Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal

Institutionalism
Author(s): Joseph M. Grieco
Source: International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 485-507
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787 .
Accessed: 20/10/2013 15:32

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International
Organization.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Anarchy and thelimitsofcooperation:
a realistcritiqueofthenewestliberal
institutionalism M. Grieco
Joseph

Realismhas dominatedinternational relationstheoryat least sinceWorld

anarchyfosterscompetition
War11.1 For realists,international and conflict
amongstatesand inhibitstheirwillingness to cooperateeven whenthey
sharecommoninterests. Realisttheoryalso arguesthatinternationalinsti-
tutionsare unableto mitigate anarchy'sconstrainingeffectson inter-state
cooperation.Realism,then,presentsa pessimistic analysisoftheprospects
forinternationalcooperationand of the capabilitiesof international
insti-
tutions.2

comments
Fortheirhelpful onthisessay,I thankLouiseHodgden,Ole Holsti,RobertJervis,
RobertKeohane,StephenKrasner,JosephNye, StephenVan Evera, KennethWaltz,and
especiallyJohnMearsheimer.For theirfinancial
supportduringpreparationof earlierdrafts,
I amgratefultotheGerman-MarshallFundoftheUnitedStatesandtheCenterforInternational
Affairs Ofcourse,I remainresponsible
at HarvardUniversity. forall statementsintheessay.
1. Major realist works include: E. H. Carr, The TwentyYears Crisis, 1919-1939: An Intro-
ductionto the Study of InternationalRelations (London and New York: Harper Torchbooks,
1964); Hans J. Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations: The Strugglefor Power and Peace, 5th
ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973); Raymond Aron, InternationalRelations: A Theoryof Peace
BakerFox (GardenCity,N.J.:Doubleday,1973);
and War,trans.RichardHowardandAnnette
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A TheoreticalAnalysis (New York: Columbia
UniversityPress, 1959); Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley, 1979); Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the MultinationalCorporation: The Political
Economy of Foreign Direct Investment(New York: Basic Books, 1975); and Gilpin, War and
Changein WorldPolitics(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1981).Thisessaydoes not
distinguishbetweenrealismand "neorealism,"because on crucialissues-the meaningof
anarchy,itseffects
international on states,andtheproblemofcooperation-modem realists
like Waltzand Gilpinare verymuchin accordwithclassicalrealistslike Carr,Aron,and
Morgenthau. For an alternativeview,see RichardAshley,"The PovertyofNeorealism,"in
Robert0. Keohane,ed., Neorealismand Its Critics(New York:ColumbiaUniversity Press,
1986),pp. 255-300.
2. RichardRosecranceprovidedtheinsight pessimistic
thatrealismpresentsan essentially
viewofthehumancondition: thisis notedbyRobertGilpin,"The RichnessoftheTradition
ofPoliticalRealism,"in Keohane,ed., Neorealismand Its Critics,p. 304.Thispessimism in
realisttheoryis mostclearlyevidentinHansJ.Morgenthau, Man vs. PowerPolitics
Scientific
(Chicago:University ofChicagoPress,1946),especiallypp. 187-203.
InternationalOrganization42, 3, Summer 1988
? 1988bytheWorldPeace Foundation and theMassachusetts ofTechnology
Institute

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Organization
486 International

The majorchallengerto realismhas been whatI shallcall liberalinsti-

tutionalism.Priorto the currentdecade, it appearedin threesuccessive
presentations-functionalist theoryinthe1940sandearly1950s,
integration
neofunctionalist theoryin the 1950sand 1960s,and in-
regionalintegration
terdependence theoryin the 1970s.3All threeversionsrejectedrealism's
propositions about statesand its gloomyunderstanding of worldpolitics.
Mostsignificantly, theyarguedthatinternational institutions
can helpstates
cooperate.Thus,comparedto realism,theseearlierversionsof liberalin-
stitutionalismoffereda morehopefulprognosis forinternational cooperation
anda moreoptimistic assessmentofthecapacityofinstitutions tohelpstates
achieveit.
Internationaltensionsand conflictsduringthe 1970sundermined liberal
institutionalismand reconfirmedrealisminlargemeasure.Yet, thatdifficult
decade did notwitnessa collapseof theinternational system,and, in the
lightof continuing cooperation,a new liberal
modestlevels of inter-state
challengeto realismcame forwardduringtheearly1980s.4
institutionalist
Whatis distinctive aboutthisnewestliberalinstitutionalismis itsclaimthat
it acceptsa numberof core realistpropositions, including,apparently, the
realistargument thatanarchyimpedestheachievement ofinternational co-
operation.However,thecore liberalarguments-that realismoverempha-
and underestimates
sizes conflict thecapacitiesofinternational institutions
to promotecooperation-remain firmly intact.The new liberalinstitution-
alistsbasicallyarguethateven ifthe realistsare correctin believingthat
anarchyconstrains thewillingnessofstatestocooperate,statesnevertheless
can worktogether and can do so especiallywiththeassistanceof interna-
tionalinstitutions.
This pointis crucialforstudentsof internationalrelations.If neoliberal
3. Forfunctionalist
international see DavidMitrany,
theory, A Working
Peace System(Chi-
cago: QuadranglePress, 1966); see also ErnstB. Haas, Beyond theNation-State:Functionalism
and International
Organization Calif.:Stanford
(Stanford, Press,1964).On neo-
University
functionalism,see Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic, and Social Forces,
1950-1957(Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversity
Press,1958);Haas, "Technology, Pluralism,
and theNew Europe,"in JosephS. Nye,Jr.,ed., InternationalRegionalism(Boston:Little,
Brown,1968),pp. 149-76;andJosephS. Nye,Jr.,"Comparing CommonMarkets:A Revised
Neo-FunctionalModel," in Leon N. Lindbergand StuartA. Scheingold, eds., RegionalIn-
tegration:Theoryand Research(Cambridge: HarvardUniversityPress,1971),pp. 192-231.
On interdependencetheory,see RichardC. Cooper,"EconomicInterdependence andForeign
Policiesinthe1970's,"WorldPolitics24 (January
1972),pp. 158-81;EdwardS. Morse,"The
Transformationof ForeignPolicies:Modernization,Interdependence,and Externalization,"
WorldPolitics22 (April1970),pp. 371-92;and Robert0. Keohaneand JosephS. Nye,Jr.,
Power and Interdependence:WorldPolitics in Transition(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
4. See RobertAxelrod,The Evolutionof Cooperation(New York: Basic Books, 1984);
Axelrodand Robert0. Keohane,"AchievingCooperationUnderAnarchy:Strategies and
Institutions,"
WorldPolitics38 (October1985),pp. 226-54;Keohane,AfterHegemony:Co-
operationand Discord in the WorldPolitical Economy (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversity
Press,1984);CharlesLipson,"International in EconomicandSecurity
Cooperation Affairs,"
World Politics37(October1984),pp. 1-23;andArthur andCollaboration:
Stein,"Coordination
Regimesin an AnarchicWorld,"in StephenD. Krasner,ed., InternationalRegimes(Ithaca,
N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress,1983),pp. 115-40.

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Anarchyand cooperation 487

arecorrect,thentheyhavedealtrealisma majorblowwhile
institutionalists
providing theintellectual justificationfortreating theirown approach,and
thetradition fromwhichitemerges,as themosteffective forunderstanding
worldpolitics.
Thisessay's principal argument is that,infact,neoliberalinstitutionalism
misconstrues the realistanalysisof international anarchyand therefore it
misunderstands therealistanalysisoftheimpactofanarchyon theprefer-
ences and actionsof states.Indeed,thenewliberalinstitutionalism failsto
addressa majorconstraint on thewillingness of statesto cooperatewhich
is generated byinternational anarchyand whichis identified byrealism.As
a result,thenewtheory'soptimism aboutinternational cooperation is likely
to be provenwrong.
Neoliberalism's claimsaboutcooperation arebasedonitsbeliefthatstates
are atomisticactors.It arguesthatstatesseek to maximizetheirindividual
absolutegainsandareindifferent to thegainsachievedbyothers.Cheating,
thenew theorysuggests,is thegreatestimpediment to cooperation among
rationally egoisticstates,butinternational thenewtheoryalso
institutions,
suggests,can helpstatesovercomethisbarriertojointaction.Realistsun-
derstandthatstatesseekabsolutegainsandworryaboutcompliance.How-
ever,realistsfindthatstatesarepositional,notatomistic, in character, and
therefore realistsarguethat,in additionto concernsaboutcheating,states
in cooperativearrangements also worrythattheirpartners mightgainmore
fromcooperationthantheydo. For realists,a statewillfocusbothon its
absoluteand relativegainsfromcooperation,and a statethatis satisfied
witha partner'scompliancein a jointarrangement mightnevertheless exit
fromit because thepartneris achievingrelatively greatergains.Realism,
then,findsthatthereare at leasttwomajorbarriersto international coop-
eration:stateconcernsabout cheatingand stateconcernsabout relative
achievements ofgains.Neoliberalinstitutionalism paysattention exclusively
to theformer, and is unableto identify, analyze,or accountforthelatter.
Realism'sidentification of the relativegainsproblemforcooperationis
based on itsinsight thatstatesin anarchyfearfortheirsurvivalas indepen-
dentactors.Accordingto realists,statesworrythattoday'sfriendmaybe
tomorrow'senemyin war, and fearthatachievements ofjoint gainsthat
advantagea friend in thepresentmight producea moredangerous potential
foein thefuture.As a result,statesmustgiveseriousattention to thegains
of partners.Neoliberalsfailto considerthethreatof war arisingfromin-
ternational anarchy,and thisallows themto ignorethe matterof relative
gainsand to assumethatstatesonlydesireabsolutegains.Yet, indoingso,
theyfailto identify a majorsourceof stateinhibitions aboutinternational
cooperation.
In sum,I suggestthatrealism,its emphasison conflict and competition
notwithstanding, offersa morecompleteunderstanding of theproblemof
international cooperationthandoes its latestliberalchallenger.If thatis
true,thenrealismis stillthemostpowerful theoryofinternational politics.

