities and services are effectively con-
veyed to the national and international public, maintains and organizes
relations with the domestic and foreign media, and takes effective mea-
sures to facilitate their working conditions and activities.37 The direc-
torate’s mission is to contribute to Turkey’s promotion and formulate its
communication strategies. Its goal is to establish a realistic perception
of Turkey.38 The directorate has published an information booklet, and
conducted seminars and meetings.39 Through such events, it aims to
create an environment that enables dialogue. However, the directorate
is inevitably the official source of information and may or may not act
impartial on certain cases. For that reason, the role of the directorate
within global audiences would be highly limited given its structure and
role as an official state entity.
The Prime Ministry’s Presidency for Turks Abroad

and Related Communities
The Presidency for Turks Abroad was founded to oversee projects

regarding Turkish citizens abroad, offer solutions to their problems,
and carry out activities to improve social, cultural, and economic rela-
tionships within communities. Besides this, the government organi-
zation also establishes principles to ensure success to students deemed
appropriate for education in Turkey by public agencies and institu-
tions, and students coming to Turkey via international agreements
after coordinating with relevant institutions.40 Hence, the objective
of the presidency is twofold, one aimed at the Turkish diaspora and
the other aimed at exchange students. The scholarship programs of
Turkey are perhaps the most important cultural diplomacy tools of
the institution. The Turkey Scholarship—Tü rkiye Burslar ı—an edu-
cational exchange program, aims to improve mutual understand-
ing with other countries and to contribute to the richness of global
information with a people-oriented approach.41 Currently, there are
12,000 international students in 105 universities in 55 cities benefit-
ing from the program.42 Despite the scope of the program, the Turkey
Scholarship is newly established which is ref lected in the lack of fol-
low-up among participants of the programs. Perhaps, a unification
of all scholarship programs could facilitate a much more productive
educational exchange program in terms of transparency, organiza-
tion, and structure.
Facilitating an ongoing dialogue with Turkey’s diaspora is the sec-

ond aim of this office. The Turkish diaspora’s fiftieth anniversary of
life in Europe was celebrated with numerous activities. Events for the
“Fifty Years of Migration” constitute a great example of public diplo-
macy practiced by the Presidency for Turks Abroad that was aimed not
only at the diaspora but also at their host societies, and hence served as a
venue for networking and collaboration.43 As international cultural and
artistic activities supported by the Presidency for Turks Abroad, those
activities displayed an example of mutual understanding and relation-
ship building between communities. Hence, the office is the foremost
stakeholder of diplomacy in communicating with Turkey’s diaspora.
The Prime Ministry’s Disaster and Emergency

Management Presidency
Humanitarian aid takes on the role of a significant public diplomacy

strategy. More importantly, humanitarian aid lies at the core of Turkey’s
new nation brand as a donor state. The Disaster and Emergency
Management Presidency (AFAD) is the sole competent authority con-
cerned with disasters and emergencies, and works as an umbrella orga-
nization in Turkey, while collaborating with other organizations. The
presidency has responded to the disasters and emergencies taking place
even in the remotest parts of the world—from Haiti to Japan; from Chile
to Myanmar—and has also carried out evacuation and humanitarian aid
operations during the social upheavals that took place in Libya, Tunisia,
Egypt, and Syria, gaining appreciation from around the world.44
The most recent example of AFAD’s humanitarian aid took place
in Iraq. After the Mosul crisis, 55,000 nourishment packages, 10,000
rugs, 217,982 units of medicine, and tents for 12,500 people were sent
to Iraq by the coordination of the presidency. Building interpersonal
bonds through humanitarian aid constitutes another supportive activity
for public diplomacy. The activities of AFAD have certainly rendered
positive outcomes in terms of Turkey’s global standing in humanitarian
assistance.
The Turkish Radio and Television Association
Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) plays an essential

role as a broadcasting tool for Turkish public diplomacy activities.
International broadcasting is a substantial and effective public diplo-

macy tool, which enables the source to control both the content and
medium of the message. Founded in 1964, TRT broadcasts on 15 tele-
vision channels, seven national, six regional, and five international
radio channels. Trt.net.tr and trt.world.com are both available nation-
ally and internationally in 35 different languages and dialects. TRT also
has teletext publishing and publishes “TeleV İZYON,” “TRT Çocuk,”
and “TRT Haber DD” journals.45 The contribution of TRT to public
diplomacy with its broadcasts on radio, television, and the Internet is
unquestionably substantial. Aiming to address nearly 250 million peo-
ple in 27 countries and 13 autonomous republics from the Balkans to
central Asia and from the Middle East to the Caucasus, TRT Avaz was
launched in 2009 and positions itself as a common regional channel
with programming in Turkish, Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Kyrghyz, Uzbek,
and Turkmen.46 The introduction of Kurdish broadcasting on TRT
6 (now TRT Kurdi) in 2009 demonstrated the alignment of the pol-
icies of the state with those of the channel. Broadcasting in a foreign
language, TRT Al-Arabiya is targeted toward the Middle East. Despite
such initiatives, the establishment of an English-language television
broadcast is imperative to establishing TRT as a force in international
broadcasting.
TRT Radio is also utilized in Turkish public diplomacy through
Voice of Turkey (VOT). Organized under the External Broadcasting
Department, VOT broadcasts on a daily basis in 29 languages, includ-
ing Turkish, German, Albanian, Arabic, Azeri, Bosnian, Bulgarian,
Croatian, Chinese, Dari, Farsi, French, Georgian, English, Spanish,
Italian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Hungarian, Macedonian, Pashtun, Uzbek,
Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Tatar, Turkmen, Urdu, and Greek.
According to Ertekin, airing of TRT or Turkish-origin productions
on all the television and radio channels broadcasting in any language
but Turkish bears great importance in creating an image and an impact
in terms of public diplomacy.47 The lack of research on Turkey’s public
diplomacy can also be recognized in the lack of significant feedback
from audiences on TRT broadcasts. An elaborate study could indicate
the mishaps of current programming and would enable custom-made
programming for audiences that can resonate on a broader scale. On
a similar note, there is an absence of a global English-language broad-
casting channel run by Turkey. Further efforts in establishing such an
outlet for global consumption will not only be an invaluable contri-
bution to Turkey’s public diplomacy, but it will also position TRT
Turkey among key global broadcasting networks given that it provides
impartial and quality news. However, at this point, there has been sub-
stantial criticism on TRT’s news coverage and its state-controlled sta-
tus. An effective international broadcasting outlet can be actualized
through improving credibility. Without appropriate steps to improve
the structure of TRT it is unlikely that the English broadcast will draw
a substantial international audience.
Turkey’s Public Diplomacy’s Stakeholders and Tools
Traditional public diplomacy is a communication tool of governments.

However, it currently springs from different sources since the target
audience has become more accessible owing to advancements in tech-
nology and the diversity of public diplomacy actors. Various other actors
partake in public diplomacy initiatives whenever there is no or mini-
mal state involvement. These actors are sometimes involved in state-
sponsored projects while at other times they conduct their activities
without state involvement. Signitzer points out that the actors of public
diplomacy relate to the state; however, he emphasizes on new actors in
the area, arguing for an increased shift toward both nongovernmental
and non–nation-state actors.48 He argues that, “the new public diplo-
macy is about building relationships with civil society actors in other
countries and about facilitating networks between non-governmental
parties at home and abroad.”49 In line with this manifestation, Anadolu
Agency, nongovernmental organizations, think thanks, universities,
schools, opinion leaders, celebrities, national brands, and international
events are all Turkey’s public diplomacy stakeholders.
Anadolu Agency
Anadolu Agency (AA), Turkey’s national press agency, has contributed

profoundly to the country’s public diplomacy. The agency was estab-
lished in 1920 and incorporated in 1925.50 In its initial stage, all of the
common stocks of Anadolu Agency TAS were owned by individuals.
However, in the course of time, the National Treasury (the Ministry
of Finance) became the main shareholder.51 Despite having an auton-
omous position, as a result of its ownership structure and eminent ties
with the state, the agency broadcasts are in tandem with state policies
and the administrations in charge, which creates various complexities
in terms of news coverage and priorities.
The agency was founded to broadcast Turkey’s voice around the

globe. The initial objective behind public diplomacy activities was to
broadcast the respective countries’ voices. Anadolu Agency’s official
history manifests that during the Turkish War of Independence, the
agency informed the domestic audience about the everyday events on
the battlefield and of other events taking place elsewhere in the world.
Along with this role of informing the domestic audience, the newly
founded agency also took on the responsibility of sharing the story of
the Turkish National Struggle with the world, thereby informing for-
eign audiences and shaping global public opinion on Turkey’s fight for
freedom.52 Hence, Anadolu Agency has a distinct national character
that was enshrined during its inauguration.
Anadolu Agency currently operates in 31 countries with the goal
of increasing the number to 80 by 2020. While it currently publishes
news only in Turkish, it plans to share news in 14 languages.53 A part
of this objective was realized in 2013 when the agency began publish-
ing in Arabic, Russian, Kurdish, English, French, Persian, Bosnian,
Croatian, and Serbian.54 The agency also posts in different languages
on Facebook and Twitter. Utilizing Instagram effectively, it shares pho-
tos of the natural and cultural wonders of Turkey with English tags.
Such innovative developments provide a much broader audience and a
more diverse means of reaching different demographics throughout the
world via a variety of communication tools. Moreover, its broad range
of languages is in line with Turkey’s foreign policy articulation and its
current standing as a rising regional power.
Nongovernmental Organizations and Think Thanks
Public diplomacy has become so complex and diverse that it simply

cannot be confined to governmental activities. Ross states that “non-
governmental organizations and, with increasing frequency, individu-
als now pursue their goals in public venues around the world, often
with skill and success.”55 Nongovernmental organizations take on crit-
ical roles, and also serve as pressure groups. The Turkish government is
in strong alliance with various groups to deliver public diplomacy mes-
sages. These organizations include industrial communities such as the
Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB),
the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD),
and cultural and artistic communities such as museums, foundations
and the Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts (IKSV). NGOs and
think tanks equally contribute to the process of research in public

diplomacy campaigns.
Perhaps the most significant and intellectually fostered activities of
Turkey’s nongovernmental public diplomacy are carried out by think
tank institutions. These institutions are geared toward both domes-
tic and international audiences in purveying Turkey’s foreign policy
messages and help promote Turkey’s nation brand through their pro-
grams. One of the most important think tanks is the Foundation for
Political, Economic, and Social Research (SETA) with its innovative
studies on national, regional, and international issues. 56 Its office in
Washington, DC positions SETA as a global organization with the
capacity to build stronger international connections. SETA also pub-
lishes Insight Turkey, a renowned journal on Turkey and global affairs
and has recently begun publishing an Arabic version.
Another substantial think thank is the Turkey Economic and Social
Studies Foundation (TESEV), which carries out research on key issues and
contributes to public diplomacy by way of engaging with renowned global
institutions. TESEV, a credible think tank based in Istanbul, contributes
to Turkey’s public diplomacy through their foreign policy program, which
to this day has brought together experts from countries and regions which
Turkey has traditionally had conflict with such as Greece and Armenia.57
Other prominent think tanks such as The International
Strategic Research Organization (USAK), the Center for Strategic
Communication (STRATIM), the Turkish-Asian Center for Strategic
Studies (TASAM), Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies
(ORSAM) and Institute of Strategic Thinking (SDE) aim to inf luence
decision making in the real world by expanding their role as advisers to
governmental agencies, corporations, nongovernmental organizations,
and the media.58 These institutions facilitate dialogue through interna-
tional cooperation. Yet, most of Turkey’s think-tank institutions lack
global presence and credibility. Part of this is due to the lack of artic-
ulated personnel and the other part relates to the institutions’ interde-
pendency to the state apparatus. It is imperative to note that most of
Turkey’s NGOs—mainly think tanks—are somewhat dependent on
and aligned with the state policies, which brings into light whether
these entities should be recognized as nongovernmental. Moreover,
think tanks tend to take very strong positions either pro or against gov-
ernment initiatives which hampers their image as credible resources.
Hence, a more independent framework is necessary to establish glob-
ally credible and independent think-tank institutions that can not only
share Turkey’s story but also formulate concepts that could shape the
intelligentsia.
Aiming to promote Turkish culture and language abroad, the Yunus
Emre Institute is another actor in Turkish public diplomacy. The
Institute is governed by the Yunus Emre Foundation, with its board
including Turkish political figures such as Abdullah Gü l, the former
president of Republic of Turkey; and Ahmet Davutoğlu, prime min-
ister of the Republic of Turkey.59 Through the Yunus Emre Turkish
culture centers abroad, the Yunus Emre Institute promotes the most
significant examples of Turkish art and culture to the world and con-
tributes to cultural interaction and sharing. Activities such as concerts,
exhibitions, workshops, stage performances, movie screenings, aca-
demic meetings, and art courses are organized to share the rich cul-
tural accumulation of music, modern and classical handcrafts, theater,
cinema, photography, and Turkish cuisine.60
The Yunus Emre Centre for Turkish Training and Teaching
(YETEM) aims at teaching the Turkish language abroad as a world
language, to prepare courses, and materials, and to promote Turkey
through its language.61 The Yunus Emre Institute is Turkey’s cultural
diplomacy tool and is modeled upon other international cultural insti-
tutes operating from China, Spain, Italy, and Great Britain. From its
34 cultural centers in 27 countries, the institute is able to reach many
people. It gives importance to its activities in the Balkan region with
two cultural centers in Albania and three each in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Kosovo.62 The institutes are registered as a foundation and there-
fore work as NGOs, while in practice, they are more inclined to follow
state policies as a result of the formation of the members on the board
of trustees. For that reason, although as an organization Yunus Emre is
regarded as an NGO, in reality, the institution has strong connections
to the state by way of its organizational framework and function. The
activities of the foundation predominantly focus on cultural diplomacy.
Given that cultural diplomacy plays a key role in long-term relation-
ship building, it would be highly effective to allocate funds to further
advance the scope of inf luence of Yunus Emre through expanding the
number of its offices.
To sum up, it can be argued that the activities of Turkey’s non-
governmental organizations contribute to Turkey’s public diplomacy
framework and the development of intercultural dialogue. Yet, much
of the success and work may be undermined by their strong connec-
tions to the government making them semipoliticized.
Universities and Schools
Universities and schools also play important roles in public diplomacy

since they transfer public diplomacy messages and provide support to
the research process and implementation of cultural diplomacy. As prac-
titioners of Socrates and Erasmus—EU related exchange programs—
universities are both the subjects of student exchange programs and the
sources of harvested messages. Preserving this status, universities are
required to be in direct contact with the creators of public diplomacy
and communicate the desired messages.
Another way in which universities communicate the messages is
by holding international conferences and congresses. The academic
staff that participate in those events from overseas or to represent
Turkey overseas serve both as senders and receivers of the messages.
Additionally, foreign universities with partners in Turkey constitute
another key actor. To illustrate, Galatasaray University, founded by an
international agreement, is part of a consortium formed by universities
in France. Therefore, it possesses the ability to communicate Turkey’s
modern vision to the other universities in the consortium. The inter-
national collaboration of Turkish universities, their worldwide recog-
nition, and their international reputations hold an essential value for
Turkey’s image and brand. A research on the world’s best universi-
ties carried out by Times Higher Education ranks Boğaziçi University,
Istanbul Technical University, Middle East Technical University,
Bilkent University, and Koç University in the top 400.63
Similar schools representing institutions of other countries also bear
great importance to public diplomacy. These schools are subjected to
the educational laws of the home country; however, they project their
own culture on students via foreign language classes, course books, and
cultural-artistic activities. Turkish schools in many countries provide
certain advantages for Turkish public diplomacy. Crafting a positive
image of Turkish culture and building long-term relationships are sig-
nificant outcomes of these educational exchanges. Approximately one
thousand schools in 120 countries and five continents aim to teach
Turkish in those countries.64 Considering their numbers, Turkish
schools abroad serve as an essential medium for public diplomacy by
ref lecting Turkish culture and values onto the students.
Currently, Turkish higher educational institutions have significant
demand from Africa and the Middle East. This new student base pro-
vides venues for Turkish public diplomacy to explore cultural diplomacy
through educational exchanges and scholarship programs. However,
the sustainability of the attractive power of these institutions depends

on their education quality and global ranking.
Opinion Leaders and Celebrities
There are times when world-renowned opinion leaders are able to

communicate messages to civil societies far more effectively than gov-
ernments. Playing a part in public diplomacy, the opinion leaders of a
country and their impact in the international arena can be described as
celebrity diplomacy. The opinion leaders-—awarded artists and writers
of a country—serve as an advantage for soft power by partaking in cit-
izen diplomacy initiatives, promoting global causes, raising awareness
to certain political issues, or using their image to cultivate a new way
of thinking.
Nobel laureates constitute a great example. Nobel literature laure-
ate Orhan Pamuk is exemplary in this area. Renowned author Yaşar
Kemal, who was awarded the Legion d’ Honneur is a well-known
Turkish figure in France and through his books, is capable of inf luenc-
ing the perception of Turkey in France, and contributing to Turkey’s
strategic communication. Apart from novelists, other opinion lead-
ers such as award-winning directors Ferzan Özpetek, Fatih Ak ın, and
Nuri Bilge Ceylan, depict a variety of images related to Turkey in their
movies, which become venues of promotion. For instance, two films,
“Distant” (2002) and “Once Upon a Time in Anatolia” (2011), both
directed by Nuri Bilge Ceylan, won the Grand Prix at the Cannes
Film Festival. Nuri Bilge Ceylan also won the Best Director award at
Cannes for “Three Monkeys” in 2008. In his award acceptance speech,
Ceylan referred to Turkey as his “lonely and beautiful country” with
which he is “passionately in love,” thus serving the purpose of public
diplomacy. Through that articulation, he was able to stimulate curi-
osity about Turkey in the international arena. His recent award, The
Palme d’Or of 2014 for “Winter Sleep” at the sixty-seventh Cannes
Film Festival constitutes a more contemporary example of how celebri-
ties can shape a nation’s global perception. To further illustrate, Ceylan
dedicated his award to the Turkish youth who died during the 2013
Gezi protests and the 2014 Soma mining disaster.
Another example of celebrity diplomacy is the popularity of Turkish
television actors and actresses abroad. The international fame of these
actors has the potential to be transformed into soft power for Turkey.
For instance, K ıvanç Tatl ıtuğ and Song ü l Oden, the models used in
the promotion of the Shopping Fest in June 2012, have large fan bases
in the Arab world and have frequently been approached by numerous
companies to attract tourists from those countries.65
National Brands
National brands serve as tools to communicate the public diplomacy

messages of countries. They contribute to the familiarity, reputation,
and quality of the country in question all over the world. Turkey has
been adamant in galvanizing its nation brand but has not been able
to do so due to the lack of consensus on national identity, projected
image, and possible ways to ref lect the diversities within the commu-
nity. Although much effort is being put into creating national brands,
Turkey lacks a strong example in this context except for Turkish
Airlines.
The leading national brand of Turkey is Turkish Airlines (THY).
With an aircraft f leet of 237, THY f lies to 42 destinations and 201
cities as of 2013.66 Skytrax has bestowed many awards on THY in
recent years. It was ranked as the best airline in Europe from 2009
to 2011. It was also selected the best airline in Southern Europe dur-
ing the same three-year period. THY joined the world’s largest air-
line group Star Alliance in 2008, adding even more benefits to those
travelling on Turkey’s rising star.67 Such an increased global presence
brought numerous responsibilities to the airline, such as communicat-
ing Turkey’s messages and introducing guests to Turkish culture and
modernity in the best way possible. Aware of this responsibility, the
company works to promote itself through sponsorships.
As an official sponsor of the Barcelona football team, THY is able
to display its advertisements and logos across all media on billboards in
Barcelona’s own stadium, Nou Campand through filming commercials
with football players in Barcelona to promote its sponsorship all around
the world.68 As the sponsor of Manchester United, THY has similar
privileges.69 Another significant sponsorship of THY is the Turkish
Airlines Euroleague, which is considered to be the most important
basketball league in Europe. Thanks to this league bearing its name,
THY promoted itself to the 1,550,000 people who followed the tour-
nament last season.70 Along with numerous other sponsorships, THY
recently signed a landmark sponsorship agreement with football team
Borussia Dortmund combining excellence in sports with excellence in
aviation.71
Another example of international awareness of Turkish national

brands can be found in the field of fashion. The presence of both,
Turkish brands such as Mavi Jeans, Vakko, Beymen, and Ipekyol in
several overseas points of sale, and the clothes of Turkish designers such
as At ı l Kutoğlu, Hüseyin Çağlayan, and Dicle Kayek adorned by inter-
national celebrity figures also ref lect the country’s image.
International Events
Public diplomacy messages can also be communicated through activ-

ities, such as international sports events, concerts, cultural and artistic
festivals, and competitions. International events increase awareness of
the country in question and the sharing of public diplomacy messages.
International sports events have the potential to disseminate public
diplomacy messages and create a ground for dialogue, in which the
host country takes on the role of an ambassador.72 The successes of
a country in events such as the Federation of International Football
Associations (FIFA) World Cup, the Union of European Football
Associations (UEFA) Champions League, and the Euro League play
a significant role in the awareness of the public diplomacy of a coun-
try. In light of this, the Turkish National Football Team’s third rank in
the 2002 World Cup, its semifinal spot in the 2008 European Football
Championship, Galatasaray Sports Club winning the UEFA Cup in
2000, and Fenerbahçe Sports Club reaching the quarterfinals in the
UEFA Cup in 2008 contributes to the international awareness of
Turkey.
The visit of Abdullah Gü l, the former president of the Republic
of Turkey, to watch the Armenian-Turkish match in Armenia con-
stitutes an example of sports diplomacy.73 Formula 1 races and the
Women’s Tennis Association (WTA) Championships are also consid-
ered significant sport activities boosting the reputation of the coun-
try. Turkey hosted the WTA Championship in 2011–2013 and the
Formula 1 Turkey Grand Prix seven times. Held in Erzurum in 2011,
the Universiade (University Olympics) can also be regarded as an inter-
national sports activity.
International cultural and artistic activities are further examples
of Turkey’s public diplomacy. The most recent such activity in terms
of public diplomacy was the Saison de la Turquie (Turkish Season in
France) of 2009–2010, which was organized under the auspices of the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Culture of both countries and in close
collaboration with IKSV and Culture France. The Turkish Season

hosted nearly 600 activities, including exhibitions, open-air activities,
and shows demonstrating the interaction and collaboration of the two
cultures.74
It goes without question that the selection of Istanbul as the 2010
European Capital of Culture was also an international cultural activ-
ity, contributing to the public diplomacy of Turkey. According to the
European Capital of Culture agency, “with its geographical location and
cultural heritage of thousands of years, Istanbul as the 2010 European
Capital of Culture gave Europe the chance to discover its own cultural
roots, and gave both sides the opportunity to take a significant step
toward understanding each other.” 75
Events such as exhibitions, fairs, theater, concerts, and ballet com-
municate messages of public diplomacy via their announcements
throughout the world and the participation of tourists in the country.
For instance, IKSV held special events in 2012 for the 400-year cele-
brations of Turkish-Dutch diplomatic relationships. Activities included
a performance by the Netherlands’ Dans Theater, a very successful
modern dance troupe on June 14–15, 2012; a concert by the Royal
Concertgebouw Orchestra with Lorin Maazel as a guest conductor at
the Haliç Congress Center on November 10, 2010; and various con-
certs during the Istanbul Jazz Festival.76 In addition, an exhibition titled
“Rembrandt and His Contemporaries: The Golden Age of Dutch Art”
at the Sak ıp Sabancı Museum on in 2010, bears great importance for
Dutch-Turkish relations.
Recent activities include Picasso, Dali and Rodin exhibitions at the
Sak ıp Sabancı Museum; Miro, Frida Kahlo, and Diego Rivera exhibi-
tions at the Pera Museum; and ISKV’s staging of Shakespeare’s Richard
III, with Kevin Spacey in the lead role in October 2011. These activi-
ties introduce tourists to Turkey’s modern face.
Another opportunity for countries to raise awareness of themselves
in other countries and manipulate the perceptions of the citizens of
the target countries is through competitions like the Eurovision Song
Contest. Although the original purpose of the contest was to transfer
cultural heritage and boost tourism, the singers representing differ-
ent nations become unexpected ambassadors of their countries. Szondi
considers the Eurovision Song Contest to be a very effective way of
reputation management and provides an opportunity for countries to
express themselves and increase their credibility.77 A leading Turkish
female singer Sertap Erener, won the contest in 2003, thereby grant-
ing Turkey the right to host the contest in 2004. The Eurovision final
in 2004 had a global audience of nearly 30 million viewers.78 Another

example of an international event is the Miss World pageant. Azra Ak ın
of Turkey who was crowned Miss World 2002, took part in Turkey’s
official promotional activities following her success.
Yet another significant example of the cultural diplomacy initiative
is the Fire of Anatolia project. The dance troupe took to the stage at
Eurovision in 2004, Formula 1 in 2005, and Universiade also in 2005,
all of which were hosted by Turkey. They performed in numerous
countries, celebrating Turkey’s cultural heritage.79
Arranged by TÜ RKÇEDER, the Turkish Olympics is a significant
international event meant to raise the Turkish language to its deserved
place and spread its use throughout the world. Turkish learners receive
awards. These games began in 2003and always generate great enthusi-
asm and interest abroad.80 As an example of cultural diplomacy, activ-
ities such as these emphasize the role of language in the meeting of
different cultures.
Examples of art and culture activities display the effectiveness and
credibility of indirect communication of messages rather than state-
based messages. Taking the target audience’s interest and curiosity
in the art and culture of a country into consideration, more effective
results can be achieved via cultural heritage. Art-, culture-, and sport-
related activities enable countries to interact with each other, and their
citizens to communicate without their respective states representing
examples of the new public diplomacy. The wealth of the historical and
cultural values of Turkey serve as a substantial basis for these activities.
Conclusion
Public diplomacy might be an old concept for the rest of the world,
but it is a fairly new concept for Turkey. Turkey’s public diplomacy was
only actualized on an organized level in 2010. Despite many pitfalls
and its fairly short life span, Turkish public diplomacy has made great
progress both in cultural and political realms. As mentioned previously,
Turkey’s public diplomacy can be assessed as characteristically proactive
because it is not involved in war-like conditions. However, contrary to
this framework, in reality, Turkey’s foreign policy issues posit most of
its public diplomacy messages to be rather functionally reactive.
Today, the most effective public diplomacy activities are conducted
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Ministry’s Office of
Public Diplomacy and offices involved in official development aid.
However, in recent years, other actors and stakeholders such as NGOs

have also become more involved. Turkey’s increased global visibility
necessitates better coordinated public diplomacy efforts by taking on
various roles in strategic communication. In this respect, the activities
of all the state institutions in regard to public diplomacy and Turkey’s
image should be unified under a single strategy that is contingent upon
Turkey’s foreign policy priorities and nation brand. A significant com-
plexity of Turkish public diplomacy lies in the ambivalence of Turkey’s
nation brand and identity. Crafting the nation brand is still an ongo-
ing process, which ostensibly calls into question whether there exists a
blueprint of Turkey’s public diplomacy strategy. Recent initiatives in
branding Turkey as a humanitarian actor could possibly serve in foster-
ing a grand public diplomacy narrative.
There seems to be four major challenges that lie ahead of Turkey’s
public diplomacy. The first challenge is the design and structure of
governmental public diplomacy and its institutions. Turkey’s govern-
mental public diplomacy tools have been acting in disconnect with one
another. This means that although several of these institutions coordi-
nate with one another from time to time, for the most part, each insti-
tution has their own public diplomacy activities, which are not rooted
in a grand strategy. Given the importance of communication in craft-
ing an international image and in reputation management, it is imper-
ative for Turkey to heavily invest in public diplomacy research and
human resources. Only through such a framework can Turkey craft
and follow an official roadmap. Turkey’s public diplomacy messages
and activities are very much domestically driven when instead they
need to be geared toward foreign audiences. Much of the public diplo-
macy initiatives specifically by institutions other than the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs are publicized to consolidate the domestic voter base,
hence undermining their initial motivation.
The second challenge lies in the role of nongovernmental entities.
In this respect, a restructure and regulation of the relationship between
the government and nongovernmental entities can prove useful. The
level of autonomy of nongovernmental tools will likely foster Turkey’s
public diplomacy in terms of its credibility, diversity, and creativity. In
addition to autonomy, another issue stems from the considerable pas-
siveness of nongovernmental organizations. NGOs, think tanks, and
universities should be able to utilize their potential and opportunities
more effectively.
The third challenge is the needs for strong national brands apart
from Turkish Airlines. As national brands help build the country image
and perception, they also ref lect the values and components of a nation
brand. Various international events held in Turkey serve as tools to
raise a positive image of the country in the minds of foreign visitors
and audiences. Yet, the lack of a globally recognized Turkish brand
hampers the potential for Turkey’s soft power.
The fourth challenge lies in the lack of appropriate research. Public
diplomacy is a new practice for Turkey and perhaps stemming from
this lack of experience, Turkey still tends to employ traditional public
diplomacy. In this regard, Turkish public diplomacy resonates one-way
f low of communication and lacks reciprocity. In a similar vein, Turkish
public diplomacy lacks research, which greatly impedes its capacity to
inf luence. Therefore, prioritizing research is of utmost importance
for crafting an effective public diplomacy strategy that builds on lis-
tening. Turkish public diplomacy should embrace processes involving
research, the revision of existing policies, determining new strategies,
planning its messages, specifying the tools to communicate these mes-
sages, and their application. It also needs to enable the applications of
the other parties, dialogue, and re-research. The research process, the
most significant of all, is the best way to understand the target audi-
ence. Support for Turkish public diplomacy, following this process,
will be accomplished by providing support for policies in the short
term, raising positive perception in the medium term, and forming
sustainable bonds.81
In this sense, Turkish public diplomacy should reach and listen to
as many opinion leaders as possible to mold international public opin-
ion in the short term. It should develop international broadcasting
strategies to achieve perpetual international visibility, hold interna-
tional events, and benefit from cinema to manage its perception in the
medium term. In the long term, it should invest in cultural diplomacy
to build relationships. The success of Turkish public diplomacy in the
future will be possible with the practice boosted by strategies achieved
through research and the increased involvement of civil society in the
process.
Positioning itself as a communication practice in peacetime, Turkish
public diplomacy holds the potential to shift its course from traditional
to new public diplomacy. With practices including greater involve-
ment by civil society, transparency, and research, Turkish public diplo-
macy bears the potential to build an environment of dialogue and
collaboration.
As a result, if efficiently employed, public diplomacy serves as an
essential tool for a developing country and rising power such as Turkey
that has a number of unresolved foreign policy issues. A proper analysis,

research, and application of public diplomacy via diverse communica-
tion tools have the capacity to generate positive outcomes for Turkey’s
public diplomacy given that the challenges ahead are addressed with
the right means.
Notes
*
The author acknowledges the financial support of the Galatasaray University
Research Fund. (Project code: 14.300.005)
1. Jan Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in
Jan Melissen (ed.) The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 3.
2. Jan Dirk Kemming and Özlem Sand ı kçı, “Turkey’s EU Accession as a Question
of Nation Brand Image,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 3, no. 1 (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2007): 38.
3. İ brahim Kalin, “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey,” Perceptions 16,
no. 3 (Autumn 2011): 5.
4. Ibid., 16: 9.
5. Murat Vural, Ali, Nitelikli Diyalog İçin Nitelikli Bir Siyaset Dili Gerekiyor
(Interview with Abdullah Gü l), NPQ Türkiye8, say ı. 5 (2011): 33.
6. İ brahim Kal ı n, “Tü rk Dış Politikası ve Kamu Diplomasisi,” in Ali Resul Usul
(ed.) Yükselen Değer Türkiye (Istanbul: MÜSİ AD Yay ı nlar ı, 2010), p. 64.
7. The Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy, “Foundation,” May 28, 2014.
Available online at http://kdk.gov.tr//en/kurumsal/foundation/7.
8. The Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy, “Objectives,” May 28, 2014.
Available online at http://kdk.gov.tr//en/kurumsal/objectives/9.
9. The Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy, “Vision and Mission,”
Available online at http://kdk.gov.tr//en/kurumsal/vision-mission/8. 2010
10. The Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy, “Vision and Mission.”
11. The Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy, “Public Diplomacy Panels,”
June 2, 2014. Available online at http://kdk.gov.tr//en/faaliyetler/public-
diplomacy-panels/24.
12 . The Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy, “Foreign Policy Promotion
Programs,” June 2, 2014. Available online at http://kdk.gov.tr//en/faaliyetler/
foreign-policy-promotion-programs/43.
13. The Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy, “Youth Programs,” June 2,
2014. Available online at http://kdk.gov.tr//en/faaliyetler/youth-programs/45.
14. The Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy, “Meetings Abroad,” June 3,
2014. Available online at http://kdk.gov.tr//en/faaliyetler/meetings-abroad/47.
15. The Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy, “Wise People Conference
Series,” June 3, 2014. Available online at http://kdk.gov.tr//en/faaliyetler/wise-
people-conference-series/10.
16. The Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy, “The Idea of Europe
Conference Series,” June 3, 2014. Available online at http://kdk.gov.tr//en/
faaliyetler/the-idea-of-europe/27.
17. The Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy, “Meetings with International
Media Representatives Residing in Turkey,” June 4, 2014. Available online at
http://kdk.gov.tr//en/faaliyetler/meetings-with-foreign-media-representatives-
residing-in-turkey/17.
18. Available online at www.twitter.com.
19. CNN Tü rk, “Ba şbakan Erdoğan’dan 24 Nisan Açı klaması”, Available online
at http://www.cnnturk.com/haber/turkiye/basbakan-erdogandan-24-nisan-
aciklamasi.
20. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Promotion of Turkey Abroad,”
March 10, 2014. Available online at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/promotion-of--tur-
key-abroad.en.mfa.
21. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “World, International and
Horticultural Expositions (EXPO),” May 17, 2014. Available online at http://
www.mfa.gov.tr/world_-international-and-horticultural-expositions-_expo_.
en.mfa.
22 . Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Years and Seasons of Turkey
Recently Organized in Other Countries,” June 30, 2014. Available online at
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/years-and-seasons-of-turkey-recently-organized-in-
other-countries.en.mfa.
23. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Chairs on Turkey at the
Universities Abroad,” May 18, 2014. Available online at http://www.mfa.gov.
tr/supporting-and-funding-the-establishment-of-chairs-in-turkish-studies-at-
internationally-renowned-universities.en.mfa.
24. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkish Cultural Centers,
Turkish Language and Literature Departments and Turkish Education Centers,”
May 18, 2014. Available online at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-cultural-
centers_-turkish-language-and-literature-departments-and-turkish-education-
centers.en.mfa.
25. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Significant Cultural, Artistic
Events and Festivals Abroad,” June 8, 2014. Available online at http://www.mfa.
gov.tr/significant-cultural_-artistic-events-and-festivals-abroad.en.mfa.
26. Ministry for EU Affairs, “Directorate for Civil Society, Communication and
Culture,” June 10, 2014. Available online at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.
php?p=44387&l=2 .
27. Avrupa Birliğ i Bakanl ığ ı, “AB’ye Yönelik İ letişim Stratejisi,” June 10, 2014.
Available online at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/abis/index.php?p=20&l=1.
28. Ibid.
29. Go Turkey, “About Go Turkey,” June 10, 2014 Available online at https://www.
goturkey.com/tr/pages/read/about.
30. Go Turkey, “Home of Bir Slogan Değ il Bir Sistem,” June 10, 2014. Available
online at http://hometurkey.com/kampanya/home-of-bir-slogan-degil-bir-
sistem/.
31. Come See Turkey, “Come See Turkey Press Bulletin,” June 13, 2014. Available
online at http://www.comeseeturkey.org/basin-bultenleri.php.
32 . Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, “About T İ KA,” June 13, 2014.
Available online at http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/about-us/1.
33. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, “Fields of Activity,” June 16,
2014. Available online at http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/fields-of-activity/2 .
34. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, “Ba şkan ı n Mesajı,” June
16, 2014. Available online at http://www.tika.gov.tr/tika-hakkinda/baskan/
baskanin-mesaji/28
35. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, “News,” June 16, 2014. Available
online at http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/4.
36. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, “Sosyal Altyapı lar ve Hizmetler,”
June 18, 2014. Available online at http://www.tika.gov.tr/faaliyet-alanlari/
sosyal-altyapilar-ve-hizmetler/egitim/1.
37. Directorate General of Press and Information, “About DGPI,” June 13, 2014.
Available online at http://www.byegm.gov.tr/english/about-dgpi.
38. Directorate General of Press and Information, “About DGPI.”
39. Directorate General of Press and Information, “Symposium on the 600th Year of
Polish-Turkish Relations,” June 14, 2014. Available online at http://www.byegm.
gov.tr/english/activities#.
40. Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, “Faaliyet Raporu”
(Ankara: 2010), p. 4.
41. Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, “Turkiye for Education,”
June 19, 2014. Available online at http://www.trscholarships.org/index.php/en/
turkiye-burslari/egitim-icin-turkiye.
42 . Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, “Tü rkiye Burslar ı Genel
Bilgiler,” June 19, 2014. Available online at http://www.ytb.gov.tr/#.
43. Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, “Almanya’ya G öçü n
50. Yı l Etkinlikleri,” June 19, 2014. Available online at http://www.ytb.gov.
tr/index.php/tr/kurumsal/teskilat-semasi/183-almanyaya-gocun-50-yili-
etkinlikleri.
44. Prime Ministry’s Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, “About Us,”
June 19, 2014. Available online at https://www.afad.gov.tr/EN/IcerikDetay.
aspx?ID=1.
45. TRT, “Tarihçe,” August 22, 2014. Available online at http://www.trt.net.tr/
Kurumsal/s.aspx?id=tarihce
46. Ibid.
47. Bü lend Ayd ı n Ertekin, “Uluslararası Sistemde Görsel-İşitsel Medyan ı n Kamu
Diplomasisi ve Kamuoyu Yaratmadaki Önemi: TRT’nin Tü rkçe Dışı nda Yay ı n
Yapan Kanallar ı Üzerine Bir İ nceleme,” Electronic Journal of Social Sciences 11,
no. 42 (Autumn 2012) : 346.
48. Benno Signitzer, “Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Some Conceptual
Explorations,” in Ansgar Zerfass, Betteke Van Ruler, and Krishnamurthy Sriramesh
(eds) Public Relations Research (Netherlands: Verlag f ü r Sozialwissenschaften,
2008), p. 209.
49. Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” p. 22.
50. Anadolu Agency, Tarihçe, July 22, 2014. Available online at http://www.aa.com.
tr/tr/kurumsal/61996--tarihce.
51. Hikmet Sami Tü rk, Anadolu Ajansı Sorunu ve Çözüm Yollar ı (Ankara:Sevinç
Matbaası), p. 63.
52 . Anadolu Agency, “Kuruluşundan Bug ü ne Anadolu Ajansı,” April 15, 2014.
Available online at http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/kurumsal/61996--tarihce.
53. Anadolu Agency, “100. Yı l Vizyonu,” May 11, 2014. Available online at http://
www.aa.com.tr/documents/AA/aa_100_yil_vizyonu.pdf.
54. Anadolu Ajansı, “Select Language,” May 11, 2014. Available online at http://
www.aa.com.tr/.
55. Christopher Ross, “Public Diplomacy Comes of Age,” The Washington Quarterly
25, no. 2 (2002): 76.
56. Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, “About SETA,” May
19, 2014. Available online at http://setav.org/About.
57. Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, “About Us,” June 9, 2014.
Available online at http://www.tesev.org.tr/about-us/TesevEng/1.html.
58. International Strategic Research Organization, “About USAK-Mission,” June 9,
2014. Available online at http://www.usak.org.tr/page.php?id=5&h=1.
59. Yunus Emre Enstit üsü, “Kurumsal,” July 22, 2014. Available online at http://
www.yee.org.tr/turkiye/tr/kurumsal/vakif-yonetimi.
60. Yunus Emre Enstit üsü, “Kü lt ü r ve Sanat,” June 7, 2014. Available online at http://
yee.org.tr/turkiye/tr/kultur-sanat.
61. Yunus Emre Enstit üsü, “Tü rkçe Eğ itim ve Öğ retim Merkezi,” June 7, 2014.
Available online at http://yee.org.tr/turkiye/tr/yetem/yetem-1.
62 . Yunus Emre Enstit üsü, “Kurumsal,” June 7, 2014. Available online at http://yee.
org.tr/turkiye/tr/kurumsal.
63. “World University Rankings,” August 25, 2014. Available online at, http://
www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2013-14/world-
ranking/range/351-400.
64. Kü r şad Zorlu, Türk Okullar ı, June 6, 2011. Available online at http://www.
turkokullari.net/content/view/452/49/.
65. Please see chapter 11 by Selcan M. Kaynak in this volume for further information
about Turkish television series.
66. Tü rk Hava Yollar ı, “Ba şar ı Hikayesi,” June 9, 2014. Available online at http://
www.turkishairlines.com/tr-tr/kurumsal/basin-odasi/bir-bakista-thy/basari-
hikayesi.
67. Turkish Airlines, “Success Story,” June 9, 2014. Available online at http://www.
turkishairlines.com/en-tr/corporate/press-room/about-turkish-airlines/success-
story.
68. Tü rk Hava Yollar ı, “Barcelona,” March 17, 2012. Available online at http://
www.turkishairlines.com/tr-TR/sponsorluklar/6120/barcelona.aspx.
69. Tü rk Hava Yollar ı, “Manchester United,” March 17, 2012. Available online at
http://www.turkishairlines.com/tr-TR/sponsorluklar/6121/manchester-united.
aspx.
70. Tü rk Hava Yollar ı, “Turkish Airlines Euroleague,” March 17, 2012. Available
online at http://www.turkishairlines.com/tr-TR/sponsorluklar/6109/turkish-
airlines-euroleague.aspx.
71. Tü rk Hava Yollar ı, “Tü rk Hava Yollar ı Alman devi Borussia Dortmund’un
Resmi Havayolu oluyor,” June 10, 2014. Available online at http://www.turk-
ishairlines.com/tr-tr/kurumsal/haberler/haber/turk-hava-yollari-alman-devi-
borussia-dortmundun-resmi-havayolu-oluyor.
72 . Evan H. Potter, Branding Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
2009), p. 53.
73. Çağ r ı Erhan, “Spor ve Kamu Diplomasisi,” July 9, 2007. Available online at
http://www.usak.org.tr/makale.asp?id=1575.
74. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Years and Seasons of Turkey
Recently Organized in Other Countries.”
75. Avrupa Kü lt ü r Ba şkenti Nedir? May 28, 2011. Available online at http://www.
istanbul2010.org/avrupakulturbaskenti/avrupakulturbaskentleri/index.htm.
76. Istanbul Kü lt ü r Sanat Vakf ı, “İ KSV 40. Yı l ı n ı Kutluyor!” January 24, 2012.
Available online at http://www.iksv.org/tr/arsiv/p/1/440.
77. Gyorgy Szondi, “Central and Eastern European Public Diplomacy,” in Nancy
Snow and Philip M. Taylor. (eds) Handbook of Public Diplomacy (New York:
Routledge, 2009), p. 303.
78. European Broadcasting Union, “Summary of Eurovision Song Contest 2004
Ratings,” March 15, 2012. Available online at http://www.ebu.ch/en/union/
news/2004/tcm_6-12311.php.
79. Anadolu Ateşi, “Hakk ı nda,” March 28, 2012. Available online at http://www.
anadoluatesi.com/hakkinda_3_17.
80. Tü rkçe Olimpiyatlar ı, “Olimpiyatlar ı n Amacı,” April 7, 2012. Available online at
http://www.turkceolimpiyatlari.org/website/content/29.
81. For further information, see Gaye Asl ı Sancar, Kamu Diplomasisi ve Uluslararası
Halkla İlişkiler (Istanbul: Beta Yay ı nlar ı, 2012).
CH A P T E R T WO
Historical Perspective: Ottomans and

the Republican Era
Ve dat D e m i r
Though the development of public diplomacy and the concept and

use of “soft power” in conf licts between states corresponds to a recent
period, its application dates back to olden times, to even before the his-
tory of diplomacy. Soft power is a mode of power to generate the admi-
ration of different countries and people, and if described as a power
directed toward attracting other people, examples can go as far back as
to the concept of creating a state. Cull has given examples on the usage
of soft power from Antiquity and the Roman period in his book.1
Nye in his work Soft Power has listed examples of different states uti-
lizing soft power at various stages of history.2 However, Nye’s articula-
tion does not include samples from one of the most significant powers
in history—the Ottoman Empire. With its population, hard power,
and strong bureaucracy, the Ottoman Empire, as the predecessor of the
modern Turkish republic, has no doubt resourcefully benefited from
early public diplomacy strategies to wield soft power.
The Turkish republic, as the successor of the Ottoman Empire, has
naturally carried forward certain aspects of the Ottoman experience.
The official narrative in regard to Ottoman soft power is overwhelm-
ingly associated with Ottoman tolerance, which has been employed
quite frequently in modern Turkish political rhetoric. Contemporary
foreign policy rhetoric and public diplomacy focuses on the Ottoman
heritage and tolerance. Hence, the historical underpinnings of modern
public diplomacy rhetoric will be analyzed in this chapter in order to
44 Vedat Demir
understand the contemporary public diplomacy practices and nation

branding attempts of Turkey. This chapter describes the background
of Turkish public diplomacy drawing from a historical perspective.
Turkey’s public diplomacy will be reviewed in two categories: the
period of the Ottoman Empire, and the Republic period.
Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in

the Ottoman Era
The Ottoman Empire (1299–1923) was one of the largest and lon-
gest lasting empires in history. It became one of the largest and most
powerful political structures in the world between the final years of
the thirteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth cen-
tury. The Ottoman Empire spread itself across three continents and
included Turkey, Transylvania, Transcaucasia and the Caucasus, the
Crimea, southern Ukraine, the countries that now make up the states
of Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Syria, Israel,
Lebanon, a part of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Cyrenaica and
Tripolitania, Tunisia, and Algeria.3 According to Goodwin, at least 36
different races of people lived within the empire.4 Istanbul, the capital
of the rich Ottoman civilization and the seat of the sultanate, was the
first city of the Old World.
Ottoman history is complicated as it involves not only the Ottoman
dynasty, but also the many people who operated and ruled the empire,
and the many who were ruled by it—Turks, Arabs, Serbs, Armenians,
Jews, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Albanians, and several others. It con-
stitutes the history of the major religious groups among the subjects
composed of Muslims, Jews, and Christians. It takes into account the
relations between the Ottomans and their neighbors in Europe and
Asia, and the complicated stories of wars, conquests, and diplomacy.5
Soft Power of the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire managed to reign for six centuries largely due
to its capacity to combine hard power with soft power. A major reason
behind the empire being such an attractive power of its time largely lies
in the advantages of life within the empire—whether it was the social
and civil organizations, the politics being applied, fair rulings, or the
religious and cultural opportunities it provided for its people.
Historical Perspective 45
Social, Cultural, and Religious Organizations

By the time the Turks arrived in Anatolia, social, cultural, and religious
organizations had made important contributions toward the soft power
of the Ottomans, especially during the empire’s expansion and devel-
opment period. In addition to the official orthodox religious estab-
lishments—which determined and organized individual statuses and
actions in the Ottoman system—there was also a network of unofficial
religious organizations that managed to capture the hearts and minds of
the majority of the sultan’s subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. As
for the Muslims, these unofficial religious movements were primarily
the products of Sufism, the movement toward mystical union with the
Creator, which had converted most of the Turkish nomads in central
Asia to Islam while they were preparing to invade the Middle East. The
practitioners of the movements, called dervishes, had established orders
(tarikats). These movements served as a unifying factor within Muslim
Ottoman society.6
In this period, there were many political, social, financial, and Sufistic
functions of the civil and social institution of that time with specific
groups having to execute crucial functions. It is said that four groups
(congregations) came to Anatolia with the migration. They were:7
1. The Anatolian Gazis (Gaziyân-ı Rum)

2. The Anatolian Dervishes (Abdalân-ı Rum)
3. The Anatolian Brotherhood (Ahiyân-ı Rum)
4. The Anatolian Sisterhood (Bacıyân-ı Rum)
Justice, Tolerance, Culture, and Religious Freedom

One of the soft power elements of the Ottoman Empire was the some-
what fair ruling its people received. The empire, which contained peo-
ple from different ethnicities, religions, and cultures, lived peacefully
for hundreds of years. This was a structure no other state in Europe pos-
sessed at the time. However, in a modern sense, the Ottoman rule could
certainly not be considered to be tolerant and inclusive. Maintaining
peace in the Ottoman Empire required a substantial amount of hard
power and could also be linked to the Ottomans’ creation of their
nation brand. Therefore Ottoman tolerance and freedom had many
complexities. Yet, it is necessary to discuss these more official articula-
tions to unpack the contemporary public diplomacy framework. To
this day, Turkey is quite content with the social and political structure
of the Ottoman Empire and strongly supports that the Empire provided
a tolerant environment, fair ruling, and freedom of religion. However,
46 Vedat Demir
although non-Muslims enjoyed religious freedoms within the state sys-

tem, they were confined to certain boundaries and were subjected to
poll taxes.8
Loyalty was a major dynamic behind the Ottoman state system. For
instance, examples of men of low status in Christendom rising to the
summits of the Ottoman state were well known throughout Europe.9
Tolerance of other races had brought many talented Greeks, Jews, and
Gentiles into the sultan’s service—a Hungarian was Sultan Mehmet’s
(1451–1481) chief gun-caster in the Siege of Constantinople.10
People of different strains and creeds lived together on the condition
that the subject populations remain loyal to the Empire. After conquer-
ing Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453, Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror
appointed a leading Orthodox cleric to be the patriarch and civil head
of all the Orthodox people in the empire. The same was done by recog-
nizing the Armenian patriarch and the Jewish grand rabbi of Istanbul as
heads of their respective millet s, or religious communities. The author-
ity granted the millet heads—and through them their clergy—power
that extended beyond the normal matters of church administration,
worship, education, and charity, all the way to supervision of the civil
status of their coreligionists.11
The Ottoman state harbored many minorities from different races
and religions on its lands for many centuries. They were appointed
high-level state positions in the field of economy, administration, and
education.12 At the end of the Ottoman rule in Europe, the Christian
nations they had ruled for centuries had managed to preserve their
languages, cultures, religions, and, to an extent, even their institutions,
intact and ready to resume their separate national existence.13
A Safe Country for Refugees

The Jews escaping the massacre in Spain in the fifteenth century; the
political refugees escaping Russia, Austria, Poland, and Hungary in the
nineteenth century; the people f leeing from Caucasia to Anatolia; or
the Rumelian immigrants from the Balkans in the twentieth century
have in all cases been welcomed to the Ottoman Empire.
Throughout history, the Turks have opened their doors to thou-
sands of victims running away from some form of tyranny, oppres-
sion, or persecution regardless of their nationality, race, or religion.
By providing a safe haven for these refugees, they have not only set a
good example to others but have also taught the international commu-
nity a valuable lesson on human rights and freedom.14 This articulation
has been maintained throughout the Republic and is currently being
implemented in Turkey’s public diplomacy rhetoric. Turkey’s more

recent humanitarian aid initiatives and its growing number of Syrian
refugees provide contemporary examples for this rhetoric and nation
brand as a safe haven.
Jewish Immigration to the Ottoman Empire: The Jewish expulsion

from Spain in 1492 is well known in Turkey, but was by no means
unique. Other groups of refugees such as dissident Christians
persecuted by the dominant churches in their own countries
also found refuge in the Ottoman lands.15 The wave of Jewish
immigration to the Ottoman Empire began in 1492 with the
Spanish Expulsion. Thousands of Spanish Jews deported by King
Ferdinand and Queen Isabella began to arrive in the Ottoman
cities of Salonika, Smyrna, and Istanbul during the reign of Sultan
Bayezid II (1481–1512), who provided a safe haven for them. These
Ottoman harbors eventually became major Jewish centers in the
empire. The Jews, deported from their own homeland, found
genuine hospitality and tolerance in the Ottoman lands. Securing
freedom of consciousness and religion in a foreign country is a
valuable asset for any minority community.16
The settlement of the Spanish Jews in Turkish cities in the fifteenth
century and the conversion of some to Islam produced a highly com-
petitive element, which took over branches of trade and industry that
were hitherto a Greek monopoly. The Jews became physicians, bank-
ers, and merchants, and many of them occupied high social positions in
the Ottoman Empire.17
Refugees and the Refugee Code: In the middle of the nineteenth

century the empire continued to be the safest port for refugees, even
though it was in a period of decline. Despite the harsh conditions, the
empire remained hospitable to the refugees and made arrangements
to increase immigration to the country. The most important of these
arrangements was the Refugee Code (Muhacir ûn Kanunnâmesi)
of 1857.
Starting in the 1840s, thousands of refugees began f looding into
the empire in order to escape oppression and massacre. These immi-
grants were promised freedom of religion, whatever their faith may be,
and they were allowed to build churches where they settled if suitable
places of worship were not already available. News of the decree spread
widely through Europe and was met with a ready response from vari-
ous groups unable to find land or political peace at home.18
48 Vedat Demir
The Immigration and Asylum Movement from Europe: Most of the

refugees came from Turkish, Tatar, and Circassian lands being
conquered by the Russians north and west of the Black Sea and the
Caspian Sea. Even earlier, hundreds of Russian “Old Believers” had
f led from the reforms of Peter and Catherine, settling in Dobruca
and along the Danube near the Black Sea. Between 1848 and 1850,
they were joined by thousands of non-Muslim immigrants, which
included farmers as well as political and intellectual leaders f leeing the
repressions that accompanied and followed the revolutions of 1848,
especially from Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland.
The f low became a torrent after the Crimean War between 1853
and 1856, not only due to the Refugee Code but also as a result of new
persecutions elsewhere in Europe. Taking advantage of the Refugee
Code, Cossacks who f led from the Russian army settled as farmers in
Macedonia, Thrace, and western Anatolia. Thousands of Bulgarians—
some of whom had previously been settled in the Crimea by the Russians
to replace the Tatars—now reacted to the alien environment and secured
permission to return to their homes in the Ottoman Empire.19
Public Diplomacy in the Ottoman Era

A major shift took place in the conduct of diplomacy beginning in
the Italian peninsula during the Renaissance period. While in many
respects the Ottoman Empire participated in the changes in diplomacy
from an early date, the turning point probably did not occur until the
nineteenth century, when patterns and trends that had been evolving
slowly came together.20
From the late sixteenth century onward, the position of the Ottoman
Empire in international politics gradually weakened. European states,
especially the newly emerging nation-states in Western Europe, had
surpassed it economically, technologically, and militarily by 1800.21
According to Davison, in this process, diplomacy became more
important than ever for the Ottoman Empire.22 Due to the empire’s
increasing weakness, especially when compared to the great powers
of Europe, the defense of its territories and interests depended more
on diplomacy and negotiation than on the use of the armed forces.
Diplomacy was a defensive weapon for the sultan and the government
in more than one way. It could help the empire avoid injury, attract
aid, and persuade European powers that it deserved support from them
because it was improving itself by means of a process of reforms and
bringing itself closer to Western ways. Under the pressure of events,

the empire developed a diplomatic system that was more Western than
traditional Ottoman methods.
The “modern” Ottoman diplomatic service began taking its defin-
itive shape in 1821 with the establishment of the Translation Bureau
(Tercüme Odası) ending the Ottoman government’s dependence on
dragomans. Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839) formally created the
Foreign Ministry and, in 1834, set up the diplomatic apparatus to allow
for permanent missions abroad.23 After 1834, a more European-style
ministry developed slowly under the minister’s direction with a dip-
lomatic corps that was more conversant with European diplomatic
training.24
When the Ottoman Empire was weakening, the Ottoman rulers
recognized their inability to compete with countries possessing hard
power such as Russia, England, and France. Therefore, they had to
retaliate with wielding soft power.
Image and Reputation Management

The ideas involving the empire’s universal reputation and image were
an essential part of the Westernization period, which continued until
the Tanzimat era. The Ottomans’ deep concern with their image pre-
dated the Abdü lhamid reign.
As their world shrank around them and they lost much of their hard
power capacity, the Ottomans realized that a vital aspect of survival was
the projection of a positive image abroad. Their efforts centered around
two major areas: the first being the attempt to contain the damage done
by incessant pejorative publications in the international media and in
other forums such as theater, which sought to project the Ottoman
state as a degenerate nest of bloodthirsty tyrants at worst, or a decaying
f leshpot of “Oriental” vice at best. The second area of focus was the
projection of a positive image, for which any opportunity to appear in
the mainstream of world events was seized. Such opportunities ranged
from providing financial aid for medical purposes to both the Russian
and Japanese sides in the Russo-Japanese War, to providing monetary
aid to the victims of a forest fire in the United States. The aim in all
of this was to support the Ottoman state’s rather ungrounded claim of
being a member of the civilized world and the Concert of Europe.25
The Press and the Theater: The Ottoman Empire sought to inf luence
the public opinion of other countries by using the foreign press. In
50 Vedat Demir
1858, because of calumnies in European newspapers, the government

created a Publicity Bureau to furnish regular news bulletins on
current questions to all Ottoman representatives abroad. The
Ottoman diplomats also learned how to get European newspaper
editors to publish stories favorable to their government, and to insert
news stories in newspapers and press services. Musurus Pasa, for
instance, as the Ottoman ambassador in London, was able to furnish
news dispatches to Reuters. Perhaps the government was less effective
in these efforts than the Western powers, but it learned rapidly and
was competing with Europe’s on its own terms.26
It is no accident that one of the major collections of archives in the
Yı ld ız Palas (the palace of Sultan Abdü lhamid II) consists of newspa-
per cuttings from over 100 newspapers ranging from The Times and
The Debates to more obscure Serbian and Bulgarian publications. These
were combed daily by the Foreign Ministry Foreign Press Service for
material either injurious or complimentary to the Ottoman state. It was
a thankless and Sisyphean task—the “grand old Turk” of the Crimean
War fame was long forgotten during the Armenian massacres and the
general liberal wave in Europe. The best the Ottoman diplomats and
other officials could do therefore was damage control, or at the very
best “image management.” The government was more than aware of
the importance of European public opinion and attempted to inf luence
it by sponsoring Ottoman and foreign writers, or resorting to down-
right bribery.27
Apart from newspapers and journals, another sphere where the
Ottomans strove for image management was the theater. Another of
the tasks of Ottoman representatives abroad was to prevent the staging
of productions, which they deemed demeaning and insulting. Ottoman
diplomats usually worked through the good offices of European states-
men, sometimes at the highest level. The French president, Sadi Carnot,
was awarded a decoration, the Nişan-ı imtiyaz (the Ottoman equivalent
of The Legion D’Honneur) for “his extraordinary goodwill and help” in
securing the banning of a play on Prophet Mohammed.28
The Sultan’s Travels Abroad: The Ottoman Empire used the sultan’s
travels as an effective way to impress European public opinion.
European monarchs in the nineteenth century often visited each
other, conducting state business as well as traveling for pleasure. No
Ottoman sultan had ever before left his own dominion, except on the
warpath, but Sultan Abdü laziz (1861–1876) ventured even as far as
London.29
In 1867, upon strong urging from his ministers, Sultan Abdü laziz
traveled to Paris, London, and Vienna, and also made a stop in Germany.
The trip was a success; the sultan evidently made a positive impression,
and along with his minister was able to counteract the inf luence that
Russia was exerting in Paris. A later sultan, Abdü lhamid II played an
active role in diplomacy, and was willing to write personal letters to
other monarchs, as he did early in 1878 asking Queen Victoria for aid
in the face of a Russian threat to Istanbul itself.30
Representation at International Expos: The activities of Sultan Abdü laziz

included participating in expos abroad to enhance the image of the
Ottoman Empire. Sultan Abdü laziz traveled outside his empire for
peaceful purposes when he visited the Paris Expo of 1867. However,
although Abdü lhamid II dismissed all rumors that he was going to
visit Europe, he made a special effort to see that the Ottoman state
was represented at all major fairs.31
The world fairs presented one of the most spectacular arenas for the
display of power in the glory days of imperialism. The Ottoman state
had made a point of being present at nearly all these fairs since the first
World Exposition in London in 1850. Like this, the Barcelona fair of
1888, the 1889 Paris Exposition, the Chicago Columbian Exhibition
of 1893, and many other expositions in different locations of the world
were prepared very seriously and had many activities to be participated
in. The Ottomans’ “fairs policy” consisted of two main elements. First,
there was the aim of presenting the Ottoman Empire as the leader of
the Islamic world, but also as a modern member of the civilized com-
munity of nations. Second, constant vigilance was aimed to repel any
slight or insult to the Sublime State’s prestige.32
Aid to Other Countries: In its last stages, the Ottoman Empire was
helping various countries around the world. This aid was a part of
image control as well as a symbol of the hospitality of the empire and
its people arising from the tenets of Islam.
For instance, when a heavy f lood, the “century’s worst disaster,” hit
America in 1889 resulting in nearly two thousand deaths and leaving
several others homeless, the Ottoman Empire helped the United States
not only by providing those affected with food, but also by donating 200
Ottoman liras per family. Interestingly enough, the Ottoman Empire
was the first to send humanitarian aid to the United States. Actions
that could enhance the image of the Ottoman state were purposefully
sought after. When the United States suffered from exceptionally heavy
52 Vedat Demir
forest fires, the sultan made a point of sending 300 gold liras as succor
for the victims. The Foreign Ministry reported that this gesture had
received very favorable publicity in the American press.33
The Ottoman rulers understood that to survive among the European
countries, they had to provide assistance whenever possible. Such oppor-
tunities arose during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 where both the
Russian and the Japanese sides needed medical as well as financial aid.
The Council of Ministers first considered sending a Red Crescent field
hospital to both sides, but the cost of such a venture proved prohibitive.
It was thus decided that the Ottoman government would send financial
aid for medical purposes to both belligerents as “this was in keeping
with humanitarian practice undertaken by other states.”34 This was just
one of the many events the Ottomans participated in aid-wise.
Public Diplomacy via Sultanate and Caliphate Symbols

