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Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg

Author(s): Jürgen Kocka
Source: History and Theory, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 40-50
Published by: Wiley for Wesleyan University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505315
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 FORUM ON COMPARATIVE HISTORIOGRAPHY

2.

ASYMMETRICAL HISTORICAL COMPARISON:

THE CASE OF THE GERMAN SONDERWEG

JURGENKOCKA

ABSTRACT

Frequently,historicalcomparisonsare asymmetricalin the sense thatthey investigateone

case carefully while limiting themselves to a mere sketch of the other case(s) which
serve(s) as comparativereferencepoint(s). The debateon the GermanSonderweg(special
path) and the rich historicalliteratureoriginatingfrom this debatecan serve as examples.
This article reconstructsthe pros and cons within this controversialdebate, reports its
results and puts it into a broaderhistorical context. It analyzes the comparativelogic
implied by the Sonderwegthesis and arguesthatthe interpretationof modem Germanhis-
tory in the sense of a Sonderweg can only be maintainedif related to the question why
Germanyturnedfascist and totalitarianin the interwarperiod while other (comparable)
societies did not, and if Westerncountriesare selected as units of comparison.The choice
of comparativereferencepoints turnsout to be decisive and partlydependenton nornma-
tive prioritiesand conventions.The articlepoints to dangersand opportunitiesinherentin
asymmetricalcomparison.

A comparative historian, Allan Mitchell recently said, is one who does twice the
work and receives half the credit. Others such as Hans-Ulrich Wehler have
praised historical comparison as a "royal road" to historical knowledge.
Comparative history has become a major field of historical research over the last
decade or so, particularly in Germany.' The aim of this article is to discuss some
of the opportunities and problems of historical comparison in an indirect way,
that is, by reconstructing and discussing the debate on the "German Sonderwveg"
(literally, "German special path," something like "German exceptionalism").2
First, I will present the Sondervveg thesis; second, the most important objections
to it; third, I will discuss which elements of this thesis should be abandoned,
modified, or retained in light of the research and debates of recent years; and
finally, I will draw some conclusions with respect to the methodology of histor-
ical comparison.

1. See Allan Mitchell's review of C. A. Dunlavy's "Politics and Industrialization:Early Railroads

in the United States and Prussia,"Central EuropeanHistory 29 (1996); and an overview of recent
research: Geschichte und Vergleich: Ansdtze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender
Geschichtsschreibung,ed. H.-G. Haupt and Jirgen Kocka (Frankfurtand New York, 1996); here
specifically,the introduction,9-45.
2. For an earliercontributionto the discussion, see J. Kocka, "Endedes deutschenSonderwegs?"
in Synposions Noiv 12-17, 1990, ed. W. Ruppert(Berlin, 1992), 9-32; Kocka, "GermanHistorybefore
Hitler:The Debate on the German'Sonderweg,"'Journal of ContemporaryHistory 23 (1988), 3-16.

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 ASYMMETRICALHISTORICALCOMPARISON 41
I