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Organization
488 International

1. Realismand liberalinstitutionalism

Realismencompassesfivepropositions. First,statesare themajoractorsin

worldaffairs.5 environment
Second,theinternational severelypenalizesstates
oriftheypursueobjectivesbeyond
iftheyfailto protecttheirvitalinterests
theirmeans;hence,statesare "sensitiveto costs" and behaveas unitary-
rationalagents.6Third,internationalanarchyis theprincipalforceshaping
themotivesandactionsofstates.7Fourth,statesinanarchyarepreoccupied
withpowerand security, are predisposedtowardsconflict and competition,
and oftenfailto cooperateeven in thefaceof commoninterests.8 Finally,
international affecttheprospectsforcooperationonlymargin-
institutions
ally.9
soughttorefute
Liberalinstitutionalists thisrealistunderstandingofworld
First,theyrejectedrealism'sproposition
politics.10 aboutthecentrality of
thekeynew actorsin worldpoliticsappeared
states.11For functionalists,

5. Morgenthau,Politics Among Nations, p. 10; see also Waltz, Theory of International

Politics, p. 95.
Politics:A Responseto My Critics,"in
on TheoryofInternational
6. Waltz,"Reflections
Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics,p. 331.
7. Waltz, Man, State, and War, pp. 224-38; and Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, pp.
79-128; StanleyHoffmann,The State of War:Essays in theTheoryand Practice ofInternational
Politics (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 27, 54-87, 129; Aron, Peace and War, pp. 6-10.
8. Aron,Peace and War,p. 5; Gilpin,"PoliticalRealism,"p. 304.
9. Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, pp. 115-16; see also Morgenthau,Politics Among
Nations,p. 512; and StanleyHoffmann, Organization
"International and the International
System,"inLelandM. GoodrichandDavidA. Kay,eds.,International Politics
Organization:
and Process(Madison:University ofWisconsinPress,1973),p. 50.
theoriesmaybe distinguished
10. Liberalinstitutionalist fromthreeothervariantsofliberal
theory.One of these,tradeliberalism, by RichardCobdenand JohnBright,
articulated finds
thatinternational
commerce greater
facilitates forCobden,see Arnold
cooperation:
inter-state
Wolfersand Laurence W. Martin,eds., The Anglo-AmericanTraditionin ForeignAffairs(New
Haven,Conn.: Yale University Press,1956),pp. 192-205;withrespectto bothCobdenand
Bright, see also Waltz,Man, State,and War,pp. 98-99,103-7.A secondvariant, democratic
structural positedbyImmanuel
liberalism, KantandWoodrowWilson,findsthatdemocracies
based on nationalself-determinationare conduciveto greaterinternational cooperation. For
Wilson,see Wolfersand Martin,eds., Anglo-American pp. 263-79;forKantand
Tradition,
Wilson,see Waltz,Man, State,and War,pp. 101-3,109-11,117-19;andMichaelW. Doyle,
"LiberalismandWorldPolitics,"American PoliticalScienceReview80 (December1986),pp.
approachsuggests
1151-69.Finally,a liberaltransactions interactions
thatprivateinternational
promote international see KarlDeutschet al., PoliticalCommunity
integration: and theNorth
AtlanticArea (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1957);and BruceRussett,Com-
munity and Contention (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1963).Citingan unpublished studyby
Keohane,Nyerecently refers twovariants
tothefirst as commercial anddemocratic liberalism,
respectively, and suggeststhatthethirdmightbe termedsociologicalliberalism. See Joseph
S. Nye,Jr.,"Neorealismand Neoliberalism," WorldPolitics40 (January 1988),p. 246.
11.In a wayquitedifferent fromliberalinstitutionalist worldsystems
theories, analysisalso
challengesrealism'sfocuson states.It suggeststhattheyare notultimate causes of world
eventsbutinsteadare themselves resultantsof thedevelopment of a singleworldcapitalist
economy.See ImmanuelWallerstein, "The Rise and FutureDemiseof theWorldCapitalist
System,"in Wallerstein, The CapitalistWorldSystem(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press,1979),pp. 1-37;andWallerstein,TheModernWorld System,vol. 1(NewYork:Academic
Press,1974).

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Anarchyand cooperation 489

to be specializedinternationalagenciesandtheirtechnicalexperts;forneo-
functionalists,theywerelaborunions,politicalparties,tradeassociations,
and supranational bureaucracies;and fortheinterdependence school,they
were multinational corporations and transnationaland transgovernmental
attackedthe realistview that
Second, liberalinstitutionalists
coalitions.12
statesare unitary Authority
or rationalagents.13 was alreadydecentralized
withinmodemstates,functionalists argued,anditwas undergoing a similar
processinternationally.14Modernstates,accordingto interdependence the-
orists,wereincreasingly characterized by "multiplechannelsof access,"
which,inturn,progressively enfeebled thegripon foreign policypreviously
heldby centraldecisionmakers.15
Third,liberalsarguedthatstateswere becomingless concernedabout
powerandsecurity. Internationally,nuclearweaponsandmobilizednational
populations wererendering warprohibitively costly.16 Moreover,increases
in inter-nationeconomiccontactsleftstatesincreasingly dependentupon
one anotherforthe attainment of such nationalgoals as growth,fullem-
ployment, and pricestability.17Domestically, had created
industrialization
thepresent"social century":theadvanceddemocracies(and,moreslowly,
socialistand developingcountries)werebecomingwelfarestatesless ori-
entedtowardspowerand prestigeand moretowardseconomicgrowthand
social security.18Thus, liberalsrejectedrealism'sfourthproposition that

12. See Mitrany,WorkingPeace System,pp. 17, 85-87, 133-34; Haas, Beyond the Nation-
State,pp. 32-40; Haas, UnitingofEurope,pp. 16-31,113-239,283-340;Nye, "Comparing
CommonMarkets,"pp. 195-206;andRobert0. KeohaneandJosephS. Nye,Jr.,"Introduc-
tion," and "Conclusion,"in Keohane and Nye, eds., Transnational Relationsand World
Politics(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1972),pp. ix-xxix,371-98.
bodyofliterature
13. A substantial thatis notbased on liberalism neverthelesssharesthe
abouttheunityand rationality
latter'sskepticism of states.It findsthatsubsystemic forces,
andbureaucratic
suchas organizational politics,smallgroupdynamics, crisisdecision-making,
and individualpsychology,all undermine statecoherenceand rationality. See GrahamT.
Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown,
1980);Ole R. Holsti,
2d ed. (Boston:HoughtonMifflin,
1971);IrvingJ. Janis,Groupthink,
CrisisEscalationWar(Montreal:McGillUniversity The
Press,1970);JohnD. Steinbruner,
Cybernetic N.J.:Princeton
TheoryofDecision(Princeton, Press,1974);Alexander
University
L. and JulietteL. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A PersonalityStudy (New
York: Dover, 1964); and RobertJervis,Perceptionand Misperceptionin WorldPolitics (Prin-
Press,1976).
University
ceton,N.J.:Princeton
14. Mitrany,
WorkingPeace System,pp. 54-55,63, 69-73,88, 134-38.
15.See Mitrany,
WorkingPeace System,pp. 20,32-38;Haas, "The New Europe,"pp. 152,
155-56;Keohaneand Nye, "Introduction,"p. xxv,and "Conclusion,"pp. 375-78;Morse,
pp. 387-89;Cooper,"Interdependence,"
"Transformation," pp. 177,179;and Keohaneand
Nye, Power and Interdependence,pp. 33-35, 226-29.
16.Mitrany, Peace System,
Working pp. 380-81;Keohane
p. 13;Morse,"Transformation,"
and Nye, Power and Interdependence,pp. 27-29, 228.
17. Mitrany, Peace System,pp. 131-37;Haas, "The New Europe,"pp. 161-62;
Working
Cooper,"Interdependence,"pp. 161-68,173-74;KeohaneandNye,PowerandInterdepend-
ence,pp. 26, 228.
18. See Mitrany,WorkingPeace System,pp. 41-42,95-96, 136-37,144-45;Haas, "The
New Europe," pp. 155-58;Morse,"Transformation," pp. 383-85;and Keohaneand Nye,
Power and Interdependence,p. 227.

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Organization
490 International