During the period in which its hard power decreased, the Ottoman
rulers emphasized the importance of soft power and public diplomacy.
Abdü lhamid tried to improve the Ottoman image, generate a posi-
tive global perception, and also aimed to win over domestic and for-
eign public opinion by utilizing public diplomacy. Therefore, Ottoman
image management was targeted toward multiple audiences. The most
concrete manifestation was the active and inf luential use of the sultan-
ate and caliphate of this period, as well as the efforts directed toward
improving the Ottomans’ image. Abdü lhamid carried out these activ-
ities mostly through symbols.
The Friday prayer ceremony (cuma selamlığı or simply selamlık) would
begin as the royal procession left the Yı ld ız Palace with great splendor—
the Imperial landau escorted by Albanian house guards in livery—and
make its way to the Yı ld ız mosque. There, after prayer, special officials
would collect petitions from the people. It also appears that the occasion
became something of a tourist attraction, as one contemporary account
describes groups of British, American, and German tourists whose car-
riages formed “a long line on their way to Yı ld ız to watch the selamlık
ceremony.” A sort of dais was built to accommodate foreign visitors,
from where they were permitted to watch the ceremonies and salute
the sultan. Another rare occasion when the sultan showed himself to
the public was during the ceremonial visit to the Holy Relics room in
Topkapı Palace, and at the shrine of Eyup (located in the Golden Horn)
during Ramadan.35
The Ottomans possessed an unusual tool—the caliphate—in con-
ducting public diplomacy.36 The Ottoman sultans inherited the title
when Sultan Selim I conquered Egypt in 1517. The sultans had occa-
sionally made rhetorical use of the title, but the fact that the Ottoman
sultans held the caliphate was more or less taken for granted for most of
the empire’s history.37 The caliphate idea—with all its historic prestige,
honor, and evocation of earlier (and better) Islamic times—was indeed
most popular among central Asian and Indian Muslims, and commu-
nities under attack by either Britain or Russia. Sultan Abdü laziz had
already adopted a pan-Islamic approach in his relations with other
Muslim countries, appealing to a shared Islam as the basis for concerted
action under his own caliphate leadership. But Sultan Abdü lhamid II,
ruling an empire that had become more Muslim than Christian in pop-
ulation since 1878, was the one who most emphasized the caliphate.38
According to Georgeon, Abdü lhamid thought the caliphate had a spir-
itual inf luence on not only the Muslims who lived under the Ottoman
Empire’s ruling but also on Muslims all over the globe.39
Abdü lhamid sought to establish his role as caliph of all Muslims. He
began to use his long-standing right to appoint religious officials in
former Ottoman territories now under foreign rule in order to main-
tain his inf luence among their Muslim population. He personally
selected and appointed judges (kadı), teachers, and other scholars, all of
whom were sent to Egypt, Cyprus, the Crimea, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and Bulgaria. The Ottoman government protested, and officially inter-
vened, whenever there was news of tyranny or oppression of Muslims
regardless of where they lived. Inf luential Muslim leaders from all over
the world were brought to Istanbul for extended visits to establish con-
tacts that could (and later would) be used to extend the sultan-caliph’s
inf luence. Britain, Russia, and France were warned, with some vehe-
mence, that aggression against the Ottoman Empire or their Muslim
people might lead to a united Muslim uprising against them with
full Ottoman support. The sultan was remarkably successful in this
endeavor to get his message across.40
Many Muslim heads of state, including the Uzbek khans, the
Crimean khans, and the sultans of Sumatra in the East Indies acknowl-
edged the Ottoman ruler as caliph. They sometimes also recognized
the Ottomans as their temporal leaders.41
Public Diplomacy in the Republic Era in Turkey
Turkey’s realization of its soft power elements occurred toward the end
of the Cold War when the process of its democratization and liberalism
sped up and it finally started to use public diplomacy techniques.
54 Vedat Demir
Turkish Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy during the

Single-Party Period
During the establishment of the Republic and the single-party sys-
tem, the Ottoman past was vehemently denied. The rich and com-
plex Ottoman history and the cultural accomplishments left by the
empire were ignored in favor of a new nation building that fostered a
new identity. This disconnection from the past also removed the most
important emotive bond with non-Turkish Muslim citizens, especially
the Kurds. What followed has often been described as a revolution.
Republican efforts to create a new language and a new history were
aggravated by the zeal of local party and municipal administrations
through the purging of non-Turkish village and street names along
with exorcising all reminders of non-Turkish and non-Muslim com-
munities in the country’s toponymy. The most obvious contradiction
of the Turkish republic was the failure of its leaders to accommodate
peacefully the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity, which had
survived wars, episodes of population exchange, and ethnic cleansing.
Instead, the state imposed a more restrictive notion of Turkishness and
expelled communities deemed unfit for assimilation.42
Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy during the Single-Party Period

The transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish republic–
especially the collapse of the empire–plus wartime developments and
the War of Independence left marks on the foreign policy of Turkey.
The Sèvres Treaty in particular, and the idea that Turkey is a constant
interest in great power rivalries, as well as the belief that the great pow-
ers were carrying out a “project” of dividing Turkish territory, are all
important anxieties in this context. This is collectively referred to as the
“Sèvres Syndrome,” and is still relevant today. The perception of being
surrounded by enemies—a state under continuous risk of attack—made
Turkey security-oriented in its foreign policy. The effects of the bipolar
international system pitched Turkey as a member of the Western Bloc,
against some of its neighbors, while historical and political differences
contributed to create a hostile security environment with others. Such
emphasis on security was dictated by a combination of history and
geopolitics, as well as the Cold War environment, which led to a pre-
dominantly realist understanding of the international system. Turkey’s
security culture has traditionally been based on realpolitik, a quest for
westernization that emphasizes the role of the military-bureaucratic
elite in security and foreign policy-making.43
Foreign policy was not at the heart of the Kemalist republic, which
dissociated itself from almost all claims on imperial possessions in the
Balkans and the Arab world. All former Arab provinces were under
British or French mandate rule, and hence there were no governments
to engage with and no regional policy to be made in the east. The only
foreign policy initiative in which Turkey was actively involved was the
Balkan Entente which was signed in 1934 to lay aside mutual territorial
claims and prevent conf lict between the signatories. Apart from that,
Mustafa Kemal and his successors followed a moderately isolationist
policy, and a politics of pragmatic regional and international balance.44
According to Zurcher, the Turkish republic’s foreign policy throughout
the period from 1923 to 1945 can be characterized as cautious, realistic,
and generally aimed at the preservation of the status quo and hard-won
victory of 1923.45
The single-party period evolved around the Republican People’s
Party, military, and bureaucratic elite. Public opinion, civil society
organizations, the business world, and academic environments were
barely incorporated, if at all. This spectrum naturally limited inter-
national communications of the modern republic and confined it to
government-to-government public affairs. At this period, Turkey
focused on establishing itself as a sovereign nation, one that was dis-
tinctly separate from the Ottoman Empire. The majority of the messages
geared toward foreign audiences stressed on Turkey’s new identity.
Turkish Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy

during the Multiparty System
The shifts in the international order after the World War II, with
which the Soviet Union brought Turkey closer to the United States,
ended the single-party period and ensured the a multiparty system in
1946. Turkey’s foreign policy during the Cold War period was con-
ditioned according to the Western Bloc, and especially dependent on
the United States. Hence, its international communication efforts were
also geared at consolidating Turkey’s role in the Western bloc and as an
ally of the United States.
The postwar era, with an emphasis on the democratic decade (1950–
1960), was a period of intensified incorporation of Turkey into the
world capitalist system, not only in the economic field, but also in
realms of foreign policy and defense. Turkey became a solid—albeit
peripheral—part of political and military structures in these years,
which the United States and its allies built to safeguard the continued
56 Vedat Demir
existence of democracy and free enterprise in their countries. This was a

major break with the Kemalist foreign policy of cautious neutralism.46
The foreign ministry and the military-bureaucratic elite were in
charge of formulating and executing foreign policy decisions, and
foreign policy was one sphere of politics where consensus among the
traditional decision-making elites was strongest, to the extent that for-
eign policy was often regarded as “state policy.” Civilian and mili-
tary circles alike, as well as the mainstream political parties shared this
consensus.47
The New Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy during the Liberalization
Period: Turkish Foreign Policies after the Cold War
A group of “state actors” apparently continued as the dominant deci-
sion-makers during the 1990s. These included, principally, the presi-
dent, the prime minister, and the foreign minister, plus the commanders
of the armed forces and the professional diplomats within the foreign
ministry. There were also differences of approach between individu-
als within the state elite. In particular, during his period as president
between 1989 and 1993, Turgut Özal is widely acclaimed for his vision-
ary role in taking risks and advancing new policy directions, compared
to both his predecessors and successor.48 The year 1989 created a myr-
iad of new opportunities in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood, which
Özal artfully seized upon: the collapse of the Soviet Union opened the
route to the “Turkic” republics of central Asia, the end of Communism
in the Balkans cleared the roads to Turkey’s immediate neighbors, and
US intervention in Iraq promised to pave the way for a more promi-
nent regional role.49
The changes in the Balkans, the Caspian, and central Asia around
Turkey opened up possibilities for new regional identities. Within this
context, Turkey began to identify itself increasingly as a Eurasian coun-
try, referring to a large geographical space ranging from the Balkans,
through the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, to the Caspian. The
assertive foreign policy approach of Özal, especially after 1989, is
mainly credited in this regard for “creating a new foreign policy.”50
President Özal talked about the coming of a “Turkic century” and
about the “Turkic [or Turkish, for the Turkish language does not dif-
ferentiate between the two] world, stretching from the Adriatic to the
Great Wall of China.” Turkey was the first country to recognize the
former Soviet republics diplomatically.51 At this time, Turkey’s public
diplomacy was centered around the newly established Turkic states in

the hope of introducing a Turkic-centric or Pan-Turkic alliance.
Parallel to these developments, the concept of foreign policy being
a consensus issue and a “state policy” was weakened during this time.
Two important developments especially inf luential at the start of the
1990s are important in this context: the first being the impact of eco-
nomic liberalization policies in signifying the change in the foreign
policy decision-makers; and the second being the role of Özal (mainly
during the Gulf War) in signifying the differences of opinion at the
higher echelons of foreign policy-making.52
Once in power, Özal took a personal interest in the conduct of
foreign policy and sought to restore Turkey’s international standing.
He initiated policies geared toward the Arab world that the previ-
ous military government had failed to sustain. Relations with Europe
improved, though rather slowly. As prime minister, Özal had a vision
for Turkey in Europe and a sense of its economic and political realities.
He recognized the need of an anchor for the country’s rapid but vola-
tile economic development. A customs union as well as EC (European
Community) membership prospects would provide a stable framework
for the country’s transition to democracy and its economic takeoff. His
vision was for a Turkey that was proudly Muslim and European.53
During the 1990’s, there was much discussion about whether Turkey
was developing a “civil society” similar to that of Western democracies,
in which nongovernmental organizations such as business groups, trades
unions, and voluntary bodies were played a bigger role in the country’s
politics.54 Although the end of the Cold War and the ensuing systemic
change brought about a change in Turkey’s surrounding regions, its
impact on Turkish foreign policy remained rather limited.55
The political and economic crises, the weak coalition governments,
the Kurdish issue and issues pertaining to minorities, unresolved mur-
der cases, PKK terrorism, and the military intervention on February
28, 1997, undermined a number of foreign policy opportunities for
Turkey until the mid-2000s. Most of the issues related to domestic
freedoms were interpreted from a national security perspective and
were repercussions of the Cold War period in Turkey.56
Shifts in Turkish Foreign Policy and the Rise of Public Diplomacy

during the Justice and Development Party Period
Since 1923, Kemalist governments had followed a cautious foreign pol-
icy based on regional and global balances. Over the course of the four
58 Vedat Demir
decades of the Cold War, Turkey had effectively been separated from
its neighborhood; the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Syria were part of the
Soviet sphere of inf luence. Greece was an ally but not a friend, and Iraq
was initially a series of weak monarchies, which later became a brutal
dictatorship under Saddam Hussein. The transformations of 1989 and
the decrease in Soviet power in central Asia and the Caucasus made
Turkey’s historical areas of inf luence accessible.57
Turkey has indeed developed an active central Asian policy. Over
300 agreements of all types have been concluded between Turkey
and the different Turkic republics covering diverse subjects such as
civil aviation and prevention of double taxation, three Turkic sum-
mits have been organized, a special Agency for Turkish Cooperation
and Development (Tİ KA) has been created by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, joint ventures in banking and financing have been created,
and over 7000 students from central Asia and Azerbaijan have received
scholarships to study in Turkey—despite the severe issue of overcrowd-
ing at Turkish universities. The private sector is heavily involved as
well. Hundreds of Turkish firms operate in the new republics, espe-
cially in the building sector, with several people also working as shop-
keepers and restaurant owners.58
The Foreign Service’s uneasiness also stemmed from the identity
of many of its members; considered a bastion of Kemalist moder-
nity, Turkish ambassadors and consuls were not positively predisposed
toward Islamic networks and the Ottoman outlook, which were essen-
tial ingredients of Özal’s foreign policy.59 Therefore, a substantial
foreign outreach was not formulated into the foreign policy applica-
tion, as there were conf licts within the outlooks of different factions.
Turkish foreign policy remained security-oriented until the late 1990s.
However, the end of the 1990s witnessed a remarkable shift concern-
ing threat perceptions and the vulnerabilities that led some scholars to
underline a desecuritization of Turkish foreign policy. The impact of
the political ideology of the ruling elite (Kemalism) declined as the
central role of the traditional military-bureaucratic elite in politics and
foreign policy making became increasingly sidelined by the new ruling
government—the Justice and Development Party ( JDP) or the AKP
(translated as Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AK Parti ).60
Özal’s visions of Turkey as a regional power created the conditions
for a brief period of strong foreign policy. Furthermore, his new institu-
tions and educational networks created the basis of Turkish soft power
that would become more pronounced during the rule of the JDP gov-
ernment in the 2000s.61
In recent years, Turkey’s position in diplomacy, mediation, and the

solution of regional conf licts has gone far beyond its traditional stance
and role in order to increase stability and prosperity in the region.
Nevertheless, Turkey’s democratization process and JDP’s rise to power
have drawn significant attention, not least in the Middle East.62
Another aspect of soft power—popular culture—became a major
export for Turkey and a remarkable success story in terms of projecting a
positive image. Television soap operas marked the country’s emergence
as a pole of attraction in many Balkan countries—including Bulgaria
and Greece with their non-Turkish and non-Muslim majorities—as
well as the Arab world and central Asia. In the Arab world, Turkish
soap operas have turned into important popular culture phenomena,
gluing millions to their screens and sparking controversy between dif-
ferent segments of society.63
European Union Process: Turkey’s relations with the EU and the reform
packages from 1999 onward provided an impetus for change. 1999
was an important year not only because of the Helsinki Summit,
but also due to the EU reforms that had visible impacts on the style
and processes of Turkish foreign policy. With the Europeanizing of
Turkish foreign policy, there has been remarkable change, especially
in terms of its utilization of the tools of foreign policy. The actual
use or threat of using force has radically declined and the use of
diplomacy, dialogue, international law (or at least a reference to it),
multilateralism, and institutionalization has gained prominence.
Creating economic interdependencies for long-lasting viable peace
in Turkey’s surrounding regions has often been underlined. The use
of and discourse on soft power in general, in line with EU policies,
has increased. This process resulted from not only the declining
importance of the military in foreign policy-making, but also from
the increasing role of civil society organizations.64
Ahmet Davutoğlu and Strategic Depth: What Davutoğlu brought to the

Turkish foreign policy was an innovative framework, a theoretical
portrait for Turkey’s diplomacy, a vision of a steady and systematic
foundation, and an effort to bravely put this forward on the field of
application.
The process of broadening and deepening Turkey’s ties to areas
beyond the West indeed began well before the JDP came to power.
Under Özal, for instance, Turkey made a combined effort to estab-
lish closer ties with central Asia. Yet, efforts to expand Turkey’s ties
60 Vedat Demir
to areas where it had strong historical and cultural links have gained
greater impetus under the JDP and have been heavily inf luenced by
the doctrine of “Strategic Depth,” a concept developed by Ahmet
Davutoğlu.65
Davutoğlu had been the architect of the JDP government’s for-
eign policy since his nomination as chief adviser to Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2002 and as ambassador in 2003. In 2009,
he became the foreign minister and put into practice the doctrine for
Turkey’s engagement with the world in the new millennium. Called
Strategic Depth, it was based on the idea of a new geography of good,
neighborly relations and economic interaction, in which Turkey played
a central part, rather than being peripheral to other regions such as
Europe or the Middle East.66
In addition, the concept of Strategic Depth emphasizes the impor-
tance of Turkey’s Ottoman past, and its historical and cultural ties to
the Balkans, the Middle East, and central Asia. These ties are seen as
important assets that can enable Turkey to become a regional power.
The doctrine also suggests that Turkey should counterbalance its ties to
the West by establishing multiple alliances that would enhance its free-
dom of action and increase its leverage, both regionally and globally.67
Davutoğlu has outlined five principles for Turkish foreign policy.
These principles are:68
1. Establishing a balance between security and democracy

2. Following a zero-problems policy toward Turkey’s neighbors
3. Developing relations with neighboring regions and beyond
4. Adherence to a multidimensional foreign policy
5. A proactive foreign policy based on rhythmic diplomacy
In other words, these principles heavily emphasize the importance of

face-to-face communication, leading with diplomatic efforts, and active
participation in international organizations. The JDP policy-makers in
general, and Davutoğlu in particular, refer to the traditional Kemalist
foreign policy as static, reactionary, and passive, and see the need for
changing it as a time of “great transformation.”
Turkey’s changing foreign policy parameters and innovative
approaches initiated a new political trend, which led to a more pro-
fessional approach that was required by the modern age against peo-
ple from foreign countries. The inauguration of the Office of Public
Diplomacy under the prime ministry has been the most groundbreaking
move in galvanizing innovative approaches in Turkey’s foreign policy

framework. 69
The Representation of the Change in Foreign Policy on Turkey’s Soft

Power: Turkey became active on several levels of foreign relations,
from leading roles in international organizations to growing regional
cooperation. This began with the government’s commitment to
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the global
body representing Muslim-majority countries, which was a
mildly significant institution that was competing with the more
inf luential Arab League. When the Turkish professor Ekmeleddin
İ hsanoğ lu was elected to its presidency in 2004, the OIC became
vocal on the international debates about Islam. It also became a key
partner in the United Nations program, “Alliance of Civilizations,”
which the Turkish and Spanish governments launched in 2005 to
counteract the “clash of civilizations” theory popularized by Samuel
Huntington. This program was eagerly adopted by many European-
American conservatives and ironically by Islamists as well. After a
sustained campaign of development cooperation and heavy lobbying,
particularly in a number of African countries, Turkey was also elected
to a nonpermanent seat on the United Nation’s Security Council.70
In 2002, the election of the JDP, a party with Islamic roots, led to
interest about Turkey in the Arab world. As will be discussed in more
detail below, both liberals and Islamists were interested in the JDP vic-
tory for different reasons. Overall, this development led to a rethinking
of Turkey. Most importantly, this development challenged the view of
Turkish politics as a small, secular elite versus the Muslim masses. This
was followed by the Turkish parliament’s decision on March 1, 2003 to
reject Turkey’s involvement in the United State’s invasion of Iraq. This
decision challenged the long-held view of Turkey as a “stooge of the
US” in the Arab world and increased Turkey’s credibility in the region.
In the meantime, Turkey-EU relations were progressing. In 1999, the
European Council Summit in Helsinki decided to grant Turkey candi-
date status to the EU. This was followed by the decision to start acces-
sion negotiations in December 2004. This shattered another popularly
held view in the Arab world that “Turkey was waiting at the door of
the EU, but the EU was not interested at all.” All of these developments
were related to developments in the Arab world and thus had relevance
to debates in the region. The overall result has been the change in per-
ception of Turkey both at the public and state level.71
62 Vedat Demir
According to Salem, the improvement of the Turkish image among

its neighbors and the Arab world over the past decade is due to a num-
ber of reasons:72
1. The rise of the JDP which tempered the anti-Islamic secularism

and anti-Arab Westernism of the Turkish Kemalists, and rebuilt
Turkey’s links to its regional and Muslim past.
2. A zero-problems regional foreign policy opened up Turkey to the
Arab and Muslim world and sought to resolve conf lict with and
among neighbors.
3. The apparent success of the Turkish democratic experiment in an
otherwise authoritarian region and the Turkish economic model
of high productivity and export-led growth in a region where
rentier economies dominate.
4. The apparent success of the Turkish balance between religion,
secularism, and public freedoms in a region where religion and
politics have not found a balanced formula of coexistence.
5. Growing familiarity with Turkish culture and society through its pop-
ular television soap operas, export products, and tourism to Turkey.
6. Turkey’s strong stand against American use of its bases in the 2003
invasion of Iraq.
7. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s rebuke of Israel during the Gaza war of
December-January 2008–2009
8. Turkey’s stand against Israel after the Gaza Flotilla incident in
May of 2010.
Conclusion
Although the term public diplomacy is quite new, it has been imple-
mented in many countries throughout history. The Ottoman Empire
had used public diplomacy in galvanizing its soft power as well as hard
power to shape Europe’s politics.
During the reign of the Ottoman Empire, public diplomacy drills
began with the establishment of modern diplomacy. Correspondingly,
public diplomacy activities and efforts were implemented to commu-
nicate with foreign audiences at both the height and demise of the
Empire stemming from different motivations. Various examples of
modern public diplomacy initiatives were put into action specifically
during the reign of Sultan Abdü lhamid II in attempts to reshape the
image of the weakened Ottoman Empire.
The most tangible manifestation of this was when Sultan Abdü lhamid
II was actively using the sultanate and caliphate in his efforts toward
improving the Ottoman Empire’s image in the world. The rulers of the
Ottoman Empire knew that to survive among the powerful European
countries, they needed the public’s opinion to be positive. They under-
went serious image management for this very reason. The use of com-
munication to reshape the country image continued throughout the
next century.
Turkey’s public diplomacy from a historical perspective has a dual
contingency that relates to contemporary public diplomacy practices.
First is the notion of nation building and country image where the
state system in both periods responded to foreign public opinion.
Turkey, to this day, focuses on attempts to shape global public opin-
ion on country image. Second is the notion of historical identity that
is interconnected to foreign policy. A certain perception and pride in
the history of the Ottoman period has been passed on to the modern
republic despite the abrupt disconnect due to top-down moderniza-
tion process. Hence, the narrative of Ottoman tolerance has been tak-
ing center stage in contemporary Turkish foreign policy and public
diplomacy initiatives. The role of history is quite significant not only
because the republic is the successor of the empire, but also because
Turkey has been trying to reconnect with its historical roots since the
Özal period.
In sum, public diplomacy efforts have been carried out in the
Ottoman Empire as well as in Turkey. However, the initiatives of these
two respective periods differed in the context of messages and the
image they aimed to project. Contemporary public diplomacy initia-
tives are of paramount importance to Turkey’s foreign policy in posit-
ing the country as a regional power. By the same token, these efforts
have become substantially complex and more professionalized.
Notes
1. Nicholas J. Cull, Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past (Los Angeles: Figueroa
Press, 2009), pp. 20–22.
2. Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002), p. 13.
3. Hélène Pignot, Christians under the Ottoman Turks (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press,
2009), p. 1.
4. Jason Goodwin, Lords of the Horizons: A History of the Ottoman Empire (New York:
Henry Holt, 1998), p. 192.
64 Vedat Demir
5. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern
Turkey, Vol: 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. vii.
6. Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, Vol: 1, pp.153–154.
7. Halil İ nalcı k, Devlet-i Aliyye (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yay ı nlar ı, 2011), p. 29.
8. Wayne Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire: Its Record and Legacy (Princeton, NJ: Van
Nostrand, 1965), pp. 37–38.
9. Eric R. Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in
the Early Modern Mediterranean (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006),
pp. 112, 114.
10. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 11.
11. Roderic H. Davison, Turkey (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 45.
12 . B. Nazir, Ottoman Hospitality and Its Impact on Europe (Istanbul: Istanbul Chamber
of Commerce, 2008), p. 15.
13. Bernard Lewis, Cultures in Conflict: Christians, Muslims, and Jews in the Age of
Discovery (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 126.
14. Nazir, Ottoman Hospitality, p. 13.
15. Lewis, Cultures in Conflict, p. 127.
16. Nazir, Ottoman Hospitality, pp. 15–16.
17. Vucinich, The Ottoman Empire, p. 58.
18. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern
Turkey, Vol: 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 115.
19. Ibid., pp. 115–116.
20. Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), p. 76.
21. Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), p. 19.
22 . Roderic H. Davison, “The Modernization of Ottoman Diplomacy in the
Tanzimat Period,” OTAM 11 (2000): 862.
23. Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, p. 80.
24. Davison, “Modernization of Ottoman Diplomacy,” pp. 862–863.
25. Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in
the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 135–136.
26. Davison, “Modernization of Ottoman Diplomacy,” pp. 871–872.
27. Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, pp. 136–137.
28. Ibid., p. 142.
29. Stanley Lane-Poole, Turkey, (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1888), p. 360.
30. Davison, “Modernization of Ottoman Diplomacy,” p. 872.
31. Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, p. 172.
32 . Ibid., pp. 154–155.
33. Fatma Ürekli, Belgelerle 1889–1894 Afetlerinde Osmanlı-Amerikan Yardimla şmalar ı
(Istanbul: Doğ u Küt üphanesi Yay ı n ı, 2007), pp. 18, 23, 141–142.
34. Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, p. 144.
35. Ibid., pp. 23–24.
37. Douglas A. Howard, History of Turkey (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 70.
39. François G. Georgeon, Osmanlı-Türk Modernleşmesi (1900–1930) Seçilmiş Makaleler,

trans. Ali Berktay (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yay ı nlar ı, 2006), pp. 158–159.
40. Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, Vol: 2, p. 260.
42 . Kerem Öktem, Turkey since 1989: Angry Nation (Nova Scotia, Canada: Fernwood,
2011), pp. 27, 33, 34.
43. Özlem Tür and Ahmet K. Han, “A Framework for Understanding the Changing
Turkish Foreign Policy of the 2000s,” in Özden Zeynep Oktay (ed.) Turkey in the 21st
Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 8–9.
44. Öktem, Turkey since 1989, pp. 26–27.
45. Zurcher, Turkey, p. 201.
46. Ibid., p. 245.
47. Tü r and Han, Changing Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 10.
48. William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774–2000, (London: Frank Cass, 2000),
p. 205.
49. Öktem, Turkey since 1989, p. 3.
52 . Tü r and Han, Changing Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 14.
54. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 206.
56. Ibrahim Kal ı n, ed., “İ nce Güç ve Kamu Diplomasisi,” in 2000’li Yıllar Türkiye’de
D ı ş Politika (Istanbul: Meydan Yay ı ncı l ı k, 2011), pp. 7–8, 9.
62 . Mensur Akg ü n, Sabiha Senyucel Gü ndoğar, and Gokce Percinlioglu, The
Perception of Turkey in the Middle East, trans. Jonathan Levack (Istanbul: TESEV
Publications, 2010), p. 3.
64. Tü r and Han, Changing Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 20–21.
65. Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee, The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 75.
67. Rabasa and Larrabee, Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, p. 76.
68. Tü r and Han, Changing Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 21–22.
69. Kal ı n, “İ nce Güç ve Kamu Diplomasisi,” p. 8.
71. Meliha Benli Altun ışı k, Turkey: Arab Perspectives (Istanbul: TESEV Publications,
2010), p. 9.
72 . Paul Salem, Turkey’s Image in the Arab World (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2011),
p. 1.
CH A P T E R T H R E E
Engaging with the Middle East: The Rise and

Fall of Turkish Leadership in the 2000s
Özle m Tür
This chapter aims to analyze the dynamics of Turkey’s relations with the
Middle East in the 2000s. It argues that three issues—economic rela-
tions, the mediation processes, and the Palestinian issue—have played
significant roles in increasing Turkey’s power and transforming it into
a central actor in the region in this period. Turkey’s economic relations
with the Middle East countries have grown significantly in the 2000s,
visible both in the trade figures as well as in the levels of investment.
The reasons for this could be found in the evolution of the Turkish
economy, its need for new markets, and the increasing power of the
Anatolian bourgeoisie. Relations with Syria were portrayed as a “spe-
cial case” in this context. In looking at the mediation efforts, relations
with the Lebanese groups and Turkey’s role in solving the 2009 impasse
and leading the indirect talks between Israel and Syria in 2007–2008
gave it a chance to boost its image as a “central country,” a regional
and global player pursuing rhythmic diplomacy, able to talk to every
actor, and upholding the principle of “security for all.” The Palestinian
issue has been significant in “winning the hearts and minds” of the
Arab street and boosting the normative character of Turkey’s foreign
policy. After analyzing the details of these issues, this chapter will look
at the developments of the Arab Spring and what kind of opportuni-
ties and challenges it posed for Turkey. While initially Turkey found
many opportunities to further its relations in the region, its role began
68 Özlem Tür
to be questioned especially as the crisis in Syria deepened. Turkey’s

economic relations soured, its position as a “just player” able to talk to
every actor in the region declined, and the Palestinian issue dropped
lower in its priority list. This chapter will analyze where Turkey stands
in the rapidly changing regional dynamics and its leadership qualities
and soft power in this context.
The 2000s—The Golden Decade of

Turkey’s Soft Power
In a speech that then prime minister Erdoğan delivered at the Turkish-

American Council in 2005, he argued that since the coming to power
of the JDP, there was a “silent revolution” in Turkey. Underlining that
in the previous decades Turkey’s strategic location was its asset—it was
contributing to its partnership with the United States with its strategic
location—by 2005 Turkey was increasing its “soft power” through “its
positive inf luence generating stability in a large geography and its suc-
cess to reconcile traditional values with contemporary norms.”1 In line
with this point, there has been growing literature focusing on Turkey’s
soft power in the Middle East in the 2000s.2 Although the changes in
the relations with the region started in 1999, it is possible to argue that
since the JDP came to power in 2002, relations with the Middle East
states have deepened economically and politically, while at the same
time, relations at the societal level also developed.
Political Economy of the Relations

Looking at the economic relations, it is possible to observe growth in
trade volumes, joint projects, and investments in Turkey’s relations with
the Middle East. In addition to the conducive environment provided
by the advent of political relations, as I have argued elsewhere, Turkey’s
economic relations with the Middle East in general have expanded
during the 2000s due to two main reasons. One of these reasons is
related to the evolution of the Turkish economy—the impact of the
1980 economic reform package that adopted export-led growth strat-
egy; the emergence of small and medium enterprises in Anatolian cit-
ies, the so-called Anatolian Tigers that were highly adaptive to global
demand; a series of economic crises in the 1990s and early 2000s which
encouraged the emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie to search for markets
and invest abroad; and Turkey’s need to trade and invest more due to its
Engaging with the Middle East 69
own economic growth. The second reason is related with the coming
to power of the JDP, its close relations with the business community,
especially the Anatolian bourgeoisie, and the MUSIAD (Independent
Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association), and its trade oriented
policies. In an interview in 2004, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was at the
time the chief adviser to then prime minister Erdoğan on foreign pol-
icy issues, outlined how the business community became one of the
driving forces of Turkish foreign policy.3 Kirişçi notes that this was a
period in which Turkey was becoming a “trading state,” wherein “for-
eign policy becomes increasingly shaped by economic considerations”
and foreign trade constitutes an important part of the gross national
product.4 In line with JDP’s foreign policy vision of zero-problems
with neighbors, “zero problems, maximum trade” became a commonly
referred motto. The increasing trade figures with the Middle East can
be seen below, in table 3.1.
Looking at the economic indicators, it is also possible to see impressive
progress in Turkey’s economic performance in general and increasing
share of Middle East trade in comparison with other regions. Turkey’s
economic growth reached 7.8 percent in 2010. In 2009, Turkey pro-
duced half of the entire output of the Middle East and North Africa
combined—including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and Israel. In 2003,
Turkey’s trade figures showed the share of Europe as 53.6 percent and
Table 3.1 Turkey’s trade with the Middle East (billion dollars)
Year Import Export Volume of trade (Middle East) Total volume of trade
1996 3.31 2.59 5.90 66.85

1998 2.08 2.68 4.76 72.89
2000 3.37 2.57 5.94 82.27
2002 3.18 3.43 6.61 87.61
2003 4.45 5.46 9.91 116.59
2004 5.58 7.92 13.50 160.70
2005 7.96 10.18 18.14 190.25
2006 10.56 11.31 21.87 225.11
2007 12.64 15.08 27.72 277.33
2008 17.62 25.43 43.05 333.99
2009 9.59 19.19 28.78 243.07
2010 16.09 23.29 39.40 299.52
Source: Adapted from Tü rkiye İ statistik Kurumu (Turkish Statistical Institute)—T Ü İ K.

70 Özlem Tür
the Middle East as 8.49 percent. The figures for 2007 were 46.5 per-
cent for Europe and 10 percent for the Middle East. In 2010, trade
decreased to 41.6 percent for Europe and increased to 17.16 percent for
the Middle East.5
Prior to 2011, Syria stood out as the most important example of
Turkey’s improving economic relations in the Middle East. It is impor-
tant to note at this point that economic relations with Syria pursued
political relations. When political relations increased, economic rela-
tions also increased and when political relations soared trade and invest-
ment also soared. For example, the low level of economic relations in
the 1980s and 1990s are to be noted here; also to be noted is the declin-
ing relationship after the uprising began in Syria, especially since August
2011, when Turkey began to underline its support for the opposition. It
is possible to argue that economic relations followed the deepening of
political relations, especially in the case of Syria. Turkey and Syria signed
a Free Trade Agreement, which came into force in January 2007, lead-
ing to a sharp increase in the level of trade. In 2009, Turkey and Syria
signed 51 protocols, 30 of which were about economic issues, aimed
at increasing trade and investment. Turkish exports to Syria grew by
$300 million in 2009, and lifting of visas filled the streets with tourists.
The lifting of visas became especially important at the time as it was seen
as the first step of unification between the two countries and brought
the two societies close to each other, in Erdoğan’s words, “building the
communication and cooperation that should exist between brothers and
relatives.” Then foreign minister Davutoğlu said, “We are lifting the
borders which were artificially put and becoming the people of one
hinterland. We are turning the economic cooperation to an economic
unity. We are hoping that this will be a model for all our neighbors.”
As the visas were lifted, the number of tourists increased, border
trade increased in a parallel fashion, and the interaction between the
two societies became significant. In 2008, Turkish company Dedeman
bought the management rights of Syria’s first five-star hotel from Le
Meridian Group and began its operations in 2009 in Damascus, Aleppo,
and Palmyra. Not only in tourism, but in general, Turkish investments
in Syria have grown during the 2000s. Turkey became the largest sin-
gle foreign investor in Syria, Turkish foreign direct investment doubled
to $146 million in 2007 from 2006. While most investments have been
concentrated in Aleppo, the largest Turkish investments of its sector
for the entire Middle East was made in Syria when Turkish firm Güriş
invested 280 million euros for the construction of a cement factory in
Raqqah.
In December 2010, a new project called the “East Mediterranean

Four: Levant Business Forum,” was initiated with the signatures of
Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. The project aims to increase wel-
fare and economic stability in the region, and includes 75 agreements
in 14 different areas enabling free movement of goods and people,
as well as cooperation in the education and cultural fields. Through
this project, Turkey is expected to double its trade with these coun-
tries. Turkish minister Çağlayan said that the project would “create a
sphere of welfare at the heart of the Middle East.” Before the agreement
was announced, Davutoğlu, in accordance with the idea of creating
regional interdependency said: “We will declare . . . that this economic
zone is in effect. We hope that this is good news not only for these four
countries but also for the entire region.” Describing this project as the
first step in a 10–15 year process, the head of the Turkish-Middle East
Business Council, Mehmet Habbab, said that in time, other countries
were expected to join.
The economic developments with Syria were demonstrative of the
improvement and deepening of Turkey’s ties with the region and with
other neighboring countries. Martin, in 2004 argued that “Turkey has
a strong interest in improving its economic relations with Iraq. [ . . . ]
Iraq is an easy destination for Turkish products.”6 Martin’s statements
proved correct as trade figures with Iraq increased rapidly by the end
of the 2000s. Unlike the Syrian case where political relations were
the engine of economic relations, with Iraq, economic relations grew
despite political strain due to the PKK issue. Since the end of the war in
2003, trade relations have been on the increase and the level of invest-
ment in northern Iraq has been impressive. As of September 2009, 500
Turkish companies had invested in Iraq, and Turkey as a country was
among the top ten foreign investors.7 Like in Syria, in northern Iraq,
Turkish companies dominated markets for consumer goods, with pen-
etration of over 80 percent in some. In addition to trade and invest-
ment, Turkey supplies the electricity of the region. By 2010, the trade
with the northern Iraq reached $5.2 billion and during a state visit to
Erbil, minister Çağlayan announced the two countries’ willingness to
increase the figure to $20 billion in four years. The trade figures have
been significant with Iran as well, despite the sanctions; however, trade
is mainly dominated by oil and natural gas imports to Turkey.
All these developments in economic cooperation have been framed
by Ibrahim Kal ın, the chief foreign policy adviser to the then Turkish
prime minister Erdoğan, as the most important pillars of Turkey’s for-
eign policy in the 2000s. He argues that an important feature of Turkey’s
72 Özlem Tür
current foreign policy is “developing and strengthening political rela-

tions through trade and investment,” as such a framework would create
“mutual empowerment” which would provide “a win-win situation
for all parties involved.”
Turkey’s Mediation and Third Party Roles in the Region

As Turkey’s relations with the regional countries increased, Turkey
emerged as an important actor in efforts to solve the crises in the
region. In sharp contrast to the 1990s, when Turkey had controversial
relations with the Arab countries as well as Iran, and good relations
with Israel, during the 2000s Turkey’s relations with regional actors
grew to a level that it became the only country that had relations with
every actor in the region. Turkey’s good relations with Israel contin-
ued despite cycles of tension until the last years of the 2000s, relations
with Arab states and Iran deepened and ties with nonstate actors like
Hamas and Hizballah also began to grow. Development of relations
with these groups caused controversy in Turkey’s relations with Israel
at times. For example in 2006, after Hamas won the elections for the
Palestinian Authority, Turkey invited the head of its political bureau
to Ankara causing an uproar in Israel. Reacting to the criticism from
Israel, Turkey explained that talking to Hamas was a part of its strat-
egy to convey the right messages of democracy and dialogue to every
group and sect in the region. Yet, until the last years of the decade,
this tension did not decrease Turkish-Israeli relations and Turkey sus-
tained its ability to be able to talk to every group and involve itself in
regional conf licts to help find solutions. The major incentive behind
this role was presented as Turkey not only being able to play such a
role but also having a responsibility in the region based on shared
history and culture. Ahmet Davutoğ lu himself had been an active
player in the mediation efforts in the region. Turkey’s mediation roles
in Iraq, between Syria and Israel, and in Lebanon stand out in this
context.
With regard to Iraq, Turkey has played an important role in persuad-
ing the parties to participate in the 2005 elections. Davutoğlu under-
lines how he took the initiative to persuade Sunni resistance groups
discussing the boycott of the elections to participate as political parties.
In an article in 2013, Davutoğlu writes, “I engaged in discreet, confi-
dential diplomacy to bring all the primary resistance leaders to Turkey
and persuade them to participate in the elections as political parties. For
three months, we negotiated. . . . ”8 Davutoğlu continues as follows:
After two or three months, in the last meeting, I said I wanted

to listen to all of them. They criticized each other for four or
five hours. In the last hour, I took the f loor and, without say-
ing anything about the dispute among them, I described to them
the Baghdad of the tenth century, when it was the center of civ-
ilization: how people lived, the intellectual vivacity, the order,
Harun Rashid and all the great leaders. Then I described another
Baghdad, which was destroyed by Mongols in the thirteenth cen-
tury. Finally, I described the choice before them: “Either you will
reestablish Baghdad as a center of civilization or you will be part of
the destruction of Baghdad, as the Mongols were.” It took an hour
to relate all these details. One of the leaders, the oldest one, in his
seventies, from the Ubeydiye tribe, stood up and said, “Look, my
sons”—the others were much younger—“we have to listen to this
brother, because he speaks like a Baghdadi.” He doesn’t speak like
someone from the outside.9
Based on this experience Davutoğlu argued that the success lay in

acting and thinking like local people. “The important thing is this:
If we are mediating between Iraqi people, we should be speaking like
Baghdadis. We have to speak like Damascenes if the issue is Syria,
[ . . . ] This is the most important aspect, if we are to convince oth-
ers.”10 It is interesting to note that this mediation process came at a time
when Turkey’s political relations with Iraq were not at its best. Despite
the difficult relationship, Turkey was perceived by many as being the
only country to manage such a role. A similar practice was followed in
Turkey’s relations with Lebanon as well, where Turkey tried to talk to
the representatives of every sect and helped build a balanced polity in
the country, which bore fruit especially in the 2008 crisis.
With regard to the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, Turkey’s role has been
significant in persuading the two regional enemies, two countries still
at war with each other, to start direct talks for peace. During Bashar
Assad’s visit in 2004, Turkey’s role as a mediator in the conf lict between
Israel and Syria was on the agenda. According to Israeli sources, it was
Israel that waited and “it took Israel three years to accept the offer.” But
by 2007, the public opinion matured and the ground for indirect talks
was prepared. Bengio, underlines that there emerged a willingness by
that time in Israel to talk to Syria. Until then, there was concern that the
only thing that would come of the peace talks with Syria would only be
“frozen peace”: Israel giving up Golan but receiving nothing in return.
Despite this concern, the negotiations started. During this period there
74 Özlem Tür
were a tensions in Turkish-Israeli relations due to the Turkish prime

minister’s messages of “state terror” and the growing primacy of the
Palestinian issue on the Turkish political agenda. However, Turkey was
still seen as a mediator in the negotiations. Just as the fifth round of
indirect talks got under way in late 2008, they were cut short by Israel’s
Operation Cast Lead on Gaza, and the process stalled. After the oper-
ation, Erdoğan’s criticism of Israeli policies in Gaza—also becoming
internationalized in Davos when during a panel, Erdoğan interrupted
the moderator with a “one-minute” comment and told Shimon Peres,
“When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill”11—brought the
mediation process to a standstill. Although there was willingness on
the Syrian side to resume negotiations, Israel announced that Turkey
was no longer acceptable to them as a mediator. Yet, until Davos, the
process showed Turkey’s potential as an honest player and its ability
to play crucial roles in such long-lasting regional conf licts. However,
Davos and later the Mavi Marmara incident, which resulted with the
death of nine Turkish citizens on the ship bringing aid to Gaza added
onto the crisis between the two countries and led to a breaking off of
the diplomatic ties. Although boosting Turkey’s power and prestige
in the Arab street, such a development of diplomatic crisis took away
Turkey’s claim to be able to talk to every actor in the region. As rela-
tions with Israel soured and channels of dialogue declined, emphasis
on Turkey as a just player, defending the rights of the weak and the
oppressed based on justice, began to be heard more. The emphasis on
the Palestinian issue demonstrated this point and, in time, Turkey’s dis-
course shifted from the Palestinian Authority and Palestine in general
toward the position of Gaza and revolved around the idea of bringing
justice to Gaza.
According to Ibrahim Kal ın, looking at the recent developments in
Turkish foreign policy, it is possible to observe the growth of a new
emphasis on justice in general. Kal ın argues that “Turkish leaders have
repeatedly emphasized that the current global order has to be based
on principles of justice and equality” and the Palestinian issue can be
understood within this context. He writes, for example, that “when
Turkey defended the Palestinian cause and demanded the end of the
Israeli occupation, it framed it as a matter of the international com-
munity’s responsibility to deliver political justice to a people under
occupation.”12 This new orientation in Turkish foreign policy was
emphasized by then prime minister Erdoğan himself when he said that
Turkey acted “with a sense of realpolitik as well as ideal-politik” as it
strives to “uphold the principles of justice, equality and peace as the
backbone of national and global politics.” Kal ın argues that Turkey has
adopted a value-based approach and has advocated respect for freedoms
as a cornerstone of a peaceful and secure regional order.13
Before the Arab uprisings hit the streets of Tunis, Cairo, Tripoli and
Damascus, Turkey was one of the leading centers of power in the region
and its popularity was significantly high among the public. Turkey’s
popularity in the Arab world was ref lected in the polls that were held
in the region. Its popularity in the region reached 80 percent in 2010,
increasing from 75 percent in 2009. According to the same poll, 75 per-
cent of those interviewed argued that Turkey had played a positive role
in keeping the peace in the region and 78 percent agreed that Turkey
should mediate in the Arab-Israeli peace process.14 However, the Arab
Spring and the developments since January 2011 changed many aspects
of Turkey’s relations with the region.
Arab Spring—Opportunities and Challenges
Despite having established deep political, economic, and social relations

with its neighbors during the previous decade, Turkey, just like other
actors, was caught unprepared for the events that erupted in Tunisia in
late 2010 and that continued into Egypt, Libya, and Syria The changes
in the region presented both important challenges and opportunities
for Turkey. Turkey welcomed the changes in Tunisia and when the
uprisings began in Tahrir Square, called for the Mubarak regime to
leave. Tunisia and Egypt were rather swift transitions within the Arab
Spring where Turkey could support the change. However, Turkey’s
position vis-à-vis the events in Libya has zigzagged in relation to for-
eign intervention—first rejecting it altogether, then having to embrace
it and contribute to the international force with the largest naval
force. When the uprisings reached Syria, looking at the Tunisian and
Egyptian examples, Turkish policy makers thought the regime would
be toppled rather swiftly like in the other cases. Also, learning from its
experience with Libya, Turkey did not want to hesitate and called for
a regime change after an initial, short period of “wait and see” policy.
However, when the conf lict continued and took on a sectarian char-
acter with many different actors involved, Turkey found itself in a dif-
ficulty, with challenges to its foreign policy principles—maintaining a
zero-problems policy and pursuing an inclusive approach.
With the Arab Spring, Turkey’s foreign policy makers began to
underline the beginning of a new period of transformation in the region
76 Özlem Tür
and the need for Turkey to play an even more active role in this trans-
formation. Ahmet Davutoğlu, in a closed meeting, said that the Middle
East was witnessing its third grand transformation. The first transfor-
mation was after World War I, when the borders were drawn and the
second one was after World War II, when these countries gained their
independence as nation states. In both cases, Turkey did not play any
significant role. Now was the time, according to Davutoğlu, when the
region was going through a third transformation, for Turkey to play
an active role and lead the way. He argued that Turkey pursued two
principles in this process: to stand by people’s demands and to mobilize
all means possible to lead in the right direction. In the next ten years,
Davutoğlu said, Turkey would need to be involved in the process of
change in the region. It was clear from the speeches of different for-
eign policy officials that, in the coming years, they expected a more
enhanced role for Turkey in the region. For example, the head of pol-
icy planning in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Şafak Gökt ürk, argued
that with the changes in the region, the role of the outside powers was
declining and a period of regional ownership of regional matters was
beginning. According to him, after the changes were completed, there
would be more room for Turkey to play a bigger role.15 Looking at
these developments, Aras and Akarçeşme argued that what was needed
was a new conceptualization where “new ideas addressing common
issues in a manner compatible with the zeitgeist should be discussed. It
is essential to realize the emergence of a post-nation state world and
operate accordingly.”16 In keeping with this sentiment, “in the wake
of the Arab Spring, . . . it is time to adapt version I of the zero-problems
with neighbors approach to the changing dynamics of the region and
to reconceptualize its version II.”17
The Arab Spring provided an opportunity for Turkey to play an
active role and improve its relations with the people of the Middle East
and the Western countries in general. Before the Arab Spring, Turkey’s
relations with the West were troubled mainly because of Turkey’s close
relationship with Syria and Iran and the state of Turkish-Israeli rela-
tions. The Arab Spring not only gave Turkey an opportunity to play an
even more active role in the Middle East but it also led to an enhanced
position in Turkey’s role with the Western countries as it emerged as
a model for the changing countries of the region. At a time when the
Obama administration was trying to deal with its withdrawal from
Iraq and the EU was struggling with an economic crisis, Turkey was
perceived to be well-fit to play an active role and be a channel through
which Western policies could be put into effect.
While Turkey initially embraced the changes and saw opportuni-

ties for an enhanced role in the region, as events spread to Syria and
Western support to solve the deepening conf lict there remained lim-
ited, Turkey began to face an increasing challenge in dealing with this
crisis. In this context, what constitutes the Turkish model also began
to be questioned. When events began in Syria in March 2012, Turkey,
based on the depth of the relationship for almost a decade, considered
and presented itself as a key player in affecting the pace of the events.
Yet, Turkish policy makers seemed to be stuck between a rock and a
hard place: if Turkey continued to cooperate with the Bashar regime,
its position as a regional model for democracy and freedom would be
discredited. Neither, however, could it openly give its support to the
opposition immediately due to its close cooperation with the regime and
personal relationships with its leaders, not to mention the importance
of Syria to Turkey’s Middle East policy and economic interests. After a
few months of the wait and see policy, Davutoğlu visited Damascus in
order to call on the Assad regime to make reforms. However, when this
call was rejected by Damascus, the relations with the regime became
strained and Turkey began to openly call for a regime change in Syria
and began supporting the Syrian opposition. Turkey tried to unite
the opposition, which was badly divided under an umbrella called the
Syrian National Council (SNC), and allowed it to open an office in
Istanbul. Turkey also began to support and host in the border areas with
Syria, the so-called Free Syrian Army (FSA), a militarized group fight-
ing against the Assad regime. Through such policy, Turkey became
an active part of the conf lict in Syria, and tried to gather international
support by bringing the issue to different international forums. Yet,
it has been unsuccessful and Turkey has felt increasingly alone in the
conf lict.
Looking at Turkey’s foreign policy principles, the Syrian conf lict
has challenged the zero-problems with neighbors policy significantly.
Not only were Turkey’s relations with the Syrian regime cut, but it
was also unable to provide more than shelter to the Syrian people.
The developments in Syria brought Turkey and Iran at opposite sides
of the equation; Iran being a staunch ally of the Assad regime found
Turkey’s stance in calling for a regime change in Syria irreconcilable
with its interests and, as a result, Turkish-Iranian relations also took
a blow. Turkey increasingly began to cooperate with Saudi Arabia
and Qatar, leading many to question its role in the emerging sectar-
ian division in the region. Turkey’s foreign policy principle has since
shifted from “zero-problems with neighbors” to “balance between
78 Özlem Tür
security and democracy”. What is often underlined by Turkish for-

eign policy makers is that Turkey had itself pursued a difficult period
of balancing between security and democracy during the 1990s and
has succeeded at the end. Now, it could ref lect this experience onto
its neighbors. If progress could be achieved in this ref lection and
state-society relations could be reformulated, then Turkey would
be able to pursue a zero-problems with neighbors policy at a later
stage.18
The crisis in Turkey’s foreign policy mainly due its failure to deal
with the Syrian crisis led to a decline in its popularity in the region as
well. Turkey’s popularity rating in 2012 was lower than its 2011 rat-
ing, especially in countries facing critical sectarian issues. For example,
Turkey’s popularity in Lebanon declined to 63 percent in 2012 from
78 percent in 2011. In Iraq, in 2011, Turkey was perceived as a positive
player in the region by 74 percent of the people; this figure declined
to 55 percent in 2012. Also, in Iran, Turkey’s popularity declined to
59 percent in 2012, from 71 percent in 2011.
Despite the willingness of the Turkish policy makers to find a solu-
tion to the crisis in Syria and take an active role in the process, it is
interesting to see that in the polls conducted in Turkey there is very lit-
tle support for Turkey’s active involvement in Syria. In a poll conducted
in June 2012 by EDAM (Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy
Studies), a majority of the population—41.1 percent—was against
Turkey’s military involvement in the conf lict while those that said
Turkey should continue its political and diplomatic initiatives (and not
involve itself in any military measures) constituted 15.9 percent, adding
up to 57 percent of those interviewed. Those that supported a security
zone in Syria under Turkish military protection constituted 14.7 per-
cent while those supporting a direct military intervention against the
Bashar regime constituted 11.7 percent.19 In another poll conducted
by the same institution, EDAM, in September 2012 regarding what
kind of a role Turkey should play in a post-Assad Syria, the results
underlined the need for an objective position, challenging the govern-
ment’s calls for active involvement. According to this poll, 51 percent
of those interviewed agreed that Turkey should remain neutral in post-
Assad Syria, 18 percent argued for Turkey’s mediation role between
conf licting parties, while only 7 percent of the interviewees underlined
the need for significant Turkish economic investment in a post-Assad
Syria. Those that supported sending Turkish troops to Syria as part of
a peacekeeping mission under the UN or NATO auspices remained at
10 percent according to this poll.20
These results once again seem to reveal the weaknesses of Turkey’s

position in the Syrian crisis. Despite the explicit support given by the
government to the Syrian opposition, it could not generate public sup-
port for its Syrian policy. Thus, Turkey’s current position seems to fall
short of fulfilling the goal of regime change in Syria and it is frustrated
with the international community for not being able to take a decision
to intervene militarily to topple the Syrian regime. Turkey is also not
able to generate public support domestically, making the Syrian crisis
a test for its foreign policy as well as a part of Turkish domestic politi-
cal debate. Considering the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey, the
recent developments with the rise of the Islamic State, and Turkey’s
dilemmas regarding the Kurdish issue, the importance of regional
developments for Turkish domestic politics becomes more visible and
important.
In addition to the Syrian crisis and Turkey’s dilemmas and frustra-
tions regarding how to achieve regime change, the developments in
Egypt have also shaken Turkey’s policy for the region and led to fur-
ther frustration toward the government cadres. Turkey presented itself
as a model for the countries of the region undergoing transformation
as a country which had limited the power of the army in politics and
hailed democracy. Turkey’s approach to Arab Spring was not unlike its
approach to similar experiences in the region wherein through uprisings,
the masses would get rid of corrupt, authoritarian regimes and embrace
democracy.—This process sometimes results in groups close to the JDP,
such as the Muslim Brotherhood, significantly increasing their power.
In this context, Turkey could present a model and advise countries
based on its own experience—its transformation over the past ten years
in office. The coming to power of al-Nahda in Tunisia and the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt was perceived very positively by Ankara. Yet,
when the Morsi government was ousted out of power through a mili-
tary coup, Turkish leadership was taken by surprise. Although Erdoğan
argued that the times of coups were over and called on the international
community to condemn it, the tacit approval of the United States for
Sisi taking over power showed that the reality in Egypt was different
from the understanding of the Turkish government. When the Muslim
Brotherhood rule was ousted by a coup led by General Sisi, Turkey
was quick to criticize this change and called the situation—the ousting
from power of elected representatives—unacceptable. Erdoğan, after
the military has opened fire on the pro-Muslim Brotherhood crowds
at the Rabia al Adawiya Square, said that not just people, but humanity
was dying in Cairo and called for the members of the coup to be tried
80 Özlem Tür
in court while also demanding the release of the leader of the Muslim
Brotherhood regime, Mohammed Morsi. In a similar vein, in a recent
article, Bü lent Arınç, vice prime minister, argued that what happened
in Egypt, “a coup right in front of our eyes,” was also an end to “Egypt’s
understanding of civilization.”21 Erdoğan criticized the international
community for not standing against the coup and repeated this criti-
cism on different platforms. Basing his argument on the unacceptabil-
ity of coups, and declaring that any coup carried out elsewhere (read
Turkey) should not go unpunished, he adopted the “Rabia” symbol—
referring to the killings in August 2013 in Cairo—to greet the crowds.
Erdoğan repeated the criticism during his UN speech in September
2014 where he said that elected leaders of Egypt had been replaced by
coup leaders and this had been legitimized by the UN. He called on the
UN to “be more courageous in defending what is right”; Erdoğan, in
the same meeting, used the Rabia symbol right after his speech on the
platform and refused to sit at the same table for dinner with Sisi. 22 The
reaction of the Egyptian leadership came shortly after this event; Sisi
was reported to have called for cancelling the screenings of all Turkish
soap operas on Egyptian television.
These developments led to a questioning of the extent of success in
Turkish foreign policy and whether Turkey was becoming increasingly
isolated. Having failed to generate a pro-intervention stance in Syria,
standing against the developments in Egypt while still being unable to
find support in the international community, and being frustrated with
the international community’s lack of commitment to the Syrian and
Egyptian cases, Turkey found itself rowing against the tide. Ibrahim
Kal ın, adviser of the prime minister on foreign policy issues used the
term “precious loneliness” to express Turkey’s stance—being alone for
the sake of defending the values one deems right. He argued that “at
some point in history there comes a time where you stand by the truth
all alone when the world keeps silent against coups and slaughters. You
do not give up your principles and values because your allies and other
countries do not stand by you, . . . actually this is not being alone but
presenting an honorable stance.” Kal ın continued, “once you are left
with such a choice, the right move is to stick to your principles which
are correct both for your national interests and the international policy.
If this places you in a different position than the rest this is a ‘value-
centered loneliness’ and this actually is a precious loneliness.”23
Turkey’s foreign policy choices—its precious loneliness—led to a
decline in its economic relations with the Middle East as well. As
argued in detail above, Syria constituted an important place, a “test
case,” in Turkey’s economic relations with the region during the

2000s. Yet, once Syria drifted into chaos, Turkey’s economic rela-
tions also took a deep hit. As stated above, as political relations often
paralleled economic relations with the region, when Turkey’s relations
began to sour politically, economic relations were also affected. When
the Arab Spring began, and economic costs were suffered initially in
Egypt and Libya, the idea proposed by the foreign policy circles was
that although there would be losses for Turkey, “countries such as
Libya, Tunisia and Egypt will search for rapid economic restructuring
and developments as things start to become normal. Political stabil-
ity and economic development will be twin processes and Turkey is
likely to be one of the most active countries contributing to the polit-
ical processes and taking part in economic development.” Yet, as the
situation in Libya got worse, Syrian uprising turned into a civil war,
relations with Iran soured due to the Syrian crisis, and relations with
the Egyptian state also began to decline. Turkey’s need for capturing
new markets continues, however, it remains to be seen whether a sit-
uation will arise in which Turkey can reassert its role and emerge as
the leading economic partner in the region; whether it will be able to
reach the levels of economic activity with the Middle East as it did in
the 2000s, and whether it will be seen as a credible economic partner
in the region.
Turkey’s mediation capacity has also become questionable in this
period as its ability to talk to every group and act “like a Baghdadi,” or
“like a Damascene” like it did in the 2000s seems to be on the decline.
Its increasing sectarian stance in the Syrian crisis and the region in
general is a great impediment for a mediation role. One important
development which could have played a positive role in Turkey’s capac-
ity as a mediator was the apology to Israel in 2013 from Turkey for
the deaths during the Mavi Marmara event. However, no progress has
been achieved in normalizing the relations between the two countries
despite the apology. Next, Turkey seems to be hard hit in its ability to
mediate, because it could not negotiate the return of its own diplomatic
personnel taken hostage from its Mosul consulate. On June 11, 2014,
the Turkish consulate in Mosul was raided by members of the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and 49 members of its personnel includ-
ing two babies were captured by the group. The Turkish government
was severely criticized for not evacuating the consulate despite intelli-
gence reports that warned about the advance of ISIS in the region. Yet,
with the censorship imposed on news agencies regarding the issue, the
discussion remained limited in the media. The inability of Turkey to,
82 Özlem Tür
first, deter aggressors against itself in the region; second, prevent such
an attack; and, third, rescue or broker a deal for the release of its cap-
tive diplomatic personnel even after several months shows the limits
of its power in the region—in this context, both soft and hard power.
The diplomatic personnel were finally released on September 20, 2014.
What kind of a bargaining with ISIS took place to release the personnel
remained unclear and what kind of steps Turkey would take against the
ISIS in the following period is yet to be seen.
Writing in 2012 and asking whether Turkey could still inspire its
neighbors in the wake of the Arab Spring, Aras and Akarçeşme argued
that “Turkey’s critical asset will be its broad accessibility. Not only
because of its location [ . . . ] but also because of its historical legacy and
distinct identity. Turkey is the unique actor that can have dialogue
with different, even conf licting, actors.” Looking at the period since
the advent of the Arab Spring, Turkey seems to be drifting away from
pursuing such an inclusive policy, and its diminishing role in shaping
regional developments with a direct impact on itself can be observed.
Conclusion
Looking at the first decade of the 2000s, it is possible to deny that

Turkey’s economic and political relations with the region have reached
unprecedented levels when compared with the previous decade—the
troubled 1990s. Turkey’s growing economic relations, deepening polit-
ical ties, inclusive approach with the idea of providing security for all,
and its mediation roles enhanced its power and popularity in the region.
The emphasis on the Palestinian issue was also important in this con-
text. Yet, as the end of the next decade approached, Turkey began to
lose some of the important assets it had in these issues. The cutting of
ties with Israel, while it increased Turkey’s popularity in the Arab street
on the one hand, took away one of Turkey’s most important traits on
the other hand—its ability to talk to every group. As the Arab Spring
began, Turkey, while initially a model for the changing political map
of the region, was soon faced with many challenges. Developments in
Syria and later in Egypt, with the ousting of the Morsi government,
demonstrated the limits of Turkey’s power in the region. For the years
ahead, Turkey seems to be playing its cards based on the assumption
that when the dust settles down, it will again be a model for the region
and will be the leader working for the region and embraced by it. Yet,
as conf licts turn into civil wars in Turkey’s southern neighborhoods
and as Turkey leaves behind its inclusive stance in the conf licts and
becomes a part of the conf licts—as in the case of Egypt and Syria—
whether it will find a Middle East that it wants and whether it will
be embraced by the people like it was in the first decade of the 2000s
remains a big question.
Notes
1. Ruşen Çak ı r, “Erdoğan: Tü rkiye’nin Yumuşak Gücü art ıyor,” Gazete Vatan,
June 8, 2005, http://www.gazetevatan.com/erdogan---turkiye-nin-yumusak-
gucu-artiyor--54916-gundem/.
2. For example, see Meliha Altun ışı k, “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft
Power in the Middle East,” Insight Turkey (2008): pp. 41–54; Tar ı k Oğ uzlu, “Soft
Power in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Australian Journal of International Affairs (2007);
Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation of the
Middle East,” Insight Turkey (2011).
3. A. K. Han, “iş Dü nyası Art ı k Dış Politikan ı n Öncü lerinden”, TurkishTime, April-
May, (2004).
4. Kirişçi, “Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation of the Middle
East,” p. 37.
5. See figures by T Ü IK at www.tuik.gov.tr
6. L. Martin, “Turkey’s Middle East Foreign Policy” in L. Martin and D. Keridis
(eds) The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), p. 168.
7. Halid Salih, “Kuzey Irak’a Tü rk Yat ı r ı mcı İ stiyoruz”, Milliyet http://www.mil-
liyet.com.tr/Ekonomi/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetayArsiv&ArticleID
=1140581&Kategori=ekonomi&b=Kuzey%20Iraka%20Turk%20yatirimci%20
istiyoruz
8. Ahmet Davutoğ lu, “Turkey’s Mediation: Critical Ref lections from the Field,”
Middle East Policy 20, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 84.
9. Ibid., pp. 84–85.
10. Ibid., p. 85.
11. İsrail’le Ayr ılık Krizi, “Hü rriyet,” October 16, 2009.
12 . İ brahim Kal ı n, “Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework, Values and Mechanisms,”
International Journal, 67, no. 1, (Winter 2011–2012): 7–14.
13. Ibid., p. 16
14. Mensur Akg ü n, Sabiha Seny ücel Gü ndoğar, Jonathan Levack, Gökçe Perçinoğ lu,
“The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East,” TESEV Report, TESEV Foreign
Policy Programme, İ stanbul: TESEV, 2011.
15. Şafak Gökt ü rk’s speech in a conference organized by the Center for Foreign
Policy and Peace Research, Bilkent Hotel, Ankara on November 1, 2012.
16. Bü lent Aras and Sevgi Akarçeşme, “Turkey and the Arab Spring,” International
Journal 67, no. 1(Winter 2011–2012): 42.
17. Ibid., p. 45.
84 Özlem Tür
18. This point was underlined by Bü lent Aras in a conference organized by the Center
for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, Bilkent Hotel, Ankara on November 1,
2012.
19. EDAM Tü rkiye’de Dış Politika ve Kamuoyu Anketleri 2012/2, “Suriye’ye Doğrudan
Müdahaleye Destek Yok,” http://edam.org.tr/document/Edam2012Anket2.pdf.
20. Esat Sonrası Dönemde Türkiye Suriye’de Tarafsız kalmalı, http://edam.org.tr/docu-
ment/Edam2012Anket3.pdf.
21. Bü lent Ar ı nç, “Arap Dü nyası’nda Dönüşü m: Tü rkiye’den Bak ış,” ORSAM
B ölgesel Gelişmeler Değerlendirmesi, no. 4 ( June 2014): 2.
22 . “Erdoğan BM’de de ilan etti: Darbeci Sisi,” Yeni Şafak, September 24, 2014.
23. “Turkey Not ‘Lonely’ but Dares to Do so for Its Values and Principles, Says PM
Adviser,” Hürriyet Daily News, August 26, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.
com/turkey-not-lonely-but-dares-to-do-so-for-its-values-and-principles-says-
pm-adviser-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=53244&NewsCatID=338.
CH A P T E R FOU R
Dominance in the Neighborhood:

Turkey and Iran
M e l ody Moh e bi
Public diplomacy represents efforts to connect with the public of

another country, not just by governments but also by other entities such
as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations.1 Public
diplomacy goes hand-in-hand with soft power. Soft power, which
“rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others,”2 plays a vital
role in guiding and reinforcing the different elements of diplomacy and
bilateral relationships. According to Joseph Nye, “[Soft power] is the
ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion
or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture,
political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate
in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.”3 Soft power embod-
ies a more cost-effective means of reaching a desired goal. However,
obtaining soft power requires strategic planning and the dedication of
resources by the entity seeking it, whether it is a government or not.
In this respect, Turkey and Iran, as two major regional powers, not
only compete for regional political access but have also had a cultural
rivalry for centuries based on religious and ethnic divides. This chapter
explores Turkey and Iran from a public diplomacy perspective with an
emphasis on travel and television.
Western powers have come to increasingly rely on Turkey as a mod-
erator in cases such as Iran and Syria. Turkey has, in turn, been able
to use this position to its financial advantage, particularly in its deal-
ings with Iran. However, the relationship is not one-sided. Both the
86 Melody Mohebi
Iranian state and its citizens have been able to use the Turkish connec-
tion to their benefit. Turkey has played a critical role in keeping Iran
and Iranians connected with the West, whether it is by engaging the
political elite in transparent or behind-the-scenes talks or by becoming
a transit route for ordinary citizens. In traditional diplomacy, Turkey
has taken on the role of intermediary, as can be seen in its attempts to
broker a nuclear deal between Iran and the Western states. Financially,
Iran has employed the Turkish banking system. Socially, the Iranian
middle class has come to rely on Turkey as a tourism hub free from the
restrictions imposed on them at home; Turkish television program-
ming fills Iranian homes via satellite and is increasingly considered a
form of soft power.
Policies and actions are not conducted in a vacuum. The interest
of Iranian citizens in Turkey has as much to do with a desire to over-
come the restrictions imposed on them by the Iranian state as with
an interest in what Turkey offers. In other words, without domestic
control on people’s personal lives or the constraints placed on financial
activity by international sanctions, Turkish-Iranian relationships could
have turned out differently. Nonetheless, given the circumstances, both
Turkish and Iranian citizens and institutions have been able to use the
other for their own benefit. Turkey’s role as an intermediary and ben-
eficiary has been a result of progressive change. In fact, the Turkish
government has made a conscious effort to create an image and provide
platforms that attract both its regional neighbors and the international
community. This tactical approach to diplomacy is also considered to
be part of a broader effort to check Iranian power in the region.4 The
Iranian public has seen Turkey’s evolution and ability to develop its
civil society alongside a modern financial sector that includes com-
merce and manufacturing.
Through the examples of travel and television, this chapter explores
facets of public diplomacy and soft power that work alongside tra-
ditional forms of political and economic relationships. Ultimately,
however, the extent and sustainability of this soft-power diplomacy
on Turkey’s security and economic interests remain to be seen. Issues
to consider include Turkey’s treatment of Iranians traveling to the
country—particularly as refugees continue to use Turkey as a route to
escape Iran—development of Iran’s domestic and international politics,
and how Turkey’s own internal political dynamics play out between
Islamism and secularism.
The aim is to provide an overview of several key ways in which
actors from Iran and Turkey engage outside of formal, state interaction.
Dominance in the Neighborhood 87
Some of these engagements require overt diplomatic efforts, such as

the sanctioning of visa-free travel, while some are carried out either
in opposition to the state or merely outside of its purview, such as the
use of satellite dishes by Iranian citizens to watch Turkish television
dramas. While traditional diplomacy will play the most direct role in
determining how the Iranian and Turkish states coexist and interact in
the region, the inf luence of soft power should not be overlooked.
The Background
Historically, attention has focused on the rivalry between the Ottoman

and Persian Empires. Literature and research including both Iran and
Turkey in their present-day construction are often focused on com-
paring their modern development, and the role of diplomacy and
inf luence of one side on the other has been generally limited to the
state and elite figures. For example, particular consideration has been
given to the inf luence of Ataturk on Reza Pahlavi and the moderni-
zation process he implemented in Iran. While this type of work adds
significant value to the understanding of sociopolitical development in
practice and theory, it does not provide sufficient context and analysis
of what, if any, concerted efforts have been made to inf luence ordi-
nary citizens across borders. Given the ever-increasing role of the two
countries in regional and global politics and the overall permeation of
borders, it is imperative to identify the ways in which public diplo-
macy is practiced and analyze its results. In addition to Turkey serving
as a conduit between Iran and the West on the nuclear issue, the two
states face increasing international and domestic pressures that neces-
sitate the implementation of strategies aimed at inf luencing popular
opinion in neighboring countries. Significant issues include, but are
not limited to, Syria, the future of Palestine, and Kurdish opposi-
tion movements. Another complex and uncertain matter is the role
of Azeri nationalism in Iran and how it impacts relations with neigh-
boring Turkey and Azerbaijan. As Robert Olson writes, Turkey has
used the “Azeri card” as a way to exert pressure on Iran and support
Azerbaijan in order to counter Iran’s support for Kurdish separatists
in Turkey and reduce its control of oil and gas pipelines.5 At the same
time, “One factor that some analysts mention as an irritant in Iran-
Turkey relations is the growing significance of Iraqi Kurdistan as an
energy supplier to Turkey,” although Iran is, and will continue to be,
Turkey’s main supplier.6
88 Melody Mohebi
In contrast to coercion and traditional forms of power, the renewed

interest in public diplomacy on the Turkish side comes over a decade
after the victory of the Justice and Development Party ( JDP) and the
emergence of its “zero-problems policy” that extends to its Iranian
neighbor. As such, “Turkey has pursued a strategy of using mutually
beneficial economic and energy ties with Iran as a way to avoid or to
limit the adverse consequences of policy differences. Turkish economic
development has benefited from access to Iranian energy and markets
as well as steadily increasing trade.” 7 Trade and investment form a sub-
stantive foundation of this relationship.
According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the coun-
try has seen over 110 million dollars of direct investment from Iran.8
Bilateral trade is seen as a significant boon by both sides, and leaders
of the two governments have signed numerous agreements to this end.
Economic goodwill appears to soften even the sharpest of political dif-
ferences. For example, in June 2014, President Rouhani visited Ankara
with business leaders and ministers of economy and oil among others
as part of an effort to increase trade; strengthening these ties while Iran
is still under the pressure of international sanctions, could prove to be
a huge advantage for Turkey if the sanctions are eased following recent
rounds of dialogue on the issue of its nuclear program.9,10 Despite the
threat of political differences, the relationship between the two coun-
tries appears strong, at least when it comes to trade and energy.11 As will
be explored below, this strong economic rapport both benefits from
and is a beneficiary of public diplomacy efforts.
Turkish Television Programming
Having witnessed the success of their programs at home, producers

of Turkish television programming began to expand internationally.12
Television programs f lourished in the 1990s as the country liberalized.
“Beginning in the 1980s, Turkey departed from its etatist economic
policies, and created an environment aimed at reaping the benefits of
the creative initiatives of its citizens. The result of this shift has been the
growth of an important middle class”.13 A statistic from the Ministry of
Culture and Tourism cited by different authors, including Yoruk and
Vatikiotis,14 is the sale of 35,675 hours of programming to 76 coun-
tries between the years 2005 and 2011. The language barrier does not
detract from the popularity of shows across the region.15 Not only does
the sale represent a form of soft power, it is also a vehicle for economic
growth: “The value of soap opera exports skyrocketed from a million

dollars in 2007 to 130 million in 2012 as the country sold 13,000 hours
of programming, according to data from the country’s Tourism and
Culture Ministry.”16 In terms of its reception, according to a survey
conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
(TESEV):
A full 78% of respondents in the Arab world and Iran report that
they have watched Turkish soap operas. Indeed these TV programs
have taken the region by storm, with Turkish TV stars becoming
pop idols among young and old, men and women. The impact of
watching hours of these Turkish soap operas cannot be underesti-
mated as they have the effect of creating attachment, understand-
ing, and affection for Turkish identity, culture, and values among
wide regional publics.17
Turkish media products are a mix of contradictions. One set of

programming challenges and counters common archetypes found in
Western media. Mathieu Rousselin writes of how Turkey produces
films for an international market that challenge Hollywood conven-
tions by, for example, reversing roles such that the heroes are repre-
sented by “Eastern” figures who must overcome Western villains.18
At the same time, he notes the popularity of Turkish television series
abroad that address taboo subjects such as “sexual emancipation, women
[sic] rights, drug or alcohol consumption and abortion which could be
deemed offensive by an Islamic audience”; they have a large following
in neighboring countries where the audience appreciates the manner
in which these issues are addressed.19 Turkish television series offer a
unique take on contemporary society that combines social freedoms
associated with modernity and the West in what is considered to be an
Islamic, Eastern setting. While audiences are enamored by the drama,
conservative authorities in Iran consider the programs to be a force that
subverts the “institution of the family.”20 Yet, it captivates an audi-
ence representing a wide spectrum of the population. In explaining
the appeal of Turkish television dramas to Arab audiences, Yigit main-
tains that the shows are able to mix liberal views of gender roles and
the allure of wealth and luxury with a familiar setting, which she says
includes a shared religion—Islam—and factors such as close-knit fami-
lies.21 A similar case can be made for Iranian audiences.
Rousselin, among others, note the paradox that the producers’ lib-
eral approach to sensitive topics is criticized inside Turkey itself.22 Series
90 Melody Mohebi
are reproached for breaking from cultural norms and harming family
values by, for example, portraying “births out of wedlock and marital
relations,” and are even fined by the public broadcasting regulations
authority.23 However, their condemnation does not mean that the con-
tent of these shows are a complete break from tradition. Criticisms
have also been lodged that the shows “reinforce and reproduce repres-
sive patriarchal values with their uncritical approach.” 24 These cultural
products and the reactions to them represent the multifaceted identity
of populations who seek freedom from religious and cultural restric-
tions within contested frameworks.
Ultimately, the substantive impact of Turkish television on the
Iranian public remains elusive. As noted by Yigit with regard to Arab
societies, “[Turkish drama] may create a positive image for Turkey, but
a positive image does not necessarily translate into power or buy peo-
ple’s support.” 25 What the programming has done is, at the very least,
generate revenue for Turkey’s emerging economy and provide a win-
dow into the possibilities of a more open society for Iranian audiences,
some of whom are finding the opportunity to visit the backdrop of
these shows in person through tourism, as discussed below.
Travel
According to the Republic of Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Iranian passport holders are allowed to travel within the country for up
to 90 days without a visa.26 Given the role of borders in international
relations, “The abolishment of visa requirements for neighbouring
countries such as Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Iran has positively inf lu-
enced the ‘soft power’ of Turkey by increasing interactions between
Turkey and these countries.”27 Combined with limited and complex
options that isolate Iranian travelers, Turkey represents a significant
opportunity. According to Aliriza and Flanagan, they are “the fourth-
largest group of foreign tourists in Turkey thanks to visa-free travel,
with nearly 2 million visitors in 2010 and 2011.”28 Another estimate
notes, “Iranian visitors to Turkey increased from 300,000 in 1997 to
1,000,000 in 2005,” with Turkey representing a “breath of fresh air.”29
This however, is not a reciprocal relationship. In 2014, a number of
proposals were made by the Iranian government in an effort to attract
Turkish tourists to their country, which offers cultural sites as well as
geographic and environmental landscapes amenable to activities such
as hiking and skiing.30 As it stands, given Iran’s political turmoil and
the numerous social restrictions residents and visitors face, the trend
will continue to favor outbound tourism to Turkey. Iranians travel to
Turkey for three main reasons: short-term transit, long-term transit
as they attempt to seek refuge in a third country, often Europe or the
United States, and tourism.
Transit
In terms of short-term transit, Turkish Airlines has become a cru-
cial carrier connecting Iran to other countries, particularly in Europe
and North America. Though Iran’s own airlines have long suffered
from sanctions by the United States on planes and parts, passengers
have relied on them for domestic and international travel. In addition,
European airlines, including Lufthansa, KLM and BMI, were popular
carriers until the intensity and scope of sanctions against Iran peaked in
the 2000s. Sanctions on the banking system impacted payment systems
and refueling conditions, and most European airlines gradually stopped
offering direct f lights. As of summer 2014, Germany’s Lufthansa and
Austrian Airlines were two of a limited number of European f lag carri-
ers with direct f lights into and out of the country. Iran Air, the national
airline of the Islamic Republic of Iran, offers a reduced number of
f lights to Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. However, the conditions of the planes, issues
around refueling, and difficulties in making payments to local facilities
through bank transfers are a constant source of concern for the receiv-
ing airports, the airline’s staff, and passengers, who increasingly prefer
other options.
Turkish Airlines has filled this expanding void. Not only does the air-
line offer frequent f lights, but also visa-free travel, which is an equally
important incentive for passengers whose final destination is not Turkey.
Transit visas are required for Iranian nationals if their f light entails a
layover in most other countries, even for a brief airport stopover, cre-
ating an additional obstacle that many avoid by traveling via Turkey.
The augmented services provided by Turkish Airlines to Europe and
North America have become valuable, reducing the time and financial
cost associated with obtaining yet another visa. Additionally, Turkey
offers access to a number of foreign embassies to which Iranians may
not have access at home. According to the US Department of State,
Bureau of Consular Affairs, Iranian nationals residing in Iran can only
seek immigrant visas at the US embassies in Ankara, Abu Dhabi, UAE
and Yerevan, Armenia, where Persian-speaking officers are present.
92 Melody Mohebi
They may apply for nonimmigrant visas at other embassy or consulate

locations.31 The opportunity to enter Turkey as a visitor without a visa
removes one of many other hurdles they face in securing permissions
to visit most countries.
Related to the issue of transit is the use of Turkey as a means to reach
Europe and North America for asylum, resulting in a form of long-
term transit, with Iranians crossing the Turkish border by land or air.
Since the mid-1990s, an increasing number of “irregular migrants”
from countries such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have
used Turkey as a transit route.32 If the individual is free to leave Iran,
he or she will f ly with an international carrier or cross through official
land borders, entering Turkey as a visitor. If the prospective refugee
is restricted from travelling outside of Iran or lacks appropriate travel
documents with which they can enter Turkey, he or she will make the
journey across the border by land and avoid official checkpoints. Iranian
citizens are barred from leaving the country or lack valid travel docu-
ments for a number of reasons, including: travel restrictions imposed on
political grounds or, as is most often the case for young Iranian males,
failure to have completed compulsory military service. Unless one is a
student, males must complete military service before they can obtain
a passport.
Few enter with the expectation that Turkey will be their final des-
tination. According to the 2014 planning figures of the UN Refugee
Agency (UNHCR) for Turkey, the number of asylum seekers from
Iran was 5,880 in December 2013 and estimated to increase to 9,040
by December 2014 and to 14,170 by December 2015.33 In Turkey and
the Middle East, Iranians and Iraqis constitute the majority of the refu-
gees, with the largest group being in Turkey, most of whom go on to
resettle in the United States.34 “The lack of legal recognition of non-
European refugees and their exclusion from mainstream legal processes
and services means resettlement is the only available durable solution
for Iranian and Iraqi refugees in Turkey.”35 While the UNHCR pro-
cesses applications of these individuals, their life in limbo is challeng-
ing; moreover, the UNHCR cannot process applications as fast as they
come in, and, not only do refugees face poor living conditions, but
they must also contend with discrimination from local residents.
Turkey’s policies and response to Iranian asylum seekers is a balanc-
ing act as it attempts to maintain its political and economic relationships
with both Iran and the West while managing domestic concerns. On
the one hand, Tehran does not like to see Turkey as an escape route for
its citizens and expects Ankara to respect its wishes in terms of securing
their border or returning those who have already f led but are sought
by the Iranian government. On the other hand, Ankara must observe
international protocols, particularly as it relates to human rights, when
dealing with asylum seekers. At the same time, Europe and other coun-
tries to which Iranians seek to enter following their stay in Turkey have
ongoing domestic battles on their hands when it comes to migration
and the stress it places on their resources, an issue that will only be
exacerbated with any progress in accession. Domestically, the Turkish
state has to appease voters who object to the inf lux of Iranian asylum
seekers for social or economic reasons. Discrimination against refugees
by the local population is an increasing concern that will impact other
arenas of diplomacy.
Tourism
However, the majority of travelers from Iran are tourists whose objec-
tive is to enjoy the luxuries Turkey offers. Tourists include young, old,
couples, groups of friends, and families. Many Iranian families with
members residing abroad choose Turkey as a reunion destination, as it
is particularly valuable for family members who cannot enter Iran or for
those who fear persecution if they were to enter the country. Therefore,
Turkey becomes a neutral meeting point. Given its proximity, retail
industry, and relatively low costs, the option of visa-free travel tips the
scales in Turkey’s favor as a popular destination for Iranian tourists.
These tourists travel to both metropolitan hubs as well as resort towns,
such as Antalya, on the Mediterranean coast. According to one study,
in contrast to other international tourists who use Turkey’s natural or
cultural attractions to inform their decision to visit the country, Iranian
tourists are pulled to Turkey by, in order of significance: the availability
of assorted attractions, low costs, the ability to engage in activities not
available to them at home, and accessibility.36
Similar to other aspects of this bilateral relationship, the volume
of and conditions associated with tourism are dependent on domes-
tic circumstances and international relations. For example, Aliriza and
Flanagan link the noticeable drop of tourist numbers in 2012 to polit-
ical differences and the weakened Iranian currency.37 The correlation
between political differences among the elite and personal travel deci-
sion is ambiguous, unless real policy measures are implemented. One
study finds that economic and political relations, aside from its impact
on visa-free travel, have not been a significant factor in the upsurge
of tourists, while Turkey’s open social environment, which includes
94 Melody Mohebi
music concerts, beach tourism, and low-cost fashion goods are part
of the draw.38 While economic and political pressure should not be
completely discounted, other factors, including the perceived advan-
tages of Turkey through word of mouth accounts and television, need
to be recognized. In 2012, a 41 percent decline in Iranian tourists was
attributed by one Turkish daily to an Iranian government directive
to travel agencies as a result of political tensions; however, individuals
from the Turkish tourism industry are adamant that the real reason
is the decrease in the value of the Iranian currency and, to a lesser
degree, an increase in prices on the Turkish side.39 The long-term tra-
jectory and intensity of such f luctuations depend on the strength and
interaction of the variables mentioned above. Trouble in one area can
also impact another; for example, a real or perceived conf lict between
Iranian refugees and local populations can enhance nationalistic spirits
that will in turn inf luence decisions by consumers and the political
elite. However, the social, political, and economic interaction between
the two countries has reached a stage that makes a total secession unre-
alistic. For example, in the same year that the number of Iranian tour-
ists to Turkey dropped to 439,000, compared to a figure of 746,000 for
the same period in 2011, there was a 169 percent increase in Turkish
exports to Iran.40 Given this strong connection, containing and resolv-
ing conf lict remains in the social and economic interests of both sides.
Conclusion
With their historic roots, rivalries between Iran and Turkey continue
into contemporary politics; however, there exists a relative detente for
security and economic benefits which feeds into other forms of engage-
ment, creating a complex relationship. Ankara has had to engage in a
balancing act between its connection to the West and its socioeco-
nomic ties with Tehran. On the whole, it has been able to use Iran’s iso-
lation from the West and strict domestic controls for its own economic
benefit. In addition to formal political channels, Turkey has been able
to utilize its position to serve as a bridge between the rigid rules of the
Islamic Republic and the West for Iranian citizens, particularly fami-
lies and individuals with sufficient financial means. If this relationship
falters, it is Iran that will see the most damage, given its precarious
political and economic position at the international level.
At the same time, while data certainly shows Iranian citizens’ appre-
ciation of Turkish cultural exports and resources, it does not translate
into a desire to replicate the Turkish political system inside their own
country. In fact, it can be reasonably hypothesized that a majority would
reject the notion of a system with strong military authority, particularly
given the history of coups and gradual encroachment of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in all aspects of life since the
1979 revolution. Moreover, the stringent rules that keep a check on the
role of religion in public life in Turkey would most likely be rejected by
the majority in Iran, including reform-minded individuals. According
to the 2012 TESEV study on the Perception of Turkey in the Middle
East, only 37 percent of Iranians surveyed believe that “Turkey suc-
cessfully combined Islam and democracy.” This is in contrast to the
80 percent and 78 percent from Egypt and Tunisia, respectively, who
support the statement; likewise, only 37 percent of Iranian respondents
agree that Turkey can serve as a model in the region.41 This assertion is
in line with that of Yoruk and Vatikiotis who argue:
The rhetoric of Turkish “soft power” does not provide a sound

argument for its portrayal of the contemporary “soap opera colo-
nialism” as a major cultural/ideological apparatus of Turkey’s
prospective regional hegemony. The pinning of exaggerated aspi-
rations onto soft power does not automatically lead to any proper
hegemonic ends, though it certainly is capable of generating an
illusion of hegemony.42
Conversely, the so-called theocracy of Iran holds little appeal for

those in Turkey, partly due to the fact that historically “the religious
establishment has always been subject to political authority and it has
never been an independent political force.”43 So long as public diplo-
macy and soft power is seen as a source of peace and revenue, the
status quo will be considered a positive position. However, this mutu-
ally beneficial exchange can be disrupted if actors on either side feel
threatened, be they affiliated with the state or private citizens. Given
the stronghold of the Iranian state on its citizens and the strength of
national pride, Turkey’s ability to convert its soft power into politi-
cal or economic leverage remains tenuous. Ultimately, the develop-
ment of broader international disputes, including the one over Iran’s
nuclear program, and domestic circumstances will have the greatest
level of inf luence on bilateral relations. Other factors, such as ethnic
nationalism, a major area of study on its own that is not addressed
in this chapter, may play a central role in determining diplomacy’s
future trajectory.
96 Melody Mohebi
Notes
1. Philip Seib, “Public Diplomacy, New Media, and Counterterrorism,” CPD

Perspectives on Public Diplomacy no. 2 (2011: 6.
2. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York:
PublicAffairs, 2004), p. 5.
3. Ibid., x.
4. Katinka Barysch, “Can Turkey Combine EU Accession and Regional Leadership?”
Centre for European Reform Policy Brief (2010), p. 7.
5. Robert Olson, “The ‘Azeri’ Question and Turkey-Iran Relations, 2000–2002,”
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 8, no. 4 (2007): 81–82.
6. Bijan Khajehpour, “Five Trends in Iran-Turkey Trade, Energy Ties,” Al Monitor,
October 31, 2013. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/iran-
turkey-trade-energy-ties-increase-five-reasons.html
7. Bulent Aliriza and Stephen J. Flanagan, “Turkey’s Evolving Relations with
Russia and Iran,” in The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus: Driving Forces and Strategies
(Abbreviated Edition), (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2013), p. 8.
8. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Website accessed in July
2014.
9. Daniel Dombey and Najmeh Borzorgmehr, “Rouhani’s Visit to Ankara Lifts
Hopes for Turkey Iran Thaw,” Financial Times, June 9, 2014.
10. “Rouhani, Business Delegation in Ankara to Boost Iran-Turkey Trade,” Tehran
Times, June 10, 2014.
11. Khajehpour, “Five Trends in Iran-Turkey Ties.”
12 . Yoruk and Vatikiotis provide a number of relevant details and references on
this topic in Zafer Yoruk and Pantelis Vatikiotis, “Soft Power or Illusion of
Hegemony: The Case of the Turkish Soap Opera ‘Colonialism’.” International
Journal of Communication7 (2013): 2361–2385.
13. Hakan Altinay, “Turkey’s Soft Power: An Unpolished Gem or an Elusive
Mirage?” Insight Turkey 10, no. 2 (2008): 59, 65.
14. Yoruk and Vatikiotis, “Soft Power or Illusion of Hegemony,” p. 2362.
15. Altinay, “Turkey’s Soft Power,” p. 59.
16. Harry Van Versendaal, “New Tool for Female Empowerment: Turkish Soap
Operas,” Ekathimerini. March 16, 2014.
17. Paul Salem, Turkey’s Image in the Arab World (Istanbul: Turkish Economic and
Social Studies Foundation, 2011), p. 6.
18. Mathieu Rousselin, “Strategic Depth through Soft Power: The Domestic
Production and International Projection of Turkish Culture,” Euxeinos: Online
Journal of the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe 10 (2013): 3.
19. Ibid., p. 4.
20. Van Versendaal, “New Tool for Female Empowerment.”
21. Ahu Yigit, “Turkish Drama in the Middle East: Secularism and Cultural
Inf luence,” European Institute of the Mediterranean (2013), pp. 292–293.
22 . Mathiew Rousselin, “Turkish Soap Power: International Perspectives and

Domestic Paradoxes,” Euxeinos: Online Journal of the Center for Governance and
Culture in Europe 10 (2013).
23. Yigit, “Turkish Drama in the Middle East,” pp. 293–294.
24. Ibid., 294.
25. Ibid.
26. “Visa Information for Foreigners,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/visa-information-for-foreigners.en.mf.
27. Selcen Öner, “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy: New Instruments and
Challenges,” Euxeinos: Governance and Culture in the Black Sea Region no. 10
(2013): 11.
28. Aliriza and Flanagan, “Turkey’s Evolving Relations with Russia and Iran,” p. 9.
29. Altinay, “Turkey’s Soft Power,” p. 60.
30. “Iran Makes Proposals to Attract Tourists from Turkey,” IRNA, May 22, 2014.
31. US Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Reciprocity by Country”,
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/fees/reciprocity-by-countr y/
IR.htm.
32 . Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration,”
Migration Information Source (The Online Journal of the Migration Policy
Institution)(November 1, 2003).
33. The UN Refugee Agency, www.unhcr.org.
34. International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), “Welcome to Europe! A
Comprehensive Guide to Resettlement,” July 2013., http://www.resettlement.
eu/sites/icmc.tttp.eu/f iles/ICMC%20Europe-Welcome%20to%20Europe_0.
pdf.
35. European Resettlement Network, “Iranian and Iraqi Refugees in Turkey,” 2013,
http://www.resettlement.eu/page/iranian-iraqi-refugees-turkey.
36. Ramin Asadi and Mahmoud Daryaei, “Prioritization of Pull Factors of Turkey as
a Destination for Iranian Tourists,” Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences
5, no. 10 (2011): 1510–1515.
37. Aliriza and Flanagan, “Turkey’s Evolving Relations,” pp. 3–12.
38. Asadi and Daryaei, “Prioritization of Pull Factors,” ofp. 1515.
39. “Number of Tourists from Iran Visiting Turkey Drop by 41 Percent,” Today’s
Zaman, July 10, 2012, http://www.todayszaman.com/national_number-of-tour-
ists-from-iran-visiting-turkey-drop-by-41-percent_286112.html.
40. Ibid.
41. Mensur Akgun, Sabiha Senyucel Gundogar, “The Perception of Turkey in the
Middle East 2012,” trans. Jonathan Levack (Istanbul: Turkish Economic and
Social Studies Foundation, 2012), p. 20.
42 . Yoruk and Vatikiotis, “Soft Power or Illusion of Hegemony,” p. 2378.
43. Sahin Alpay, “Iran-Turkey Relations: Love Thy Neighour?” Al Jazeera, February
12, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/02/iran-turkey-
relations-love-thy-ne-2014211671992287.html.
CH A P T E R F I V E
Elsewhere in the Neighborhood: Reaching

Out to the Western Balkans
M a r i ja M i t rov i Ć B o š kov i Ć ,
D u š a n R e lj i Ć , a n d
A l i da Vr a Č i Ć *
Introduction
The violent disintegration of nonaligned Yugoslavia in the 1990s

that coincided with the end of the Cold War in Europe triggered
a quest among external actors to fill the emerging geopolitical void
and strengthen their inf luence in Southeast Europe. Since the very
beginning of the Yugoslav turmoil in the late 1980s, the United
States, the European Union (EU), Russia (at that moment still the
Soviet Union), and some Muslim countries (i.e., Turkey, Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Malaysia, etc.) became progressively involved in the events on
the ground. At the outset, the external interest was declared to be
of humanitarian nature, yet, unavoidably, external involvement soon
shifted to bickering for inf luence in the successor countries of former
Yugoslavia and thus, in Southeast Europe as well. After 2000, vio-
lent conf licts became subdued and bidders for inf luence in Southeast
Europe switched to public diplomacy and “soft power.” Those who
had appropriate means, such as the EU and Russia, forged additional
strategic inroads in the field of economy and energy, offering, like the
EU, perspectives of full-scale integration or, in the case of Moscow,
100 Marija Mitrović Bošković, Dušan Reljić, and Alida Vračić
participation in geostrategic energy security schemes. In 2003, the

EU extended to the “Western Balkans,” meaning former Yugoslavia
minus Slovenia plus Albania, a formal offer of membership once con-
ditions were fulfilled. Around 2007, Russia proposed to build South
Stream, a gas pipeline from its Black Sea coast to southeast and central
Europe. Throughout this time, among the less forceful actors, Turkey
considered itself to be particularly capable of establishing a leading
position in the post-Yugoslav sphere. This belief rested mostly on the
assumption that there exists a regional interconnectedness based on a
common Ottoman past, “kin” ethnic groups, religious traditions, and
other, mostly historic, relations.
Between the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 and the 1980s, there
were mostly only formal relations between Turkey and Yugoslavia, at
first a kingdom but after World War II, a socialist federation. Tens of
thousands of ethnic Turks had left the new kingdom and later, the fed-
eral state, to emigrate to Turkey until the middle of the last century,
where only a small number of them remained in Yugoslavia, mostly
in Macedonia and Kosovo. With their exodus, everyday human con-
tacts vanished to a great extent, economic and cultural contacts dimin-
ished vastly, and a general mutual alienation set in. However, Turkey
and Socialist Yugoslavia maintained pragmatic relations that were
not inf luenced by either religion or culture, but rather were intended
only to support their mutual interests, be they security or, to a lesser
extent, economic interests. On February 28, 1953, Turkey, Greece, and
Yugoslavia even signed in Ankara an “Agreement of Friendship and
Cooperation,” later called the Balkan Pact. The treaty was perceived as
a barrier against Soviet pressures in Southeast Europe. From the mid-
1950s, though, contacts started loosening up as Yugoslavia practiced an
increasingly nonaligned policy, while Turkey assumed a strategically
important role on NATO’s southeast f lank.
Yugoslavia’s implosion became irreversible after the February 1992
package recognition of Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH) as independent countries by the Western states.
This also marked a turning point in Turkey’s approach to this part of
Southeast Europe. Turkey apparently perceived BiH, and later Kosovo,
to be the spots where Turkish historic interests were intensely affected
and where Muslims were suffering and being threatened to the extent
of extinction. Greece’s prolonged conf lict with the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia about the “name issue”1 was another opening
for increasing Turkish inf luence in the former Yugoslav region. Skopje
saw in Ankara a welcome ally against Athens. Nonetheless, the tragic
Elsewhere in the Neighborhood 101
events in BiH, where the Bosniak population suffered terribly dur-

ing the war, draw understandably the largest portion of Turkish public
attention and was particularly conducive to the revival of old Ottoman
memories. This is one of the reasons why the Turkish attitude toward
Bosnia and Herzegovina receives particular attention in this chapter.
While Turkey started to develop special relations with BiH in the
1990s, seeing it as the center of the Balkans, there actually seemed to
be little contemporary knowledge about this country or at least there
was a biased view of it, based on much historic romanticism. Orhan
Dede, from the Turkish think tank Bilgesam, told a research team from
the Sarajevo based think tank “Populari” how until the end of the
war in BiH, Turkish newspapers mistakenly considered Bosnians to be
Turkic people: “In 1992 or 1993, the daily newspapers Sabah started
the promotion of newly independent states and gave f lags of newly
formed Turkic states in the newspapers. They wanted to promote their
newly founded brothers, and they gave f lags mostly of Central Asian
new states, like Azerbaijan, but they included Bosnian f lag as well!
[ . . . ] This is the perception in Turkey: Bosnia is ethnically a Turkish
state.”2
A number of Turkish parliamentary sessions were dedicated to the
catastrophe in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The opposition parties at that
time criticized Turkey’s “inaction” during the war and advocated uni-
lateral intervention in BiH. However, the government, for the most
part, followed the line of acting that was put forth in the framework
of NATO offering diplomatic and public support to the authorities in
Sarajevo. Yet, there were also reports in the media about clandestine
military support to the Muslim fraction in BiH. At the same time,
Turkey was pragmatic enough not to sever its diplomatic relations with
Serbia even though Ankara was adamant about who the aggressor and
victim were.3
After the end of the most violent phase in the disintegration of
Yugoslavia, from 2000 onward, it was evident that the United States, by
leading the Western military interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Kosovo (1999), had determined the outcome. A new regional order
started to emerge, often under direct external patronage. To this date,
Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a fully sovereign state as, nominally, the
UN retains decisive prerogatives.4 This is to a much bigger extent also
true in Kosovo: Pristina’s sovereignty is not recognized by five out of
28 EU members and the chances of becoming a UN member soon are
close to nil because of the certainty that Russia and China would veto
such a move. Often overlooked, but easily discernible, there is a strong
sentiment among Albanians throughout the region to achieve unifica-

tion in a single national state (Reljić, 2012). Strong interethnic tensions
exist in BiH and also in the Republic of Macedonia. The reordering
of the former Yugoslavia’s territory is not over yet. However, after the
guns have fallen silent, the antagonisms within the successor states and
in the region are played out through political and diplomatic means.
External inf luences are stronger than ever before as the successor states
are weak and are forced to vie constantly for foreign allies to help them
achieve their aims. Correspondingly, external actors seek to strengthen
their inf luence. Public diplomacy and soft power are pivotal tools to
this end.
Turkey’s Rediscovery of the Balkans after

the Cold War
During the Cold War era and in the 1990s, Turkey was considered a
“hard power” because of the high inf luence of its military in politics
and deficiencies in its democracy and human rights. 5 For Turkey, the
dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s
that coincided with the implosion of the Soviet Union was of major
concern. It forced Turkey to thoroughly reconsider its external pol-
icy. From its previous mostly passive and reactive approach, it moved
toward a more assertive and multidirectional foreign policy, also in the
Western Balkans. However, Ankara also had to pay attention not to
abandon its firm embedding in the NATO and the transatlantic alli-
ance because of the vast security threats arriving from its eastern and
southeastern neighborhood.
Consequently, in the initial period of the wars for post-Yugo-
slav succession, Turkey mostly relied on traditional foreign policy
and bilateral and multilateral instruments. Ankara was careful not
to lose the balance between its bilateral activism and the interests
of its Western allies, especially the United States. Turkey engaged
directly through multilateral arrangements with organizations such
as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), UN Security
Council, institutions of the European Union, NATO, and United
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployed in Croatia and
in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Yugoslav wars, and later with
the Kosovo Force (KFOR) under NATO leadership. Once the vio-
lent conf licts came to an end, and postwar reconstruction and rein-
tegration of the region began, Turkey looked for a leading role in
new initiatives such as South East European Cooperation Process

(SEECP), the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), Southeast
European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), Peace Implementation
Council (PIC) and South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG).
Admittedly, the proliferation of regional diplomatic initiatives often
appeared to be inversely proportional to their efficiency. In essence,
in a similar vein to other countries, Turkey modified its external
relations after the end of the Cold War by significantly expanding its
reliance on public diplomacy.
Following the 2002 November elections in Turkey, when the Justice
and Development Party ( JDP) came to power for the first time, Turkey
experienced relative political stability and prolonged economic prosper-
ity. It recorded an average economic growth of more than 4.5 percent
annually from 2005 to 2012, reaching the position of the seventeenth
largest nominal GDP in the world in 2012.6 Thanks to increased pros-
perity, the expansion of the business sector, and the advancement of
communication and transportation, Turkish civil society and business
groups also increased their contacts and relationships with the outside
world, including the Balkans.7 Turkey’s “Chinese growth rates” vastly
improved the country’s image in the world. In the eyes of the impov-
erished and desperate Western Balkan nations, still suffering from the
effects of the wars, Turkey was the success story in their neighborhood.
Denigrated in the public discourse in the Western Balkans for many
decades as backward and chained by its Ottoman history, all at once
Turkey shone with dynamism and modernity—it appeared an example
to be emulated.
The drive for EU membership was also of major importance for
this period for Turkey and the Balkans. In December 1999, Turkey
obtained EU membership candidate status and in 2003 in Thessaloniki,
the EU leaders offered “a membership perspective” to the Western
Balkans. Ankara could from then on also point out to the shared goal
of EU membership. The common goal boosted Turkey’s “soft power”
and helped its public diplomacy to gain credibility as the country intro-
duced reforms in the areas of democracy, human rights, and minority
rights. These reforms decreased the inf luence of the military on pol-
itics and strengthened Turkish civil society.8 Turkey could point to
its successful reforms as examples to be followed. Broadening the EU
integration to the Balkans provided an additional element of intercon-
nection between Turkey and the region and even opened the possi-
bility for Turkey to compete latently with European powers, such as
Germany, for regional inf luence. The EU perspective inf luenced the
“softening” of the Turkish approach: from power politics to a multi-

dimensional policy reliant on trade, cross-border investment, cultural
exchange, and cooperation with civil society.
Perhaps in a climactic moment of Turkish efforts to ally the Western
Balkan states into a common f lotilla heading toward the EU, unmis-
takably with Ankara as the spearhead, in October 2012, then foreign
minister Ahmed Davutoğ lu invited his Western Balkan colleagues to
Istanbul for a conference entitled “From Balkan Wars to Balkan Peace.”
Besides the centennial commemorations of the First Balkan War, the
talk about the common EU goal featured at the top of the agenda.
However, only the “traditional friends” came: Albania, Kosovo, BiH,
Macedonia, and also Montenegro motivated by its current govern-
ment’s determination to distance itself from Serbia. Ministers and
high-ranking officials from other countries of the region were mark-
edly absent. Clearly, Turkey’s newly elevated diplomatic standing in the
Western Balkans had passed its apogee. Both the rise and the decline
of Turkish leverage in the region had much to do with how domes-
tic and foreign policy developed under then prime minister Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan and his leading diplomat Davutoğ lu. In addition, as
will be shown later in this text, Turkey did not fulfill its promises to
the Western Balkan countries to significantly boost trade and invest-
ments in the region.
Davutoğlu’s Weltanschauung, spelled out at the beginning of the cen-
tury in much detail in his book Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International
Position, provided the basis for defining the principles and objectives of
Turkey’s new foreign policy and also shaped its approach to the Western
Balkans.9
Davutoğlu takes geography as the first determinant of foreign policy
and history as the second. Following these principles, and because of
the openings established by the disintegration of Federal Yugoslavia and
the Soviet Union, Turkey engaged itself far more actively in the Middle
East, the Balkans and the Caucasus. Turkey’s foreign policy defined
itself as being proactive and as showing greater readiness to take risks,
with emphasis on the principles of “zero-problems with neighbors”
and “win-win” politics. 10 However, for Davutoğlu, the connecting
links for Turkey’s Balkan policy that are of prime importance are the
local Muslim and other kin communities:
The basis of Turkey’s political inf luence in the Balkans is the

Ottoman remnants, the Muslim communities. [ . . . ] At first
Turkey’s natural allies are the two countries with Muslim majority
[BiH and Albania]. The will to turn this common historic accu-
mulation into a natural alliance has now emerged. 11
Already at this point, there was apparently a misperception: Contrary

to Davutoğlu’s assumption, Muslims in BiH are only a simple major-
ity constituting roughly 40 percent of the population. Taken together,
there are more Christians in BiH with 46 percent (31 percent Serbian-
Orthodox, and 15 percent Catholics). “Christians” and “Muslims” are
given extra emphasis here because it is highly problematical to equate
historic cultural traditions with modern personal religious feelings:
there are many people in BiH and the former Yugoslavia who nour-
ish specific cultural traditions, such as giving their children names of
Islamic origin but who are often atheists and culturally inclined to
Western European matrices. Also, being a Serb or a Croat is by no means
equal to being Orthodox or Catholic. Moreover, 70 years of living in
a joint state and 50 years of living in socialist Yugoslavia left undeni-
able imprints on personal identities that have not fully disappeared nor
been entirely replaced by previous identities that were strongly rooted
in religion. Albanians are also not homogeneously Muslim; there was
religious persecution during the many years of Enver Hoxdha’s rule in
Albania.
In Davutoğlu ’s perception, however, not embarking upon an “active
Balkan policy,” would lead to Turkey losing its inf luence to Greece and
Russia who would then use their Orthodox/Slavic clout. Therefore,
Turkey should pursue a strategy ensuring its position as the leader in
the region that is obviously of paramount interest to Turkey because
it is both geographically and politically connected to the European
Union and the West. To put it simply, there is no point further west
in Europe where Turkish diplomatic inf luence could possibly reach
than Bosnia and Herzegovina.12 Moreover, in Davutoğlu’s vision, the
Balkans is a buffer zone and an important strategic point for Turkey
on its way to Europe.13 In his interpretation, conf licts in the Balkans
between regional and global actors arose over establishing control and
the sphere of inf luence over these crucial lines.14 For Turkey, these lines
are also very important and as Davutoğlu explains in his book, Turkey
can secure its interests in the region by developing a more constructive
relationship with communities that carry forward the Ottoman leg-
acy and who themselves feel politically, economically, and culturally
attracted by Turkey’s power and inf luence.
Consequently, economic cooperation is crucially important.
Investments that could connect different regions in the Balkans and
support regional interconnectedness are needed. The Organization of

the Black Sea Economic Cooperation should play a more active part
in this.15 Another path to broaden Turkish inf luence in the Balkans
is to strengthen regional interdependence and thus maintain an inter-
nal regional balance between the interest of global powers and their
regional counterparts. 16 The best way for Turkey to achieve this is
by supporting regional initiatives and strengthening cooperation and
interconnectedness in the region. In that sense, Turkey needs to take an
active and leading role in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe,
the Southeast European Cooperation Process, and all other similar
endeavors.17
Redefining the Ottoman Heritage in the

Western Balkans
Based on such strategic assumptions, Turkey approached the Western

Balkans after the end of the wars for Yugoslavia’s succession with all
available instruments including the extensive use of soft power and
public diplomacy. The focal was on strengthening a positive image of
Turkey, relying on the Ottoman legacy in the region, and on “soydaş ve
dindaş,” ethnic and cultural kin in Southeast Europe.
One of the pivotal communication strategies used by Davutoğlu
and other JDP leaders in their approach to the Balkans was to insist
on historical and cultural ties and to appeal to a sense of togetherness
and closeness based on common Ottoman heritage. A positive inter-
pretation of Ottoman history and an emphasis on the multicultural
structure of the empire is widely spread in the discourse. To illustrate
this, as one of the authors of this chapter recalls, Davutoğlu stated, at
the 2012 Istanbul conference with Western Balkan foreign ministers,
that “Serbo-Croat was the second most spoken language at the Sultan’s
court in the 16th century.” In Turkish public diplomacy, the Ottoman
experience is postulated as an overwhelmingly positive example for
the establishment of contemporary interreligious and interethnic rela-
tions in the region.18 This, however, contradicts harshly the collec-
tive memories of most Balkan nations, including the Albanians: they
learn in schools that the Ottoman reign of almost 500 years brought
oppression, suffering, and economic and social decline, separated the
region from the rest of Europe, and is still among the main causes of
many social and economic malaises.19 They are yet to be convinced of
the merits of the contemporary, official Turkish interpretation of the
Ottomans’ half-a-millennium-long presence in the Western Balkans.

Occasionally, as has happened in Kosovo, Turkish diplomats go to great
lengths so as to intervene with local educational authorities to bring
about changes in the school curricula so that the Ottoman past is not
presented in a negative light.20
The discrepancy between JDP/Davutoğlu’s vision and the percep-
tions of most Western Balkan communities reached a climax in the
autumn of 2009. In his speech at the opening ceremony of the con-
ference “Ottoman Legacy and Balkan Muslim Communities Today”
in Sarajevo in October 2009, Davutoğlu contended that during most
of ancient history, in the Alexandrian, and then Roman Empire, this
region had a peripheral role. However, “during the Ottoman state, the
Balkan region became the centre of world politics in the 16th century.
This is the golden age of the Balkans!”21 He went on to propose that
the Balkan countries could escape the destiny of being in the periphery
or a victim of the geostrategic competition of great powers by reestab-
lishing the success of the Ottoman period. In that sense, the empire’s
model is seen as a positive example and a solution for ethnic and reli-
gious conf licts:
As the Republic of Turkey, we would like to construct a new

Balkan region based on political dialogue, economic interdepen-
dence, cooperation and integration, as well as cultural harmony
and tolerance. These were the Ottoman Balkans, and hopefully
we will re-establish the spirit of these Balkans.22
He emphasized: “Our foreign policy aims to establish order in . . . the

Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East . . . we will make these areas
with Turkey as the centre of world politics in the future.” Besides using
this discourse in addressing the nominally or genuinely Muslim popu-
lation with historic ties to Turkey in the Western Balkans, these argu-
ments are also used internally in the discourse to the Turkish people
of Balkan origin. By some estimation, there are around ten million
Turks with Balkan origin and between four and ten million people
from Balkan countries living in Turkey.23 Davutoğlu and even Erdoğan
often insist that there are more people of Bosnian origin and people of
Albanian origin in Turkey than in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,
or Albania; “Whenever there is a crisis in the Balkans, victims of those
crises, like Bosnians, Albanians, Turks in Bulgaria, they all look to
Istanbul.”24 Evidently, his interpretation of a common history mainly
resonates with the Muslim population in the Balkans. This revived
Turkish interest for the Muslims in the Balkans was interpreted by

many scholars as neo-Ottomanism. 25 Evidently, it evokes few positive
sentiments among Christian-Orthodox, Catholic, and other segments
of the population who see no reason to foot their identities in concepts
stemming from ancient historic periods.
In contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially, as there are
severe divisions among its three main political communities, there is
a profound difference regarding both the perception and, essentially,
the desirability of Turkish inf luence in the country. While the major-
ity of Bosniaks support Turkey’s efforts to increase its inf luence in the
country, considering Ankara to be a worthy political ally, Serbs and
Croats are obviously not at ease with it. What many Bosniaks see as
friendly rhetoric, proofs of friendship and even brotherhood, and a
perspective of abundant economic investments based on pure positive
emotions, Serb and Croat politicians consider an unwanted embrace.
Consequently, according to Milorad Dodik, the president of Republika
Srpska in BiH, Turkish presence creates more internal divisions. For
politicians like him, who openly question the future of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Turkish assertiveness in the region is welcome.
Taking into account the fact that the political leaders in BiH have
profound disagreements about the future development of the constitu-
tional order of the country and even about the benefits of its very exis-
tence, it cannot help to ease the tensions if there is the impression that
an external actor, in this case Turkey, is seen to be favoring one ethnic
group; in fact, it only adds to the existing tensions. Turkey also finds
this situation to be troublesome, as Ankara’s stated policy is to support
the whole country and not just one of the entities. This discrepancy
frustrates Turkish diplomats working in Sarajevo. As former first coun-
selor at the Turkish Embassy in Sarajevo, Yasemin Eralp, explained to
the “Populari” research team:
This is the major problem we Turks have in Bosnia—the image.

We support the country, not any entity specifically, and we are
working on changing this perception.26
Enhancing the Political Image of Turkey in the

Western Balkans
Turkey has invested much effort in the recent past to overcome the
image of a one-sided actor in the Western Balkans. The main endeavor
was to assume the role of a regional mediator and emphasize regional

cooperation. Consequently, Ankara energetically pursued bilateral, tri-
lateral, and multilateral peace initiatives as Turkey tried to present itself
as an important political player in the region, as moderator, and even
arbiter of regional issues and conf lict resolutions. 27
One important instance in this framework was the establishment
of trilateral consultation mechanisms upon Turkish initiatives between
Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and also Turkey, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and Croatia. Following the Trilateral Balkan
Summit, held in Istanbul in April 2010, an Istanbul Declaration was
adopted, which, as pronounced by the Turkish side, brought together
the presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia for the first time
since the war.
There were seven meetings between the foreign ministers of Turkey,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and five between the foreign
ministers of Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. However,
the consultations with Zagreb all but ceased after Croatia’s entry into
the EU in July 2013. Soon afterward, trilateral meetings with Serbia
also ceased probably because Ankara and Belgrade considered their
usefulness, particularly within the domestic political context, to be
exhausted. In October 2013, Serbian president Tomislav Nikolić can-
celled an announced trilateral meeting as a response to then prime
minister Erdoğan’s statement in Prizren (Kosovo): “Kosovo is Turkey
and Turkey is Kosovo.”28 Nikolić took such a statement to constitute
an “an aggression without arms.”29 The background is that Serbia had
not abandoned its claim that constitutionally, and according to inter-
national law, Kosovo was still part of its territory. The political class
in Belgrade still vividly remembers that Turkey was among the first
states to recognize Pristina’s unilateral declaration of independence on
February 17, 2008.
Beyond the trilateral mechanisms, Turkey initiated high level bilat-
eral meetings with the Balkan countries. Following its strategic interest
and promotion of special connections with the Muslim population in
the Balkans, Turkey paid special attention to the relations with Muslims
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Erdoğan and Davutoğlu visited Sarajevo
on various occasions, often in the company of many businessmen and
other Turkish figures.
Bosniak officials are prominent in the political communication with
their Turkish counterparts. All three members (representing the three
constitutional peoples) of the BiH presidency on a rhetorical level agree
that bilateral relations between BiH and Turkey are good, strong, and
constantly improving. In practice, the three members of the collective

presidency rarely interact with their Turkish counterparts collectively;
since the end of 2010, when the current presidency members assumed
office, a joint meeting has only happened four times, two of which
took place within the framework of trilateral meetings with Serbian
and Turkish heads of state.
During the same time period, each of them individually attended
several meetings with their Turkish colleagues. According to the
website of the presidency of BiH, in more than three years, Nebojša
Radmanović, the member from Republika Srpska, attended three for-
mal meetings, while Željko Kom šić, the Croat member, held four offi-
cial meetings with his Turkish counterparts. At the same time, Bakir
Izetbegović, the Bosniak member of the presidency maintained the
most intensive contacts with the Turkish side by far—these resulted in
no less than 25 formal meetings with Turkish governmental officials.
What is more, Izetbegović travelled to Turkey for official meetings
on six occasions, while the other two members only joined him in
May 2013 for a trilateral meeting together with the Serbian president
Tomislav Nikolić.
All in all, these numbers confirm that Bosniak politicians effec-
tively maintain what could almost be considered a monopoly over rela-
tions with Turkey. Unofficially, this is explained by President Bakir
Izetbegović’s personal friendship with the new Turkish president,
which is based on the legacy of his father, Alija Izetbegović (the late
leader of the Bosnian Muslims during the times of conf lict and war in
the 1990s) and his close associate the then reisu-l-ulema Mustafa Ceriç
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ceriç is highly esteemed in Turkey and is
said to have attended the same university in Malaysia with Davutoğlu.
Alija Izetbegović’s memory is honored with several parks, mosques,
streets, and even boulevards in major Turkish cities like Ankara,
Istanbul, Izmir, Konya, and Adana carrying his name. Turkish politi-
cal leaders like to emphasize these special relations with him. Turkish
prime minister Erdoğan likes to recall how Alija Izetbegović left him
BiH to take care of after his death. This never ceases to infuriate Serb
and Croat politicians in BiH: they consider this to be the final proof
of Turkish ambition to dominate Bosnia. A park in Sarajevo has been
dedicated in Erdoğan’s name, which is the first such example outside
of Turkey. Such signs of respect and affection probably contribute to
strengthening mutual bonds, however in a torn society, as Bosnia and
Herzegovina still is, they are prone to contribute further to ethnic divi-
sions and political strife. If the declared Turkish aim is to enhance its
positive image in the perception of all ethnic groups and the whole
region, then such moves certainly do not contribute to this end.30
Admittedly, the JDP government paid much attention to improve
relations with Serbia after democratic parties gained power in October
2000. The Serbian president at that time Boris Tadiç visited Turkey
in 2007 and 2010 and then prime minister Mirko Cvetkoviç visited
Turkey in 2011. Turkish President Abdulah Gü l visited Serbia in 2009
becoming the first Turkish president to visit Serbia since 1986. Former
prime minister Erdoğan visited Serbia in July 2010, when the visa-free
agreement between the two countries was signed.31 During this period,
tripartite consultation meetings between Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Serbia, and Turkey were carried out, followed by a number of visits
on a ministerial level. Turkey and Serbia signed a free trade agree-
ment in June 2009. Besides offering its good service in mediating with
Bosniaks in Bosnia, Turkey has also mediated between divided blocs
of Muslims in the Sand žak region of Serbia. During Erdoğan’s visit to
Serbia in November 2011, he brought together local representatives of
the Bosniak community who were in a prolonged conf lict.
In a similar vein, Turkey raised its diplomatic, political, and cul-
tural profile in Albania, Kosovo, the Republic of Macedonia, and
Montenegro. The pattern is always the same: rhetorically, the aim is
to work holistically with the entire county but in reality, religious and
ethnic “kin” groups receive particular attention and benefits.
Turkey’s Trade, Investments and Development Aid

in the Western Balkans
Turkish government delegations touring the Western Balkans in the

post-2000 period promised to boost trade and investments. Macedonia
was the first country in the Balkans with whom Turkey signed a free
trade agreement in 1999. Later on, free trade agreements were signed
with all Balkan countries and visa exemption agreements were signed
with all non-EU member states in the region.
All the Balkan countries did increase their exports to Turkey; how-
ever, Turkey’s trade volume with the Balkan countries is modest. The
EU member states from the region—Romania, Bulgaria and Greece—
take the most of this share: 77 percent of Turkish Balkan exports and
91 percent of imports goes to the three EU countries. Still, counting
these three EU member states, the share of the Balkans in Turkey’s
trade is 6–7 percent in exports and 3–4 percent in imports. 32
Turkey also engages in development projects in the region through the

Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA). It has program
coordination offices in almost all parts of the region (Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia). It
must be mentioned that TIKA has been active mainly in the areas of the
Balkans with a high Muslim population.33 Most of Turkey’s develop-
ment cooperation projects in the recent past focused on the development
of the social infrastructure sector. Dr. Zülküf Oruç, coordinator of the
world’s third largest TIKA office—by budget—based in Sarajevo, told
the Populari research team in 2014 that the largest chunk of their bud-
get is allocated to specifically one of their three work pillars in BiH—
culture and history. Some 50–70 percent of the budget of his office goes
toward restoration projects. In Oruç’s words, the aim of TIKA is to turn
the Ottoman heritage in BiH into accessible tourist sites “in order to
build a future through rebuilding history and past.”34
While it is not certain to what extent TIKA’s activities contributed
to the tourism sector in BiH, they certainly contributed to the rehabil-
itation of BiH’s cultural heritage. It is also noteworthy that while most
other external development agencies have either left or reduced their
activities and funds in BiH, TIKA’s presence and budgets are contin-
uously increasing. However, even though its representatives insist that it
aims to work equally with all ethnic groups in BiH, this is not ref lected
in practice. 90–95 percent of project applications submitted to TIKA
are from the “Muslim-Croat” part of the country, the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Despite emphatic promises, frequent diplomatic talks, and words of
encouragement by Turkish and local officials, the level of Turkish FDI
remains chronically low not only in BiH but throughout the region.
In the field of direct investments, crucial to establishing long-term
economic and political ties, practice is not equal to rhetoric. According
to the Central Bank of BiH, in the first nine months of 2013 when FDI
f lows amounted to 210 million euros, Russia was the top investor con-
tributing 97 million euros, while Turkey was at the tail of the top ten
investors with 5.9 million euros amounting to slightly less than 3 per-
cent of the overall FDI in BiH in that period. Overall, Turkey ranked
ninth in terms of FDI stock in BiH between 1994 and 2012.
According to the Turkish Ministry of Economy, Turkish investment
in the region amounted to 33.6 million euros in 2002, and jumped to
141.6 million euros in 2011, an impressive increase in just nine years.
However, overall Turkish investments abroad increased from 160 mil-
lion euros in 2002 to 1.35 billion euros in 2011, raising its investments in
the Balkans to 10 percent of its total FDI in 2011. The Turkish Ministry
of Economy lists Kosovo as the recipient of the highest FDI from Turkey
(one billion USD or more than 771 million euros) from 2002–2012.
However, Kosovo Central Bank and Kosovo Investment Promotion
Agency report investments of only around 235 million euros from Turkey
between 2007 and 2013. Others, such as the UN Conference on Trade
and Development, do not mention Kosovo at all as receivers of signifi-
cant Turkish investments. In some statistics, Serbia is cited as the leading
recipient of Turkish investments, while sometimes it is Macedonia.
Culture, Education, and Media
TIKA is one of the biggest actors in the cultural revival of BiH. This
is much less the case in the rest of the region. For educational, as well
as cultural, and artistic initiatives, another institution is in charge—
Yunus Emre, the Turkish Cultural Center. Among the Western Balkan
countries, its activities are most widespread in BiH, hence, they will be
presented here in more detail. The Yunus Emre Association started its
activities in the Balkans in 2007 and is now running ten of its offices in
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Romania.
These centers have also been active in the spread of the Turkish language
in public schools. As a result, for the academic year 2012–2013, some
primary and secondary schools in Sarajevo started offering Turkish as
an elective course and 4,863 students have already enrolled.35 In addi-
tion, in BiH alone, there are 500 undergraduate and 750 master’s stu-
dents on scholarships in Turkey.
In Albania, Turkish schools are considered to be among the better
ones and are reported to have around 3,000 students.36 A large num-
ber of Albanians also go to Turkey to study. Turkey had expended its
scholarship programs in Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In the summer
of 2010, Turkey opened a Kemal Atatürk Cultural Center in Novi
Pazar, the city that is the center of the Bosniak population in Serbia.
In 2011, Turkey also developed new scholarship programs for students
from Serbia. There were 45,000 applications from 160 countries for
scholarships that the Turkish state had offered in 2012, 1,600 of which
were from the Balkan countries.37
The Turkish media is also attempting to establish itself in the Western
Balkans. Up to now, the entertainment industry has had the most suc-
cess. It is important to mention that Turkish soap operas found enthu-
siastic fans not just among “kin” population groups in the Balkans but
also gained sympathies from broader Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek

populations, where negative sentiments toward Turkey and Turks are
still palpable. According to the Gallup Balkan Monitor Survey of 2010,
75.1 percent of the population of Albania, 60.2 percent of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 93.2 percent of Kosovo, and 76.6 percent of Macedonia
considered Turkey a friendly country. However, the numbers were
lower in Croatia, where 26.7 percent of the population considered
Turkey a friendly country, while in Montenegro that percentage was
33.5 and in Serbia, just 18.2 percent.38
According to the Hurriyet Daily News, the annual income from
Turkish soap opera exports is roughly $90 million. However, the cul-
tural and even political rewards of these TV soaps are believed to be
much higher than the direct export income. These TV soaps played a
big part in promoting Turkey’s values and traditions, while at the same
time presenting Turkey as a liberal and democratic country. Yet, there
was also an opposite effect when news started arriving that high-rank-
ing Turkish state officials objected to the content of the soap operas,
particularly the way in which gender relations were presented and how
the Ottoman past was portrayed.
Turkish state-run broadcaster TRT now offers Internet news and
radio programs in all languages in the Balkans: Greek, Bulgarian,
Macedonian, Romanian, Bosnian, Albanian, Serbian and Croatian. In
its reporting, it focuses on domestic Turkish developments, the cur-
rent crises in the Middle East, Turkish- Balkan relations, cultural and
friendship bonds, Ottoman history, and the foreign relations of Turkey.
Recently, the Anatolian News Agency (Anadolu Ajansı, AA) opened
the Directorate of the Region of the Balkans in Sarajevo, transmitting
news in regional languages. A more detailed content analysis would
probably confirm the initial impression that the news agenda, promoted
by TRT and Anadolu, corresponds far more to the interests and tradi-
tions of the domestic public in Turkey than to the consumption habits
of the Western Balkans’ readers and viewers. Turkish media in the local
languages remain an alien element in the regional public sphere to an
even greater extent than other external broadcasters such as Al Jazeera
Balkans or the US-run Radio Free Europe.
Tourism and People-to-People Contacts
Turkey is a favored summer destination for holidaymakers from across

Southeast Europe, as shown by the example of the Serbian president,
who spent his summer holidays in 2014 at the Aegean coast in spite of
the downturn in the diplomatic relations between Belgrade and Ankara.
Visitor numbers have been rising each year since 1990. Turkey is the
third most popular destination for Serbs after Greece and Montenegro.
For Kosovo Albanians who only have identity papers of the Republic
of Kosovo, Turkey is one of the few destinations where they can travel
freely without the cumbersome process of applying for an entry per-
mit. Turkey established visa-free travel with all Western Balkan coun-
tries in the recent past. However, with Croatia entering the EU, it
reintroduced entry permits for Turkish citizens. Turkish companies
invested in the rehabilitation and management of several airports in
Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania. However, a joint business project
between Turkish Airlines and BiH Airlines did not take off successfully
and was suspended after a relatively short period.
Direct contact between the people is also promoted through other
activities. Cooperation between the municipalities in Turkey and the
Balkans, especially those in which an important number of Balkan-
origin people lives, is such activity. The Bayrampaşa municipality in
Istanbul, where 50 percent of the residents are said to have Balkan
origins, carries out different social and cultural activities within the
Project of Ramadan in the Balkans (Balkanlar’da Ramazan). Another
example is the İzmit municipality, which is also involved in various
projects, such as the construction of a center for social and cultural
activities in Momchilgrad (Mestanl ı) in Bulgaria, as well as the build-
ing of a children’s park.39
The Role of Religious Organization (Diyanet and

Fetulah Gulen Movement)
The Diyanet’s (the Turkish government’s “Presidency for Religious