In the nineteenthand early twentieth century,Germanhistoriansand publicists

often advocateda positive variantof the Sonderwvegthesis. They stressedthe sin-
gularitiesof Germanhistory,which in theireyes differedfavorablyfrom the his-
tory of western Europe and, according to them, were based in and justified by
Germany'sspecial geographicand historicalsituation.For example, they point-
ed to Germany's pronouncedstatism, ratherthan Westernparliamentarianism;
the Prussian ethic of service in contrast to Western eudemonism; German
"Kultur"as opposed to Western"Zivilisation";and the early-developingsocial
welfare state in contrastto the economically liberal laissez-faire and plutocracy
of the West.3This positive version of the Sonderwegthesis no longer played any
great role after 1945, and will not be consideredin the rest of this essay.
Since the 1940s, a critical variantof the Sonderwegthesis has emerged.This
version had famous forebears,such as FriedrichEngels andMax Weber.Scholars
who had fled from or been driven out of Germanyin the 1930s, many of whom
were accepted in England and the USA (for example, Ernst Fraenkel, Hans
Rosenberg,and youngerscholarslike George Mosse and Fritz Stern)contributed
decisively to the developmentof this interpretationof Germanhistory.Soon they
were joined by a younger generationof Germanhistoriansand social scientists
who were early acquaintedwith westernEuropeandthe USA, amongthem Karl-
Dietrich Bracher,GerhardA. Ritter,Hans-UlrichWehler, and HeinrichAugust
Winkler-authors who otherwise exhibit great differences.
In essence, the critical version of the Sonderwegthesis attemptedto answer a
fundamentalquestion, namely: in the general crisis of the interwarperiod, why
did Germany unlike comparablecountriesin the West and North turnto fas-
cist and/ortotalitarianperversion?They interpretedthe major developments of
Germanhistory,at least since the nineteenthcentury,in light of this question.
Certainly,no one overlooked the significance of the Germandefeat in World
WarI, the subsequentinflationand laterdepression,that is, of short-termfactors
contributingto the early collapse of the Weimar Republic and to the rise of
National Socialism. In addition,all serious scholars were cautious about assert-
ing a necessary relationshipbetween long-termdevelopmentsin Germanhisto-
ry and the triumph of National Socialism. But historians of the German
Sonderweglooked back on the nineteenthcenturyand sometimes even furtherto
identify-on the basis of implicit or explicit comparisonswith England,France,
NorthAmerica, or "theWest"-peculiarities of Germanhistory that, in the long
run, hinderedthe developmentof liberal democracyin Germanyand ultimately
facilitatedthe rise of National Socialism.
Helmut Plessner spoke of the "verspitete Nation,"of the burdenof the belat-
ed process of developing a nationand nation-state.ErnstFraenkel,Karl-Dietrich
Bracher, and Gerhard A. Ritter described structural weaknesses of the

3. See B. Faulenbach, Die Ideologie des delaschen Weges: Die deutsche Geschichte ill der
HistoriographiezvischenKaiserreichund Nationalsozialismus(Munich, 1980).

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42 JURGEN KOCKA

Kaiserreich's system of government:blocked parliamentarization,a relatively

rigid andfragmentedpartysystem, and otherpeculiaritiesthatlaterbecame man-
ifest problems of the Weimar system of government. Leonard Krieger, Fritz
Stern, George Mosse, and Kurt Sontheimerstressedthe long-termdevelopment
of illiberal, anti-pluralisticthreadsof Germanpolitical culturethat later enemies
of the WeimarRepublic,includingthe Nazis, could take up. Hans Rosenbergand
others showed that pre-industrialelites, in particularthe "Junker"--thelarge
agrarianlandownerseast of the Elbe River-retained much influence and power
as late as the interwarperiod. They stood in the way of liberal democracy in
Germany. Bismarck's variant of forming the nation-state with "Blut und
Eisen"-"blood and iron"-reinforced the political and social weight of the offi-
cer corps, which, in the Prussiantradition,was anyway very pronouncedand not
subjectto any parliamentarycontrol.In the political cultureand socially, this led
to militarization,a featureoften noted by foreign visitors to the GermanEmpire.
Max Weberhad alreadycastigatedthe "feudalization"of the upperbourgeoisie,
large parts of which he thought had accepted aristocraticdominance in culture
and politics, instead of sticking to its bourgeois style of life and questioningthe
power of the nobility and the bureaucracy.Withoutthe experience of a success-
ful popularrevolution,molded by a long traditionof entrenchedbureaucracyand
top-down reforms, and additionallychallenged by an ever-strongerproletarian
movement from below, the German bourgeoisie seemed relatively weak and
"unbourgeois,"at least comparedwith the West. In the influentialinterpretation
of Hans-UlrichWehler,the Kaiserreichwas characterizedby a strangemixture
of, on the one hand, highly successful capitalist industrializationand socioeco-
nomic modernization,and on the other by surviving pre-industrialinstitutions,
power relations,and cultures.4
In this view, the interplayof these long-termpatternswith the short-termfac-
tors of the 1920s and 1930s helped explain the early collapse of the Weimar
Republic and analytically separable the rise and triumph of National
Socialism. The Nazi dictatorshipwith its catastrophicconsequencesbroughtthe
GermanSonderwegto its nadir,but also contributedto creatingthe preconditions