statesare fundamentally disinclinedto cooperate,finding insteadthatstates

increasinglyviewedone anothernot as enemies,but insteadas partners
neededto securegreatercomfort and well-being fortheirhomepublics.19
Finally,liberal rejected
institutionalists realism's pessimismaboutinter-
nationalinstitutions.For functionalisttheory, specialized agencieslikethe
InternationalLabor Organization could promote cooperation because they
performed valuable tasks without frontally challenging state sovereignty.20
For neofunctionalist theory,supranational bodies like the EuropeanEco-
nomicCommunity were "the appropriate regional counterpart tothenational
statewhichno longer feelscapable of realizing welfaregoals within itsown
narrowborders.' '21 Finally, interdependence theory suggested that "in a
worldof multiple issues imperfectly linked, in which coalitions are formed
transnationallyand transgovernmentally, thepotentialroleofinternational
in politicalbargaining
institutions is greatlyincreased.''22
Postwarevents,and especiallythoseof the 1970s,appearedto support
realisttheoryand to invalidateliberalinstitutionalism. Statesremainedau-
tonomous in setting foreignpolicy goals; they retainedtheloyaltyof gov-
ernment activein "transgovernmental
officials networks";and theyrecast
thetermsoftheirrelationships withsuchseemingly powerful transnational
actorsas high-technology multinational corporations.23 Industrialized states
variedin theireconomicperformance duringthe1970sinthefaceofsimilar
challenges(oil shortages,recession,and inflation). Scholarslinkedthese
differencesin performance to divergences, and not convergence, in their
domesticpolitical-economic structures.24 A numberof eventsduringthe
1970sand early1980salso demonstrated thattheuse offorcecontinued to
be a pervasivefeatureof worldpolitics:increasesin East-Westtensions
suggested
19. Neofunctionalists that,forWestEuropeanstates,"theargument is no longer
overthemeansforincreasing
overthesliceofthepietogo toeach;itis increasingly theoverall
size ofthepastry."See Haas, "The New Europe,"p. 158;see also pp. 160-62,166-67.See
Working
also Mitrany, Peace System,pp. 92-93;Morse,"Transformation," pp. 383-85;and
Cooper,"Interdependence," pp. 164-67,170-72,179.
20. Mitrany,WorkingPeace System,pp. 133-37, 198-211; see also Haas, Beyond theNation-
State.
21. Haas, "The New Europe,"p. 159.
p. 35; see also pp. 36,232-34,240-42.
22. KeohaneandNye,Powerand Interdependence,
23. See Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest:Raw Materials Investments
N.J.:Princeton
and U.S. ForeignPolicy(Princeton, Press,1978);RobertW. Russell,
University
"Transgovernmental in theInternational
Interaction MonetarySystem,1960-1972,"Interna-
tionalOrganization27 (Autumn1973),pp. 431-64; and JosephM. Grieco,BetweenDependency
and Autonomy:India's Experience withthe InternationalComputerIndustry(Berkeley: Uni-
Press,1984).
ofCalifornia
versity
24. See Peter J. Katzenstein,ed., Between Power and Plenty:Foreign Economic Policies of
ofWisconsinPress,1978);Katzenstein,
States(Madison:University
AdvancedIndustrialized
Small States in WorldMarkets: IndustrialPolicy in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1985);JohnZysman,Political StrategiesforIndustrialOrder:State, Market,and Industry
of California
in France(Berkeley:University Markets,
Press,1977);Zysman,Governments,
and Growth:Financial Systems and the Politics of IndustrialChange (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
UniversityPress, 1983); and PeterGourevitch,Politics in Hard Times: ComparativeResponses
Press,1986),pp. 181-217.
EconomicCrises(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity
toInternational

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Anarchyand cooperation 491

and thecontinuation oftheSoviet-American armscompetition; directand

indirectmilitary intervention by thesuperpowers
and counter-intervention
in Africa,CentralAmerica,and SouthwestAsia; and theYom Kippurand
Iran-Iraqwars.25International appearedto be unableto reshape
institutions
state interests;instead,theywere oftenembroiledin and paralyzedby
East-Westand North-South disputes.26 in West
Finally,supranationalism
Europe was replacedby old-fashioned intergovernmentalbargaining,and
theadvanceddemocraciesfrequently experiencedserioustradeand mon-
etaryconflictsand sharpdiscordover economicrelationswiththe Soviet
Union.27
Andyet,international cooperationdid notcollapseduringthe1970sas it
had duringthe 1930s.28In finance,privatebanksand governments in de-
velopedcountriesworkedwiththeInternational MonetaryFundto contain
theinternational
debtcrisis.29In trade,theadvancedstatescompletedthe
Tokyo Round negotiations underthe GeneralAgreement on Tariffsand

25. On thecontinuing offorceinthenuclearage,see Alexander

utility L. GeorgeandRichard
Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theoryand Practice (New York: Columbia
University andStephenS. Kaplan,ForceWithout
Press,1974);BarryM. Blechman War:U.S.
ArmedForces as a Political Instrument(Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution,1978); Ste-
phen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet ArmedForces as a Political Instrument(Wash-
ington,D.C.: Brookings 1981);andRichardBetts,NuclearBlackmailandNuclear
Institution,
Balance (Washington,D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1987).
26. East-Westdisputesin a specializedinternational
agencyare examinedin WalterGal-
enson, The InternationalLabor Organization: An American View (Madison: Universityof
WisconsinPress,1981).North-South withininternational
struggles are discussed
institutions
in StephenD. Krasner,StructuralConflict:The ThirdWorldAgainst Global Liberalism(Berke-
ley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1985).
27. On theproblemofEuropeanintegration, see DonaldJ.Puchala,"DomesticPoliticsand
RegionalHarmonization in the EuropeanCommunities," WorldPolitics27 (July1975),pp.
496-520;andPaulTaylor,TheLimitsofEuropeanIntegration (NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity
Press, 1983).Trendstowardsa "new protectionism" supportedrealistargumentsthatthe
erosionof America'shegemonic positionwouldproducea less openinternational economy.
See Gilpin,U.S. Power,and StephenD. Krasner,"State Powerand theStructure of Inter-
nationalTrade,"WorldPolitics28 (April1976),pp. 317-45.Ontradeconflictsduringthe1970s,
see JohnH. Jackson,"The Crumbling Institutionsof theLiberalTradeSystem,"Journalof
WorldTradeLaw 12 (March-April1978),pp. 93-106; Bela and Carol Balassa, "Industrial
ProtectionintheDevelopedCountries,"WorldEconomy7 (June1984),pp. 179-86;andMiles
Kahler,"EuropeanProtectionism in TheoryandPractice,"WorldPolitics37 (July1985),pp.
475-502. On monetarydisputes, see Susan Strange,InternationalMonetaryRelations of the
WesternWorld,1959-1971, vol. 2 of AndrewShonfield,ed. InternationalEconomic Relations
oftheWestern World,1959-1971(Oxford:OxfordUniversity PressfortheRoyalInstitute
of
International
Affairs,
1976),pp. 320-53;andBenjaminJ.Cohen,"Europe'sMoney,America's
Problems,"ForeignPolicy,No. 35 (Summer1979),pp. 31-47.On disputesovereconomicties
withthe Soviet Union, see StephenWoolcock, WesternPolicies on East-West Trade, Chatham
HousePapersNo. 15(London:Routledge
& KeganPaulfortheRoyalInstitute
ofInternational
Affairs,1982); and Bruce W. Jentleson,Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of
East-WestEnergyTrade(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press,1986).
28. StephenD. Krasner,"Preface,"in Krasner,ed., International Regimes,p. viii.
29.See CharlesLipson,"Bankers'Dilemmas:PrivateCooperation inReschedulingSovereign
Debts," WorldPolitics38 (October1985),pp. 200-25;also see MilesKahler,ed., ThePolitics
ofInternational
Debt (Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press,1986).

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
492 International
Organization

Trade.30In energy,theadvancedstatesfailedto coordinateresponsestothe

oil crisesof 1973-1974and 1979,butcooperatedeffectively-through the
InternationalEnergyAgency-following theoutbreakoftheIran-Iraqwar
in 1980.31Finally,in hightechnology,the Europeanstatesinitiatedand
pursuedduringthe 1970sa hostofjointprojectsin hightechnology suchas
AirbusIndustrie,theARIANE rocketprogram, andtheESPRIT information
technology effort.32
Governments hadnottransformed theirforeign
policies,
and worldpoliticswerenotin transition,butstates achievedcooperation
throughinternational institutions even in the harsh 1970s. This set the stage
fora renewed,albeittruncated,
liberalchallengeto realismin the 1980s.

2. The new liberal institutionalism

In contrastto earlierpresentations of liberalinstitutionalism,

the newest
liberalismacceptsrealistarguments thatstatesarethemajoractorsinworld
affairsand are unitary-rationalagents.It also claimsto accept realism's
emphasison anarchyto explainstatemotivesand actions.RobertAxelrod,
forexample,seeks to addressthisquestion:"Under whatconditionswill
cooperation emergeina worldofegoistswithout centralauthority?"33
Sim-
ilarly,AxelrodandRobertKeohaneobserveofworldpoliticsthat"thereis
no commongovernment to enforcerules,andbythestandardsofdomestic
society,international are weak."34
institutions
Yet neoliberalsarguethatrealismis wrongto discountthepossibilities
forinternationalcooperation and thecapacitiesofinternational
institutions.
Neoliberalsclaimthat,contrary torealismandinaccordancewithtraditional

30. See GilbertWinham,InternationalTrade and the TokyoRound Negotiation (Princeton,

N.J.: PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1986);see also CharlesLipson,"The Transformation
of
Trade:The SourcesandEffectsofRegimeChange,"in Krasner,ed., InternationalRegimes,
pp. 233-72;and JockA. Finlaysonand MarkW. Zacher,"The GATT and theRegulation of
Trade Barriers:RegimeDynamicsand Functions,"in Krasner,ed., International
Regimes,
pp. 273-314.
31. See RobertJ. Lieber, The Oil Decade: Conflictand Cooperation in the West(New York:
Praeger, 1983); Daniel Badger and Robert Belgrave, Oil Supply and Price: What WentRight
in 1980?(Paris:AtlanticInstitute
forInternational May 1982);and Keohane,After
Affairs,
Hegemony, pp. 217-40.
32. See BruceL. R. Smith,"A New Technology Gap in Europe?"SAIS Review6 (Win-
ter-Spring1986),pp. 219-36;andWalterA. McDougall,"Space-AgeEurope:Gaullism, Euro-
Gaullism,andtheAmerican Dilemma,"Technologyand Culture26 (April1985),pp. 179-203.
33. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, p. 3; also see pp. 4, 6.
34. AxelrodandKeohane,"Achieving Cooperation," p. 226.Steinarguesthathistheory of
regimes"is rootedin theclassiccharacterization
international politicsas re-
of international
lationsbetweensovereign entitiesdedicatedto theirownself-preservation, able to
ultimately
dependonlyuponthemselves, andprepared to resortto force";see Stein,"Coordination and
Collaboration,"p. 116. LipsonnotesthatAxelrod'sideas are important becausethey"ob-
viouslybearona centralissueininternationalrelationstheory:theemergence andmaintenance
of cooperationamongsovereign, self-interestedstates,operatingwithoutanycentralized au-
thority";see Lipson,"International Cooperation,"p. 6.