Affairs”) representative, Hasan Atl ı, in the newly established Diyanet
office in the Turkish embassy in Sarajevo explained that all projects in
BiH that are financed through this institution rely on donations col-
lected in Turkish mosques.40 In the past few years, Diyanet contributed
to the construction of mosques in Maglaj, Gora žde, and Tešanj, recon-
structed the ones in Mostar and Tuzla, invested 400,000 euros in the
Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka, modernized the Travnik madrassa,
and built a mosque within the campus of the International University
of Sarajevo. 41 The list of Diyanet projects in the region is long; how-
ever its total budget in this part of the world remains unknown.
In the recent past, the Gü len movement has been very active in the
Balkans. In Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, there are 15 educational
institutions (preschools, primary schools, high schools, colleges, and
one university) led by the Bosna Sema Educational Institutions fam-
ily, a group founded in 1998 by the members of the Gü len movement.
Since 2009, when the JDP came to power, seven new education insti-
tutions have been opened out of the current 15. The Gü len movement
also runs a number of schools in Albania (one university, four colleges,
and five madrassas operated jointly with the Muslim community);
Macedonia (two primary schools and six colleges); and Kosovo (two
colleges and one educational center).42
Altogether, the general public in the Western Balkans knows little
about religious connections with Turkey and this lack of solid informa-
tion provides fertile ground for accusations of neo-Ottoman “religious
penetration” and similar, often unsubstantiated, accusations sometimes
bordering on conspiracy theories.
Conclusion
Acting as a fierce ally of Bosnian Muslims during the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1992, and later wholeheartedly supporting the pursuit
of Kosovo Albanians for secession from Serbia, Ankara gained standing
and inf luence among those population groups that it considered, from
the very beginning, to be inclined to reestablish close ties with Turkey
after the collapse of Yugoslavia and the end of the Cold War. Around
2010, when peace consolidations and the quest for EU membership was
on the top of the agenda in the region, Turkey invested much diplo-
matic effort for a political rapprochement with Serbia, particularly in
the context of opening channels of communication between the more
conservative political Bosnian Muslim political leaders and Belgrade.
Parallel to it, Turkey paid much attention in strengthening its eco-
nomic and cultural inf luences in the whole region. Yet, the drive to
promote economic ties yielded only modest results. In essence, the only
realistic interest that could have attracted all countries of the region to
seek closer ties with Turkey could have rested on palpable mutual eco-
nomic gains. Ankara’s narrative about historic commonalities, how-
ever, proved to be insufficient.
Culturally, Turkey gained little inf luence outside the segments of
the Bosniak and Albanian communities, whichfor their own political
reasons, looked for support from Ankara. Furthermore, the increasing
polarization of the domestic political scene in Turkey during the sec-

ond Erdoğan government and the perception abroad, including in the
Western Balkans, that conservative and Islamic political ideas were
putting liberalism and democracy on the defense in Turkey, adversely
inf luenced the political image of the country. Turkey’s political accom-
plishments during the times of crises and war in former Yugoslavia
started dissipating in times of political stabilization in the region. There
are five main reasons for this:
1. Turkish public diplomacy did not convince the political actors in

the region that its interests and goals also benefit those commu-
nities that were not from the very beginning marked as potential
Turkish political “clients” in the region, for example, Muslims of
various ethnicities.
2. The “leitmotif ” of the Turkish public diplomacy discourse
directed to the Western Balkans, focusing on a romantic and
brightened-up interpretation of the history of the Ottoman rule
in the region, rekindled resentments and stirred suspicion in many
parts of the region instead of fostering commonality.
3. Turkey did not achieve substantial progress in the field of trade and
investments in the Western Balkan regions and did not manage to
catch up with Germany, Italy, and Russia and, since recently, even
China—countries that remain its main external economic partners.
4. Turkey has not significantly progressed on its path toward EU
membership whereas Western Balkan countries consider EU
membership to be the paramount goal of their domestic trans-
formation and foreign policy; hence, the capability of Turkey to
present itself as an example of successful “Europeanization” has
regressed.
5. Turkey’s domestic conf licts and its tarnished record regard-
ing human rights and the rule of law mostly during the second
Erdoğan government has diminished its international image in
such a way that the country presently does not have the potential
to act as an example for modernization and development in the
eyes of the majority of the Western Balkan population.
Turkey’s chances of transcending the present limitations of the inf lu-

ence of its public diplomacy on just a few “kin” Muslim communities in
the Western Balkans will decisively depend on how the overwhelming
majority of the Western Balkan populace perceives the state of Turkish
modernization and democracy, its relations toward the European
Union, and the ability of the Turkish economy to perform as an attrac-

tive trading partner and investor in the region.
Notes
* The authors are grateful to their Belgrade colleague Žarko Petrović for his support
during the writing of this essay.
1. Athens accuses Skopje of territorial ambitions by calling the state “Macedonia”
although geographically Macedonia also encompasses northern Greece and west-
ern Bulgaria.
2. Report by think thank Populari: “A Political Romance: Relations between Turkey
and Bosnia and Herzegovina,” (May 2014), p. 19. Available online at http://www.
populari.org/index.php?bGFuZz1sYXQmcj0zJmw9MyZlPTE5Mg.
3. Mehmet Uğur Ekinci, “Turkey’s ‘ Zero Problems’ Era in the Balkans,” SETA
Foundation Analysis (Ankara, October 8, 2013): 9–10. Available online at http://
file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20131010120900_turkeyszeroproblemserainthebalkans.
pdf.
4. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) is an ad hoc international insti-
tution responsible for overseeing the implementation of civilian aspects of the
Peace Agreement for this country. This office was created under the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, usually referred to
as the Dayton Peace Agreement that was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, and signed
in Paris on December 14, 1995.
Challenges,” in Issue: Strategic Depth through Soft Power: The Domestic Production
and International Projection of Turkish Culture (Euxeinos : GCE-HSG, 10/2013): 7.
6. OECD Economic Survey of Turkey, 2012.
7. Ekinci, “Turkey’s ‘Zero Problems’ Era,” p. 11.
8. Öner, “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy,” p. 7.
9. Marija Mitrović, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: The Inf luence
of Traditional Determinants on Davutoğ lu’s Conception of Turkey-Balkan
Relations,” GeT MA Working Paper No: 10 (2014): 6. Available online at http://
edoc.hu-berlin.de/series/getmaseries.
10. Stephen F. Larrabee, ‘‘Turkey‘s New Geopolitics,’’ Survival 52, no. 2 (April-May
2010): 157–180; Kemal Kirişci, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times (Paris:
European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2006).
11. Ahmet Davutoğ lu, Strategic Depth: International Position of Turkey (Istanbul: Kü re
Yay ı nlar ı, 2001), p. 123.
12 . Žarko Petrović and Du šan Reljić, “Turkish Interests and Involvement in the
Western Balkans: A Score-Card,” Insight Turkey 13, no. 3 (2011): 163.
13. Ahmet Davutoğ lu, speech at the opening ceremony of the conference “Ottoman
Legacy and Balkan Muslim Communities Today,” Sarajevo, October 16,
2009.
14. Ahmet Davutoğ lu, Stratejik Derinlik – Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu, Chapter
II, trans. Miloš B. Marković, in: Politeia no. 2 (Banja Luka, December 2011):
189–190.
15. Ibid., p. 214.
16. Ibid., p. 212.
17. Ibid., p. 214.
18. Ahmet Davutoğ lu, Address of the minister Davutoğ lu at the opening of the
Ministerial Meeting of the SEECP, Istanbul, June 22, 2010.
19. Piro Misha, “The Neo-Ottomanist Project and Albania,” The Tirana Times,
March 19–25, 2010.
20. Jeton Musliu, “Kosovo Textbooks Soften Line on Ottoman Rule,” BIRN,
January 22, 2013.
21. Davutoğ lu, “Ottoman Legacy and Balkan Muslim Communities.”
22 . Ibid.
23. Sylvie Gangloff, “The Impact of the Ottoman Legacy on Turkish Policy in the
Balkans (1991–1999),” CERI (2005): 1–20. Available online at http://www.sci-
encespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/artsg.pdf.
24. Davutoğ lu, “Ottoman Legacy and Balkan Muslim Communities.”
25. Miloš B. Marković, “Preko proš losti u budućnost: povratak Turske na prostor
bivše Jugoslavije,” Politeia no. 2 (December 2011): 47–72; Kerem Öktem, “New
Islamic Actors after the Wahhabi Intermezzo: Turkey’s Return to the Muslim
Balkans,” European Studies Centre University of Oxford, (December 2010);
Inan Rü ma, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: New Activism,
Neo-Ottomanism or/so What?” Turkish Policy Quarterly 9, no. 4 (Winter 2010):
133–140; Darko Tanasković, “Srbi pred izazovima neoosmanizma,” Politeia no. 2
(Banja Luka, December 2011): 19–31.
26. Report by think thank Populari: “A Political Romance,” p. 25.
27. Erhan Tü rbedar, ‘‘Turkey’s New Activism in the Western Balkans: Ambitions
and Obstacles,’’ Insight Turkey 13, no. 3 (2011): 143.
28. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during a visit in Prizren, Kosovo in October 2013 stated:
“We all belong to a common history, common culture, common civilization;
we are the people who are brethren of that structure. Do not forget, Turkey is
Kosovo, Kosovo is Turkey!” He further added that he “feels home” when in
Kosovo. It sparked fury among politicians in Serbia. Yavuz Baydar, “Erdoğan:
‘Kosovo Is ‘Turkey’”, Al Monitor, October 28, 2013. Available online at http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/erdogan-kosovo-turkey.html
29. President of the Republic of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić, used the phrase to explain
how he sees the statements by Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that
“Turkey is Kosovo, Kosovo is Turkey” in Prizren, Kosovo, in October 2013.
31. Tü rbedar, “Turkey’s New Activism,” p. 144.
32 . Tam á s Szigetvá ri, “Turkey Is Back: Turkish Interest on the Western Balkans,”
EU Frontier Study no. 9 (November 2012): 10.
33. Öktem, “New Islamic Actors,” p. 29.
35. Birg ü l Demirta ş, “Turkey and the Balkans: Overcoming Prejudices, Building
Bridges and Constructing a Common Future,” SAM—Center for Strategic
Research, Perceptions 18, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 176.
36. Petrović and Reljić, “Turkish Interests and Involvement,” p. 166.
37. Demirta ş, “Turkey and the Balkans,” p. 177.
38. Balkan Monitor: Turkey Friendly/Hostile—Public opinion survey, 2010
39. Demirta ş, “Turkey and the Balkans,” p. 178.
41. Ibid.
42 . Öktem, “New Islamic Actors,” p. 38.
CH A P T E R SI X
The Benefactor: NGOs and

Humanitarian Aid
B. S e n e m Ç e v i k
Introduction
Recognizing the potentially substantial role that public diplomacy can

play in exerting its growing soft power both domestically and interna-
tionally, Turkey has continually sought to expand its sphere of inf luence
over the last decade. It is ranked as the world’s third largest humanitar-
ian donor state. Humanitarian assistance by governmental and nongov-
ernmental organizations constitutes an integral component of Turkey’s
foreign policy toolkit, which derives from a value-based orientation.1
Turkey’s humanitarian assistance and mediatory efforts can be char-
acterized as long-term relationship building public diplomacy tools.
These efforts are intended to expand Turkey’s global soft power in
developing regions, establish ties through credibility, and then engage
in emerging economic markets.
Natural disasters, public discontent and regional conf licts in various
parts of the world have created a vast need for philanthropic efforts
to support the welfare of aggrieved societies. Formulated on action,
understanding, dialogue, and international public good, Turkey’s
contemporary foreign policy framework has paved the way for civic
engagement and humanitarian assistance. Moreover, its aggressive for-
eign policy took civic and government initiatives into account, while
counting on Turkey’s economic progress.
122 B. Senem Çevik
Humanitarian responsibility has assumed center stage in Turkish for-

eign policy, where discourse converges with value-based policies. A nota-
ble factor in Turkey’s global humanitarian assistance efforts is the notion
of responsibility to maintain balance, regional/global peace and stability,
and protection for the fragile. In a broader sense, it is fair to say that
Turkey’s collective mind perceives this responsibility as fulfilling a his-
torical legacy, one that was passed down from the Ottoman Empire. This
protective instinct stemming from the selective glorification of the past
has occasionally been utilized in political discourse. This impulse invokes
a nexus of Islamic discourse and the concept of conscience that has been
encapsulated in value-based or ethical foreign policy formulation.
Turkey has been able to connect with regions that were beyond its
reach in the past through employing this new foreign policy outlook.
Over the past decade, it has offered relief and assistance via its inter-
national NGOs and official development assistance (ODA) institutions
to Niger, Somalia, Mali, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia,
Uzbekistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon,
Tunisia, Gaza, Iran, Syria, Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Macedonia
and Montenegro—all places that have fallen victim to civil unrest, con-
f lict, famine, or natural disasters. In this respect, Turkish NGOs and
governmental institutions have initiated notable efforts to offer human-
itarian assistance to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region
as well as other countries in Africa, Asia, and the Balkans.
Not only do these efforts encompass Turkey’s humanitarian/value-
based foreign policy discourse, but they also manifest deeper psycho-
logical underpinnings in response to its recently gained status of donor
statehood, increased societal self-confidence, and a political rhetoric
inf luenced by the spirit of Islam. Turkey’s newfound self-confidence
can though be a double-edged sword, posing as a threat emerging from
an over-glorified self-image. This in turn can result in Turkey’s over-
estimation of its soft power and its realistic capacity to bring change
to global governance. Nonetheless, the complex structure of Turkey’s
tools of engagement has led to significant results in actual foreign pol-
icy objectives and provided a new understanding of global governance.
The next section will address the interconnection between a more
active foreign policy and humanitarian assistance.
Pursuing an Active Foreign Policy: New Apparatuses
For decades, Turkish foreign policy pursued Atat ürk’s dictum “Peace
at Home, Peace in the World,” which, for the most part, has been
The Benefactor 123
embedded in the collective psyche of Turkish identity in light of its

traumatizing past.2 Turkey’s relatively more hesitant approach—despite
its engagement in neighboring states and even former enemies such as
Greece, Russia and United Kingdom —has been a natural response to
overlapping strategic, practical, and historical underpinnings.3
Foreign policy isolation has also been relevant to the debates on iden-
tity. Turkish foreign policy decisions encapsulate the identity debates
in Turkey. Therefore, its domestic policies have always had a tremen-
dous effect on its foreign policy. Embodying the multifaceted iden-
tity debates and alignment with Western ideals, Turkish foreign policy
charted a more Western-centric path exemplified in the Eurocentric
approach that predominantly rejected historical ties with the Middle
East.4 Turkey’s conscious decision to refrain from interfering in the
problems of the Middle East demonstrates the convergence between
a more Western outlook of identity and foreign policy decision mak-
ing. There have been substantial critiques of this disconnection from
the Ottoman past, predominantly by conservative circles and the JDP
cadres. However, with the Turgut Özal era, a new political and eco-
nomic discourse based on “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” was initiated,
concurrent with the fall of the Soviet Union and the establishment
of independent Turkic Republics.5 This era—signifying a rapproche-
ment of the center and periphery relations6 in Anatolia—gave rise to
a new social middle class, introduction of a liberal political economy,
as well as the reintroduction of historical consciousness and social lib-
erties. This emerging political pattern resulted in Turkey’s increased
economic and political engagement within countries in its geographi-
cal proximity As a result, Turkey’s foreign policy priorities are largely
intertwined with domestic politics and shifts within the sociopolitical
representation of identity.
Turkey predominantly owes its engagement in regional and global
issues to the Turgut Özal period, which facilitated the integration of
business associations into the global economic system—almost a rite
of passage for the Turkish economy.7 Faith-based businesses and relief
organizations emerged at the same time as the containment of Islamic
movements in the sociopolitical sphere and their reemergence in con-
temporary Turkish politics in the mid-1990s.8 It is notable that the
NGOs were established during political containment and the economic
rise of a new conservative bourgeoisie. With the introduction of liberal
economic policies beginning in the mid-1980s, representation of Islam
in the sociopolitical sphere, and later with the rise of the current JDP
government, NGOs have found a more fertile ground to expand their
inf luence. Today, Turkish NGOs involved in economic development
124 B. Senem Çevik
and foreign policy are predominantly conservative and hold strong ties
to numerous Islamic schools of thought.
Turkey’s recently gained economic and political momentum parallels
the JDP’s new means of interaction with neighboring states, building
on the initial reconciliatory efforts between Turkey and Greece. The
JDP’s electoral victory in 2002 prompted a significant societal trans-
formation, as well as political and economic structure, which included
greater liberties, further integration with international markets, and
privatization. Turkey’s inward-looking policy making changed grad-
ually. Turkish international relations scholar Yeşiltaş describes this
process as the desecuritization of Turkish foreign policy, which also
allowed Turkish businesses and NGOs to expand their horizons to
reach a more diverse audience.9
Turkey’s newfound activism that took root in the late 1990s is for
the most part also grounded in the blueprint set forth by former foreign
minister Davutoğlu in his seminal work “Strategic Depth.” Davutoğlu
argues that strategic depth is a vision that takes into account Turkey’s
historical, geographical, demographic, and cultural background in
conducting relations with neighboring countries, but that these inter-
actions should be free of psychological barriers. According to the holis-
tic approach that Davutoğlu articulated, Turkey is obliged to discover
its aggregate power in historical and cultural terms. Policy principles
such as rhythmic diplomacy, multidimensional foreign policy, zero
problems with neighbors, order-instituting actor, international coop-
eration, and proactive foreign policy have been the foundations of
Turkish foreign policy under the JDP administration. The strategic
depth doctrine is also accompanied by changes in the international cli-
mate and the global trend of soft power. Strategic depth articulates that
an identity-based historical reconciliation and recognition of intangible
cultural assets will assist Turkey in achieving its objective of becom-
ing an order-instituting state. Furthermore, strategic depth, as a new
outlook for Turkish foreign policy envisions a value-based reach for
Turkey in the international relations order. In doing so, Turkey is ready
to assume the responsibility of a global actor that defends universal
values10 in international crises. Keyman and Bayer argue that Turkey’s
rise as a responsible actor converges with the emergence of the south,
the rise of developing countries such as Brazil and Indonesia. Hence,
as much as the strategic depth formulation has introduced a new out-
look, the global system encouraging the rise of middle powers has also
facilitated the concept to be put in action. In turn, Turkey along with
various other rising powers, has been seeking to create new forms of
The Benefactor 125
democratic global governance via governmental and nongovernmental

institutions.11
Turkey’s governmental and nongovernmental actors are currently
implementing this holistic foreign policy vision via a network of busi-
ness organizations, relief NGOs, educational partnerships, member-
ships in international organizations, and international partnerships.
The purpose is to share the story of Turkey—the change it has gone
through and establish Turkey as a prominent international actor.12 Thus,
the strategic depth doctrine emphasizes public diplomacy by encourag-
ing the state apparatuses to be more engaged and bold, and by investing
in human interaction.
Discussion on Values and Humanitarian Diplomacy
Public diplomacy, a key instrument of soft power, is defined as the

actions taken by states and NGOs in formulating policy goals which
are oriented toward foreign publics and governments.13 One of the
main tasks of public diplomacy is to persuade foreign publics and politi-
cians of the values, policies, and actions of the initiating state.14 Unlike
traditional public diplomacy, new public diplomacy strategies require
a broader range of skills that, for the most part, rely on civil society.15
It highlights people-to-people interaction that takes into account both
governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders, with an emphasis on
non-state actors.16 The mission of modern-day public diplomacy is to
build bridges with foreign publics.17 It seeks to accomplish this through
a broad array of activities including small cultural gestures, develop-
ment aid, and political advocacy in international settings—all of which
ultimately seek an increased degree of soft power for the source and
increased cultural understanding among the countries in contact. By
way of example, Turkey’s NGOs—the civic tools of its international
communication efforts—are building bridges with foreign publics.
As non-state actors, they rely on civic engagement, charity work, and
human interaction. Turkey’s public diplomacy via humanitarian assis-
tance is composed of three elements: citizen diplomacy, development
projects, and mediation/humanitarian diplomacy.
Mueller argues that citizen diplomacy—a subcategory of public
diplomacy—“extends well beyond the official government efforts
to reach foreign audiences.”18 The author defines citizen diplomats
as “unofficial ambassadors who participate in exchange programs
overseas or host and interact with international exchange program
126 B. Senem Çevik
participants . . . They build person-to-person relationships.”19 The cit-

izen diplomats who play a fundamental role in building these rela-
tionships come from a wide and varied candidate pool that includes
students, NGOs, businesses, and cultural organizations. In Turkey’s
case, business associations and businessmen have taken on the role of
citizen diplomats in their contribution to the improvement of bilat-
eral economic, commercial and social ties.20 Turkey’s business and
relief organizations play a strong role in citizen diplomacy and, more
importantly, in humanitarian diplomacy with countries that tradition-
ally have had limited interaction with Turkey. These organizations
serve as Turkey’s chief communication apparatuses and what van Ham
describes as social power.21 A certain degree of confidence building
and social engagement is initially required in the host society, and it
is fostered through the work of nongovernmental relief-based orga-
nizations. These organizations offer a hands-on approach by actively
working in the field, which inherently facilitates the penetration of
businesses in these new markets. More importantly, the two socie-
ties embark on a long-term journey of getting to know one another
through interactions based on relief, development, and business con-
nections. In return, these engagements require the establishment of
stronger bilateral diplomatic relations. Hence, an improvement in
diplomatic relations overlaps an improvement in economic and social
relations.
The second element of Turkey’s humanitarian diplomacy is rela-
tionship building. Zaharna contends that relationship building can be
carried out through development projects as an expression of the ties
between two entities.22 This engagement model can be established and
enriched by the long-term humanitarian investment of businesses and
aid NGOs. As a matter of fact, in addition to emergency humani-
tarian assistance, Turkish NGOs fund development projects in Africa,
the Middle East, and Asia. Similarly, Turkey has positioned itself as a
forerunner in regional stability and peace through the NGOs’ niche
humanitarian efforts—for example, agriculture and construction—in
integrating civilian capacity.23 For instance, the NGOs have estab-
lished agricultural schools in Somalia, Gaza, and the Gambia among
other places in cooperation with TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and
Coordination Agency). Besides other development assistance, the
IHH (the Humanitarian Relief Foundation) has facilitated an educa-
tional workshop for the women of Burkina Faso to teach them crafts
that can generate income. NGOs have also established orphanages in
Philippines, Darfur, Zanzibar, Kenya, Niger, and Uganda and hospitals
The Benefactor 127
in Haiti, Somalia, and elsewhere. Perhaps the most striking develop-

ment assistance is İ HH’s “Istanbul Village” project in tsunami-ravaged
Indonesia.24 Turkey’s ODA and NGO aid aim to provide societies with
the means of self-governance and demonstrate Turkey’s willingness to
stand by the people for the long haul without any material expecta-
tions.25 More importantly, the people-to-people interaction between
aid workers and recipients serve as communication pathways to estab-
lish genuine relations.
Together with long-term confidence and philanthropic efforts,
Turkey’s NGOs have been able to partake in the facilitation of
negotiations between groups in conf lict. Turkey’s humanitarian,
value-based discourse and mediation efforts are modeled upon the
notion of “niche diplomacy” that is commonly associated with mid-
dle powers. 26 Good will, support for good work, and the perfor-
mance of good deeds pay off in terms of international prestige, in
which a country is rewarded for it goodness. Switzerland, Sweden,
and Canada are prime examples of niche diplomacy. Turkey’s pub-
lic diplomacy efforts in enhancing its soft power encompass cul-
tural diplomacy, development assistance, and mediation services,
which are attuned to the concept of niche diplomacy.27 Goodwill in
Turkey is predominantly based upon the Islamic school of thought—
pillars of Islam such as zakat, sadaqah, and other forms of charity—
as well as self-professed historical responsibilities. In a way, the
conservative political elite perceives humanitarian aid as manifest
destiny and employs this type of discourse to consolidate the elec-
torate. This notion of responsibility also held center stage at the Fifth
Ambassadors Conference titled “Humanitarian Diplomacy” drawing
from the notion of historical accountability.28 Despite this psycho-
logical background, Turkey’s public diplomacy has had actual policy
outcomes. For instance, f lourishing ties with Africa facilitated the
vote for Turkey’s nonpermanent seat in the United Nations Security
Council for the 2009–2010 term.29 Administrative level represen-
tation in international organizations such as the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the International Monetary Fund, as
well as its presence in the United Nations via hosting international
conferences on peace building are tangible results of Turkey’s global
presence. Turkey assumed the G20 presidency in 2015 and is engaged
in numerous international organizations—with the most significant
being the NATO—in fostering global peacekeeping efforts. Turkey’s
leading role in organizing the First Global Humanitarian Summit in
2016 is also a noteworthy achievement on Turkey’s part.
128 B. Senem Çevik
Gass and Seiter define goodwill as a fundamental component of

credibility and an essential ingredient in public diplomacy.30 These
authors contend that NGOs are particularly good at demonstrating
goodwill by taking on difficult tasks that official bodies cannot tackle.
In this respect, humanitarian diplomacy is interconnected with values
and ethics in which NGOs can partake in actualizing the humanitarian
diplomacy efforts. In accordance with the doctrine of strategic depth,
Turkey is eager to introduce change, a distinctive approach to inter-
national relations, through a humanitarian vision. More importantly,
Turkey is trying to carve out a credible image for itself as a moral state
(a state of conscience) representing global values.
Turkey’s value-based discourse is illustrated in its value-based poli-
cies that are inspired by the notions of global good and responsibility.
In this perspective, the concept of “global governance” draws its con-
ceptual framework from the guiding principles of achieving inclusiv-
ity and outreach. Davutoğlu defines global governance as adopting a
global frame of reference that treats all societies as if it were one’s own
through a mutually respectful interaction. He further contends, “The
security of a child in Somalia is as important as that of one’s own child
or that of the children in Slovenia, Brazil, and elsewhere.”31 Hence, the
new framework of Turkish foreign policy is composed of morals, eth-
ics, and values that is by way of extension a historical responsibility, yet
one that is liberated from historical prejudices. Invariably, Davutoğlu
further argues, “our approach to global issues should be emancipated
from the burden of a history—or rather a historiography—infused with
prejudice and exclusionary perspectives. We have to be conscious that
all humankind has the same destiny and the same future, regardless of
our petty rivalries.”32 In doing so, the new outline of Turkey’s foreign
policy stresses grassroots mobilization to actualize global governance
drawing from the responsibility to attain security and peace in both the
regional and global order.
Davutoğlu characterizes Turkey as a responsible and wise country
with the potential to shape the course of its regional developments by
contributing to the resolution of regional conf licts. This new discourse
aims to move Turkey beyond its traditional role as a bridge, and reposi-
tions it as a regional power, center country, and order-instituting country. In this
way, Turkey is determined to have a transformative effect on regional
and global issues. Davutoğlu argues that Turkey will firmly defend uni-
versal values in its pursuit of that objective. He further suggests “while
embracing these universal principles, we will enmesh them with local
values; and advocate, in particular, human rights and such norms as
The Benefactor 129
democracy, good governance, transparency and rule of law. We will

extend our assistance to the people who rise up to demand such values
because, given our belief in the principles of justice and equality, we are
convinced that they also deserve to have the same rights and privileges
enjoyed by our own people.”33 Turkey’s activism in trying to mediate
between the parties in the Syrian conf lict and providing emergency
relief to over two million Syrians taking refuge in Turkey is charac-
terized as the policy that necessitates some involvement in regional
conf licts and human tragedies. Turkey’s stance toward Gaza, Somalia,
Myanmar, and Bosnia can be evaluated within the same position. The
value-based policy conceptualization derives from the notion of jus-
tice, morals, ethics, and equality—the pillars of universal principles—
that persistently hold center stage in Turkey’s foreign policy discourse.
Despite such an elaborate framework, the value-based conceptualiza-
tion faces several deficits emerging from the failure to uphold uni-
versal standards on various points, whether related to humanitarian
work, democratic standards or political rhetoric. These deficits produce
a disparity between policy and action mostly because Turkey has been
trying to pursue a purely value-based foreign policy, which sets certain
limitations.
Public diplomacy practitioners have frequently discussed the dispar-
ity between what a country does and what it says. Any public diplo-
macy attempt made by a state in contradiction of its policy, any doubts
on the intrinsic motivations of the state, or perceptions of hypocrisy
with regard to democracy creates a “say-do-gap”.34 The say-do-gap
is detrimental to a country’s reputation, image, and credibility. A
nation’s domestic political conduct and whether it can practice what
it preaches are inherently correlated with its international reputation.
Hence, domestic political conduct is inevitably at the center of a nation’s
brand.
Elaborating on the battle of perceptions, Smith notes that the chal-
lenge of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been the gap
between its discourse and real-life actions.35 Under the same rubric,
Snyder argues that the United States suffered from a credibility prob-
lem in the Middle East owing to its actions in Abu Ghraib and simi-
lar violations that have been lamented in the Arabs’ collective mind.36
Turkey is not excluded from this say-do-gap, with challenges on simi-
lar fronts. In fact, Ankara’s passionate advocacy of value-based foreign
policy inexorably pivots Turkey on the hot seat. Its international and
domestic actions which fall outside of the scope of its discourse are
equally critical in materializing its credibility, or lack thereof. More
130 B. Senem Çevik
importantly, as an emerging middle power with limited hard power

capacity and a budding democracy, Turkey assumes an even more vul-
nerable position than states with stronger hard power capacity—such as
the United States—and is more likely to face criticism. Turkey’s more
vulnerable position has manifested itself predominantly stemming from
its domestic policies and some foreign policy decisions that have been
challenged on various fronts. Perhaps this gap is more visible owing to
the overwhelmingly value-based foreign policy formulation, which has
proven to limit the traditional pragmatic approach.
Drawing from Nye’s conceptualization, one pillar of soft power capa-
ble of producing attraction and credibility is a country’s political sys-
tem. Kal ın asserts that soft power is rooted in a values-based definition;
and, one of the key values Turkey has been promoting is its democratic
experience. The author further argues that negative perceptions of
Turkey are partly due to the “imprudent policies that Turkish govern-
ments have followed in the past such as extra-judicial killings, torture
in prisons, following ill-advised policies on the Kurdish issue, human
rights abuses, religious minorities, freedom of thought and belief.”37
In tandem with Kal ın’s argument that Turkey’s soft power has always
been dependent upon its domestic actions, Keyman notes that Turkey’s
credentials are dependent upon its foreign policy behavior as much as
its domestic politics.38 Given Turkey’s current stance in international
indexes, the striking gap between discourse and actions yields a say-do-
gap. For a country that has instituted its foreign policy on values, this
deficiency might be termed an “ethos gap”—the moral deficit caused
by the disjuncture of overemphasized values and extreme actions and/
or rhetoric in accordance with those proposed values that impede a
nation’s soft power. Ethos gaps can be more challenging for middle
powers, especially for those self-professing, value-based policies. The
challenge lies in the application of a truly value-based policy encom-
passing all venues of domestic and foreign policy while maintaining
a healthy balance of hard and soft power. A state with an imbalance
of soft and hard power may be held more accountable for its self-pro-
claimed ethical stance when in fact it fails to uphold universal principles
applied domestically as much on an international level.
Over the past few years, Turkey has been attempting to craft its nation
brand on global humanitarian values. Key points in the Turkish foreign
policy framework have been justice, equal representation rights, polit-
ical inclusiveness, support for regional political demands, and global
governance. Turkish policy makers have been positing Turkey as a
value-driven nation in pursuit of global governance. Turkey’s current
The Benefactor 131
position as the third biggest global humanitarian donor is ref lective

of its foreign aid initiatives. For example, over two million Syrians
have found refuge in Turkey and hundreds of thousands are hosted in
Turkish camps that have been praised by the UNHCR.39 Turkish for-
eign policy makers have been vocal about providing foreign aid, which
they frame as Turkey’s historical duty and its self-proclaimed “manifest
destiny,” inspired by its Ottoman heritage. However, Turkey has fallen
short of living up to its own discourse, most notably in the domes-
tic realm. As a result, the humanitarian element of Turkey’s nation
brand has been undermined by its idealistic discourse creating an ethos
gap despite strong support for global humanitarian issues and active
engagement in global governance.
Turkey’s standing vis-à-vis the demands in the Arab world through-
out the Arab Spring, the 2012 Egyptian elections, and the immediate
democratic concerns in Somalia and Myanmar were par excellence in
terms of promoting democratic values. However, its orientation toward
Islamic discourse in defending such morality, for instance, and lack of
application of universal human rights to all venues of domestic and
international politics highlights this ethos gap.
Turkey’s ethos gap manifests itself in three dimensions: its discourse,
historical baggage, and domestic limitations on democratic freedoms.
Turkey’s inconsistency in applying universal human rights, both
domestic and international, is contradictory to its humanitarian dis-
course. While the Turkish response to the Palestinian plight has been
informed by an Islamic point of view, it has failed to fully embrace
the universal humanitarian aspect of the tragedy. Although Turkey has
been a vocal promoter of peace and justice in Gaza and in the Israeli-
Palestinian conf lict, its approach to Darfur, for instance, has been crit-
icized as contradictory. Turkey did not describe the conf lict in Darfur
as genocide but rather acknowledged the human tragedy in a more
subtle way that is termed as “passive quiet diplomacy.”40 However, the
passive quiet diplomacy approach evidently contradicts the value-based
foreign policy discourse of standing on the right side of history. The
same inconsistency perhaps stemming from historic anxieties of parti-
tion appeared in the initial hesitancy to engage with the Kurdish region
in Syria during the siege of ISIL/DAESH. The relatively silent posi-
tion of NGOs vis-à-vis the plight of Middle East Christians has also
facilitated the ethos gap. Nevertheless, there has been a consistency in
Turkey’s attitude toward supporting the free elections in Egypt and
reforms in pre–civil war Syria, which ironically negatively impacted
Turkey’s position as an impartial mediator and hampered its efforts in
132 B. Senem Çevik
regional peace building. In addition, Turkey’s humanitarian aid via its

NGOs seems to be allocated primarily to victim groups of Muslim
heritage, highlighting a discrepancy in universal moral principals—its
most significant source of inspiration.41 In the context of humanitar-
ian aid, Heins argues that without universal values and ideals, there
is a hierarchy in which the recipients are either included or excluded
from the benefits of humanitarian work.42 In the same milieu, İşeri
and Dilek argue that “Turkey’s international prestige, and status as a
role model, has received a powerful blow from her failure to make a
standing as a non-biased, consistent, and, most critically, democratic
(self-contained) power-broker.”43 It is also essential to note that the
Islamic character of aid NGOs and their grassroots networks set a cer-
tain limitation on the distribution of aid. Inevitably, the Islamic nature
of donors and these institutions shape aid drives. This selectivity in turn
has a negative effect on Turkey’s impartiality as an actor in assistance.
The intricate relationship between the NGOs and the government also
plays a large role in shaping this perception. Nonetheless, it is worth
mentioning the leverage that faith-based NGOs provide to Turkey in
terms of mediating between the Muslim world and Western countries
through cultural and religious affiliations. For that reason, the faith-
based character of Turkish NGOs can be assessed as a positive factor
especially when it comes to Muslim audiences.
The second dimension of Turkey’s ethos gap is in relation to the
Kurdish question and the confrontations with Armenians and Alevis—
longstanding conf licts inherited from the Ottoman Empire. These dis-
putes inf luence Turkey’s global reputation and challenge the vision of its
highly idealist value-driven foreign policy discourse. Recognizing the
importance of seeking resolutions to these concerns, Ankara initiated
the Kurdish reconciliation process two years ago. Despite occasional
setbacks, Turkey is dedicated to the peace process, with significant
strides being made on the cultural and political fronts with regard to
the Kurdish question. In addition, the Armenian opening was initi-
ated with the persistent efforts of the JDP government and is based
primarily on cultural heritage conservation—such as returning con-
fiscated land and properties, support of minority institutions, as well
as the renovation of churches. Turkey, for the first time in 99 years has
allowed an official liturgy by the Istanbul Armenian Patriarchate along
with many public commemoration events on the occasion of what
Turkey officially describes as “the events of 1915.” Prime Minister
Davutoğlu recently described the deportations of Ottoman-Armenians
as crimes against humanity.44 Yet there is still an unaddressed ethical
The Benefactor 133
predicament facing Turkish-Armenian relations post-2015. Turkey’s

vocal position on Israel’s crimes against Palestinians and the liberal use
of the word “genocide” to describe the degree of violence of Israeli
operations against Gaza discredits the state’s own approach vis-à-vis the
Armenians. Similarly, Turkey’s historical participation in oppressing its
Alevi population consecutively in the Dersim-Tunceli and Sivas atroci-
ties and through the lingering discriminatory discourse in the political
and social sphere constitutes a fundamental societal question thatneeds
to be answered. The Sunni character of the state religious structure
has long caused discontent among the Alevi population. In attempts to
bridge this gap, the JDP administration has held meetings with various
representatives of the Alevi community, but with minimal legislative
progress or commitment. The sociopolitical prejudice against the Alevi
population persists in Turkey and Turkish political rhetoric, all of which
makes the government’s position both hard to manage and impossible
to gain traction. Ultimately, deconstructing these key historical issues
is vital in Turkey’s search for a pluralistic society. Ironically, the ethos
gap manifests itself not in what the state apparatus does—because it has
improved its policy; it is, in fact, the rhetoric of what the political elite
and/or bureaucrats say at times that discredits Turkey’s progress.
The third dimension in relation to the ethos gap is about the con-
temporary domestic limitations on human rights, freedoms, and the
rule of law. Issues surrounding the interpretation of freedoms have neg-
atively affected the national image of Turkey in the Western imagina-
tion and have raised concerns regarding its democratic credentials. The
government’s exercise of control over social and print media—such as
the short-term Twitter bans—has also furthered these concerns. The
Gezi Park protests, the unsettled corruption allegations against the gov-
ernment, and charges against the Gü lenist formation infiltrating into
the state have prompted an increasingly polarizing political rhetoric.
Prosecuting violence against women and hate speech has not improved
Turkey’s standing either. Mass discontent over interference in the life-
style and choices of Turkish citizens has also contributed to a discrep-
ancy between discourse and the interpretation and implementation of
basic human rights.
Turkey’s domestic policy and foreign affairs are interrelated and
heavily inf luenced by political rhetoric. Interdependence of domestic
and foreign affairs aggravates Turkey’s credibility and yields an ethos
gap. The ethos gap is exemplified in a domestic political rhetoric, which
undermines policy through rhetoric that eschews the global in favor
of the national. The rhetoric/policy based ethos gap sends perplexing
134 B. Senem Çevik
messages to global audiences in regard to Turkey’s nation brand and

the message it wants to send out. The rhetoric/policy contradiction
therefore partially lies within the sentimental rhetoric that has domestic
appeal to conservative masses, foregoing international and intraethnic
concerns. Ironically enough, a discourse-based ethos gap is exemplified
in the domestic political discourse where it shadows Turkey’s actual
initiatives on the ground when it comes to global security, peace-
keeping, and humanitarian aid. This contradiction is perhaps another
ref lection of how domestic and foreign policies are intertwined in the
Turkish case. In fact, when it comes to humanitarian aid, Turkish ODA
is in tandem with the official ethical discourse that is embodied in its
record breaking foreign aid toward reestablishing security in Somalia
and aiding Syrians. Hence, the contradictory situation lies within the
discourse that is geared toward consolidating the voter base and con-
servative masses, one that hampers a more accurate national image that
ref lects the reality on the ground.
The hypocrisy of the ethos gap against the moralistic foreign policy
orientation bears the risk of eliciting undesired consequences unless the
foreign policy rhetoric shifts its tone toward a more refined and real-
istic outlook. The most blatant outcomes are eroding credibility and
trust, losing Turkey’s demonstrative effect and eliminating the role of an
impartial mediator in conf licts. Nevertheless, recognition of the ethos
gap and adoption of a liberal democratic tradition would likely elimi-
nate the adverse effects of the rhetorical ethos gap and become an oppor-
tunity for Turkey to consolidate the ethos component of its nation brand.
Narrowing the discrepancy between rhetoric/application rests on refin-
ing the foreign policy rhetoric to a more realistic tone and putting the
house in order. Further, narrowing the ethos gap will help facilitate
Turkey’s efforts in establishing itself as a niche actor in humanitarian
diplomacy efforts. In this perspective, Keyman proposes that Turkey
consolidate its democracy and multicultural modernity to maintain its
soft power.45 Perhaps the most fundamental step would be for Turkey to
latch onto the EU anchor: apply universal values and human rights in
adopting a rather liberal democratic tradition. Undertaking reforms and
upholding universal principles will not only rebrand Turkey, but also
position the country among the liberal democracies of the West. Turkey
will then enjoy more global credibility in its public diplomacy efforts.
For that reason Turkey’s commitment to reforms, democratizations, and
defense of universal standards bear the potential to reverse the negative
effects of the ethos gap. This commitment will also reinstate Turkey as
an impartial and credible mediator in conf licts that have been tarnished
The Benefactor 135
since 2010 by regional and domestic developments. In fact, the ethos gap
can be assessed as a step along the process of full democratization.
An Emerging Actor in Humanitarian

Diplomacy and Mediation
Nevertheless, Turkey’s NGO presence in remote regions of conf lict has

facilitated its role as a mediator and an eminent actor in humanitarian
diplomacy, particularly in Africa and the Middle East.
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC) defines humanitarian diplomacy as “persuading deci-
sion makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of
vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian
principles.”46 Humanitarian diplomacy is interconnected with conf lict
resolution and mediation. Minear classifies diplomacy as “capital D”
and “small D”—the first one being high-level and formal, and the sec-
ond being terrestrial regarding humanitarian functions. Minear fur-
ther argues that “diplomacy” may overlap with “Diplomacy” where
“humanitarian practitioners themselves play a role in negotiating terms
of engagement in hot-war or post-conf lict situations.”47 In the con-
text of Turkey’s foreign policy, humanitarian diplomacy can be defined
as the balance between a compassionate and powerful state that pre-
vents another state from either being cruel or weak. Turkey’s vision
of humanitarian diplomacy has a humanitarian essence, speaks to the
human conscience, and hence has a base built on morals. The three
dimensions of Turkish humanitarian diplomacy are the citizens of
the Turkish Republic; the country’s human-oriented attitude in crisis
zones; and an inclusive humanitarian perspective at the global level,
most importantly, in the UN system.48 Furthermore, Turkish foreign
policy’s human-oriented approach overarches models of old and new
public diplomacy, and focuses on real time interaction between the dip-
lomatic corps, NGOs and locals. In that sense, it establishes an under-
standing through the listening function of public diplomacy in which
cultural dynamics play a key role in maintaining real dialogue.
Turkey has been an emerging actor in peacekeeping and humanitar-
ian operations such as the Iran nuclear talks, the Middle East peace pro-
cess, the Gaza crisis, the drought and civil war in Somalia, the ethnic
conf lict in Myanmar, and the typhoon in Philippines. Despite a wide
array of involvements, the following section will discuss Turkey’s two
most prominent humanitarian operations in more detail.
136 B. Senem Çevik
The Middle East
Although Turkey has previously shown interest in the Middle East

Peace Process, it had never been realized as a policy objective in the way
it has been during the JDP administration.49 Though former Turkish
politicians have also criticized Israeli policies and downgraded diplo-
matic ties, none were as firm on the Israeli treatment of Palestinians
as Erdoğan and Davutoğlu. This attitude exemplifies Turkey’s new
policy line in the region. It can be argued that the discourse of the
Turkish political elite was inspired to lay the groundwork for Turkey’s
regional role by its regional, political, economic, and social engage-
ments. In discussing democratic transformations and a new regional
vision, Davutoğlu emphasizes the commonalities between Turkey and
the Middle East—a common fate based upon shared history, and roots
in Islamic civilization—and further connects the two via Morocco,
which he envisions as not just another nation-state but rather as a civ-
ilizational connection.50 Perhaps the experiences and political tradition
of the JDP officials are the prime motives behind the glorification of
the Ottoman past, and the historical and cultural ties with the Arab/
Islamic world.51
In tandem with the vision of a common fate, Turkey has been
actively seeking to raise international awareness on the plight of the
Gaza blockade and Palestinians via emergency assistance.52 It can be
said that Turkey’s two most distinct humanitarian diplomacy efforts
vis-à-vis Gaza occurred during the Mavi Marmara f lotilla crisis
between Turkey and Israel and the UN temporary membership status
of Palestine. Mavi Marmara’s attempt to deliver humanitarian assis-
tance to Gaza was unsuccessful. Despite the ambiguous background and
Islamist identity of the Turkish NGO supporting the mission, the dis-
proportionate use of force by the Israeli Defense Forces on civilian pas-
sengers resulted in heightened global attention to the Palestinian cause
and a discussion of the two-state solution. The government of Turkey
became a stern defender of the f lotilla incident and employed the inci-
dent as global political leverage against Israel’s violent actions. Turkey
proclaimed itself as the voice of conscience throughout Operation
Cast Lead (2009), Operation Pillar of Defense (2012), and Operation
Protective Edge (2014) and as an able partner in attaining a cease-fire.
By the same token, Erdoğan’s leverage on Hamas’ leadership may pos-
sibly deliver substantial results in putting a stop to violence and bro-
kering a deal between Hamas and other actors involved in the conf lict.
Over the course of a decade, Turkey has become the champion of the
The Benefactor 137
Palestinian cause and the source of much attraction for the Arab Middle
East. Turkey’s efforts across various platforms in passionately support-
ing an independent Palestinian state brought forth substantial results in
2012 when the UN General Assembly accorded Palestine nonmember
observer state status. The UN vote is by far the most notable byproduct
that Turkey’s support of the Palestinian cause has yielded.
Turkey’s involvement with the Syrian conf lict from the beginning
of the uprisings is demonstrative of its mediation and aid efforts. In an
effort to bring the Assad government to a compromise, Turkish high-
level officials pushed for reforms until the end of 2011. Turkey’s efforts
to offer humanitarian assistance to the Syrian refugees can also be
understood as Turkish eagerness to become a mediator through the use
of humanitarian diplomacy. A recent report published in 2014 indicates
that there are 210,358 Syrians in sixteen tent cities, one transitional
center, and six container cities – which were praised for their mainte-
nance. However, the number of Syrians in Turkey is estimated to be
around 2 million.53 According to the ORSAM report, state expenses
for Syrian care have surpasses $2.5 billion, while NGO aid has reached
$500 million. The limited assistance by international actors leaves a
substantial financial burden on Turkey.54 The refugee camps allocated
for Syrians in Turkey have been acclaimed for their excellence and ser-
vices they provide.55 A recent 2014 press release claims that Turkey has
spent over $4.5 billion toward Syrian refugees.56 The Syrian refugee
inf lux has not been limited to Sunni Muslim Arabs. In fact, Turkey
has also opened its borders to the Yazidis, Christians, and Syrian Kurds
providing official aid in neighboring cities. However, the faith-based
NGOs seem to be reluctant to allocate assistance or to advertise aid
drives for these minorities. Nevertheless, Turkey has been significantly
affected—or perhaps the most affected due to its 900 km border with
Syria—by the refugee inf lux, leaving a heavy burden on the country.
Deteriorating diplomatic ties with Israel and Egypt have left Turkey
tenuous in its role as a regional mediator. Turkey has somewhat
lost its leverage in the Middle East post-2010 as a result of regional
developments—not necessarily connected to Turkey—and its position
vis-à-vis those political shifts. After Mavi Marmara, Turkey and Israel
cut diplomatic ties. Turkish-Egyptian relations were strained after the
displacement of the Morsi government. Turkey’s vehement backing
of the Morsi government and the Muslim Brotherhood is consistent
with Turkish political discourse as a moral obligation to ‘stand on the
right side of history’.57 However, the prolonged diplomacy nonpres-
ence in Egypt, Syria, and Israel, at the time of this writing, may hinder
138 B. Senem Çevik
Turkey’s leverage in the region. Although the success of this policy

which is dubbed “precious loneliness” is debated, it is fair to say that
Turkey has lost its pre-2010 leverage to communicate with all parties
in conf lict.58 This end result has prevailed over the moralistic versus
realist contradictions of the value-based stance.
Somalia
Turkey’s involvement in the Somalian drought to draw the attention

of the international community to this crisis as well as the intractable
civil war in Somalia can be seen as an example of mediation through
humanitarian diplomacy. Unlike other Western NGOs operating from
Nairobi, Turkish NGOs are actually based in Mogadishu, which has
proven to be more effective than involvement through intermediar-
ies.59 In 2011, then prime minister Erdoğan visited Somalia with a
group of politicians, activists and celebrities. He played a leading role
in launching and promoting the majority of Turkish aid campaigns for
Somalia.60 Erdoğan’s official visit to Mogadishu—the first by a leader
outside Africa in 20 years—and his bold decision to open an embassy
there created what Ali has called the “bandwagon effect,” attracting
other leaders to do the same.61 Despite the 2013 attack by terrorist
Al-Shabbab on the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu, Turkey has been
increasingly active in rebuilding Somalia by implementing tangi-
ble projects with locals. The Mogadishu port, airport and a few large
hospitals are amongst those projects funded and supported by Turkey.
Through humanitarian and development work, the physical distance
between Turkey and Somalia is diminishing, and can thus be redefined
as affective distance.62 Turkey’s humanitarian assistance can therefore
easily facilitate mediation work by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when
it comes to political conf licts. In this regard, The First Istanbul Somalia
Conference in 2010 was organized within the UN framework, and, the
next one took place in 2012. The Istanbul II Conference, unlike the
previous London Conference on Somalia, took an inclusive approach.
The conference included both civil society representatives and politi-
cians as well as 135 clan elders, thus providing a more homegrown
solution.63 In fact, Turkey has been providing extensive assistance for
Somalia’s state building efforts. Paradoxically, this process poses a threat
of evolving into “Somalia fatigue”—the gradual decline in Turkey’s
effectiveness in aiding Somalia—due to the lack of local expertise and
the perception of Turkey as an idealized “super country.”64
The Benefactor 139
Turkey’s humanitarian work in Africa has had a tremendous effect on

trade volume, increasing the total amount of trade from around $7 bil-
lion to around $23 billion by 2012. Correspondingly, Turkish Airlines
(THY) has been expanding its network and now provides access to
over 30 destinations in Africa as of 2013.65 With Istanbul serving as the
connecting hub between Turkey and Africa, more businesses have the
opportunity to reach their African destinations. Together with trade,
the number of Turkish embassies in Africa has increased from 12 in
2002 to 35 by 2013.66 In this, then, it would be fair to say that faith-
based relief and business organizations have leverage on foreign policy
prioritization by acting as a driving force and facilitation in state to
state engagement.
Turkey’s governmental and nongovernmental involvement in con-
f lict resolution and humanitarian diplomacy has rendered substantial
results. Under the auspices of the UN, Turkey and Finland launched
the Friends of Mediation initiative and hosted the First Istanbul
Conference on Mediation in February 2012.67 The Second Istanbul
Conference on Mediation was held in April 2013. Turkey, Finland, and
Switzerland formed a Friends of Mediation Group in the Organization
for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) on March 6, 2014,
as an international platform to share experiences of mediation. More
importantly, Turkey is trying to establish a retreat center in Istanbul for
use in the UN’s mediation activities. Turkey will host the first World
Humanitarian Summit in 2016.68
The following sections will more closely examine the complex net-
work of NGOs and their business networks in consolidating the Turkish
nation brand and expanding Turkey’s foreign policy outreach.
Aid NGOs and Civic Engagement
Despite the large number of NGOs that exist in Turkey and the vast
array of social causes that they encompass, almost none of them partake
in international activities as prominently as the relief NGOs that offer
emergency or long-term humanitarian assistance. The degree of effec-
tiveness of the NGOs dealing with social issues is hardly comparable
to relief NGOs in terms of international presence. The rise of relief
organizations can be attributed to Turkey’s economic development,
f lourishing democratic sphere, and foreign policy ambitions. The evo-
lution of relief NGOs dates back to the early 1990s, a time when the
military still had an overwhelming inf luence on politics. During that
140 B. Senem Çevik
period, Turkey encountered political turmoil resulting from a release

of pent-up friction between Islamist and secularist groups that had
accumulated over multiple decades. As a consequence, politics and
parties with an Islamic focus had minimal power in the state system at
the time, which forced them to build grassroots organizations in order
to gain political or economic power. Throughout the years the growth
of faith-based relief organizations has overlapped with sociopolitical
movements in Turkey, particularly the normalization of Islam in the
political sphere. Today, Turkey’s faith-based relief NGOs are actively
involved in providing humanitarian assistance across several conti-
nents. In doing so, they represent both their charity work and Turkey
as a brand name, resting on the credibility of or sometimes even estab-
lishing credibility for Turkey through their humanitarian work. These
NGOs also set the pretext for Turkey’s economic involvement in var-
ious regions.
These NGOs have an indirect impact on Turkey’s policy making as
well as having a direct impact on its growing soft power. Fidan con-
tends that NGOs “ . . . have highlighted a new instrument in Turkey’s
foreign-policy toolkit, humanitarian aid and development assistance.
Turkey’s non-governmental aid organizations set up massive campaigns
to help the needy by offering food and shelter to those affected by nat-
ural disasters or famine and providing medical services to the poor
in many under developed countries.”69 Indeed, Turkey’s humanitarian
assistance has become a foreign policy toolkit and a way to draw global
attention to humanitarian crises.
The civic engagement is intensely expressed in Turkey’s global efforts
in humanitarian assistance and activism as a part of its economic devel-
opment. Turkish civic engagement can be attributed to NGOs with an
Islamic outlook that extends a helping hand to Africa, the Middle East,
and Asia. Turkey’s humanitarian efforts are in fact boosting its positive
image while enhancing economic, cultural, and social cooperation. In
this sense, although these organizations offer humanitarian assistance
on a goodwill basis, their efforts can be categorized as tools of Turkey’s
public diplomacy and a part of its growing soft power.
Turkish humanitarian assistance is organized in a systematic way that
incorporates NGOs with government agencies, such as the Disaster and
Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), the Turkish Cooperation
and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Directorate of Religious Affairs
(Diyanet), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) and Türk K ızı lay ı (Turkish Red Crescent). Turkey’s
humanitarian assistance essentially depends on the coordination of
The Benefactor 141
AFAD, Türk K ızı lay ı and IFRC. The NGOs and AFAD collaborate to
organize campaigns and distribute the aid donated to those negatively
impacted by crisis.70
The international prominence of the Turkish relief NGOs can also
be related to the rising demand of attention from Muslim and non-
Muslim communities alike. Historical collective memory in regions
such as Africa, for example—where African societies feel as though
colonialists have exploited their resources in the past—has provided
Turkish NGOs with opportunities for action.71 This public perception
of mistrust toward Western organizations as well as religious affin-
ity has proved a safe haven for Turkish faith-based NGOs, underscor-
ing the role that religion plays in public diplomacy.72 The faith-based
dynamics behind these NGOs can be seen as leverage in reaching out
to Muslim audiences, which is reverberated in Zaharna’s “in-awareness
approach” and in what Seib has pointed out as an essential ingredient in
public diplomacy initiatives toward certain audiences.73 Within these
lines, the cultural and religious affinity between communities can pro-
vide better outreach and communication.
In the case of the Arab uprisings, Turkish NGOs contributed a vari-
ety of monetary and emergency humanitarian services to Libya, Egypt,
Tunisia, Yemen, and, most significantly, Syria. Immediately after the
revolts, Turkish NGOs and governmental agencies such as TIKA and
AFAD worked diligently for the self-sufficiency of Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya, and Yemen by contributing to infrastructure work, restorations,
and cultural and educational development.74 Through such recon-
structive work, Turkey has been pursuing a long-term commitment
to the stability and establishment of a new Middle East. In fact, Bayer
and Keyman (2012) argue that “Turkey’s efforts in humanitarian aid
respond to immediate crises while also claiming to pursue the long-
term goal of contributing to the creation of a better human and stable
global order.” 75
The most inf luential Turkish NGOs are Cansuyu Derneği, Kimse
Yok Mu? Derneği, Deniz Feneri Derneği, Yery üzü Doktorlar ı, Hüdayi
Vakf ı, Beşir Derneği, and İ nsan Haklar ı ve Hizmet Derneği (IHH)—
with regard to international humanitarian assistance. These NGOs
provide humanitarian assistance in crisis situations such as earthquakes,
famines, f loods, manmade disasters, ethnic conf licts and religious
conf licts. Patrons come from a diverse geographical background, yet
the majority are motivated by Islamic religious duties. They interpret
humanitarian assistance as a long-term investment in another society
that works to foster a positive image of Turkey.76
142 B. Senem Çevik
In addition to providing goodwill and representing Turkey in the

global arena, these inf luential NGOs also play an indirect role as
key actors in rebuilding the Turkish economy via their connections
with conservative business associations. Though the main purpose of
humanitarian assistance is to provide essential goods to those in need
without expecting anything in return, it would be na ïve to assert that
humanitarian assistance does not offer any benefit for the aid provider.
In fact, this connection brings to light a discussion on whether human-
itarian assistance should be truly categorized as altruistic efforts and
whether they are genuinely civic initiatives. Pinkney notes that NGOs
that partake in global humanitarian activities may follow official gov-
ernment protocol and work very closely with governments. However,
such connections may pose a local threat of exploitation of means. This
possible exploitation is characterized in what Pinkney describes as the
clash between self-interest and common good.77
NGO activities demonstrate that they are indeed somewhat con-
nected to the government, though obscurely. The support base for
these NGOs draw their patrons from conservative business ventures
and organizations linked with MÜSIAD and Turkish Confederation
of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) as well as other devout
Muslims, indicating a visible link between conservative businesses,
pious masses, and humanitarian assistance. Hence, faith-based NGOs
have become convenient tools of policy making and strengthening the
dimension of the active foreign policy with numerous stakeholders.78
In retrospect, the success of Turkish foreign policy has also assisted in
the further expansion of aid NGOs—providing them with the useful
apparatuses to conduct their business while intrinsically reinforcing the
role of religion in Turkey’s public diplomacy initiatives.
While Turkey’s faith-based NGOs can be categorized as faith-driven
organizations, they do not cultivate a particular faith. These organiza-
tions are not doing missionary work as most of their affiliations are
already with Muslim communities and are relief-based organizations.
However, there is a strong Islamic tradition within the charity work,
an affinity for Islam and willingness to lend a helping hand to fellow
Muslim communities in need. This prioritization generates doubts on
the credibility and equal distribution of aid based on global moral val-
ues. A similar doubt has been cast upon the NGO Deniz Feneri—a
major case of corruption that raises uncertainties on whether the aid
is actually distributed to those in need.79 Moreover, the faith-based
structure of Turkey’s aid NGOs sets major limitations to the delivery
of assistance, in turn directly affecting Turkey’s global credibility as
The Benefactor 143
an impartial donor state. This predicament can perhaps be resolved

through diversification of the NGOs. Hence, secular NGOs can play a
key role in reshifting the perception stemming from selective assistance
as well as diversification of the patrons that fund faith-based NGOs.
The irrefutable connection between faith-based NGOs, conserva-
tive business, and policy calls into question whether these civic engage-
ment initiatives can entirely be considered nongovernmental initiatives
or faith-driven organizations that have the blessing of the policy mak-
ers. The ultimate dilemma for NGOs with governmental connections
has always been a global issue; it is the same for Turkey’s faith-based
NGOs.80 Nonetheless, as supranational entities, Turkish faith-based
NGOs have so far succeeded in not only providing a substantial amount
of global assistance, but also in harnessing a positive image in recipient
countries, thus strengthening Turkey’s soft power and serving as agents
of public diplomacy in pursuit of foreign policy interests.
Business NGOs: The Rise of the Anatolian Tigers
The grassroots mobilization of Anatolian businesses dubbed the