burgerlichenGeistes
4. Cf. H. Plessner,Die verspdteteNation: uber die politische Verfiihrbarkeit
(Stuttgart,1959); E. Fraenkel,Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien(Stuttgart,1964); K.-D.
Bracher,Die Auflisung der WeimarerRepublik(Villingen. 1962); M. R. Lepsius, "Parteiensysteme
und Sozialstruktur:Zum Problem der Demokratisierungder deutschen Gesellschaft,"in Wirtschaft,
Geschichte, Wirtschaftsgeschichte:FestschriftffirFriedrich Liidtkezum 65. Geburtstag,ed. W. Abel
et al. (Stuttgart,1966), 371-393; L. Krieger, The GermanIdea of Freedom (Boston, 1957); F. Stern,
The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (Berkeley,1961);
G. L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the ThirdReich, (New York,
1964); K. Sontheimer,AntidemokratischesDenken in der Weimnarer Republik (Munich, 1962); H.
Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience 1660-1815
(Cambridge,Mass., 1958); Rosenberg, "Die Pseudodemokratisierungder Rittergutsbesitzerklasse"
(1958), in Rosenberg, Machteliten und Wirtschaftskonjunkturen (Gottingen, 1978), 83-101; H. A.
Winkler, "Die 'neue Linke' und der Faschismus: Zur Kritik neomarxistscherTheorien fiber den
Nationalsozialismus,"in Winkler,Revolution, Staat, Faschismus (Gottingen, 1978), 65-117; H.-U.
Wehler,Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918 [1973] (Gbttingen, 1983), 5; F. Fischer, Buindnisder
Eliten: Zur Kontinuitdtder Machtstrukturenin Deutschland 1871-1945 (Dusseldorf, 1979).

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 ASYMMETRICALHISTORICALCOMPARISON 43

for endingit step-by-stepafterWorldWarII in the FederalRepublicof Germany.

For despite the existence of two-in many ways opposite-German states, and
despite the burdenof the legacy of the pre-1945 period, the Federal Republic
managedto become a relativelynormalWesterncountry-economically, social-
ly, constitutionally,and culturally-whose self-image no longer fed on a "con-
trastto the West."5
The above may suffice as a condensedrecapitulationof the criticalSonderweg
thesis, thoughit ignores, as unfruitfulfor discussion, a numberof extreme utter-
ances, especially from the immediate postwar period (like the slogan "from
Lutherto Hitler").In a nutshell, the critical Sonderwegthesis claimed to identi-
fy long-termstructuresandprocesses that,underthe influenceof numerousother
factors (from the consequences of defeat in WorldWarI throughthe class con-
flicts of the 1920s to the peculiaritiesof Adolf Hitler's personality),contributed
to the collapse of the WeimarRepublic and the triumphof National Socialism.
The criticalSonderwegthesis examined and interpretedimportantdevelopments
of recent German history from the perspective of their relationship to the
"Germancatastrophe"of the 1930s and 1940s, without claiming that modern
Germanhistory in its entirety could be explained solely by its relationshipto
"1933" and without disputing the legitimacy of other interpretations.Many
authorshave contributedto this thesis or view in theirown ways and often with-
out using the term"Sonderweg."In English, the preferredand probablymore apt
expressionwas "Germandivergencefrom the West."In fact, the termSonderweg
was used more frequentlyby the many critics of this thesis thanby its defenders.