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Anarchyand cooperation 493

liberalviews,institutionscan helpstatesworktogether.35 Thus,neoliberals

argue,the prospectsforinternational cooperationare betterthanrealism
allows.36Thesepointsofconvergence anddivergence amongthethreeper-
spectivesare summarized in Table 1.
Neoliberalsbeginwithassertionsof acceptanceof severalkey realist
propositions;however,theyendwitha rejectionofrealismand withclaims
ofaffirmationofthecentraltenetsoftheliberalinstitutionalist tradition.To
developthisargument, neoliberalsfirstobservethatstatesin anarchyoften
facemixedinterests and,in particular, situationswhichcan be depictedby
Prisoner'sDilemma.37 In thegame,each stateprefersmutualcooperation
to mutualnoncooperation (CC>DD), butalso successfulcheating to mutual
cooperation(DC>CC) and mutualdefectionto victimization by another's
cheating(DD>CD); overall,then,DC>CC>DD>CD. In these circum-
stances,and in theabsenceof a centralized authorityor someothercoun-
tervailingforceto bindstatesto theirpromises,each defectsregardlessof
whatit expectstheotherto do.
However,neoliberalsstressthatcountervailing forcesoftendo exist-
forcesthatcause statesto keeptheirpromisesand thusto resolvethePris-
oner'sDilemma.Theyarguethatstatesmaypursuea strategy oftit-for-tat
and cooperateon a conditional basis-that is, each adheresto itspromises
so longas partnersdo so. Theyalso suggestthatconditional cooperation is
morelikelyto occurin Prisoner'sDilemmaifthegameis highlyiterated,
sincestatesthatinteractrepeatedly ineithera mutually beneficialorharmful
mannerare likelyto findthatmutualcooperationis theirbest long-term
strategy.Finally,conditional cooperationis moreattractive to statesifthe
35. Keohanenotesin AfterHegemony(p. 9) that"I beginwithRealistinsights aboutthe
roleofpowerandtheeffects ofhegemony" butthat"mycentralarguments drawmoreon the
tradition,
Institutionalist arguing thatcooperation can undersomeconditions developon the
basisofcomplementary interests, and thatinstitutions, broadlydefined, affectthepatterns of
cooperation thatemerge."Keohanealso notes(p. 26) that"whatdistinguishes myargument
fromstructuralRealismis myemphasison theeffects ofinternational institutionsandpractices
on statebehavior."
36. KeohaneindicatesinAfterHegemony(pp. 14, 16) thathe does notseek thewholesale
ofrealism.However,on theissueoftheprospects
rejection forcooperation, likethequestion
ofinternationalinstitutions,he does seek to refuterealism'sconclusionswhileemploying its
assumptions. He notes(p. 29) that"[s]tarting withsimilar premisesaboutmotivations, I seek
to showthatRealism'spessimism aboutwelfare-increasing cooperation is exaggerated," and
he proposes(p. 67) "to show,on thebasis of theirownassumptions, thatthecharacteristic
pessimismof Realismdoes notfollow."Keohanealso suggests(p. 84) thatrational-choice
analysis"helps us criticize,in its own terms,Realism'sbleakpictureof theinevitability of
eitherhegemony orconflict." Finally,he asserts(p. 84) thatrational-choicetheory, "combined
withsensitivityto the significance of internationalinstitutions,"allowsforan awarenessof
boththestrengths and weaknessesofrealism,and in so doing"[w]e can stripawaysomeof
the aura of verisimilitudethatsurrounds Realismand reconsider the logicaland empirical
foundationsofitsclaimsto ourintellectual allegiance."
37. On theimportance of Prisoner'sDilemmain neoliberal theory,see Axelrod,Evolution
ofCooperation, p. 7; Keohane,After Hegemony, pp.66-69;AxelrodandKeohane,"Achieving
Cooperation,"p. 231; Lipson,"International Cooperation,"p. 2; and Stein,"Coordination
andCollaboration," pp. 120-24.

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ro)

r-0)

'J

rw 4.4
0 0
0
0
Co
C13
C)
4-J

= = 0
o C13 03
4-
0 0
U $., 0 rA 64
rA 4C. Cq
-1-4 Cl 4-4
0 C13
C,3 r- 0) +-j
...4

4-4
6) ... CZ w rol Cd ;.
-
0) 0)
4- = 4-4
0
0
o 4-1 C,3 C,3
o o o
4-4 w +-j

z z z

C) 4-J

4-4
1.0

0 C'S0
U 0
C13 0
4-i

CZ - -4
4-J
0
U
C13 C13
0 ct

4-i4

4-4
C,3 C13
ct 0
4-1
In 42 =
44) 0
>, U.4 IZI = 4-10
CZ
C's .4,o
rA

+C4
4) U4
4-i CZ 4) +-
M
0
CZ 0. "o

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Anarchyand cooperation 495

costs of verifying one another'scompliance,and of sanctioning cheaters,

are low comparedto the benefitsofjointaction.Thus, conditionalcoop-
erationamongstatesmayevolve in theface of international anarchyand
mixedintereststhroughstrategies of reciprocity,extendedtimehorizons,
and reducedverification and sanctioning costs.
Neoliberalsfindthatone way statesmanageverification and sanctioning
problems is torestrictthenumber ofpartnersina cooperative arrangement.38
However,neoliberalsplace muchgreateremphasison a secondfactor-
international institutions.In particular,
neoliberalsarguethatinstitutions
reduceverification costs,createiterativeness,and makeit easierto punish
cheaters.As Keohanesuggests,"in general,regimesmakeitmoresensible
to cooperateby loweringthelikelihoodof beingdouble-crossed."39 Simi-
larly,Keohaneand Axelrodassertthat"international regimesdo notsub-
stituteforreciprocity; rather,theyreinforceandinstitutionalizeit.Regimes
incorporating the normof reciprocity delegitimize defectionand thereby
makeitmorecostly."40 In addition,
findingthat"coordination conventions"
areoftenan element cooperation
ofconditional inPrisoner'sDilemma, Charles
Lipson suggeststhat"in international relations,such conventions, which
are typicallygroundedin ongoingreciprocalexchange,rangefrominter-
nationallaw to regimerules.''41 Finally,ArthurSteinarguesthat,just as
societies"create" statesto resolvecollectiveactionproblemsamongin-
dividuals,so too "regimesintheinternational arenaarealso createdto deal
withthe collectivesuboptimality thatcan emergefromindividual[state]
behavior.''42 Hegemonicpowermaybe necessaryto establishcoooperation
amongstates,neoliberalsargue,butitmayendureafterhegemony withthe
aid ofinstitutions.As Keohaneconcludes,"Whenwe thinkaboutcooper-
ationafterhegemony, we needto thinkaboutinstitutions."43

3. Realism and the failureof the new

liberalinstitutionalism

The newliberalsassertthattheycan acceptkeyrealistviewsaboutstates

andanarchyand stillsustainclassicliberalarguments and
aboutinstitutions
cooperation.Yet, in fact,realistand neoliberalperspectives
international
on statesand anarchydiffer profoundly, and theformerprovidesa more
completeunderstanding oftheproblemofcooperationthanthelatter.
Neoliberalsassumethatstateshave onlyone goal in mixed-interest in-
Hegemony,
38. See Keohane,After Cooperation,"
p. 77; AxelrodandKeohane,"Achieving
see Lipson,"Bankers'Dilemmas."
pp. 234-38.For a demonstration,
39. Keohane, AfterHegemony, p. 97.
40. Axelrodand Keohane,"AchievingCooperation," p. 250.
Cooperation,"p. 6.
41. Lipson,"International
p. 123.
and Collaboration,"
42. Stein,"Coordination
43. Keohane, AfterHegemony,p. 246.

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Organization
496 International

teractions:to achievethe greatestpossibleindividualgain. For example,

Axelrodsuggeststhatthekeyissue in selectinga "best strategy"in Pris-
oner'sDilemma-offered byneoliberals as a powerfulmodeloftheproblem
of statecooperationin theface of anarchyand mixedinterests-isto de-
termine"what strategy will yielda playerthe highestpossiblescore. 44
Similarly,Lipson observesthatcheatingis attractive in a singleplay of
Prisoner'sDilemmabecause each playerbelievesthatdefecting "can max-
imizehisownreward,"and,in turning to iteratedplays,Lipsonretainsthe
assumption thatplayersseek to maximizeindividual payoffs overthelong
run.45Indeed,relianceuponconventional Prisoner'sDilemmato depictin-
relationships
ternational and uponiteration to solvethedilemmaunambig-
uouslyrequiresneoliberalism to adhereto an individualistic payoffmax-
imizationassumption,fora playerrespondsto an iteratedconventional
Prisoner'sDilemmawithconditionalcooperationsolelyout of a desireto
maximizeits individuallong-termtotalpayoffs.
Moreover,neoliberalinstitutionalists assumethatstatesdefinetheirin-
terestsin strictly terms.Axelrod,forexample,indicatesthat
individualistic
hisobjectiveis to showhowactors"who pursuetheirowninterests"may
nevertheless worktogether.46 Dilemmais useful
He also notesthatPrisoner's
to studystatesinanarchybecauseitis assumedinthegamethat"theobject
is to do as wellas possible,regardlessofhowwelltheotherplayerdoes.''47
Similarly, Lipson suggeststhatPrisoner'sDilemma"clearlyparallelsthe
Realistconception ofsovereign statesinworldpolitics"becauseeachplayer
inthegame"is assumedto be a self-interested, maximizer
self-reliant ofhis
own utility.''48
Finally,Keohane bases his analysisof international cooperationon the
assumption thatstatesarebasicallyatomisticactors.He suggeststhatstates
inan anarchicalcontextare,as microeconomic theoryassumeswithrespect
to businessfirms, "rationalegoists."Rationalitymeansthatstatespossess
"consistent, ordered preferences,and . . . calculate costs and benefitsof
coursesof actionin orderto maximizetheirutilityin view of
alternative
maximization
thesepreferences."In turn,he definesutility atomistically;
egoism,according functions
toKeohane,"meansthattheir[i.e., state]utility
are independentof one another:theydo not gain or lose utilitysimply
because ofthegainsor losses ofothers.49

44. Axelrod,Evolutionof Cooperation, pp. 6, 14. Steinacknowledgesthathe employsan

absolute-gains assumption andthatthelatter"is verymucha liberal,notmercantilist,viewof
itsuggests
self-interest; thatactorsfocuson theirownreturns andcomparedifferentoutcomes
withan eyeto maximizing theirowngains."See Stein,"Coordination andCollaboration," p.
to see how Steincan employa "liberal"assumption
134. It is difficult and
of stateinterest
assertthathistheoryofregimes, as notedearlierinnote34,is basedon the"classic [realist?]
characterization" ofinternationalpolitics.
45. Lipson,"International Cooperation,"pp. 2, 5.
46. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, p. 9.
47. Ibid.,p. 22.
Cooperation,"p. 2.
48. Lipson,"International
49. Keohane, AfterHegemony,p. 27.