“Anatolian Tigers”—or the new conservative bourgeoisie—is inf luenc-
ing Turkey’s foreign policy as a result of their economic and humani-
tarian engagement. Thus, as Şahin argues, the Anatolian Tigers have
become one of the key stakeholders of Turkey’s foreign policy, culti-
vating bilateral economic, commercial, and social ties inside and out-
side of the Middle East.81 Kutlay posits that the economy has become a
practical hand of Turkish foreign policy and suggests that explanations
in Turkish foreign policy by security or identity-based approaches do
not adequately address the changing dynamics in Turkey.82 The author
further contends that the shifts in domestic power have had implica-
tions in foreign policy preferences.
It would be fair to say that Turkey’s international activism is largely
dependent on Turkey’s economic strength and social power. Its gross
domestic product has risen to $820 billion in 2013 from $392 billion in
2004. Its gross national income (GNI) has risen from $5,070 in 2004 to
$10,563 in 2013.83 Today, Turkey is the seventeenth largest economy
in the world, with trade increasing in both volume and composition.84
Exports to Africa have reached $48 million while the investment value
in the Middle East in the construction sector reached $68 billion in
2013.85 Coinciding with the increase in economic numbers, TÜSIAD,
MÜSIAD, and TUSKON are the three key business actors that serve as
144 B. Senem Çevik
the actual practical hands in the new Turkish foreign policy. MÜSIAD
was established in 1990 as an alternative to the older establishment
TÜSIAD (est. 1971). Hence, TÜSIAD represents the older, secular
Turkish establishment, while MÜSIAD and TUSKON represent the
Anatolian Tigers, the rising economic powerhouse of conservative
Anatolian capitalists. MÜSIAD now serves in 60 countries with 143
locations, many of these being in Africa and Asia. The other organi-
zation, TUSKON, connected to the Hizmet/Gü len movement, was
established in 2005 and has four international offices with various busi-
ness ventures in Africa. It benefits from the Gü len network in terms of
support and connections.86 On the other hand, TÜSIAD’s few inter-
national offices are mainly located in Europe and one exists in China.
In connection with the doctrine that laid the groundwork for the rein-
vigorated Turkish foreign policy in which NGOs hold center stage in
wielding soft power, the JDP has been somewhat conducive to pro-
viding conservative aid and business organizations. The presence and
inf luence of MÜSIAD has significantly increased since the JDPtook
office. MÜSIAD and TUSKON have been playing key roles in what
has been dubbed the “new Turkey,” while the JDP government has also
facilitated the growth of such organizations through incentives and net-
works. While TÜSIAD and its members, the stakeholders for the older
establishment representing the biggest businesses in Turkey, have been
frequently scrutinized and financially harassed by way of additional tax
audits, MÜSIAD enjoys being JDP’s natural grassroots business orga-
nization. Hence, MÜSIAD is directly incorporated into policy making
in collaboration with faith-based relief organizations that are also asso-
ciated with the JDP. For instance, MÜSIAD has organized telethons
and aid campaigns with the IHH to provide humanitarian assistance
to Gaza, Syria, and other regions of foreign policy priority.87 Besides,
MÜSİ AD has hosted three conferences in Turkey on the Syrian oppo-
sition with a viewpoint that parallels the government’s political posi-
tion.88 Overall, the rise of a bourgeoisie and faith-based NGOs are
intertwined with Turkey’s active engagement in global conf licts and
humanitarian issues.
Conclusion
Turkey has gone through an impressive change over the course of a

decade while expanding its social, political, and economic develop-
ment. The course of development in Turkey has manifested itself in
The Benefactor 145
multiple areas such as improved global business connections, advance-

ments in democratic credentials, and the capacity to reach out to new
audiences. As a result of these shifts and natural demands emanating
from the competitiveness of the rising powers, Turkey has been seeking
innovative ways to share its new story, exert power, and create other
stories through collaboration. A key component of these stories is the
growing capacity of Turkey’s soft power. Humanitarian aid and devel-
opment aid have been significant ways to wield Turkey’s soft power by
way of hard power elements. Humanitarian aid has been a major tool
in Turkey’s foreign policy framework, its rhetoric, and its capacity to
establish long-term grassroots relationships with the recipient states.
Currently, as the world’s seventeenth largest economy, Turkey is the
third largest donor state globally and is a key humanitarian actor in
providing aid to over 2 million Syrian refugees.
A significant portion of Turkey’s nongovernmental humanitarian
aid comes from faith-based organizations, which are compassionate
and motivated by Islamic ethics in their commitment to humanitarian
relief. Although these NGOs are not state sponsored, they have a cer-
tain degree of affiliation with the ruling JDP government owing to the
common characteristics of their grassroots. Both being motivated by
faith, the interests of the NGO patrons and the political elite are seem-
ingly aligned for the most part. Grassroots operations of faith-based
NGOs in parts of the globe where Turkey’s diplomatic representation
is not significant have been facilitating a more proactive and dynamic
Turkish foreign policy. Besides providing emergency humanitarian aid,
the collaborative efforts of faith-based NGOs also provide develop-
ment aid. Turkey’s NGOs enable a long-term process of relationship
building, and people-to-people connection, which could prove valu-
able to Turkey’s foreign policy framework in the long term. Related to
this, the framework behind branding Turkey as the land of conscience
is an actual description of Turkey’s contribution to global good, but
is ironically somewhat unsound in terms of the domestic discourse.
The fault lines rest on the contradiction between the value-based pol-
icy approach and Turkey’s ethos gap, which in turn hampers Turkey’s
credibility. Its ethos gap is partly triggered by the design of faith-based
NGOs and partly by the its own foreign policy decisions and domes-
tic actions. Narrowing this gap by way of employing universal values
and diversifying the foreign aid NGO network is likely to improve
Turkey’s image as a key humanitarian diplomacy actor.
The faith-based NGO framework analyzed in this chapter acts as a
natural filter to Turkey’s foreign aid efforts and runs the risk of drawing
146 B. Senem Çevik
criticism for its selectiveness. Besides, the NGO framework can under-
mine official development and humanitarian aid. Nonetheless, faith-
based NGOs have been Turkey’s key public diplomacy actors in its
long-term relationship building approach with recipient countries in a
very short time frame.
This dedicated grassroots approach will most likely consolidate Turkey’s
regional and global role as a mediator in conf licts and ultimately estab-
lish strong ties between the donor and recipient state. More importantly,
this framework proposes a new foreign policy model in changing global
governance that in fact converges Turkey’s ethical stance with realist
goals of maximizing power. Its faith-based NGOs provide the capacity
to promote new modes of engagement with publics in which religious
and cultural dynamics hold center stage. As a result, Turkey’s eagerness
to introduce new modes of global governance can also introduce new
approaches in humanitarian aid through nongovernmental initiatives.
More importantly, the faith-based framework of Turkish NGO-based
humanitarian diplomacy creates new modes of communication between
Muslim communities and those non-Muslim global powers that have
limited outreach and capacity to impact these audiences. The limits and
prospects of Turkey’s NGOs will in turn have direct implications on its
soft power, public diplomacy initiatives, and nation brand as a donor
state. On a global level, Turkey’s role as a key humanitarian diplomacy
actor will inherently reassess the function of culture and religion in public
diplomacy initiatives through regional and global transformative work.
Acknowledgments
Various parts of this chapter are inspired by my University of Southern

California Center on Public Diplomacy blog posts on humanitarian
aid. I would like to thank my colleague Mehmet Özkan, PhD for his
comments and suggestions on the faith-based NGOs’ involvement in
humanitarian diplomacy and Danny Fittante for extensive discussions
on foreign aid and ethos gap.
Notes
1. Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) Report (2014), http://www.globalhu-

manitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/GHA-Report-2014-
interactive.pdf; Value–based orientation describes an ethical, moral stance that
focuses on the human aspect.
The Benefactor 147
2. Birol Akg ü n, “Tü rk Dı ş Politikası ve Uluslararası Örg ütler Akademik Ortadoğu

3 no. 2 (2009): 1–39; H. Şaban Çal ış, Hayalet bilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler: Neo-
Osmanlıc ılık, Özal ve Balkanlar, (Bası m, Konya: Çizgi, 2010), p. 4.
3. Please see chapter 2 and chapter 7 of this book for more details.
4. Mehmet Şahin, “Tü rkiye’nin Ortadoğ u politikası: sü reklilik ve değ i şim”
(Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East: Continuity and Change),
Akademik Ortadoğu 4, no. 2 (2010a): 9–21. (In Turkish); also see chapter 7 in this
volume.
5. Katerina Dalacoura, “Islamist Movements as Non-State Actors and Their
Relevance to International Actors,” in Daphe Josselin and William Wallaca (eds)
Non-State Actors in World Politics (New York: Palgrave), pp. 235–284; Yı lmaz
Çolak, “Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective Memory and Cultural Pluralism
in 1990s Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 4 (2006): 587–602; Muhittin
Ataman, “Leadership Change: Özal Leadership and Reconstructing in Turkish
Foreign Policy,” Alternatives 1, no. 1 (2002): 120–153.
6. For more information on center and periphlery relations please see Şerif Mardin,
“Center-Periphery Relations: The Key to Turkish Politics,” Daedalus 102, no. 1
(1973): 169–190.
7. Altay Atl ı, “Businessman and Diplomats,” Insight Turkey 13, no. 1 (2011):
109–128.
8. Turkish Islamist political parties have been banned from contesting elections time
after time and have faced court charges on plotting against the secular state.
9. Murat Yeşilta ş, “The Transformation of the Geopolitical Vision in Turkish
Foreign Policy,” Turkish Studies 14, no. 4 (2013): 661–687.
10. Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik: Turkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Istanbul:
Kü re Yay ı nlar ı, 2001); Ahmet Davutoğ lu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy
and Regional Political Structuring,” International Policy and Leadership Institute.
SAM Vision Papers No: 3 (Ankara: Republic of Turkey MFA Center for Strategic
Research, 2012), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/bakanmakale_tepev.
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New Turkish Foreign Policy,” Middle East Policy 20, no. 1 (2013): 91–96.
11. Reşat Bayer and E. Fuat Keyman, “Turkey: An Emerging Hub of Globalization
and Internationalist Humanitarian Actor?” in Paul Amar (ed.) Global South to the
Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industries (Milton
Park, New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 73–90.
12 . İ brahim Kal ı n, “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey,” Perceptions 16,
no. 3 (2011): 5–23.
13. Jan Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in
Jan Melissen (ed.) The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations
(Hampshire: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 3–27, p.4; Mark Leonard, Public Diplomacy
(London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002); Brian Hocking, “Rethinking the New
Public Diplomacy,” in Jan Melissen (ed.) The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in
International Relations (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 28–43, 41.
14. Ben D. Mor, “Public Diplomacy in Grand Strategy,” Foreign Policy Analysis No: 2
(2006): 157–176,.
148 B. Senem Çevik
15. Nancy Snow, “Rethining Public Diplomacy,” in Nancy Snow, Philip M. Taylor
(eds) Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2009),
pp. 3–11; Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past,” CPD
Perspectives on Public Diplomacy (Los Angeles: Figueora Press, 2009).
16. Nancy Snow, “Rethining Public Diplomacy,” in Nancy Snow, Philip M. Taylor
(eds) Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2009),
pp. 3–11.
17. R. S. Zaharna, “The Network Paradigm of Strategic Public Diplomacy,” Foreign
Policy in Focus (FPIF) Policy Brief: 10, no. 1 (2005).
18. Sherry Mueller, “The Nexus of U.S. Public Diplomacy and Citizen Diplomacy,”
in Nancy Snow, Philip M. Taylor (eds) Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy
(New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 101–107.
19. İ bid., p. 102.
20. Altay Atl ı, “Businessman and Diplomats,” Insight Turkey
21. For more on social power please see Peter Van Ham, “Social Power in Public
Diplomacy,” in R. S. Zaharna, Amelia Arsenault, and Ali Fisher (eds) Relational,
Networked and Collaborative Approaches to Public Diplomacy: The Connective Mindshift
(New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 17–28.
22 . R.S. Zaharna, “Mapping Out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives:
Information and Relational Communication Frameworks,” in Nancy Snow,
Philip M. Taylor (eds) Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (New York:
Routledge, 2009), pp. 86–100.
23. Terry Murphy and Onur Sazak,, Turkey’s Civilian Capacity in Post-Conflict
Reconstruction. ( İ stanbul: Sabanc ı University IPC, 2012).
24. For more information on development aid please see www.cansuyu.org.tr; www.
ihh.org.tr; www.denizfeneri.org.tr; and www.kimseyokmu.org.tr.
25. Personal interview with representatives of NGOs (Cansuyu, Kimse Yok Mu,
Deniz Feneri), April-May 2013, and personal interview with an IHH representa-
tive in August 2014.
26. Alan K. Henrikson, “Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: The Global
‘Corners’ of Canada and Norway,” in Jan Melissen (ed.) The New Public Diplomacy:
Soft Power in International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2007).
27. Hakan Fidan, “A Work in Progress: The New Turkish Foreign Policy.”
28. Dışişleri Bakan ı Say ı n Ahmet Davutoğ lu’nun Beşinci Büy ü kelçiler Konferansı
Kapsam ı nda Verilen Ak şam Yemeğ inde Yapt ı klar ı Konuşma, 2 Ocak 2013,
Ankara. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-
besinci-buyukelciler-konferansi-kapsaminda-verilen-aksam-yemeginde-yap-
tiklari-konusma.tr.mfa.
29. Turkey’s UNSC nonpermanent seat bid for 2015–2016 has not rendered desired
results. Part of the failure could be attributed to the rift between the government
and the Gü lenist formation which has strong connections within African nations
providing for many of the votes in the previous bid.
30. Robert H. Gass and John S. Seiter,, “Credibility and Public Diplomacy,” in
Nancy Snow, Philip M. Taylor (eds) Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (New
York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 154–165.
The Benefactor 149
31. Ahmet Davutoğ lu, “Global Governance,” SAM Vision Papers No: 2 (Ankara:
SAM Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012), p. 4.
32 . Ibid., p. 15.
33. Ahmet Davutoğ lu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy,” p. 3.
34. Joshua S. Fouts (ed.), “Executive Summary,” in Public Diplomacy: Practitioners,
Policy Makers, and Public Opinion (Los Angeles: USC Center on Public
Diplomacy, 2006).
35. Rachel E. Smith, “Afghanistan and Pakistan: Public Diplomacy during Conf lict
and Instability,” in William A. Rugh (ed.), The Practice of Public Diplomacy:
Confronting Challenges Abroad (New York: Palgrave, 2011), pp. 55–71.
36. James Thomas Snyder, The United States and the Challenge of Public Diplomacy (New
York: Palgrave, 2013).
37. İ brahim Kal ı n, “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey,” pp. 5–23.
38. E. Fuat Keyman, “Globalization, Modernity and Democracy—Turkish Foreign
Policy 2009 and Beyond,” Perceptions 15, no. 3–4 (Autumn/Winter 2010): 1–20.
39. AA Interview with UNHCR Turkey Representative Ms. Carol Bathcelor,
December 6, 2013. UNHCR-The UN Refugee Agency. http://www.unhcr.org.
tr/?lang=en&content=526, Accessed May 6, 2015.
40. Mehmet Özkan, and Birol Akg ü n, “Why Welcome Al Basheer ? Contextualizing
Turkey’s Darfur Policy,” SETA Policy Brief No: 45 (2010).
41. Besides predominantly Muslim countries, the İ HH donated funds to establish a
cemetary for over 1000 Muslims living in Bolivia. http://www.ihh.org.tr/tr/main/
activity/saglik-yardimlari/6/bolivyali-muslumanlarin-mezarlik-ihtiyaci/1915.
42 . Volker Heins, Nongovernmental Organizations in International Society: Struggles over
Recognition (New York: Palgrave, 2008).
43. Emre İşeri and Oğ uz Dilek, “Beyond a Turkish Model of Transforming the
Penetrated Middle East: The Nexus of Authority and International Prestige,”
Ortadoğu Etüdleri 3, no. 2 (2012): 119–142.
44. For Davutoğlu’s description of deportations as a crime against humanity see
“Turkish PM Says Deportation is Crime against Humanity”, Hürriyet Daily
News, April 22, 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-says-
deportation-is-crime-against-humanity.aspx?pageID=238&nID=81445&News
CatID=510. Accessed May 6, 2015. Turkey interprets the mass atrocities against
Ottoman Armenians as civil war conditions and uses the term “the events of
1915” while the Republic of Armenia, its constituencies, a wide number of schol-
ars and publics interpret the same events as genocide. So far, there has not been an
international tribunal on the issue to offer an exact definition.
45. E. Fuat Keyman, “Globalization, Modernity and Democracy: Turkish Foreign
Policy 2009 and Beyond,” Perceptions 15, no. 3–4 (Autumn/Winter 2010) : 1–20.
46. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
UNDP Turkey, http://www.undp.org.tr/Gozlem2.aspx?WebSayfaNo=2155.
Retrieved on: April 23, 2013.
47. Larry Minear, “The Craft of Humanitarian Diplomacy,” in Larry Minear, Hazel
Smith (eds) Humanitarian Diplomacy (Tokyo: United Nations University Press,
2007), pp. 7–35.
150 B. Senem Çevik
48. For more details on Turkey’s official perspective on humanitarian diplomacy

please see: Ahmet Davutoğ lu, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives,
Challanges, andPprospects,” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and
Ethnicity 41, no. 6 (2013): 865–870.
49. Reşat Bayer & E. Fuat Keyman, “Turkey: An Emerging Hub of Globalization
and Internationalist Humanitarian Actor?” Globalizations. 9, no. 1 (2012): 73–90;
Esra Çuhadar-Gü rkaynak, “Turkey as a Third Party in Israeli-Palestinian
Conf lict: Assessment and Ref lections,” Perceptions (Spring 2007): 89–108; Bü lent
Aras, “Turkey and the Palestinian Question,” SETA Policy Brief No: 27 (Ankara:
SETAV, 2009); Şaban Karda ş, “Turkey’s Regional Approach in Afghanistan: A
Civilian Power in Action,” SAM Vision Papers No: 6 (Ankara: MFA Center for
Strategic Research, 2013).
50. Dışişleri Bakan ı Say ı n Ahmet Davutoğ lu’nun Fas Dışişleri Bakan ı Saad Eddine
El Othmani İ le Birlikte Kat ı ld ı klar ı “Demokratik Dönüşü m Ve Ortak Bölgesel
Vizyon” Konulu Seta Panelinde Yapt ığ ı Konuşma, 19 Mart 2012, Ankara,
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-fas-dis-
isleri-bakani-saad-eddine-el-othmani-ile-birlikte-katildiklari--_demokratik-d.
tr.mfa.
51. Meliha Benli Altun ışı k and Leonore G. Martin,, “Making Sense of Turkish
Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP,” Turkish Studies 12, no. 4 (2011):
569–587.
52 . K ı z ı lay Gazze Faaliyet Raporu (2012), http://www.kizilay.org.tr/kurumsal/
sayfa.php?t=6. Retrieved on April 8, 2013.
53. Report: “Turkey Ranks First in International Humanitarian Aid,” Daily Sabah,
December 9, 2014. Accessed on Dec 10, 2014; the rest of the Syrian refugees who
don’t live in camps are scattered all around Turkey finding shelter in cities.
54. “The Situation of Syrian Refugees in the Neighboring Countries:
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations,” ORSAM Report No: 189,
(Ankara:ORSAM).
55. Mac MacCleland, “How to Build a Perfect Refugee Camp,” The New York Times,
February 13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/magazine/how-to-
build-a-perfect-refugee-camp.html?_r=1. Retrieved on February 16, 2014.
56. Suriye İ nsani Yard ı m Raporu, AFAD (October 14, 2014), https://www.afad.gov.
tr/tr/HaberDetay.aspx?IcerikID=3124&ID=12 .
57. For more on Turkey and Egypt’s Muslim Bortherhood please see: Senem Ayd ı n-
Düzgit, The Seasaw Friendship between Turkey’s AKP and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), http://carnegieendow-
ment.org/2014/07/24/seesaw-friendship-between-turkey-s-akp-and-egypt-s-
muslim-brotherhood; one of Turkish foreign policy principles has been ‘standing
on the right side of history’.
58. For more information on the concept, see: http://turkey.setimes.com/en_GB/
articles/ses/articles/features/departments/national/2013/08/29/feature-01.
59. Interview with K ı z ı lay official, April 2013.
60. Cemalettin Ha şimi, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development
Cooperation,” Insight Turkey. 16, no. 1 (2014): 127–145.
The Benefactor 151
61. Ali Abdirahman, “Turkey’s Foray into Africa: A New Humanitarian Power?,”
Insight Turkey 13, no. 4 (2011): 65–73.
62 . Cemalettin Ha şimi, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development
Cooperation,” pp. 127–145.
63. Pı nar Tank, “Turkey’s New Humanitarian Approach in Somalia,” NOREF
Policy Brief (2013), http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezf low_site/storage/orig-
inal/application/bbea860140d9140ccbcb6c5d427b4f28.pdf.
64. For a detailed analysis on Turkey’s African foreign policy and its involvement in
Somalia please see Mehmet Özkan, “Turkey’s Involvement in Somalia: Assesment
of State Building in Progress,” SETA Publications 401 ( İ stanbul: SETA, 2014).
65. Orçun Selçuk, “Turkish Airlines: Turkey’s Soft Power Tool in the Middle East,”
Akademik Ortadoğu 7, no. 2 (2013): 175–199.
66. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014), Sorumluluk ve Vizyon: 2014 Yı l ı na Girerken
Tü rk Dış Politikası, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/sorumlu-
lukvevizyon-2014.pdf.
67. Summary Report: “First İ stanbul Conference on Mediation” (Ankara: Republic
of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). Also available online; Bü lent Aras,
“Turkey’s Mediation and Friends of Mediation Initiative,” SAM Papers No: 4
(Ankara: Republic of Turkey MFA Center for Strategic Research, 2012).
68. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Resolution of Conf licts and
Mediation, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/resolution-of-conf licts-and-mediation.
en.mfa.
69. Hakan Fidan, “A Work in Progress: The New Turkish Foreign Policy,” p. 94.
70. AFAD personal correspondence, April 2, 2013.
71. Mehmet Özkan, “Turkey’s Rising Role in Africa,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 9,
no. 4 (2010): 93–105.
72 . Faith-based NGOs such as the İ HH have initiated a “100,000 Qur’an to Africa”
project and have built mosques in Senegal, Nepal, Mali, Rwanda, Pakistan, and
Somalia.
73. Please see R. S. Zaharna, “The Cultural Awakening in Public Diplomacy,” CPD
Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Paper 4 (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2012);
Philip Seib (2013) Religion and Public Diplomacy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2013)
74. TIKA Website, http://www.tika.gov.tr/haber/turkiye-ile-tunus-arasindaki-
dev-isbirliginde-tika-imzasi/524; http://www.tika.gov.tr/haber/turkiye-ve-
misirin-ortak-tarihi-gecmisten-gelecege-tasiniyor/244. Retrieved on April 27,
2013; AFAD homepage, http://www.afad.gov.tr/EN/Index.aspx. Retrieved on
March 17, 2013.
75. Bayer and Keyman, “Turkey: An Emerging Hub of Globalization and
Internationalist Humanitarian Actor?” p. 75.
76. Personal communication, March 26, 2013.
77. Robert Pinkney, NGOs, Africa and the Global Order (New York: Palgrave, 2009).
78. Talha Köse, “Transformative Conf lict Resolution in an Unstable Neighbourhood:
Turkey’s Conf lict Resolution Efforts in the Middle East,” Perceptions. 18, no. 4
(Winter 2013) : 171–194.
152 B. Senem Çevik
79. “Turkey: Less than White?” The Economist, http://www.economist.com/

node/12273885.
80. Shamima Ahmed and David Potter, NGOs in International Politics (Bloomfield,
CT: Kumarian Press, 2006).
81. Mehmet Şahin, “Anadolu kaplanlar ı Tü rkiye’yi Ortadoğ u ve Afrika’da etkili
k ı l ıyor” (Anatolian Tigers are Enforcing Turkey’s Inf luence in the Middle East
and Africa), Ortadoğu Analiz 17, no. 2 (2010b): 94–99. (In Turkish).
82 . Mustafa Kutlay, “Economy as the ‘Practical Hand’ of ‘New Turkish Foreign
Policy’: A Political Economy Explanation,” Insight Turkey 13, no. 1 (2011):
67–88.
83. Data collected from World Bank website, http://data.worldbank.org/country/
turkey.
84. Data collected from MFA website, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/prospects-and-recent-
developments-in-the-turkish-economy.en.mfa.
85. Sorumluluk ve Vizyon: 2014 Yı l ı na Girerken Tü rk Dış Politikası. Dışişleri
Bakanl ığ ı. http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/sorumlulukvevizyon
-2014.pdf.
86. “Turkey’s Growing Trade Network,” Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2011, http://
mondediplo.com/2011/05/09turkeytrade.
87. “İ HH, MÜSİ AD Send Humanitarian Aid to Gaza,” Today’s Zaman, January
18, 2009, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-164422-ihh-musiad-send-
humanitarian-aid-to-gaza.html; Nationwide Aid Effort for Syrians, AK Parti
English, http://m.akparti.org.tr/english/haberler/nation-wide-aid-effort-for-
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88. Meliha Benli Altun ışı k, “Challanges to Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle East,”
TESEV Foreign Policy Programme ( İ stanbul: TESEV, 2011).
CH A P T E R SE V E N
Turkish Foreign Policy in a Transatlantic

Context: A Case for Soft Power and
Public Diplomacy
K i va n ç Ulu soy
Introduction
The end of the Cold War did not bring about an immediate, major
change in Turkey’s foreign policy. Despite the surprising collapse of
the bipolar international structure and the following outbreak of ethnic
and religious wars in the surrounding regions from the Balkans to the
Caucasus, the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy has been grad-
ual for two principal reasons. First of all, Turkey, situated at the inter-
section of highly unstable geopolitical areas, continued to follow the
traditional Kemalist dictum of foreign policy, “peace at home, peace in
the world.” The underlying logic of this policy denotes multilateral-
ism in diplomacy with active participation in international institutions,
observance of international law, and more importantly a noninvolve-
ment strategy with the internal affairs of the neighboring countries.
These core principles provided the Turkish policy makers a basis for a
coolheaded approach toward the radical changes in the aftermath of the
Cold War. The second reason that made Turkey adopt a gradual strat-
egy of change in foreign policy relates to its capacity and its capabilities,
particularly in terms of inf luencing political shifts among neighbor-
ing countries. Turkey was, neither militarily nor economically, strong
154 Kıvanç Ulusoy
enough to benefit extensively from the emerging opportunities by the

end of the Cold War. Its recently liberalized economy was still vulner-
able to outside shocks. Turkey’s domestic politics were unstable in the
aftermath of the military coup in 1980. Over the course of a decade,
a fierce struggle emerged among Turkey’s leading political forces con-
gruent with the attempts to transition to democracy. This paralysis
in mainstream politics was coupled with the Kurdish insurgence in
the southeast as the main challenges to the territorial integrity of the
Turkish state in the post-1980 period.
In the immediate post–Cold War era, significant changes occurred
in domestic politics due to the disintegration of the Kemalist priori-
ties of secularization and modernization. In particular, the Left-Right
cleavage strongly shaped by the Cold War context was replaced by
other forms of political divisions. The new fracture was mainly based
on ethnic and religious differences. However, shifts in the international
system gave impetus to pressures on Turkey to take more responsibility
in its region. The Western international powers recognized the sig-
nificance of a stable Turkey that could eventually extend stability and
prosperity in its surrounding regions. Under the same rubric, various
domestic political groups were challenging the Kemalist establishment
and its foreign policy, based on “status quo” and encouraged Turkey
toward a deeper involvement in its region by way of projecting power
and inf luence.
The ascendance to power of the Justice and Development Party
( JDP) in 2002 did not eradicate Turkey’s foreign policy priorities tra-
ditionally shaped by Kemalist principles and postwar realities. In fact,
these foreign policy priorities converged with efforts to start accession
negotiations with the EU and the deepening of strategic relations with
the United States in regard to the post-9/11 developments in Middle
East. However, this foreign policy formulation shifted slightly as the
JDP consolidated its power in the domestic realm by winning a second
round of elections and attempted to project power in the region. This
new political elite with its conservative background obscurely “instru-
mentalized” the relations with the EU as a way to propel its soft power.
Paradoxically, as Turkey started to consolidate its soft power and pur-
sue an aggressive foreign policy, the United States expressed concerns
about Turkey’s new foreign policy paradigm with the fear that its axis
had shifted from the West to Euro-Asian and Middle Eastern priori-
ties. In this context, the significance of public diplomacy initiatives—
largely defined as an all-encompassing strategy to respond to the wider
public opinion inside and outside of the country—increased for two
Turkish Foreign Policy 155
principal reasons. First of all, against the backdrop of criticisms on its

conservative party identity the JDP was obliged to explain the similar-
ities between the government in action and its predecessors. Second,
the JDP faced the pressure to argue and explain the reasoning behind
Turkey’s pursuit of an active foreign policy in the region.
This chapter argues that Turkey’s recently designed proactive for-
eign policy requires the mobilization of other sources and instruments
of power and a variety of tools. These tools include different forms of
diplomacy and diverse forms of engagement with the wider public,
both in domestic and international arenas. Revolutionary changes in
technology, information, and communications have dispersed power
away from governments and empowered individuals and groups to play
roles in world politics. Different forms of threats require that efforts go
beyond traditional state-centric forms of dealing with them. The first
section puts forward a framework of analysis drawn from these colossal
changes in the international political landscape that had notable effects
on the practice of diplomacy and projections of national power. The
second section focuses on the Western perception of Turkey as a “hard
power” for the most part of the twentieth century. In the post–Cold
War era, Turkey gradually discovered its “soft power” as a friendly
nation toward neighbors and an able country with the capacity to carry
out multilateral global tasks. Outlining the evolution of Turkey’s for-
eign policy from the Cold War to present days, this chapter demon-
strates that Turkey is required to develop a public diplomacy capacity
incorporating soft and hard power in response to crucial foreign policy
choices that it might soon be confronting due to major social and polit-
ical changes in the surrounding regions.
Clarifying the Conceptual Ground: Propaganda

versus Public Diplomacy
Public diplomacy is a novel phenomenon in international relations.

Despite converging points with traditional diplomacy, public diplo-
macy distinguishes itself in various ways of implementation. These dif-
ferences involve the particular character of contemporary international
politics, complexity of the current issues, and democratization in the
making of foreign policy. These waves of change include pressure from
the public to be more involved in the foreign policy decision making
process. Besides, the transparency in diplomacy, expansion of interna-
tional institutions, observance of international law, and multilateralism
156 Kıvanç Ulusoy
became the main principles of modern diplomacy in the postwar period.

Similar to traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy is an element of
national power. Many countries integrate public diplomacy practices
from cultural programs to international exchanges of students, schol-
ars, and artists to the traditional diplomatic domain, as they recog-
nize the necessity of presenting their policies to a wider audience. The
strategy of public diplomacy becomes comprehensive and integrated by
way of disseminating public opinion through the global expansion of
information technology. Similar to traditional diplomacy, public diplo-
macy strives to maintain international peace and order through devel-
oping a better understanding of foreign policies among nations and
transforming the context of foreign policy making through informa-
tion and communication. Public diplomacy emerged from the desire to
reach out to foreign publics in comparison to the traditional practice of
communicating with foreign governments and diplomats. It refers to a
set of complex practices designed to communicate with the public in
foreign countries. In part, fostering goodwill between people and states
will help achieve central goals.
The classical international relations theory argues that diplomacy
peacefully promotes national interests. An element of national power
along with other factors—geography, natural resources, industrial
capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, and
national morale—is quality diplomacy. Morgenthau refers to the qual-
ity of diplomacy as the most unstable power since it is highly dependent
on how the other sources of power—raw material out of which the
national power is fashioned—are integrated as a whole, given direc-
tion, and used to awaken potentialities.1 According to Morgenthau,
diplomacy has three means at its disposal: “persuasion,” “compromise,”
and “threat of force.” He further argues “the art of diplomacy consists
in putting the right emphasis at any particular moment on each of
these three means at disposal.”2 Hence, diplomacy aims to avoid the
absoluteness of victory and defeat and to meet the other side on the
middle ground of negotiated compromise for the sake of long-term
peace. However, by the same token, diplomacy is a practice in a world
of states, of seasoned diplomats, and statesmen. Foreign policy mak-
ing is the domain of particular principles of compromise, peace, and
prudence, rather than a professional field open to popular excitements,
provocations, and emotions. Morgenthau states “The rational require-
ments of good foreign policy cannot from the outset count upon the
support of a public opinion whose preferences are emotional rather
than rational.”3 However, technological developments and the advent
of democracy has enabled transparency in international relations pre-

venting further attempts at “secret diplomacy.” As a result, there has
been significant reaction from professionals of the field in regard to the
possible decline in significance of traditional diplomacy and execution
of policy.4
If understood in the widest terms, public diplomacy has always been
part of the traditional diplomatic practices and projections of national
power. E.H. Carr underlined the significance of the “power over opin-
ion,” along with two other major forms of power: “military” and “eco-
nomic.” Facing the advent of democracy, economic crisis, and the rise
of Hitler during the interwar year period, Carr saw the rise of a cru-
cial phenomenon called “propaganda” to inf luence the opinions of the
masses for political purposes by leaders and countries. He argued that
“contemporary politics are vitally dependent on the opinion of large
masses of more or less politically conscious people.”5 Carr considered
“propaganda” to be an instrument of foreign policy for many countries
during the interwar years. He underlined that propaganda was a device
as strong as military and economic tools in the projection of national
power. The real national power, for Carr, was derived from the art of
linking these three forms.6
Public diplomacy was integrated into national strategies in a more
sophisticated way along with technological improvements in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century. The ideological struggle between the
United States and the USSR during the Cold War pushed them as well
as other actors such as China to develop major propaganda machines
along with public diplomacy practices. In fact, the contemporary prac-
tices of public diplomacy and propaganda developed simultaneously
throughout the Cold War.7 As a result of the fierce ideological struggle
between two superpowers, the propaganda aspect was at the frontlines
compared to public diplomacy. Surveillance of the communication
mechanisms, priority of government agencies, defense of ideology, and
secret teams of propaganda operating in the target countries character-
ized the logic of these enormous propaganda machines.8
A more contemporary interpretation of public diplomacy, different
from the Cold War propaganda practices, emerged as a response to
the rise in contemporary security threats such as the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001. While the traditional responses of hard power
such as military intervention or an economic embargo appeared insuf-
ficient or irrelevant to contemporary challenges, the idea of a “war
on terrorism” implemented by the Bush administration was not palat-
able to global audiences either. Nonetheless, public diplomacy offered
158 Kıvanç Ulusoy
an alternative approach by defending American interests and values in

other countries and this strategy gradually became an integral part of
the American national security strategy as an element of soft power.9
Public diplomacy as a set of practices to maximize American soft
power, offers the mediums to deal with world politics challenged by
technological developments, cultural changes, and identity conf licts.
The foreign policy experts realized that cultural differences can cause
miscommunication of American policies and hamper efforts to wield
inf luence. Policy misperceptions have frequently created environments
saturated in hostility. This hostility engendered transgressed responses,
such as acts of violence and terrorism. Consequently, American policy
makers recognized the role of American values, culture, and politi-
cal systems as valuable assets of public diplomacy to both maximize
American power and foster peaceful international politics.10
The 9/11 attacks brought a significant debate revolving around how
to project national power in a world where the United States appears
to be the only superpower. Public diplomacy appeared to be the opera-
tional practice of a novel conception of power coined by Joseph Nye as
soft power.11 Articulated in the context of the post-9/11 intervention-
ist policy of the Bush administration, Nye puts forward a critique of
using solely military means to fight terrorism and maintain American
supremacy around the world. As a quest for a multilateral foreign policy
and a response to the challenges of an interdependent world shaken by
impressive developments in communication technology, Nye under-
lines the necessity to craft an innovative interpretation of diplomacy
supplementing soft power, which he considers the most relevant way
of success in contemporary world politics.12 Nye states, “we are not
only bound to lead, but bound to cooperate.”13 He argues that soft
power resources often work through shaping the environment for pol-
icy preferences, and take a long time to produce the desired outcomes.
He further provides three forms of soft power: cultural soft power, soft
power derived from political values, and soft power derived from for-
eign policies.14
Claiming that the United States was a latecomer to the use of infor-
mation and culture for the purposes of diplomacy,15 Nye stresses that
public diplomacy differs from traditional one-sided propaganda because
it delivers more credible pluralistic views. It is based on interactions and
includes private views in addition to the views of the government and
primarily mobilizes private citizens and nongovernmental organizations
as diplomatic agents. Through this interaction, the source country is posi-
tioned as more reliable and credible. In this context, public diplomacy
responds to the challenges of world governance that the United States

might face. Nye outlines three dimensions of public diplomacy as daily
communications, strategic communication through developing a set of
simple themes, and the development of lasting relationships with key
individuals. While the first requires a continuous engagement with the
public to explain the context of foreign policy decisions, the second
appears to be similar to a political campaign, while the third includes
mediums such as scholarships, exchanges, trainings, seminars, con-
ferences, and access to media channels. Nye contemplates that public
diplomacy involves exchanges, listening, and dialogue radically differ-
ent from state-controlled propaganda. However, he sees the foreign pol-
icy of a state as a major aspect of soft power that decides whether the
state is perceived as beneficial or detrimental. Public diplomacy, based
on understanding the target audience, listening others, and fine-tuning
it accordingly, is a key tool in maximizing a state’s soft power.
What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy: Security,

Development, and Westernization
Turkey has been regarded as a hard power in its regional proximity

almost until JDP’s ascendance to power, as it has not hesitated to use
military means when its vital national interests are at stake. A few facts
can be outlined to verify this hard power:
1. The warlike roots of the Turkish republic as an armed national

resistance movement; Turkey’s membership in NATO in the
postwar period;
2. The 1974 military intervention in Cyprus despite the opposition
from the United States and other European powers; the military
arms race with Greece following the Cyprus intervention;
3. The frequent pursuit of Kurdish guerrillas by the Turkish army in
Iraq;
4. Threatening to use force against Syria; sheltering of Abdullah
Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdish guerrilla movement in 1996;
and
5. Entering a military alliance with Israel in the 1990s to pressurize
Syria and other Middle Eastern neighbors.
Despite all of the hard power elements, “peace” and maintaining

good-neighborly relations have been key principles of Turkish foreign
160 Kıvanç Ulusoy
policy since the founding of the republic. Turkey’s foreign policy

has been driven by Atat ürk’s dictum “Peace at home, peace in the
world,” which ref lects the post–World War trauma of the collapse of
the Ottoman Empire.16 After the devastating defeat of the Ottoman
Empire in the World War I, Turkey did not want to be involved in
World War II and remained neutral until the very end. Before World
War II, Turkey signed the Balkan Entente with Greece, Romania, and
Yugoslavia in February 1934 and the Sadabat Pact with Iran, Iraq, and
Afghanistan in July 1937. These were pacts of nonaggression and dem-
onstrated respect for frontiers among the newly established states after
World War I. However, after World War II, the governing elites real-
ized that Turkey’s integration into the Atlantic Alliance was inevitable
as a result of security, economic cooperation, and sociocultural mod-
ernization, or Westernization.17
In the postwar period, Turkey’s strategic choice was conditioned by
the Cold War realities: the bipolar international structure, ideological
competition, and arms race between two blocs—the Western Alliance
led by the United States and the Eastern Bloc led by the USSR.18
Turkey sided with the Western Alliance and became a member of newly
established international institutions such as the Council of Europe
(1949) and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation
(1948). Security considerations motivated Turkey to adopt the Truman
Doctrine in 1948 and join NATO in 1952.19 Rejecting the Friendship
Treaty of 1925 with Turkey, the Soviet Union (SU) demanded the ter-
ritory of the northeastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan from Turkey
and challenged the Turkish policies of the straits of the Dardanelles and
the Bosporus.20 The possibility of the SU menace against an insuffi-
ciently equipped Turkey forced the government to seek ways of pro-
tection. Concurrently, the West viewed Turkey as the only country
capable of resisting the Soviet aims in the eastern Mediterranean and
the Middle East.21 Hence, Turkey provided a land barrier to Soviet
ambitions in the oil-rich Persian Gulf along with Iran. Turkey’s main
strategic role was increasingly seen in the European context as poten-
tially circling the Warsaw Pact forces along NATO’s southern f lank
and serving as a counter menace against the Soviet Union.22
Zürcher notes that Turkey’s entry to NATO was perceived as a great
success by the governing elite at the time and caused widespread enthu-
siasm among the Turkish population. Turkey provided a buffer against
Soviet expansion and guaranteed the f low of Western aid, then con-
sidered necessary for modernization and recognition by the West.23
Turkey, shaken by the Great Depression, was somewhat detached from
the world economy from the 1930s onward. The lack of infrastruc-
ture in all areas of economy made economic progress with national
resources impossible. The Kemalist elite recognized the necessity of
incorporating Turkey into the world economy in the postwar period.
As a result, Turkey became a member of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 1947. Economic considerations,
like the Marshall Aid and the economic cooperation with the NATO
countries, were vital for Turkey. While the relations with NATO con-
tributed to the modernization of the defense forces, the economic
modernization of Turkey was realized through the recently established
European Economic Community (EEC). Turkey applied for member-
ship to this organization in July 1959. With the Treaty of Ankara signed
in September 1963, it became an associate member. The governing
elite perceived the relations with the EEC as an economic extension of
the Western Alliance.24
Turkey’s association with the Western Alliance also possessed cul-
tural dimensions. The Turkish Republic intensified the process of
Westernization, which was originally initiated in the nineteenth cen-
tury Ottoman Empire.25 Atat ürk’s aim of establishing a Western model
of nation-state, an appropriate position for Turkey in international soci-
ety, and the effort to elevate Turkey to the level of contemporary civi-
lization, shaped Turkish foreign policy.26 The 1940s and 1950s brought
about a new phase of the Westernization process to overcome eco-
nomic, technological, and sociocultural backwardness of Turkey vis-
à-vis the West. Therefore, the Western orientation, the fundamental
aspect of Turkish foreign policy after independence, remained a con-
stant reference for the evolution of the developments in international
politics.27
The Contemporary Challenge: The Quest for

Public Diplomacy
Turkey entered the post–Cold War era cautiously, despite pressure from
its allies in the West. This cautious anxiety was built on the emerging
crises in the Balkans, the Caucasus, central Asia, and the Middle East.28
The collapse of the Soviet Union left a power vacuum in those regions
that was difficult to fill. In the immediate post–Cold War period, the
Russian domestic political crisis led to foreign policy uncertainties and
paralysis, further contributing to the turmoil in those regions.29 Turkey
and its Western allies moved into these areas by developing various
162 Kıvanç Ulusoy
mechanisms of cooperation in economic, political, and security are-

nas.30 The EU and NATO initiated a simultaneous political expansion
toward central and eastern Europe from the 1990s onward.31 The dis-
integration of Yugoslavia, the possible border disputes, and the spillover
effect in other countries of the region required the Western powers to
be more inclusive in their EU framework. Likewise, Turkey followed
Western political priorities and developed mechanisms of economic,
political, and humanitarian exchanges with countries such as Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and the central Asian republics to ease the processes of
transition.32
The end of the Cold War affected the role of the United States in
world affairs and its relations with its allies, particularly with unifying
Europe. There were signs of divergence between the European and
American perception of the sociopolitical changes particularly in the
post-Soviet regions. This disparity in perception was due to the geo-
graphical proximity of the EU to those regions.33 However, the postwar
security partnership between the US and EU countries conditioned the
coordinated policies toward those unstable regions in the post–Cold
War era.34 Eastern Europe stabilized after the Cold War owing to the
expansion of the EU and NATO in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Yet, the end of the Cold War brought fierce power struggles among
regional powers, leading to wars such as the first Gulf War and the war
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the Balkans, Yugoslavia faced
a tragic breakup leading to a civil war between Serbians, Croats, and
Bosnians. The Western response to those conf licts was multilateral
without major internal frictions.
There had been certain expectations that the end of the Cold War
would bring a Pax Americana denoting a worldwide American hege-
mony. In fact, this expectation gave way to a world order introducing
rising global powers such as China and Russia, and the emergence of
regional powers such as India, Turkey, and Brazil.35 The continuing
instability in the Middle East following the initial stages of the Arab
Spring created further complexities. As a result, the role of the United
States was challenged by other great powers with stakes in the region.
The civil war in Ukraine demonstrated Russia’s aim in recovering its
place as a great power. The challenges to American hegemony in Libya,
Syria, and Ukraine were warning f lags in regard to the structure of the
emerging world order. Still, two critical institutions of the Western
Alliance, the EU and NATO, continued to pursue similar foreign poli-
cies. The EU developed special policy instruments around the European
Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership.36 Both aimed to
extend the EU’s soft power through expanding stability, encourag-

ing democratization, liberalization, and good-neighborly relations in
Europe’s proximity. However, as the post-Arab Spring crises in the
Middle East and the Ukrainian crisis demonstrate, those mechanisms
of projecting soft power have limits, when confronted with excessive
force, revolutions, or civil wars.
The dramatic transformations in world politics pushed Turkey to
follow a more integrated policy. Turkey’s gradual adaptation resulted
in multilateral strategies, cooperation with the international commu-
nity, and encouragement of peaceful solutions to territorial disputes.
Confronted by state collapse or civil wars, Turkey did not take a uni-
lateral path, even toward the most sensitive situations like the Bosnian
war or the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It rather cautiously
followed a strategy coherent with Western policies. The end of the Cold
War brought such unexpected conf licts from the Balkans to Central
Asia and Africa that even the major international actors put forth inco-
herent strategies. Within these lines, it would be misleading to treat the
Turkish policy as inherently hesitant. Nonetheless, Turkey entered the
post–Cold War era with domestic turmoil affecting its already fragile
economy.
Turkey’s mainstream politics was unable to generate solutions to
domestic problems for a period of time during the post-Cold War
period. Security concerns halted any kind of peaceful way out of
accommodating the rising visibility of Islam in the political sphere and
Kurdish separatism, both perceived as threats to the integrity and secu-
lar character of the state. Problems of democratization were also closely
linked to the foreign policy challenges, contributing to the primacy
of the security establishment in designing domestic and foreign pol-
icies.37 Continuing economic crisis shaken by high inf lation, budget
deficit, and an inefficient political structure made Turkey extremely
vulnerable to outside shocks and political instability. All these prob-
lems coupled with the frequent incursions of the army into politics
gave the latter various rights and reasons to intervene in civil political
life.38 In this context, Turkey received pressure from the EU regard-
ing human rights and democratization39 and was partially disintegrated
from the EU’s Eastern enlargement because of these deficits. Atatürk’s
legacy in sustaining peace was faced with challenges in the postwar era
manifesting itself in the deep contradictions in domestic and foreign
policy.40 For the most part of the republic’s history, Turkey appeared as
a hard power. Turkey’s membership application revealed a deep clash
of security culture between itself and the EU. In contrast to Turkey,
164 Kıvanç Ulusoy
which easily threatened to use hard power against its neighbors, the EU
extensively employs soft power instruments in its region and requires
its candidate countries to follow this approach as well. The contrasting
approaches to the use of power created further divergences between the
paths that Turkey and the EU follow.41
In the post–Cold War period, Turkey was regarded as an island of
stability at the intersection of the unstable regions but it was not a par-
ticular country of attraction due to the variety of deficits described
above. Its soft power was very limited. The content of public diplo-
macy efforts was predominantly shaped by the discourse of Turkey’s
secular identity. However, such a contextualization did not correspond
to the reality as the challenges of culture and identity occupied cen-
ter stage in Turkey’s politics.42 However, Turkey became a country of
attraction when its relations with the EU improved from the late 1990s
onward and latched on to the EU anchor. Granting Turkey the offi-
cial candidate status at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, the EU upgraded
Turkey’s power of attraction as a democratic, predictable, and stable
country.43 In this context, conservative politics was incorporated as a
moderate force into Turkey’s politics through the rise of JDP in the
2002 elections.44 Turkey issued a series of reforms in efforts to resolve
the Kurdish problem.45 Its democratization along with the EU acces-
sion was crucial in terms of how Turkey was perceived by (its) neigh-
bors. Rather than comprehensive public diplomacy efforts, Turkey’s
soft power increased through effective domestic and foreign policies.
The EU accession process contributed to the improvement of Turkey’s
image as a European power in its region. In addition to reform pack-
ages, Turkey made a significant turn in the Cyprus issue by supporting
the UN plan for a unified Cyprus to progress in the EU accession.46
The shift in foreign policy encountered a significant setback from
2005 onward as the accession negotiations stalled as a result of the
Cyprus problem. The strategy of the major European countries offer-
ing alternatives to full membership was detrimental to Turkey-EU rela-
tions.47 Turkey-EU relations has been stagnant partially due to the EU’s
criticisms of the growing authoritarian tendencies of the Erdoğan gov-
ernment, which has also been ref lected in the EU annual reports issued
by the European Commission over the past several years.48 Turkey’s
active policy in the Middle East also contributed to this tenuous posi-
tion. There have been signs of change in relations between Turkey
and the United States from 2003 onward following the invasion of
Iraq.49 The JDP improved relations with the Unites States within the
framework of US involvement in the Middle East. However, tensions
increased when Turkey aimed to be benefiting from the gradual with-

drawal of the United States from many other regions fostering its status
as a regional power.50
In comparison with strategic concerns, the issues of identity and cul-
ture hardly played a significant role in assessing the value of Turkey
during the Cold War. Two major events that brought radical changes
to the world were the end of the Cold War and globalization. At each
of these turning points, and on various other occasions, Turkey has
appeared a model state.51 Until the late 1990s the “Turkish model” pro-
moted by the West corresponded to its officially enforced secular and
democratic one. In contrast, this model had serious misgivings because
of Turkey’s crisis-ridden economy, problems of democratization, and
heavy military involvement in politics. Nonetheless, the electoral vic-
tory of the JDP in 2002 brought about a new era in terms of actualiz-
ing Turkey’s image as a model country. The JDP governments brought
stability to the economy and political scene by expanding democrati-
zation that also incorporated ties with the EU. The JDP era has been
significant in Turkish politics since it demonstrated that Western values
such as liberalism, democracy, and freedom of expression could take
root in a country beyond the West. The JDP experience, for many
observers of Turkey in the West, demonstrated that Islam and democ-
racy could coexist and political stability could bring about economic
growth. Even before the impressive changes that took place as a result
of the Arab Spring from 2010 onwards, Turkey was portrayed as a
model for democratic development in the Middle East, a region in
which the so-called third wave of democratization after the Cold War
did not take root. Turkey emerged as a critical example in the post–
Cold War international context, shaped by the “clash of civilizations,”
and a model for the Muslim countries toward democratization on the
eve of the Arab Spring.52
Soon enough, this positive image of Turkey started to disman-
tle and the Turkish model disappointed many in the West.53 The
Turkish model had its limits particularly in the Middle East owing to
the increased domestic polarization.54 The disappointment from the
Turkish model relates to two major dynamics: growing authoritarian
tendencies under President Erdoğan and the pursuit of a proactive
foreign policy—mainly in the Middle East—that in turn has the spill-
over effect in Turkey’s domestic affairs. The United States and the
major EU countries have demanded that Turkey be more proactive
in the regional proximity. While this proactivity has so far demon-
strated Turkey’s regional imagery or hegemonic drive, 55 the civil war
166 Kıvanç Ulusoy
in Syria has revealed that Turkey’s interests appear to conf lict with
the interests of the West.56 Turkey’s own priorities have been per-
ceived as dissociated from Western priorities.57 This fracture between
Western and Turkish policy making partially contributed to the ero-
sion of “trust” between Turkey and its allies such as the United States
and Germany.58 Turkey, particularly disappointed by the paralysis in
the EU relations and affected by the developments in the Middle
East, started to oscillate between Europeanism and Euro-Asianism.59
However, regardless of the foreign policy vocation Turkey chooses,
“European” or “Euro-Asian,” whether Turkey’s national power will
shine in the future or not depends on its capacity to fine tune its hard
power and soft power.
Conclusion
Turkey has recognized the contemporary challenge of technological

developments and democratization. It has also realized that it cannot
simply rely on its hard power elements. Therefore, it has adopted a
framework to wield soft power through utilizing public diplomacy as
the key component of its foreign policy. The establishment of a special
coordinating body dedicated to the task of organizing public diplo-
macy activities under the prime ministry is a clear sign of this shift.
The expansion of media alternatives and the rise of many autonomous
and semiautonomous think tanks also provide a a fertile ground for
deliberating foreign policy issues and presenting it to the wider public
through its various dimensions. The reforms in Turkey’s democratiza-
tion in the post–Cold War era by way of the EU accession process have
also resulted in serious challenges to foreign policy decisions. Turkey’s
problems in regard to public diplomacy arise from two key elements.
The first element is the domestic challenge of crafting a coherent pub-
lic diplomacy strategy vis-à-vis Turkey’s standing in the global world
and its identity. Turkey has been able to provide a coherent platform
for foreign policy decisions since its establishment as a secular, west-
ern, democratic, modern state and one that has adopted a liberal econ-
omy. This nation branding has facilitated a natural place for Turkey
in the Western Alliance in the postwar era, which corresponded with
the bipolar international structure where security issues and ideological
divisions were of primary concern. Nonetheless, this conceptualization
was not questioned seriously in the domestic arena for a long period of
time.
However, Turkey’s foreign policy started to face challenges in the

post–Cold War context, where identity issues and cultural divisions
gained priority. This challenge, coupled with Turkey’s democratiza-
tion, emerged as a new outlook questioning the secular, modernist, and
Western character of foreign policy, resulting in new political forma-
tions. The JDP’s ascendance to power and the introduction of Kurdish
politics into Turkey’s political spectrum created radical challenges for
Turkey’s traditional foreign policy, which necessitated the projection of
a new and coherent image of Turkey through public diplomacy. As a
result, along with the process of defining its identity, Turkey also needs
a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy that offers solutions to its
numerous domestic issues. It has yet to find a way to clearly define this
new plural identity and is therefore facing challenges on crafting its
public diplomacy content and strategy.
The second element of challenge lies in Turkey’s foreign policy deci-
sions, where there is seemingly a struggle to balance and converge its
“hard” and “soft” power capabilities. Turkey’s recent foreign policy
activism also evokes a series of questions that revolve around the end
goal of its soft and hard power projections and the drive behind the
current public diplomacy content. Whether Turkey aims to advance
its foreign policy objectives through collaboration and peace building
in its regional proximity or pave its way through complications in the
regional political sphere is thus a central question. The developments in
the Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East in the post–Cold War era
initially pushed Turkey to (adopt) proactive foreign policies. However,
remaining impartial yet engaged in the region has become a dilemma
of soft and hard power for Turkey.
These two elements are intertwined and built on one another, and
heavily rely on how Turkey positions itself in the international order.
Turkey’s improved image has been slowly deteriorating as a result of
a series of policy failures vis-à-vis the civil wars in Syria and Iraq and
lack of diplomatic ties—at the time of this publication—with Egypt
and Israel. These facts demonstrate that Turkey should pursue a more
delicate foreign policy and “fine tune” its hard and soft power capabil-
ities. It is also imperative for Turkey to diligently craft its public diplo-
macy strategy in order to project the objectives of its foreign policy.
In doing so, public diplomacy will play a key role in communicating
its foreign policy ambitions, identity, and global standing in terms of
its EU and NATO connections to the global audience. More impor-
tantly, the EU process has facilitated Turkey’s rising soft power through
reforms, which could provide for the sustainability of that soft power if
168 Kıvanç Ulusoy
the policy makers choose to go forward with the reforms. Hence, the
way in which Turkey identifies and positions itself in the international
order is contingent upon its ties with these two Western institutions.
The EU and NATO have been convenient instruments in galvanizing
Turkey’s soft power for decades and shaping its nation brand. Similarly,
the way forward for Turkey’s public diplomacy and the soft-hard power
balance will largely be shaped by these ties more than its newly found
connections to other regions.
Notes
1. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among the Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), pp. 80–107.
2. Ibid., p. 421.
3. Ibid., p. 443.
4. Herbert Butterfield, “The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy,” in Martin
Wight et.al., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), pp. 181–192.
5. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (New York: Perennial, 2001),
p. 133.
6. Ibid., pp. 143–145.
7. Soviet Policy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for U.S. Diplomacy,
Committee on Foreign Affairs (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office);
Mao Zedong On Diplomacy (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1998).
8. Nicholas Cull, “How We Got Here” in Philip Seib (ed.) Toward a New Public
Diplomacy: Redirecting US Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009),
pp. 23–48; Jian Wang, “Introduction: China’s Search for Soft Power,” in Jian
Wang (ed.) Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy Through Communication (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 1–18.
9. R. S. Zaharna, Battles to Bridges: US Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy
After 9/11 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
10. Philip Seib, Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting US Foreign Policy (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
11. Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public
Affairs, 2004).
12 . Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” Political Science
Quarterly119, no. 2, (2004): 255–270; Joseph Nye, “Decline of America’s Soft
Power: Why Washington Should Worry,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2004):
16–20.
13. Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t
Go It Alone, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. xiv.
14. Nye, Soft Power, p. 99.
15. Ibid., pp. 100–104.
16. Türkiye D ı ş Politikasında 50 Yıl: Kurtulu ş Sava şımız (1919–1922), (Ankara: T.C.
Dışişleri Bakanl ığ ı, 1974). The dictum: Peace at home, peace in the world.
17. Turkiye Dis Politikasinda 50 Yil: Cumhuriyetin Ilk On Yili ve Balkan Pakti (1923–
1934), (Ankara: T.C. Disisleri Bakanligi, 1974).
18. Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: The European-American Relations since 1945
(New York: Vintage Books, 1982).
19. Joseph Satterthwaite, “The Truman Doctrine: Turkey,” The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 401 (1972): 74–83.
20. Türkiye D ı ş Politikasında 50 Yıl: İkinci D ünya Sava şı Yıllar ı (1939–1946), (Ankara:
T.C. Dışişleri Bakanl ığ ı, 1974).
21. Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West since World War II,” in Vojtech Mastny
and Craig Nation (eds) Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising
Regional Power (New York: Westview Press, 1996), p. 49.
22 . Suat Bilge, G üç Kom şuluk: Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri, 1920–1964 (Ankara:
Tü rkiye İş Bankası Yay ı nlar ı, 1992).
23. Erik Jan Zü rcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), p. 246.
24. Atila Eralp, “Turkey and the European Community in the Changing Post-War
International System,” in Canan Balkir and Alan Williams (eds) Turkey and Europe
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), pp. 24–45.
25. Andrew Mango, “Ref lections on the Atat ü rkist Origins of Turkish Foreign
Policy and Domestic Linkages,” in Makovsky and Sayari (eds), Turkey’s New World:
Changing Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Washington
Institute of Near Eastern Policy, 2000), pp. 9–19.
26. Donald Everett Webster, The Turkey of Ataturk: Social Process in the Turkish
Reformation (Philedelphia, PA: American Academy of Political and Social Science,
1939) pp.112–126.
27. Oral Sander, “Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity and of Change,”
Turkish Review 7, no. 34 (1993): 31–46.
28. Andrew Mango, Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role (New York: Praeger, 1994).
29. Alexei Arbatov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives,” International Security 18,
no. 2 (1993): 5–43.
30. Malik Mufti, “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Middle East
Journal52, no. 1 (1998): 32–50.
31. Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, The Enlargement of the European Union
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998).
32 . Christopher Hill, “The Geopolitical Implications of Enlargement,” in Jan
Zielonka (ed.) Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the
European Union (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 94–115.
33. John Lewis Gaddis, “The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future,” in Michael
Hogan (ed.) The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 21–38.
34. Miles Kahler and Werner Link, Europe and America: A Return to History (New
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996), pp. 1–28.
35. Robert Jervis, “Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,” World Politics 61, no. 1
(2009): 188–213.
170 Kıvanç Ulusoy
36. Raffaella del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What Is at Stake
with the European Neighborhood Policy toward the Southern Mediterranean?”
European Foreign Affairs Review 10 (2005): 17–38; Roberto Aliboni, “The
Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighborhood Policy,” European Foreign
Affairs Review 10 (2005): 1–16; Ketie Peters, Jan Rood, and Christof van Agt,
“The Eastern Partnership: Towards a New Era of Cooperation between the EU
and Its Eastern Neighbours?” Clingendael European Studies Program, 2009.
37. Ali Karaosmanoglu, “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the
Military in Turkey,” Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 1 (2000): 200–216.
38. Andrew Mango, “The Turkish Model,” Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 4, (1993):
726–757; Eric Rouleau, “The Challenges to Turkey,” Foreign Affairs (November-
December 1993), pp. 110–126.
39. Ihsan Dagi, “Human Rights and Democratization: Turkish Politics in the
European Context,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 1, no. 3 (2001): 51–68;
Necati Polat, “Identity Politics and the Domestic Context of Turkey’s European
Union Accession,” Government and Opposition 41, no. 4 (2006): 512–533.
40. Malcolm Cooper, “The Legacy of Ataturk: Turkish Political Structures and
Policy Making,” International Affairs 78, no. 1 (2002): 115–128.
41. Hasan Kosebalaban, “Turkey’s EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures,”
Middle East Policy 9, no. 2 (2002): 130–146; Thomas Diez, “Turkey, the European
Union and Security Complexes Revisited,” Mediterranean Politics 10, no. 2 (2005):
167–180.
42 . David Kushner, “Self-perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey,” Journal
of Contemporary History 32, no. 2 (1997): 219–233 ; Atila Eralp, “Turkey and
the European Community: Forging New Identities Along Old Lines,” New
Perspectives on Turkey, (Fall 1992): 1–14.
43. Caglar Keyder, “Moving in from the Margins? Turkey in Europe,” Diogenes, 53,
no. 2 (2006): 72–81.
44. Saban Taniyici, “Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: Islamist Welfare
Party’s Pro-EU Turn,” Party Politics 9, no. 4 (2003): 463–483.
45. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Ozcan, “The Kurdish Question and Turkey’s Justice
and Development Party,” Middle East Journal 13, no. 1 (2006): 102–119.
46. Kivanç Ulusoy, “Turkey and the EU: Democratization, Civil-Military Relations,
and the Cyprus Issue,”Insight Turkey 10, no. 4 (2008): 51–76.
47. Andrea Gates, “Negotiating Turkey’s Accession: The Limitations of the Current
EU Strategy,” European Foreign Affairs Review 10 (2005): 381–397.
48. European Commission. Turkey. Progress Reports in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011,
2012, 2013, and 2014.
49. Fusun Turkmen, “Turkish-American Relations: A Challenging Transition,”
Turkish Studies 10 no. 1 (2009): 109–129.
50. Mohammed Ayoob, “From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring
Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order,” Australian Journal of
International Affairs 53, no. 3 (1999): 247–260; Andre Barrinha, “The Ambitious
Insulator: Revisiting Turkey’s Position in Regional Security Complex Theory,”
Mediterranean Politics (2013): 1–18.
51. Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Ersen, “Reassessing the ‘Turkish Model’ in the Post-
Cold War Era: A Role Theory Perspective,” Turkish Studies 15, no. 2 (2014):
258–282.
52 . Asli Bali, “A Turkish Model for the Arab Spring,” Middle East Law and Governance
V3 (2011): 24–42.
53. Omer Ta şpı nar, “The End of the Turkish Model,” Survival 56, no. 2 (2014): 49–64;
Henri Barkey, “Turkish Democracy: Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Backward,”
Harvard International Review (Spring 2014): 75–79; Amir Taheri, “The Turkish
Roller Coaster,” American Foreign Policy Interests 36 (2014): 138–147.
54. Meliha Benli Altunisik, “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s soft power in
the Middle East,” Insight Turkey 10, no.2 (2008): 41–54.
55. Faruk Yalvac, “Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist Analysis
of Turkey’s Position in the World System,” International Relations 26, no. 2 (2012):
165–180; Stephanos Constantinides, “Turkey: The Emergence of a New Foreign
Policy; The Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model,” Journal of Political and Military
Sociology 24, no. 2 (1996): 323–334.
56. Seymour Hersh, “The Red Line and the Rat Line.” London Review of Books,
57. Ozlem Demirtas Bagdonas, “Reading Turkey’s Foreign Policy on Syria: The
AKP’s Construction of a Great Power Identity and the Politics of Grandeur,”
Turkish Studies (2014): 1–17. Meliha Altunisik and Esra Cuhadar, “Turkey’s
Search for a Third Party Role in Arab-Israeli Conf licts: A Neutral Facilitator or
a Principal Power Mediator?” Mediterranean Politics 15, no. 3 (2010): 371–392.
58. Andy Muller Maguhn et. al., “A Two-Faced Friendship: Turkey Is ‘Partner and
Target’ for the NSA,” Spiegel Online International, 31 August 2014.
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Inf luence in a Turbulent Middle East,” Mediterranean Politics 19, no. 2 (2014):
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Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey During the AKP Era,” Turkish
Studies 10, no. 1 (2009): 7–24.
CH A P T E R EIGH T
Addressing Controversy I: Public Diplomacy

between Turkey and Armenia
Bu rc u Gü lt e k i͘ n P u n s m a n n
Setting the Context: No Diplomatic Relations,

Closed Common Border
The Turkish-Armenian interstate relations do not appear to have been

a problematic issue in the first half of the 1990s. Turkey recognized
Azerbaijan on November 9, 1991, and a month later on December 19,
all the other states of the former USSR. Turkey established diplomatic
relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia in 1992. However, diplomatic
relations were though never established with Armenia. In April 1993,
Turkey sealed its border with Armenia by closing the Doðu Kapý/
Akhourian crossing and halting direct land communications between
the two countries in view of the escalating conf lict over Nagorno-
Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and more precisely after
the Armenian offensive against Kelbajar which triggered a massive f low
of refugees. The border has since been closed and bilateral diplomatic
relations have never been established.
The intergovernmental agenda of the negotiation for the normali-
zation of bilateral relations has been dominated by three main issues,
namely, the Nagorno-Karabakh conditionality, the genocide issue,
and the explicit recognition of the common border by Armenia.
The closure of the border and the ensuing refusal to establish dip-
lomatic relations with Armenia took place in view of the escalating
174 Burcu Gültekin Punsmann
conf lict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenia’s ambivalence over the

recognition of its common border with Turkey. The gravity of this
ambivalence is magnified by the dispute over the recognition of the
Armenian genocide, which Turkey fears could feed Armenian ter-
ritorial claims over eastern Turkey. Since 1998, the Armenian gov-
ernment has perceived the genocide issue as an important asset for
its international communication strategy. Events which occurred in
the pre-Soviet era began to play a more significant role in shaping
Armenian public opinion and the formulation of its foreign policy.
It seems that the Armenian government decided to align itself with
the position of its diaspora and use its power to inf luence the inter-
national community.1
However, the diplomatic channel of communication is not entirely
closed. The Turkish embassy in Tbilisi has been in charge of conduct-
ing the communication with Yerevan since 2004 and has been com-
municating with the Armenian embassy, also in Tbilisi, through the
exchange of notes. The consular section of the embassy is dealing with
enquiries originating from Armenia, those including both Turkish and
Armenian citizens. The representative of Armenia at the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation’s (BSEC) permanent secretariat in Istanbul
gained some visibility as the only Armenian diplomat in Turkey.
Although his mandate doesn’t allow him to handle bilateral Armenian-
Turkish issues, he is often perceived by civil society organizations as an
inf luential contact person.2
Public Diplomacy to Open Channels for