II

The critique of the critical Sonderweg thesis has been in part methodological.
ThomasNipperdeywas one of the first to stress that there are "severalcontinu-
ities" in Germanhistory.He saw the Kaiserreichnot merely as the prehistoryof
1933 but also of the FederalRepublic, and as a period in its own right as well. 6
One could add that the furtherNational Socialism fades into the past, the less
self-evident it becomes to interpretnineteenth- and twentieth-centuryGerman
history primarilyin relation to the breakdownof the WeimarRepublic and the
victory of National Socialism.
David Blackbournand Geoff Eley have arguedthat the idea of a Sonderweg
assumesthe existence of a "normalpath"from which Germandevelopmentdevi-

5. Cf. J. Kocka, "Ursachendes Nationalsozialismus,"in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 25/80

(1980), 3-15; H. A. Winkler,"Unternehmensverbande zwischen Standeideologieund Nationalsozial
ismus," in Winkler,LiberalismusundAntiliberalismus:Studienzur politischen Sozialgeschichtedes
19. und 20. Jahrhunderts(Gottingen, 1979), 175-194; H. Mo11er,"Parlamentarismus-Diskussion in
der WeimarerRepublik: Die Frage des "besonderenWegs" zum ParlamentarischenRegierungs-
system," in Demokratieund Diktatur: Geist und Gestalt politischer Herrschaft in Deutschland und
Europa, ed. M. Funke et al. (Dusseldorf, 1987), 140-157; J. Kocka, "1945: Neubeginn oder
Restauration?"in Wendepunktedeutscher Geschichte 1848-1990, ed. C. Stern and H. A. Winkler
(Frankfurt,1994), 159-192.
6. T. Nipperdey,"1933 und die Kontinuitatder deutschenGeschichte,"HistorischeZeitschrift227
(1978), 86-111.

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44 JURGENKOCKA

ated. Here, each meaning of the term "normal"calls for a different critical
response. If "normal"means "average"or "most frequent," it is difficult to
demonstratethat French, English, or American development represented"nor-
mality,"quite aside from the great differences among them which rendertheir
grouping as "Western"problematic. But understanding"normal"as "norm"
implies a highly subjective value judgment and, beyond that, the dangerof ide-
alizing "theWest."7One could add that, with the growing doubtsaboutthe supe-
riorityof "the West,"the Sonderwegthesis has lost some of its immediateplau-
sibility rightly or wrongly. Still, in regardto the collapse of democracyand the
rise of dictatorshipin the interwar period, western and northernEurope and
NorthAmerica stood the test betterthan Germanyand much of central,eastern,
and southernEurope.
Debate about the Sonderveg thesis itself spurredempiricalcriticism that was
at least as importantas the problematicdefinitionof "normality."In place of an
overview of the literature,I will limit myself to a single example:the majorpro-
ject in Bielefeld on the history of the Europeanbourgeoisie was partly motivat-
ed by the controversy on the "Sonderweg."In the course of this research, it
emerged that aristocraticinfluence on the grande bourgeoisie was probably no
greaterin late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuryGermanythan in many
other parts of Europe. The charge of "feudalization"intended to document the
weakness of the Germanbourgeoisie has lost much of its weight as a partof the
Sonderwegthesis. Comparingmiddle-class self-governmentin German,western
European,and easternEuropeancities of the nineteenthcenturyprovides no evi-
dence for a special weakness of bourgeois norms and practices in Germany.On
the contrary, an internationalcomparison shows that Germany's "Bildungs-
buirgertum," her educatedand cultivatedbourgeoisie,was strongand clearly con-
toured.In the face of these and other findings, the empirical foundationsof the
Sonderwegthesis have crumbled.8
A thirdobjection to the Sonderwvegidea is only beginning to make itself felt.
It traces the tendency toward a certainEuropeanizationof the image of twenti-
eth-centuryhistory. The more this view gains acceptance, the more National
Socialism will be seen as part of a broaderEuropean,and the less as an exclu-
sively German,phenomenon.In the mid-1980s, Ernst Nolte proposed a radical
variantof this Europeanizedinterpretationof National Socialism. It smacked of
apologetics, was criticized in the "Historikerstreit"("historians'dispute"),and