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Anarchyand cooperation 497

Neoliberalism findsthatstatesattaingreater utility-thatis, a higher

level
of satisfaction-astheyachievehigherindividual payoffs.Also, in keeping
withtheconceptofrationalegoism,a utility functionspecifiedby thenew
theoryforone statewouldnotbe "linked"to theutility functions ofothers.
Hence,ifa stateenjoysutility, U, indirectproportion to itspayoff, V, then
theneoliberalinstitutionalist
specification
ofthatstate'sutility functionwould
be U=V.50
Overall,"rationalegoist" statescare onlyabouttheirown gains.They
do notcare whetherpartnersachieveor do notachievegains,or whether
thosegainsare largeor small,or whether suchgainsaregreaterorless than
thegainstheythemselves achieve.Themajorconstraint ontheircooperation
in mixedinterest international is theproblemofcheating.
situations
Andyet,realisttheoryrejectsneoliberalism's exclusivefocuson cheating.
Differences in the realistand neoliberalunderstanding of the problemof
cooperation resultfroma fundamental divergence intheirinterpretations of
thebasicmeaning ofinternational anarchy.Neoliberalinstitutionalism offers
a well-established definitionof anarchy,specifying thatit means"the lack
of commongovernment in worldpolitics."51 Neoliberalism thenproceeds
to identifyone majoreffectof international anarchy.Because of anarchy,
according toneoliberals, individualsorstatesbelievethatno agencyis avail-
able to "enforcerules," or to "enact or enforcerulesofbehavior,"or to
"forcethemto cooperatewitheach other.''52 As a result,accordingto
neoliberaltheory,"cheatingand deceptionare endemic"in international
Anarchy,then,meansthatstatesmaywishto cooperate,but,
relations.53
awarethatcheatingis bothpossibleandprofitable, lacka centralagencyto
enforcepromises.Giventhisunderstanding of anarchy,neoliberalinstitu-
tionaltheorycorrectly identifiestheproblemofcheatingand thenproceeds
to investigatehowinstitutions can amelioratethatparticular problem.
For realists,as forneoliberals, international anarchymeanstheabsence
of a commoninter-state government. Yet, accordingto realists,statesdo
notbelievethatthelackofa commongovernment onlymeansthatnoagency
can reliablyenforcepromises.Instead,realistsstress,statesrecognizethat,
in anarchy,thereis no overarchingauthorityto preventothersfrom using
50. On payoffsandutilityfunctions,
see AnatolRapoport,Fights,GamesandDebates(Ann
Arbor:University ofMichiganPress,1960),p. 121,and MichaelTaylor,Anarchy and Coop-
eration(London:Wiley,1976),pp. 70-74.
51. Axelrodand Keohane,"AchievingCooperation,"p. 226; see also Keohane,AfterHe-
gemony,p. 7; Lipson,"InternationalCooperation,"pp. 1-2; Axelrod,Evolutionof Cooper-
ation,pp. 3-4; and Stein,"Coordination
and Collaboration,"
p. 116.
52. See AxelrodandKeohane,"Achieving Cooperation,"p. 226;Keohane,AfterHegemony,
p. 7; and Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, p. 6.
53. Axelrodand Keohane,"AchievingCooperation,"p. 226. Similarly, Lipsonnotesthat
whileinstitutionalizedmechanisms (suchas governments) thatguarantee theenforcement of
contractsareavailableincivilsociety,"theabsenceofreliableguarantees is an essential
feature
of internationalrelationsand a majorobstacleto concluding treaties,contracts, and agree-
ments."The resulting problem, accordingto Lipson,is that"constraints on opportunism are
weak." See Lipson,"International Cooperation,"p. 4. Also see Keohane,AfterHegemony,
p. 93, and Stein,"Coordination and Collaboration,"
p. 116.

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Organization
498 International

violence, or the threatof violence, to destroyor enslave them.As Kenneth

Waltz suggests,in anarchy,wars can occur "because thereis nothingto
prevent them,"andtherefore "in international
politicsforceserves,notonly
as theultimaratio,butindeedas thefirst and constantone."54Thus,some
statesmaysometimes be drivenby greedor ambition, butanarchyand the
dangerof warcause all statesalwaysto be motivated in somemeasureby
fearand distrust.55
Givenits understanding of anarchy,realismarguesthatindividualwell-
beingis notthekeyinterest of states;instead,it findsthatsurvivalis their
coreinterest.RaymondAron,forexample,suggested that"politics,insofar
as it concernsrelationsamongstates,seemsto signify-inbothideal and
objectiveterms-simply thesurvival ofstatesconfronting thepotentialthreat
createdbytheexistenceofotherstates. "56 Similarly,RobertGilpinobserves
thatindividualsand groupsmay seek truth,beauty,and justice,but he
emphasizesthat"all thesemorenoblegoals willbe lostunlessone makes
provisionforone's security in thepowerstruggle amonggroups."57
Drivenbyan interest insurvival, statesareacutelysensitive toanyerosion
of theirrelativecapabilities,whichare theultimate basis fortheirsecurity
and independencein an anarchical,self-help international context.Thus,
realistsfindthatthemajorgoal of statesin anyrelationship is notto attain
thehighest possibleindividual gainorpayoff. Instead,thefundamental goal
of states in any relationshipis to preventothersfrom achieving advances
in theirrelativecapabilities. For example, E. H. Carr suggestedthat "the
mostseriouswarsare fought in orderto makeone's owncountry militarily
strongeror, more often,to preventanotherfrombecomingmilitarily
'58 Alongthesamelines,Gilpin
stronger.' findsthattheinternational
system
"stimulates, and maycompel,a stateto increaseitspower;at theleast,it
necessitatesthattheprudentstatepreventrelativeincreasesin thepower
of competitor states."59 Indeed, statesmayeven forgoincreasesin their
ifdoingso prevents
absolutecapabilities othersfromachievingevengreater
gains.Thisis because,as Waltzsuggests,"thefirst concernofstatesis not
to maximizepowerbutto maintain theirpositionin thesystem."60
54. See Waltz, Man, State, and War, p. 232; and Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, p.
113.Similarly, thatwar"lurksinthebackground
Carrsuggests ofinternational
politicsjustas
revolutionlurksin thebackgroundof domesticpolitics."See Carr,TwentyYearsCrisis,p.
109. Finally,Aronobservesthatinternationalrelations"presentone originalfeaturewhich
theytakeplacewithin
themfromall othersocialrelations:
distinguishes theshadowofwar."
See Aron, Peace and War, p. 6.
55. See Gilpin,"PoliticalRealism,"pp. 304-5.
56. Aron, Peace and War, p. 7; also see pp. 64-65.
Waltzindicatesthat"in anarchy,
57. Gilpin,"PoliticalRealism,"p. 305. Similarly, security
is the highestend. Onlyif survivalis assuredcan statessafelyseek such othergoals as
tranquility,
profit,and power." See Waltz,TheoryofInternational Politics,p. 126;also see
pp. 91-92,and Waltz,"Reflections," p. 334.
58. Carr, Twenty-YearsCrisis, p. 111, emphasis added.
59. Gilpin, War and Change, pp. 87-88.
p. 334.
Politics,p. 126;see also Waltz,"Reflections,"
60. Waltz,TheoryofInternational

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Anarchyand cooperation 499

Statesseektoprevent As a result,
increasesinothers'relativecapabilities.
statesalwaysassess theirperformancein anyrelationship in termsof the
performance Thus,I suggestthatstatesarepositional,
ofothers.61 notatom-
istic, in character.Most significantly,state positionalitymay constrainthe
willingnessof states to cooperate. States fearthattheirpartnerswillachieve
relatively greatergains;that,as a result,thepartners will surgeahead of
themin relativecapabilties;and, finally, thattheirincreasingly powerful
partners in thepresentcouldbecomeall themoreformidable foesat some
pointin thefuture.62
State positionality, then,engendersa "relativegainsproblem"forco-
operation.Thatis, a statewilldeclinetojoin,willleave,orwillsharply limit
itscommitment to a cooperativearrangement ifitbelievesthatpartners are
achieving,or are likelyto achieve,relatively greatergains.It willeschew
cooperation eventhoughparticipation in thearrangement was providing it,
or would have providedit, withlargeabsolutegains. Moreover,a state
concerned aboutrelativegainsmaydeclinetocooperateevenifitis confident
thatpartners willkeep theircommitments to a jointarrangement. Indeed,
if a statebelievedthata proposedarrangement wouldprovideall parties
absolutegains,butwouldalso generategainsfavoring partners, thengreater
certainty thatpartners wouldadhereto thetermsofthearrangement would
onlyaccentuateits relativegainsconcerns.Thus, a stateworriedabout
relativegainsmightrespondto greatercertainty thatpartners wouldkeep
theirpromiseswitha lower,ratherthana higher, willingnessto cooperate.
I muststressthatrealistsdo notarguethatpositionality causes all states
to possessan offensively orienteddesireto maximizethedifference ingains
arisingfromcooperationto theirown advantage.They do not, in other
words,attribute to stateswhatSteincorrectly callsa mercantilistdefinition
Instead,realistsarguethatstatesare morelikelyto con-
of self-interest.63
centrateon thedangerthatrelativegainsmayadvantagepartners and thus