Intergovernmental Dialogue
The absence of official diplomatic relations deprives both the Turkish

and Armenian states from a vital channel of communication which
could have been of utmost importance in fixing their relationship.
Public diplomacy has, on many occasions, helped state actors maintain
a minimum level of interaction to prepare the ground for the normali-
zation of relations, or sustain the momentum of an ongoing negotiation
process.
Specific occasions have prompted communication at the state level.
The earthquakes which hit both countries successively established,
for a very brief period of time, a channel for communication. Turkey
accepted the aid sent by Armenia after the earthquakes that hit the
Marmara region in 1999 and Van in October 2011.3
Addressing Controversy I 175
The first openly publicized official contacts between Turkey and

Armenia took place in the field of heritage protection. The Turkish gov-
ernment, through its Ministry of Culture, had supervised the expert ren-
ovation of the Church of the Holy Cross on Akhtamar Island in Van. The
Ministry of Culture formally reopened the church, now recognized as a
museum, on March 29, 2007. Upon an official invitation from Turkey, the
Armenian government sent a delegation headed by the deputy minister
of culture, Mr. Gagik Gyurjyan—himself a preservation expert—accom-
panied by several historians and members of the arts community. Turkish
and Armenian ministers of culture have been supporting the process of
normalization of relations between the two countries with constructive
messages and calls for collaboration via the Turkish and Armenian press.4
The president of the Republic of Turkey, Abdullah Gü l, visited
Armenia on September 6, 2008, upon the invitation of his Armenian
counterpart, Serzh Sargsyan, to watch a World Cup qualifying match
between Armenia and Turkey. This was the first visit ever made by a
Turkish head of state to Armenia in the history of the two republics.
President Sargsyan travelled to Bursa in October 2009 for the return
game. This public diplomacy initiative launched by state actors helped
boost the momentum of the negotiations, ongoing since 2007, and led
to the signing of intergovernmental protocols on the normalization of
bilateral relations and the establishment of diplomatic relations.
Public Diplomacy through Non-State Actors: The

Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council
In the early 1990s, generally speaking, civil society was still very weak
in Turkey and almost nonexistent in the newly independent, post-
Soviet Armenia. The EU accession process gave a significant boost
to civil society in Turkey. The Turkish-Greek rapprochement process,
triggered by the Marmara earthquake of 1999, also opened a space for
civilian initiatives and introduced the notions of public diplomacy. In
Armenia, the process of political stabilization, and the opening up to
the outside world contributed progressively to the emergence of civil
society organizations.
The Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC), a
private sector–driven initiative became, at the end of the ‘90s, the inter-
mediary in intergovernmental communication. It actively started pro-
moting Turkish-Armenian cultural events. The positive media coverage
of these events helped to improve tensions at the intersocietal level.
TABDC was the first to open a Track Two channel of communi-

cation with Armenia in the worsening political context that followed
Robert Kocharian’s rise to power. The TABDC was cofounded in
1997 in both Turkey and Armenia in order to foster the creation of new
trade links. The idea came up during a BSEC meeting held in 1997 in
Istanbul, and was supported by businessman Telman Ter Petrossian, the
brother of the Armenian president. In the absence of diplomatic rela-
tions, the establishment of an official Turkish-Armenian business coun-
cil in Turkey was impossible. The TABDC thus remained an unofficial
structure as it could not be integrated in to the Foreign Economic
Relations Board, the Turkish umbrella organization gathering busi-
ness councils. The TABDC has grown from its early business focus
to become an inf luential line of political communication between the
two governments. Advocating the opening of the Turkish-Armenian
border and the establishment of diplomatic relations, the people active
in TABDC have established and maintained close ties with political
leaders in both countries. One of the highlights of this cooperation was
the leading role TABDC played in arranging for the supply of earth-
quake aid from Armenia to Turkey in 1999.5
Over the next decade, public diplomacy initiatives supported by the
availability of international sources of funding contributed to the emer-
gence of a group of civil society organizations from both sides of the
border acting as advocates of the normalization of Turkish-Armenian
relations. During the period, Turkish and Armenian societies had
started interacting increasingly with each other. The proximity factor
between Turkey and Armenia has been at work even in the context
of closed borders. The direct f light connection established between
Istanbul and Yerevan and the improvement of bus connections tran-
siting through Georgia improved cross-border contacts. In the early
years of the independence of Armenia, small traders were the main
agents of the interactions between the two countries. In the follow-
ing decade, with the improvement of economic conditions, Armenian
tourists began visiting Turkey. The Mediterranean resort of Antalya
has become a popular destination.
A Cross-Border Public Diplomacy Effort for

Normalization and Reconciliation
The availability of funding is a major determinant of the intensity of

NGO-run public diplomacy activities on both sides of the border.
Interestingly, funding was much less generous during periods of dead-

locks in intergovernmental negotiations. Donors—more precisely, the
US government, and more recently, the EU countries—have been
considering taking an interest in the full normalization of Turkish-
Armenian relations. The genocide issue, however, proves to be poten-
tially costly for the governments of countries that value their relations
with Turkey and where the Armenian diaspora is well organized.
Furthermore, the abnormality of political relations between Turkey
and Armenia was increasingly being perceived as an additional source
of instability in the South Caucasus and an obstacle for the integration
of the region into the Euro-Atlantic area.
In spite of the fact that the genocide issue was a higher priority on
the agenda of the donor countries, most of the public diplomacy proj-
ects are aimed at the normalization of relations between Turkey and
Armenia. The notions of normalization and reconciliation emerged as
two distinct and often opposing notions in Turkish-Armenian public
diplomacy initiatives.
The grant scheme was set in motion after an acceleration in intergov-
ernmental efforts. The democratization process was launched follow-
ing the general elections of 2002, which saw the JDP rise to power in
Turkey. The reactions of the Turkish political class and society to the
recognition of the 1915 events as genocide by the French Parliament in
January 2001 showed the US State Department how the dispute over
the qualification of the tragedy of 1915 could jeopardize the course of
diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey. As a matter of fact, the
historical dispute between Turks and Armenians could eventually have
a spillover effect on the bilateral relations between Turkey and other
European or American countries, home to large populations of peo-
ple of Armenian descent and active diaspora organizations. Therefore,
investing in the settlement of the historical dispute was largely moti-
vated by the desire to safeguard Armenia’s bilateral relations with
Turkey.
More precisely, between 2001 and 2003, more than a dozen Track
Two diplomacy projects were initiated between the two countries with
the support of the US State Department and under the supervision of
the Center for Global Peace of the American University in Washington,
DC.6 The most publicized initiative financed by this program was also
the only one that aimed at tracking the dispute over the events that
occurred in 1915. In July 2001, the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation
Commission (TARC) brought together a select group of retired officials
and scholars from Turkey and Armenia including one representative
from a diaspora organization. The terms of reference of TARC defined

its objectives in very general terms—to explore cooperative activities
between Turks and Armenians. It appeared though, that the genocide
issue was the commission’s main item of discussion. The TARC ended
its activities in April 2004 after the release of a report commissioned to
the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ).7 The TARC
remains a unique attempt in the history of Turkish-Armenian pub-
lic diplomacy. There hasn’t since been any other politically focused,
high-level working group that specifically targets a concrete contribu-
tion to the negotiation process. It is difficult to prove that the Track
Two activities contributed significantly to the signing of the protocols.
The negotiation process leading to the protocols was initiated through
back-channel diplomacy under the auspices of the Swiss ministry of
foreign affairs. However, this back channel was limited to diplomats
and was not supported by any Turkish-Armenian confidence-building
activity on the Track Two level.
After 2004, the US government continued to fund public diplo-
macy initiatives between Turkey and Armenia through the US
State Department and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). The funding mechanism affected the quality
of the cross-border partnerships. Since Turkey is not officially among
the beneficiary countries of US assistance, Turkish NGOs were not
eligible for direct funding from USAID. They had to subcontract with
Armenian NGOs. Therefore, they were not involved in the design
of the projects. The availability of donor funding pushed professional
NGOs into the limelight. The Eurasia Partnership Foundation—a
beneficiary of US funding— acting as the head of the consortium,8
played a major role in Armenia by organizing public diplomacy initia-
tives with Turkey. The latest program, Support to Armenia-Turkey
Rapprochement (SATR), was conducted between 2010 and 2012 and
aimed at promoting the formation of cross-border networks. The goals
were to increase confidence and decrease stereotypes among the two
societies, to create conditions for state actors to develop informal rela-
tions, and, in the long term, help to address more controversial issues.
The program launched in the aftermath of the Turkish-Armenian pro-
tocols signed in October 2009 in Zurich, and integrated activities that
aimed at engaging the Track One level in the dialogue. This compo-
nent of the program could barely be implemented.
Although the European Commission, generally speaking, has been a
major donor of aid to both Armenia and Turkey and despite the impor-
tance given by European institutions to Turkish-Armenian relations,
in the past decade, it didn’t channel any significant amount of money

to public diplomacy initiatives between Turkey and Armenia. The
representatives of the EU delegation were the only ones who used to
allocate some small-scale grants. The existence of different contrac-
tual frameworks for EU relations with Turkey and Armenia is a seri-
ous limitation to the funding of any Turkish-Armenian initiatives. It
was only in 2013 that the European Commission decided to use the
Instrument for Stability (IfS)—a strategic tool that it designed, com-
plementary to geographic instruments to address global security and
development challenges—in support of civil society activities between
Turkey and Armenia. The IfS funding might, in future, lead to the
creation of a specific EU budget line for Turkish-Armenian relations
similar to the Turkish-Greek Civic Dialogue Project launched in 2004
by the European Commission.
In the beginning of 2014, the Support to the Armenia-Turkey
Normalisation Process program financed by the IfS grant of the EU
started its activities. The program will last for 18 months as of January
2014. It is implemented by a consortium of eight civil society organiza-
tions from Armenia and Turkey.9 The program funds a set of projects,
some involving NGOs from both sides, that aim at enhancing people-
to-people contacts, expanding economic and business links, promoting
cultural and educational activities, and facilitating access to balanced
information in both societies.
Activities include TV talk shows and citizen reporting to contribute
to better mutual understanding; workshops and trainings for youth and
teachers; exchange of artists, architects, and entrepreneurs; fellowship
opportunities and travel support to enhance encounters and cooper-
ation across the border; research on business and economic opportu-
nities; celebrity discussions about the past; and opinion exchanges of
high-level former officials. A grant scheme should help engage new
actors in the dialogue process by providing funding for selected proj-
ects. The program focused more one societal activities compared to
activities designed in the framework of the SATR grant scheme. The
emphasis is placed on the need to improve the understanding between
the two countries, educating the Armenian audience on today’s quickly
evolving Turkey, and opening a space for civic discussions on the past
and the future of the relations. The youth is considered an agent of
change that should be empowered. History of art and architecture with
initiatives to further support the restoration of Armenian cultural her-
itage in Turkey, constitutes an interesting component of the program
and a gateway to the field of reconciliation.
Normalization and Reconciliation

In the context of Turkish-Armenian affairs, normalization refers to the
establishment of good-neighborly relations and the increase of cross-
border interactions. Normalization is seen as a technical process, which
will lead to the establishment of normal intergovernmental relations
and the opening of the physical and the mental borders between the
two nations. Normalization does not aim to solve the conf lict, but
rather to manage it at a nondestructive level.
The agenda of normalization is based on the minimum level of con-
sensus for cross-border engagement. Foremost priority is given to the
establishment of channels of communication and to the socialization
processes through the conduct of joint activities. The expectation is
that most difficult issues will be tackled once trust has been established.
The genocide issue is not part of the normalization agenda: the nor-
malization projects carried out between Turkey and Armenia, at the
moment, very rarely deal with the historical aspect of the dispute.
The reconciliation phase, which implies a full restoration of relations
and the settlement of grievances inherited from the past, brings the
genocide issue to the table. At the moment, there isn’t any agreed upon
agenda for reconciliation between the civil society groups of the two
countries. Armenians are extremely cautious of not giving the impres-
sion of “discussing the Genocide” which is considered “a fact and part
of the mentality of the Armenian people.”
These normalization initiatives have in most cases excluded the
Armenian diaspora and have been conducted with the participation of
NGOs from Turkey and Armenia. As highlighted in the International
Center for Human Development (ICHD) report of the town hall meet-
ing dedicated to Armenia-Turkey,10 the normalization of relations with
Turkey could jeopardize Armenia’s relations with its diaspora. There is
a fear that normalization will create division lines within the diaspora
and hamper the natural course of cooperation between Armenia and
its diaspora.
Joint Turkish-Armenian Public Diplomacy Initiatives in

Support of the Normalization of Relations
A large part of the normalization projects aimed at the organization
of interactive workshops, involve joint working groups with partici-
pants from a wide range of backgrounds, mostly selected from among
opinion makers and inf luential individuals such as academics, former
diplomats and policy makers, and, in some cases, historians. Contacts

and interactions between adversaries taking place in a safe and friendly
environment is supposed to pave the way to mutual empathy and chal-
lenge negative attitudes with the expectation that such interaction will
improve the perception of the other, thereby helping each side over-
come assumed stereotypes.11
Some examples of such an interaction could be the cultural exchange
programs and grassroots-level dialogue groups aimed at promoting
activities between students at the university level and below to help
enhance understanding between young people. These initiatives were
mainly ad hoc in the form of summer camps, with a few intended
to be institutionalized as actual student exchange programs between
universities.
Academic seminars and conferences undertaken by think tanks on
both sides were usually in the form of closed seminars with the limited
and “invitation-only” attendance of academics. These conferences were
quite important in the beginning of the Turkish-Armenian Multitrack
diplomacy efforts. However, in time, especially in the context of the
Turkish-Armenian protocols, they began to be repetitive in terms of
their agenda and attendance.
Public diplomacy initiatives of the media supported the establishment
of a network of journalists interested in the other country and had very
little impact at the editorial level. The Global Political Trends Center
(GPoT Center) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution established
in Turkey in 2009, under the auspices of the Istanbul Kültür University
that focuses on the media as a participant to the SATR consortium.
GPoT organizes policy and media discussions with the participation of
media figures, opinion makers, experts, and former officials from Turkey
and Armenia, and facilitates television media coverage of the SATR in
Armenia and in Turkey. GPoT also established the Turkey-Armenia
Journalism Award, which recognizes journalists with the highest qual-
ity and most engaging media publications on Armenian-Turkish issues.
The organization aims at increasing the production and dissemination
of multisourced media content. The Hrant Dink Foundation programs
which aim at strengthening ties between journalists from Turkey and
Armenia and contributing to the establishment of direct and accurate
means of exchanging news sources has entered its seventh year in 2015.
Journalists from Açık Radyo, Agos, Altyazı, BirGün, CNN Türk,
Habertürk, Milliyet, Radikal, and Zaman paid their first ever visits to
Armenia in 2009 and met with various media outlets such as Armenian
Public TV H1, ArmNews TV, and CivilNet.
Some other public diplomacy initiatives included technical and pro-

fessional cooperation. These projects aimed mainly at building bridges
between Armenian and Turkish business communities, while other
areas of professional and technical cooperation (e.g., transboundary
issues and the environment) were neglected. The protocol signing pro-
cess and the possibility of the opening of business and technical cooper-
ation projects are somewhat different from others in terms of expected
outcomes and rationale. Unlike seminars, workshops, and dialogue
groups, the incentive to establish business relations has the potential of
bringing together people from the mainstream. The establishment of
business networks should also lead to building trust. These projects also
aim at building interdependence between Turkey and Armenia, which
eventually will serve as a positive driving force toward the settlement of
the conf lict. Furthermore, these projects are more likely to be durable
and sustainable.
The Genocide Issue and Public Diplomacy Initiatives
Each year as April 24— the day that commemorates the tragic his-
tory of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire—approaches, interna-
tional attention refocuses on Turkish-Armenian relations. This period
between mid-March to the end of April is indeed the least favorable
time for any Turkish-Armenian public diplomacy initiative.
Turkish interest in Armenia and Armenians increases during spring.
This is aimed at preventing the president of the United States from
qualifying the massacres of the Armenians under the Ottoman Empire
as genocide in his annual White House statement. Armenian activists
mobilize themselves for the opposite purpose as Armenian and Turkish
diaspora organizations based in the United States engage in a frontal
opposition.
The genocide issue, raised within many Western parliaments, has
strained Turkish-Armenian relations since 1998. The first attempt at
its recognition goes as far back as 1965 to Argentina, well before the
Armenian accession to independence. Between 1991 and 1998, the
controversy continued without any participation of the Republic of
Armenia. The Armenian government started to raise the issue of the
recognition in 1998, when the incoming Armenian government rec-
ognized it as an important asset for its international communication
strategy.
As a matter of fact, parliamentary resolutions cut communications
of the political campaigns pursuing the international recognition of
the Armenian genocide. Groups both for and against the normaliza-
tion of Turkish-Armenian relations have to focus on damage control
in the aftermath of each third party recognition. The change in the
official rhetoric with regard to the Armenian issue is significant as
most recently shown by the condolence message published by Prime
Minister Erdoan on the occasion of the anniversary of the massacre on
April 24, 2014. However, “officially,” Turkey is still positioning itself
defensively in a frontal opposition convinced of the need to counter the
offensive. In Turkey, the problem is still seen as an academic dispute
about history. During the year 2015, in the context of the commem-
orative events for the centenary organized by Armenians worldwide,
the dispute transformed into an international public relations battle.
The commemoration ceremony of the battle of Dardanelles organized
by the Turkish government in Gallipoli onApril 24–25 with a high
level international participation competed successfully for interna-
tional media coverage with the commemoration of the centenary of
the Armenian genocide that took place in Yerevan12.
Governmental Initiatives Related to the Genocide Issue

and Public Diplomacy
Turkish initiatives aimed at addressing the historical dimension of the
Turkish-Armenian dispute incorporates a strong public diplomacy
component and have been advocating the need to open a space to dis-
cuss the tragedy of 1915. These initiatives have so far been limited to
widely publicized calls made by Turkish officials to set aside a space
for dialogue, interaction, and research on the events of 1915. These
calls became the signs of Turkish willingness to tackle the historical
dispute.
In 2005, the exchange of letters between Prime Minister Erdoðan
and President Kocharian created an impression of dialogue. A new
momentum was indeed launched by two public proposals—one Turkish
and one Armenian. Prime Minister Erdoðan, in his letter to President
Kocharian, called for the creation of a joint commission to study the
historical developments and events of 1915. This was accompanied by
President Kocharian’s proposal for an intergovernmental commission
to meet and discuss all outstanding issues between the two countries
with the aim of resolving them. These would have to be sustained by
practical steps aiming at complete normalization of bilateral relations.
The condolence message issued by Prime Minister Erdoðan on the
April 24, 2014 constitutes an important rhetorical change of the official
discourse.13 Opinions within the Turkish society have been evolving

steadily in the last decade. For the last several years, a group of local
NGOs working on issues related to human rights and antidiscrimina-
tion have organized a ceremony annually on April 24 at the Taksim
Square in Istanbul in commemoration of the tragedy of 1915.14 Prime
Minister Erdoðan highlights this change underlining that “in Turkey,
expressing different opinions and thoughts freely on the events of 1915
is the requirement of a pluralistic perspective as well as of a culture of
democracy and modernity” and wishes that “the Armenians who lost
their lives in the context of the early twentieth century rest in peace,
and we convey our condolences to their grandchildren.”15 The mes-
sage reiterates Turkey’s former proposal for the establishment of a joint
historical commission whereby Turkish, Armenian, and international
historians could study the events of 1915 in a scholarly manner.
The political communication went on during 2015. Prime Minister
Davutoğlu issued a message on the occasion of the anniversary of the
murder of Hrant Dink where he stressed that Turkey has started over-
coming the generalizations and stereotypical assertions of the past and
issued an invitation to Armenians to come and visit Turkey. A second
message followed on April 23, 2015 where Prime Minister Davutoğlu
offered his condolances to the grandchildren of the Ottoman Armenians
who lost their lives during the relocation in 1915. He stated that it
was a “a historical and humane duty for Turkey to uphold the mem-
ory of Ottoman Armenians and the Armenian cultural heritage,” and
announced that a religious ceremony would be held at the Armenian
Patriarchate church in Istanbul on April 24 to remember the “Ottoman
Armenians in Turkey just as they will be across the world.”
The ceremony, led by the Deputy Patriarch Aram Ateşyan, was also
attended by EU minister Volkan Bozk ır. President Erdoğan’s message
was also read at the ceremony where white doves symbolizing peace
were released and bells were rung 100 times. This was the first ever
mass organized on an April 24 since 1916.16
Inclusion of the Armenian Diaspora in Turkish-Armenian

Public Diplomacy Initiatives
The population of Armenia is approximately three million; double that
number of Armenians live outside the country. The Armenian nation
is defined by the totality of the Armenians in the world. The diaspora
is older, larger, and more diverse than the Armenian state. The western
Armenian diaspora was formed by those who survived the massacre

of 1915 by f leeing Anatolia. A large majority of the citizens of the
Republic of Armenia are originally from Anatolia. Very few families
are not connected with Anatolia. It is hardly possible to think of an
Armenian identity without Mount Ararat, the ancient ruins of Ani, or
the island of Akhtamar in Lake Van.
The diaspora is perceived, at the same time, as both an asset and lia-
bility. Armenian civil society activists are wary of its power of obstruc-
tion. Much effort is being spent to prevent the diaspora from hindering
Turkish-Armenian initiatives.
Cross-border Turkish-Armenian public diplomacy initiatives rarely
involve any diaspora organizations. The initiatives organized among
the diaspora exclusively address the historical conf lict; the central ele-
ments of the value system are based on the memory of the 1915 vic-
tims and the pan-Armenian efforts to address the consequences of that
disaster. They sometimes involve like-minded Turkish participants. In
Turkey, the political class and society at large have developed deep
fears and suspicions about the Armenian diaspora, considered all-
powerful and closely knit. The diaspora is feared as it is perceived to be
strong and united in its hostility toward Turkey. It is however impor-
tant that the diaspora be considered as a potential partner in Track
Two efforts rather than an obstacle. The diaspora is a major factor in
Turkish-Armenian relations. The best way to prevent them from dis-
rupting any dialogue or initiative is to get them involved with the
process and the ultimate goals. It seems important to help the diaspora
define a positive agenda toward both Armenia and Turkey.
Beyond normalization, reconciliation requires the opening of a direct
channel of communication between Turks and Armenians living in the
diaspora. The Turkish and Armenian diasporas need to develop a bilat-
eral agenda. However when it comes to Turkey, it is hard to mobilize
diaspora groups around any other agenda apart from the international
recognition of the genocide.
In 2010, the Turkish government started developing an outreach
program toward the diaspora but with very little success. The minister
of foreign affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu officially started promoting a new
concept of the diaspora, which underlines its roots in Anatolia.17 The
Armenian diaspora, however, is reluctant to interact with Turkish soci-
ety at large fearing instrumentalization by the Turkish government for
its public relations purposes. The issue of whether they are entitled to
become Turkish citizens, for instance, has become a recurrent theme
for discussion. A positive redefinition or reframing of their link with
Turkey will transform them into stakeholders in the conf lict resolution
processes underway in Turkey.
The changes within the Turkish society have started giving incentives
to Armenians from the diaspora. The murder of Hrant Dink reinvigo-
rated the debate around the issue of genocide within Turkish intellectual
circles. Turkish-Armenian reconciliation is seen as an important factor
in the further democratization of Turkish society and the political sys-
tem. The issue is defined clearly as an internal Turkish question that only
a societal awakening can address. Emboldened by Turkish human rights
activists, the Armenian General Benevolents’ Union-Europe (AGBU-
Europe) and the European Grassroots Antiracist Movement (EGAM)
led a delegation to Istanbul, composed mainly of young people from
around Europe. The commemoration events culminated in a gathering
at the Taksim Square in Istanbul where people of the Armenian diaspora
made speeches in Armenian, Turkish, and English.
Recent civil society initiatives have focused on overcoming collec-
tive amnesia, on reviving the memory of the centuries-old Turkish-
Armenian coexistence, and on nourishing the Armenian heritage in
Anatolia. Most of the initiatives have taken place in the fields of art and
culture, as well as publishing (e.g., oral history projects, oral history
archives, and books). The main objective is usually to raise awareness
and historical knowledge of the daily lives of Ottoman Armenians.
Anadolu Kü lt ür, a Turkish foundation established by a Turkish phi-
lanthropist, has sponsored many such cultural projects. The rationale of
these exchanges has been to bring Turks and Armenians together using
culture and common heritage as a bridge, and, in this way, help improve
understanding and relations. A noteworthy project in this spirit was a
series of exhibits and books by Osman Köker published by Birzamanlar
Yay ıncı l ık that documented the lives of Armenians in Turkey during
different historical periods. In 2014, Osman Köker organized an exhi-
bition and published a book on Armenians in Antakya, Iskenderun,
and the Musa Mountain. The exhibition traveled to the Hatay prov-
ince, including Vak ıf l ı, the only remaining village in Turkey populated
entirely by Armenians.
The Hrant Dink Foundation set up in 2007 “to carry on Hrant’s
dreams, Hrant’s struggle, Hrant’s language and Hrant’s heart” has
become an important factor in reconciliation-oriented initiatives and has
contributed to create a positive interest for Turkey among the Armenian
diaspora. The foundation pursues a domestic agenda promoting fur-
ther democratization and respect of human rights, supporting activ-
ities advocating the recognition of its rich, cultural diversity, and the
acknowledgment of differences as a right. The foundation developed a

history program that supports efforts to record history devoid of nation-
alism and racism. It is also active in the bilateral relations between Turkey
and Armenia. The normalization of relations with Turkey is perceived
as being interlinked with democratization. Furthermore, the foundation
has a sense of responsibility in designing the future of Turkish-Armenian
relations. The prospect of a common future can help deal with the past.
The Hrant Dink Foundation is member of the consortium set for the IfS
grant along with the Civilitas Foundation, which similarly encourages
diaspora interested in interaction with the Turkish society.
The Civilitas Foundation was established in 2008 by Vartan Oskanian,
former Armenian minister of foreign affairs, to support the establish-
ment of a participative democracy in Armenia, and promote develop-
ment projects through the involvement of the Armenian diaspora. The
foundation has a strong diaspora connection and is chaired by Salpi H.
Ghazarian, who worked as a special assistant to Vartan Oskanian, and
also belongs to the Armenian diaspora, like the former minister. The
Civilitas Foundation opened an office in Istanbul in November 2013
in a move that was explained as an effort to share information about
Armenian organizations and the diaspora. This office will also support
Civilnet.am, an online television project within the same foundation,
in providing better access to regular coverage of developments taking
place in Turkey. Civilnet.am has been broadcasting news and reports
from Istanbul for almost a year.18
Architecture acts as a powerful testimonial of the common Turkish-
Armenian past. Restoring and rediscovering Armenian cultural sites
around Anatolia would not only help shape public opinion in Turkey
but also build bridges. A common ground can be found with the
Armenian diaspora through efforts aimed at protecting and rediscover-
ing Armenian heritage. Furthermore the revalorization of Armenian
cultural heritage can help shape public opinion within Turkey. The
revision of the law on foundations brought about major change in
2008. The amendments allowed minorities to acquire and renovate
properties and the Turkish government also began returning minority
properties that had previously been confiscated.
The renovation of the Surp Giragos Armenian church in Diyarbakir
is a very good illustration of the ideal way to move forward and develop
collaboration between Istanbul Armenians, the diaspora, and national
and local authorities. The Surp Giragos Church, dating back to 1515,
was once one of the largest Armenian churches in the Middle East.
Its bell tower was bombarded and destroyed by German/Ottoman
cannon fire in 1915, since it was deemed unacceptable for the structure
to loom over the local minarets. In 2009, the Surp Giragos Foundation
in Istanbul launched a reconstruction project under the auspices of the
Istanbul Patriarchate. The board secured a legal deed and title to the
church, obtained the required permits for reconstruction, and launched
fundraising activities worldwide. Raffi Bedrosyan, a civil engineer
and pianist living in Toronto, organized the reconstruction project and
helped raise money from among the diaspora. The foundation cov-
ered 70 percent of the restoration costs amounting to approximately
2.5 million USD. The Diyarbakir Municipality paid the remaining
30 percent. The foundation also succeeded in reclaiming other proper-
ties, the rent from which will secure steady funds for the maintenance
of Surp Giragos. The renovation started in 2009, the church opened
for worship in October 2011, and work on the bell tower concluded
a year later. Unlike the Holy Cross Church of Armenia on Akhtamar
Island, renovated by the Turkish government but converted into a
state museum, the Surp Giragos Church is officially recognized as an
Armenian church under the control of the Armenian Patriarchate. It
is the first church property in Anatolia reclaimed by Armenians since
1915. The signs at Akhtamar Island have recently been changed to
“Armenian Church of the Holy Cross,” and the church is undergoing
a process of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) registry as an Armenian structure.19
Interestingly, Turkish officials have started investing in this area of
heritage protection and the revival of the Armenian identity for public
diplomacy purposes. Soon after having conveyed his condolence mes-
sage in April 2014, Prime Minister Erdoğan underlined at the inaugura-
tion of the historical mosque of Ortaköy which underwent renovation
work, that it was built by an Armenian architect, a member of the
famous Balian family.20 At the same time, the Armenian community
of Istanbul inaugurated in its Bak ırköy district, the first ever Armenian
school built under legal framework in republican Turkey. The school
was built on the land of a church foundation which was rezoned with
the support of the municipality. Turkish national news agency, the
Anatolian News Agency, reported a long article on this story.21
Conclusion
With no diplomatic relations, the communication channel between

Turkey and Armenia is dependent on the civil society. So far, public
diplomacy initiatives have facilitated a communication channel sus-

taining some degree of interaction necessary for the normalization pro-
cess. Besides, normalization of relations also requires the engagement
of the Turkish and Armenian diasporas. However, civil society initia-
tives are focused on repairing ties between the Republic of Turkey and
the Republic of Armenia.
Civil society engagement is still very dependent on the perception of
“permissiveness” as viewed in the respective domestic contexts. Track
Two activism increases when there is an opening at the political level.
Turkish- Armenian relations are still perceived as being highly sensi-
tive by mainstream organizations in Turkey, and, to some extent, in
Armenia. There is a clear call for a leader who is ready to display the
political courage and vision to pull the issue of the normalization of
bilateral relations and of reconciliation with Armenians above domestic
politics. The Turkish society has started questioning the past and shows
a genuine interest in the Armenian cultural legacy in Anatolia.
Notes
1. Burcu Gü ltekin and Nicolas Tavitian, Les Relations Arméno-Turques: la Porte Close
de l’Orient (Brussels: Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security,
2003).
2. The permanent representative of the Republic of Armenia in the Organization of
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) based in Istanbul between 2005–
2010, a former graduate from the Institute of Oriental Studies of Yerevan State
University and perfectly f luent in Turkish, had become a focal point for cross-
border civil society initiatives. Mr. Mirzoyan is currently serving as the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh.
3. “Armenia Sends Aid for Turkish Quake Survivors,” Today’s Zaman, October,
28, 2011. Accessed on August 27, 2014. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-
261334-armenia-sends-aid-for-turkish-quake-survivors.html.
4. “Ankara Restores Armenian church,” BBC News Europe, March, 29, 2007.
Accessed on August 27, 2014. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6505927.stm.
5. For information, http://www.tabdc.org/armenian-resolution-debates-in-us-
have-turned-into-a-kind-of-business/.
6. Armenian-Turkish Track Two Diplomacy Projects: Assessment of Best Practices ( Yerevan:
International Center for Human Development, 2006). Available online at www.
ichd.org/download.php?f=374&fc=Download.
7. David L. Phillips, Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-
Armenian Reconciliation (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005). For the report of
the International Center for Transitional Justice on “The Applicability of the
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide to Events which Occurred During the Early Twentieth Century” visit
http://www1.american.edu/cgp/TARC/ictj.htm.
8. More information available at http://www.epfound.am/english/accomplished/
support-to-armenia-turkey-rapprochement-.html.
9. Partners include Civilitas Foundation (CF), Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF),
Public Journalism Club (PJC), Regional Studies Center (RSC) from Armenia;
and Anadolu Kü lt ü r, the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
(TEPAV), Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (hCa), and Hrant Dink Foundation from
Turkey. More information available at http://www.armenia-turkey.net/.
10. ICHD, “People’s Voices on Armenia-Turkey Protocols,” report. Accessed on
August 27, 2014. http://ichd.org/?laid=1&com=module&module=static&i
d=403.
11. For a precise mapping of Turkish-Armenian civil society initiatives see Burcu
Gü ltekin Punsmann and Esra Çuhadar Reflecting on the Two Decades of Bridging the
Divide: Taking Stock of Turkish-Armenian Civil Society Activities (Ankara: TEPAV,
2012).
12 . Constanze Letsch “Turkey Eclipses Centenary of Armenian Massacre by mov-
ing Gallipoli Memorial,“ The Guardian, April 16, 2015. Accessed on: May 5,
2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/16/turkey-armenia-1915-
centenary-gallipoli-massacre-genocide
13. The message of the prime minister of The Republic of Turkey, Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, on the events of 1915. Accessed on August 27, 2014. http://www.bas-
bakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Article/pg_Article.aspx?Id=e11bde56-a0b7-4ea6-8a9a-
954c68157df9.
14. Burcu Gü ltekin Punsmann, Paving the Way for Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation: A
Personal Account (Istanbul: Turkey Analysis, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013).
15. The message of the prime minister of The Republic of Turkey, Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, on the events of 1915. Accessed on August 27, 2014. http://www.bas-
bakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Article/pg_Article.aspx?Id=e11bde56-a0b7-4ea6-8a9a-
954c68157df9.
16. 100 Bells Ring at Kumkapı Patriarchal Church, Agos, April 24, 2015, http://
www.agos.com.tr/en/article/11390/100-bells-ring-at-kumkapi-patriarchal-
church. Accessed on May 5, 2015; “Ottoman Armenians Commemorated in
Istanbul Ceremony,” Anadolu Ajansı, April 24. 2015, http://www.aa.com.tr/
en/turkey/498947--ottoman-armenians-commemorated-in-istanbul-ceremony.
Accessed on May 5, 2015
17. Ahmet Davutoğ lu, “Turks and Armenians—we must follow Erdoğan’s lead
and bury our common pain,” The Guardian, May, 2, 2014. Accessed on August
27, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/02/turks-
armenians-erdogan-condolences-1915-armenian-massacre
18. “Armenia’s The Civilitas Foundation Launches Activities in Istanbul,” News.
Am November, 19, 2013. Accessed on August 27, 2014. http://news.am/eng/
news/181487.html; Menekse Tokyay, “Armenian Foundation Opens Office in
Istanbul to Improve Dialogue,”, SES Türkiye, November 29, 2013. Accessed on
August 27, 2014., http://turkey.setimes.com/en_GB/articles/ses/articles/features/

departments/world/2013/11/29/feature-02 .
19. “Akdamar Kilisesi, UNESCO Dü nya Miras Listesi’ne aday,” Zaman, June 28,
2014. Accessed on October 2, 2014. http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_
akdamar-kilisesi-unesco-dunya-miras-listesine-aday_2227373.html
20. Krikor Amirzayan, “Erdoğan rappelle ‘cette magnifique mosquée a été construite
par un architecte arménien,”, Armenews, June 8, 2014. Accessed on August 27,
2014. http://www.armenews.com/article.php3?id_article=100595.
21. Tuncay Kayaoğ lu, “Istanbul Armenians Build First School since 1923,” Anatolian
News Agency, June 5, 2014. Accessed on August 27, 2014. http://www.aa.com.
tr/en/turkey/340495--istanbul-armenians-build-first-school-since-1923.
CH A P T E R N I N E
Addressing Controversy II:

Turkey and the Kurds
Ga l i͘ p Da l ay
Introduction
Turkey’s former deputy prime minister Beşir Atalay said in an inter-

view that during the Justice and Development Party’s ( JDP) rule since
2002, almost 60 percent of all reforms and democratization initiatives
undertaken were related to the Kurdish issue.1 This statement alone
illustrates the centrality of the Kurdish issue in Turkey’s political and
democratic evolution. The domestic consequences and economic costs
of the Kurdish issue have been all too evident: over 40,000 deaths, a
military-dominated hybrid political regime, an economic bill of hun-
dreds of billions of dollars, the institution of a regime of impunity in
the Kurdish plurality east and southeast of Turkey as a result of the
emergence of a dual legal system in a country that takes pleasure from
emphasizing the unitary nature of its state, and the fast fraying social
bondages between state and the Kurds are a few such domestic reper-
cussions to name.
Likewise, this issue exerted significant inf luence on the country’s
foreign policy and paralyzed its international engagement.2 Turkey’s
self-conceived historical goal of becoming part of the West required
it to align itself with the Western, more precisely European, legal and
political regime. Arguably, no single domestic issue has disturbed this
mission, particularly in the case of Turkey’s integration within the
194 Galip Dalay
evolving supranational European institutional arrangements as much

as the Kurdish issue did. This was particularly the case in the post–
Cold War era, when Turkey’s geopolitical importance to the West/
Europe could no longer rule supreme and the country had to be judged
based on its democratic, political, and economic progress. At this junc-
ture, political developments in Turkey and Europe seemed to set them
apart. Turkey was mired in a low-intensity warfare with the Kurdistan
Worker Party (PKK) with its attendant human rights violation and
democratic regression, while the European Union (EU) devised an
extensive list of political, legal, and democratic criteria, which came to
be known as the Copenhagen political criteria, to be fulfilled by any
applicant country for membership.
In the meantime, as Turkey strived to obtain a date to commence
formal accession negotiations with the EU and then to become a mem-
ber, the EU institutions such as the European Commission (EC),
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the European
Parliament (EP) became more directly involved in Turkey’s Kurdish
issue. Violations directly or indirectly related to this issue has consti-
tuted a significant part of the European Commission’s annual progress
report on Turkey, which was first published in 1998 and has been pro-
duced every year since. Turkey’s government had recognized the indi-
vidual petition mechanism of the ECtHR in 1987 and accepted the
court’s jurisdiction in 1990. Soon afterward, the ECtHR was f looded
with cases by Turkey’s Kurds regarding the state’s human rights viola-
tions. The EP also became more vocal about Turkey’s political trajec-
tory vis-à-vis the Kurds. As these cases illustrate, and as Dilek Kurban
puts it, “no domestic issue has preoccupied European institutions as
intensively as the Kurdish conf lict, and no other civil society organi-
sations have invoked European institutions as intensively as those in
the Kurdish region.”3 Thus, Turkey’s European vocation was fraught
with its dismal record regarding the Kurds from late 1980s to the early
2000s.
Turkey’s human rights record and democratic credentials vis-à-vis
the Kurdish issue not only tarnished its reputation with the EU, but
also with the world at large, the most dramatic manifestation of which
came when Nelson Mandela rejected Turkey’s Ataturk International
Peace Prize in 1992 by citing Turkey’s dismal human rights record
and its oppression of its Kurdish population.4 As a result of all these,
Turkey’s international standing and reputation has suffered immeasur-
ably. Its nation brand in the sphere of democracy and human rights has
been unfavorable. Its image, especially in the West, has been stained
Addressing Controversy II 195
as one of the world’s prime human rights violators. No other issue

has contributed as much toward such a negative perception of Turkey
internationally, particularly in the last three to four decades, as has the
Kurdish issue.
In addition, Turkey adopted a security-oriented perspective in its
approach toward its Middle Eastern neighbors due to their sizeable res-
tive Kurdish populations, besides the perceived threat of Islamism.5 Any
disturbance of the status quo in these countries was viewed with alarm
and translated into the language of national security in Ankara. This
mindset equated any Kurdish gain with Turkish loss in the regional
setting, and hence, ferociously opposed any manifestation of Kurdish
national demands. Thus, the Kurdish issue has cost Turkey dearly both
domestically and internationally.
The Kurdish Issue in the JDP Era: From

Recognition to Negotiation
Cognizant of the centrality of this issue and its heavy bill, the JDP shifted
the paradigm in approaching the Kurdish issue by conceiving it mostly
in political terms rather than in terms of security since coming to power
in 2002.6 The JDP’s paradigm shift has been ref lected in social and
political spaces, reaching out to both the domestic Kurdish population
and Iraqi Kurdish region. In the early years of its rule, the JDP expanded
the linguistic and broadcasting rights of the Kurds (in Kurdish), adopted
a law to compensate the financial losses of the displaced people, and
sought to alleviate the daily life of the people residing in the Kurdish
region by terminating the state of emergency regime in the remaining
part of the region and discarding some other security-oriented mea-
sures.7 However, this did not mean that both the government and the
Kurdish side completely abandoned the security-oriented approach to
settle the matter. In 2004, the PKK terminated its cease-fire, which it
had put in place following its leader Abdullah Öcalan’s capture in 1999.
Sporadically, it resorted to violence, which reached its apex in 2012.
The JDP government amended the antiterror law in 2006, which in its
revised form necessitated the prosecution of minors over the age of 15
in heavy penal courts with special authority instead of juvenile courts.
This amendment led to a large number of Kurdish minors being put on
trial for taking part in pro-PKK demonstrations.8
The JDP, nevertheless, adopted a gradualist strategy toward the res-
olution of the issue for the fear of a backlash both from the previously
196 Galip Dalay
formidable military-led secularist-nationalist establishment and society

at large. The more it consolidated its power and felt secure in the sys-
tem, the more it was willing to take higher risks in dealing with the
issue; it went from merely recognizing the Kurdish issue by its name
and offering narrowly-defined cultural and economic measures as solu-
tions in its first term to open engagement with the PKK’s leader Öcalan
for a political settlement of the matter in its last term.
The reasons the JDP invested so much time, energy, and political
capital into the resolution of this issue are multifarious. Domestically, it
pursued the goal of economic progress and political opening (or democ-
ratization), which in its most rudimentary form meant getting rid of
the military-led guardianship system’s grip over politics, in tandem.
Internationally, the JDP sought a more prominent and proactive role
for Turkey; a Turkey that was deeply involved in the regional affairs of
the Middle East while searching for a more enhanced status in interna-
tional institutions, and equality and independence in its dealing with
its major Western partners. The party’s leaders conceptualized these
changes in the modus operandi of the country as the birth of a “new”
Turkey, which strives to attain domestic peace, economic and political
progress, and international prominence as opposed to the previously
authoritarian, introverted, and economically weak “old” Turkey.9
Conscious of the shortage of its essential hard power instruments, it
believed that it could fall back on its soft power instruments to attain
its desired goals, especially in its adjacent region. Government officials
have persistently referred to the establishment of a “new” Turkey as
their prime goal. At the same time, soft power instruments have for
long been presented as one of the significant mechanisms to achieve
this goal of a new Turkey.10 The JDP leadership rightly believed that
the persistence of the Kurdish issue in its previous form would hol-
low out the content of both these terms. In order for the new Turkey
to be credible, it needed to be supported by a strong narrative and
achievement. To date, no other policy area has provided as strong a
narrative for the new Turkey than the ongoing Kurdish peace process.
As Turkey’s prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu put it, the peace pro-
cess is the only shining success story not only in Turkey but also in the
broader Middle East.11 The ongoing peace process is the most powerful
narrative that Turkey shares with the domestic and international audi-
ence. If derailed, it will strip Turkey of the power of its new narrative:
an essential ingredient of a country’s soft power. A new Turkey would
be little more than a play on words if its century-old Kurdish question
remains unresolved and the sizeable chunk of its Kurdish population
feels disenfranchised and discriminated against. To state it differently,

no other single policy can provide the narrative of a new Turkey with
as much credence as a successful settlement of the Kurdish issue. Thus,
the rationale behind and motivation for a peaceful settlement of the
issue was/is self-evident.
The current peace process, however, is not the first attempt of the
JDP government. There have been prior efforts both during and before
the JDP rose to power. During the reign of the JDP government alone,
there were two significant attempts for the settlement of the issue.
These attempts did not deliver the intended outcome; yet, it would be
implausible to portray them as failures for the fact that they socialized
the society into the peaceful resolution of the issue, thereby setting the
stage for the next level in trying to solve the issue. However, unlike
the other trials, the current peace process proved more resilient. Never
in Turkey’s history has the country has traveled that far to solve the
Kurdish issue, or at least the armed manifestation of it. Besides ide-
ational motivation, which facilitated the paradigm shift in the state’s
understanding of the issue, there have been facilitating factors that
set this process apart from other trials, and precipitating factors and
regional developments that rendered the resolution of the issue urgent.
Though Turkey has never come that close to a final settlement, there
remain many pitfalls on the road toward the successful completion of
the process.
The Ideational Foundation of the Peace Process12
At the foundation of the modern Turkish nation-state, the republican

elites crafted a new notion of identity/nationhood for the new state.
The main tenets of this new identity were Turkishness, laicism, and
Western orientation.
From this perspective, “Kurds—the largest non-Turkish ethnic group
in Turkey—have been regarded as a potential threat to Turkishness and
thus to the territorial integrity of the state. Islamism had been per-
ceived as a central threat to the laic-secular nature of the state. The
Middle East, as the geography of both of these respective identity-
ideologies, had been seen as antithetical to country’s Western orien-
tation.”13 Hence, the Middle East, Islamism and Kurdishness were
largely securitized. Despite some interruptions, this policy was upheld
by Turkey’s political and bureaucratic establishment for the majority of
the republic’s history.
198 Galip Dalay
Coming from a conservative Islamic background, the govern-

ing JDP elites have had a partial revisionist policy: they do not see
Turkishness, secularism, and Western orientation as the primary foun-
dations of Turkey’s identity nor do they see the Middle East, Islamism,
and Kurdishness as threat. As such, they gradually desecuritized them.
Of the three, desecuritization of the Kurdish issue proved to be the
most challenging, given that it has had 29 rebellions, the latest of which
culminated in the death of over 40,000 people. Moreover, the gov-
ernment had to operate within the confines of a military-dominated
system, which pursued “red-line” politics toward the Kurds abroad and
a repressive one toward the Kurds within, until 2008 and 2009. For
instance, then prime minister Erdoğan’s modest opening with regard
to the Kurdish issue, by recognizing it by its name-—Kurdish issue—
elicited stern criticisms from the military in 2005. Moreover, during
the same period, Turkey-Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
relations were marked by tension.
Yet, since 2009, as the military lost its primacy in the system, Turkey
witnessed a swift pace of desecuritization of the Kurdish issue. This
was largely facilitated by the JDP’s perception of Kurdishness as being
part of Turkey’s primary Islamic identity. The ban on the cultural and
linguistic manifestation of the Kurdishness has been gradually lifted.
The term Kurdistan, as uttered by Erdoğan in a rally in Diyarbakir
in the presence of the KRG’s president Mesut Barzani on November
16, 2013,14 has been desecuritized. Moreover, as a result of dialogue
and negotiations, both the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan are in
the process of normalization for the general public, though this pro-
cess was partially disturbed by the violent outbreak of protests over
Turkey’s alleged inaction toward the self-declared Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria’s (ISIS) siege of the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane. Around
the same time, Turkey and the KRG formed cordial relations, which
later evolved into a strategic alliance.15
The outbreak of the Arab Spring only further convinced the gov-
ernment of the wisdom of its policy of rapprochement with the Kurds.
Similar to the Islamists, the Kurds were ascending in the emerging
regional setting. Turkey’s new conservative elites believed that by cul-
tivating even closer ties with the Middle East’s two rising groups, its
foreign policy would gain significant leverage in regional politics.
Thereby, the convergence of the ideational factors and interest-based
calculations set the stage for the normalization of the Kurdish issue
both domestically and regionally.
Yet, such an ideational foundation alone cannot account for the

tenacity of the peace process that has been underway for almost two
years. There have been other attempts at brokering peace during the
JDP’s rule and prior to it. Yet, no other attempt has provoked the level
of optimism more than the one generated by the current peace pro-
cess. For the first time, Kurdish peace seems to be within the reach of a
political solution, despite all the shortcomings and setbacks throughout
the process.
Besides this ideational foundation, five factors set the current pro-
cess apart from previous trials and render the ground ripe for a solu-
tion: transformation in the state’s understanding of the Kurdish issue,
termination of military-dominated tutelary and concomitant rise of
civilian politics, the public’s increasing resistance to provocations,
the perceived legitimacy of the solution’s methods and parameters on
both sides, and an extensive and effective utilization of public rela-
tions strategies to increase and sustain public support for the process.
Furthermore, changing regional dynamics resulting from the Syrian
crisis have been another compelling determinant that pushed Turkey
to tackle the issue more earnestly. These factors can be aptly termed as
facilitating factors.
Facilitating Factors
First, state mentality in Turkey, for a long time, had been epitomized
in the policies, approaches, and decisions of the National Security
Council (NSC). The NSC was dominated by the military and served
as the most important platform for deliberating on issues of high poli-
tics. Prior to 2000, it also provided the military with the most condu-
cive mechanism to impose its will on the civilian governments, as the
NSC secretary-general had to be a military officer and the agenda of
the NSC meetings had largely been set by the military. Of all topics,
the NSC regarded the protection of the republic’s secular nature and
its territorial integrity as primary prerogatives. While any manifesta-
tion of Islamic identity and demands were deemed as posing a grave
menace to the secular nature of the republic, the Kurds’ demands for
greater cultural and political rights, as discussed above, were also con-
sidered threatening to the territorial integrity of the country. Hence
these demands were cast into security terms and were responded to
largely with security measures.
200 Galip Dalay
Yet, in 2004, Turkey overhauled the structure of the NSC as part of

its drive to conform to the EU’s political and legal demands, with the
hopes of obtaining a date to commence membership negotiations. In its
new form, the NSC had become dominated by civilians and its overall
role was relegated to that of an advisory body. This change to the com-
position and agenda of the NSC paved the way for the desecuritization
of the issues that had been previously securitized by the NSC. In this
respect, the Kurdish issue has gradually been recast into political and
civilian terms rather than security terms.
Second, dismantling the military-led guardianship system, as a result
of an active struggle against it by the civilians that took place between
2007 and 2010/2011, has unfettered the government from previous
constraints. This in return led the government to take bolder steps in
settling the Kurdish issue. As stated earlier, the recent peace process
is not the first initiative in attempting to solve the issue during the
JDP’s rule. Rather, it is the third trial. The first initiative came with
then prime minister Erdoğan’s 2005 speech in Diyarbak ır, the largest
Kurdish majority city in Turkey. In the speech, he recognized the exis-
tence of a distinct Kurdish issue. He then referred to further democra-
tization and economic improvement of the Kurdish-dominated region
as the way forward for tackling the issue.
Despite the modest nature of the overture, his remarks elicited stern
criticism from the military-led secular establishment, which in return
led him to backtrack on this opening. The second initiative came in
2009, when the balance of power was already tilting in favor of the
government in the fight against the old guards. This initiative was pre-
mised on secret negotiations between PKK representatives and officials
from the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) in Oslo. However,
this opening f loundered due to the mass arrests of Kurdish politicians
and activists within the framework of the Kurdistan Communities
Union (KCK), a transnational umbrella organization steered by the
PKK and comprised of the sister parties in Syria, Iraq, and Iran that aim
to create an “independent state structure.”
The most audacious step to date came with the current peace pro-
cess, which was centered on open dialogue with Abdullah Öcalan, the
leader of the PKK. This occurred only after government won a deci-
sive victory over the old guards in a power struggle. As can be seen,
the more the civilian government gained ground vis-à-vis the mili-
tary, thus feeling secure in the system, the more willing and capable it
became in taking bolder and more sophisticated steps in approaching
the issue.16
Third, throughout the history of the PKK insurgency in Turkey,

some form of cease-fire has been proclaimed at least nine times in order
to clear the way for a political solution to set in.17 Yet, each of these
cease-fires was broken as a result of provocations on both sides. This
has gradually led the general public to develop a strengthened immune
system against similar provocations. The fact that the recent peace pro-
cess withstood a wide variety of provocations since its start attests to
this increased level of public resistance to provocations. This in return
rendered the task of negotiating parties easier.
Fourth, the growing convergence between the Kurds and Turkey
on the broader boundaries within which a prospective solution would
take place is another facilitating factor. In this respect, Öcalan’s letter,
which was read aloud to a crowd of a million gathered in Diyarbak ır on
March 21, 2013 was critical. In his letter, Öcalan declared two things:
first, that the PKK seeks a solution to the Kurdish issue within Turkey’s
borders and through further democratization, thus effectively renounc-
ing any irredentist claims and violence. Second, that the era of armed
struggle has come to an end. In the new era, the struggle for Kurdish
rights will be advanced through political means.18 Both of these points
increased the legitimacy of the Kurdish demands in the eyes of the
broader public. Yet, as the discussion over the Kurdish part of Syria,
Rojava, illustrated, especially starting from the second half of 2014,
the parties seemed to move apart from each other with regard to their
understanding of the solution. If this gap is not bridged, this trend
might prove challenging in moving forward with the process.
Fifth, the process has been effectively communicated to the pub-
lic. In other words, the public was involved and made a stakeholder in
the process through various mechanisms. This aspect was particularly
aided by the fact that the current peace process commenced and con-
tinues with public knowledge. First, the government and the JDP offi-
cials, but particularly then prime minister and now president Erdoğan,
has consistently and extensively explained to the public the necessity
and rationale of the process and the advantages of its successful com-
pletion for Turkey, Kurds, and the broader region. Second, in order
to (re)shape the public opinion on the peace process and the Kurdish
issue, JDP branches throughout Turkey prepared and distributed pam-
phlets to the public. Third, a “wise men commission” composed of 63
prominent individuals with different political, social and professional
backgrounds-—including singers, actors and actresses, journalists,
business leaders, and NGO leaders—was established with the task of
communicating the process to the public, cultivating support for it, and
202 Galip Dalay
advising the government on a roadmap.19 The members of the com-

mission visited seven geographic regions of Turkey, met people and
informed them about the nature, content, and goal of the process. In
return, they prepared their reports consisting of their observations and
recommendations for the government’s use. Fourth, the media, public
personalities, the government, and the Kurdish side largely adopted a
responsible language about the process. All these efforts helped recast
the Kurdish issue in political terms and increased support for the pro-
cess as illustrated by various poll results.20
Regional Dimension
As outlined above, Turkey’s changing perception of the Kurdish issue

manifested itself most clearly in its improving relations with the KRG.
This sea change in relations with the KRG occurred in 2008–2009;
prior to this, Turkey’s policy toward the KRG was epitomized by a set
of untenable “red-lines.” This was also around the time when Turkey
was embarking on its “democratic opening” in the summer of 2009,
which aimed to settle the Kurdish issue through secret negotiations
with the representatives of the PKK. This opening is seen as the pre-
cursor of the current process.
As the domestic Kurdish issue was gradually desecuritized, Turkey
began to view the KRG through the prism of opportunity and mutual
benefits. In particular, the KRG’s vast untapped energy resources
have come to occupy a special place in Turkey’s energy-hungry
imagination. Given that Turkey is mostly reliant on prickly Russia
and Iran for energy, the KRG’s resources are seen as a way to lessen
Turkey’s reliance on these nations, thereby contributing to Turkey’s
energy security, as well as helping it realize its ambition of becoming
an energy transit hub between Europe and the Middle East/Central
Asia.21
Moreover, the burgeoning trade between Turkey and Iraq, 70–8022
percent of which is conducted with the KRG, was another factor for
improved relations. The sides later leveraged these energy and trade
relations with political-security goals, which then evolved into a strate-
gic alliance.23 While Turkish-KRG relations were experiencing such a
level of amelioration, the “democratic opening” almost ran aground as
a result of the outbreak of the conf lict and the mass arrests of Kurdish
politicians and civilians within the framework of the KCK trials in
2010–2011. Soon afterward, the outbreak of the waves of protests in
Syria, which quickly developed into a full-f ledged civil war, further
complicated the nature of Turkey’s domestic Kurdish issue.
Such a fast-paced deterioration of the Kurdish issue internally did
not bode well for Turkey—KRG relations. To put it differently, the
simmering tension and open hostility between Turkey and PKK-
spearheaded Kurdish movement cast doubts over the future direction
of Turkey-KRG relations. This tense climate between the sides with
possible dire consequences for the significantly improving relations was
only further aggravated by the emergence of the Kurdish dimension of
the Syrian crisis in 2012. Thus, Turkey’s belief that its relations with
the KRG would remain tenuous unless it settles its own Kurdish issue,
coupled with the perceived danger stemming from the PKK-affiliated
Kurdish groups gaining ground in Syria precipitated the initiation of
the peace process. Moreover, the fact that an ongoing internal con-
f lict with the Kurds would have significantly tainted Turkey’s image of
championing the democratic aspirations of the people across the Arab
world rising against autocratic regimes was another motivating factor
in Turkey’s search for a peaceful settlement of its own Kurdish issue.
Precipitating Factors
The year 2012 was the deadliest in the conf lict between Turkey and
the PKK since the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999.
The PKK’s dramatic intensification of its armed activities in 2012 was
particularly caused by the dynamics and psychology that were ushered
in by the events in the Arab world. By mirroring the Arab Spring, the
PKK believed that it could create momentum for a “Kurdish Spring.”24
In fact, the PKK leadership openly speculated about such a possibil-
ity.25 The momentum created by the Arab Spring, but especially the
Syrian imbroglio, exerted a significant impact on the PKK as well as
on Turkey’s calculations regarding the Kurdish issue and its prospec-
tive settlement. Despite the fact that the PKK failed to generate similar
momentum in the Kurdish dominant part of Turkey, it clearly demon-
strated that it could also reap the spoils of the Arab Spring, as its off-
spring party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), was gaining ground
in the Kurdish part of Syria.
Stating differently, 2012 was also the year in which the Kurdish
dimension of the Syrian conf lict was most evident.26 In July 2012,
the PYD took control of border towns and state institutions that were
evacuated by retreating regime forces in Syria. This paved the way for
204 Galip Dalay
the eventual proclamation of self-rule by the PYD in Kurdish enclaves.

Since then, the PYD, despite the friction with other Kurdish and oppo-
sition groups, has only strengthened its grip over the areas that it con-
trols, which was only seriously challenged when the radical terrorist
group ISIS attacked and laid siege to Kobane starting from September
16, 2014. Turkey furiously responded by threatening armed interven-
tion, if necessary, to stif le any attempt towards a fait accompli on the part
of the Kurds until the dust of the Syrian crisis settles.
At the initial stage, Turkey refused to meet any representatives of the
PYD and put forward three preconditions for dialogue: the PYD must
sever ties with the regime, which the PYD denied having on numerous
accounts; the PYD may not support any terrorist groups and activities
in Turkey, which meant that the PYD had to distance itself from its
mother organization, the PKK; and lastly, the PYD cannot seek any
fait accompli until the Syrian crisis is solved, which meant that it should
not establish a self-ruled Kurdish enclave in Syria while the conf lict
is ongoing.27 However, this policy did not stick. As the crisis in Syria
deepened, much-expected intervention remained unfulfilled and the
opposition proved ineffective, whereas the PYD proved resilient by
enhancing and entrenching its control over the Kurdish populated area
of Syria, most of which borders Turkey. Therefore, Ankara revised its
policy toward the PYD. Previously persona-non grata, Salih Muslim was
invited to Turkey for talks with the foreign ministry, during which
he met with the undersecretary of the ministry, Feridun Sinirlioğ lu,
and the head of the National Intelligence Organization, Hakan Fidan.
These meetings and exchanges resulted in a recognizable toning down
of the critical language on Turkey’s side.
Likewise, the PYD also adopted a new parlance aimed at quelling
Turkey’s concerns. It talked about possible cooperation with Turkey
and tried to convey the message that Kurdish gains in Syria should
not be regarded as Turkey’s loss. However, the adoption of positive
language on both sides has not been a consistent policy, as has been
evident with the stern accusatory exchanges between Turkey and PYD
representatives since the outbreak of the PYD-ISIS fight.28
Putting this aside, as stated above, the PYD is an offspring of the
PKK. Similar to the PKK, it also regards Abdullah Öcalan as its undis-
puted leader. Given this direct link between the PYD and the PKK,
it became clear that unless Turkey tackles its own domestic Kurdish
issue in earnest and engages with the PKK, rapprochement with the
PYD-headed Syrian Kurds would remain untenable and Turkey’s
Syria policy would be further complicated. The then prime minister
Erdoğan’s announcement of the dialogue initiated with Öcalan to solve

the Kurdish issue in the closing days of 2012 had this regional picture
in the background.
Challenges Ahead
The peace process has already achieved some significant milestones.

It largely recast the Kurdish issue into political terms, socialized soci-
ety into a peaceful settlement of the issue, provided Turkey with a
new narrative, and proved resilient in the face of various provocations.
Its achievements can be further extended. Yet, the negotiating parties
should not become oblivious to the challenges and perils facing the
process.
One of the perils surrounding the peace process is (and will be)
the inf lated expectation of the process and the exaggerated mean-
ing that has been (and will be) bequeathed on it. The termination of
fighting and the PKK’s laying down of arms, in and of itself, do not
signify the solution of the Kurdish issue in its entirety. Instead, this
will mean the cessation of the armed manifestation of the Kurdish
issue, a sine qua non phase for Turkish and Kurdish politics to move
forward to deal with the crux of the issue which is centered around
the prevalent feeling of alienation among the Kurds from the state and
the structural inequality deeply rooted in Turkey’s identity impos-
ing state— trait that was conceived, from the outset of the republic,
by modern Turkey’s founding fathers. Further democratization and
comprehensive political, economic, and social reforms are needed to
tackle this aspect of the issue. This assessment is in accordance with
world experiences of the settlement of ethnopolitical conf licts. As
these cases illustrate, the major part of resolution or final settlements
of such disputes begins more in earnest once the armed manifesta-
tion of these conf licts is over. In this regard, the stakeholders need
to adopt a carefully crafted language in communicating the process
to the public. While encouraging and cultivating support from the
public for the concerned parties to take necessary steps to bring the
armed phase of the issue to a terminal end, they should not imply
an exaggerated optimism and inf lated expectation about what the
ongoing process can deliver in dealing with the Kurdish issue in its
entirety. Disillusionment and disappointment of the public will ren-
der the task of a conclusive and comprehensive settlement harder to
attain in the postconf lict phase.
206 Galip Dalay
The opposing sides in the conf lict seem to have agreed on the
method of the settlement but not on the content of it as of yet. Turkey
sees the issue mainly as an internal one centered around state-indi-
vidual relations, rather than group-state relations. The ultimate goal
of the process is the termination of the conf lict and disarmament of
the PKK. It prefers to deal with the issue in isolated from the devel-
opments surrounding the Kurds in neighboring countries. Moreover,
rather than granting any special status, it locates the Kurdish grievances
within Turkey’s wider democratic deficit. While recognizing the fact
that the PKK is the consequence of the Kurdish issue, not the cause of
it, and, hence, that these two issues are intimately interlinked, Turkey
still wants to draw a level of distinction between them. To this end,
Turkey seeks to solve the PKK issue, or the armed aspect of the issue,
through dialogue at the highest level, and the Kurdish issue through
gradual democratization and economic progress.
The Kurdish part, however, does not distinguish between the domes-
tic Kurdish issue and the broader Kurdish presence, demands, and
yearnings region-wide. The waves of protests induced by the Kurdish
movement over the government’s purported inaction over the ISIS’
siege of Kobane on October 6–7, 2014 which culminated in the death
of over 40 people, amply confirmed this stance.29 It is not only that
the Kurdish movement does not regard the ongoing peace process in
isolation of broader regional development, it sees the evolution of the
process as being contingent upon these unfolding developments, espe-
cially the ones in Syrian Kurdistan. Furthermore, their understanding
of a solution is not confined to the individual-level democratization or
amelioration of rights and liberties. Instead, they attach as much impor-
tance to collective group rights as they do to individual rights, if not
greater. For instance, restructuring Turkey’s administrative system with
the aim of devolving more power to local administration and acquir-
ing a political status stand as the two primary demands of the Kurdish
movement. Disarmament should also be part of a broader political set-
tlement. Bridging these divergent views of the settlement between the
sides, though not insurmountable, is likely to prove formidable.
Conclusion
A final solution to the Kurdish issue obviously requires Turkey to devise

a new constitution. Some of the fundamental demands voiced by the
Kurdish side, which include but is not limited to the use of the Kurdish
language in all levels and types of educational institutions, modifica-

tion of the citizenship clause, and devolution of power to local author-
ities, can only materialize with constitutional amendments. However,
Turkey’s a new constitution writing process, which began in 2011, has
failed due to disagreements among parties over contentious articles.
Yet, the government thus far has taken some significant steps and has
indicated that it is ready to take further steps to advance the process.
Besides expanding cultural, linguistic, and broadcasting rights, the
government also met some of the long-standing Kurdish demands for
a legal framework for and the institutionalization of the peace process.
In this regard, the much-awaited six-article bill entitled “Draft Law to
End Terror and Strengthen Social Integration”30 was adopted by the
government on July 10, 2014. In addition, the government established
the “Reconciliation Process Committee”31 on October 1, 2014. These
steps were intended to demonstrate its commitment to the process and
also to alleviate Kurdish fears that the process is underway in de facto
terms, or that it lacks any legal/institutional basis, and is easily revers-
ible depending on the government’s will. Moreover, the government
did not rule out another key demand of the Kurdish side for establish-
ing an independent committee of observers that will oversee the peace
process32—in fact, some of the senior JDP officials offered their support
for this demand. Finally, before the outbreak of the Kobane protests,
both the government and Öcalan said that a roadmap of the process with
a concrete action plan was soon to be shared with the public. Though
gradual and incomplete, all of these factors point to the continuing will
on the part of the government to advance the process.
In addition, structural factors and rational political calculations
appear to favor the upholding of the process for both sides. On the
government’s side, first, if the process derails, Turkey will be devoid of
any significant success narrative both domestically and internationally.
Second, growing anti-JDP coalitions will be emboldened by the pres-
ence of dynamic and self-confident Kurdish politics. Third, Turkey’s
regional policy will be further complicated and the alliance with the
KRG will become fragile.
In addition, the reinitiation of the conf lict will also prove to be a sig-
nificant setback for Turkey’s public diplomacy which it has so strenu-
ously worked to develop since the JDP came to power in 2002. Turkey
has exponentially increased its development and humanitarian aid over
the years. It claimed the third spot on the Global Humanitarian Aid
Report.33 It has also significantly increased its international scholarship
schemes. Globally expanding Yunus Emre Institutes are promoting
208 Galip Dalay
Turkish language and culture. All these public diplomacy activities

and soft power instruments, among others, are expected to improve
Turkey’s image and its nation branding. All this investment, however,
will suffer a blow if the Kurdish peace process is derailed and conf lic-
tual images from Turkey go viral globally. Therefore, the settlement of
the issue will give a boost to Turkey’s public diplomacy as it will offer
a successful end to a long-standing conf lict in a region mired in hot
and cold conf licts. On the other hand, the rekindling of the conf lict
will deal a serious blow to Turkey’s nation brand and public diplomacy
efforts.
Moreover, Turkey’s officials have argued that its soft power capacity
and the strength of its public diplomacy is derived from its history, cul-
ture, and geography.34 Such appreciation of Turkey’s history, culture,
and geography has paved the way for a more multicultural reading of
Turkey’s society and state. The new Turkey’s narrative was strongly
built around such a multicultural setting. Nonsettlement of the Kurdish
issue and failure to accommodate the Kurds’ demands for further polit-
ical, cultural, and social rights will dilute and weaken this narrative.
There will be several setbacks to the Kurdish side if the peace pro-
cess does not continue. First, their leader and chief negotiator Öcalan’s
hopes of being freed from his prison cell and becoming a coprotagonist
of Turkey’s peace would be dashed. Second, the recent strategy of the
Kurdish movement to fill the vacuum on the Left side of the politi-
cal spectrum by breaking into Turkey’s liberal/Left-wing constituency
would be sealed for the foreseeable future. Third, the PKK’s aim of
being removed from the terrorist lists of the Western countries and
establishing some kind of relationship with them would surely remain
unfulfilled for a long time. Fourth, Turkey can further frustrate the
Kurdish political calculations in Syria. This list can go on for both
sides.
Additionally, in a democracy, a major project of that magnitude will
not be able to move forward for an extended period of time in the
absence of a significant public support. One of the strengths of the
ongoing process has been the incremental rising of the support that
it has received from the public. This has eased the task of the nego-
tiating parties and needs to be sustained in order to bring the process
forward.
Despite all the pitfalls and challenges, the arguments for the advance-
ment of the process seem stronger than the arguments against it. Yet,
an ethnopolitical dispute of that magnitude can’t solely rely on the
rationality and power of the arguments in its favor for its successful
completion. Instead, it is the political will and dexterity on both sides

that will prove decisive as to whether the sides will turn the momen-
tum in favor of the successful resolution of the issue into reality.
Notes
1. See Besir Atalay’s interview with Nil Gü lsü m in Yeni Safak, Nil Gü lsü m,
“Tü rkiye nefes aldi,” Yeni Safak, October 13, 2013. Accessed October 23, 2014.
http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/roportaj/turkiye-nefes-aldi-573622.
2. Galip Dalay, “Foreign Policy Implications of the Kurdish Peace for Turkey,” Al
Jazeera, July 26, 2013
3. Dilek Kurban, “Europe as an Agent of Change: The Role of the European Court
of Human Rights and the EU in Turkey’s Kurdish Policies,” SWP Research
Paper, October 6, 2014.
4. “Nelson Mandela: Irkçı l ı kla mücadeleye adanm ı ş bir ömü r,” Hürriyet, December
7, 2013, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/25291705.asp.
5. For an overview of the Turkish republic’s securitization politics, see Galip Dalay,
“Kurdish Peace Process: The Latest Phase of De-Securitisation politics,” Al
Jazeera, May 14, 2013; For a journalist’s perspective on the state’s securitization
of the Kurdish issue, especially in the roiling years of 1990s, see Hasan Cemal,
Kürtler (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2003); For a good account of how the Kurdish
issue has been perceived and presented in the state’s discourse, see Mesut Yegen,
Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu, (Istanbul: İ letişim Yay ı nlar ı, 1999).
6. As Mesut Yegen argued, the failure of Turkey’s politics of assimilation, repres-
sion, and containment used until the late 1990s against the Kurds gave way to
a new politics of “soft” recognition at the turn of the new millennium. Mesut
Yegen, “The AK Party and the Kurdish Question: Conf lict to Negotiation,” Al
Jazeera Center for Studies Report, January 15, 2014. Also see Metin Atmaca’s
work on the history of Turkey’s attempts to settle the Kurdish issue peacefully.
Metin Atmaca, “Ozal’dan Erdogan’a Kurt Sorununda Cozum Sureci,” in Hakan
Samur and Zelal Kizilkan Kisacik (eds) Turkiye’nin Demokratiklesmesi: Etnik-Dini
Kesimler Uzerinden Degisimin Analizi, (Konya: Cizgi Yayinevi, 2014), pp. 19–53.
7. See, Taha Ozhan and Hatem Ete, “Kü rt Meselesi: Problemler ve Cözü m
Önerileri,” SETA Analiz, November 2008.
8. For a detailed account of the JDP’s record with regard to the Kurdish issue from
a human rights perspective, see Dilek Kurban, “Europe as an Agent of Change:
The Role of the European Court of Human Rights and the EU in Turkey’s
Kurdish Policies,” p. 21.
9. For a wide range of analyses on the JDP’s policies/vision in its early years and the
evolution of Political Islam in Turkey, see, M. Hakan Yavuz, ed., The Emergence
of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti (Utah: University of Utah Press,
2006). As regards the JDP’s utilization of human rights and democracy discourse
as a shield against the then powerful secularist establishment and as a mean for
210 Galip Dalay
systemic security and legitimacy, see Ihsan Dagi, “The Justice and Development
Party: Identity, Politics, and Human Rights Discourse in the Search for Security
and Legitimacy,” in M. Hakan Yavuz (ed.) The Emergence of a New Turkey:
Democracy and the AK Parti (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006),
pp. 88–107.
10. Starting from the second term of the JDP until the early phase of the Arab Spring,
there emerged a considerable amount of literature on Turkey’s “soft power” and
its utilization of public diplomacy. For instance, Ibrahim Kalin, “Soft Power and
Public Diplomacy in Turkey,” Perceptions 16, no. 3 (2011): 5–23.
11. See Davutoglu’s interview with Ibrahim Karag ü l, “Tek bir ba şar ı hikayesi var,”
Yeni Safak, September 15, 2014. Accessed October 24, 2014. http://www.yenisa-
fak.com.tr/roportaj/tek-bir-basari-hikayesi-var-685039.
12 . Some part of arguments advanced in this chapter has also appeared in my GMF
on Turkey policy series. See Galip Dalay, “The Kurdish Peace Process: Ideology,
Interest, and the Regional Dynamics,” GMF Series on Turkey, Analysis, April
29, 2014.
13. Galip Dalay, “Kurdish Peace Process: The Latest Phase of De-Securitisation
Politics.” Al Jazeera Opinion, 14 May 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
opinion/2013/05/2013514154722778273.html, Accessed May 8, 2015.
14. “Ba şbakan Erdoğan Diyarbak ı r’da konuştu,” Milliyet, November 16, 2013.
Accessed October 24, 2014. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/basbakan-erdogan-
diyarbakir-da/siyaset/detay/1793255/default.htm.
15. For a short read on how Turkey-KRG’s economic and energy relations soon
evolved into a strategic partnership, see David Phillips, “Turkey and Iraqi
Kurdistan Are Strategic Partners,” Atlantic Council, June 27, 2009.
16. Galip Dalay, “Çözü m sü reci ve düşü ndü rdü kleri,” Star – Acik G örüs, March 2,
2013.
17. “PKK: Tü rkiye ad ı m atmazsa ateşkesi bitirebiliriz,” Al Monitor, September 25,
2014. Accessed October 25, 2014. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/origi-
nals/2014/09/turkey-pkk-commander-bayik-threatens-resume-war.html.
18. See “Full Transcript of Abdullah Ocalan’s Ceasefire Call,” Euronews, March 22,
2013. Accessed October 25, 2014. http://www.euronews.com/2013/03/22/web-
full-transcript-of-abdullah-ocalans-ceasefire-call-kurdish-pkk/.
19. See the list of wise men committee members, “Wise Men Committee Members
Announced,” Anadolu Agency, April 3, 2013. Accessed October 25, 2014.
http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/153507--wise-men-committee-members-
announced.
20. “Çözü m için destek 3 ayda 2 kat artt ı,” Sabah, April 3, 2013. Accessed October
25, 2014. http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2013/04/03/cozum-icin-destek-3-
ayda-2-kat-artti; also see “Çözü m sü recine destek Tü rkiye genelinde y üzde 57,
Kü rt nü fusta y üzde 83,” T24, September 29, 2014. Accessed October 25, 2014.
http://t24.com.tr/haber/cozum-surecine-turkiye-genelinde-57-kurt-nufusta-
83-destek,272210.
21. Gonul Tol, “Untangling the Turkey-KRG Energy Partnership: Looking beyond
Economic Drivers,” Instituto Affari Internazionali Policy Brief 14, March 2014.
22 . Depending on the method of the estimation, different accounts give different

levels of trade between Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. But
almost all of these accounts put the level of the trade between these sides as being
between 70–80 percent of Turkey’s whole trade with Iraq.
23. Tol, “Turkey-KRG Energy Partnership.”
24. In fact, this term was not only used by the Kurdish politicians or event-driven
journalists but also by some scholars of the Kurdish issue who adopted the term
for their works. For example, see Mohammed M. A. Ahmed and Michael M.
Gunter, eds., The Kurdish Spring: Geopolitical Changes and the Kurds (Costa Mesa,
CA: Mazda, 2013).
25. One of PKK’s top leaders Duran Kalkan repeatedly said that 2012 will witness
a new kind of resistance while denoting 2013 as the year of the revolutionary
peoples’ war against Turkey. “Kalkan: Şemdinli daha ba şlang ıç,” Firatnews.com,
August 8, 2012. Accessed October 26, 2014. http://www.ajansafirat.com/news/
guncel/kalkan-themdinli-daha-bathlangyc.htm.
26. Galip Dalay, “Turkey’s Approach to Syria’s Kurds Ignores Potential Gains,” World
Politics Review, August 15, 2012.
27. Galip Dalay, “The Kurdish Peace Process: Ideology, Interest, and the Regional
Dynamics,” GMF on Turkey, April 29, 2014.
28. See reporting by Alex Christie Miller on the stern exchanges between PYD and
Turkey, “Kurds Accuse Turkish Government of Supporting ISIS,” Newsweek, October
22, 2014. Accessed October 26, 2014. http://www.newsweek.com/2014/10/31/
kurds-accuse-turkish-government-supporting-isis-278776.html.
29. For an analysis on the ramifications of the October 6–7 protests on the peace pro-
cess, see Yunus Akbaba, “6–7 Ekim Olaylari ve Cozum Sureci,” SETA Perspektif,
October 2014.
30. “Reform Package Brings Kurdish Question to Legal Ground,” Daily Sabah,
July 16, 2014. Accessed October 26, 2014, http://www.dailysabah.com/poli-
tics/2014/07/16/reform-package-brings-kurdish-question-to-legal-ground. For
an analysis of this law’s impact on the process see Wise Men Commission member
Yilmaz Ensaroglu’s interview with Sadik Sanli, “5 SORU: Çözü m Sü reci Yasa
Tasar ısı,” SETA website, June 28, 2014. Accessed October 26, 2014. http://setav.
org/tr/5-soru-cozum-sureci-yasa-tasarisi/yorum/16039.
31. “Reconciliation Process Committee Established to Permanently Resolve the
Conf lict,” Daily Sabah, October 1, 2014. Accessed October 26, 2014. http://
www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/10/01/reconciliation-process-committee-
established-to-permanently-resolve-the-conf lict.
32. See the former deputy prime minister and current JDP spokesperson Besir Atalay’s
interview with Fadime Ozkan, “Beşir Atalay: Kobani olaylar ı Çözüm Süreci’ni
aşıladı,” Star, October 19, 2014. Accessed October 26, 2014. http://haber.stargazete.
com/yazar/hdp-oyuna-geldigini-anladi-kobani-olaylari-sureci-asiladi/yazi-953671.
33. “Turkey Ranks Third in Humanitarian Aid Delivery,” Daily Sabah, August
20, 2014. Accessed November 5, 2014. http://www.dailysabah.com/
nation/2014/08/20/turkey-ranks-third-in-humanitarian-aid-delivery.
34. Ibrahim Kalin, “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey,”pp. 5–23.
CH A P T E R T E N
Expanding Perspective: Reaching Out

to China and the East
Ç a Ğ da Ş Ü ng ö r
Introduction
This article aims to shed light on the Turkish government’s public

diplomacy vision and activities geared toward the Asia-Pacific region
in the twenty-first century. The first decade of the century is associated
with the rise of the conservative Justice and Development Party (Adalet
ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP, or JDP) in Turkish politics. Progovernment
circles often highlight the economic growth and political stability asso-
ciated with the JDP era, as opposed to the 1990s when Turkey was
aff licted with financial crises and weak coalition governments. Main
domestic transformations under the JDP rule (2002–2014) include the
declining inf luence of military circles in decision making, and the
prospect of a resolution for Turkey’s long standing Kurdish problem.
In the foreign policy realm, JDP remains committed to its promise of
granting Turkey its full EU membership, although it may be difficult
to reconcile this ideal with the growing emphasis on Islamic solidarity
and Ottoman nostalgia. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s governments criti-
cized previous administrations for adopting a strict pro-Western orien-
tation and turning their backs on Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors.
Turkey’s “zero-problems with neighbors” policy succeeded in chang-
ing this image, at least until the complications brought about by the
Arab Spring.
214 Çağdaş Üngör
Turkey’s rising “soft power” in this decade manifested itself in the

popularity of Turkish TV dramas abroad, as well as the soaring num-
ber of tourists, foreign students, and immigrants f lowing into Turkey.1
This study examines whether or not Turkish soft power stretches to
the Asia-Pacific region. JDP’s foreign policy activism, as well as the
inf luence of global economic dynamics, resulted in closer ties with
East and Southeast Asia in the 2000s. An important case in point is
the country’s growing trade volume with China, which has reached
24 billion dollars in 2013. Also noteworthy is Turkey’s cooperation
with Asia-Pacific countries in the fields of energy, technology transfer,
and infrastructure projects. The Turkish government is also willing to
participate in regional organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) or the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN). The country’s mediation efforts in the Asia-Pacific region
showcase the multifaceted and long-term nature of this new engage-
ment.2 These developments led academics to examine different aspects
of Turkey’s ties with East and Southeast Asian countries. The themes
of “public diplomacy,” “nation branding,” and “soft power,” however,
seem to have escaped scholarly focus.
This chapter aims to evaluate the relevance and extent of Turkish soft
power in the Asia Pacific. Since Joseph Nye coined the term in 1990,
there has been an intense discussion over the definition and practical
applications of soft power. At its root, this term refers to a nation’s over-
all attractiveness and its ability to achieve objectives without resorting
to coercion. Its key elements, according to Nye, are culture, political
values, and foreign policies.3 But how does a country enjoy a favorable
soft power position in today’s world? Nancy Snow lays down the fol-
lowing criteria:
1. When culture and ideas match prevailing global norms;

2. When a nation has greater access to multiple communication
channels that can inf luence how issues are framed in global news
media; and
3. When a country’s credibility is enhanced by domestic and inter-
national behavior.4
Any assessment of Turkey’s capacity to win hearts and minds in the

Asia-Pacific region needs to address these criteria.
Throughout this study, I will deal with the contents of the Turkish
soft power “toolkit” in this region, which includes mass media, cultural
and artistic platforms, academic exchange programs and scholarships,
Expanding Perspective 215
and more. Equally important is the disaster relief and humanitarian

aid extended by the Turkish government and civil society organiza-
tions to a number of South and Southeast Asian countries in recent
years. Turkish business groups and religious communities, such as the
Fethullah Gü len (“Hizmet”) movement, are also active in several Asian
countries. Nevertheless, Turkey’s presence in this region is still minis-
cule. Unlike in the Middle East or the Balkans, Turkish public diplo-
macy confines itself to introducing Turkish culture to local audiences
rather than generating favorable political outcomes in the long run.
Another question is whether or not Turkish culture and ideas appeal
to the Asia-Pacific audiences. Under the conservative JDP govern-
ment, Turkey’s Ottoman heritage and Islamic identity has clearly
become an important theme in public discourse. Erdoğan’s defiance
of the Israeli government, crystallized in his “one minute” speech at
the Davos Summit in 2009 struck a chord with Arab audiences. In
the Asia-Pacific region, JDP officials often refer to common religious
bonds to establish favorable relations with Muslim-majority nations.
However, in most parts of Asia, Turkey’s Ottoman heritage is not part
of collective memory. By contrast, the emphasis on religious sentiment
might be inf lammatory in many South and Southeast Asian countries,
most of which have multiethnic, multireligious social compositions.
Unless Turkish public diplomacy relies on more tangible and relatively
universal values, such as pluralism, ethnic and religious tolerance, etc.
Turkey’s appeal in the Asia-Pacific region may remain limited.
Turkey’s New Foreign Policy, Soft Power,

and Public Diplomacy
“Public diplomacy” is simply defined as “government communication

aimed at foreign audiences to achieve changes in the ‘hearts and minds’
of the people.”5 This is a new term in Turkish foreign policy circles,
although Turkish embassies have, since the 1920s, undertaken activities
that fall under this category. During most of the twentieth century,
Turkish public diplomacy had modest objectives, such as introducing
the country’s national culture to foreign audiences. Turkey lacked the
financial means and the ideological assertiveness to establish an equiv-
alent of the United States Information Agency during the Cold War
years. Propaganda and persuasion did not become a priority for Turkish
administrations, except when there was a need to counter Armenian
or Kurdish demands. These two issues were addressed by the Kemalist
state establishment not only because they caused negative publicity

abroad but also because they were considered a direct threat to the
foundations of the Turkish State.
Following the rise of the JDP in Turkish politics, the concept of soft
power acquired new meaning in foreign policy. The intensity and scope
of Turkish public diplomacy activities saw an expansion, thanks in part
to the economic growth in the 2000s. A more fundamental change,
though, occurred with regard to the key concepts and ideas surround-
ing Turkey’s national identity. JDP’s novel perspective was built on a
critique of the pro-Western diplomatic heritage of the Kemalist era.6
Although the Erdoğan government did not question Turkey’s EU can-
didacy or NATO membership, deteriorating relations with Israel sig-
naled that Turkey would follow its own course in the Middle East.
Turkey’s strategic partnership deals with China and Russia also inten-
sified this sense of relative autonomy, which aimed to reach a new bal-
ance between East and West.
In terms of nation branding, although JDP officials cast aside the
“bridge” metaphor because of its passive connotations, Turkey’s
“unique” location between East and West is still an important selling
point.7 Despite the change of emphasis, the bridge metaphor continues
to dominate the language in popular works, tourist guides, and busi-
ness reports.8 Beyond this, Turkey’s main attraction in the early 2000s
was its unique blend of (moderate) Islam and democracy. Turkey’s self-
assumed role as the leader of the Muslim world was reinforced by its
participation in global initiatives such as the Alliance of Civilizations.9
As İ brahim Kal ın explains, Islamic identity and Ottoman heritage
acquired new significance in this era:
In the larger Euro-Asian landmass, the common denominator

for Turks, Kurds, Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians, Abkhazians,
Arabs, Azeris, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Uzbeks, Turkmens and other
ethnic groups, as well as Armenian, Greek, Jewish and Assyrian
communities is the Ottoman experience they have shared and
built together. It is this Ottoman heritage that brings together
these diverse groups and enables them to relate to a shared experi-
ence in time and place. Today, Turkey represents the pivotal point
of this heritage.10
Then foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero-problems with neigh-

bors” policy was an important manifestation of this ideational change.
Not surprisingly, Turkey’s favorability ratings in Arab countries peaked
in 2011, although complications in Egypt and Syria cast doubts on

Turkey’s future appeal in this region as of 2014.11 Nevertheless, gov-
ernment pundits view the first decade of the 21st century as a period
of linear progress. The economic development and political stability in
“New Turkey” is often juxtaposed against the 1990s, an era known for
military interventions, ethnic conf lict, economic crises and weak coa-
lition governments. Inside Turkey, the JDP is praised for passing new
legislation aimed at full EU membership, launching healthcare reforms,
and making efforts to resolve the Kurdish problem. In the foreign pol-
icy realm, a proresolution perspective on the Cyprus issue and soften-
ing relations with Armenia are cited as noteworthy changes.
A more balanced take on Turkish soft power, however, also needs
to address concerns over freedom of expression and rule of law in
Turkey. Such concerns have exacerbated since 2011 but it was two
years later that Turkey’s reputation took a global nose dive. The Gezi
Park demonstrations of Istanbul in the summer of 2013 and corruption
charges against high-ranking JDP officials in winter made interna-
tional media headlines. Although JDP earned another election vic-
tory in 2014, news of police brutality and lack of due process took
its toll on Turkey’s international appeal. During the crisis, Erdoğan
government accused the demonstrators of collaborating with “foreign
conspirators” in order to instigate a “civilian coup” in Turkey. As for
the corruption allegations, prosecutors affiliated with the Fethullah
Gü len religious community were accused of establishing a “parallel
state” within the Turkish bureaucracy. The JDP government’s assault
on Gü len charter schools intensified this polarization beyond Turkey’s
borders, with negative ramifications on its soft power.12 Last but not
least, the nationwide ban on YouTube and Twitter left a memorable
scar on Turkish democracy.
Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that Turkey’s “charm offen-
sive” followed a linear and uninterrupted journey in the 2000s. After
the Syrian crisis turned into a civil war, and General Sisi ousted the
Morsi government in Egypt, Turkey seems to have lost its ability to
get results through diplomacy and persuasion even in the Middle East.
Whether or not this is a short-term hurdle, it is clear that the Turkish
brand of soft power has been geared, perhaps excessively, toward the
country’s immediate neighborhood. Frequent references to Turkey’s
Ottoman heritage and Islamic solidarity may have struck a chord with
Middle Eastern audiences but it has little relevance in Latin America,
sub-Saharan Africa or the Asia-Pacific region13. Then again, the JDP
government made substantial efforts to reach out to Asian publics in
the last decade. Below is an analysis of Turkish public diplomacy activ-

ities targeting East and Southeast Asian countries.
Soft Power Toolbox: Does Turkish Public Diplomacy

Extend to the Asia-Pacific Region?
How is Turkey perceived in the Asia-Pacific region? This is a hard

question to answer because there have been few scientific surveys
and opinion polls addressing this topic.14 The available data, how-
ever, does not offer much optimism. According to the Simon Anholt
Nation Brands Index, for instance, Chinese people’s average ranking of
Turkey in 2009 was fortieth among 50 countries.15 Public perception
of Turkey in the eyes of Indians was equally unfavorable in that par-
ticular year. Although it enjoyed more popularity in South Korea and
Japan—mainly because of historical reasons—this enabled Turkey to
reach only a twenty-something position among 50 countries.16
Many factors contribute to the relative weakness of Turkish soft
power in the Asia-Pacific region. During the Cold War, Turkey had
very limited interaction with communist countries, such as China and
Vietnam. Although Turkey was closer to the US allies such as Japan
and South Korea, ideological affinity did not necessarily translate into
substantial contact. Even today, Turkey has only a small economic and
cultural presence in this region. Nor does Turkey have any multina-
tional brands easily recognizable by Asians. In the age of the Internet
and satellite TVs, Turkish mass media is still unable to reach audi-
ences beyond its immediate neighborhood. Audiovisual exports and
the number of translated works from Turkey are similarly few in num-
ber. Nevertheless, several official agencies, NGOs, and business coun-
cils stepped up their efforts to reach out to China and the East in the
2000s.
Expanding inf luence in this region requires a considerable degree of
maneuvering and adaptation. The Turkish government’s endeavor to
attract Chinese tourists in recent years is a good case in point. The lack
of interest of Chinese visitors in Turkey’s most advertised coastal towns
and seaside resorts brought about a shift of focus to historical and cul-
tural themes. Promoting Turkish soft power in the Asia-Pacific region
may indeed require new slogans and imagery. A rethinking may be in
order even for Turkey’s conventional bridge metaphor, which does not
sound all that authentic in the Asia-Pacific context. Hong Kong tour-
ism agencies, for instance, have been using “where East meets West” as
their primary slogan for years, while Singapore takes pride in “bring-
ing the best of East and West” together in this port city.17
Turkish public diplomacy activities in the Asia-Pacific region are
organized by a number of ministries and offices. Examples include
the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Foreign Ministry, Turkish
Cooperation and Coordination Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon
Ajansı, or TIKA), Turkish Higher Education Board (Yüksek Öğretim
Kurulu), and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities
(Dı ş Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı). The Office of Public
Diplomacy (Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü), which was established
in 2010, is responsible for providing overall coordination in the public
diplomacy sphere. Due to lack of sufficient transparency in government
bodies, it is difficult to make an overall assessment of the size and effi-
ciency of Turkey’s public diplomacy activities. Given the large num-
ber of agencies with separate budgets involved in this process, it is not
possible to measure the share allocated to Asia-Pacific countries within
the annual public diplomacy budget either. Based on the sheer number
of official visits and high-profile activities, however, we can conclude
that the Asia-Pacific region is still a low priority for the Turkish gov-
ernment compared to Europe and neighboring regions.
The section below examines Turkey’s official public diplomacy
activities in the Asia-Pacific region, which include humanitarian aid,
cultural and artistic exhibitions, academic exchanges and scholarships,
mass media and the Internet, etc.
Humanitarian and Development Aid

Turkey’s activism in the humanitarian field has become an impor-
tant soft power tool in the twenty-first century.18 Given its developing
economy with a recorded GDP per capita of 11,000 USD, it is signifi-
cant that Turkey became the fourth largest humanitarian donor in the
world in 2012.19 During 2007–2011 almost 70 percent of Turkish aid
went to Pakistan, Somalia, and Iraq.20 Following natural disasters and
other humanitarian emergencies, Turkish NGOs often get involved
in relief processes. In the Asia-Pacific region, Turkey extended relief
to Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis, Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami,
and Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, among others.
Although Turkish humanitarian aid is not exclusively sent to Muslim
countries, Islamic solidarity plays a key role in setting the govern-
ment’s agenda and in public mobilization efforts.. The humanitarian
field in Turkey is dominated by faith-based organizations such as the
Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), Cansuyu, Kimse Yok Mu,

etc.21 Charity and donation campaigns organized by these NGOs often
have the biggest impact when the recipient is a Muslim-majority coun-
try. The plight of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar is a case in point. A
country which virtually had no significance for Turkish foreign pol-
icy prior to 2012, Myanmar became a public issue in Turkey after the
IHH publicized the humanitarian crisis concerning Muslim refugees
in Arakan.
In terms of development aid, the Turkish Cooperation and
Coordination Agency which was established in 1992, remains the key
government actor. According to Pınar İpek, the ideational changes in
Turkish foreign policy have reshaped the agency’s priorities. While
TIKA’s development projects concentrated on central Asia, the
Caucasus, the Balkans and eastern Europe until 2004, the agency began
to place more emphasis on Africa and the Middle East in later years.22
In the Asia-Pacific region, TIKA has a miniscule presence, with offices
only in Myanmar and Mongolia.
Cultural and Artistic Exchanges

The Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism sponsors several activ-
ities around the globe to promote Turkish culture, history, language,
arts, and tourism. The ministry has been quite active in the Asia-
Pacific region in recent years. Notable activities include Turkey’s par-
ticipation in the Shanghai Expo in 2010. Visited by 7.5 million people
according to the Cihan News Agency, the two thousand square meter
pavilion became an important outlet for introducing Turkey to Asian
audiences.23 The attentiveness of Turkish authorities to China was
later reinforced by the Sino-Turkish treaty in which it was agreed that
the year 2012 would be celebrated as the “Year of China” in Turkey;
while 2013 would be the “Year of Turkey” in China. Accordingly, in
2013, the Turkish government sponsored several high-caliber events
in China, including theatrical plays, academic conferences, musical
shows, and artistic exhibitions. As part of the cultural year’s activities,
the ministry also invited 100 Chinese intellectuals, including the Nobel
literature prize winner, Mo Yan, who paid a short visit to Turkey in
February 2014.24
The ministry is also responsible for designing strategies to attract
tourists from the Asia-Pacific region. China is a particularly impor-
tant market for the Turkish tourism industry. As of 2012, only 114,000
Chinese tourists chose Turkey as their final destination from among
the 80 million who travel abroad each year.25 Nevertheless, it is impor-

tant to recall that this number has risen considerably since 2002, when
the number of Chinese tourists visiting Turkey was merely 28,000.26
Tourists from other East and Southeast Asian countries also consti-
tute a tiny percentage of the 28 million foreign visitors Turkey hosted
in 2010.27 According to the Association of Turkish Travel Agents
(TURSAB), South Korean tourists ranged between 123,000 and
159,000, whereas around 200,000 Japanese tourists visited Turkey per
annum in the 2010–2012 period. Gearing Turkey’s tourism indus-
try toward the needs of the Asian middle classes is a long-term pro-
cess. The insufficient number of certified tourist guides f luent in the
Chinese language in Istanbul and other Turkish destinations is still a
major problem. The fact that Turkey’s official tourism portal gotur-
key.com does not offer information in any Asian language (except for
Chinese) demonstrates that the Turkish tourism industry is still very
focused on European, Russian, and Middle Eastern markets.
Another major weakness of Turkish soft power is the lack of lit-
erary inf luence in the Asia-Pacific region. The Ministry of Culture
and Tourism runs the Translation and Publication Grant Program of
Turkey (TEDA) which provides funds for the translation of Turkish lit-
erature into foreign languages. So far, TEDA has sponsored the trans-
lation of 16 works of Turkish fiction into Chinese. According to Bruce
Humes, this effort pales in comparison with the number of Turkish
works translated into German (209) or Bulgarian (169) over the years.28
The main problem here seems to be that of supply rather than demand.
Orhan Pamuk, who won the 2006 Nobel Prize in Literature com-
mands a wide readership in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region,
particularly in China.
In this respect, the Yunus Emre Institutes, the first of which was
established in 2007, are an important means of Turkish cultural diplo-
macy. Aimed at promoting Turkish language and culture abroad, the
Yunus Emre Institutes is the counterpart of France’s Alliance Française
and China’s Confucius Institutes. As of 2014, the Yunus Emre centers
operate in 28 countries, most of which are located in Turkey’s regional
neighborhood.29 Related with its mission, these institutes also help
encourage Turcology studies around the world. Under the institute’s
Turcology program, the Turkish government sends academic experts
to designated educational institutions in 35 countries, including China,
India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Mongolia.30 Yet Turkey’s only Yunus
Emre Institute in the Asia-Pacific region is located in Tokyo. The cen-
ter’s representatives host a rich array of activities, including artistic
exhibitions, fashion shows, concerts, literature panels, and so forth.31

Its Tokyo center has signed a number of cooperation agreements with
Japanese educational institutions in order to promote Turkish culture
and language in Japan. Although Chinese authorities agreed to host a
Turkish cultural center, bureaucratic hurdles have so far impeded the
launch of a Yunus Emre Institute in China. In the meantime, Turkish
universities host three branches of China’s Confucius Institutes, two in
Istanbul and one in Ankara.
Another government agency which has recently become active in
the field of public diplomacy is the Directorate of Religious Affairs
(Diyanet İşleri Ba şkanlığı), which promotes the Turkish brand of Islamic
scholarship in the Asia-Pacific region.32 The JDP government views
this as a new soft power tool, through which Turkey’s Islamic scholars
and Chinese Muslims are likely to build new bonds.33 In 2013, the
directorate sponsored the “China-Turkey Islamic Culture Expo” held
in China’s Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. The expo showcased
various artistic and cultural items related to Turkey’s Ottoman past and
Islamic heritage.34 It is also significant that the directorate had six of its
publications translated into Chinese, including Xuexi women de xianzhi
(Learning Our Prophet) and Women de Daode (Our Morals).35
Educational Exchanges and Scholarships

Scholarship and exchange programs are nothing new in Turkey. The
Turkish government has been offering scholarships to students from
“brotherly” central Asian countries since the 1990s. The JDP leader-
ship, however, set more ambitious goals to attract foreign students to
Turkish universities in the 2000s. Overseas students, including those
from the Asia-Pacific countries, are given various options to study in
Turkey. For short-term stays, the Turkish Higher Education Board
(YÖK) offers the Mevlana student exchange program, which is open to
foreign students who are already enrolled in a degree program abroad.
Launched in 2011, the Mevlana program works through bilateral agree-
ments signed by Turkish universities and their chosen counterparts in
a foreign country. Although the main idea is to encourage exchanges
at the undergraduate level, Mevlana scholarships are also extended to
professors in the designated universities. Students and academics from
Asia-Pacific countries are already making use of this program to visit
Turkey.36
Foreign students who are interested in long-term studies are eli-
gible for the “Türkiye Scholarship,” which was launched in 2012.37
Administered by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related

Communities (Yurtdı şı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı), this
scholarship provides undergraduate and graduate students tuition-free
college education, free accommodation, health care, and a monthly sti-
pend. According to official figures, in the academic year 2013–2014,
Turkish authorities received 55,000 applications from around the world
and granted 13,000 scholarships.38 The most number of applicants
were from Somalia, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Pakistan. The Türkiye
Scholarship is a generic name, which has region-specific subcategories.
“The Bosphorus Scholarship,” for instance, targets students from Latin
America and the Asia-Pacific region, dubbed as “distant geographies”
on the program’s official website.39
Turkish universities have so far attracted few students from Asia,
although this region constitutes the leading student market in overseas
education. According to the Student Selection and Placement Center
(ÖSYM), Turkish universities enrolled a total of 5 students from
Taiwan, 21 from Japan, 276 from China, and 48 from South Korea in
the 2011–2012 academic year.40 Promotion of Turkish higher educa-
tion in China is a very recent phenomenon and not all Turkish univer-
sities are recognized by Chinese authorities.41
In order for educational exchanges to become a soft power tool in the
Asia-Pacific region, Turkey needs to overcome certain structural prob-
lems and learn from past experience. The fact that only one out of three
central Asian students was able to finish their education in Turkey since
the 1990s does not portray a very optimistic picture in this sense.42
Also, Turkey ranks below OECD averages in global educational rank-
ings like PISA, whereas Asian countries top the charts.43 Likewise,
according to the Times Higher Education world university rankings,
there is only one Turkish university in the top 200 list.44 Turkish pub-
lic universities currently lack the high-end educational facilities that
could attract students from advanced capitalist countries, such as Japan,
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. Short-term exchange programs,
however, may offer better prospects, especially for those who specialize
in Turkish or Middle Eastern studies, local language, culture, religion,
et cetera.
Mass Media and Internet

Although the government’s role in nation branding and public diplo-
macy is undeniable, mass media and the Internet have become inf luen-
tial channels to spread cultural and political values in the twenty-first
century. The popularity of Turkish TV series in the Balkans, Middle

East, and North Africa, for instance, was certainly not the result of a
concerted government action. On the contrary, Magnificent Century was
heavily criticized by the conservative JDP officials for misrepresenting
the life of Suleiman the Magnificent, the well-known sixteenth cen-
tury Ottoman sultan. Although these costume dramas did not enjoy
similar publicity in the Asia-Pacific region, the recent purchase of
Magnificent Century by the Chinese national broadcaster CCTV offers
some optimism in this regard.45 But in general, Turkish cinema and
musical pieces are rarely enjoyed by Asia-Pacific audiences. Turkey has
not yet produced the equivalent of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, a
box-office hit which went on to become an overnight success on a
global scale.
Similar to other developing countries, Turkey lacks strong media
institutions that are able to inf luence world public opinion. Two offi-
cial media outlets, Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT)
and Anadolu Agency (AA) aim at fulfilling this role with little success.
These organizations did not enjoy budgetary and editorial autonomy
before 2002, and there has been no visible improvement in this realm
under the JDP government. They are, therefore, largely viewed by over-
seas audiences as “government mouthpieces.” Besides, unlike Russia
and China, Turkey does not maintain a 24-hour English-language TV
channel.46 The selection of languages in official TV broadcasts ref lects
a regional, rather than global focus: Kurdish (TRT 6), Central Asian
Turkic languages (TRT Avaz), and Arabic (TRT 7 El Turkiyya)47.
TRT radio broadcasts (Voice of Turkey) are much more diverse, avail-
able in 34 foreign languages, including Mandarin.48 Information on
the budget, personnel, and audience for TRT’s Chinese-language radio
broadcasts is not easily accessible.49 TRT Chinese has around two 2,550
followers on Twitter in May 2015, which is a considerable figure if one
recalls that Twitter is not accessible in the People’s Republic of China.
Yet, it is difficult to conclude that Turkish public diplomacy institu-
tions have, in general, a strong presence on social media.50
Ideas: The Problem with Turkish Soft Power

in the Asia-Pacific Region
Under the JDP rule, the Asia-Pacific region got renewed attention from
Turkish officials and businessmen, as did Africa and Latin America. The
number of high-level visits to Asian countries increased, overall trade
volume grew, and cultural communication witnessed a major boost.

Turkey’s fundamental approach toward the Asia-Pacific region, how-
ever, was not touched by the ideational novelties introduced by Ahmet
Davutoğlu in other areas of Turkish foreign policy. Despite the rela-
tive dynamism, the JDP government’s main outlook on East Asia has
remained the same since the 1990s. This pragmatic approach focuses
on what Turkey can gain from the Asia-Pacific region, rather than
how it can extend its economic and cultural inf luence here. Attracting
business and tourists, and drawing investment and technology from the
Asia-Pacific countries remain key goals for the present government.
Turkey’s growing trade deficit with China, Japan, and South Korea
during the JDP era demonstrates that short-term interests prevail over
long-term strategy even in the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, the
values promoted elsewhere by the government had their ref lections on
the Asia-Pacific region as well.
The JDP government has focused on international human rights
issues and humanitarian concerns more than the previous Turkish
governments. In Asia, Turkey’s concerns on the plight of Myanmar’s
Arakan Muslims, public denunciation of Abdul Kader Mullah’s execu-
tion in Bangladesh, and then prime minister Erdoğan’s “almost geno-
cide” remark about China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang
are cases in point. These examples, however, are almost always wrapped
up in a discourse of Islamic solidarity rather than a cosmopolitan human
rights consciousness. In other words, the JDP government is as highly
selective in picking issues for its human rights agenda in the Asia-Pacific
region as elsewhere. There is complete indifference, for instance, to
Chinese and Korean demands relating to Japanese war crimes, which
has been the most widely discussed human rights issue in the Asia-
Pacific region for two decades. Myanmar’s past and present democra-
tization struggle, likewise, is virtually unknown in Turkey.51 With so
few experts on East Asia, and virtually none on South and Southeast
Asia, Turkish public opinion is shaped by short-lived emotional reac-
tions rather than an in-depth understanding of these countries.
Religious identity is a constant theme in public speeches deliv-
ered by Turkish leaders to Asian audiences. During an official trip to
Singapore in January 2014, then prime minister Erdoğan referred to
Singapore as a “Buddhist” country, when he asked Singaporean offi-
cials to join hands with Turkey in mediating between Myanmar’s
Buddhists and Muslims.52 During the same trip, Erdoğan emphasized
the importance of Malaysia and Turkey’s sharing of a “common faith
and religion.”53 How such remarks will expand Turkey’s inf luence in
the Asia-Pacific region, which is characterized by multireligious and

multiethnic communities remains to be seen. Even Muslim-majority
countries like Indonesia and Malaysia have significantly large minority
groups, including the Overseas Chinese who play an important role in
local economies. Frequent references to the Ottoman past may have
resonated well, at least partially, with certain audiences in Africa, the
Balkans or the Middle East, but it has little appeal in the Asia-Pacific
region. As of today, it is also clear that Ottoman nostalgia and Islamic
solidarity fails to deliver results even in the Middle East, which is cur-
rently shaken by political chaos and sectarian violence.
Conclusion
Evaluating Turkey’s soft power in the Asia-Pacific region is important

because this region hosts some of the most advanced economies in the
world. China, Japan, and the Asian Tigers are likely to reshape global
economic dynamics in the twenty-first century. Although Turkey has
intensified relations with East and Southeast Asian countries under the
JDP government, it is difficult to say that Turkish civil society, media,
and intellectuals pay the Asia-Pacific region attention commensu-
rate with its growing economic and political significance. Despite all
efforts, new Turkey is still very focused on its regional neighborhood.
The relative neglect of the Asia-Pacific region is visible in the insti-
tutional mechanisms guiding Turkish public diplomacy. The devel-
opment projects undertaken by TIKA, for instance, extend only to
Mongolia and Myanmar. Turkey’s scholarship programs, likewise,
attract few students from China, although this country constitutes the
biggest student market in overseas education. Similarly, few Turkish
novels and songs are accessible to Asian audiences. And Yunus Emre
Institutes, that aim to promote Turkish culture abroad, have seem-
ingly not entered the Asia-Pacific region, with the notable exception of
Japan. Turkey’s already weak soft power basis in the Asia-Pacific region
may further be hurt by the ongoing political struggle between the JDP
and the Fethullah Gü len religious community. Gü len’s Hizmet move-
ment owns charter schools in several Southeast Asian countries, where
Turkey has little or no presence. The community’s business networks,
charities, and other civil society organizations such as the Turkish
Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) and
Pasifik Ü lkeleri ile Sosyal ve İ ktisadi Dayan ışma Derneği (PASIAD)
are important outlets to spread Turkish soft power in the Asia-Pacific.
Domestic polarization, therefore, may take a toll on Turkey’s standing

in these countries.
The polarized state of Turkish domestic politics also casts doubt on
the key values of Turkish soft power. Especially since the Gezi Park
protests of 2013, government officials defy global powers and inter-
national media, which sends mixed signals as to Turkey’s position
toward Western values and globalization. Neither does the govern-
ment’s Islamic solidarity or emphasis on the Ottoman legacy work in
a regional neighborhood that is in constant f lux after the Arab Spring.
In the Asia-Pacific region, where most countries have multiethnic and
multireligious social compositions, Turkish public diplomacy needs to
address a wider range of values that need to be worded in a more cos-
mopolitan language in the future.
Notes
1. Turkey climbed up the soft power indexes in the 2010–2012 period. See, for
instance, Jonathan McClory’s The New Persuaders, which is a global ranking of
soft power published by the Institute for Government. http://www.institutefor-
government.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20new%20persuad-
ers%20III_0.pdf
2. Turkey contributed to the peace process between Moro Islamic Front guerillas
and the government of the Philippines. The mediation efforts to settle the dis-
pute between the Myanmar government and the Rohingya Muslims are also
noteworthy. Although it lies beyond the scope of my research, Turkey has also
played a constructive role in Afghanistan. See Bü lent Aras’s “Turkey’s Mediation
and Friends of Mediation Initiative,” SAM Papers No: 4, December 2012. http://
sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/SAM_Papers_No.4-Dec12.pdf.
3. Joseph Nye, “What China and Russia Don’t Get about Soft Power,” Foreign
Policy (April 29, 2013). http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/
what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power.
4. Nancy Snow, “Rethinking Public Diplomacy” in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor
(eds) Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 4.
5. Gyorgy Szondi, “Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities
and Differences,” in Virginia Duthoit and Ellen Huijigh (eds) Discussion Papers
in Diplomacy (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendeal:
The Hague, 2008). http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20081022_
pap_in_dip_nation_branding.pdf
6. This shift is discernible in the words of Ibrahim Kal ı n, an inf luential JDP foreign
policy maker: “Turkish public no longer sees itself as a problematic and small
footnote in the Euro-centric historical narrative. ( . . . ) Turkish society desires to
see itself as an active agent in the formation of its own history. We have before us a
subject that is able and courageous enough to intervene in the f low of history, not
a subject that observes the course of history from a distance with apprehension.”
See İ brahim Kal ı n, “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey,” Perceptions
16, no. 3 (Autumn 2011): 10. http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/
ibrahim_kalin.pdf.
7. Metin Parlak, “Nation Branding in Turkey: A Rickety Bridge between East and
West,” in “Chapter 4: Nation Branding: Country Specific Evaluation,” Cultural
Diplomacy Outlook Report, (Institute of Cultural Diplomacy, 2011). http://www.
cosv.org/download/centrodocumentazione/Cultural_Diplomacy_Outlook_
Report_2011_-_04-01.pdf.
8. See, “Growing beyond: Ernst and Young’s Attractiveness Survey; Turkey 2013
(The Shift, the Growth and the Promise)” http://www.ey.com/Publication/
vwLUAssets/Turkey_attractiveness_survey_2013/$FILE/turkey_attractive-
ness_2013.pdf.
9. Ali Balcı and Nebi Miş, “Turkey’s Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A
New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?” Turkish Studies 9, no. 3 (2008):
387–406.
10. İ brahim Kal ı n, “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey,” Perceptions 16,
no. 3 (Autumn 2011): 10. http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ibra-
him_kalin.pdf.
11. See “Five Years after the Cairo Speech: How Arabs View President Obama and
America” (Washington, DC: Zogby Research Services, June 2014), p. 7.
12 . Bayram Balcı, “Gü len Movement and Turkish Soft Power,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (February 4, 2014). http://carnegieendow-
ment.org/2014/02/04/g%C3%BClen-movement-and-turkish-soft-power/h04s
13. For the weaknesses of Islamic/neo-Ottoman discourse in sub-Saharan Africa,
see Gokhan Bacik and Isa Afacan, “Turkey Discovers Sub-Saharan Africa: The
Critical Role of Agents in the Construction of Turkish Foreign Policy Discourse,”
Turkish Studies 14, no. 3(2013): 483–502.
14. Turkey’s soft power projections are generally done within the context of
Middle East. TESEV and other think tanks have conducted surveys to mea-
sure Turkey’s attractiveness in Arab countries. See Meliha Benli Altun ışı k,
“Challenges to Turkey’s ‘Soft Power’ in the Middle East,” TESEV Foreign Policy
Program (Istanbul: June 2011). http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/
file/21102013113608.pdf.
15. The Nation Brand Index measures people’s perceptions about another country.
This measurement is based on public views of products, governance, people, cul-
ture, and tourism in the country under evaluation. In 2009, out of 50 countries,
Chinese people ranked Turkish products at 44,, Turkish people and governance
at 40, and Turkish tourism at 36. http://www.simonanholt.com/Research/
research-introduction.aspx.
16. Ibid.
17. Kishore Mahbubani, “Seven Pillars of Singapore’s Soft Power,” The Huffington
Post, November 15, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kishore-mahbubani/
seven-pillars-of-singapor_b_4280459.html.
18. Reşat Bayer and Fuat Keyman, “Turkey: An Emerging Hub of Globalization and
Internationalist Humanitarian Actor?” Globalizations 9, no. 1 (2012): 73–90.
19. “Turkey Becomes 4th Largest Donor of Humanitarian Assistance,” Hürriyet Daily News,
July 19, 2013. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-becomes-4th-donor-of-
international-assistance.aspx?pageID=238&nID=50995&NewsCatID=338.
20. See Global Humanitarian Assistance website: http://www.globalhumanitarian-
assistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/In-focus-Turkey.pdf.
21. See Senem Çevik, “The Rise of NGOs: Islamic Faith Diplomacy,” USC Center
on Public Diplomacy May 27, 2014. http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/rise-
ngos-islamic-faith-diplomacy.
22 . Pı nar İpek, “Ideas and Change in Foreign Policy Instruments: Soft Power and
the Case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency,”
Foreign Policy Analysis (2013): 1–21.
23. Also see the official site of the Turkish Pavilion at Shanghai Expo 2010: http://
www.turkishpavilion2010.com/en/.
24. “Bakan Çelik Çinli Yazar Mo Yan’i kabul etti,” Radikal, February 22, 2014. http://
www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/bakan_celik_cinli_yazar_mo_yani_kabul_etti-
1178054
25. See “2010–2012 Yı llar ı nda Ü lkemize gelen Yabancı lar ı n Milliyetlerine göre
Kar şı la şt ı r ı lması (Aral ı k-Ocak)” (A Nationality-Based Comparison of Foreign
Visitors to Our Country in the Years 2010–2012), Association of Turkish Travel
Agencies (TURSAB). http://www.tursab.org.tr/tr/istatistikler/milliyetlerine-
gore-gelen-yabanci-ziyaretciler.
26. Sadi Kaymaz, “Tü rkiye’ye gelen turist say ısı nda rekor,” Hürriyet, April 1, 2013.
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/22943158.asp.
27. “Turizm Verileri,” T. C. Kü lt ü r ve Turizm Bakanl ığ ı, Ankara, 2011. http://
www.kultur.gov.tr/Eklenti/2140,turizmverileripdf.pdf?0
28. Bruce Humes, “Translation Crunch: Turkey Revs Up for Role as Country of
Honor at 2014 Beijing Book Fair,” Altaic Storytelling (blog), November 27,
2013. http://bruce-humes.com/archives/40
29. These countries are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, France, Jordan, Germany, Georgia, Hungary,
Iran, Italy, Morocco, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Montenegro,
Macedonia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa and the UK. See
Yunus Emre Institutes official website: http://yee.org.tr/turkiye/tr/kurumsal
30. Turcology program runs at 49 Turkish language/Turcology departments in 35 coun-
tries. Turkey sends experts to teach Turkish classes and provides educational mate-
rial.These countries are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, People’s Republic of China, Estonia, Morocco,
Georgia, India, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Mongolia, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation/Tartar Republic, Russian
Federation/Baskurdistan Republic, Serbia, Slovakia, Sudan, Ukraine, Ukraine/
Crimea Autonomous Region, and Yemen.
31. See the official website for Yunus Emre Institute in Tokyo, Japan: http://yee.org.
tr/japonya-tokyo/tr/anasayfa
32 . “Diyanet İşleri Ba şkan ı Çin’de,” Milliyet, June 22, 2011. http://dunya.milliyet.

com.tr/diyanet-isleri-baskani-cin-de/dunya/dunyadetay/22.06.2011/1405388/
default.htm
33. “Çinli Müslü manlardan Diyanete ziyaret,” Directorate of Religious Affairs
(Diyanet İşleri Ba şkanl ığ ı) website. http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr/icerik/cinli
-muslumanlardan-diyanet%E2%80%99e-ziyaret%E2%80%A6/10547?get
English=.
34. “China, Turkey Co-Host Islamic Culture Expo,” CCTV English, September 14,
2013. http://english.cntv.cn/program/cultureexpress/20130914/103040.shtml
35. Yabancı Dilde Yay ı nlar (Çince): Publications in Foreign Languages
(Chinese), Directorate of Religious Affairs. http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/
DiniYay%C4%B1nlarGenelMudurlugu/Sayfalar/Yabanci-Dilde-Yayinlar-cince.
aspx.
36. A Chinese professor, who came to Turkey through the Mevlana Exchange
Program, visited Celal Bayar University in Manisa. http://www.ahmetlimyo.
com/index.php/en/ahmetli-vs/news/407-mevlana-degisim-program-yla-cin-
den-gelen-yrd-doc-dr-hu-hongling-ahmetli-myo-da-ders-verdi.
37. Tü rkiye Scholarships official website: http://www.trscholarships.org/index.php/
en/.
38. “Tü rkiye burslar ı na rekor ba şvuru: 2013–2014 y ı l ı için 55 bin ba şvuru yapı ld ı,”
Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities website. http://www.
ytb.gov.tr/tr/uluslararasi-ogrenciler/667-turkiye-burslarina-rekor-basvuru-
2013-2014-ogretim-yili-icin-55-bin-basvuru-yapildi.
39. Eligible countries in the Asia-Pacific region include the People’s Republic of
China, Brunei, East Timor, Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea, India, Japan,
Myanmar, Nepal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, as well as
the special administrative zones of Hong Kong and Macao. See the Bosphorus
Scholarships category. http://www.trscholarships.org/index.php/tr/turkiye-
burslari/burs-programlari.
40. “21. Yabancı Uyruklu Öğ rencilerin Uyruklar ı na göre Say ı lar ı 2011–2012”
(Number of Foreign Students by Nationality), ÖSYM (Student Selection
and Placement Center) website: http://www.osym.gov.tr/dosya/1–60408/
h/21yabanciogrenciuyruk.pdf.
41. “Ba şkanl ığ ı m ı z Çin’de Tü rkiye Burslar ı tan ıt ı m ı yapt ı,” February 25, 2013.
Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities website. http://www.
ytb.gov.tr/tr/uluslararasi-ogrenciler/674-baskanligimiz-cinde-turkiye-burslari-
tanitimi-yapti; “Çinli öğ renciler Mevlana program ı na ilgi gösterdi”, Timetürk,
October 22, 2013. http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2013/10/22/cinli-ogrenciler-
mevlana-programina-ilgi-gosterdi.html#.U0cMt6iSwUM.
42 . Gözde Ergin and Fahri Tü rk, “Tü rkiye’de öğ renim gören Orta Asyal ı öğ renciler,”
Sosyal ve Be şeri Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt 2, Say ı 1, 2010. http://www.sobiad.org/ejour-
nals/dergi_SBD/arsiv/2010_1/05gozde_ergin.pdf
43. “Asian Countries Top OECD’s Latest PISA Survey on State of Global Education,”
December 3, 2012. http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/asian-countries-top-oecd-
s-latest-pisa-survey-on-state-of-global-education.htm.
44. World University Rankings 2013–2014. http://www.timeshighereducation.

co.uk/world-university-rankings/2013-14/world-ranking.
45. “China to Broadcast Magnificent Century,” Hürriyet Daily, January 13, 2014.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/china-to-broadcast-magnificent-century.as
px?pageID=238&nID=60974&NewsCatID=381
46. TRT instead has English-language radio broadcasts and a website: http://www.
trt.net.tr/english. TRT English has around 1,557 followers on Twitter in May
2015, which is an indication that brand recognition is not great.
47. For the link between nation branding and Arabic-language broadcasting, See
Omar Al-Ghazzi and Marwan M. Kraidy, “Neo-Ottoman Cool 2: Turkish
Nation Branding and Arabic-Language Transnational Broadcasting,” International
Journal of Communication, 7 (2013): 2341–2360. http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/
article/viewFile/1881/1006
48. Turkish Radio and Television Corporation has radio broadcasts in German,
Arabic, Albanian, Azeri Turkish, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Chinese, Dari, Persian,
French, Georgian, Croatian, English, Spanish, Italian, Kazakh, Kyrgiz,
Hungarian, Macedonian, Uzbek, Pashto, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Tatar,
Turkmen, Urdu, Uyghur language, Greek and Armenian.
49. The lack of transparency at TRT prevented me from attaining realistic num-
bers while conducting research on this topic. The person responsible for overseas
broadcasts at TRT forwarded my e-mail inquiry to a public relations specialist,
who never replied.
50. For the discrepancy between the number of followers on the Office of Public Diplomacy’s
Turkish and English accounts on Twitter, See Efe Sevin, “Bridge No More? Turkish
Public Diplomacy and Branding under the AKP Government,” E-International
Relations. October 5, 2012. http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/05/bridge-no-more-
turkish-public-diplomacy-and-branding-under-the-akp-government/.
51. As of 2014, Turkey’s biggest online bookstore Idefix offers only two titles on
Myanmar. Neither of them is about politics or history.
52 . “Erdoğan Asks Singapore to Mediate between Myanmar Buddhists, Muslims”,
Today’s Zaman, January 9, 2014. http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_get-
NewsById.action;jsessionid=5C758A64624A3441BC8D15B6467B84AF?newsI
d=336216.
53. “Malezya’da İ slam ve demokrasi vurgusu,” Al Jazeera Tü rk, January 10, 2014.
http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/malezyada-islam-ve-demokrasi-vurgusu.
CH A P T E R E L E V E N
Noor and Friends: Turkish Culture

in the World
M . S e l c a n K ay na k
This chapter will discuss Turkish television in the global context and
question its role in public diplomacy. Shows in the late 2000s, such as
Gümüş (Noor, 2008), Kurtlar Vadisi (Valley of the Wolves, 2009), Aşk-ı
Memnu (Forbidden Love) and Muhteşem Yüzyıl (Magnificent Century)
became immensely popular, first in the Middle East, and then in wider
markets, subsequently setting a trend for other Turkish soaps to capture
global audiences. The response to Turkish series has not been unani-
mously positive: They have stirred anger among religious figures for
disturbing family life and breaking marriages,1been accused of pushing
a neo-Ottomanist political agenda, and protested for their destructive
effect on local television markets.2 These controversies aside, it is clear
that these shows have been projecting fragments of Turkish culture,
which are received and interpreted in diverse settings.
The sociopolitical implications of popular Turkish television have
been widely covered by the global news media,3 and have also resulted
in a growing scholarly response.4 The central argument of this chapter
is that although the shows’ popularity is frequently linked to Turkey’s
public diplomacy strategy and its soft power capacity at large, establish-
ing a direct link between the reach of popular culture and foreign pol-
icy in the Middle East and beyond is a stretch.
There will be three central components of this argument: First, when
key actors of Turkish politics are considered, the attitude toward pop-
ular television series has been one of disapproval; at times encouraging
234 M. Selcan Kaynak
direct or indirect censorship. If there has been any strategic capitalizing

of the shows’ popularity, it came after the initial global response and
mostly through economic agents. The increasing political pressure on
the television industry is further evidence of disapproval and discon-
nect between popular culture and political authority.
Second, public opinion polls regarding Turkey’s power in the Middle
East indicate an unstable trend in the last couple of years. Although
diplomatic outreach intensified during this very time period, whether
or not it affected public opinion regarding Turkey’s leadership role in
the region is unclear. More significantly, the current chaotic situation
in the region and Turkey’s volatile position among the major actors
suggest that the future for Turkey’s soft or hard power is uncertain.
Finally, the argument that the popular soaps project a “neo-Otto-
man cool,”5 thus, an attractive and alternative model of modernity par-
ticularly for the Middle East, needs to be questioned. What Turkey,
through its foreign policy and its popular culture, projects has been
subject to intense debate within and outside the country. It is safe to
assume at this point that the neo-Ottoman cool that these shows are
argued to exude is a reproduction of the conservative ideology that has
been made to fit the contradictory pulls of economic, political, and
cultural forces at play. Most of the popular soaps involve stories of love,
betrayal, intrigue, and family feuds; yet, they also glorify traditional
gender roles on the one hand, and consumerism fit for the global econ-
omy, on the other hand.
Although this chapter will provide a critical review of the argu-
ments regarding the popularity of Turkish television and its political
outcomes, it does not to aim to dismiss the fascinating growth of the
Turkish television industry or its impact on global public opinion. As
the growing scholarly attention attests, the popularity of Turkish tele-
vision is quite interesting for several reasons. First, this trend is quite
recent, setting a stark contrast between the response to Turks and/or
Turkish culture in various contexts. In the Middle East, for example,
the inf luence of Turkish politics and culture has been historically per-
ceived with apprehension, if not aversion. Earlier television shows at
the advent of Arab TV, such as Ikhwat Al-Turab (Brothers of the Earth)
produced by Syrians, depicted Turks as cruel rulers.6 The success of
recent Turkish shows marks a cultural shift.
Another reason for the peculiarity of this shift relates to the larger
political dynamics in the region: Under the leadership of Davutoğlu and
his “strategic depth” principle, Turkey’s foreign policy has been aim-
ing for a growing role in its region.7 Recent conf licts with neighbors
Noor and Friends 235
testify to the uncertain and many-sided implications of this attempt.

Nevertheless, at least in the projections of its leading foreign policy
officials, Turkey aims to compete with regional as well as international
powers.8 Such a projection found support and has been reinforced by
the government’s Western allies until recently, with Turkey being fre-
quently upheld as a model for the Middle East. A shared heritage of
Islam has been a decisive element of such policy endeavors, further
solidifying a renewed sense of proximity between the Arab publics and
Turkey. The popularity of the television shows owe some debt to this
political context, while at the same time, further contributing to the
construction of a new Turkish identity both domestically and within
the region.9
Finally, global television market involves the rise of regional stars,
but since Turkey was not expected to have the potential of produc-
ing and distributing its own shows, its sudden success has surprised
both scholars and the larger public alike. All in all, then, the reach
of Turkish popular culture has started a whole new discussion on its
global impact.
In reviewing this ongoing discussion, the present chapter will focus
on the connections between reception of television shows and its impli-
cations for soft power. It will first contextualize the growing global
appeal of Turkish television, then discuss the budding public diplo-
matic efforts, and its reach, for larger public support. Finally, it will
question the hype around the shows, put forth both by journalists and
scholars alike, which links popular culture’s impact to soft power.
Turkish Television in the Global Context
A recent news article headlined “Serbian Millionaire’s Wife, Rescued

by Kanuni” reports that the wife of the Serbian millionaire Zoran
Baskovic, was rescued safely after having been kidnapped for ransom.
The operation to save the wife ended happily as the police followed
the kidnappers to the hostage location and were able to break in while
the kidnappers were watching Magnificent Century.10 The series’ suc-
cess in the larger Balkan market received wide coverage earlier; it was
reported to be one of the top Turkish shows in Serbia, Macedonia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.11
Another popular soap, the first that started the Turkish televi-
sion trend in the Middle East, Noor, created such a fan base that
when the Lebanese prime minister was visiting an orphanage during
Ramadan, the wish that came from the children were not toys or
bicycles but to meet Noor, the lead character.12 As another is that
of a Pakistani journalist residing in the United States who was sur-
prised when her mother started to call her grandson “Engin” during
their Skype talks, after her favorite actor from one of the popular
Turkish shows, What is Fatmagul’s Fault?13 These and similar anec-
dotes have been covered in the hundreds of news reports to date as
testimony to the fascinating appeal of Turkish soaps to global audi-
ences. Magnificent Century, alone, is broadcast in 43 countries and
reported to be watched by 200 million viewers.14 According to data
from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, as of June 2014, over 70
television series are exported to 75 countries, generating close to
200 million dollars.15
A quick review of the history of the Turkish television industry
reveals that this has indeed been an unexpected evolution. Turkey had
only one official broadcaster between 1968 and 1990. The liberaliza-
tion regime after the 1980 coup relaxed the regulations over television
broadcasting; satellites and then private channels started to reach out to
both domestic and transnational audiences through the 1990s. While
the rest of the economy was merging into global markets, the media
sector quickly became absorbed by larger corporations and began to
be closely tied in to the financial interests of the parent companies,.
Both the overall structure and the content of broadcasting, completely
transformed by the 2000s, seemingly diversified as far as the number
of channels are concerned, but became increasingly aligned with the
interests of political and economic elites.16
This period, then, marks the first wave of the advancement of Turkish
culture through television to transnational audiences: satellites broad-
casting Turkish television channels reached immigrant communities
first in Europe, and then in North America and Australia. Aksoy and
Robbins state that while the state-sponsored TRT International had a
direct foreign policy goal of projecting “the (imagined) common cul-
tural, historical and artistic heritage of the Turkic peoples, and to situate
Turkey itself at the heart of this new—or newly reanimated—transna-
tional cultural space,”17 the private channels offered “a commercial-
revisionist style of Turkishness”18and exposed transnational audiences
to the popular culture and everyday life of Turkey. Consequently, this
wide array of Turkish television for Turks outside the country helped
them to question, negotiate, and reappropriate elements of their cul-
ture. The exposure to Turkish culture from a distance offered possibil-
ities to observe the “provisional nature of cultural identity.”19
The second wave, through popular television series, has transcended

abroad to the Turkish communities resulting in a complex cultural
exchange. The codes relating to gender roles, family structure, and
success and failure appear to have a universal appeal, yet, the sociopo-
litical responses to the “Turkishness” of the shows is shaped by the local
context. Their wide appeal, perhaps, lies in this very provisional nature
of the way in which Turkish culture is framed.
The first soap opera to initiate this wave was Noor, which was picked
up by the Saudi Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) in 2008 and
became a quick hit within the year, gathering 85 million viewers by
the end of its first season.20 Its dubbing in the Syrian dialect and smart
marketing by MBC gave it a boost as it was introduced to Arab audi-
ences. Shortly after its launch, it moved to prime time and the “Noor
mania” began.21
What does explain the success of Noor and subsequent shows?
Compared to the preceding shows and their competitors in the local
markets, the quality of recent Turkish television production is one of
the significant reasons. As the number of channels increased through
the 1990s into the 2000s, the size of the audience and consequently,
advertising revenues for local productions expanded.22 Along the way,
the production quality also improved. Currently, the market is reported
to reach Hollywood through the investments of American companies
in local remakes and even more so in the reverse direction, through
American remakes of Turkish dramas.23 How the Turkish television
market performs alongside global actors remains to be seen. There are
signs of a decline in audience size in Greece, for example, raising ques-
tions about whether or not Turkish soaps are a passing phase similar
to their Brazilian and Mexican counterparts.24 Nevertheless, there has
been a clear upward trajectory of economic success so far.25
Another factor that helped the entry of Turkish shows into foreign
markets has been political or economic blows to local production cen-
ters. In the Middle East, significant production hubs such as Syria and
Egypt have been devastated by political turmoil, with many produc-
tion companies moving to Lebanon or stopping work.26 In Greece, the
financial crisis has slowed down productions.27 In Pakistan, the banning
of Indian channels paved the way for Turkish television to enter the
market.28 In short, sociopolitical contexts, for a variety of reasons, pro-
vided easier access to wider audiences. This did create resentment how-
ever; the local television industries and actors from Greece to Pakistan
have expressed anxiety about their prospects on many occasions. The
wider negative response relates to the “corrupting” inf luence of the
soaps, implying decadent lifestyles and liberal gender roles in the more
conservative Middle Eastern countries, and, reviving the Ottoman past
in the Balkans.29
Regardless of the ways in which such anxieties get expressed, the
concern about the negative inf luence of Turkish soap operas relates to
larger questions about popular culture and politics. At the heart of the
debate, is the role of television for new configurations of soft power.
This debate extends as far back as the 1970s: as televisions became a
household items across cultures worldwide, television dramas began to
be produced and distributed for a target audience that went beyond the
original, local context. Most of the circulating products were Western,
and specifically, American-made. Shows such as Dallas, Falcon’s Crest,
and Dynasty that were broadcast in diverse contexts appeared to have
such a reach and impact, perhaps more than any other similar shows
could have had before. Consequently, a wider concern about whether
or not the values embedded in these stories imposed a new form of
imperialism emerged. Referenced as the “cultural imperialism” thesis,
this perspective proposed that the exposure and perhaps aspirations of
audiences to the ideology embedded in television shows furthered the
economic and political hegemony of the West.30 Later studies pointed
to the complex processes through which these shows were consumed
and interpreted 31 and thus proved that audiences were not simply pas-
sive recipients. When ownership and profit patterns are considered,
global media companies do have a hold on the market, but the picture
is one of hybrid globalization: non-Western shows are not the only
shows that circulate widely (as evidenced through the popularity of
Mexican telenovelas, for example); there are also regional patterns of
television f low.32
Turkish television shows raise similar questions: Do they inf luence
the audience to buy into a particular worldview or political project? As
just mentioned, the particular agenda that is feared in each context var-
ies. While in the Middle East numerous critics warn about the corrupt-
ing inf luence of liberal depictions of gender relations and consumption
of alcohol as adverse to authentic Arab culture, in Greece, the fear is
not liberalism, per se, but glorification of an Ottoman past and Turkish
propaganda in the region. In the Balkans, the shows are accused of
being too conservative, highlighting traditional values. Interestingly,
the shows have been attacked in Turkey as well, for validating immoral
behavior and popularizing an inaccurate version of history. In short,
the backlash appears to be universal, however with different reasons
of the backlash for each audience. The emerging empirical studies
suggest that critics need not worry: cultural codes in the stories are fil-
tered through the viewers’ own priorities. Yanardağoğlu and Karam’s
interviews with viewers in Palestine and Egypt reveal that while most
women appreciate the romantic male leads and their compassion toward
female characters, they do not necessarily embrace all that takes place
in the relationships portrayed. The interviews suggest no substantial
evidence of “cultural invasion.”33
Instead of a direct cultural invasion, a more fitting frame to under-
stand the appeal of Turkish series is “cultural proximity”.34 Empirical
work through the 1990s indicate that audiences preferred shows that
had semblances of local culture, that were broadcast in their language,
and that involved stars they recognized. In short, productions that had
elements of local culture created cultural proximity.35 Cultural prox-
imity can work within the boundaries of a nation-state, or, as more
recent studies reveal, in contexts beyond the nation-state—such as
Hispanic television in the United States,36 Catalan television in Spain37
and Indian television in Nepal38. Among the factors that contribute
to the multilayered nature of cultural proximity are geography/space,
language, religion, ethnicity, gender, and diaspora identity.39
The proximity thesis aptly explains Turkish television’s reception in
the region. The characters’ looks as well as familiar cultural codes, such
as strong family bonds and religious rituals render Turkish soaps much
more agreeable to Middle Eastern or Balkan audiences as compared
to Latin or North American ones. Noor and the subsequent shows in
the Middle East owe their success, to some extent, to being dubbed in
Arabic in Syria, capitalizing on Syria’s established domination in the
TV industry. In fact, much of the discussion about Noor focused on the
accent in which the show was dubbed. Since the late 1990s many of
the Arab TV series featured this accent; thus the broadcasting of Noor
did not present a radical contrast to what the larger audience was famil-
iar with.
Proximity, Culture and Turkish Television
There are two other forms of proximity that have contributed to the
popularity of Turkish television across the globe. The first is “genre
proximity,” that is, the genre’s conduciveness to engage audiences in
diverse contexts.40 Telenovelas and soaps have long been recognized
to directly appeal to the hearts and minds of the audiences. Allen
suggests that “soap operas routinely cross cultural, political and social
boundaries as representatives of a new kind of global media culture.”41

Soaps engage audiences, because they provoke “talk” among their
followers.42 The popularity of Turkish soaps can be observed through
the conversations among their fans and cultural critics. This collec-
tive conversation reveals how viewers in diverse contexts respond
to the shows’ stories. The role of digital technologies in boosting
the fan base and its collective conversation cannot be ignored. Baran
argues that digital platforms, social media in particular, increased the
demand for Turkish TV series, while at the same time video stream-
ing sites freely circulated the content, increasing the popularity of the
shows.43
A complementary concept is “cultural proximity,” that is, a “desired
proximity with modernity.”44 This does not necessarily involve per-
fect similarity with what is represented, but rather an attachment to what
is desired. The popularity of Japanese culture in East Asia, for exam-
ple, provides a culturally resonant form of (desired ) modernity.45 At one
level, for its Middle Eastern followers, Turkish shows offer a desired
proximity with the West. A commentator remarked that the popularity
of Noor is due to its portrayal of “Eastern characters living a Western
life.”46 This might stem from the appearance of the characters and the
visually appealing décor, both indoors and outdoors. The male charac-
ter Muhannad is known to charm female viewers, the target audience
for the show. Public discussion and news reports particularly focused
on the male character as the locus of desire. The following two are
among many of the comments on the lead actor’s appeal:
The hit Turkish soap “Noor” which is being aired on MBC has
sparked a rash of divorces in countries across the Middle East as
women compare their real-life husbands to the TV heart throb,
according to press reports. 47
Every evening for the past four months, a tall young man with
soulful blue eyes has been stealing hearts across the Middle East,
from the refugee camps of the Gaza Strip to the gated mansions
of Riyadh.48
Thus, at one level, a desired proximity with modernity could be argued
to reside in the characters’ appearance, particularly the male lead. The
blonde, Western-looking, and romantic male character possibly pro-
vided room for questioning and responding to existing cultural codes
within orthodox Islamic cultures. The characters’ seeming ease and
openness with romance, while adhering to Islamic values, assured
viewers and offered possibilities for loosening the tight bounds that
keep women confined.
Kraidy and Al-Ghazzi’s recent analysis of Turkish popular culture
similarly addresses this quintessential issue: What kind of cultural
implications does Turkish television have? They argue that the reach of
Turkish popular culture in the Middle East can be explained through
a “multiple modernities” perspective, which would acknowledge the
varying and, at times, contradictory takes on modernity that coex-
ist in the region.49 They suggest that Turkish modernity, that is both
Western and Islamic, “resonates with similar searches for a negotiated
Arab modernity.”50 This argument is on solid ground to the extent
that one can see the popular shows’ inf luence at the intersection of the
political, economic, and cultural dynamics of the region. However, the
suggestion of multiple modernities as a productive force by Kraidy and
Al-Ghazzi, and similar commentators is in need of further elaboration.
The dreamworld portrayed by the soaps does not challenge existing
social constraints; they repackage them through the lures of global cap-
italism, thus, releasing the tensions between modernity and tradition.
With respect to gender codes, for example, Noor and the stories of
subsequent soaps involve traditional roles emphasizing obedience to
elders and family. Noor’s first episode starts with her being married off
to Muhannad through a family arrangement; through the rest of the
story, she struggles to be accepted by his upper-class family. The older
and religious characters provide the moral anchor; those that deviate
from traditional codes find their punishment in the form of death, loss,
or social exclusion.
Noor offers the desired proximity to wealth and success achieved in
a patriarchal and conservative culture; in this way, the desired moder-
nity, that is compatible with Islam, promises individual success and
wealth without having to compromise moral righteousness. As global
economic processes force traditional cultures to interact and change,
it becomes quite challenging for such codes to retain power in popu-
lar culture. Thus, the narratives of Turkish soaps offer a reformulation
of traditional norms within the demands of the new socioeconomic
order.
Television critic Tayfun Atay argues that Magnificent Century could
be viewed as reconstructing history through the lens of today’s norms.
The main character Hürrem was brought into the harem as a slave but
through intrigue and fierce competition, becomes the Sultan’s wife.
Her story could be that of any woman living in a modern society who
is offered the possibility of “empowerment” at work or family life only
through competing with and defeating other women. Atay claims that
Magnificent Century’s success, especially with female viewers, lies in its
being modeled on today’s practices.51
Gökariksel and Secor argue that the merging of Islam and the drive
toward integrating Turkey with the global economy “involves not
only adaptation and appropriation of neoliberal capitalism but also the
redefinition and transformation of Islamic practice and values.”52 This
transformation and particularly “‘Islamic consumerism’ may serve the
vision of a global umma by cementing communal bonds between trans-
national Islamic actors at the same time as it creates and reveals dif-
ferences among Muslims, especially those of class and gender.”53Noor,
Magnificent Century, and other series resonate with a wide range of
viewers, especially in the Middle East, since they provoke discussion on
what it means to be an observant Muslim, while surviving within the
dictates of globalized capitalist societies. In addition, the tourism and
consumerism motivated by these shows also point to a “global umma”
created and maintained by popular culture. The class and gender hier-
archies experienced in everyday life, however, are blurred; the soap
opera characters deal with success and tragedy as inevitable aspects of
their own fate; their fans experience romance and glory vicariously
through them.
As will be addressed in the next section, the government does benefit
from the inf luence of popular culture; however, a direct link between
foreign policy aims and popular culture is difficult to maintain. As
McAlister suggests, cultural texts become meaningful only when they
are contextualized in time and through interaction with other spheres
of culture.54 Turkish television’s appeal appears to be a product of the
right timing for the industry’s expansion into global markets, the soap
opera genre’s general allure, and the situating of Turkey as a “model”
for its neighbors by its own politicians and global actors. The form of
mutual inf luence between popular culture and political power is dis-
cussed in the next section.
“Soap Power” to Soft Power
The 2011 op-ed titled “Turkish Soap Power” for the Journal of Turkish
Weekly is cited to be one of the first to refer to Turkish “soap power”
and discuss its political reach.55 The article reviews how the image of
Turks in Slovakia turned around dramatically all thanks to Turkish
television series, which were broadcast for the first time in Slovak
history. Although not an intended or expected outcome, the love sto-

ries changed negative beliefs about Turks, encouraging further interest
in Turkish culture through tourism and consumption of other Turkish
exports.56 The soap power-soft power connection has been stated many
times since then, ranging from the fascination of journalists with the
political ramifications of the soaps in each context, to the ref lections of
scholars on Turkish popular television’s increasing presence in a wide
geography.57 Similar to the “neo-Ottoman” cool as discussed in the
previous section, the political significance of the shows’ reach is argued
to reside in their modeling an alternative way of modernization—in
David Rohde’s words—a “third way” that effectively merges Islam
with a modern lifestyle.58 This approach overlaps with, perhaps what
evolved as parallel to, the projections of Turkey as a “role model” for its
region, particularly the Middle East, both by the global pundits and by
its own politicians readily taking up the role. The “model” discourse
itself has been questioned on conceptual, ethical, political, and empir-
ical grounds.59 This section will examine to what extent television’s
reach is connected to public diplomacy outreach, and, in which ways
it might be translating into soft power capacity in the neighboring
regions.
The foreign policy aspirations of Turkey, particularly in the Middle
East, was marked by then minister of foreign affairs Davutoğlu’s for-
mula of “zero-problems with neighbors,” which highlighted increased
interaction with the Middle East through economic, cultural, and
political means. Öniş refers to this aim as the security, economy, and
identity nexus.60 The first phase of the policy, which was brought to
life as the Justice and Development Party ( JDP) came into power in
2003, involved a diversification of interests by both focusing ener-
gies on the EU membership, while at the same time, improving rela-
tions with other neighboring countries.61 Through this period, Turkey
became what Kirişçi calls a “trading state,” engaging in intense eco-
nomic activity with its neighbors.62 Turkey’s exports to the Middle East
in particular increased from $3.4 billion to $42.4 billion from 2002 to
2012.63 Along with economic activity, Turkish culture and identity got
highlighted through more systematic efforts to sell soft power. Once
the EU strategy lost momentum for reasons that emanate from both
domestic and international political fronts, the JDP-era foreign policy
moved into its second phase, that is, heightened emphasis on the role
in the Middle East.
The components of soft power involved lifting of visa require-
ments for many Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, Lebanon,
Syria, and Iran which fostered both tourism and trade; highlighting
humanitarian aid; educational initiatives, such as the establishment of
Turkish study centers at several universities, and initiating exchange
programs; and finally, launching cultural centers (such as the Yunus
Emre initiative).64
As part of this overall effort, The Office of Public Diplomacy was
established in 2010. The office defines its mission as disseminating
accurate and effective information about Turkey and coordinating the
efforts of public and civic associations within this realm. The activities
are categorized under University Programs, Political Communication
and Media and PR Work. The past activities listed under each cate-
gory include lectures by scholars and renowned activists, workshops,
panels, and special visits organized for university students from Turkey
and elsewhere, meetings with foreign press, and cultural products such
as documentaries and concerts produced by the office.65 Strikingly,
their website is in Turkish only, giving the impression that their target
audience in disseminating their mission is the Turkish public. Their
Twitter accounts are in both Turkish and English, posting updates
on their activities as well as visits by government officials, and press
releases. In short, the Office of Public Diplomacy and its presence on
the web do not appear to have fully developed into a public diplo-
macy mission per se; although there are ongoing activities involving
journalists, students, and foreign publics, the overall operation seems
to inform mostly the Turkish public about its state-centered cultural
sphere.
There is one article on the Turkish television series’ global reach
on the website.66 It presents the latest state of the television industry’s
growth stating that over 70 series are exported to 75 countries, generat-
ing close to 200 million dollars. Minister Çelik is quoted as stating that
they are in collaboration with television producers and are targeting
one billion dollars by 2023.
The ministry started to promote tourism to Turkey after Noor became
a cultural phenomenon in the Middle East, through capitalizing on the
series’ and their actors’ popularity. In 2011, it launched a celebrity tour
to Dubai with the lead actors of Noor, K ıvanç Tatl ıtuğ and Song ü l
Öden, in order to promote the Istanbul Shopping Fest.67 The tour con-
tinued in the subsequent years,68 further solidifying the highly overlap-
ping aims of trade, tourism, and soft power. The Ministry of Culture
and Tourism is at the forefront in this regard, as expressed through
minister Çelik’s tatements praising the television industry’s growth and
impact on tourism at various events.69
Al-Ghazzi and Kraidy’s recent analysis of Turkish broadcasting,

particularly the Turkish Radio and Television’s (TRT) Arab chan-
nel, lead them to conclude that Turkish soft power is largely based
on the Turkish government’s multiple and concerted efforts to brand
the nation through a neo-Ottoman vision.70 In the authors’ words,
the government’s “use of popular culture and broadcasting, rhetoric,
and media-savvy diplomacy has successfully constructed and promoted
an integrated neo-Ottoman national brand and image.” 71 As a result,
the Arab public began to interpret all exports of Turkey as part of the
larger strategy of the government’s policy goals in the region.72 Their
point regarding the politicians’ nation-branding—with all cultural and
political symbols also interpreted to represent this packaged brand—
provides a useful frame to understand the Middle Eastern response to
Turkish popular television. However, the JDP itself, or even the Office
of Public Diplomacy, has not been embracing or promoting popular
television as part of a systematic and strategic effort. As stated above, the
office has a report on the television industry’s growth on its website, it
has also highlighted the global popularity of the shows within its social
media space, but has not been engaged in any direct popular culture
initiative. Al-Ghazzi & Kraidy’s reference to a state-centered strategic
communication effort that publicizes the neo-Ottoman cool does not
apply to television series or the entertainment industry at large. In fact,
as discussed in the previous section, the response on the part of the JDP
officials to the popular series has been distanced if not outright censori-
ous. The then prime minister Erdoğan’s reaction to Magnificent Century
has been widely covered by the international media.73 At the height of
the show’s success (in late 2012), at an official ceremony to open an air-
port, the PM expressed his outrage at the series’ portrayal of the sultan
through his love affairs and involvement in harem intrigue. Erdoğan
stated that Sultan Suleyman spent his life on horseback and was not at
all like the way he was portrayed in the series. He continued to imply
legal action against the show.74 The public reaction to the comments
involved arguments about Erdoğan’s real intention for the outrage: he
wanted to divert attention from more serious issues such as the stagger-
ing economy and the escalating conf lict with Syria. Regardless of the
range of political motivations in instigating such a debate, Erdoğan’s
disdain for this show has been made clear on other occasions as well.75
Similarly, the deputy prime minister Bü lent Ar ınç’s derogatory com-
ments on popular culture, and television series in particular, and his
position on “appropriate codes of behavior for women,” garnered wide
public reaction. For example, in a statement in which he criticized
depictions of love and romance in television shows, he declared that

chastity is important, thus, women should not laugh out loud in pub-
lic.76 As a response, hundreds of thousands of women across Turkey
posted their smiling faces on social media, with Twitter hashtags “
Resist Laughter” (#direnkahkaha) and “Resist Woman” (#direnkadin).
Ar ınç is one of the most outspoken cabinet members who targets tele-
vision shows for displaying and encouraging inappropriate behavior77
thus making them directly responsible for various social problems.78
Although one cannot ascribe the views of some JDP politicians to the
whole government, given that the criticism—at times implications of
censorship—comes from the prime minister and his deputy, it is safe
to assume that the JDP has is not a huge fan of television series. The
restrictions imposed by the Radio and Television Supreme Council on,
for example, the length of lovemaking scenes79 or even an episode of
The Simpsons featuring God80 provide evidence to the tightening con-
trol over television production.
The perspective of Al-Ghazzi & Kraidy and other similar scholars
that the launch of popular Turkish television was a strategic commu-
nication effort on the part of the government cannot be substantiated.
Though the Ministry of Tourism and Culture and other business initia-
tives have benefited from the shows’ popularity, it is a relatively recent
trend, coming after the shows’ initial success.
Joseph Nye who introduced the term “soft power” to analyses of
culture and political power draws attention to the distinction between
soft power and public diplomacy. While the cultural resources that
produce soft power emanate from the internal values that reside in and
are practiced by a culture, public diplomacy is the instrument used
by the government to attract foreign publics to such resources. Thus,
public diplomacy to be effective, should draw on the existing cultural
resources and broadcast them directly to the publics of other countries
(not to their governments). The critical point Nye makes is that if the
content of the values or policies that are broadcast are not attractive,
“public diplomacy that ‘broadcasts’ them cannot produce soft power.”81
The Turkish public diplomacy efforts cannot be argued to draw on the
creative industries’ energies so far. The domestic policy toward tele-
vision production has been to keep it under a tight leash. If the shows
have generated some power, that has been a byproduct of the global
economic and political dynamics, but not necessarily a public diplo-
matic strategy.
The final concern regarding the soap power-soft power connection
addresses to what extent the shows’ popularity might shape positive
public opinion regarding Turkey’s diplomatic role in the region, partic-

ularly in the Middle East. The opinion polls conducted by The Turkish
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) suggest that Turkey
is viewed as having a positive image in the Middle East for over half
of the participants. The polls conducted yearly since 2009 document
the trends of Middle Eastern public opinion on Turkey, on issues such
as domestic politics in Turkey, its role in the region, its relations with
the surveyed country, the viewership of Turkish television series, and
whether or not Turkey could be a model for the region. Although
the positive perception persists, it has been on a steady decline, about
10 percent for each year, for the last three years (the regional weighted
average for positive response in percentages: 78% in 2011, 69% in
2012, and 59% in 2013).82 When the survey’s respondents were asked
whether they watched television series of any of the listed countries,
Turkey and Egypt came up as the most popular countries, with a pos-
itive response of 69 percent for each country. Syria was quite close,
with 67% responding positively to the question. In spite of the reports
of two formerly central locations for Syrian television productions suf-
fering political turmoil, their television series nevertheless still manage
to reach a wide audience. Turkey’s initial popularity and its decline
over the last two years could be related to various factors. Instead of
the general regional average, if one takes each country’s response into
account, the wide f luctuation for Turkish television becomes visible. In
Egypt, for example, while positive opinion about Turkey was 84 per-
cent in 2012, it dropped to 34 percent in 2013.83 The year-to-year as
well as cross-country changes in favorable opinions most likely relate to
the shifting foreign policy strategies of Turkey vis-à-vis different actors
dominant in the region. In short, hard power dynamics rather than soft
power capacity play a major role in shaping the way Turkey is perceived
in the region.
Turkey at the Crossroads: Soft Power, Diplomacy

and Hard Power
At the writing of this chapter, the Turkish parliament is about to vote for
a military action against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).84 The
ongoing operation at the very border of Turkey makes this an unpredict-
able time with respect to any analysis of Turkish politics. Its foreign pol-
icy activism has drawn criticism over the last couple of years, as Turkey
became involved in sectarian politics and engaged with some “unsavory”
actors while supporting the change of regime in Syria.85 The state of

democracy within the country also raises concern. The brutal repression
of civil movements as experienced last summer and the strict system of
control over the media are alarming.86 In Tugal’s words, “Turkey needs
to confront its own problems of sectarian and ethnic repression, state
coercion, and economic inequality before it can offer itself as a model to
anyone.”87 Yet, at the same time, the cultural realm is dynamic, embody-
ing a diverse set of creative forces as exemplified by the booming televi-
sion industry and its award-winning films and directors. Turkish popular
culture’s real power resides in its potential to generate a multitude of
genres and stories; but whether or not its political and economic plans
will allow room for them to f lourish remains to be observed.
Notes
1. Khalid Al Jaber, “Turkish Soap Operas Inf luencing Arab Culture and Politics,”
The Peninsula Qatar. Last modified July 20, 2010. http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/
views/editor-in-chief/120926/turkish-soap-operas-inf luencing-arab-culture-
and-politics
2. Katerina Serafeim, “The Rise and Fall of Turkish TV Series on Greek Television,”
CST Online. Critical Studies in Television. Accessed August 2, 2014. http://
cstonline.tv/the-rise-and-fall-of-turkish-tv-series-on-greek-television.
3. See Nichole Sobecki, “Turkish Soap Opera Noor Brings Tourist Boom to Istanbul,”
The Guardian. Accessed May 15, 2012. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/
aug/13/soap-opera-noor-tourist-boom-turkey; Michael Kimmelman, “Soap
Operas in the Arab World Yield Their Own Soft Power.” The New York Times.
Accessed August 13, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/18/arts/18abroad.
html; Mohammad Al-Kassim, “Turkish Soap Operas Captivate Arab World,”
(VIDEO) The Huffington Post. Accessed October 10, 2014. http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2009/04/22/turkish-soap-operas-capti_n_190323.html.
4. See Senem Çevik, “Turkish Soap Opera Diplomacy: A Western Projection by
a Muslim Source” Exchange Journal of Public Diplomacy 5(2014): 77–102; Omar
Al-Ghazzi and Marwan M. Kraidy, “Turkey, the Middle East & the Media: Neo-
Ottoman Cool 2: Turkish Nation Branding and Arabic-Language Transnational
Broadcasting.” International Journal of Communication 7 (2013): 20; Marwan Kraidy
and Omar Al-Ghazzi, “Neo-Ottoman Cool: Turkish Popular Culture in the
Arab Public Sphere,” Popular Communication 11, no. 1 (2013): 17–29; Eylem
Yanardağoğ lu and Imad N. Karam, “The Fever That Hit Arab Satellite Television:
Audience Perceptions of Turkish TV Series,” Identities 20, no. 5 (2013): 561–579.
Zafer Yör ü k and Pantelis Vatikiotis, “Turkey, the Middle East & the Media|
Soft Power or Illiiusion of Hegemony: The Case of the Turkish Soap Opera
‘Colonialism’,” International Journal of Communication 7 (2013): 25.
5. Kraidy and Al-Ghazzi, “Neo-Ottoman Cool,” pp. 17–29.

6. Rebecca Joubin, The Politics of Love: Sexuality, Gender, and Marriage in Syrian
Television Drama (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013).
7. Ahmet Davutoglu, “Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy 20
(2010).
8. Mustapha Karkouti, “Who calls the Shots? Intervention or Meddling? In Essence
It Amounts to the Same Thing,” Mustapha Karkouti reports from the Gulf on
how a number of non-Arab powers are playing an increasing role in shaping the
region’s political and economic future. The Free Library June 1, 2008. http://www.
thefreelibrary.com/Who calls the shots? Intervention or meddling? In essence it
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9. Nadia Bilbassy-Charters, “Leave It to Turkish Soap Operas to Conquer
Hearts and Minds,” Foreign Policy. Last modified April 15, 2010. http://mideast
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10. Last modified February 17, 2014. http://www.mynet.com/haber/dunya/sirp-
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11. Amina Hamzic, Maja Nedelkovska, Donjeta Demolli, and Nemanja Cabric,
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12 . Jumana Al Tamimi, “Challenge of the Turkish Soap Operas.” Last modified
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from Turkey,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 3, no. 3 (2000): 343–365.
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19. Ibid., 356.
20. A. Buccianti, “Dubbed Turkish Soap Operas Conquering the Arab World: Social
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21. Ibid., 10: 2.
22 . Melis Behlil, “Close Encounters? Contemporary Turkish Television And
Cinema,” Wide Screen 2, no. 2 (2010).
23. Scott Roxborough, “TV Dramas from Turkey Draw Hollywood’s Eye,” The
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24. Serafeim, “Rise and Fall of Turkish TV Series.”
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27. “Soap Opera Diplomacy: Turkish TV in Greece”
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31. For example, Ien Ang, Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic
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32 . Joseph D.Straubhaar and Luiz G. Duarte, “Adapting US Transnational Television
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33. Yanardağoğ lu and Karam, “Fever That Hit Arab Television.”
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and Cultural Proximity,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 8, no. 1 (1991):
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35. Straubhaar and Duarte, “Adapting US Transnational Television,” p. 247.
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38. Elizabeth Burch, “Media Literacy, Cultural Proximity and TV Aesthetics: Why
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39. Antonio C. La Pastina and Joseph D. Straubhaar, “Multiple Proximities between

Television Genres and Audiences: The Schism between Telenovelas’ Global
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40. Ibid., p. 275.
41. Robert C. Allen, “As the World Turns: Television Soap Operas and Global Media
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42 . Ibid., p. 113
43. http://f lowtv.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/sbaran.pdf.
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29, 2008.
47. Sonia Farid, “Turkish Soap Star Sparks Divorces in Arab World.” Last modified
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49. Kraidy and Al-Ghazzi, “Neo-Ottoman Cool,” p. 25.
50. Ibid., p. 26
51. Atay Tayfun, “Muhtesem Yüzyil’, tarih ve bug ü n,” Radikal. Last modi-
fied February 8, 2013. http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/tayfun_atay/
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52 . Banu Gökariksel and Anna Secor, “Between Fashion and Tesett ü r: Marketing
and Consuming Women’s Islamic Dress,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 6,
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59. See Tuğal for a sharp review: Cihan Tugal, “Democrat ıc Janissaries?” New Left
Review 76 (2012): 5–24.
60. Ziya Öniş, “Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power
Inf luence in a Turbulent Middle East,” Mediterranean Politics ahead-of-print
(2014): 1–17.
61. Ibid., p. 5
62 . Kemal Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the
Trading State,” New Perspectives on Turkey 40 (2009): 29–56.
63. Öniş, “Turkey and the Arab Revolutions,” p. 6
Challenges,” Euxeinos, Issue: Strategic Depth through Soft Power: The Domestic
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70. Al-Ghazzi and Kraidy, “Neo-Ottoman Cool 2.”
71. Ibid., p. 2349.
72 . Ibid.
73. See, Andrew Finkel, “ Erdogan, the Not-So Magnificent,” The New York Times.
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74. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-11-27/entertainment/sns-rt-us-turkey-
show-suleimanbre8aq11h-20121127_1_prime-minister-tayyip-erdogan-soap-
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82 . Mensur Akgun and Sabiha Seny ücel Gü ndoğar, The Perception of Turkey in the
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83. Ibid.
84. Simon Tisdall, “Turkey Prepares for Bigger Role in Fight against Islamic State
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world/2014/sep/29/turkey-role-fight-islamic-state-isis.
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87. Tugal, “Democratic Janissaries?” p. 22
CON T R I BU TOR S
Marija Mitrović Bošković completed a dual masters program con-

ducted by the Middle East Technical University in Ankara and the
Humboldt University in Berlin. She earned her bachelor’s degree from
the International Relations Department of the Faculty of Political
Sciences in Belgrade. She wrote her master’s thesis on Turkish Foreign
Policy towards the Balkans: The influence of traditional determinants on
Davutoğlu’s conception of Turkey-Balkan relations. Ms. Mitrović Bošković
is currently engaged in different EU projects in Serbia dealing with
institution building in the areas of judiciary, fundamental rights, jus-
tice, freedom, and security.
B. Senem Çevik is assistant professor at Ankara University and adjunct
faculty at At ı l ım University. She serves on the membership board of
International Dialogue Initiative (IDI). She holds a BA and MBA
from California State University, San Bernardino, and a PhD in pub-
lic relations with an emphasis on political communication from Gazi
University, Ankara, Turkey. Her research interests are cultural diplo-
macy, citizen diplomacy, and political psychology. She is the coeditor
of Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy and International Public
Relations and Humanitarian Aid: A Public Diplomacy Perspective, both in
Turkish.
Galip Dalay is a research director at Al Sharq Forum and senior asso-
ciate fellow on Turkey and Kurdish Affairs at Al Jazeera Center for
Studies. He previously worked as a visiting fellow at the German
Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin and as
a political researcher at SETA Foundation in Ankara. He is the book-
review editor of the quarterly magazine Insight Turkey. In addition, he
is a blogger for The Huffington Post.
256 Contributors
Vedat Demir is professor on the Faculty of Communication at Istanbul

University. He has served as a visiting scholar at Ithaca College and
Cornell University in the United States. He is the author of Public
Diplomacy and Soft Power, Media and Politics in Turkey –in Turkish-, and
other books.
M. Selcan Kaynak is assistant professor at the Department of Political
Science and International Relations at Bogazici University in Istanbul.
Her work focuses on media and politics from a comparative perspec-
tive. Her research interests include media and globalization, new tech-
nologies and social change, and political psychology.
Melody Mohebi received a PhD from the Department of Social Policy
of the London School of Economics and Political Science. In addition
to an academic focus on Iranian civil society, she has worked exten-
sively with nongovernmental institutions. Her first book, The Formation
of Civil Society in Modern Iran (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) draws on
elite in-depth interviews and documents to investigate how and why
Iranian reformists used the language and concept of civil society to
enhance the reformists’ positions of power.
Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, is currently working as program coordi-
nator in international affairs at the Ankara Policy Center. She holds a
PhD from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris. Her research spe-
cializes on regionalism, border studies, peace building, and humanitar-
ian aid. She has been working in the field of Turkish-Armenian issues
for the last ten years as an analyst, NGO practitioner, and civil society
activist. Dr. Punsmann authored a groundbreaking study titled “The
Stakes of the Opening of the Turkish-Armenian Border: Cross-Border
Relations between Turkey and Armenia” for the French Institute for
Anatolian Studies.
Dušan Reljić has been working since 2003 as senior research asso-
ciate in the SWP—the German Institute for International and Security
Affairs —and is currently head of the SWP Brussels office. He previ-
ously worked at the Dusseldorf-based European Institute for the Media
(EIM), and, prior to that, as senior editor at Radio Free Europe in
Munich and the foreign editor of the Belgrade weekly Vreme. He was
a cofounder of the Beta Press Agency in Belgrade during the critical
years of 1991–1993. Mr. Reljić works on international relations and
security with focus on the EU and Southeast Europe; democratiza-
tion, nationalism and ethnic strife, political communication, and media
Contributors 257
performance in situations of tensions and conf lict. Reljić holds a PhD

from the University of Vienna.
Gaye Asl ı Sancar is assistant professor at Galatasaray University Faculty
of Communication, Public Relations Department. She received her
PhD from Marmara University Institute of Social Sciences in the Public
Relations Program. Her publications concentrate on public relations
and public diplomacy. She is the author of International Public Relations
and Public Diplomacy (in Turkish).
Philip Seib is vice dean of the Annenberg School for Communication
and Journalism at the University of Southern California, where he
is also professor of Journalism and Public Diplomacy and professor
of International Relations. He served from 2009–2013 as director
of USC’s Center on Public Diplomacy. He has authored and edited
numerous books, including Headline Diplomacy: How News Coverage
Affects Foreign Policy; New Media and the New Middle East; The Al Jazeera
Effect; Toward a New Public Diplomacy; Global Terrorism and New Media;
Al Jazeera English; and Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the
Social Media Era.
Özlem Tür is associate professor of International Relations at Middle
East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. Her main areas of expertise
include the political economy of the Middle East, Arab-Israeli conf lict
and Turkey’s relations with the Middle East (especially Syria, Israel, and
Lebanon).
K ıvanç Ulusoy is associate professor of Political Science at the Istanbul
University. He was previously a Fulbright Fellow at the Harvard
Kennedy School (2012–2013), a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European
University Institute in Florence (2003–2004), a Swedish Institute
Fellow at Stockholm University (2003) and a Madrid Diplomatic School
Fellow (1996–1997). His areas of research include regime change and
democratization, Turkish politics and foreign policy, Turkey-EU rela-
tions, and Spanish politics.
Çağda ş Üngör is associate professor at Marmara University’s Department
of Political Science and International Relations in Istanbul. She holds
a PhD in East Asian history from the State University of New York at
Binghamton. Her publications in English and Turkish concentrate on
different aspects of Sino-Turkish relations, modern Chinese history,
and politics. She is the coeditor of Turkey in the Cold War: Ideology and
Culture (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
258 Contributors
Alida Vračić is the director and cofounder of Populari, a think tank

based in Sarajevo thatspecializes in providing evidence-based reports
on key issues facing Bosnia’s development. Prior to that, she worked
with European think tanks and has led several Balkan-wide projects
at the Human Rights Centre at Sarajevo University and the Spanish
Institutional Programme. Ms. Vracic holds an MS in International
Public Policy from the University College London and a BA from
the Law School at the University of Sarajevo, specializing in crim-
inal law, human rights, and the Dayton Peace Agreement. In 2011,
Alida attended a professional program at Harvard University’s John F.
Kennedy School of Government.
I N DE X
Abdülhamid, Sultan, 49–53, 62, 63, Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 14, 87, 113,
226, 228 122, 160–1, 163, 194
Africa, 1, 3, 9, 10, 21–2, 30, 61, 69, 122, Azerbaijan, 25, 58, 87, 101, 162, 163, 173
126, 127, 135, 138–41, 143–4, 163,
217, 220, 224 Baghdad, 73, 81
Albania, 25, 29, 44, 52, 100, 102, 104–7, Balkan Pact, 100
111–16, 122, 216 Barzani, Massoud, 198
Al-Nahda, 79 BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina), 100–5,
Al-Sisi, Abdulfattah, 79–80, 217 109–13, 115
Alevis, 132–3 Black Sea, 48, 56, 100, 106, 174
Anadolu Agency, 6, 7, 26–7, 114 Bosnia, 25, 27, 29, 44, 53, 100–2, 105,
Anadolu Kültür, 186 107–16, 122, 129, 162–3, 216, 235
Anatolian tigers, 68–9, 143–4 branding, 6, 8, 13–15, 20, 24, 26, 28,
Ankara, 10, 72, 79, 88, 91–4, 100–4, 30, 32–3, 36–7, 44–5, 47, 129–31,
108–10, 115–16, 129, 132, 161, 195, 134, 139–40, 145–6, 166, 168, 194,
204 208, 214, 216–18, 222–3, 245
Arab revolts, 1, 141 BRICS, 1
Arab Spring, 7, 67, 75–6, 79, 81–2, 131, broadcasting, 24–6, 37, 90, 187, 195,
162–3, 165, 198, 203, 213, 227 207, 236–7, 239, 245
Arabs, 11, 44, 129, 137, 216 Bulgaria, 25, 44–5, 50, 53, 59, 107, 111,
Aras, Bülent, 76, 82 114–15, 122, 221
Arınç, Bülent, 80, 245–6 business organizations, 3, 125, 139,
Armenia (Republic of ), 9, 28, 91, 142, 144
162–3, 173, 175–9, 187–8, 217
Armenian diaspora, 177, 180, 184–9 Cairo, 75, 79–80
Armenians, 10, 33, 44, 46, 50, 132–3, caliphate, 52, 53, 63
173–87, 189 Cansuyu Relief Foundation, 6, 141, 220
Army, 48, 77, 79, 159, 163 Caucasus, 3, 14, 25, 44, 58, 104, 107,
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 153, 161–2, 167, 177, 220
Nations), 10, 214 celebrities, 8, 26, 31–3, 138, 179, 244
Assad, Bashar, 10, 73, 77–8, 137 China, 1, 10, 19, 29, 56, 101, 117, 144,
Asylum, 48, 92–3 157, 162, 213–14, 216, 218, 220–6
260 Index
Christians, 4–5, 21, 44, 46–7, 53, 105, democratization, 4, 5, 53, 59, 134–5,
108, 131, 137 155, 163, 164–6, 177, 186–7, 193, 201,
citizen diplomacy, 14, 16, 126, 135, 158 205–6, 257
civil organizations, 9, 16, 44, 55, 59, 226 Deniz Feneri Association, 6, 141–2
civilian democracy, 5 Dervishes, 45
Cold War, 3, 8, 14, 21, 53–8, 99, 102–3, dialogue, 16–18, 22–4, 28–9, 33, 37, 59,
116, 153–5, 157, 160–7, 194, 215, 218 72, 74, 82, 88, 107, 121, 135, 159, 174,
conf lict, 1, 3, 7, 9, 28, 43, 55, 58–9, 62, 178–9, 181–3, 185, 198, 200, 204–6
72–5, 77–8, 82–3, 94, 99, 100, 102, diaspora, 23, 24, 174, 177–80, 182,
105, 107, 109–11, 117, 121, 127–9, 184–9, 239
131–2, 134–8, 141, 144, 146, 158, diaspora organizations, 177, 180, 182,
162–3, 166, 173–4, 180, 182, 185–6, 184–9
194, 202–8, 217, 234, 245 digital diplomacy, 17, 20–1, 27, 224,
conservative, 4, 61, 89, 116, 117, 123–4, 240, 244, 246
127, 134, 142–4, 154–5, 164, 198, Directorate General of Press and
213, 215, 224, 234, 238, 241 Information (BYEGM), 7, 17, 22–3
Copenhagen Criteria, 5, 194 Directorate of Religious Affairs
coup d’etat, 4, 13, 79, 80, 95, 154, 236. (DIYANET), 6, 114, 140, 222
See also military coups Disaster and Emergency Management
crisis, 4, 8, 9, 11, 24, 68, 73–4, 76–9, 81, Presidency (AFAD), 6–7, 24, 140–1
107, 135–6, 138, 141, 157, 161, 163,
165, 199, 203–4, 217, 220, 237 economy, 3–5, 8, 46, 67–8, 88, 90, 99,
Croatia, 25, 27, 44, 100, 102, 109, 112–13, 118, 123, 142–3, 145, 154,
114–15 161, 163, 165, 219, 236, 242–3, 245
Cull, Nicholas J., 43 educational exchanges, 10, 14, 16, 23,
cultural diplomacy, 10, 17–19, 21, 23–4, 30, 156, 159, 179, 181, 214, 219,
29, 30, 33–5, 37, 113, 181, 220, 222, 222–3, 244
224 Egypt, 1, 7, 24, 44, 53, 69, 75, 79–83,
cultural exchanges, 10, 14, 16, 23, 30, 90, 95, 122, 131, 137, 141, 167, 217,
104, 125, 156, 179, 181, 214, 219–20, 237, 239, 243, 247
222–3, 237, 244 ethics, 122, 128–30, 132, 134, 145–6, 243
Cyprus, 13, 53, 159, 164, 217 Europe, 3, 9, 17, 21, 24, 32, 44–52, 57,
60, 62, 69–70, 91–3, 99–103, 105–6,
DAESH, 131. See also ISIS 114, 144, 160, 162–3, 186, 194, 202,
Damascus, 70, 75, 77 219–20, 236, 256
Davutoğ lu, Ahmet, 6–7, 29, 59–60, European Union, 3, 5, 7, 9, 13–14, 19,
69–73, 76–7, 83, 104–7, 109–10, 124, 20, 30, 59, 61, 76, 99–102, 104, 109,
128, 132, 136, 184–5, 196, 216, 225, 111, 115–17, 134, 154, 162, 163–8, 177,
234, 243 179, 184, 194, 200, 213, 216–17, 243
Davutoğ lu doctrine, 7, 60, 124–5, 128, Eurovision Song Contest, 34–5
144. See also zero-problems policy Erasmus, 30
democracy, 1, 2, 4–6, 13, 56, 57, 60, 72, Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, 60, 62, 68–71,
77–9, 95, 102–3, 117, 129, 130, 134, 74, 79–80, 104, 107, 109–11, 117, 119,
149, 154, 157, 165, 184, 187, 194, 208, 136, 138, 164–5, 184, 188, 198,
216–17, 248 200–1, 205, 213, 215–17, 225, 245
Index 261
faith-based organizations, 9, 45, 123, IHH (IHH Humanitarian Relief

139, 143, 219 Foundation), 6, 126, 127, 141, 144,
football, 32–3 220
foreign policy, 2, 3, 6, 8, 11, 13–16, image, 9, 13, 15, 20–1, 25, 28,
18–19, 22, 27–8, 35–6, 38, 43, 54–63, 30–3, 36–7, 49–52, 59, 62, 63, 67,
67, 69, 71–2, 74–5, 77–81, 104, 107, 86, 90, 103, 106, 108, 111, 117, 122,
117, 121–5, 128–35, 139–40, 142, 128–9, 133–4, 140–1, 143, 145,
143–6, 153–67, 174, 193, 198, 164–5, 167, 194, 203, 208, 213, 218,
213–17, 220, 225, 234–6, 242, 245, 247
242–3, 247 immigrants, 46, 48, 91–2, 214, 236
Free Trade Agreement, 70, 111 IMF (International Monetary Fund),
3, 161
G20 Presidency, 127 international organizations, 1, 18, 60,
Galatasary University, 30 61, 127
Gaza, 8, 62, 74, 122, 126, 129, 131, 133, international schools, 26, 30, 106–7,
135, 136, 144, 152 113, 116, 126, 188, 217, 226
Gaza f lotilla, 8, 62, 74, 81, 136–7. See investment, 4, 9, 67–70, 72, 78, 88,
also Mavi Marmara 104–5, 108, 111–13, 117, 126, 141,
geopolitics, 9, 54, 99, 153, 194 143, 208, 225, 237
Germany, 19, 51, 91, 103, 117, 166 Iran, 1, 3, 7–10, 69, 71–2, 76–8, 81,
Gezi Park protests, 5, 133, 217, 227 85–95, 99, 122, 135, 160, 200, 202,
global affairs, 2, 162 244
globalization, 8, 165, 227, 238 Iraq, 7, 9, 10, 24, 44, 56, 58, 61,
Greece, 28, 44, 58–9, 100, 105, 111, 115, 62, 71–3, 76, 78, 81, 87, 159–60,
123–4, 159–60, 237–8 164, 167, 195, 198, 200, 202,
Gül, Abdullah, 15, 29, 33, 175 219, 247
Gülen, Fethullah, 6, 115–16, 133, 144, ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham),
215, 217, 226 204, 206, 247
Gulf War, 3, 57, 162 Islamic solidarity, 213, 217, 219, 225,
226–7
Hamas, 72, 136 Islamophobia, 19
hard power, 8, 43–5, 49, 52, 62, 82, 102, Israel, 4, 7, 8, 44, 62, 67, 69, 72, 73, 74,
130, 145, 155, 157, 159, 163–4, 166–7, 75, 76, 81, 82, 131, 133, 136, 137, 159,
196, 234, 247 167, 215, 216
Hizballah, 72 Izetbegovic ,́ Alija, 110
human rights, 6, 46, 93, 103, 117, 128,
130–1, 133, 163, 184, 186, 194–5, 225 Japan, 10, 19, 24, 49, 59, 218, 221–3,
humanitarian aid, 6, 9, 18, 24, 47, 51, 225–6, 240
121–2, 125, 127, 129, 132, 134, 136–7, Jews, 44, 46–7
140, 142, 144–6, 207, 215, 219, 244 JDP ( Justice and Development Party),
4, 7, 58–62, 68–9, 79, 88, 103, 106–7,
identity, 3–4, 14, 17, 32, 36, 54–5, 58, 111, 116, 123–4, 132–3, 136, 144–5,
63, 82, 89, 90, 115, 123–4, 136, 143, 154–5, 159, 164–5, 167, 177, 193,
155, 158, 164–7, 185, 188, 197–9, 195–201, 207, 209–11, 213–17, 222,
205, 215–16, 225, 235–6, 239, 243 224–6, 243–6
262 Index
Kalın, Ibrahim, 14, 15, 71, 74, 75, 80, multi-dimensional policy, 104, 124
130, 216 multi-party system, 4, 55
Kemalism, 58 MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists’
Kirişçi, Kemal, 69, 243 and Businessmen’s Association), 69,
Kosovo, 29, 100–2, 104, 107, 109, 142–4
111–16, 122, 235 Muslim brotherhood, 7, 79–80, 137
KRG (Kurdish Regional Government), Muslims, 3, 44–6, 53, 100, 105, 108–11,
198, 202–3, 207 116–17, 142, 220, 222, 225, 242
Latin America, 11, 22, 217, 223–4, 239 narrative, 9, 11, 36, 43, 63, 116, 196–7,
leadership, 2, 4, 5, 11, 53, 67, 68, 79, 80, 205, 207–8, 241
102, 136, 196, 203, 234 nationalism, 4, 87, 94, 196
Lebanon, 44, 71–3, 78, 90, 122, 237, 243 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization), 3, 9, 78, 100–2, 127,
Mavi Marmara, 8, 62, 74, 81, 136–7 159, 160–2, 167–8, 216
mediation, 8, 59, 67, 72–4, 78, 81–2, Neo-Ottomanism, 11, 108, 233
111, 125, 127, 132, 135, 137–9, 214, nongovernmental organizations
225 (NGOs), 6, 8–9, 15, 27–9, 36, 85,
Mediterranean, 56, 71, 93, 160, 176 121–8, 131–2, 135, 137–46, 178–80,
Menderes, Adnan, 4 184, 218–20
middle class, 86, 88, 221 nuclear deal, 86–8, 95, 135
Middle East, 1–4, 7, 7, 9, 11, 14, 25, 28,
30, 45, 59–60, 67–71, 76–8, 80–3, Obama, Barack, 8, 76
92, 95, 104, 106–7, 114, 122–3, 126, Öcalan, Abdullah, 10, 159, 195–6, 198,
128–9, 131, 135–7, 140–1, 143, 154, 200–1, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208
159–67, 187, 195–6, 198, 202, 213, Office of Public Diplomacy, 6, 7, 14–19,
216–17, 221, 223–6, 233–5, 237–45, 35, 244–5
247 Operation Cast Lead, 74
middle power, 1, 9, 124, 130 opinion leaders, 8, 26, 31, 37, 135,
military coups, 4, 13, 79, 80, 95, 154, 180–1
236 Organization of Islamic Conference
military edict, 4 (OIC), 61, 102, 127
military takeover, 4 Ottoman Empire, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14,
Ministry for European Union Affairs, 21, 22, 43–55, 58, 60, 62–3, 87, 100,
19–20, 184 101, 103–8, 112, 114, 116–17, 122–3,
Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 6, 131, 132, 136, 160, 161, 182, 184,
20–1, 88–9, 219–20, 236, 244, 246 186–7, 213, 215–17, 222, 224, 226–7,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6–7, 18–19, 233–4, 238–43, 245
33, 35, 36, 58, 76, 88, 90, 138, 243 Özal, Turgut, 3, 56–9, 63, 123
MINTs, 1
Montenegro, 44, 104, 111–12, 114–15, Pahlavi, Reza, 87
122 Palestine, 74, 87, 136–7, 223, 239
Morsi, Mohammed, 79, 80, 82, 137, 217 Peres, Shimon, 74
Mosques, 8, 21, 52, 110, 115, 188 PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), 10, 57,
multicultural, 106, 134, 208 71, 195–8, 200–8
Index 263
popular culture, 8, 59, 238, 241, 242 soap operas, 11, 59, 62, 80, 89, 95,
Presidency for Turks Abroad, 7, 23–4 113–14, 233, 234–43, 246
press, 17, 26, 50, 52 soft power, 2–3, 5–8, 10–11, 13–16, 31,
propaganda, 155, 157–9, 215, 238 37, 43–5, 49, 52–3, 58–9, 61–2, 68,
public affairs, 17–18, 55 82, 85–7, 95, 99, 102–4, 106, 121–2,
public opinion, 13–15, 19–20, 27, 124–5, 127, 130, 134, 140, 143–6,
49–50, 52, 55, 63, 73, 87, 154, 156, 153–5, 158–9, 163–4, 166–8, 196,
174, 187, 201, 218, 224–5, 234, 247 208, 214–19, 221–4, 226–7
PYD (Kurdish Democratic Union Soviet Union, 55–6, 58, 99, 100, 102,
Party), 10, 203–4 104, 123, 160–2, 174–5
strategic depth, 50, 59–60, 104, 124–5,
Qatar, 77 128, 234
Syria, 7, 9, 10, 17, 24, 44, 47, 58, 67–87,
Rabia, 79–80 90–2, 122, 129, 131, 134, 137, 141,
reconciliation, 124, 132, 176–7, 179–80, 144–5, 150, 152, 159, 162, 167, 171,
185–6, 189, 207 198–201, 203–6, 208, 211, 217, 234,
refugees, 8, 46–8, 79, 86, 92–4, 137, 237, 239, 244, 245, 247–9, 257
147, 173, 220, 240 Syrian crisis, 78, 79, 81, 199, 203, 204, 217
regional power, 3, 11, 27, 58, 60, 63, 63, Syrian Kurds, 198, 206
85, 105, 136, 162, 165 Syrian National Council (SNC), 77
religious organizations, 9, 45, 123, Syrian refugees, 137, 145
139, 143, 219. See also faith-based
organizations Tahrir Square, 75
reputation, 30, 32–4, 36, 49, 129, 132, television, 5, 6, 11, 22, 24–5, 31, 59, 62,
194, 217 80, 85–90, 94, 181, 187, 224, 231,
rhetoric, 5, 43, 47, 53, 95, 108–9, 111–12, 233–9, 241–7
122, 129–30, 133–4, 145, 183, 245 TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social
Rouhani, Hassan, 88 Studies Foundation), 28, 89, 95, 247
Russia, 1, 7, 19, 25, 27, 46, 48, 49, 51–3, think tanks, 8, 16, 28–9, 36, 101, 166,
99–101, 105, 112, 117, 123, 162–3, 181
202, 216, 221, 224 tolerance, 43, 45–7, 63, 107, 215
tourism, 4, 8, 34, 62, 70, 86, 90–1,
Saudi Arabia, 44, 69, 77, 99, 237 93–4, 112, 114, 221, 228, 242, 243
sectarianism, 7, 25, 77–8, 81, 226, 246, trade, 47, 57, 67–72, 88, 104, 111, 113,
248 117, 139, 143, 176, 202, 214, 224–5,
secularism, 8, 62, 86, 198 244
security, 1, 8, 54, 57–8, 60, 67, 78, 82, Truman Doctrine, 160, 169
86, 94, 100, 102, 128, 134, 139, 143, Turcology Project, 22, 221
157–60, 162–3, 166, 179, 195, Turkic Republics, 56–8, 101, 123, 224,
199–200, 202, 243, 255, 256 236
Seib, Philip, 141 Turkish Airlines, 12, 32, 36, 91, 115,
Serbia, 25, 27, 44, 50, 101, 104–5, 139
109–14, 116, 162, 235 Turkish Cooperation and Coordination
Sevres syndrome, 54 Agency, 4–6, 20–2, 111–13, 125–6,
single-party, 54–5 139–41, 218–20, 226
264 Index
Turkish model, 1, 5, 79, 82, 95, 132, United States, 51, 55, 68, 91–2, 99, 129,
165, 235, 247 154, 157–9, 162, 164–6, 178, 182,
Turkish Radio and Television 215, 236, 239
Corporation, 6, 24–6, 114, 224, 236, universities, 16, 22–3, 26, 30–1, 33, 36,
245 58, 110, 115, 116, 177, 181, 222–3,
Turkish Red Crescent, 6, 52, 153, 244
140–1 USAID (United States Agency for
Turkish-Armenian relations (please also International Development), 178
see other items for Armenia), 133,
173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 187, 189 values-based policy, 1, 5–9, 75, 80,
Turkish-Islamic synthesis, 123 121–2, 124, 125, 127–32, 138, 145
TÜSİ AD (Turkish Industrialists’ and
Businessmen’s Association), 27, 143–4 Western powers, 1, 50, 54–5, 76, 85–6,
TUSKON (Turkish Confederation 132, 154, 162, 182, 208
of Industrialists and Businessmen), Westernization, 49, 62, 159, 160–1
142–4, 226 World EXPO, 18, 51, 220, 222
Twitter, 17, 21, 27, 133, 217, 224, 231,
244, 246 Yerevan, 91, 174, 176, 183
Yugoslavia, 9, 99–102, 104–6, 116–17,
UEFA (Union of European Football 160, 162
Associations), 33 Yunus Emre Centers, 29, 113, 207,
UN (United Nations), 2, 61, 102, 127, 221–2, 226, 244
137, 188
UNHCR (United Nations Refugee Zaharna, R. S., 126, 141
Agency), 92, 131 zero-problems policy, 7, 60, 62, 69,
United Kingdom, 91, 123 75–8, 88, 104, 124, 213, 216, 243

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Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy

Published by Palgrave Macmillan:

Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy

List of Abbreviations vii

Introduction: Why Turkey’s Public Diplomacy Matters 1

Eight Addressing Controversy I: Public Diplomacy between

Notes on Contributors 255

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

As the global world order continues its evolution, we are witnessing

Turkey overlooks the Middle East, and it is literally a bridge between

Turkey’s soft power outreach relies on these variables of internal

poverty, and assists thirty countries to reach world standards in educa-

become prime minister.) Davutoğlu devised the “zero-problems with

Presidency. Among nongovernmental tools are think tanks, NGOs,

and economic cooperation reemerged between Turkey and south-

have drawn in other nations that have domestic constituencies with

Turkey’s Public Diplomacy: Its Actors,

With its strategic geographical location and complex historical back-

Turkey’s Public Diplomacy and Soft Power

Turkish public diplomacy is overwhelmingly concentrated on the

and sustainment of Turkey’s brand has been twofold. Turkey’s offi-

in progress. The ability to reach out to a number of audiences is being

Turkey’s Public Diplomacy’s Actors

The Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy

The Office of Public Diplomacy was established in 2010.7 “The main

Turkey in international arena and to enhance its credibility.”8 The mis-

of these conferences is mutual understanding and dialogue. Another

Aside from the discussion on its position as a purely bureaucratic

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

A key actor in Turkey’s public diplomacy is the Ministry of Foreign

organized in numerous countries such as France, Russia, China, and

The Ministry for European Union Affairs

The main goal behind the communication strategies of the ministry

The Ministry of Culture and Tourism

Similarly, the Ministry’s “Home of ” campaign also promotes Turkey

The Prime Ministry’s Turkish Cooperation

The Prime Ministry’s Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency

and cultural development. To coordinate the operations to be carried

The Prime Ministry’s Directorate General of

The main objective of the Directorate is to communicate with media

The Prime Ministry’s Presidency for Turks Abroad

The Presidency for Turks Abroad was founded to oversee projects

Facilitating an ongoing dialogue with Turkey’s diaspora is the sec-

The Prime Ministry’s Disaster and Emergency

Humanitarian aid takes on the role of a significant public diplomacy

The Turkish Radio and Television Association

Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) plays an essential

International broadcasting is a substantial and effective public diplo-

Turkey’s Public Diplomacy’s Stakeholders and Tools

Traditional public diplomacy is a communication tool of governments.

Anadolu Agency (AA), Turkey’s national press agency, has contributed

The agency was founded to broadcast Turkey’s voice around the

Nongovernmental Organizations and Think Thanks

Public diplomacy has become so complex and diverse that it simply

think tanks equally contribute to the process of research in public

Universities and Schools

Universities and schools also play important roles in public diplomacy

the sustainability of the attractive power of these institutions depends

Opinion Leaders and Celebrities

There are times when world-renowned opinion leaders are able to

National brands serve as tools to communicate the public diplomacy

Another example of international awareness of Turkish national

Public diplomacy messages can also be communicated through activ-