7. D. Blackbournand G. Eley, MvthendelitscherGeschichtsschiieibnng(Berlin, 1980), rev.English

version: The Pecudliaritiesof Ger-manHistor: Bout-geois Society and Politics in 19th Century
Ger-many(Oxford, 1984).
8. Cf. H. Kaelble, "Wie feudal warendie Unternehmerim Kaiserreich?"in Beitridgez71r quantita-
tiven deutschen Unternehlnnergeschichte,ed. R. Tilly (Stuttgart, 1985), 148-174; D. L. Augustine,
Patricians and Par-i'enus:Wealthand High Society in Wilhelmnine Ger-many(Oxford, 1994); H.-U.
Wehler, "Deutsches Bildungsbtirgerturnin vergleichender Perspektive: Elemente eines 'Sonder-
wegs'?' in Bildnngsbtirgertumiun19. Jahrhunnlert.TeilIV: Politischer Einfhufl.
noidgesellschaftliche
Formiation, ed. J. Kocka (Stuttgart, 1989), 215-237; Bti-gertuminito 19. Jahrhundert, ed. J. Kocka, 3
vols. (Munich, 1988); (abridgednew edition, Gottingen, 1995).

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 ASYMMETRICALHISTORICALCOMPARISON 45

has not prevailed.9FranqoisFuret'sforay may prove more influential:it too inter-

pretsthe Europeanfascisms (includingtheir most radicalcase, GermanNational
Socialism) in theirbroaderEuropeancontext and in their interactionwith Soviet
Bolshevism.'?Historicalresearchand interpretationcertainlystill has the task of
comparingthe twentieth-centuryEuropeandictatorshipsin theirinteraction,thus
increasingly supplementing self-absorbed national histories. But the gradual
Europeanizationof the issues, definitions, and interpretationsfurtherrelativizes
the Sonderwegviewpoint.

III

I do not think, however, that the Sonderweg interpretationof nineteenth- and

twentieth-centuryGerman history has been completely discredited, or that it
should be abandonedfor other reasons in the foreseeable future.
Empirically,the findingsare ambiguous.Certainly,some aspects, like the aris-
tocratictingeing of the upperbourgeois strataand their turn away from liberal-
ism that began in the nineteenth century, was less a specifically German and
more a widespreadEuropeanphenomenon.Further,it shouldbe admittedthatthe
premodernand unbourgeoistraitsof the Kaiserreichcan easily be exaggerated;
in realityit was full of moderndynamism,for example in the areasof science and
scholarship,art and culture.Intensive researchin recent years has also revealed
National Socialism less as a result of premodernresidues and anachronistictra-
ditions than as a phenomenon of modernityitself. This somewhat reduces the
bearingpower of the Sonderwegthesis.
Nevertheless, critical researchin recent years has reinforcedthe foundations
of this thesis in three ways. First, researchhas shown thatin Germany,and only
in Germany,threebasic developmentalproblemsof modernsocieties came to the
fore at about the same time, that is, in the third quarterof the nineteenthcentu-
ry: the formationof the nation-state,the constitutionaldecision (yes or no to par-
liamentarization),and the social question (which resulted from embarkingon a
path of industrialization).The temporaloverlap of and interactionamong these
threecrises led to theirincomplete solution, which influencedmuch in Germany:
the peculiarities of a workers' movement that was independentearly and was
early in a position of fundamentalopposition;the pronouncedweakness of party
liberalism; the narrow limits of bourgeois power in the Kaiserreich; illiberal
characteristicsin the political cultureof the time; and the "blood and iron"path
to forming a nation-state,with the accompanyingtendency to high prestige for
the militaryin society and state.
Second, it is true that one can no longer speak of a general "lackof bourgeois
qualities"in nineteenthandtwentieth-centuryGermany.But researchhas revealed

9. "Historikerstreit":Die Dokuinentationurnder Kontroverseurndie Einzigartigkeitder nation-

alsozialistischen.Juden'vernichtung
(Munich, 1987).
10. F. Furet, Das Ende der Illusionen: Der Konimunismusim 20. Jahrhundert(Munich, 1995).
More recently, F. Furet and E. Nolte, Feindliche Ndhe: Kommunismusund Faschismiusimn20.
Jahr-hundert. Ein Briefwechsel (Munich, 1998).