61. Onthetendency ofstatestocompareperformance levels,see OranYoung,"International

Regimes:Towarda New Theoryof Institutions," WorldPolitics39 (October1986),p. 118.
Youngsuggests thatrealistsassumethatstatesare "statusmaximizers" andattribute to states
thetendency tocompareperformance levelsbecauseeachseeks"to attainthehighest possible
rankin thehierarchy ofmembers oftheinternationalcommunity." The presentwriter offers
understanding
a different of realism:whilerealismacknowledges thatsome statesmaybe
in thesensenotedbyYoung,itsfundamental
positional insightis thatall statesare positional
and compareperformance levelsbecausetheyfearthatothersmayattaina higherranking in
an issue-area.
62. As Waltzsuggests,"Whenfacedwiththepossibility of cooperating formutualgains,
statesthatfeelinsecuremustask howthegainwillbe divided.Theyarecompelledto ask not
"Willbothofus gain?"but"Who willgainmore?"Ifan expectedgainis to be divided,say,
in theratiooftwoto one, one statemayuse itsdisproportionate gainto implement a policy
intendedto damage or destroythe other." See Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, p. 105.
p. 134.
and Collaboration,"
63. Stein,"Coordination

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Organization
500 International

mayfostertheemergence ofa morepowerful potentialadversary.A4Realism,

then,findsthatstatesare positional, butitalso findsthatstatepositionality
is moredefensivethanoffensive in nature.
In addition,realistsfindthatdefensivestatepositionality and therelative
gainsproblemforcooperationessentially reflectthepersistenceof uncer-
taintyin international relations.Statesare uncertainabout one another's
futureintentions; thus,theypay close attention to how cooperationmight
affectrelativecapabilitiesin thefuture.65 Thisuncertainty resultsfromthe
inabilityof statesto predictor readilyto controlthefutureleadershipor
interestsofpartners. As RobertJervisnotes,"Mindscan be changed,new
leaderscan cometo power,valuescan shift, newopportunities and dangers
can arise."66
Thus,realismexpectsa state'sutility functionto incorporate twodistinct
terms.It needs to includethe state'sindividualpayoff,V, reflecting the
realistview thatstatesare motivatedby absolutegains.Yet it mustalso
includea termintegrating boththestate'sindividual payoff andthepartner's
payoff, W, in sucha waythatgapsfavoring thestateadd to itsutilitywhile,
moreimportantly, gaps favoring thepartnerdetractfromit. One function
thatdepictsthisrealistunderstanding of stateutilityis U = V - k (W- V),
withk representing the state'scoefficientof sensitivityto gaps in payoffs
eitherto itsadvantageor disadvantage. 67

64. In herreviewofAxelrod,JoanneGowa citesthe1979Waltzpassageemployedin note

62 and,following Taylor'sterminology inAnarchy and Cooperation (pp. 73-74),suggests that
a statemaydisplay"negativealtruism."Furthermore, according to Gowa,a state"mayseek
tomaximize function
a utility thatdependsbothonincreasesinitsownpayoffs andonincreases
inthedifference betweenitspayoffs andthoseofanother state."See JoanneGowa,"Anarchy,
Egoism,andThirdImages:TheEvolutionofCooperation andInternational Relations,"Inter-
nationalOrganization 40 (Winter1986),p. 178.Thisportrays realistthinkingina manner similar
to thatsuggested by Youngand citedabovein note61. However,thisunderstanding of state
utilitycannotbe readilybased on Waltz,forhiscoreinsight, and thatoftherealisttradition,
is notthatall statesnecessarily seek a balanceof advantagesin theirfavor(although some
maydo this)butratherthatall fearthatrelativegainsmayfavorand thusstrengthen others.
Froma realistviewpoint, somestatesmaybe negative altruists,butall stateswillbe "defensive
Waltzemphasizesthathe does notbelievethatall statesnecessarily
positionalists." seekto
maximizetheirpower:see his statement citedin note60 and see especiallyhis "Responseto
My Critics,"p. 334.
65. Waltz,forexample,observesthat"theimpediments to collaboration maynotlie in the
character andtheimmediate intentionofeitherparty.Instead,thecondition ofinsecurity-at
theleast,theuncertainty ofeachabouttheother'sfuture intentions andactions-worksagainst
theircooperation." See Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, p. 105.
66. RobertJervis,"CooperationUndertheSecurity Dilemma,"WorldPolitics30 (January
1978),p. 168.
to gaps injointlyproduced
coefficient"
67. Similarto theconceptof a state"sensitivity
gainsis theconceptof a "defensecoefficient" modelof armsraces.
in Lewis Richardson's
the
The latterservesas an indexof one state'sfearof another:thegreaterthecoefficient,
strongerthestate'sbeliefthatit mustmatchincreasesin theother'sweaponsinventory with
increases in its own. See Lewis F. Richardson,Arms and Insecurity:A Mathematical Study
of theCauses and Originsof War,eds. NicolasRachevskyand ErnestoTrucco(Pittsburgh
and Chicago:BoxwoodPressand Quadrangle Books,1960),pp. 14-15.

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Anarchyand cooperation 501

Thisrealistspecification canbe contrasted

ofstateutility withthatinferred
fromneoliberaltheory,namely,U = V. In bothcases, the stateobtains
fromthereceiptof absolutepayoffs.However,whileneoliberalin-
utility
theoryassumesthatstateutility
stitutional areindependent
functions ofone
anotherandthatstatesare indifferentto thepayoffsofothers,realisttheory
arguesthatstateutility functionsare at leastpartially
interdependentand
thatone state'sutility
can affectanother's.68We mayalso observethatthis
realist-specified
function does not suggestthatany payoffachievedby a
partnerdetractsfromthestate'sutility. Rather,onlygaps inpayoffsto the
advantage of a partnerdo so.
The coefficient fora state'ssensitivityto gaps in payoffs-k-willvary,
butitwillalwaysbe greaterthanzero. In general,k willincreaseas a state
transitsfromrelationships in whatKarl Deutschtermeda "pluralisticse-
curitycommunity" to thoseapproximating a stateofwar.69The level of k
willbe greaterifa state'spartneris a long-termadversary ratherthana long-
timeally;iftheissue involvessecurityratherthaneconomicwell-being; if
thestate'srelativepowerhas beenon thedeclineratherthanon therise;if
payoffs intheparticular issue-areaaremorerather thanlesseasilyconverted
intocapabilitieswithinthatissue-area;or ifthesecapabilitiesand theinflu-
ence associatedwiththemare moreratherthanless readilytransferred to
otherissue-areas.70 Yet, giventhe uncertaintiesof international
politics,a
state'slevel of k willbe greaterthanzero even in interactions withallies,
forgapsinpayoffs favoringpartners willalwaysdetract froma state'sutility
to somedegree.7'
Faced withbothproblems-cheating and relativegains-states seek to
ensurethatpartners in commonendeavorscomplywiththeirpromisesand
thattheircollaboration produces"balanced" or "equitable"achievements
of gains.Accordingto realists,statesdefinebalanceand equityas distri-
butionsofgainsthatroughly maintain pre-cooperationbalancesofcapabil-
ities.To attainthisbalancedrelativeachievement of gains,accordingto
Hans Morgenthau, statesoffertheirpartners"concessions";in exchange,
theyexpectto receiveapproximately equal "compensations."As an ex-
68. RobertJervisalso arguesthatrealisttheorypositsat leastpartially state
interdependent
utility
functions.See Jervis,"Realism,GameTheory,and Cooperation,"WorldPolitics40
(April1988),pp. 334-36.
69. A pluralistic
securitycommunity, accordingto Deutschand his associates,"is one in
whichthereis real assurancethatthemembers of thatcommunity willnotfighteach other
physically,
butwillsettletheirdisputesin someotherway,"andinwhichthemembers retain
separategovernments; theexamplestheyprovideare Canada-UnitedStatesandNorway-
Sweden. See Deutsch et al., Political Community,pp. 5-7.
70. Contextual influenceson statesensitivities
to gaps in gainsare exploredin JosephM.
Grieco,"RealistTheory andtheProblem ofInternational
Cooperation:AnalysiswithanAmended
Prisoner'sDilemmaModel,"JournalofPolitics50 (August1988)pp. 600-24.
71. In contrast,
Keohanefindsthatthatrelativegainsconcernsmayimpedecooperation only
in cases in whichstatespursue"positionalgoods" such as "status"; see Keohane,After
Hegemony, p. 54. Similarly,
Lipsonexpectsthatstateswillbe sensitive to relativegainsonly
in securityrelationships;
see Lipson,"InternationalCooperation," pp. 14-16.

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Organization
502 International

ampleofthisbalancingtendency, Morgenthau offerstheparticular case of

"cooperation"amongPrussia,Austria,and Russia in theirpartitions of
Polandin 1772,1793,and 1795.He indicatesthatin each case, "the three
nationsagreedto dividePolishterritory in sucha waythatthedistribution
of poweramongthemselveswould be approximately the same afterthe
partitions as ithadbeenbefore.''72 For Morgenthau, statebalancingofjoint
gainsis a universalcharacteristic of thediplomacyof cooperation.He at-
tributes thisto thefirmly grounded practiceofstatesto balancepower,and
arguesthat"givensucha system,no nationwillagreeto concedepolitical
advantagesto anothernationwithoutthe expectation, whichmayor may
notbe wellfounded,ofreceiving proportionateadvantagesin return.' 7
In sum, neoliberalsfindthatanarchyimpedescooperationthroughits
generation of uncertainty in statesaboutthe complianceof partners.For
neoliberals, theoutcome statemostfearsin mixedinterest
a situations is to
be cheated.Yet, successful unilateral is
cheating highly unlikely,and the
moreprobableneoliberal"worstcase" forall is states to defectand to find
themselvesless well offthanif theyhad all cooperated.For neoliberal
institutionalists,then,anarchyand mixedinterestsoftencause statesto
suffer theopportunity costs of notachievingan outcomethatis mutually
morebeneficial.Keohane and Axelrodarguethatgames like Prisoner'ss
Dilemma,Stag Hunt,Chicken,and Deadlockillustrate howmanyinterna-
tionalrelationships offerboth the danger that "the myopicpursuitof self-
interest can be disastrous" and the prospect that "both sidescan potentially
benefit fromcooperation-ifthey can only achieve it.
"74
Realistsidentify even greateruncertainties forstatesconsidering coop-
eration:whichamongthemcould achieve the greatestgains, and would
imbalancedachievements ofgainsaffectrelativecapabilities? In addition,a
statethatknowsit willnotbe cheatedstill confronts another riskthatis at
least as formidable: a
perhaps partner will achieve disproportionate gains,
and,thusstrengthened, mightsomeday be a more dangerous enemy than if
they had never worked together. For neoliberal theory, the problem of co-
operation inanarchyis thatstatesmayfailtoachieveit;inthefinalanalysis,
theworstpossibleoutcomeis a lost opportunity. For realisttheory,state
to
efforts cooperate entailthese dangers plus the much greater risk,forsome
states, that cooperation might someday result in lost independence or se-
curity.
Realismandneoliberal institutionalism offer markedly differentviewscon-
cerning the effectsof international anarchy on states. These differences are
summarized in Table 2. Compared to realist theory, neoliberal institution-
alismunderstates the rangeof uncertainties and risksstatesbelievethey
72. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 179.
73. Ibid.,p. 180,emphasisadded.
74. AxelrodandKeohane,"Achieving Cooperation,"
p. 231; see also Stein,"Coordination
and Collaboration," pp. 123-24.

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Anarchyand cooperation 503

TABLE 2. Anarchy,state properties,and state inhibitionsabout

cooperation: summaryof neoliberal and realist views

Basis of Comparison Neoliberal institutionalism Political realism

Meaning of anarchy No centralagency is No centralagency is

available to enforce available to enforce
promises promisesor to provide
protection
State properties
Core interest To advance in utilityde- To enhance prospectsfor
finedindividualistically survival
Main goal To achieve greatestpossi- To achieve greatestgains
ble absolute gains and smallestgap in gains
favoringpartners
Basic character Atomistic("rational ego- Defensivelypositional
ist")
Utilityfunction Independent:U = V Partiallyinterdependent:
U = V-k(W-V)
State inhibitionsconcern-
ing cooperation
Range of uncertaintiesas- Partners'compliance Compliance and relative
sociated withcoopera- achievementof gains and
tion uses to which gaps fa-
voringpartnersmay be
employed
Range of risks associated To be cheated and to re- To be cheated or to expe-
withcooperation ceive a low payoff rience decline in relative
power if othersachieve
greatergains
Barriersto cooperation State concerns about part- State concerns about part-
ners' compliance ners' compliance and
partners'relativegains

mustovercometo cooperatewithothers.Hence, realismprovidesa more

comprehensive theoryof theproblemof cooperationthandoes neoliberal
institutionalism.

4. Conclusion

Neoliberalinstitutionalism
is notbased on realisttheory;in fact,realism
specifiesa widerrangeof systemic-level on cooperationthan
constraints
does neoliberalism.
Thus, the nextscholarlytaskis to conductempirical
testsof thetwo approaches.It is widelyaccepted-even by neoliberals-
thatrealismhas greatexplanatory powerin nationalsecurity
affairs.How-

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
504 International
Organization

ever, international politicaleconomywould appearto be neoliberalism's

preserve.Indeed,economicrelationships amongtheadvanceddemocracies
wouldprovideopportunities to design"crucialexperiments" forthe two
theories.75 Thatis, theywouldprovidetheopportunity to observebehavior
confirming realistexpectations in circumstances leastlikelyto have gener-
atedsuchobservations unlessrealismis trulypotent,whileat thesametime
theymight disconfirm neoliberalclaimsincircumstances mostlikelyto have
producedobservations validating neoliberaltheory.76
Accordingto neoliberaltheory,two factorsenhanceprospectsforthe
achievement and maintenance ofpolitical-economic cooperation amongthe
advanceddemocracies.First,thesestateshave thebroadestrangeofcom-
monpolitical,military, and economicinterests.77 Thus,theyhavethegreat-
est hopes forlargeabsolutegainsthrough jointaction.This shouldwork
againstrealismand its specification oftherelativegainsproblemforcoop-
eration.Thatis, stateswhichhavemanycommoninterests shouldhavethe
fewestworriesthattheymight becomeembroiled inextremeconflicts inthe
future and,as a result,theyshouldhavethefewestconcernsaboutrelative
achievements of gains arisingfromtheircommonendeavors.Neoliberal
theoryemphasizesanotherbackgroundcondition:the economicarrange-
mentsof advanceddemocraciesare "nested" in largerpolitical-strategic
alliances.Nesting,accordingto thetheory, accentuatesiterativenessand so
promotescompliance.78 Thisconditionshouldalso place realisttheoryat a
disadvantage. If statesare allies,theyshouldbe unconcerned thatpossible
gapsin economicgainsmightadvantagepartners. Indeed,theyshouldtake
comfort inthelatter'ssuccess,forinattaining greatereconomicgainsthese
partners becomestronger military allies.
We can identify a number ofefforts byadvanceddemocracies tocooperate
in economicissue-areasthatwerecharacterized by highcommoninterests
and nesting.In thetradefield,suchefforts wouldincludetheTokyoRound
codes on non-tariff barriersand efforts by theNordicstatesto construct
regionalfree-trade arrangements. In the monetary field,thereare the ex-
75. A crucialexperiment seeks real worldobservations confirmingone theory'sempirical
expectationsincircumstances mostunlikely tohavedoneso unlessthetheory is verypowerful,
whilesimultaneously disconfirminga competitive theory'sempirical expectations in circum-
stancesmostlikelyto have providedsuchconfirming observations.On themethodology of
crucialexperiments, see Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories(New York:
Harcourt,Brace, 1968),pp. 20-28;and HarryEckstein,"Case StudyandTheoryin Political
Science,"in FredI. Greenstein and NelsonW. Polsby,eds., StrategiesofInquiry,vol. 7 of
theHandbookofPoliticalScience(Reading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975),pp. 118-20.
76. Such a crucialexperiment woulddemonstrate realism'ssuperiority
overneoliberalism.
On theotherhand,ifneoliberal theoristswantedtodesigna crucialexperiment todemonstrate
thesuperiority of theirapproach,theywouldfocusnoton North-North economicrelations
butratheron North-South relationsor,betterstill,on East-Westmilitary interactions.
77. See Keohane, AfterHegemony, pp. 6-7.
78. On the "nesting"of international
regimes,
see Keohane,AfterHegemony,
pp. 90-91;
and Vinod K. Aggarwal,Liberal Protection: The InternationalPolitics of Organized Textile
Trade(Berkeley:University
ofCalifornia
Press,1985).

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Anarchyand cooperation 505

periencesof theEuropeanCommunity withexchange-rate coordination-

the Economicand MonetaryUnionand the EuropeanMonetarySystem.
Finally,in thefieldof hightechnology, one mightexamineEuropeancol-
laboration in commercial aviation(AirbusIndustrie) or dataprocessing(the
Unidatacomputerconsortium).79 If thesecooperativearrangements varied
in termsof theirsuccess (and indeedsuchvariancecan be observed),and
theless successfulorfailedarrangements werecharacterized notbya higher
incidenceof cheatingbutby a greaterseverityof relativegainsproblems,
thenone couldconcludethatrealisttheoryexplainsvariation inthesuccess
or failureof internationalcooperationmoreeffectively thanneoliberalin-
stitutional theory.Moreover,one could have greatconfidence in thisas-
sessment,forit wouldbe based on cases whichweremosthospitableto
neoliberalism and mosthostileto realism.
However,additionaltestsof thetwo theoriescan and shouldbe under-
taken.Forexample,onemight investigate realistandneoliberal
expectations
as to thedurability ofarrangements statespreferwhentheyengageinjoint
action.Neoliberaltheoryarguesthatcheatingis less likelyto occurin a
mixedinterestsituationthatis iterated;hence,it suggeststhat"the most
directway to encouragecooperationis to maketherelationship moredu-
rable."80 If,then,twostatesthatareinterested incooperation couldchoose