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46 JURGENKOCKA

thatthe bourgeoisie-the Blirgertum molded Germansociety much less than it

did in Switzerland,France,Italy,or the Netherlands.
Third,again and again, recent researchhas confirmeda basic fact of German
developmentthatwas also stressedby the Sonderwveg thesis: the weight and con-
tinuityof the bureaucratictradition.The early emergenceof an efficient, respect-
ed, andhighly influentialprofessionalcivil service, togetherwith a long tradition
of successful reforms from the top down, distinguished German development
from that of the West and the East. A powerful authoritarianstate achieved a
greatdeal and, not withoutreason,met with widespreadacceptance,but the price
was a specific weakness of bourgeois-liberalvirtues. The bureaucratictradition
influencedthe formationof social classes and strata,the school system, the struc-
ture and mentalityof the bourgeoisie, the workers'movement and the partysys-
tem, the organizationof large enterprises,and even the social theories of Max
Weber.The bureaucratictraditioneased Germany'searly transformationinto a
social welfare state and reinforcedthis in the long run, helping to provide this
society with a degree of disciplined achievement-orientationthat has much to
recommendit and can in no way be takenfor granted.But the traditionof a pow-
erful bureaucraticstate also helped block the parliamentarizationof the Empire
and its individualstates until 1918. The bureaucratictraditionsmolded mentali-
ties. In a broadspectrumof social milieus, people expected a greatdeal from the
state, and when these expectations were disappointed,they easily turned into
state-fixated,and finally anti-system,protests."
Certainly,our image of the failure of the WeimarRepublic and the victory of
National Socialism has been differentiatedand modified in recent years. In seek-
ing their causes, we must clearly distinguish the rise and triumphof National
Socialism from the weakness and fall of the Weimar democracy. Deriving
NationalSocialism from the traditionsof the GermanSonderwegleads us astray;
National Socialism was too new, too modern, and too Europeana phenomenon
for this. But that it encounteredso little resistancein Germany;that the Weimar
Republic was so weak and helpless againstits onslaught;and thatWeimar'spar-
liamentarianismfunctionedso poorly, its elites hardly accepted it, and the polit-
ical cultureof the time so markedlyfailed to supportit all these things do seem
tied to the traditionswhich are the analyticfocus of the Sonderwegthesis.'2
Since the 1970s, part of the German Sonderweg thesis has been that
Germany'sspecialness came to an end in the FederalRepublic as an unintend-
ed consequence of dictatorship,war, and collapse; as the result of changing con-
ditions and conscious learningprocesses; as the fruit of a new policy of Western
orientationand of a new, parliamentary-democratic beginning that graduallymet
broad approval in the populace, and that was enabled and promoted by the
Westernpowers underthe conditions of the Cold War.The researchand experi-

11. More in Kocka, "Ende des deutschen Sonderwegs?," 24-25; H.-U. Wehler, Deutsche
Gesellschaftsgeschichte(Munich, 1995), III, 449-486.
12. Cf. H. A. Winkler, Weimar1918-1933: Die Geschichte der ersten deutschen Dernokratie
(Munich, 1933).

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 ASYMMETRICALHISTORICALCOMPARISON 47
ence of recent years has confirmedthis part of the Sonderweg view of German
historyas well. Even the reunificationof 1989-90 can be adducedhere:elements
of theSonderweg,
inparticular
its illiberal,
authoritarian stillexist-
dimensions,
ed in East Germanylong after it had faded in the Federal Republic. Thus seen,
1989-90 also markedthe end of the GermanSonderwegin the East, where it had
survived-in greatlyalteredform, of course. The FederalRepubliccould expand
its system eastward and the Cold War was brought to an end without pushing
Germanyback to a Sonderwegbetween East and West.'"In other words, a close
look and systematic comparisonconfirms not all of the critical Sonderweg the-
sis, but it does supportits core.
The emerging Europeanizationof our view of the catastrophesof the twenti-
eth centurywill lead beyond the customarynarrownessof nationalhistory; this
should be welcomed. But in the end we should not and may not be distracted
from the fact that Germanywas the leading country of Europeanfascism, and
thatWorldWarII and the Shoah came from Germany.Thus, the Europeanization
of the interpretationof National Socialism has clear limits,'4 and the questions
the Sonderwegthesis sought to answerremain.
What aboutthe declining persuasivepower of the Sonderwegidea as National
Socialism moves furtherinto the past?After more thanfifty years and a new turn-
ing point (1989-90), in the face of new socioeconomic and socioculturalprob-
lems typical for modernWesternsocieties ratherthan specific to Germany,the
Sonderwegthesis should be losing interpretivepower. The tendency to interpret
Germanhistory sub specie "1933" ought to decline. It has been suggested that
we are at the end of a long phase of German self-criticism, which manifested
itself in an emphaticallyskeptical view of Germannationalhistory."' With this,
the plausibilityof the Sonderwegthesis would crumblebecause it answersques-
tions hardlyever posed anymoreat the end of the century.
Some aspects of the currentdebates among historians and publicists indeed
point in this direction. It is also conspicuous that comparativeresearch today
focuses more on the long-taboo comparisonbetween brown and red, fascist and
communist,dictatorshipsthanon comparingthe Germandevelopmentthatled to
dictatorshipwith Westerndevelopmentthat did not.'6
On the other hand, interestin National Socialist Germanyand its misdeeds is
hardlyflagging. The more one examines the history of the second Germandicta-
13. Cf. J. Kocka, "Ein deutscher Sonderweg: Uberlegungenzur Sozialgeschichte der DDR," in
Kocka, Vereinigungskrise. Zur Geschichtedee Gegenwart(Gottingen, 1995), 102-121; Jirgen Kocka,
"Nationalsozialismusund SED-Diktaturin vergleichenderPerspektive,"in Materialiendee Enquete-
Kommission "Aufarbeitungvon Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatilr in Deutschland" (12.
Wahiperiodedes Deutschen Bundestags), published by the Deutsche Bundestag (Baden-Badenand
Frankfurt,1995), IX, 591ff.
14. For a skillful presentationof the intertwiningof the Europeanand Germandimensionssee Saul
Friedlander,Das Dritte Reich und die Juden (Munich, 1998), volume 1.
15. Cf. for example S. Berger, The Searchlfor Normality: National Identity and Historical
Consciousness in Germanysince 1800 (Oxford, 1997).
16. Cf. Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Compearisol,ed. I. Kershaw and M. Lewin
(Cambridge,Eng., 1997); S. Courtoiset al., Le livre noir du conimunisme:Crimes,terreui;repression
(Paris, 1997).

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48 JURGEN KOCKA

torship(the GDR), the more attentionis devoted to the first(NationalSocialism).

Nazi Germanyis more intensely present in historical consciousness today than
twenty years ago. It does not look as if this will soon change. The Germancata-
strophefrom 1933 to 1945 of which the Shoah is a particularlyterriblepart
remains the period in which Germanand world history were tied more closely
than at any other time in modernhistory.This is a burdenand unchangeable:a
piece of the past that does not disappearin time, but ratherbecomes more pres-
ent. As long as this is the case, the questionsthatled to the Sonclerwegthesis will
remaincurrent.
But all these argumentsin support of the Sonclerwegthesis are valid only
under the condition that its claim to validity be substantially limited. The
Sonderwegconcept makes sense in the discussion of the question why Germany
under certain conditions became perverted into a totalitarian,fascist system,
while this did not happenunderroughly similar conditions in the Westerncoun-
tries to which the Germanstraditionallylike to comparethemselves. This is the
question that led to the critical Sonderveg perspective on Germanhistory.This
was the context in which the critical Sonderwvegthesis was originally formulat-
ed, on the basis of the life-experience and knowledge interests of two genera-
tions: the emigrants and exiles, as well as the subsequentyounger generation,
who increasinglysaw themselves as partof "theWest"and who wanted to make
the burdenof their past compatible with the opportunitiesof the future.As an
answer to that question and as part of this context, the Sonderweg thesis still
makes sense, though with modified contents. Otherwise,however, it is mislead-
ing. For example, this thesis is out of place when comparatively examining
processes of regional or national industrializationin terms of their dependence
on pre-industrialstructures,or when comparingthe educationalsystems of vari-
ous countriesin termsof exclusion and inclusion. In regardto most issues, every
country and every region has its own Sondervveg.Applied to most topics and
problems, the concept of the German Sonderveg has little or no explanatory
power.The validity and usefulness of the Sonderwegapproachare closely tied to
specific questionsand intellectualconcerns.Withinthese limits, it remainsvalid.

IV

A criticalfeatureof the Sonderwegperspectiveon Germanhistory is its compar-

ative core. It confronts certain aspects of German development with develop-
ments in westernEuropeand NorthAmerica,whereby similarities for example
in the state of economic differentiation,social development, and the challenges
to be mastered are assumed while differences are highlighted. But the state-
ments of the Sonclerveg thesis seldom resultfrom balancedcomparisonscharac-
terized by equally precise and equally comprehensive attentionto all the units
compared. On the contrary,the Soncler-wegapproach is usually based on an
extremely asymmetricaltype of comparison, more a comparativeperspective
than a full-fledged comparison.Its primaryinterest is a better understandingof

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 ASYMMETRICALHISTORICALCOMPARISON 49

specific issues in the historyof one country.To this purpose,a brief sketch of the
historyof anothercountryor othercountriesis used merely as a foil for the pecu-
liarities of the case one in which one is really interested here, Germany."7
Asymmetriccomparisonsare often risky, as the history of the Sonder-wegthe-
sis shows. Based as a rule on selected secondary literature,the sketch of the
foil in this case the sketch of the history of a Western country or of "the
West" can be so selective, superficial,stylized, and idealized thatit leads to dis-
tortingresults. It can also be objected that asymmetricalcomparisonabuses the
unit of comparison,which is not studiedin its own right,but is instrumentalized.
One examines the other only to understandoneself better.
On the other hand, a lot can be said for asymmetriccomparison, as long as
superficialityand distortionare avoided. It has labor-savingadvantagesbecause
it does not demandthe same effort for all the objects compared.For dissertations
and otherprojectssubjectto narrowtime limits, asymmetriccomparisonis often
the only way to open oneself to comparisonat all. Even in its asymmetricform,
comparisoncan lead to questions that cannot otherwisebe posed and to answers
that cannot otherwise be given. Consideringthe degree to which nation-specific
approachesdominatemodernand contemporaryhistory,there is much to recom-
mend accepting the comparativeperspective as a means of widening horizons,
even where it is not accomplishedin a balancedfashion, but only asymmetrical-
ly. And even if asymmetriccomparisoncan lead to problematicresults and dis-
tortions,it can be self-correctingby motivatingempiricalresearchto uncoverini-
tially one-sided or distortedassumptionsand interimresults.
The example of the Sonderwvegdebate makes extremely clear the degree to
which the results of a comparisondepend on the selection of the objects of com-
parison. Comparedwith its Dutch or English parallels, the nineteenth-century
Germaneconomic bourgeoisie appearsrelatively limited in extent, power, and
bourgeois qualities. But comparedwith east-centralor eastern Europeancoun-
terparts,it appearsstrongand intensely bourgeois.The westerncomparativeper-
spective makes National Socialism appear deviant; from a southern or south-
eastern Europeanperspective, Nazism becomes part of a phenomenon spread
across large partsof the continent.One must not lose sight of the resultingselec-
tivity of comparison.Changing the partnercomparedcan make this selectivity
conscious and can mitigate the gross distortionsof one-sided comparisons.
But a resolute "Western-oriented" comparativeperspective can be defended
despite the resulting selectivity. In the study of history,comparisonserves vari-
ous purposesand fulfills many functions.'8In the case of the Sondenveg debate,
it serves with critical intent the collective examinationof identity. Comparison
with the West opens the gaze to alternativehistoricaldevelopments,in this case
to better, non-fascist, less dictatorial alternativesunfortunatelynot chosen by
Germanhistory. In light of such alternatives not mere possibilities but actual

17. On asymmetriccomparison,see also Geschichte anodVergleich,ed. Hauptand Kocka, 15.

18. Ibid., 15-20.

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50 JURGEN KOCKA

occurrencesin the countriescompared the course of Germanhistory seems less

inevitable, more questionable,more a problemthan a dead fact. In this way his-
torical comparisoncan serve criticism.

Freie UniversitdtBerlin

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