a studyof therelativegainsproblemin thecase oftheTokyoRound

79. I am completing
tradecodes. AvailablestudiessuggestthattheEconomicand Monetary Unionbrokedown
during1972-76as a resultof concernsby Britain,France,Ireland,and Italythattheyhad
takenon disproportionateburdensand thatWestGermanywas achievingdisproportionate
gains: see Loukas Tsoukalis, The Politics and Economics of European MonetaryIntegration
(London:Allen& Unwin,1977),p. 157.Its successor,theEuropeanMonetary System,was
see PeterCoffey,
designedto ensuregreaterbalancein thegainsand lossesamongpartners:
The European MonetarySystem: Past, Present, and Future (Dordrecht,Neth., and Boston:
MartinusNijhoff,1984),pp. 21-26, 126-27.In thecase of Scandinavian tradecooperation,
Norwayshifted fromopposition during the1950sandmuchofthe1960sto supportat theend
of thelatterdecade as it becameless concernedaboutitscapacityto achievea satisfactory
share oftradegains withSweden: see Barbara Haskel, The Scandinavian Option: Opportunities
and OpportunityCosts in Postwar Scandinavian Foreign Policies (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget,
1976),pp. 124-27.Muchoftheliterature on theproblemofregionalintegration amongdevel-
opingcountries theimportance
also emphasizes gainsissues.See, forexample,Lynn
ofrelative
K. Mytelka,"The SalienceofGainsin Third-World IntegrativeSystems,"WorldPolitics25
(January1973),pp. 236-46;W. AndrewAxline,"Underdevelopment, Dependence,andInte-
ThePoliticsofRegionalism
gration: intheThirdWorld,"International Organization 31(Winter
1977),pp. 83-105;and Constantine V. Vaitsos,"Crisisin RegionalEconomicCooperation
AmongDevelopingCountries:
(Integration) A Survey,"WorldDevelopment 6 (June1978),pp.
747-50.Forcase studiesoftheproblem ofrelativegainsindevelopingcountry regionalefforts
to cooperate, see Richard I. Fagan, Central American Economic Integration:The Politics of
(Berkeley:Institute
UnequalBenefits Studies,1970);LynnKriegerMytelka,
ofInternational
Regional Developmentin a Global Economy: The MultinationalCorporation,Technology,and
(New Haven,Conn.:Yale University
AndeanIntegration Press,1979),pp. 39-61;andArthur
Hazlewood,"The End oftheEast African Community,"JournalofCommonMarketStudies
1979),especiallypp. 44-48and 53-54.
18 (September
80. Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, p. 129; also see Keohane, AfterHegemony, pp.
andthatstatescommit
257-59,inwhichhearguesthatthereare"costsofflexibility" themselves
in thefuture
forgoa measureofflexibility
to regimesand thereby in the
to attaincooperation
present;and Axelrodand Keohane,"AchievingCooperation,"p. 234, in whichtheyargue
thatinternational
regimespromotecooperationbecausethey"linkthefuture withthepresent."

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Organization
506 International

betweentwo institutional arrangements thatofferedcomparableabsolute

gainsbutthatdiffered intheirexpecteddurability-onearrangement might,
forexample,have higherexit costs thanthe other-neoliberalism would
expectthestatesto prefertheformer overthelatter,foreach statecould
thenbe moreconfident thatthe otherwouldremainin the arrangement.
Realismgeneratesa markedly differenthypothesis. Iftwostatesareworried
or uncertainaboutrelativeachievements of gains,theneach willprefera
less durablecooperative arrangement, foreachwouldwanttobe moreread-
ilyable to exitfromthearrangement ifgaps in gainsdid cometo favorthe
other.
A secondpairofcompeting hypotheses concernsthenumberofpartners
statespreferto includein a cooperativearrangement. Advocatesofneolib-
eralismfindthata smallnumberof participants verification
facilitates of
complianceand sanctioning of cheaters.Hence, theywould predictthat
stateswitha choice would tendto prefera smallernumberof partners.
Realismwouldoffera verydifferent hypothesis. A statemaybelievethatit
mightdo betterthansomepartnersin a proposedarrangement butnotas
well as others.If it is uncertainaboutwhichpartnerswoulddo relatively
better, thestatewillprefer morepartners, forlargernumbers wouldenhance
thelikelihood thattherelativeachievements ofgainsadvantaging (whatturn
outto be) better-positioned partnerscouldbe offset bymorefavorableshar-
ingsarisingfrominteractions with(as matters develop)weakerpartners.
A thirdpair of competing empiricalstatements concernsthe effectsof
issue linkageson cooperation.Neoliberalism's proponents findthattightly
knitlinkageswithin andacrossissue-areasaccentuateiterativeness andthus
facilitatecooperation.81Realism,again,offers a verydifferent proposition.
Assumethata statebelievesthattwo issue-areasare linked,and thatit
believesthatoneelementofthislinkageis thatchangesinrelativecapabilities
in one domainaffectrelativecapabilitiesin theother.Assumealso thatthe
statebelievesthatrelativeachievements ofjointlyproducedgainsin one
issue-areawouldadvantagethepartner.This statewouldthenbelievethat
cooperation wouldprovideadditionalcapabilitiesto thepartnernotonlyin
thedomainin whichjointactionis undertaken, butalso in thelinkedissue-
area. Cooperationwould therefore be unattractive to thisstatein direct
proportion toitsbeliefthatthetwoissue-areaswereinterrelated. Thus,issue
linkagesmayimpederatherthanfacilitate cooperation.
Thesetestsarelikelyto demonstrate thatrealismoffers themosteffective
understanding of the problemof international cooperation.82 In addition,
further analysisof defensivestatepositionality mayhelp pinpointpolicy
strategies thatfacilitatecooperation.If relativegainsconcernsdo act as a
81. See Keohane,After Hegemony,pp.91-92,103-6;andAxelrodandKeohane,"Achieving
Cooperation,"pp. 239-43.
82. This,however,wouldcertainly challenge
notmarktheendoftheliberalinstitutionalist
thatare firmly
to realism.Thereare at leasttworelatedclustersofmodernliterature rooted

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Anarchyand cooperation 507

constraint thenwe shouldidentify

on cooperation, methodsbywhichstates
havebeenable to addresssuchconcernsthrough unilateral strat-
bargaining
egiesorthrough themechanisms andoperations institutions.
ofinternational
For example,we mightinvestigate to mitigate
states'use of side-payments
therelativegainsconcernsof disadvantaged partners.83Thus,withits un-
derstanding and therelativegainsproblem
of defensivestatepositionality
forcollaboration,realismmayprovideguidanceto statesas theyseek se-
curity,independence, and mutuallybeneficialformsof international
coop-
eration.

intheliberalinstitutionalist
tradition,
thatattemptnocompromise withrealism,
andthatpresent
an understandingofworldpoliticsmarkedly
at oddswithrealisttheory.
Thefirstclusterargues
thatinternational
institutions
embodyandreinforcenormsandbeliefsthatareheldincommon
amongstatesand thatfacilitateandguidetheircooperative
endeavors.The keyworksin this
clusterincludeJohnGerardRuggie,"International Responsesto Technology: Conceptsand
Trends," InternationalOrganization 29 (Summer 1975), pp. 557-83; Ruggie, "International
Regimes,Transactions, andChange:EmbeddedLiberalism inthePostwarEconomicOrder,"
in Krasner,ed., InternationalRegimes,pp. 195-231;Friedrich Kratochwil,
"The Force of
Prescriptions,"International
Organization38(Autumn 1984),pp. 685-708;JohnGerardRuggie
and Friedrich Kratochwil,
"InternationalOrganization:
The StateoftheArton an Artofthe
State,"InternationalOrganization40 (Autumn1986),pp. 753-76;andDonaldJ.Puchalaand
Raymond F. Hopkins,"International
Regimes:LessonsfromInductive Analysis,"inKrasner,
ed.,InternationalRegimes,pp.61-92.Thesecondclustersuggests thatinternational
institutions
helpstatesdevelop,accept,and disseminateconsensualtheoretical and empiricalknowledge
thatcan reinforceorintroduceinternational
normsleadingtocooperation. Haas presented
this
argument in BeyondtheNationState,pp. 12-13,47-48,79-85; also see Haas, "Is Therea
Hole in theWhole?Knowledge,Technology, Interdependence and theConstructionofInter-
nationalRegimes,"InternationalOrganization29 (Summer1975),pp. 827-76;Haas, MaryPat
Williams,and Don Babai, Scientistsand WorldOrder: The Uses of Technical Informationin
InternationalOrganizations (Berkeley:Universityof California
Press, 1977);Haas, "Why
Collaborate?Issue-Linkage and International
Regimes,"WorldPolitics32 (April1980),pp.
357-405;Haas, "WordsCan HurtYou; Or, WhoSaid Whatto WhomAboutRegimes,"in
Krasner,ed., International
Regimes,pp. 23-59;and BeverlyCrawford andStefanieLenway,
"Decision Modes and International RegimeChange:WesternCollaboration on East-West
Trade," WorldPolitics37 (April1985),pp. 375-402.
83. Onthegeneralconceptofside-payments, see R. DuncanLuce andHowardRaiffa, Games
and Decisions: Introductionand Critical Survey (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 168-69; and
William H. Riker, The Theoryof Political Coalitions (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press,1962),pp. 34, 108-23.Deutschand his associatesdetermined thatthecapacityof ad-
vantaged regionsto extendsymbolic andmaterial side-paymentsto disadvantaged
regionswas
essentialto nationalintegration
andamalgamation insuchcases as Switzerland
andGermany.
See Deutschet al., PoliticalCommunity, p. 55. Similarly,
specialsubsidieswereprovidedto
Italyand Irelandto attractthemto theEuropeanMonetary System.See GeorgeZis, "The
EuropeanMonetary System,1979-84:An Assessment," JournalofCommonMarketStudies
23 (September1984),p. 58. In addition,Norwaywas attracted to theproposedNordekar-
rangement during1968-70partlybecauseSwedenoffered to providethebulkofthefundsfor
a Nordicdevelopment bankthatwouldbe usedinlargemeasuretosupport Norwegianindustrial
projects.See ClaesWiklund, "The Zig-ZagCourseoftheNordekNegotiations," Scandinavian
Political Studies 5 (1970), p. 322; and Haskel, Scandinavian Option, p. 127. Finally, West
Germanyhas soughtto ameliorateU.S. concernsaboutrelativeburden-sharingin NATO
through special"offset"programs
aimedat reducing
U.S. foreign
exchangeexpenditures as-
sociatedwithitsEuropeancommitment.See GregoryF. Treverton,The "DollarDrain" and
American Forces in Germany: Managing the Political Economics of the Atlantic Alliance
(Athens,Ohio: Ohio University
Press,1978).

This content downloaded from 188.74.116.106 on Sun, 20 Oct 2013 15:32:23 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions