1
EN BANC An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In the United States,
G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, C.J.:
This Court, so long as the fundamentals of republicanism continue to guide it, shall not shirk its bounden
duty to wield its judicial power to settle "actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government."1 Be that as it may, no amount of exigency can make this Court exercise a power where
it is not proper.
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and
taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled "A Resolution Calling upon
the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the
Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress." In essence, both petitions
seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of
Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.
Unfortunately, this Court cannot indulge petitioners’ supplications. While some may interpret
petitioners’ moves as vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would
reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability set by this Court before it will assume jurisdiction
over cases involving constitutional disputes.
It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is.2 The determination of the
nature, scope and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of the judiciary, such
that any mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation of constitutional boundaries would
amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment of its "solemn and sacred obligation" under the
Constitution.3 This Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and
controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented.4 The "case-or-controversy" requirement bans this court from deciding "abstract,
hypothetical or contingent questions,"5 lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning
legislative or executive action.6 In the illuminating words of the learned Justice Laurel in Angara v.
Electoral Commission7 :
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may
not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.8 Another approach is the evaluation of the
twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship
to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration.9 In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is
generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.10 An alternative
road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished
or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.11
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In
the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act
complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of
Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to
the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been
adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross
abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential
example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this
Court.
Tan v. Macapagal presents a similar factual milieu. In said case, petitioners filed a petition assailing the
validity of the Laurel-Langley resolution, which dealt with the range of authority of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. The court resolved the issue thus:
More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the
interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for
ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That
is the command of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses
force by being overruled or a new precedent being announced, it is controlling. It is implicit in the rule of
law.12
Yet another requisite rooted in the very nature of judicial power is locus standi or standing to sue. Thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the
remedy being sought.13 In the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that
would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a
controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for
the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions.14The lack of petitioners’
personal stake in this case is no more evident than in Lozano’s three-page petition that is devoid of any
legal or jurisprudential basis.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the
cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires that the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.15 It is undisputed that
there has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet. To be sure, standing
as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental importance or when paramount public interest is involved.16 While the Court recognizes
the potential far-reaching implications of the issue at hand, the possible consequence of House

Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under the
"transcendental importance" doctrine.
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only "actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As stated in Kilosbayan,
Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.,17 viz.:
[C]ourts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to open
their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance. The rationale for this constitutional
requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle. It is intended "to assure a vigorous adversary
presentation of the case, and, perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the
determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government." It thus goes to the very
essence of representative democracies.
A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire to litigate
constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of
courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately
open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and
ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly
confronts our judiciary today. Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to
the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of "personal injury" to the broader
"transcendental importance" doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for
the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.
In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not available simply at the behest of a
partisan faction, but is exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete injury.18 When warranted by the
presence of indispensible minimums for judicial review, this Court shall not shun the duty to resolve the
constitutional challenge that may confront it. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed. SO
ORDERED.
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and
taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon
the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the
Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress.” Both petitions seek to trigger
a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article
XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged
that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution
by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the
Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.”
Issue: Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the HR1109.
Held:
2
No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent Assembly and adopt some Rules
for proposing changes to the charter. The House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for
its approval and adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution convening
the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or
hardship from the act complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of
Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to
the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been
adopted. No proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of
discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an
uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The
House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court. Judicial
review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury.
FACTS:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and
taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon
the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the
Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress.” In essence, both petitions
seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of
Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.
ISSUE: Do petitioners have legal standing?
RULING:
No. In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly
lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from
the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of
Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to
the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been
adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or
gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a
quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an
intervention from this Court.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the cases
at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires that the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed that there has
been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet.
 3

EN BANC Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled "Directing the
Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for
Other Purposes." EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed
G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012
compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. A Task Force was also created to
review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees and officers, while GOCCs and GFIs were ordered
JELBERT B. GALICTO, Petitioner, to submit to the Task Force information regarding their compensation. Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a
vs. moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments
H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the
Philippines; ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and FLORENCIO B. President,9 and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of
ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, Respondents. Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010.10

RESOLUTION EO 7 was published on September 10, 2010.11 It took effect on September 25, 2010 and precluded the
Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from granting and releasing bonuses and
allowances to members of the board of directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new
BRION, J.:
or additional benefits and allowances to their employees.

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
The Petition
and/or Temporary Restraining Order,1 seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of Executive
Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on September 8, 2010. Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto
asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the President and for The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which
being in breach of existing laws. was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, based on the
following arguments:
The petitioner is a Filipino citizen and an employee of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PhilHealth).2 He is currently holding the position of Court Attorney IV and is assigned at the PhilHealth I.
Regional Office CARAGA.3
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF LEGAL BASIS DUE TO THE
Respondent Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III is the President of the Republic of the Philippines (Pres. FOLLOWING GROUNDS:
Aquino); he issued EO 7 and has the duty of implementing it. Respondent Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. is the
incumbent Executive Secretary and, as the alter ego of Pres. Aquino, is tasked with the implementation
A. P.D. 985 IS NOT APPLICABLE AS BASIS FOR EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 BECAUSE
of EO 7. Respondent Florencio B. Abad is the incumbent Secretary of the Department of Budget and
THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WERE
Management (DBM) charged with the implementation of EO 7.4
SUBSEQUENTLY GRANTED THE POWER TO FIX COMPENSATION LONG AFTER SUCH
POWER HAS BEEN REVOKED BY P.D. 1597 AND R.A. 6758.
The Antecedent Facts
B. THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS DO NOT NEED
On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged excessive TO HAVE ITS COMPENSATION PLANS, RATES AND POLICIES REVIEWED BY THE DBM
allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila AND APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT BECAUSE P.D. 1597 REQUIRES ONLY THE
Waterworks and Sewerage System – a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which has GOCCs TO REPORT TO THE OFFICE TO THE PRESIDENT THEIR COMPENSATION
been unable to meet its standing obligations.5 Subsequently, the Senate of the Philippines (Senate), PLANS AND RATES BUT THE SAME DOES NOT GIVE THE PRESIDENT THE POWER OF
through the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, conducted an CONTROL OVER THE FISCAL POWER OF THE GOCCs.
inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs
and government financial institutions (GFIs).6
C. J.R. NO. 4, [SERIES] 2009 IS NOT APPLICABLE AS LEGAL BASIS BECAUSE IT HAD
NOT RIPENED INTO X X X LAW, THE SAME NOT HAVING BEEN PUBLISHED.
Based on its findings that "officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been
granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as
D. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT J.R. NO. 1, S. 2004 (sic) AND J.R. 4, S. 2009 ARE
well as other] irregular and abusive practices,"7 the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 "urging the
VALID, STILL THEY ARE NOT APPLICABLE AS LEGAL BASIS BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT
President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive
LAWS WHICH MAY VALIDLY DELEGATE POWER TO THE PRESIDENT TO SUSPEND
allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and THE POWER OF THE BOARD TO FIX COMPENSATION.
[GFIs]."8

II.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS INVALID FOR DIVESTING THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF [THE]
GOCCS OF THEIR POWER TO FIX THE COMPENSATION, A POWER WHICH IS A LEGISLATIVE
GRANT AND WHICH COULD NOT BE REVOKED OR MODIFIED BY AN EXECUTIVE FIAT.
III.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS BY SUBSTANCE A LAW, WHICH IS A DEROGATION OF
CONGRESSIONAL PREROGATIVE AND IS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
IV.
THE ACTS OF SUSPENDING AND IMPOSING MORATORIUM ARE ULTRA VIRES ACTS BECAUSE
J.R. NO. 4 DOES NOT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO EXERCISE SUCH POWERS.
V.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS AN INVALID ISSUANCE BECAUSE IT HAS NO SUFFICIENT
STANDARDS AND IS THEREFORE ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE AND A VIOLATION OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.
VI.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 INVOLVES THE DETERMINATION AND DISCRETION AS TO WHAT THE
LAW SHALL BE AND IS THEREFORE INVALID FOR ITS USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
VII.
CONSISTENT WITH THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE CASE,
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7 IS ONLY DIRECTORY AND NOT MANDATORY.12
The Case for the Respondents
On December 13, 2010, the respondents filed their Comment. They pointed out the following procedural
defects as grounds for the petition’s dismissal: (1) the petitioner lacks locus standi; (2) the petitioner
failed to attach a board resolution or secretary’s certificate authorizing him to question EO 7 in behalf of
PhilHealth; (3) the petitioner’s signature does not indicate his PTR Number, Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) Compliance Number and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Number; (4) the jurat
of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to indicate a valid identification card
as provided under A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC; (5) the President should be dropped as a party respondent as he
is immune from suit; and (6) certiorari is not applicable to this case.13
The respondents also raised substantive defenses to support the validity of EO 7. They claim that the
President exercises control over the governing boards of the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix their
compensation packages. In addition, EO 7 was issued in accordance with law for the purpose of
controlling the grant of excessive salaries, allowances, incentives and other benefits to GOCC and GFI
4
employees. They also advocate the validity of Joint Resolution (J.R.) No. 4, which they point to as the
authority for issuing EO 7.14
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149,15 otherwise known as the
"GOCC Governance Act of 2011." Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the President to fix the
compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to DISMISS the petition for its patent formal and procedural infirmities, and for having been
mooted by subsequent events.
A. Certiorari is not the proper remedy.
Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question judicial,
quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a
mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for
declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the
proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7:
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphases ours.)
Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila16 is a case in point.17 In Liga, we dismissed the
petition for certiorari to set aside an EO issued by a City Mayor and insisted that a petition for
declaratory relief should have been filed with the RTC. We painstakingly ruled:
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss this petition for certiorari.
First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto
themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.

Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal,
board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting [to] lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law
is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of
public administrative officers or bodies … required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature."
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there
be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such
rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer
clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties.
The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of
Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive
order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the
declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and
executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court
has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Italics supplied).
As such, this petition must necessar[ily] fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.18
5
Likewise, in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti Terrorism Council,19 we similarly
dismissed the petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9372,
otherwise known as the "Human Security Act of 2007," since the respondents therein (members of the
Anti-Terrorism Council) did not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
While we have recognized in the past that we can exercise the discretion and rulemaking authority we
are granted under the Constitution,20 and set aside procedural considerations to permit parties to bring a
suit before us at the first instance through certiorari and/or prohibition,21 this liberal policy remains to be
an exception to the general rule, and thus, has its limits. In Concepcion v. Commission on Elections
(COMELEC),22 we emphasized the importance of availing of the proper remedies and cautioned against
the wrongful use of certiorari in order to assail the quasi-legislative acts of the COMELEC, especially by
the wrong party. In ruling that liberality and the transcendental doctrine cannot trump blatant disregard
of procedural rules, and considering that the petitioner had other available remedies (such as a petition
for declaratory relief with the appropriate RTC under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court), as in
this case, we categorically ruled:
The petitioner’s unusual approaches and use of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court do not appear to us to be
the result of any error in reading Rule 65, given the way the petition was crafted. Rather, it was a
backdoor approach to achieve what the petitioner could not directly do in his individual capacity under
Rule 65. It was, at the very least, an attempted bypass of other available, albeit lengthier, modes of
review that the Rules of Court provide. While we stop short of concluding that the petitioner’s
approaches constitute an abuse of process through a manipulative reading and application of the Rules
of Court, we nevertheless resolve that the petition should be dismissed for its blatant violation of the
Rules. The transgressions alleged in a petition, however weighty they may sound, cannot be justifications
for blatantly disregarding the rules of procedure, particularly when remedial measures were available
under these same rules to achieve the petitioner’s objectives. For our part, we cannot and should not –
in the name of liberality and the "transcendental importance" doctrine – entertain these types of
petitions. As we held in the very recent case of Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles, albeit from a different
perspective, our liberal approach has its limits and should not be abused.23 [emphasis supplied]
B. Petitioner lacks locus standi.
"Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."24 This
requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or
controversies.25
Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to "raise a constitutional question" when (1) he can show that
he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.26
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real
interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest."27

To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present petition, the petitioner contends that as
an employee of PhilHealth, he "stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a
moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of
GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his
compensation."28 The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good
standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally
and validly issued and implemented.
The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest since future
increases in salaries and other benefits are merely contingent events or expectancies.29 The petitioner,
too, is not asserting a public right for which he is entitled to seek judicial protection. Section 9 of EO 7
reads:
Section 9. Moratorium on Increases in Salaries, Allowances, Incentives and Other Benefits. –Moratorium
on increases in the rates of salaries, and the grant of new increases in the rates of allowances, incentives
and other benefits, except salary adjustments pursuant to Executive Order No. 8011 dated June 17, 2009
and Executive Order No. 900 dated June 23, 2010, are hereby imposed until specifically authorized by
the President. [emphasis ours]
In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal
stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based
on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits
cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to
salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to
assail EO 7.
It has been held that as to the element of injury, such aspect is not something that just anybody with
some grievance or pain may assert. It has to be direct and substantial to make it worth the court’s time,
as well as the effort of inquiry into the constitutionality of the acts of another department of
government. If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial,
then the courts may end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not really justify such an
excursion into constitutional adjudication.30 The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus
standi is by no means trifle. Not only does it assure the vigorous adversary presentation of the case;
more importantly, it must suffice to warrant the Judiciary’s overruling the determination of a coordinate,
democratically elected organ of government, such as the President, and the clear approval by Congress,
in this case. Indeed, the rationale goes to the very essence of representative democracies.31
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioner’s claim that he is instituting the present
petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of
the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This supposed interest has been branded by the
Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora,32 "as too general an interest which is shared by
other groups and [by] the whole citizenry."33 Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the
IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to
clothe it with standing in that case. The Court made a similar ruling in Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-
Arroyo34 and held that the petitioners therein, who are national officers of the IBP, have no legal
standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP, as an institution, or its
members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and
General Order No. 5.35
6
We note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions concerning the power
of the President to fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on their
officials and employees, the same cannot "infuse" or give the petitioner locus standi under the
transcendental importance or paramount public interest doctrine. In Velarde v. Social Justice
Society,36 we held that even if the Court could have exempted the case from the stringent locus standi
requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the transcendental issue could not be resolved
any way, due to procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case.37 In other words, giving
due course to the present petition which is saddled with formal and procedural infirmities explained
above in this Resolution, cannot but be an exercise in futility that does not merit the Court’s liberality. As
we emphasized in Lozano v. Nograles,38 "while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to
the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of ‘personal injury’ to the broader
‘transcendental importance’ doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused."39
Finally, since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and personal interest in the issue in
dispute, he cannot also be considered to have filed the present case as a representative of PhilHealth. In
this regard, we cannot ignore or excuse the blatant failure of the petitioner to provide a Board
Resolution or a Secretary’s Certificate from PhilHealth to act as its representative.
C. The petition has a defective jurat.
The respondents claim that the petition should be dismissed for failing to comply with Section 3, Rule 7
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the party or the counsel representing him to sign the
pleading and indicate an address that should not be a post office box. The petition also allegedly violated
the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution dated November 12, 2001, requiring counsels to indicate in their
pleadings their Roll of Attorneys Number, their PTR Number and their IBP Official Receipt or Lifetime
Member Number; otherwise, the pleadings would be considered unsigned and dismissible. Bar Matter
No. 1922 likewise states that a counsel should note down his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption in the pleading, but the petitioner had failed to do so.40
We do not see any violation of Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as the petition bears the
petitioner’s signature and office address. The present suit was brought before this Court by the
petitioner himself as a party litigant and not through counsel. Therefore, the requirements under the
Supreme Court En Banc Resolution dated November 12, 2001 and Bar Matter No. 1922 do not apply. In
Bar Matter No. 1132, April 1, 2003, we clarified that a party who is not a lawyer is not precluded from
signing his own pleadings as this is allowed by the Rules of Court; the purpose of requiring a counsel to
indicate his IBP Number and PTR Number is merely to protect the public from bogus lawyers. A similar
construction should be given to Bar Matter No. 1922, which requires lawyers to indicate their MCLE
Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption; otherwise, the provision that allows parties to sign
their own pleadings will be negated.
However, the point raised by the respondents regarding the petitioner’s defective jurat is correct.
Indeed, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, dated February 19, 2008, calls for a current identification document issued
by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual as competent evidence of
identity. Nevertheless, we hasten to clarify that the defective jurat in the Verification/Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping is not a fatal defect, as we held in In-N-Out Burger, Inc. v. Sehwani,
Incorporated.41 The verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement that the Court may
waive.
D. The petition has been mooted by supervening events.

Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present case has already been
rendered moot by these supervening events: (1) the lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO 7
that suspended the allowances and bonuses of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and GFIs; and (2) the
enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering
their board of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system, in favor of the grant of
authority to the President to perform this act.
With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now authorized to fix the
compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 5. Creation of the Governance Commission for Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporations.
— There is hereby created an advisory, monitoring, and oversight body with authority to formulate,
implement and coordinate policies to be known as the Governance Commission for Government-Owned
or-Controlled Corporations, hereinafter referred to as the GCG, which shall be attached to the Office of
the President. The GCG shall have the following powers and functions:
h) Conduct compensation studies, develop and recommend to the President a competitive
compensation and remuneration system which shall attract and retain talent, at the same time allowing
the GOCC to be financially sound and sustainable;
Section 8. Coverage of the Compensation and Position Classification System. — The GCG, after
conducting a compensation study, shall develop a Compensation and Position Classification System
which shall apply to all officers and employees of the GOCCs whether under the Salary Standardization
Law or exempt therefrom and shall consist of classes of positions grouped into such categories as the
GCG may determine, subject to approval of the President.
Section 9. Position Titles and Salary Grades. — All positions in the Positions Classification System, as
determined by the GCG and as approved by the President, shall be allocated to their proper position
titles and salary grades in accordance with an Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary
Grades of the Compensation and Position Classification System, which shall be prepared by the GCG and
approved by the President.
[N]o GOCC shall be exempt from the coverage of the Compensation and Position Classification System
developed by the GCG under this Act.
As may be gleaned from these provisions, the new law amended R.A. No. 7875 and other laws that
enabled certain GOCCs and GFIs to fix their own compensation frameworks; the law now authorizes the
President to fix the compensation and position classification system for all GOCCs and GFIs, as well as
other entities covered by the law. This means that, the President can now reissue an EO containing these
same provisions without any legal constraints.1âwphi1
A moot case is "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."42 "[A]n action is considered ‘moot’
when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic
or dead[,] or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to
judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties x x x. Simply stated,
there is nothing for the x x x court to resolve as [its] determination x x x has been overtaken by
subsequent events."43
7
This is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has expressly empowered the President
to establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule upon the supposed
unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise. Any further discussion of the
constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its face in light of the
enactment of R.A. No. 10149. In the words of the eminent constitutional law expert, Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
S.J., "the Court normally [will not] entertain a petition touching on an issue that has become moot
because x x x there would [be] no longer x x x a ‘flesh and blood’ case for the Court to resolve."44
All told, in view of the supervening events rendering the petition moot, as well as its patent formal and
procedural infirmities, we no longer see any reason for the Court to resolve the other issues raised in the
certiorari petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III exposed anomalies in the financial management of the
Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System, the National Power Corporation and the National Food
Authority.
Because of this, the Senate prompted to conduct legislative inquiries on the matter of activities of GOCC
and issued Resolution No. 17 s. 2010, urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the
unusually large and excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the
governing boards of GOCC’s and government financial institutions (GFIs). President Aquino issued E.O 7
strengthening the supervision of compensation levels of GOCCs and GFIs by controlling the grant of
excessive salaries, allowances and other benefits.
However, petitioner Jelbert Galicto allegedly questions the constitutionality of E.O 7 in his capacity as a
lawyer and as an employee of PhilHealth Regional Office. As he allegedly stands to be prejudiced by E.O
7 because it suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grant of salary increase and other benefits
granted to the GOCC and GFI officials. Moreover, he claims interest in making sure that laws and orders
by government officials are legally issued and implemented.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Galicto has a locus standi in bringing the petition before the Court.
Ruling:
No, the SC said that petitioner cannot claim legal stance because petitioner is simply concerned about his
entitlement to future salary increases.
A public officer has a vested right only to salaries already earned or accrued. Salary increases are a mere
expectancy volatile and dependent on various variables in nature.
His assertion of legal impediment under Section 9 of E.O 7 of any future increase in petitioner’s
compensation will only depend on usual factors considered by proper authorities was misleading and
 8

incorrect due to the concept of injury as an element of Locus standi. He only points out the denial of a
reasonable expectation which is not a subject of harm to go against the law.

His membership of Philippine Bar and a PhilHealth official does not suffice to clothe his legal standing.
Thus, Petitioner failed to satisfy irreducible minimum condition to trigger the exercise of judicial power.

STAT CON PRINCIPLE OF LOCUS STANDI

Locus Standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from
the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case.

The party is directly subject to an adverse effect by the statute or action in question, and the harm
suffered will continue unless the court grants relief in the form of damages or a finding that the law
either does not apply to the party or that the law is void or can be nullified. This is called the "something
to lose" doctrine, in which the party has standing because they directly will be harmed by the conditions
for which they are asking the court for relief. A person cannot bring a suit challenging the
constitutionality of a law unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that he/she/it is or will "imminently" be
harmed by the law.

Otherwise, the court will rule that the plaintiff "lacks standing" to bring the suit, and will dismiss the
case without considering the merits of the claim of unconstitutionality. To have a court declare a law
unconstitutional, there must be a valid reason for the lawsuit. The party suing must have something to
lose in order to sue unless it has automatic standing by action of law.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 149719 : June 21, 2007]
MOLDEX REALTY, INC., Petitioner, v. HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, OFFICE OF
APPEALS, ADJUDICATION AND LEGAL AFFAIRS, EDITHA U. BARRAMEDA in her capacity as Regional
Officer and METROGATE COMPLEX VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
nullification of Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, issued by the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC), as well as the two issuances and the writ of mandatory injunction issued
by public respondent Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in connection with the
implementation of the assailed Resolution.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Moldex Realty, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in real estate development. It is the
owner-developer of Metrogate Complex Phase I, a subdivision situated in Meycauayan, Marilao, Bulacan.
In 1988, the HLURB issued petitioner a License to Sell 696 parcels of land within the subdivision. In 1993,
a sufficient number of lot buyers and homeowners in the subdivision formally organized to become the
Metrogate Complex Village Homeowners' Association (respondent association).
Petitioner claims that since the completion of the subdivision, it had been subsidizing and advancing the
payment for the delivery and maintenance of common facilities including the operation of streetlights
and the payment of the corresponding electric bills. However, in 2000, petitioner decided to stop paying
the electric bills for the streetlights and advised respondent association to assume this obligation.
Respondent association objected to petitioner's resolution and refused to pay the electric bills. Thus,
Meralco discontinued its service, prompting respondent association to apply for a preliminary injunction
and preliminary mandatory injunction with the HLURB against petitioner.
On 5 April 2001, Editha U. Barrameda, in her capacity as Regional Officer of HLURB's Office of Appeals,
Adjudication and Legal Affairs, issued a Resolution granting respondent association's application for
injunction. In support of the Resolution, Barrameda cited the relevant provisions of Presidential Decree
(PD) Nos. 957 and 1216 and HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994.
HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, particularly provides that "subdivision owners/developers
shall continue to maintain street lights facilities and, unless otherwise stipulated in the contract, pay the
bills for electric consumption of the subdivision street lights until the facilities in the project are turned
over to the local government until after completion of development in accordance with PD 957, PD 1216
and their implementing rules and regulations."1
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was rebuffed in an Order dated 28 May 2001.2 After
respondent association filed a bond, Barrameda issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dated
9
28 June 2001 ordering petitioner to assume the obligation of paying the cost of electricity of the
streetlights starting from December 2000 until their turn over or donation to the Municipality of
Meycauayan.3
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari,
praying not only for the reversal of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, as well as the
Resolution dated 5 April 2001 and the Order dated 28 May 2001, but also for the nullification of HUDCC
Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
During the pendency of the petition before the Court of Appeals, the HUDCC approved Board Resolution
No. R-699, series of 2001, entitled Amending the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Subdivision
and Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree and Other Related Laws.4
On 27 August 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner should
have raised the constitutionality of HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, directly to this Court.
The appellate court likewise found that no proof was submitted to show Mr. Juanito Malto's authority to
execute the requisite verification and certification against non-forum shopping in behalf of petitioner.5
Following the Court of Appeals' pronouncement that constitutional issues should be raised directly
before this Court, petitioner instituted on 21 September 2001 an action for certiorari and
prohibition.6 The petition reiterated the prayer for the reversal of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, the Resolution dated 5 April 2001 and the Order dated 28 May 2001, all issued by the HLURB
and for the setting aside of HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994.
The instant petition is anchored on the following arguments:
1. Resolution No. 526 Series of 1994 issued by the HUDCC is unconstitutional for being a void exercise of
legislative power.
2. Public respondent gravely abused its direction in issuing the Mandatory Injunction on the basis of a
void regulation (HU[D]CC Resolution No. 526 Series of 1994).
3. Public respondent abused its discretion in not commanding that the obligation to maintain the
subdivision including the payment of the streetlight consumption belongs exclusively to private
respondents.7
In its Comment,8 respondent association brought up the tardy filing of the instant petition. It contends
that the instant petition, which assails the two HLURB issuances dated 5 April 2001 and 28 May 2001,
was filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. In its opinion, the prior filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals did not
toll the running of the 60-day period.
The Solicitor General agrees, pointing out that the instant petition, captioned as Petition for Prohibition
and Certiorari, does not assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals but the twin issuances and the writ of
mandatory injunction issued by the HLURB and, therefore, should have been filed within 60 days from
petitioner's receipt on 18 June 2001 of the HLURB Order dated 28 May 2001. It appears that when
reckoned from 18 June 2001, the filing of the instant petition would go beyond the 60-day reglementary
period.

Petitioner maintains, on the contrary, that it filed a petition for certiorariwith the Court of Appeals within
the reglementary period, but the same was dismissed by the appellate court and "referred" to this Court,
as it raised a constitutional issue.
When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or invalid, a party may raise its
unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the regulation is being enforced. For the Court to
exercise its power of judicial review, the party assailing the regulation must show that the question of
constitutionality has been raised at the earliest opportunity.9 This requisite should not be taken to mean
that the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of the state action
complained of. That the question of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for
refusing to allow it to be raised later. A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional,
would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to
challenge the same.10
In the instant case, petitioner has complied with the requirement that the issue of the constitutionality
of the subject HUDCC Resolution must be timely raised. Petitioner had already raised the question of
constitutionality in its petition filed with the Court of Appeals. The alleged injury caused to petitioner as
a result of the implementation of the HUDCC Resolution is continuous in nature in that as long as the
assailed resolution is effective, petitioner is obliged to pay for the electricity cost of the streetlights. For
every occasion that petitioner is directed to comply with the assailed resolution, a new cause of action to
question its validity accrues in favor of petitioner. Thus, the instant petition is not time-barred.
The Solicitor General also points out that it is the Regional Trial Court, and not this Court nor the Court of
Appeals, which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of this original action for certiorari and prohibition,
notwithstanding Section 4, Rule 6511 of the Rules of Court.
It must be emphasized that this Court does not have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions assailing
the constitutionality of a law or an administrative regulation. In Drilon v. Lim,12 it was clearly stated that
the lower courts also have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality at the first instance, thus:
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section
187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are
the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. x x x Moreover,
Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.13
The general rule is that this Court shall exercise only appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation, except in circumstances where the Court believes that
resolving the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance is of paramount
importance and immediately affects the social, economic and moral well being of the people. Thus, the
Court of Appeals erred in ruling that a question on the constitutionality of a regulation may be brought
only to this Court.
The instant petition does not allege circumstances and issues of transcendental importance to the public
requiring their prompt and definite resolution and the brushing aside of technicalities of procedure.
Neither is the Court convinced that the issues presented in this petition are of such nature that would
nudge the lower courts to defer to the higher judgment of this Court. The application of the assailed
10
HUDCC resolution mainly affects the proprietary interests of the parties involved and can hardly be
characterized as overriding to the general well-being of the people. Ultimately, the Court is called upon
to resolve the question of who bears the obligation of paying electricity cost, a question that the lower
courts undoubtedly have the competence to resolve.
However, it is also a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and
decide a law, or an administrative regulation as in the instant case, to be unconstitutional or invalid,
unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some
other ground upon which the court may raise its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.14 In other
words, the Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota of the case.15
Apart from the non-observance of the hierarchy of courts principle, a subsequent development occurred
which has not only rendered the question of constitutionality unpivotal but made the resolution of the
case itself a pure theoretical exercise. During the pendency of the petition before the Court of Appeals,
Board Resolution No. 699, series of 2001, entitled Amending the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree and Other Related Laws, was passed by the
HUDCC. The regulation amended certain design standards for subdivision projects, among which is the
proportionate obligation of subdivision homeowners in the payment of the electricity cost of
streetlights.16 The amendatory provision has superseded the provision in HUDCC Resolution No. R-562,
series of 1994, directing subdivision developers to shoulder the electricity cost of streetlights. At the
time of the filing of the instant petition, the new provision was already in effect. That being the situation,
the instant petition has become moot and academic.
One final note. In the main, petitioner is assailing the constitutionality of Resolution No. R-562, series of
1994, issued by the HUDCC. However, the HUDCC, although obviously an indispensable party, was not
impleaded either in the instant petition or in the petition before the Court of Appeals. An indispensable
party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall
be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The
presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority
to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable
parties to a suit or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an
indispensable parties renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.17 That is why the case is generally
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. In this case, however, remand is not feasible
because the initial action has to be discarded for failure to observe the hierarchy of courts principle.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
HLURB issued petitioner a license to sell 696 parcels of land within the subdivision. Petitioners subsidized
and adverced the payment for the delivery and maintenance of common facilities including the
operation of streetlights and the payment of the corresponding electric bills. In 2000, petitioners stop
paying the electric bills for the streetlights and advised respondent association to assume this obligation.
 11

Respondent refused to pay the electric bills. No proof was submitted to execute the requisite verification
and certification against non-forum shopping in behalf of a petitioner. There was a compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements of RA 26 and that there was no extrinsic fraud. The petition has no merit.

Issue:

Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution despite lack of actual
notice to petitioners as occupants or persons in possession of the property.

Whether there was extrinsic fraud.

Whether the period to file a petition for annulment of judgment had already prescribed.

Whether the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reconstitution of
the title although there was a discrepancy in the area of the property as indicated in the notice of
hearing.

Held:

There was no discrepancy in the identity of the property. The petition denied and affirmed resolution of
the CA.
 12

EN BANC Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents)
under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with
the following terms and conditions:
G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009

ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner, Duration of contract 12 months

vs.
Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., Respondents. Position Chief Officer

Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00

DECISION
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Overtime US$700.00 per month
For decades, the toil of solitary migrants has helped lift entire families and communities out of poverty. Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month5
Their earnings have built houses, provided health care, equipped schools and planted the seeds of
businesses. They have woven together the world by transmitting ideas and knowledge from country to
country. They have provided the dynamic human link between cultures, societies and economies. Yet, On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded
only recently have we begun to understand not only how much international migration impacts employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the
development, but how smart public policies can magnify this effect. assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April
1998.6
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon
Global Forum on Migration and Development Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer.7 Hence, petitioner refused
Brussels, July 10, 20071 to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.8

For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,2 to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement
of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19,
1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven
(7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint9 against respondents for constructive dismissal
and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73, broken down as follows:
May 27/31, 1998 (5 US$ 413.90
days) incl. Leave pay

June 01/30, 1998 2,590.00

does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to national development, but
exacerbates the hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal July 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
to their lump-sum salary either for the unexpired portion of their employment contract "or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" (subject clause). Petitioner claims that August 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
the last clause violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, Sept. 01/30, 1998 2,590.00
deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.
Oct. 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the December 8,
Nov. 01/30, 1998 2,590.00
2004 Decision3 and April 1, 2005 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which applied the subject
clause, entreating this Court to declare the subject clause unconstitutional. Dec. 01/31, 1998 2,590.00

Jan. 01/31, 1999 2,590.00


Feb. 01/28, 1999 2,590.00
Mar. 1/19, 1999 (19 1,640.00
days) incl. leave pay
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
25,382.23
Amount adjusted to
chief mate's salary
(March 19/31, 1998 1,060.5010
to April 1/30, 1998)
+
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL CLAIM US$ 26,442.7311
as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding
him monetary benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal of the
complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents
are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency,
based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the complainant’s salary for
three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.1avvphi1
The respondents are likewise ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in
Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of
FORTY FIVE U.S. DOLLARS (US$ 45.00),12 representing the complainant’s claim for a salary differential. In
addition, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant, jointly and severally, in Philippine
Currency, at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment, the complainant’s (petitioner's) claim
for attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount awarded to the aforesaid
employee under this Decision.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the salary
period of three months only -- rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of
petitioner's employment contract - applying the subject clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate
13
of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner's "[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed
overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month."14
Respondents appealed15 to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question the finding of
the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
Petitioner also appealed16 to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the
Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission17 that in case of illegal
dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.18
In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified the LA Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 15 July 1999 is MODIFIED. Respondents are hereby ordered to pay
complainant, jointly and severally, in Philippine currency, at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time
of payment the following:
1. Three (3) months salary
$1,400 x 3 US$4,200.00
2. Salary differential 45.00
US$4,245.00
3. 10% Attorney’s fees 424.50
TOTAL US$4,669.50
The other findings are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.19
The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the
applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 "does not provide for the
award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave
pay."20
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of
the subject clause.21 The NLRC denied the motion.22
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari23 with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the
subject clause.24 After initially dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due
course to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution dated August 7, 2003 which granted the petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 151833, filed by petitioner.
In a Decision dated December 8, 2004, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the
applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.25

His Motion for Reconsideration26 having been denied by the CA,27 petitioner brings his cause to this
Court on the following grounds:
I The Arguments of Petitioner
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in accord with applicable
decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages
equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months
II
In the alternative that the Court of Appeals and the Labor Tribunals were merely applying their
interpretation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in law when it failed to discharge its judicial duty to decide questions of substance not theretofore
determined by the Honorable Supreme Court, particularly, the constitutional issues raised by the
petitioner on the constitutionality of said law, which unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily limits
payment of the award for back wages of overseas workers to three (3) months.
III
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from petitioner’s award the overtime pay and vacation pay
provided in his contract since under the contract they form part of his salary.28
On February 26, 2008, petitioner wrote the Court to withdraw his petition as he is already old and sickly,
and he intends to make use of the monetary award for his medical treatment and medication.29 Required
to comment, counsel for petitioner filed a motion, urging the court to allow partial execution of the
undisputed monetary award and, at the same time, praying that the constitutional question be
resolved.30
Considering that the parties have filed their respective memoranda, the Court now takes up the full
merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
On the first and second issues
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not disputed.
Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora. What
remains disputed is only the computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason
of his illegal dismissal.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the
monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine
months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the
US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of
14
US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment
contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31
Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly impairs the freedom of
OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas employment contracts a determinate employment
period and a fixed salary package.32 It also impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs
differently from local Filipino workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary
to which OFWs are entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award
for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate treatment is not reasonable
as there is no substantial distinction between the two groups;33and that it defeats Section 18,34 Article II
of the Constitution which guarantees the protection of the rights and welfare of all Filipino workers,
whether deployed locally or overseas.35
Moreover, petitioner argues that the decisions of the CA and the labor tribunals are not in line with
existing jurisprudence on the issue of money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs. Though there are
conflicting rulings on this, petitioner urges the Court to sort them out for the guidance of affected
OFWs.36
Petitioner further underscores that the insertion of the subject clause into R.A. No. 8042 serves no other
purpose but to benefit local placement agencies. He marks the statement made by the Solicitor General
in his Memorandum, viz.:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the payment of money claims in the
event that jurisdiction over the foreign employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign employer
reneges on its obligation. Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which fulfill their
obligations are unnecessarily penalized for the acts of the foreign employer. To protect them and to
promote their continued helpful contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for money
claims was reduced under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. 37 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner argues that in mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, the subject clause
sacrifices the well-being of OFWs. Not only that, the provision makes foreign employers better off than
local employers because in cases involving the illegal dismissal of employees, foreign employers are
liable for salaries covering a maximum of only three months of the unexpired employment contract
while local employers are liable for the full lump-sum salaries of their employees. As petitioner puts it:
In terms of practical application, the local employers are not limited to the amount of backwages they
have to give their employees they have illegally dismissed, following well-entrenched and unequivocal
jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, foreign employers will only be limited to giving the
illegally dismissed migrant workers the maximum of three (3) months unpaid salaries notwithstanding
the unexpired term of the contract that can be more than three (3) months.38
Lastly, petitioner claims that the subject clause violates the due process clause, for it deprives him of the
salaries and other emoluments he is entitled to under his fixed-period employment contract.39
The Arguments of Respondents

In their Comment and Memorandum, respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be
entertained, for this was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the
earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.40
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions
could not have impaired petitioner's 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded
petitioner's contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of petitioner's
employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties.42
Moreover, the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in terms of the nature of their
employment, such that their rights to monetary benefits must necessarily be treated differently. The
OSG enumerates the essential elements that distinguish OFWs from local workers: first, while local
workers perform their jobs within Philippine territory, OFWs perform their jobs for foreign employers,
over whom it is difficult for our courts to acquire jurisdiction, or against whom it is almost impossible to
enforce judgment; and second, as held in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations Commission43 and Millares
v. National Labor Relations Commission,44 OFWs are contractual employees who can never acquire
regular employment status, unlike local workers who are or can become regular employees. Hence, the
OSG posits that there are rights and privileges exclusive to local workers, but not available to OFWs; that
these peculiarities make for a reasonable and valid basis for the differentiated treatment under the
subject clause of the money claims of OFWs who are illegally dismissed. Thus, the provision does not
violate the equal protection clause nor Section 18, Article II of the Constitution.45
Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind the subject clause as a police power measure adopted to
mitigate the solidary liability of placement agencies for this "redounds to the benefit of the migrant
workers whose welfare the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies
helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are properly deployed and are employed under
decent and humane conditions."46
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains petitioner on the first and second issues.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its co-equals, such as
the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination;47 (2) that the constitutional question is
raised by a proper party48 and at the earliest opportunity;49 and (3) that the constitutional question is the
very lis mota of the case,50otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some other
ground.51
Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly involving petitioner who is
personally aggrieved that the labor tribunals and the CA computed his monetary award based on the
salary period of three months only as provided under the subject clause.
The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in mind that the requirement that a
constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity entails the interposition of the issue in the
pleadings before a competent court, such that, if the issue is not raised in the pleadings before that
15
competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be
considered on appeal.52 Records disclose that the issue on the constitutionality of the subject clause was
first raised, not in petitioner's appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial Reconsideration with
said labor tribunal,53 and reiterated in his Petition for Certiorari before the CA.54Nonetheless, the issue is
deemed seasonably raised because it is not the NLRC but the CA which has the competence to resolve
the constitutional issue. The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-judicial function – its
function in the present case is limited to determining questions of fact to which the legislative policy of
R.A. No. 8042 is to be applied and to resolving such questions in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself;55 thus, its foremost function is to administer and enforce R.A. No. 8042, and not
to inquire into the validity of its provisions. The CA, on the other hand, is vested with the power of
judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof, such as the subject
clause.56 Petitioner's interposition of the constitutional issue before the CA was undoubtedly seasonable.
The CA was therefore remiss in failing to take up the issue in its decision.
The third condition that the constitutional issue be critical to the resolution of the case likewise obtains
because the monetary claim of petitioner to his lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his
12-month employment contract, and not just for a period of three months, strikes at the very core of the
subject clause.
Thus, the stage is all set for the determination of the constitutionality of the subject clause.
Does the subject clause violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts?
The answer is in the negative.
Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the
term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive57 is not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides:
No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective
operation,58and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected;59 however, as to laws already in
existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof.60 Thus, the non-
impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that
would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner
changing the intention of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the
employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A.
No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when
the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all
the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared
unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the
exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the

recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and
well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.61Police power legislations adopted by the State to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are
generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private
contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public
welfare.62
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and
Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18,63 Article II and Section 3,64 Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without
distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar
category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be
denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.65
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees
fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with
these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law;
3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.66
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification
embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification
needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest;67 b) the middle-tier or
intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an
important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that
interest;68 and c) strict judicial scrutiny69 in which a legislative classification which impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right70 or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a
suspect class71 is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.72
Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny is triggered by suspect classifications73 based on
race74 or gender75 but not when the classification is drawn along income categories.76
It is different in the Philippine setting. In Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,77 the constitutionality of a provision in the charter of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas(BSP), a government financial institution (GFI), was challenged for
16
maintaining its rank-and-file employees under the Salary Standardization Law (SSL), even when the rank-
and-file employees of other GFIs had been exempted from the SSL by their respective charters. Finding
that the disputed provision contained a suspect classification based on salary grade, the Court
deliberately employed the standard of strict judicial scrutiny in its review of the constitutionality of said
provision. More significantly, it was in this case that the Court revealed the broad outlines of its judicial
philosophy, to wit:
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution.
The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge
its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a
stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these
foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are
persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. We should not place undue and
fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot
come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a different
ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our
qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice. Our
laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be
deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More
importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all
of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others.
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of
effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble
proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The
command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national development,"
further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the
direction of greater equality. x x x [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal
support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over
backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with
less privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is
incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this
pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power.

Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given
deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation
of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny
ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court’s
solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true
whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or
one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of
the actor.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee
status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients
of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher
compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried
employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-
and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank -
possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher
compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file
employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job
marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the
adjustment . This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty,
provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of
life for all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict
scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster. (Emphasis supplied)
Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor," the Court in the present case
also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect
classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a
closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with
employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of
one year or more
As pointed out by petitioner,78 it was in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission79(Second Division, 1999) that the Court laid down the following rules on the application of
the periods prescribed under Section 10(5) of R.A. No. 804, to wit:
17
A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally
dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or three (3) months’ salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year
or more. This is evident from the words "for every year of the unexpired term" which follows the words
"salaries x x x for three months." To follow petitioners’ thinking that private respondent is entitled to
three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and
overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to the well-
established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part
or word thereof be given effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the meaning of the
words employed in the statue and to have used them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat.80 (Emphasis supplied)
In Marsaman, the OFW involved was illegally dismissed two months into his 10-month contract, but was
awarded his salaries for the remaining 8 months and 6 days of his contract.
Prior to Marsaman, however, there were two cases in which the Court made conflicting rulings on
Section 10(5). One was Asian Center for Career and Employment System and Services v. National Labor
Relations Commission (Second Division, October 1998),81 which involved an OFW who was awarded
a two-year employment contract, but was dismissed after working for one year and two months. The LA
declared his dismissal illegal and awarded him SR13,600.00 as lump-sum salary covering eight months,
the unexpired portion of his contract. On appeal, the Court reduced the award to SR3,600.00 equivalent
to his three months’ salary, this being the lesser value, to wit:
Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondent’s employment contract is eight (8)
months. Private respondent should therefore be paid his basic salary corresponding to three (3) months
or a total of SR3,600.82
Another was Triple-Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division,
December 1998),83 which involved an OFW (therein respondent Erlinda Osdana) who was originally
granted a 12-month contract, which was deemed renewed for another 12 months. After serving for one
year and seven-and-a-half months, respondent Osdana was illegally dismissed, and the Court awarded
her salaries for the entire unexpired portion of four and one-half months of her contract.
The Marsaman interpretation of Section 10(5) has since been adopted in the following cases:
As the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs into two categories. The first
category includes OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of less than one year; in case of illegal
dismissal, they are entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their contract. The second
category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of one year or more; in case of illegal
dismissal, they are entitled to monetary award equivalent to only 3 months of the unexpired portion of
their contracts.
The disparity in the treatment of these two groups cannot be discounted. In Skippers, the respondent
OFW worked for only 2 months out of his 6-month contract, but was awarded his salaries for the

remaining 4 months. In contrast, the respondent OFWs in Oriental and PCL who had also worked for
about 2 months out of their 12-month contracts were awarded their salaries for only 3 months of the
unexpired portion of their contracts. Even the OFWs involved in Talidano and Univan who had worked
for a longer period of 3 months out of their 12-month contracts before being illegally dismissed were
awarded their salaries for only 3 months.
To illustrate the disparity even more vividly, the Court assumes a hypothetical OFW-A with an
employment contract of 10 months at a monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00 and a hypothetical OFW-B
with an employment contract of 15 months with the same monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00. Both
commenced work on the same day and under the same employer, and were illegally dismissed after one
month of work. Under the subject clause, OFW-A will be entitled to US$9,000.00, equivalent to his
salaries for the remaining 9 months of his contract, whereas OFW-B will be entitled to only US$3,000.00,
equivalent to his salaries for 3 months of the unexpired portion of his contract, instead of US$14,000.00
for the unexpired portion of 14 months of his contract, as the US$3,000.00 is the lesser amount.
The disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court takes into account jurisprudence that, prior to
the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042 on July 14, 1995,97 illegally dismissed OFWs, no matter how long the
period of their employment contracts, were entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of
their contracts. The matrix below speaks for itself:
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions
thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal
dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by
the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of
the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling
out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them
to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for
the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from such
prejudice, simply because the latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
Among OFWs With Employment Contracts of More Than One Year
Upon closer examination of the terminology employed in the subject clause, the Court now has
misgivings on the accuracy of the Marsaman interpretation.
The Court notes that the subject clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less" contains the qualifying phrases "every year" and "unexpired term." By its
ordinary meaning, the word "term" means a limited or definite extent of time.105 Corollarily, that "every
year" is but part of an "unexpired term" is significant in many ways: first, the unexpired term must be at
least one year, for if it were any shorter, there would be no occasion for such unexpired term to be
measured by every year; and second, the original term must be more than one year, for otherwise,
whatever would be the unexpired term thereof will not reach even a year. Consequently, the more
decisive factor in the determination of when the subject clause "for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less" shall apply is not the length of the original contract period as held
in Marsaman,106 but the length of the unexpired portion of the contract period -- the subject clause
applies in cases when the unexpired portion of the contract period is at least one year, which
arithmetically requires that the original contract period be more than one year.
18
Viewed in that light, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose
contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year
left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while
those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by
the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months only.
To concretely illustrate the application of the foregoing interpretation of the subject clause, the Court
assumes hypothetical OFW-C and OFW-D, who each have a 24-month contract at a salary rate of
US$1,000.00 per month. OFW-C is illegally dismissed on the 12th month, and OFW-D, on the 13th
month. Considering that there is at least 12 months remaining in the contract period of OFW-C, the
subject clause applies to the computation of the latter's monetary benefits. Thus, OFW-C will be entitled,
not to US$12,000,00 or the latter's total salaries for the 12 months unexpired portion of the contract,
but to the lesser amount of US$3,000.00 or the latter's salaries for 3 months out of the 12-month
unexpired term of the contract. On the other hand, OFW-D is spared from the effects of the subject
clause, for there are only 11 months left in the latter's contract period. Thus, OFW-D will be entitled to
US$11,000.00, which is equivalent to his/her total salaries for the entire 11-month unexpired portion.
OFWs vis-à-vis Local Workers With Fixed-Period Employment
As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of
illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with
fixed-term employment.107
The earliest rule prescribing a uniform system of computation was actually Article 299 of the Code of
Commerce (1888),108 to wit:
Article 299. If the contracts between the merchants and their shop clerks and employees should have
been made of a fixed period, none of the contracting parties, without the consent of the other, may
withdraw from the fulfillment of said contract until the termination of the period agreed upon.
Persons violating this clause shall be subject to indemnify the loss and damage suffered, with the
exception of the provisions contained in the following articles.
In Reyes v. The Compañia Maritima,109 the Court applied the foregoing provision to determine the
liability of a shipping company for the illegal discharge of its managers prior to the expiration of their
fixed-term employment. The Court therein held the shipping company liable for the salaries of its
managers for the remainder of their fixed-term employment.
There is a more specific rule as far as seafarers are concerned: Article 605 of the Code of Commerce
which provides:
Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent should be for a
definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged until the fulfillment of their contracts, except for
reasons of insubordination in serious matters, robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage caused
to the vessel or to its cargo by malice or manifest or proven negligence.
Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie,110 in

which the Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its
illegally dismissed employees for the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present,111 Article 299 of the Code of Commerce was
replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain time and for a
certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause, before the fulfillment of the
contract. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Manresa, the Court in Lemoine v. Alkan112 read the disjunctive "or" in Article 1586 as a conjunctive
"and" so as to apply the provision to local workers who are employed for a time certain although for no
particular skill. This interpretation of Article 1586 was reiterated in Garcia Palomar v. Hotel de France
Company.113 And in both Lemoine and Palomar, the Court adopted the general principle that in actions
for wrongful discharge founded on Article 1586, local workers are entitled to recover damages to the
extent of the amount stipulated to be paid to them by the terms of their contract. On the computation
of the amount of such damages, the Court in Aldaz v. Gay114 held:
The doctrine is well-established in American jurisprudence, and nothing has been brought to our
attention to the contrary under Spanish jurisprudence, that when an employee is wrongfully discharged
it is his duty to seek other employment of the same kind in the same community, for the purpose of
reducing the damages resulting from such wrongful discharge. However, while this is the general rule,
the burden of showing that he failed to make an effort to secure other employment of a like nature, and
that other employment of a like nature was obtainable, is upon the defendant. When an employee is
wrongfully discharged under a contract of employment his prima facie damage is the amount which he
would be entitled to had he continued in such employment until the termination of the period. (Howard
vs. Daly, 61 N. Y., 362; Allen vs. Whitlark, 99 Mich., 492; Farrell vs. School District No. 2, 98 Mich.,
43.)115(Emphasis supplied)
On August 30, 1950, the New Civil Code took effect with new provisions on fixed-term employment:
Section 2 (Obligations with a Period), Chapter 3, Title I, and Sections 2 (Contract of Labor) and 3
(Contract for a Piece of Work), Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV.116 Much like Article 1586 of the Civil Code of
1889, the new provisions of the Civil Code do not expressly provide for the remedies available to a fixed-
term worker who is illegally discharged. However, it is noted that in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc.
v. Rich,117 the Court carried over the principles on the payment of damages underlying Article 1586 of the
Civil Code of 1889 and applied the same to a case involving the illegal discharge of a local worker whose
fixed-period employment contract was entered into in 1952, when the new Civil Code was already in
effect.118
More significantly, the same principles were applied to cases involving overseas Filipino workers whose
fixed-term employment contracts were illegally terminated, such as in First Asian Trans & Shipping
Agency, Inc. v. Ople,119involving seafarers who were illegally discharged. In Teknika Skills and Trade
Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,120 an OFW who was illegally dismissed prior to the
expiration of her fixed-period employment contract as a baby sitter, was awarded salaries corresponding
to the unexpired portion of her contract. The Court arrived at the same ruling in Anderson v. National
Labor Relations Commission,121 which involved a foreman hired in 1988 in Saudi Arabia for a fixed term
of two years, but who was illegally dismissed after only nine months on the job -- the Court awarded him
salaries corresponding to 15 months, the unexpired portion of his contract. In Asia World Recruitment,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,122 a Filipino working as a security officer in 1989 in Angola
19
was awarded his salaries for the remaining period of his 12-month contract after he was wrongfully
discharged. Finally, in Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,123 an OFW whose
12-month contract was illegally cut short in the second month was declared entitled to his salaries for
the remaining 10 months of his contract.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally
discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of
R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired
portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that
their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers
with fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation
of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month
cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on
the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out
one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court
now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling
state interest through the least restrictive means.
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the
Constitution and calibrated by history.124 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state125 for which
some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining
medical standards,126 or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.127
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the
subject clause may possibly serve.
The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure "designed to protect the employment of
Filipino seafarers overseas x x x. By limiting the liability to three months [sic], Filipino seafarers have
better chance of getting hired by foreign employers." The limitation also protects the interest of local
placement agencies, which otherwise may be made to shoulder millions of pesos in "termination pay."128
The OSG explained further:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the payment of money claims in the
event that jurisdiction over the foreign employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign employer
reneges on its obligation. Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which fulfill their
obligations are unnecessarily penalized for the acts of the foreign employer. To protect them and to
promote their continued helpful contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for money
are reduced under Section 10 of RA 8042.
This measure redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks to
promote. The survival of legitimate placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant

workers are properly deployed and are employed under decent and humane conditions.129 (Emphasis
supplied)
However, nowhere in the Comment or Memorandum does the OSG cite the source of its perception of
the state interest sought to be served by the subject clause.
The OSG locates the purpose of R.A. No. 8042 in the speech of Rep. Bonifacio Gallego in sponsorship of
House Bill No. 14314 (HB 14314), from which the law originated;130 but the speech makes no reference
to the underlying reason for the adoption of the subject clause. That is only natural for none of the 29
provisions in HB 14314 resembles the subject clause.
On the other hand, Senate Bill No. 2077 (SB 2077) contains a provision on money claims, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of the complaint, the claim arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal and the recruitment/placement agency or any and all claims under this
Section shall be joint and several.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on any money claims exclusive of
damages under this Section shall not be less than fifty percent (50%) of such money claims: Provided,
That any installment payments, if applicable, to satisfy any such compromise or voluntary settlement
shall not be more than two (2) months. Any compromise/voluntary agreement in violation of this
paragraph shall be null and void.
Non-compliance with the mandatory period for resolutions of cases provided under this Section shall
subject the responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:
(1) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within the
prescribed period shall be, or caused to be, withheld until the said official complies therewith;
(2) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(3) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office for five
(5) years.
Provided, however, That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any liability which
any such official may have incurred under other existing laws or rules and regulations as a consequence
of violating the provisions of this paragraph.
But significantly, Section 10 of SB 2077 does not provide for any rule on the computation of money
claims.
20
A rule on the computation of money claims containing the subject clause was inserted and eventually
adopted as the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. The Court examined the rationale of the
subject clause in the transcripts of the "Bicameral Conference Committee (Conference Committee)
Meetings on the Magna Carta on OCWs (Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 2077 and House Bill
No. 14314)." However, the Court finds no discernible state interest, let alone a compelling one, that is
sought to be protected or advanced by the adoption of the subject clause.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a compelling state
interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the employment
of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will
have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates
the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored
sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is
composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private
business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of placement
agencies vis-a-vistheir foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place that can be employed to
achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas
Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign
employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine
agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The
POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23,
2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding local
placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of
petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.1avvphi1
Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the declaration of the unconstitutionality
of the subject clause from the lone perspective that the clause directly violates state policy on labor
under Section 3,131Article XIII of the Constitution.
While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing,132 there are some which
this Court has declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII being one,133 particularly Section 3 thereof,
the nature of which, this Court, in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,134 has described to be
not self-actuating:
Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be deemed as self-
executing in the sense that these are automatically acknowledged and observed without need for any
enabling legislation. However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the
full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein expressed, would be

impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being
overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees of "full protection to labor" and "security of tenure", when
examined in isolation, are facially unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible suggests a
blanket shield in favor of labor against any form of removal regardless of circumstance. This
interpretation implies an unimpeachable right to continued employment-a utopian notion, doubtless-but
still hardly within the contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the
parameters of these guaranteed rights to ensure the protection and promotion, not only the rights of
the labor sector, but of the employers' as well. Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies
will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive enforceable
right to stave off the dismissal of an employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice
or hearing. As manifested by several framers of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on social justice
require legislative enactments for their enforceability.135 (Emphasis added)
Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct enforceable rights, for the
violation of which the questioned clause may be declared unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk
opening the floodgates of litigation to every worker or union over every conceivable violation of so
broad a concept as social justice for labor.
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the working class any actual
enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges
protection through executive or legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited to
being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to
protect the welfare of the working class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional agenda
that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, formulated the
judicial precept that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of prejudice
against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection -- such as the working class or a
section thereof -- the Court may recognize the existence of a suspect classification and subject the same
to strict judicial scrutiny.
The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial scrutiny formulated in Central Bank
Employee Association exaggerate the significance of Section 3, Article XIII is a groundless
apprehension. Central Bank applied Article XIII in conjunction with the equal protection clause. Article
XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal protection clause, has no life or force of its own as
elucidated in Agabon.
Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's
right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits,
without any existing valid governmental purpose.136
The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of the subject clause of limiting the
entitlement of OFWs to their three-month salary in case of illegal dismissal, is to give them a better
chance of getting hired by foreign employers. This is plain speculation. As earlier discussed, there is
nothing in the text of the law or the records of the deliberations leading to its enactment or the
pleadings of respondent that would indicate that there is an existing governmental purpose for the
subject clause, or even just a pretext of one.
21
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise
reason that the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal protection, but also her right to
substantive due process under Section 1,137 Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired
period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior
to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
On the Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his
contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner,
DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in
which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses;
whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work "performed" in excess of the regular eight hours, and
holiday pay is compensation for any work "performed" on designated rest days and holidays.
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday
pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary award, unless there is evidence that he performed work
during those periods. As the Court held in Centennial Transmarine, Inc. v. Dela Cruz,138
However, the payment of overtime pay and leave pay should be disallowed in light of our ruling in
Cagampan v. National Labor Relations Commission, to wit:
The rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said was actually performed
are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which should be
computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees
the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established.
In the same vein, the claim for the day's leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract is
unwarranted since the same is given during the actual service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause "or for three months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042
is DECLAREDUNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire
unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the
rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES,INC.
By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA).
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents)
under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with
the following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April
1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused
to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March
19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and
seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23)
days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal
and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding
him monetary benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal of the
complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents
are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency,
based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND
22
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the complainant’s salary for three
(3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the salary
period of three months only — rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of
petitioner’s employment contract – applying the subject clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate
of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner’s “[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed
overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month.”
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question the finding of the
LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary awarded
to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No.
8042 “does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually
performed, and for vacation leave pay.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of
the subject clause. The NLRC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the
subject clause. After initially dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course
to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution which granted the petition for certiorari,filed by
petitioner.
The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted
the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brings his cause to this Court
on the following grounds:
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in accord with applicable
decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages
equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months.
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from petitioner’s award the overtime pay and vacation pay
provided in his contract since under the contract they form part of his salary.
The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance of the
constitutional question raised therein.

ISSUES:
Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional
Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal
Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the computation of his
monetary award
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not disputed.
Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the
monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine
months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the
US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of
US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment
contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31
Arguments of the Petitioner
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their
contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.
The Arguments of Respondents
Respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this was belatedly
interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was
when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.40
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions
could not have impaired petitioner’s 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded
petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of petitioner’s
employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties.
The Court’s Ruling:
First Issue
23
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and
Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction
as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar
category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be
denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the Court in the present case
also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect
classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a
closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise
reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to
substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
Second Issue
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions
thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal
dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by
the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of
the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling
out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them
to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for
the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from such
prejudice, simply because the latter’s unexpired contracts fall short of one year.

Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally dismissed
OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term
employment.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise
reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to
substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired
period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior
to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his
contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner,
DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in
which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses;
whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in excess of the regular eight hours, and
holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated rest days and holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the day’s leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract is
unwarranted since the same is given during the actual service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause “or for three months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire
unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the
rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer,
with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation
leave per month.
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000 upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
24
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano refused to
stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998, serving only two (2)
months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-
three (23) days.
Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and
for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on the computation of
$2590/month from June 1998 to February 199, $413.90 for March 1998, and $1640 for March 1999) as
well as moral and exemplary damages.
The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770, representing his salaray for
three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment, plus $45 for salary
differential and for attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount; however, no compensation for
damages as prayed was awarded.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing three (3)
months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and 10% for attorney's fees. This decision was
based on the provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July 15, 1995.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of
the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement
of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.
The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling
on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the constitutional issue raised by herein
petitioner Serrano.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-
impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

HELD:
On the first issue.
The answer is in the negative. Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is
not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective
operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in
existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment
clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any
way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the
intention of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the
employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A.
No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when
the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all
the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared
unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the
exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the
recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and
well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the State to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are
generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private
contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public
welfare.
On the second issue.
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction
as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar
category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be
25
denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees
fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with
these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law;
3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification
embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification
needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or
intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an
important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest;
and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a
closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts
of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally
discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of
R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired
portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that
their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers
with fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation
of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap
on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the
claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one
classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court
now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling
state interest through the least restrictive means.
 26

What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the
Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some
individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining
medical standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the
subject clause may possibly serve.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a compelling state
interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the employment
of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will
have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates
the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored
sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is
composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private
business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of placement
agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place that can be employed to
achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas
Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign
employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine
agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The
POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23,
2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.
very lis mota of the case, otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some other
ground.
As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of
illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with
fixed-term employment.
Article 605 of the Code of Commerce provides:
Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent should be for a
definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged until the fulfillment of their contracts, except for
reasons of insubordination in serious matters, robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage caused
to the vessel or to its cargo by malice or manifest or proven negligence.
Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie, in which the Court held the
shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its illegally dismissed employees
for the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present, Article 299 of the Code of Commerce was
replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain time and for a
certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause, before the fulfillment of the
contract.

Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding local
placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of
petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Note:

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its co-equals, such as
the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) that the constitutional question is
raised by a proper party and at the earliest opportunity; and (3) that the constitutional question is the
 27

EN BANC
Angelina S. Gutierrez Toyota Grandia, 115,800.00 150,600.00 34,800.00
(Associate Justice) 2002 model
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC July 31, 2012
Adolfo S. Azcuna Toyota Camry, 536,105.00 543,300.00 9,195.00
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the (Associate Justice) 2005 model
Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.
Toyota Grandia, 117,300.00 145,000.00 27,700.00
2002 model
RESOLUTION
Sony TV Set 2,399.90 2,500.00 100.10
PER CURIAM:
Ma. Alicia 5,800.002

The present administrative matter stems from the two Memoranda, dated July 14, 2011 and August 10,
2010, submitted by Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer,
Office of Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice. These
Memoranda essentially ask the Court to determine the proper formula to be used in computing the
appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice and several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to
pay to acquire the government properties they used during their tenure.
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the
wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the
Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal
Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance
with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it should
have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5, 1998.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her Memorandum dated August 10, 2010,
Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation
based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of
This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion1 issued by the Legal Services Sector, Office of the the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of
General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), which found that an underpayment amounting to government property since these were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances
P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court involving two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices,5the COA upheld the in-house appraisal of
the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court, to wit: government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More importantly, the
Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources. Full
autonomy, among others,6 contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation and utilization
of the Judiciary’s resources, based on its own determination of what it needs. The Court thus has the
Valuation under recognized authority to allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in the
Valuation under COA course of the discharge of its functions.7 To allow the COA to substitute the Court’s policy in the disposal
Difference
Name of Justice Items Purchased CFAG Memorandum of its property would be tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial prerogative.
(in pesos)
(in pesos) No. 98-569A
(in pesos)
OUR RULING
Artemio Panganiban Toyota Camry, 341,241.10 365,000.00 23,758.90
(Chief Justice) 2003 model We find Atty. Candelaria’s recommendation to be well-taken.

Toyota Grandia, 136,500.00 151,000.00 14,500.00

2002 model The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal
autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
Toyota Camry, 115,800.00 156,000.00 40,200.00
2001 model Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
Ruben T. Reyes Toyota Camry, 579,532.50 580,600.00 1,067.50 property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
(Associate Justice) 2005 model agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been
Toyota Grandia, 117,300.00 181,200.00 63,900.00 granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution. emphasis ours
2003 model

This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation
with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court
rulings on these matters.
Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence
In Angara v. Electoral Commission,8 we explained the principle of separation of powers, as follows:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law,
and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.9
The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the other hand, extends from
the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in
any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the
other branches or the citizenry.10To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-
equal branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their
respective mandates; lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to
check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.11
Under the Judiciary’s unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that individual judges
can freely exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole,
should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the
other branches, save only for those imposed by the Constitution itself.12 Thus, judicial independence can
be "broken down into two distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional
independence."13 Decisional independence "refers to a judge’s ability to render decisions free from
political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law."14 On the other
hand, institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and
legislative branches of government."15 Simply put, institutional independence refers to the "collective
independence of the judiciary as a body."16
In the case In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet
Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007,17 the Court delineated the distinctions
between the two concepts of judicial independence in the following manner:
One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge and seeks to
insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this
kind of independence when he can do his job without having to hear – or at least without having to take
it seriously if he does hear – criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second
concept is institutional judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a
branch of government and protects judges as a class.
28
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved -
wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public
accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence threatens the maintenance of
an independent Third Estate. italics and emphases ours Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays
in our system of government as the sole repository of judicial power, with the power to determine
whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of the government is attended with grave abuse of
discretion,18 no less than the Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure that judicial
independence is protected and maintained.
The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction, as
enumerated in Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution, or from passing a law that undermines the
security of tenure of the members of the judiciary.19 The Constitution also mandates that the judiciary
shall enjoy fiscal autonomy,20 and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and judicial personnel. Jurisprudence21 has characterized administrative supervision as exclusive, noting
that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and court personnel's compliance with all laws,
rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.22
The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by prohibiting any decrease in
their salary during their continuance in office,23 and ensures their security of tenure by providing that
"Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until
they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office."24 With these guarantees, justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of
reprisals brought on by their judicial action. They can act inspired solely by their knowledge of the law
and by the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy
motives.25
All of these constitutional provisions were put in place to strengthen judicial independence, not only by
clearly stating the Court’s powers, but also by providing express limits on the power of the two other
branches of government to interfere with the Court’s affairs.
Fiscal Autonomy
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal
autonomy. Just as the Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for
example, by physically preventing a court from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not
enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts,26 the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom
to use or dispose of their funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While, as a general
proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any
form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy amounts to an
improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its primary
function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose. This
authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at
first blush appears to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy)
is necessary to maintain judicial independence27 and is expressly provided for by the Constitution
through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII. This provision states:
 29

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced
by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released.
In Bengzon v. Drilon,28 we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the
following manner:
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman
contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and
dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees,
fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay
plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed
by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100
typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress
without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory
platitude.
Application to the Present Case
The Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the
Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its
personnel. As the Court En Banc’s Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the
fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciary’s properties to
retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and the appellate courts:
WHEREAS, by the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy as defined in Bengzon v. Drilon (G.R. No.
103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150) the Judiciary has "full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its)
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that (its) needs require";
WHEREAS, the long-established tradition and practice of Justices or Members of appellate courts of
purchasing for sentimental reasons at retirement government properties they used during their tenure
has been recognized as a privilege enjoyed only by such government officials; and
WHEREAS, the exercise of such privilege needs regulation to the end that respect for sentiments that a
retiring Justice attaches to properties he or she officially used during his or her tenure should be in
consonance with the need for restraint in the utilization and disposition of government resources.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
sale to the retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established practice within
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express
the Judiciary that even the COA has previously recognized.32 The En Banc Resolution also deems the
mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
grant of the privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest
employees in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision. Under this administrative authority,
of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have
the Court has the power to administer the Judiciary’s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to
so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant
handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as provided by law and
of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.29 (emphases ours)
by its own grants.33

In this cited case, the Court set aside President Corazon Aquino’s veto of particular provisions of the
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and
General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of
the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and
retired justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the Judiciary’s
benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the
constitutionally guaranteed independence and fiscal autonomy. The Court ruled:
Court’s granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35
to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal
is a part of the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted
autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds
retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement
appropriated from the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular
privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and
item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the
independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the
Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it
Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs.
in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice
must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.30
As a final point, we add that this view finds full support in the Government Accounting and Auditing
Manual (GAAM), Volume 1, particularly, Section 501 of Title 7, Chapter 3, which states:
The Court’s declarations in Bengzon make it clear that the grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary is
more extensive than the mere automatic and regular release of its approved annual
appropriations;31 real fiscal autonomy covers the grant to the Judiciary of the authority to use and Section 501. Authority or responsibility for property disposal/divestment. – The full and sole authority
dispose of its funds and properties at will, free from any outside control or interference. and responsibility for the divestment and disposal of property and other assets owned by the national
government agencies or instrumentalities, local government units and government-owned and/or

controlled corporations and their subsidiaries shall be lodged in the heads of the departments, bureaus,
and offices of the national government, the local government units and the governing bodies or
managing heads of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries conformably to
their respective corporate charters or articles of incorporation, who shall constitute the appropriate
committee or body to undertake the same. italics supplied; emphases ours
This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the Judiciary, possesses the full and
sole authority and responsibility to divest and dispose of the properties and assets of the Judiciary; as
Head of Office, he determines the manner and the conditions of disposition, which in this case relate to a
benefit. As the usual practice of the Court, this authority is exercised by the Chief Justice in consultation
with the Court En Banc. However, whether exercised by the Chief Justice or by the Supreme Court En
Banc, the grant of such authority and discretion is unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretations
and insertions.
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the
Property Division, Office of `Administrative Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April
23, 1997, as directed under the Court Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is
CONFIRMED to be legal and valid. Let the Commission on Audit be accordingly advised of this Resolution
for its guidance.
SO ORDERED.
RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES PURCHASED
BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC JULY 31, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of,
not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the
constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the
Judiciary’s own affairs.
FACTS:
Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA) found that an underpayment
amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the
Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court. The COA
attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong
formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property
Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court
En Banc in A.M. No. 03- 12-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No.
98-569-A4.
Atty. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, recommended that the Court
advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was
the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35
and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in 1997.
30
As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices,
the COA upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG
guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling
of its budget and resources.
ISSUE: WON COA’s interference, in this case, violates the judiciary’s autonomy.
HELD:
Yes. The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal
autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This authority, however,
must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional
provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.
The concept of the independence of the three branches of government extends from the notion that the
powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of
government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates; lack
of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-
interest assertions of another or others.
Thus, judicial independence can be “broken down into two distinct concepts: decisional independence
and institutional independence.” Decisional independence “refers to a judge’s ability to render decisions
free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law.”On the
other hand, institutional independence “describes the separation of the judicial branch from the
executive and legislative branches of government.”
While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is
unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary’s fiscal
autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to
perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that
purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national
purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of
legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence and is expressly provided for by the
Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII.
The Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the
Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its
personnel. As the Court En Banc’s Resolution reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the
basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciary’s properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and the
appellate courts. The Judiciary has full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the wisdom
and dispatch that (its) needs require.
By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the
sale to the retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency
has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established practice within
the Judiciary that even the COA has previously recognized. The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant
of the privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and
employees in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision. Under this administrative authority,
 31

the Court has the power to administer the Judiciary’s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to
handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as provided by law and
by its own grants.

In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35
is a part of the Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted
retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement
privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and
independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the
Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs.
 32

EN BANC WHEREFORE, the requirement of seeking a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case

from the Civil Service Commission embodied in Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 10154 is declared INAPPLICABLE to retiring employees of the Judiciary.
A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC October 1, 2013
SO ORDERED.
RE: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE/CLARIFICATION ON SECTION 7, RULE III OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10154
REQUIRING RETIRING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO SECURE A CLEARANCE OF PENDENCY/NON-
PENDENCY OF CASE/S FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a Memorandum dated September 18, 2013 from Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy
Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services of the Supreme Court,
requesting guidance/clarification on the applicability to the Judiciary of Section 7, Rule III of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 101541 which states:

Section 7. Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek Clearance of Pendency/Non-
Pendency of Administrative Case from his/her employer agency, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Office of
the Ombudsman, or in case of presidential appointees, from the Office of the President.

Section 6,2 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) exclusively vests in the Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel.3 As such, it oversees the court
personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the proper administrative action against them for any
violation thereof.4 As an adjunct thereto, it keeps in its custody records pertaining to the administrative
cases of retiring court personnel.1âwphi1

In view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the subject provision – which requires retiring government
employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from, among
others, the CSC – should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary.1âwphi1 To deem it
otherwise would disregard the Court’s constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision
over its personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of
the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which makes the CSC clearance a
superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154.5

To further clarify the matter, the same principles dictate that a prior clearance of pendency/non-
pendency of administrative case/s from the Office of the President (albeit some court personnel are
presidential appointees, e.g., Supreme Court Justices) or the Office of the Ombudsman should not
equally apply to retiring court personnel. Verily, the administrative supervision of court personnel and all
affairs related thereto fall within the exclusive province of the Judiciary.

It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary administrative
supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance requirement obtains with respect
to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by
the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman,6 on retiring court personnel as it
is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciary’s power of administrative supervision.

EN BANC
UDK-15143, January 21, 2015
IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY
MOVEMENT v. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL
AUTONOMY.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund1 and replacing it with
the Judiciary Support Fund. Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support Fund shall be remitted
to the national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will be used.
Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this
court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of
Congress.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This matter was raised to this court through the letter4 dated August 27, 2014, signed by Mijares and
addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. The letter is captioned:
Petition for Mandamus with Manifestation to invoke the Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy as
mandated under the Constitution5
The letter was referred to the Clerk of Court En Banc for appropriate action.6 It was then docketed as
UDK-15143.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is a Filipino citizen, and a concerned taxpayer[.]8 He filed
this petition as part of his continuing crusade to defend and uphold the Constitution9 because he
believes in the rule of law.10 He is concerned about the threats against the judiciary after this court
promulgated Priority Development Assistance Fund11 case on November 19, 2013 and Disbursement
Acceleration Program12 case on July 1, 2014.
The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President after the
promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial independence.
In the first week of July 2014, Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo Farinas filed House Bill No. 4690,
which would require this court to remit its Judiciary Development Fund collections to the national
treasury.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A week later, or on July 14, 2014, Iloilo Representative Niel Tupas, Jr., filed House Bill No. 4738 entitled
The Act Creating the Judicial Support Fund (JSF) under the National Treasury, repealing for the purpose
Presidential Decree No. 1949.
On the same day, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III addressed the nation:
My message to the Supreme Court: We do not want two equal branches of government to go head to
head, needing a third branch to step in to intervene. We find it difficult to understand your decision. You
had done something similar in the past, and you tried to do it again; there are even those of the opinion
33
that what you attempted to commit was graver, if we were to base it on your decision. Abiding by the
principle of presumption of regularity, we assumed that you did the right thing; after all, you are the
ones who should ostensibly have a better understanding of the law. And now, when we use the same
mechanism which, you yourselves have admitted, benefit our countrymen why is it then that we are
wrong?
We believe that the majority of you, like us, want only the best for the Filipino people. To the honorable
justices of the Supreme Court: Help us help our countrymen. We ask that you review your decision, this
time taking into consideration the points I have raised tonight. The nation hopes for your careful
deliberation and response. And I hope that once you’ve examined the arguments I will submit, regarding
the law and about our economy, solidarity will ensue thus strengthening the entire governments
capability to push for the interests of the nation.15
The issue for resolution is whether petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for this court
to grant the petition and issue a writ of mandamus.
Petitioner argues that Congress gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court.
Petitioner points out that Congress is exercising its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility by abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) of the Supreme
Court.
With regard to his prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, petitioner avers that Congress
should not act as wreckers of the law18 by threatening to clip the powers of the High
Tribunal[.]19Congress committed a blunder of monumental proportions20 when it reduced the judiciary’s
2015 budget.
Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to REVOKE/ABROGATE and EXPUNGE whatever
irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial independence and fiscal autonomy as
mandated under the Constitution to better serve public interest and general welfare of the people.
This court resolves to deny the petition.
The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to certain limitations.
Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of
the case. The requisites are:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.23
Petitioner’s failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the outright dismissal of this petition.
I
The petition does not comply with the requisites of judicial review
No actual case or controversy
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that:

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial review is the existence of an
actual controversy. This means that there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion.24 As emphasized by this court in Information Technology Foundation of the Phils. v.
Commission on Elections:25
It is well-established in this jurisdiction that . . . for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there
must be an actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based
on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. . . . [C]ourts do not sit
to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging.�The controversy must be justiciable definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations
of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a
real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.26
For this court to rule on constitutional issues, there must first be a justiciable controversy. Pleadings
before this court must show a violation of an existing legal right or a controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. In the concurring opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa:
Basic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the requirement that there must be an actual case or
controversy. This Court cannot render an advisory opinion. We assume that the Constitution binds all
other constitutional departments, instrumentalities, and organs. We are aware that in the exercise of
their various powers, they do interpret the text of the Constitution in the light of contemporary needs
that they should address. A policy that reduces this Court to an adviser for official acts by the other
departments that have not yet been done would unnecessarily tax our resources. It is inconsistent with
our role as final arbiter and adjudicator and weakens the entire system of the Rule of Law. Our power of
judicial review is a duty to make a final and binding construction of law. This power should generally be
reserved when the departments have exhausted any and all acts that would remedy any perceived
violation of right. The rationale that defines the extent of our doctrines laying down exceptions to our
rules on justiciability are clear: Not only should the pleadings show a convincing violation of a right, but
the impact should be shown to be so grave, imminent, and irreparable that any delayed exercise of
judicial review or deference would undermine fundamental principles that should be enjoyed by the party
complaining or the constituents that they legitimately represent.
The reason for this requirement was explained in Angara v. Electoral Commission:28
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
34
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.29
Petitioners allegations show that he wants this court to strike down the proposed bills abolishing the
Judiciary Development Fund. This court, however, must act only within its powers granted under the
Constitution. This court is not empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not a law.
Montesclaros v. COMELEC30 involved the postponement of the 2002 Sangguniang Kabataan Elections and
the lowering of the age requirement in the Sangguniang Kabataan to at least 15 but not more than 18
years of age.31 Montesclaros and other parties filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.32 One of the reliefs prayed for was:
a) To prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law, decree, Comelec resolution/directive and other
respondents issuances, orders and actions and the like in postponing the May 6, 2002 SK elections.33
This court held that:
. . . petitioners instituted this petition to: (1) compel public respondents to hold the SK elections on May
6, 2002 and should it be postponed, the SK elections should be held not later than July 15, 2002;
(2) prevent public respondents from passing laws and issuing resolutions and orders that would lower the
membership age in the SK. . . .
Petitioners prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership
age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial
review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by
the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no
power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of
rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be
exercised in vacuo. . . .
Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court
can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.
Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from
setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress
in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members
of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral
Committee of approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber
of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of
private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or
procedures of Congress.
. . . To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution
for the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of government.
Similar to Montesclaros, petitioner is asking this court to stop Congress from passing laws that will
abolish the Judiciary Development Fund. This court has explained that the filing of bills is within the
legislative power of Congress and is not subject to judicial restraint[.]35 A proposed bill produces no legal
effects until it is passed into law. Under the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It
cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not

pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial determination.36 The
petition, therefore, does not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for this courts
determination.
Petitioner has no legal standing
Even assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this court must resolve, petitioner has no
legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill. The rule on legal standing has been discussed
in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo:37
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public
right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He
may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger,
or in the category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to
seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases,
such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente,
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.38
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is passed
into law. While his concern for judicial independence is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with
the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect the
judiciary.
This court, however, has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing when the issues involved are of
transcendental importance to the public. Specifically, this court has stated that:
the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.39
Transcendental importance is not defined in our jurisprudence, thus, in Francisco v. House of
Representatives:40
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of
the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.41
35
A mere invocation of transcendental importance in the pleading is not enough for this court to set aside
procedural rules:
Whether an issue is of transcendental importance is a matter determined by this court on a case-to-case
basis. An allegation of transcendental importance must be supported by the proper allegations.42
None of the determinants in Francisco are present in this case. The events feared by petitioner are
merely speculative and conjectural.
In addition to the determinants in Francisco, it must also be shown that there is a clear or imminent
threat to fundamental rights. In an opinion in Imbong v. Ochoa:43
The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 should not be declared
unconstitutional in whole or in any of its parts given the petitions filed in this case.
None of the petitions properly present an �actual case or controversy,� which deserves the exercise of
our awesome power of judicial review. It is our duty not to rule on the abstract and speculative issues
barren of actual facts. These consolidated petitions, which contain bare allegations, do not provide the
proper venue to decide on fundamental issues. The law in question is needed social legislation.
That we rule on these special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition � which amounts to a pre-
enforcement free-wheeling facial review of the statute and the implementing rules and regulations � is
very bad precedent. The issues are far from justiciable. Petitioners claim in their class suits that they
entirely represent a whole religion, the Filipino nation and, worse, all the unborn. The intervenors also
claim the same representation: Filipinos and Catholics. Many of the petitions also sue the President of
the Republic.
We should apply our rules rigorously and dismiss these cases. The transcendental importance of the
issues they want us to decide will be better served when we wait for the proper cases with the proper
parties suffering real, actual or more imminent injury. There is no showing of an injury so great and so
imminent that we cannot wait for these cases.
The events feared by petitioner are contingent on the passing of the proposed bill in Congress. The
threat of imminent injury is not yet manifest since there is no guarantee that the bill will even be passed
into law. There is no transcendental interest in this case to justify the relaxation of technical rules.
II
Requisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus not shown
Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Rule 65
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
 36

The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
The writ of mandamus will issue when the act sought to be performed is ministerial.45 An act is
ministerial when it does not require the exercise of judgment and the act is performed in compliance
with a legal mandate.46 In a petition for mandamus, the burden of proof is on petitioner to show that
one is entitled to the performance of a legal right and that respondent has a corresponding duty to
perform the act.47Mandamus will not lie to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do
or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.
In this case, petitioner has not shown how he is entitled to the relief prayed for. Hence, this court cannot
be compelled to exercise its power of judicial review since there is no actual case or controversy.
which is significantly higher than the average P46,000.00 allocated monthly to each trial court.
It was only in 2013 that the budget allocated to the judiciary included an item for the construction,
rehabilitation, and repair of the halls of justice in the capital outlay. The amount allocated was P1 million.
In 2014, there was no item for the construction, rehabilitation, and repair of the halls of justice.60 This
allocation would have been used to help fund the repair of existing halls of justice and the construction
of new halls of justice in the entire country, including those courts destroyed by Typhoon Yolanda and
the 2013 earthquake.
The entire budget for the judiciary, however, does not only come from the national government. The
Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the judiciary to maintain its independence.61 In Bengzon v.
Drilon:62

Final note The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
The judiciary is the weakest branch of government. It is true that courts have power to declare what law constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
is given a set of facts, but it does not have an army to enforce its writs. Courts do not have the power of appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express
the purse. Except for a constitutional provision that requires that the budget of the judiciary should not mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
go below the appropriation for the previous year, it is beholden to the Congress depending on how low separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.63
the budget is. Courts, therefore, must also be accountable with their own budget. The Judiciary Development Fund,
used to augment the expenses of the judiciary, is regularly accounted for by this court on a quarterly
Despite being the third co-equal branch of the government, the judiciary enjoys less than 1%50 of the basis. The financial reports are readily available at the Supreme Court website.
total budget for the national government. Specifically, it was a mere 0.82% in 2014,51 0.85% in
2013,520.83% in 2012,53 and 0.83% in 2011. These funds, however, are still not enough to meet the expenses of lower courts and guarantee credible
compensation for their personnel. The reality is that halls of justice exist because we rely on the
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses or MOOE pays for sundry matters such as utility payments, generosity of local government units that provide additional subsidy to our judges.65 If not, the budget
paper, gasoline and others.55 The MOOE granted to the lower courts in 2014 was for the construction, repair, and rehabilitation of halls of justice is with the Department of
P1,220,905,000.00.56While this might seem like a large amount, the amount significantly dwindles when Justice.66chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
divided among all lower courts in the country. Per the 2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA), the
approximate monthly MOOE for all courts are estimated as follows: As a result, our fiscal autonomy and judicial independence are often undermined by low levels of
Estimated Monthly MOOE Per budgetary outlay, the lack of provision for maintenance and operating expenses, and the reliance on
Type of Court Number of Courts57 local government units and the Department of Justice.
Court
Regional Trial Courts 969 P46,408.67
Courts are not constitutionally built to do political lobbying. By constitutional design, it is a co-equal
Metropolitan Trial Courts 106 P46,071.89 department to the Congress and the Executive. By temperament, our arguments are legal, not political.
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities 229 P46,206.01 We are best when we lay down all our premises in the finding of facts, interpretation of the law and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts 468 P46,305.69 understanding of precedents. We are not trained to produce a political statement or a media release.
Municipal Trial Courts 366 P46,423.30
Sharia District Courts 5 P40,696.83 Because of the nature of courts, that is that it has to decide in favor of one party, we may not have a
political base. Certainly, we should not even consider building a political base. All we have is an abiding
Sharia Circuit Courts 51 P45,883.68
faith that we should do what we could to ensure that the Rule of Law prevails. It seems that we have no
These amounts were arrived at using the following computation: champions when it comes to ensuring the material basis for fiscal autonomy or judicial independence.
Number of Courts x MOOE
--------------------------- For this reason, we appreciate petitioners concern for the judiciary. It is often only through the vigilance
Total Number of Courts / 12 of private citizens that issues relating to the judiciary can be discussed in the political sphere.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unfortunately, the remedy he seeks cannot be granted by this court. But his crusade is not a lost cause.
Number of Courts Considering that what he seeks to be struck down is a proposed bill, it would be better for him to air his
In comparison, the 2014 MOOE allocation for the House of Representatives was P3,386,439,000.0058 or concerns by lobbying in Congress. There, he may discover the representatives and senators who may
about P282.2 million per month for the maintenance and operation of the House of Representatives have a similar enthusiastic response to truly making the needed investments in the Rule of Law.
compound in Batasan Hills. Even if this amount was divided equally among the 234 legislative districts, a
representatives office space would still have a monthly MOOE allocation of approximately P1.2 million, WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
 37

IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY It was only in 2013 that the budget allocated to the judiciary included an item for the construction,
MOVEMENT VS. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL rehabilitation, and repair of the halls of justice in the capital outlay. The amount allocated was P1
AUTONOMY. million.59

The judiciary is the weakest branch of government. It is true that courts have power to declare what law
is given a set of facts, but it does not have an army to enforce its writs. Courts do not have the power of
the purse. "Except for a constitutional provision that requires that the budget of the judiciary should not
go below the appropriation for the previous year, it is beholden to the Congress depending on how low
the budget is."49
Despite being the third co-equal branch of the government, the judiciary enjoys less than 1%50 of the
total budget for the national government. Specifically, it was a mere 0.82% in 2014,51 0.85% in
2013,52 0.83% in 2012,53 and 0.83% in 2011.54
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses or MOOE "pays for sundry matters such as utility payments,
paper, gasoline and others."55 The MOOE granted to the lower courts in 2014
was P1,220,905,000.00.56 While this might seem like a large amount, the amount significantly dwindles
when divided among all lower courts in the country. Per the 2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA), the
approximate monthly MOOE for all courts are estimated as follows:
Type of Court Number of Estimated Monthly
Courts57 MOOE Per Court
Regional Trial Courts 969 P46,408.67
Metropolitan Trial Courts 106 P46,071.89
In 2014, there was no item for the construction, rehabilitation, and repair of the halls of justice.60 This
allocation would have been used to help fund the repair of existing halls of justice and the construction
of new halls of justice in the entire country, including those courts destroyed by Typhoon Yolanda and
the 2013 earthquake.
The entire budget for the judiciary, however, does not only come from the national government. The
Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the judiciary to maintain its independence.61 In Bengzon v.
Drilon:62
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express
mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.63
Courts, therefore, must also be accountable with their own budget. The Judiciary Development Fund,
used to augment the expenses of the judiciary, is regularly accounted for by this court on a quarterly
basis. The financial reports are readily available at the Supreme Court website.64 These funds, however,
are still not enough to meet the expenses of lower courts and guarantee credible compensation for their
personnel. The reality is that halls of justice exist because we rely on the generosity of local government
units that provide additional subsidy to our judges.65 If not, the budget for the construction, repair, and
rehabilitation of halls of justice is with the Department of Justice.66

Municipal Trial Courts in Cities
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
Municipal Trial Courts
Shari’a District Courts
Shari’a Circuit Courts
These amounts were arrived at using the following computation:
Number of Courts
Total Number of Courts
229 P46,206.01 As a result, our fiscal autonomy and judicial independence are often undermined
by low levels of budgetary outlay, the lack of provision for maintenance and operating expenses, and the
468 P46,305.69
reliance on local government units and the Department of Justice.
366 P46,423.30
"Courts are not constitutionally built to do political lobbying. By constitutional design, it is a co-equal
5 P40,696.83 department to the Congress and the Executive. By temperament, our arguments are legal, not political.
We are best when we lay down all our premises in the finding of facts, interpretation of the law and
51 P45,883.68 understanding of precedents. We are not trained .to produce a political statement or a media
release."67
"Because of the nature of courts, that is - that it has to decide in favor of one party, we may not have a
political base. Certainly, we should not even consider building a political base. All we have is an abiding
faith that we should do what we could to ensure that the Rule of Law prevails. It seems that we have no
x MOOE
champions when it comes to ensuring the material basis for fiscal autonomy or judicial
/ 12 independence."68

Number of Courts
In comparison, the 2014 MOOE allocation for the House of Representatives wasP3,386,439,000.0058 or
about 282.2 million per month for the maintenance and operation of the House of Representatives
compound in Batasan Hills. Even if this amount was divided equally among the 234 legislative districts, a
representative’s office space would still have a monthly MOOE allocation of approximately P1.2 million,
which is significantly higher than the average P46,000.00 allocated monthly to each trial court.
For this reason, we appreciate petitioner's concern for the judiciary. It is often only through the vigilance
of private citizens that issues relating to the judiciary can be discussed in the political sphere.
Unfortunately, the remedy he seeks cannot be granted by this court. But his crusade is not a lost cause.
Considering that what he seeks to be struck down is a proposed bill, it would be better for him to air his
concerns by lobbying in Congress. There, he may discover the representatives and senators who may
have a similar enthusiastic response to truly making the needed investments in the Rule of Law.
 38

IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY THE REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
MOVEMENT VS. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL
AUTONOMY
The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to certain limitations.
UDK-15143
Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of
the case. The requisites are:

En Banc
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
January 21, 2015
Ponente: Leonen
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
FACTS:
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of
Congress.
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is "a Filipino citizen, and a concerned taxpayer[.]"He filed
Petitioner’s failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the outright dismissal of this petition.
this petition as part of his "continuing crusade to defend and uphold the Constitution" because he
believes in the rule of law. He is concerned about the threats against the judiciary after this court
promulgated Priority Development Assistance Fund I

The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President after the The petition does not comply with the requisites of judicial review
promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial independence.
NO ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
Petitioner argues that Congress "gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court."
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that:

Petitioner points out that Congress is exercising its power "in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
ARTICLE VIII
reason of passion or personal hostility by abolishing the ‘Judiciary Development Fund’ (JDF) of the
Judicial Department
Supreme Court."

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
With regard to his prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, petitioner avers that Congress
established by law.
should not act as "wreckers of the law" by threatening "to clip the powers of the High Tribunal[.]"
Congress committed a "blunder of monumental proportions" when it reduced the judiciary’s 2015
budget. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to "REVOKE/ABROGATE and EXPUNGE whatever
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial independence and fiscal autonomy as
mandated under the Constitution to better serve public interest and general welfare of the people."
One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial review is the existence of an
actual controversy. This means that there must be "an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ISSUE: The issue for resolution is whether petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for this
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
court to grant the petition and issue a writ of mandamus.
advisory opinion." As emphasized by this court in Information Technology Foundation of the Phils. v.
Commission on Elections:
HELD:
It is well-established in this jurisdiction that ". . . for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there
The Supreme Court resolved TO DENY THE PETITION. must be an actual case or controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
 39

opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based This court, however, has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing when the issues involved are of
on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. . . . "transcendental importance" to the public. Specifically, this court has stated that:

The reason for this requirement was explained in Angara v. Electoral Commission:
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
Petitioner’s allegations show that he wants this court to strike down the proposed bills abolishing the
Judiciary Development Fund. This court, however, must act only within its powers granted under the
Constitution. This court is not empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not a law.
NO LEGAL STANDING TO QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF THE PROPOSED BILL
the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
Transcendental importance is not defined in our jurisprudence, thus, in Francisco v. House of
Representatives:
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of
the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.41

Even assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this court must resolve, petitioner has no
legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill. The rule on legal standing has been discussed
in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo:

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private
suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.

Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other
person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In either case,
he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make
out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or
"taxpayer."

This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result."

Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is passed
into law. While his concern for judicial independence is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with
the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect the
judiciary.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS,
JR.,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf
of the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents), duly opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor.
In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the
JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with one (1)
vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the
following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so
that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration and with due regard to Senate
Resolution Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on
August 2, 2012.7 On August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed, in the
meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012
Decision which decreed that it was immediately executory. The decretal portion of the August 3, 2012
Resolution8 reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten (10)
days from notice. Until further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of
the dispositive portion of the Court’s July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This disposition is
immediately executory."9
40
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda.10
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of
appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and
legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos
Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in
the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during these times
that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their
appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body.13
Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one body,
the appointment of judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power
became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that the appointees must
have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political
pressure and partisan activities,15 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process,
and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution in this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in the JBC
to act as one of the ex-officio members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is
entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but
alternately or by rotation.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered.1âwphi1 An eighth member
was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the
JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each.18 It has been the situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the
petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC
would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make the

proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3]
that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the
JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member
composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth grounds
listed by respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues
covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion arrived at, with
respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined and by which those powers are distributed among the
several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.19 The Framers
reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and
the framework upon which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the
constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they
say. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite
purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent
which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly
says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked to
interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify
constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a"
to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers intended that
Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution
could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in
tune with the shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the
presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately."20 Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-
President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately,
by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members."22 In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of
Congress was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter
would be handled and voted upon by its two Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their
decision to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot
just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the Framers
were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not
in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to
appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
41
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2)
Houses. The need to recognize the existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the
Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions which particular House plays,
regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately.
Whether in the exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such as inter alia, the power of
appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence of a state of war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the
President and Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must be
acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses. In all these
instances, each House is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and
with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the
principle of checks and balances, as to the other branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation in
the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a
unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major
branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial
Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a representative of
the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing,
the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain
constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government.
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of
Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:
I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of Congress in the JBC in
accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x.
The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation. Perhaps,
it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation come only after
it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."
Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate
the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt the rule of single
representation of Congress in the JBC in order to respect and give the right meaning to the above-quoted
provision of the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant, submitted to
the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC is intended
to curtail the influence of politics in Congress in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is
that seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two votes for Congress runs
counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in
the appointment of judges. Also, two votes for Congress would increase the number of JBC members to
 42

eight, which could lead to voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered membership, and a clear process, it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and
violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. To permit or
tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a constitutional circumvention that cannot
be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one member of
In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:
Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation carries with him one full
vote.
As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7)
representatives coming from different sectors. From the enumeration it is patent that each category of
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the JBC
members pertained to a single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of the bicameral nature
simply because all of the regular members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and
of our legislative department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is
balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular members of the JBC is subject to
explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative." Thus, two (2) representatives
a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is composed of
from Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight (8), a number beyond what the
members of Congress.
Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Respondents’ contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a
because it was only questioned for the first time through the present action, deserves scant
former JBC consultant, is worth reiterating.31 Thus:
consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no matter how
frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches,
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC because once an act is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the very
reflects the Commission’s desire "to have in the Council a representation for the major elements of the beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.
community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives from the three main
branches of government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if
representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting
it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts,
members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
This is essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc.
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by v. Fertiphil Corporation:32
Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the
Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and
constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the
fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute
other hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and the House of
prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress’ role under our
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine
constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two
is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts
relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
with the other two co-equal branches of government.
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in
reliance upon a law creating it.33
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the same
weight to considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act as such for one branch
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
and should not have any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of
official actions are nonetheless valid.
prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three
branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the direct
action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate.
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and
Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into the
vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the
law something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as correcting a perceived
House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a
inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the Court action of making amendment to the
constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.
Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.

From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus omissus
This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between
"a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a reasonable
two representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting

certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the
omission even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in
question was not foreseen or contemplated."36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature
would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation."37
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution
against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the
Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance.38 In cases
like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an
excision or an insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of
congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not
included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor
constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable
the proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.
The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012
Decision of the Court, which reads, "This disposition is immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings
held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman
Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this
practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the
controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the
Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,”
such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise
their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean
one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further
argue that petitioner has no “real interest” in questioning the constitutionality of the JBC’s current
composition. The respondents also question petitioner’s belated filing of the petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been met in this case; and
43
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two
(2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
(1) Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such
that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these
conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch
of government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he
is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case
is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief
Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC
likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard,
the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast
number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More
importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the
nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an
object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek
judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
(2) Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives
is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the
JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution
should there be a stalemate in voting.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role
of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that
the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
“Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
 44

Facts:
A body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process was conceived and
called the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and its composition, term and functions are provided under
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which also indicates that the JBC shall be composed of
seven (7) members.
proceedings are not tainted with illegality and that its composition and actions do not violate the
Constitution”.
The legality of the very process of the nominations to the positions in the judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy which is considered by the court as a constitutional issue that must be passed upon and that
the allegations are substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from the court.

In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. In separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives
one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. Francisco I. Chavez,
(petitioner) questioned this practice in this petition.
The Supreme Court granted the petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
met in this case; and
(2) Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its basic
sense, and not pertaining to either House of Representatives or Senate is referred to, but that, can only
have one representative. The practical purpose of the seven-member composition of the JBC is solution
to stalemate voting.
Bicameralism of “Congress” refers to its legislative function in the government. The Constitution is clear
in the distinction of the role of each house in the process of lawmaking. In the JBC, since there is no need
for a liaison between the Senate and House of Representatives when nominating judicial officers.
“Congress” must therefore refer to the entire Legislative department. It is clear that the Constitution
orders that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Even though finding the current composition of the JBC as unconstitutional, all its prior official actions
are valid. Actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized under the
doctrine of operative facts. These official actions are not nullified.

(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two
(2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:

(1) Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such
that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’ argument that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he
is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. To question the JBC composition for being
unconstitutional is not limited to official nominees for the post of Chief Justice.
The court recognizes the petitioner’s right to sue in this case and that he has the legal standing to bring
the present action because he has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. According to
petitioner, “since the JBC derives financial support for its functions, operation and proceedings from
taxes paid, petitioner possesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand that the JBC’s

EN BANC
G.R. No. 228628 | July 25, 2017
REP. REYNALDO V. UMALI, in his capacity as Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on
Justice and Ex Officio Member of the JBC, Petitioner
vs.
THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, chaired by THE HON. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, Chief Justice
and Ex Officio Chairperson, Respondent
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This principle of adherence to precedents has not lost its luster and
continues to guide the bench in keeping with the need to maintain stability in the law.1
This Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed directly with this
Court by herein petitioner Rep. Reynaldo V. Umali, current Chair of the House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, impugns the present-day practice of six-month rotational representation of
Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for it unfairly deprives both Houses of Congress of their full
participation in the said body. The aforementioned practice was adopted by the JBC in light of the ruling
in Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.2
As an overview, in Chavez, the constitutionality of the practice of having two representatives from both
houses of Congress with one vote each in the JBC, thus, increasing its membership from seven to eight,
was challenged. With that, this Court examined the constitutional provision that states the composition
of the JBC, that is, Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (Emphasis supplied.)
Following a painstaking analysis, this Court, in a Decision dated July 17, 2012, declared the said practice
of having two representatives from Congress with one vote each in the JBC unconstitutional. This Court
enunciated that the use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of the Congress" in the
aforequoted provision is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction or interpretation.
The same is indicative of the Framers' intent that Congress may designate only one representative to the
JBC. Had it been otherwise, they could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. This Court further
articulated that in the context of JBC representation, the term "Congress" must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department as no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC.
There is no mechanism required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening
and nomination of judicial officers. Moreover, this Court, quoting the keen observation of Retired
Supreme Court Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is also a JBC Consultant, stated that
the ex officio members of the JBC consist of representatives from the three main branches of
government, to wit: the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court representing the judiciary, the Secretary of
Justice representing the executive, and a representative of the Congress representing the legislature. It
45
can be deduced therefrom that the unmistakable tenor of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution was to treat each ex officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government
having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees. Now, to allow the legislature to have more than one
representative in the JBC would negate the principle of equality among these three branches of the
government, which is enshrined in the Constitution.3
The subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a Resolution dated April 16, 2013,
where this Court reiterated that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution providing for "a
representative of the Congress" in the JBC is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further
interpretation. Besides, this Court is not convinced that the Framers simply failed to adjust the aforesaid
constitutional provision, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of
legislature. Even granting that there was, indeed, such omission, this Court cannot supply the same.
Following the rule of casus omissus, that is, a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted, this
Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the omission even if the same may have resulted
from inadvertence or it was not foreseen or contemplated for to do so would amount to judicial
legislation. Ergo, this Court has neither power nor authority to add another member in the JBC simply by
judicial construction.4
In light of these Decision and Resolution, both Houses of Congress agreed on a six-month rotational
representation in the JBC, wherein the House of Representatives will represent Congress from January to
June and the Senate from July to December.5This is now the current practice in the JBC. It is by reason of
this arrangement that the votes cast by the petitioner for the selection of nominees for the vacancies of
then retiring Supreme Court Associate Justices Jose P. Perez (Perez) and Arturo Brion (Brion) were not
counted by the JBC during its En Banc deliberations held last December 2 and 9, 2016. Instead, the
petitioner's votes were simply placed in an envelope and sealed subject to any further disposition as this
Court may direct in a proper proceeding.6 This is the root of the present controversy that prompted the
petitioner to file the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus based on the following grounds:
I.
THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS PROPER TO ENJOIN THE JBC TO CORRECT ITS UNWARRANTED DENIAL OF
THE VOTES REGISTERED BY [HEREIN PETITIONER] DURING THE EN BANC DELIBERATIONS ON DECEMBER
2 AND 9, 2016 BECAUSE THE DECISION IN THE CHAVEZ CASE IS DEFECTIVE/FLA WED.
II.
THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS PROPER TO MANDATE THE JBC TO ACCEPT/COUNT SAID VOTES CAST BY
[PETITIONER] BECAUSE THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE JBC IS DEFECTIVE/FLA WED AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
III.
THE PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE JBC IN ALLOWING ONLY ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE SENATE OR
THE HOUSE OF [REPRESENTATIVES] TO PARTICIPATE AND VOTE ON A [6- MONTH] ROTATION BASIS IS
IMPRACTICABLE, ABSURD AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL, CREATES AN [INSTITUTIONAL] IMBALANCE
BETWEEN THE TWO INDEPENDENT CHAMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND INSTITUTES AN INHERENT AND
CONTINUING CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JBC THAT ADVERSELY AFFECTS
APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING AND PARTICULARLY [THIS COURT].

IV.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION CLEARLY REQUIRES PARTICIPATION AND VOTING BY REPRESENTATIVES FROM
THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN JBC PROCEEDINGS AND ALL APPOINTMENTS TO
THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING AND PARTICULARLY [TIDS COURT].
A. THE BICAMERAL NATURE OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT WAS BELATEDLY DECIDED UNDER THE
1987 CONSTITUTION, BUT MUST BE DEEMED AS INCORPORATED AND MODIFYING THE JBC STRUCTURE
UNDER SECTION 8(1)[,] ARTICLE VIII OF THE [1987] CONSTITUTION, TO GIVE FULL MEANING TO THE
INTENT OF ITS FRAMERS.
B. THERE WAS A CLEAR OVERSIGHT AND TECHNICAL OMISSION INVOLVING SECTIONS 8(1)[,] ARTICLE VIII
OF THE [1987] CONSTITUTION THAT SHOULD BE RECTIFIED BY [TIDS COURT].
C. THE FULL REPRESENTATION OF CONGRESS IN THE JBC IS POSSIBLE ONLY WITH PARTICIPATING AND
VOTING FROM REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE TWO INDEPENDENT CHAMBERS, OTHERWISE THE JBC
PROCEEDINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
D. THE PRESENCE OF THE SENATE AND [THE] HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MEMBERS IN THE JBC
UPHOLDS THE CO-EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN THE COUNCIL OF THE THREE MAIN BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT.7
As instructed by this Court,8 both Houses of Congress, through the Manifestation of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), which acts as the People's Tribune in this case, and the JBC commented on the
Petition.
The OSG wants this Court to revisit Chavez for its alleged unexecutability arising from constitutional
constraints. It holds that the current practice of alternate representation was only arrived at because of
time constraints and difficulty in securing the agreement of both Houses of Congress.9 And, since the
Constitution itself did not clearly state who is the Congress' representative in the JBC, the provision,
therefore, regarding the latter's composition must be harmonized to give effect to the current bicameral
system.10 With this in view, the OSG believes that it is only proper for both Houses of Congress to be
given equal representation in the JBC as neither House can bind the other for there can be no single
member of either House who can fully represent the entire legislature for to do so would definitely
result in absurdity.11
Further, the OSG avers that Chavez's strict interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution violates the very essence of bicameralism and sets aside the inherent dichotomy between
the two Houses of Congress.12 To note, a JBC member's votes are reflective of the position and the
interest such member wants to uphold, such that when the representatives from each House of
Congress vote for a certain judicial nominee, they carry the interests and views of the group they
represent. Thus, when only one would represent both Houses of Congress in the JBC, the vote would not
be representative of the interests embodied by the Congress as a whole.13
In the same way, the OSG contends that the bicameral nature of the legislature strictly adheres to the
distinct and separate personality of both Houses of Congress; thus, no member of Congress can
represent the entire Congress. Besides, the phrase "a representative of the Congress" in Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is qualified by the phrase "ex officio members." The ex officio nature
46
of the position derives its authority from the principal office. It, thus, follows that each house of Congress
must be represented in the JBC.14
Also, the OSG states that the constitutional intent in creating the JBC is to ensure community
representation from the different sectors of society, as well as from the three branches of government,
and to eliminate partisan politics in the selection of members of the judiciary. The focus, therefore, is
more on proper representation rather than qualitative limitation. It even insists that when the Framers
deliberated on Section 8(1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, they were still thinking of a unicameral
legislature, thereby, giving Congress only one representative to the JBC. However, with the shift from
unicameralism to bicameralism, "a representative of the Congress" in the JBC should now be understood
to mean one representative from each House of Congress. For had it been the intention of the Framers
for the JBC to be composed only of seven members, they would have specified the numbers just like in
the other constitutional provisions. As such, the membership in the JBC should not be limited to seven
members. More so, an eventual deadlock in the voting would not pose any problem since the voting in
the JBC is not through a "yes" or a "no" vote.15
As its final argument, the OSG maintains that while Congress' participation in the JBC may be non-
legislative, still, the involvement of both Houses of Congress in its every proceeding is indispensable, as
each House represents different constituencies and would necessarily bring a unique perspective to the
recommendation process of the JBC.16
For its part, the JBC vehemently pleads that the present Petition be dismissed as its adopted rotational
scheme and the necessary consequences thereof are not the proper subjects of a certiorari and even a
mandamus petition for the same do not involve an exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. Apart from that, it committed no grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recognize, accept and
count the petitioner's votes during its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016 for it merely
acted in accordance with the Constitution and with the ruling in Chavez. More so, there is no showing
that the petitioner has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy other than this Petition for nowhere
herein did he assert that he exerted all efforts to have his concern addressed by Congress, such as asking
the latter to repudiate the rotational arrangement. Thus, for the petitioner's failure to exhaust all
remedies available to him in Congress, he deprived the latter of an opportunity to address the matter.
Also, the practice and acquiescence of both Houses of Congress to such an arrangement operates as an
estoppel against any member thereof to deny its validity. As regards a writ of mandamus, it cannot be
issued to compel the JBC to count the petitioner's votes for it will not lie to control the performance of a
discretionary act.17
The JBC further enunciates that the petitioner has no locus standi to institute this Petition in his capacity
as Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice and Ex Officio Member of the JBC
without the requisite resolution from both Houses of Congress authorizing him to sue as a member
thereof, which absence is a fatal defect rendering this Petition dismissible.18
In the same vein, the JBC asseverates that this Petition should also be dismissed as the allegations herein
are mere rehash of the arguments and dissents in Chavez, which have already been exhaustively litigated
and settled therein by this Court, more in particular, the interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, hence, barred by the doctrine of stare decisis. Similarly, there exists no substantial
reason or even supervening event or material change of circumstances that warrants Chavez's reversal.19
The JBC likewise insists that it was the intent of the Framers of the Constitution for the JBC to have only
seven members. The reason for that was laid down in Chavez, that is, to provide a solution should there

be a stalemate in the voting. As to the alleged oversight and technical omission of the Framers in
changing the provision on the JBC to reflect the bicameral nature of Congress, these are flimsy excuses
to override the clear provision of the Constitution and to disturb settled jurisprudence. As explained
in Chavez, Congress' membership in the JBC was not in the interest of a certain constituency but in
reverence to it as a major branch of government.20
Last of all, the JBC holds that should this Petition be granted, there would be an imbalance in favor of
Congress with respect to the representation in the JBC of the three main and co-equal branches of the
government. For the unmistakable tenor of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution was to treat
each ex officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government. And, even assuming that
the current six-month rotational scheme in the JBC created an imbalance between the two Houses of
Congress, it is not within the power of this Court or the JBC to remedy such imbalance. For the remedy
lies in the amendment of this constitutional provision.21
Given the foregoing arguments, the issues ought to be addressed by this Court can be summed up into:
(1) whether the petitioner has locus standi to file this Petition even without the requisite resolution from
both Houses of Congress permitting him to do so; (2) whether the petitioner's direct resort to this
Court via a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to
him to assail the JBC's adoption of the rotational representation leading to the non-counting of his votes
in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016; (3) whether the JBC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in adopting the six-month rotational scheme of both Houses of Congress resulting in the non-
counting of the petitioner's votes in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016; (4) whether
the JBC can be compelled through mandamus to count the petitioner's votes in its En Banc deliberations
last December 2 and 9, 2016; and (4) whether this Court's ruling in Chavez applies as stare decisis to the
present case.
Before delving into the above-stated issues, this Court would like to note that this Petition was primarily
filed because of the non-counting of the petitioner's votes in the JBC En Banc deliberations last
December 2 and 9, 2016 held for the purpose of determining, among others, who will be the possible
successors of the then retiring Associate Justices of the Supreme Court Perez and Brion, whose
retirements were set on December 14 and 29, 2016, respectively. The list of nominees will then be
forwarded to the President as the appointing authority. With the appointments of Associate Justices
Samuel R. Martires (Martires) and Noel G. Tijam (Tijam) on March 2 and 8, 2017, respectively, this
Petition has now been rendered moot insofar as the petitioner's prayers to (1) reverse and set aside the
JBC En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016; and (2) direct the JBC to count his votes therein
as its ex officio member,22 are concerned.
As a rule, courts do not entertain moot questions. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases
to present a justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or
value. This notwithstanding, the Court in a number of cases held that the moot and academic principle is
not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will still
decide cases otherwise, moot and academic if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.23Considering that all the
arguments herein once again boil down to the proper interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution on congressional representation in the JBC, this Court deems it proper to proceed on
deciding this Petition despite its mootness to settle the matter once and for all.
Having said that, this Court shall now resolve the issues in seriatim.
47
On petitioner's locus standi. The petitioner brings this suit in his capacity as the current Chairman of the
House of Representatives Committee on Justice and Ex Officio Member of the JBC. His legal standing was
challenged by the JBC for lack of an enabling resolution for that purpose coming from both Houses of
Congress.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.24 With that definition, therefore, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he
can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought.25Otherwise, he/she would not be
allowed to litigate. Nonetheless, in a long line of cases, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators
when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court. This was succinctly
explained in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, thus:
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be
direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but
also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he
is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims
infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing
to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.26 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The legal standing of each member of Congress was also upheld in Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez,27 where this Court pronounced that:
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. (citation
omitted). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of the Upper House of Congress,
filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was
authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989, and which reads as follows:
Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the
Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of

the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General
Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes.
In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has been recognized (citation
omitted).
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate President and the
Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate itself. Likewise, the
petitions in G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the purpose.
Therefore, the question of the legal standing of petitioners in the three cases becomes a preliminary
issue before this Court can inquire into the validity of the presidential veto and the conditions for the
implementation of some items in the GAA of 1994.
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal
standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an
appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the
President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of
the Legislature arises (citation omitted).
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (citation omitted).
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress (citation omitted). In such a case,
any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted:
This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual Senators as such having a
substantial interest in the question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was the requisite injury to
their rights as Senators. It would then be futile to raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the
domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if the situation were reversed, and it is the
Executive Branch that could allege a transgression, its officials could likewise file the corresponding
action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office (citation omitted).28 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
It is clear therefrom that each member of Congress has a legal standing to sue even without an enabling
resolution for that purpose so long as the questioned acts invade the powers, prerogatives and privileges
of Congress. Otherwise stated, whenever the acts affect the powers, prerogatives and privileges of
Congress, anyone of its members may validly bring an action to challenge the same to safeguard and
maintain the sanctity thereof.
48
With the foregoing, this Court sustains the petitioner's legal standing as Member of the House of
Representatives and as the Chairman of its Committee on Justice to assail the alternate representation
of Congress in the JBC, which arrangement led to the non-counting of his votes in its En Banc
deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016, as it allegedly affects adversely Congress' prerogative to be
fully represented before the said body.
On petitioner's direct resort to this Court via certiorari petition. The JBC questions the propriety of the
petitioner's direct resort to this Court via the present Petition to assail its adoption of the rotational
representation of Congress resulting in the non-counting of his votes in its En Banc deliberations last
December 2 and 9, 2016. The JBC insists that the said scheme was a creation of Congress itself; as such,
the petitioner's plain, speedy and adequate remedy is to appeal to Congress to repudiate the same.
Direct resort to this Court should not be allowed if there is a remedy available to the petitioner before
Congress.
Generally, the writ of certiorari can only be availed of in the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals, however, this
Court clarified that it is inadequacy that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari and not the
mere absence of all other remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ. A remedy is
considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects
of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.29
In the same way, as a matter of policy, direct resort to this Court will not be entertained unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as in cases involving national interest and those of serious implications, justify the
availment of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction.30 In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,31 and again in Maza v. Turla,32this
Court took pains in enumerating the circumstances that would warrant a direct resort to this Court, to
wit: (1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
immediate time; (2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (3) cases of first
impression as no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter; (4) the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court; (5) the time element presented in this case
cannot be ignored; (6) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (7) petitioners rightly
claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and (8)
the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy,
or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent
nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.33
Here, while this Court agrees with the JBC that the petitioner's preliminary remedy to question the
rotational arrangement of Congress is to ask the latter to repudiate the same, this, however, cannot be
considered plain, speedy and adequate. This Court is, thus, inclined to sustain the petitioner's direct
resort to this Court not only because it is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to him but
also by reason of the constitutional issues involved herein and the urgency of the matter. As correctly
pointed out by the OSG, the Constitution mandates that any vacancy to the office of an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court must be filled up within the 90-day period from its occurrence. Therefore, the JBC
must submit the list of nominees prior to the start of that period. As the nominations covered by the
questioned December 2016 JBC En Banc deliberations were intended for vacancies created by then
Associate Justices Perez and Brion, who respectively retired last December 14 and 29, 2016, hence, any
resort to Congress during that time would already be inadequate since the JBC list of nominees would be
submitted any moment to the Office of the President for the appointment of the next Associate Justices
 49

of the Supreme Court. Since time is of the essence, the petitioner's direct resort to this Court is On the propriety of mandamus. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant
warranted. has a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to
perform the act required. The burden is on the petitioner to show that there is such a clear legal right to
the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to
On the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the JBC in adopting the rotational representation of Congress
perform the act. As an extraordinary writ, it lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty,
correctible by certiorari. The petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the JBC in its
not a discretionary one.37 A clear line demarcates a discretionary act from a ministerial one. A purely
adoption of the rotational scheme, which led to the non-counting of his votes in its En Banc deliberations
ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
last December 2 and 9, 2016, as it deprives Congress of its full representation therein. The JBC, on the
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
other hand, believes otherwise for it merely acted in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.38 On the other hand, if the law imposes a
and with the ruling in Chavez. Also, such rotational scheme was a creation of Congress, which it merely
duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed,
adopted.
such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the
same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.39 Clearly, the use of discretion and
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the present Rules of Court are the two special civil actions the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive. Further, the writ of mandamus does not
used for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct.40
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which necessarily
includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.34 The burden is
In the case at bench, the counting of votes in the selection of the nominees to the judiciary may only be
on the petitioner to prove that the respondent tribunal committed not merely a reversible error but also
considered a ministerial duty of the JBC if such votes were cast by its rightful members and not by
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Showing mere abuse of discretion
someone, like the petitioner, who is not considered a member during the En Banc deliberations last
is not enough, for the abuse must be shown to be grave. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the
December 2 and 9, 2016. For during the questioned period, the lawful representative of Congress to the
judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
JBC is a member of the Senate and not of the House of Representatives as per their agreed rotational
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
scheme. Considering that a member of the Senate already cast his vote therein, the JBC has the full
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge,
discretion not to count the votes of the petitioner for it is mandated by both the Constitution and
tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as
jurisprudence to maintain that Congress will only have one representative in the JBC. As the act of the
to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.35
JBC involves a discretionary one, accordingly, mandamus will not lie.

But, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach before this
On the application of Chavez as stare decisis in this case. The petitioner strongly maintains
Court as the writs may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
that Chavez must be revisited and reversed due to its unexecutability. But the JBC insists that the
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
arguments herein are mere rehash of those in Chavez, hence, already barred by the doctrine of stare
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
decisis. Also, there is no cogent reason for Chavez's reversal.
by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions. Thus, they are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.36 This Court takes another glance at the arguments in Chavez and compares them with the present
arguments of the petitioner. A careful perusal, however, reveals that, although the petitioner questioned
the JBC's adoption of the six-month rotational representation of Congress leading to the non-counting of
Here, it is beyond question that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
his votes in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016, the supporting arguments hereof still
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.1âwphi1 Neither did it act in any judicial or quasi-judicial
boil down to the proper interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, being
capacity nor did it assume any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative in adopting the
mere rehash of the arguments in Chavez, the application of the doctrine of stare decisis in this case is
rotational scheme of Congress, which was the reason for not counting the votes of the petitioner in its
inevitable. More so, the petitioner failed to present strong and compelling reason not to rule this case in
En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016. But, despite this, its act is still not beyond this Court's
the same way that this Court ruled Chavez.
reach as the same is correctible by certiorari if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion even if it is not
exercising judicial and quasi-judicial functions. Now, did the JBC abuse its discretion in adopting the six-
month rotational arrangement and in not counting the votes of the petitioner? This Court answers in the As stated in the beginning of this ponencia, stare decisis et non quieta movere is a doctrine which means
negative. As correctly pointed out by the JBC, in adopting the said arrangement, it merely acted pursuant to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established. This is embodied in Article 8 of
to the Constitution and the Chavez ruling, which both require only one representative from Congress in the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
the JBC. It cannot, therefore, be faulted for simply complying with the Constitution and jurisprudence.
Moreover, said arrangement was crafted by both Houses of Congress and the JBC merely adopted the
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
same. By no stretch of imagination can it be regarded as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the JBC.
legal system of the Philippines.

With the foregoing, despite this Court's previous declaration that certiorari is the plain, speedy and
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and requires courts in a country to follow the rule
adequate remedy available to petitioner, still the same cannot prosper for the petitioner's failure to
established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
prove that the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in adopting the rotational scheme.
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine is based on the principle that once a
 50

question of law bas been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further While it is true that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution did not explicitly state that the JBC
argument. The same is grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, shall be composed of seven members, however, the same is implied in the enumeration of who will be
thus, time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that the members thereof. And though it is unnecessary for the JBC composition to be an odd number as no
when a court bas laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to tie-breaker is needed in the preparation of a shortlist since judicial nominees are not decided by a "yes"
that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. It simply or "no" vote, still, JBC's membership cannot be increased from seven to eight for it will be a clear
means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that violation of the aforesaid constitutional provision. To add another member in the JBC or to increase the
follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from representative of Congress to the JBC, the remedy is not judicial but constitutional amendment.
the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to
be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by
In sum, this Court will not overthrow Chavez for it is in accord with the constitutional mandate of giving
the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule
Congress "a representative" in the JBC. In the same manner, the adoption of the rotational scheme will
of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. The doctrine has assumed such value
not in any way deprive Congress of its full participation in the JBC for such an arrangement is also in line
in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that " [a]bandonment thereof must be based only on
with that constitutional mandate.
strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from
this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the stability of the solemn
pronouncements diminished." Verily, only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a particular WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is
case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
courts be justified in setting aside the same.41
SO ORDERED.
Here, the facts are exactly the same as in Chavez, where this Court has already settled the issue of
interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Truly, such ruling may not be Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628, [July 25, 2017])
unanimous, but it is undoubtedly a reflection of the wisdom of the majority of members of this Court on
that matter. Chavez cannot simply be regarded as an erroneous application of the questioned
Facts:
constitutional provision for it merely applies the clear mandate of the law, that is, Congress is entitled to
only one representative in the JBC in the same way that its co-equal branches are.
This Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed directly with this
Court by herein petitioner Rep. Reynaldo V. Umali, current Chair of the House of Representatives
As this Court declared in Chavez, Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is clear, categorical
Committee on Justice, impugns the present-day practice of six-month rotational representation of
and unambiguous. Thus, it needs no further construction or interpretation. Time and time again, it has
been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for it unfairly deprives both Houses of Congress of their full
there is no room for interpretation, only application.42 The wordings of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the participation in the said body. The aforementioned practice was adopted by the JBC in light of the ruling
1987 Constitution are to be considered as indicative of the final intent of its Framers, that is, for inChavez v. Judicial and Bar Council.
Congress as a whole to only have one representative to sit in the JBC. This Court, therefore, cannot
simply make an assumption that the Framers merely by oversight failed to take into account the Issue: Whether the petitioner has locus standi to file this Petition even without the requisite resolution
bicameral nature of Congress in drafting the same. As further laid down in Chavez, the Framers were not from both Houses of Congress permitting him to do so
keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC as it was not in the exercise
of its primary function, which is to legislate. Notably, the JBC was created to support the executive
Held:
power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative
function. No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the
exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII It is clear therefrom that each member of Congress has a legal standing to sue even without an enabling
of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is resolution for that purpose so long as the questioned acts invade the powers, prerogatives and privileges
constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its JBC representation.43 of Congress. Otherwise stated, whenever the acts affect the powers, prerogatives and privileges of
Congress, anyone of its members may validly bring an action to challenge the same to safeguard and
This Court cannot succumb to the argument that Congress, being composed of two distinct and separate maintain the sanctity thereof.With the foregoing, this Court sustains the petitioner's legal standing as
chambers, cannot represent each other in the JBC. Again, as this Court explained in Chavez, such an Member of the House of Representatives and as the Chairman of its Committee on Justice to assail the
argument is misplaced because in the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the alternate representation of Congress in the JBC, which arrangement led to the non-counting of his votes
House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016, as it allegedly affects adversely Congress'
constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity. To broaden the scope of congressional prerogative to be fully represented before the said body.
representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in
the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor
constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the
proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.44

EN BANC
G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA
VALLEY PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this Court via a Petition for
Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief1 under Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of
Court, respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Facts
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level
court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad,
Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed
the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date,
the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the
list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the
prejudicature examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that
his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include
his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance
for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their
current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a
year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge,
and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the constitutional
provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also
asserted that the requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 104 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 85575 should not be merely directory and should be fully implemented. He further alleged that
he has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress, since he has
already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of law.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution6 dated April 22, 2014, the JBC7 and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG)8separately submitted their Comments. Summing up the arguments of the JBC and the
51
OSG, they essentially stated that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the assailed policy does not
violate the equal protection and due process clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution
to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial function; (2) the remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner
has no clear legal right that needs to be protected; (3) the equal protection clause is not violated
because the classification of lower court judges who have served at least five years and those who have
served less than five years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4) there is no violation
of due process as the policy is merely internal in nature.
The Issue
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of
first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.
Ruling of the Court
Procedural Issues:
Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary to first determine whether or
not the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and declaratory relief commenced by the
petitioner was proper.
One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two special
civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by
Rule 65."9 As discussed in the case of Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino
III, etc., et al.,10 this Court explained that:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in
scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and
to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.11 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither
acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or
quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy
that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional
mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's power of
supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power of oversight,
or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the
rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials
see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or

redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the
act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.12
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC
complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then
the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and
ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules.
Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. The
petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated when he was not included in
the list of candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that his non-inclusion in the list of
candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to
the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required.13The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to the
performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform
the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a
ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a
course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would have the JBC do in his
favor. The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is
discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be included in the
list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for
appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the list
of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the list of the candidates depends on the
discretion of the JBC, thus:
The fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to
the Judiciary does not create an entitlement or expectation that his or her name be included in the list of
candidates for a judicial vacancy. By submitting an application or accepting a recommendation, one
submits to the authority of the JBC to subject the former to the search, screening, and selection process,
and to use its discretion in deciding whether or not one should be included in the list. Indeed, assuming
that if one has the legal right to be included in the list of candidates simply because he or she possesses
the constitutional and statutory qualifications, then the application process would then be reduced to a
mere mechanical function of the JBC; and the search, screening, and selection process would not only be
unnecessary, but also improper. However, this is clearly not the constitutional intent. One's inclusion in
the list of candidates is subject to the discretion of the JBC over the selection of nominees for a
particular judicial post. Such candidate's inclusion is not, therefore, a legally demandable right, but
simply a privilege the conferment of which is subject to the JBC's sound discretion.
Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional appointment, that is, a promotion from a first-
level court to a second level court. There is no law, however, that grants him the right to a promotion
to second-level courts.15 (Emphasis in the original)
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by mandamus
inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC.
Three. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be filed by
a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this
52
remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the
judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder."16 "[T]he purpose of the action is to secure
an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,
contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its
alleged breach."17
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition
specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of
applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that
no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant
judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a
judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list of
candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner
cannot claim any right that could have been affected by the assailed policy.
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.18 The special
civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to
Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691.20
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded
judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event, even if the
Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should still be dismissed.
Substantive Issues
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary
and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by
the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is
imbued with public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench.
While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not
preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively
ensure its mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's principal
function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the
President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall
follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the
authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject
only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. The search
for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most
fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its
duties.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order to
promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had
to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimum
constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the
adoption of the five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and
incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.

Equal Protection
There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to screen applicants who cannot
be all accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who is best qualified
among the applicants, and not to discriminate against any particular individual or class.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws to
all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary."22 "The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by
law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid."23
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised its discretion in
accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of
proven competence, integrity, probity and independence.24"To ensure the fulfillment of these standards
in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices, among
others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best
for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of extending
judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or
disqualified."25
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees does not
constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs
number of years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of
years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by
experience, among other factors. The difference in treatment between lower court judges who have
served at least five years and those who have served less than five years, on the other hand, was
rationalized by JBC as follows:
Formulating policies which streamline the selection process falls squarely under the purview of the JBC.
No other constitutional body is bestowed with the mandate and competency to set criteria for applicants
that refer to the more general categories of probity, integrity and independence.
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court, which is five years
experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the
Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of
the stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of "proven
competence." In determining competence, the JBC considers, among other
qualifications, experience and performance.
Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been judges of first-level courts for five (5) years
are better qualified for promotion to second-level courts. It deems length of experience as a judge as
indicative of conversance with the law and court procedure. Five years is considered as a sufficient span
of time for one to acquire professional skills for the next level court, declog the dockets, put in place
improved procedures and an efficient case management system, adjust to the work environment, and
gain extensive experience in the judicial process.
53
A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of the integrity, probity, and independence of
judges seeking promotion. To merit JBC's nomination for their promotion, they must have had a "record
of, and reputation for, honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound
moral and ethical standards." Likewise, their decisions must be reflective of the soundness of their
judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of character.
Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy of promotion to the next level court, it
would be premature or difficult to assess their merit if they have had less than one year of service on the
bench.26 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only factor that determines the
selection of candidates for RTC judge to be appointed by the President. Persons with this qualification
are neither automatically selected nor do they automatically become nominees. The applicants are
chosen based on an array of factors and are evaluated based on their individual merits. Thus, it cannot
be said that the questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.
Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test. The foregoing
shows that substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year experience and
those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the classification enshrined in the
assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the
questioned policy does not infringe on the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable
classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants. Therefore, the said policy is
valid and constitutional.
Due Process
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural due process for lack of publication and
non-submission to the University of the Philippines Law Center Office of the National Administrative
Register (ONAR). The petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect all applying judges, thus, the said
policy should have been published.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because
the publication requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the
Executive branch of the government.27 Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the Supreme
Court,28 it is not covered by the publication requirements of the Administrative Code.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before
they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been published. As a general rule,
publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to
enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect. There are, however, several
exceptions to the requirement of publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.29
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and regulations exempted from
the publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall
determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it
would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process
involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the
Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence thereof that potential
applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to

prepare for and comply with them.
The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the Rules of the Judicial and Bar
Council, the JBC had put its criteria in writing and listed the guidelines in determining competence,
independence, integrity and probity. Section 1, Paragraph 1 of Rule 9 expressly provides that applicants
for the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, should, as a general rule, have at least five years of
experience as an RTC judge, thus:
RULE 9 - SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A VACANCY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
SANDIGANBAYAN
Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. - In addition
to the foregoing guidelines the Council should consider the following in evaluating the merits of
applicants for a vacancy in the Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan:
1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years of experience as a judge of Regional Trial Court,
except when he has in his favor outstanding credentials, as evidenced by, inter alia, impressive scholastic
or educational record and performance in the Bar examinations, excellent reputation for honesty,
integrity, probity and independence of mind; at least very satisfactory performance rating for three (3)
years preceding the filing of his application for nomination; and excellent potentials for appellate
judgeship.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have been duly published on the website
of the JBC and in a newspaper of general circulation suggests that the JBC is aware that these are not
mere internal rules, but are rules implementing the Constitution that should be published. Thus, if the
JBC were so-minded to add special guidelines for determining competence of applicants for RTC judges,
then it could and should have amended its rules and published the same. This, the JBC did not do as JBC-
009 and its amendatory rule do not have special guidelines for applicants to the RTC.
Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published. Thus, by
analogy, publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks to implement a
constitutional provision requiring proven competence from members of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the petitioner's private
interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of
nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for
appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the list
of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the
JBC.30
As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the completion of the prejudicature program
as a requirement for appointment or promotion in the judiciary under R.A. No. 8557, this ground of the
petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded. Clearly, it cannot be said that JBC unlawfully neglects
the performance of a duty enjoined by law.
Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the assailed policy violates the constitutional
provision under social justice and human rights for equal opportunity of employment. The OSG
explained:
[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of employment opportunities. The constitutional
provision does not call for appointment to the Judiciary of all who might, for any number of reasons,
54
wish to apply. As with all professions, it is regulated by the State. The office of a judge is no ordinary
office. It is imbued with public interest and is central in the administration of justice x x x. Applicants who
meet the constitutional and legal qualifications must vie and withstand the competition and rigorous
screening and selection process. They must submit themselves to the selection criteria, processes and
discretion of respondent JBC, which has the constitutional mandate of screening and selecting
candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President. So long as a fair opportunity
is available for all applicants who are evaluated on the basis of their individual merits and abilities, the
questioned policy cannot be struck down as unconstitutional.31 (Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not established a clear legal right to justify the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. The petitioner has merely filed an application with the JBC for the
position of RTC judge, and he has no clear legal right to be nominated for that office nor to be selected
and included in the list to be submitted to the President which is subject to the discretion of the JBC. The
JBC has the power to determine who shall be recommended to the judicial post. To be included in the list
of applicants is a privilege as one can only be chosen under existing criteria imposed by the JBC itself. As
such, prospective applicants, including the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to take part in
it if they fail to meet these criteria. Hence, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of an
injunctive writ is not justified.
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and selecting applicants
relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the authority to determine how best
to perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC issues various policies setting
forth the guidelines to be observed in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines
in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its discretion is freed
from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is shielded from any outside
pressure and improper influence. Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those judges with five years
of experience was an exercise of discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants, however, should have
been informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they could properly prepare for and
comply with them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain
from interfering with the exercise of JBC's powers, and will respect the initiative and independence
inherent in the latter.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court, however, DIRECTS that the
Judicial and Bar Council comply with the publication requirement of (1) the assailed policy requiring five
years of experience as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to the Regional
Trial Court, and (2) other special guidelines that the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be implementing.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS :
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level
court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad,
Agusan Del Sur In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and
Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said
stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration
of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did
not pass the prejudicature examination. The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer,
through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC
en banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the
JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others,
 55

incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the
petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the
petitioner to take recourse to this Court
ISSUE : WON the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its
principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is
not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function
HELD :
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.18 The special
civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to
Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded
judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event, even if the
Court will set aside procedural infirmities

The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two special civil
actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither
acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or
quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy
that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional
mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.

Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's power of
supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power of oversight,
or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.

Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC
complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then
the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and
ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules

The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. It is essential to
the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The
remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial
duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act
are mutually exclusive. Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly
compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC

The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a
person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this
remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the
judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder."

In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition
specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of
applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that
no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant
judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a
judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person

EN BANC
RE: PETITION FOR A.M. No. 08-2-01-0
RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICEbINSURANCE SYSTEM FROM
PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
Promulgated: February 11, 2010
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
May the legislature exempt the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from legal fees imposed by
the Court on government-owned and controlled corporations and local government units? This is the
central issue in this administrative matter.
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-owned or controlled
corporations under Section 22,[1] Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The said provision states:
SEC. 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are
exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local government corporations and
government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charter are not exempt
from paying such fees.
However, all court actions, criminal or civil, instituted at the instance of the provincial, city or municipal
treasurer or assessor under Sec. 280 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall be exempt from the
payment of court and sheriffs fees. (emphasis supplied)
The GSIS anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RA[2] 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997):
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State
that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times and
that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in
order not to burden the members of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to
impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the
benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues
including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges
or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any
assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all
laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this
provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and
effect.
Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws to the contrary unless this section
is expressly, specifically and categorically revoked or repealed by law and a provision is enacted to
substitute or replace the exemption referred to herein as an essential factor to maintain and protect the
56
solvency of the fund, notwithstanding and independently of the guaranty of the national government to
secure such solvency or liability.
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution,
levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including
Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including
his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his
official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work except when
his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favour of the GSIS. (emphasis supplied)
The GSIS then avers that courts still assess and collect legal fees in actions and proceedings instituted by
the GSIS notwithstanding its exemption from taxes, assessments, fees, charges, or duties of all kinds
under Section 39. For this reason, the GSIS urges this Court to recognize its exemption from payment of
legal fees.
According to the GSIS, the purpose of its exemption is to preserve and maintain the actuarial solvency of
its funds and to keep the contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits provided by RA 8291 as low
as possible. Like the terms taxes, assessments, charges, and duties, the term fees is used in the law in its
generic and ordinary sense as any form of government imposition. The word fees, defined as charge[s]
fixed by law for services of public officers or for the use of a privilege under control of government, is
qualified by the phrase of all kinds.[3] Hence, it includes the legal fees prescribed by this Court under
Rule 141. Moreover, no distinction should be made based on the kind of fees imposed on the GSIS or the
GSIS ability to pay because the law itself does not distinguish based on those matters.
The GSIS argues that its exemption from the payment of legal fees would not mean that RA 8291 is
superior to the Rules of Court. It would merely show deference by the Court to the legislature as a co-
equal branch.[4] This deference will recognize the compelling and overriding State interest in the
preservation of the actuarial solvency of the GSIS for the benefit of its members.[5]
The GSIS further contends that the right of government workers to social security is an aspect of social
justice. The right to social security is also guaranteed under Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The
Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, including the right to social security, but the GSIS is not compelling the Court to promulgate such
rules. The GSIS is merely asking the Court to recognize and allow the exercise of the right of the GSIS to
seek relief from the courts of justice sans payment of legal fees.[6]
Required to comment on the GSIS petition,[7] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the
petition should be denied.[8] According to the OSG, the issue of the GSIS exemption from legal fees has
been resolved by the issuance by then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.[9] of OCA[10]
Circular No. 93-2004:

TO : ALL JUDGES, CLERKS OF COURT AND COURT PERSONNEL OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS,
SHARIA CIRCUIT COURTS
SUBJECT : REMINDER ON THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 3-98 (Re:
Payment of Docket and Filing Fees in Extra-Judicial Foreclosure); SECTION 21, RULE 141 OF THE RULES OF
COURT; SECTION 3 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 385; and ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 07-99 (Re:
Exercise of Utmost Caution, Prudence, and Judiciousness in Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders
and Writs of Preliminary Injunctions)
Pursuant to the Resolution of the Third Division of the Supreme Court dated 05 April 2004 and to give
notice to the concern raised by the [GSIS] to expedite extrajudicial foreclosure cases filed in court, we
wish to remind all concerned [of] the pertinent provisions of Administrative Circular No. 3-98, to wit:
2. No written request/petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, real or chattel, shall be acted
upon by the Clerk of Court, as Ex-Officio Sheriff, without the corresponding filing fee having been paid
and the receipt thereof attached to the request/petition as provided for in Sec. 7(c), of Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court.
3. No certificate of sale shall be issued in favor of the highest bidder until all fees provided for in the
aforementioned sections and paragraph 3 of Section 9 (I) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court shall have
been paid. The sheriff shall attach to the records of the case a certified copy of the Official Receipt [O.R.]
of the payment of the fees and shall note the O.R. number in the duplicate of the Certificate of Sale
attached to the records of the case.
Moreover, to settle any queries as to the status of exemption from payment of docket and legal fees of
government entities, Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides:
SEC. 21. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are
exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local governments and government-owned or
controlled corporations with or without independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.[11]
The OSG contends that there is nothing in Section 39 of RA 8291 that exempts the GSIS from fees
imposed by the Court in connection with judicial proceedings. The exemption of the GSIS from taxes,
assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds is necessarily confined to those that do not involve
pleading, practice and procedure. Rule 141 has been promulgated by the Court pursuant to its exclusive
rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Thus, it may not be amended or
repealed by Congress.
On this Courts order,[12] the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and
recommendation[13] on the petition of the GSIS and the comment of the OSG thereon. According to the
OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis. Read in its
proper and full context, Section 39 intends to preserve the actuarial solvency of GSIS funds by exempting
the GSIS from government impositions through taxes. Legal fees imposed under Rule 141 are not taxes.
57
The OCAT further posits that the GSIS could not have been exempted by Congress from the payment of
legal fees. Otherwise, Congress would have encroached on the rule-making power of this Court.
According to the OCAT, this is the second time that the GSIS is seeking exemption from paying legal
fees.[14] The OCAT also points out that there are other government-owned or controlled corporations
and local government units which asked for exemption from paying legal fees citing provisions in their
respective charters that are similar to Section 39 of RA 8291.[15] Thus, the OCAT recommends that the
petition of GSIS be denied and the issue be settled once and for all for the guidance of the concerned
parties.
Faced with the differing opinions of the GSIS, the OSG and the OCAT, we now proceed to probe into the
heart of this matter: may Congress exempt the GSIS from the payment of legal fees? No.
The GSIS urges the Court to show deference to Congress by recognizing the exemption of the GSIS under
Section 39 of RA 8291 from legal fees imposed under Rule 141. Effectively, the GSIS wants this Court to
recognize a power of Congress to repeal, amend or modify a rule of procedure promulgated by the
Court. However, the Constitution and jurisprudence do not sanction such view.
Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court was promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-
making powers under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts is a traditional
power of this Court.[16] It necessarily includes the power to address all questions arising from or
connected to the implementation of the said rules.
The Rules of Court was promulgated in the exercise of the Courts rule-making power. It is essentially
procedural in nature as it does not create, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Corollarily,
Rule 141 is basically procedural. It does not create or take away a right but simply operates as a means to
implement an existing right. In particular, it functions to regulate the procedure of exercising a right of
action and enforcing a cause of action.[17] In particular, it pertains to the procedural requirement of
paying the prescribed legal fees in the filing of a pleading or any application that initiates an action or
proceeding.[18]
Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of
the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of
the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in
courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement.[19] It is not simply the

filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the prescribed docket fee
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action.[20] Appellate
docket and other lawful fees are required to be paid within the same period for taking an appeal.[21]
Payment of docket fees in full within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an
appeal.[22] Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.[23]
An interesting aspect of legal fees is that which relates to indigent or pauper litigants. In proper cases,
courts may waive the collection of legal fees. This, the Court has allowed in Section 21, Rule 3 and
Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court in recognition of the right of access to justice by the poor
under Section 11, Article III of the Constitution.[24] Mindful that the rule with respect to indigent
litigants should not be ironclad as it touches on the right of access to justice by the poor,[25] the Court
acknowledged the exemption from legal fees of indigent clients of the Public Attorneys Office under
Section 16-D of the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended by RA 9406.[26] This was not an abdication
by the Court of its rule-making power but simply a recognition of the limits of that power. In particular, it
reflected a keen awareness that, in the exercise of its rule-making power, the Court may not dilute or
defeat the right of access to justice of indigent litigants.
The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government employees in support of
its petition. It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of its individual
members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely
and are not shared by its members. Its capacity to sue and bring actions under Section 41(g) of RA 8291,
the specific power which involves the exemption that it claims in this case, pertains to it and not to its
members. Indeed, even the GSIS acknowledges that, in claiming exemption from the payment of legal
fees, it is not asking that rules be made to enforce the right to social security of its members but that the
Court recognize the alleged right of the GSIS to seek relief from the courts of justice sans payment of
legal fees.[27]
However, the alleged right of the GSIS does not exist. The payment of legal fees does not take away the
capacity of the GSIS to sue. It simply operates as a means by which that capacity may be implemented.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one
of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, much less with the Executive.[28]
Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of
the rule-making power of this Court and highlighted its evolution and development in Echegaray v.
Secretary of Justice:[29]
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to
the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
58
Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on
pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court,
subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan,
Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the
practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of
70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations.
This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the
aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke
these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments
would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist
further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling,
this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973
Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary
by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive.
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within
the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or
issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this
Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of
legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without
transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Courts independence fiscal
autonomy.[30] Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and
collect fees,[31] including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components,
the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF).[32] The
laws which established the JDF and the SAJF[33] expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to
guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.[34]
Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Courts financial resources but also
comprise an essential element of the Courts fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of
legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government
units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm
for it impairs the Courts guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.
WHEREFORE, the petition of the Government Service Insurance System for recognition of its exemption
from the payment of legal fees imposed under Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court on
government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units is hereby DENIED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to promptly issue a circular to inform all courts
in the Philippines of the import of this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
59
Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment
of Legal Fees 612 SCRA 193, February 11, 2010 TOPIC: COURTS; LEGAL FEES|FISCAL INDEPENDENCE OF
THE JUDICIARY
Facts:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-owned or controlled
corporations under Section 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The said provision states:
SEC. 22. Government exempt.
The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees
provided in this Rule. Local government corporations and government-owned or controlled corporations
with or without independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees. However, all court actions,
criminal or civil, instituted at the instance of the provincial, city or municipal treasurer or assessor under
Sec. 280 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall be exempt from the payment of court and sheriff's
fees. (emphasis supplied) The GSIS anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS
Act of 1997): SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall
be preserved and maintained at all times and that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits
under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the members of the GSIS and their
employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the
contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to
the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt
from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless
expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are
hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or
jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded
and rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect. Moreover, these exemptions shall not be
affected by subsequent laws to the contrary unless this section is expressly, specifically and categorically
revoked or repealed by law and a provision is enacted to substitute or replace the exemption referred to
herein as an essential factor to maintain and protect the solvency of the fund, notwithstanding and
independently of the guaranty of the national government to secure such solvency or liability. The funds
and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the
benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other
processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on
Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary
accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official
functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work except when his
monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favour of the GSIS. (emphasis supplied)
The GSIS then avers that courts still assess and collect legal fees in actions and proceedings instituted by
the GSIS notwithstanding its exemption from taxes, assessments, fees, charges, or duties of all kinds
under Section 39. For this reason, the GSIS urges this Court to recognize its exemption from payment of
legal fees.
 60

Political Law 2 Political Law 3

The GSIS argues that its exemption from the payment of legal fees would not mean that RA 8291 is
superior to the Rules of Court. It would merely show "deference" by the Court to the legislature as a co-
equal branch. 4 This deference will recognize the "compelling and overriding" State interest in the
preservation of the actuarial solvency of the GSIS for the benefit of its members. The GSIS further
contends that the right of government workers to social security is an aspect of social justice. The right
to social security is also guaranteed under Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Court has the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, including the
right to social security, but the GSIS is not compelling the Court to promulgate such rules. The GSIS is
merely asking the Court to recognize and allow the exercise of the right of the GSIS "to seek relief from
the courts of justice sans payment of legal fees."
Issue: May the legislature exempt the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from legal fees
imposed by the Court on government-owned and controlled corporations and local government units?
the right to social security of its members but that the Court recognize the alleged right of the GSIS "to
seek relief from the courts of justice sans payment of legal fees." Congress could not have carved out an
exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important
institutional safeguard of the Court's independence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the
power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal
fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special
Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expressly
declare the identical purpose of these funds to "guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as
mandated by the Constitution and public policy." Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital
source of the Court's financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Court's fiscal
independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-
owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the
SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court's guaranteed fiscal
autonomy and erodes its independence.

Held:

No. The payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules
promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the
Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts.
Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement. It is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Appellate docket and other
lawful fees are required to be paid within the same period for taking an appeal. Payment of docket fees
in full within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment,
the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision
sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. An interesting aspect of legal fees is that
which relates to indigent or pauper litigants. In proper cases, courts may waive the collection of legal
fees. This, the Court has allowed in Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court in
recognition of the right of access to justice by the poor under Section 11, Article III of the Constitution.
Mindful that the rule with respect to indigent litigants should not be ironclad as it touches on the right of
access to justice by the poor, the Court acknowledged the exemption from legal fees of indigent clients
of the Public Attorney's Office under Section 16-D of the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended by RA
9406. This was not an abdication by the Court of its rule-making power but simply a recognition of the
limits of that power. In particular, it reflected a keen awareness that, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, the Court may not dilute or defeat the right of access to justice of indigent litigants. The GSIS
cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government employees in support of its petition.
It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of its individual members.
The rights of its members are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely and are
not shared by its members. Its capacity to sue and bring actions under Section 41 (g) of RA 8291, the
specific power which involves the exemption that it claims in this case, pertains to it and not to its
members. Indeed, even the GSIS acknowledges that, in claiming exemption from the payment of legal
fees, it is not asking that rules be made to enforce

RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GSIS FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES.
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0
February 11, 2010
FACTS:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs under Sec 22, Rule 141
(Legal Fees) of the ROC. The said provision states:
SEC. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are
exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local government corporations and
government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charter are not exempt
from paying such fees. xx
The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997):
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State
that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times and
that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in
order not to burden the members of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to
impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the
benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues
including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges
or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any
assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all
laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this
provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and
effect.
Required to comment on the GSIS’ petition, the OSG maintains that the petition should be denied. On
this Court’s order, the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation on
the petition of the GSIS and the comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the claim of the
GSIS for exemption from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis.
ISSUE: May the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on GOCCs and local
government units?
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition of the GSIS for recognition of its exemption from the payment of legal fees
imposed under Sec 22 of Rule 141 of the ROC on GOCCs and LGUs is hereby DENIED .
NO
Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the ROC was promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making
powers under Sec 5(5), Art VIII of the Constitution:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged.
xxxxxxxx
61
Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the ROC is an integral part of the rules
promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts.
Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one
of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, much less with the Executive.
NOTES:
The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government employees in support of
its petition. It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of its individual
members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely
and are not shared by its members.
-Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without
transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence — fiscal
autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect
fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which
established the JDF and the SAJF[33] expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to
“guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.” Legal
fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise
an essential element of the Court’s fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees
granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will
necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it
impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.
Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of
the rule-making power of this Court and highlighted its evolution and development in Echegaray v.
Secretary of Justice:
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to
the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on
pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court,
subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan,
Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the
 62

practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of
70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations.
This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that “x x x
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment – a judgment promulgated by this Court during the
aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke
these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments
would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question.” The venerable jurist
further ruled: “It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.” By its ruling,
this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to “repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973
Constitution reiterated the power of this Court “to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa x x x.” More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary
by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 226679 | August 15, 2017
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic
Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the
imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess
or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and custody, one
(1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of
white crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2
thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion
for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress'
prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or
63
Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into
plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.]
9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining,
[it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi
City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining,
encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the
Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that
breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because
it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining
as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law, R.A. No.
9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of
illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed
rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as
held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this
case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to
serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for the
declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed
the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the
Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever warranted,
constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower
courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions. Upon which
admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given
the potential ramifications that such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases
pending before this judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order9 dated July 26, 2016; hence,
this petition raising the issues as follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL
VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON
THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO
DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the
petition should be dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the
Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a petition
for declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG
argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal
standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no actual case or controversy; and (3) the
constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without
much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the
rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties'
arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural
flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk
from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching
implications.11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial
and transcendental importance are present.12 We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on
illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions,13 and that its
disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes,
and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens.14 At the same time, We have
equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as
urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the accused as mandated by the
Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly
accused and convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country and
its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort
to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users.16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters should not
deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for
enlightenment and guidance.17 When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural
rules in order to resolve a constitutional issue.18
64
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a
necessary complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed
the rationale for this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court
reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling
as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and
again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override
substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no
longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's
rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was
granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani
Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the
maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this
power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to
be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on

pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court,
subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re:
Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission
to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the
average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar
examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno
held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this
Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this
Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of
these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question."
The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for
the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the
license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973
Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary
by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. "
65
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive. x x x.22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by
constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs
exclusively to this Court.Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making
authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing
scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions
by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the
Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and
more independent judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the Framers debated
on whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial
suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules
with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S.
Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word "[under]privileged," place a
comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a
compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner
Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said
rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino
agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any
form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was
that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within
the sole province of this Court.25 The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or
issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the
Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress,
in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative
disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of
the Rulesinstead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The Cooperative Code
provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; 29 Baguio Market
Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re: Exemption of
the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon.
Mangotara, et al. 32 - Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt
from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No.
6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is
unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive
branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice,
and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when the
1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and of the fiscal,
may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was retained under Rule
118 (Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the
provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended party and the
fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it
is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial
court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during pre-trial. Section
2, Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
66
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained, Section 2,
Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this
plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was
substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other matters36 that will
promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases
cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional
Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be
allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of
the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan,Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a
shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense;
and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.
(Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the
latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are
procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive.
In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another. It is admitted that
what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however,
an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own
procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule
takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it
may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right
then the rule deals merely with procedure.41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. For
example, in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a
special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an
essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the
right of the State to prosecute the accused.43Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two
years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused
and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression,
unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing
the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and
speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into
account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed
that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be
respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a
denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
67
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the
Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to
due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of
provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly,
either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the
public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to
causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the
lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the
mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor,
especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the
hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the
State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may
have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof
of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The
longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to
prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a
criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not
derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy
and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of community
suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with
the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the
passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the
fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the
accused only.44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which
provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall
lose the remedies available against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely
provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to
avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause
on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail
themselves of the remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the
substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to
"provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This provision
protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple

expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases in all courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing
criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an "important,"
"essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of justice.48 Some of its
salutary effects include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and
limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin
immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages -
the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the
objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are
conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there
is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most
criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement
for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who
are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time
between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty
when they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he
gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing
whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce
resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are
at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71
[1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."49 There is
give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.51 Properly administered, plea
bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality -
can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right
nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's
case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and
accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a
"serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the
68
witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not
to be compelled to be a witness against himself.55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56 Under
the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on
the consent of the offended party57and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of
guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.58 The reason for this is that
the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.59
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial
deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to assessing the
strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and intangible factors,
such as government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the
scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every
serious criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the
courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to examine the decision whether
to prosecute. "60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to
plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The
word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to
make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than
that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the
convenience of the accused.62
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial
court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion"
is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates
the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.65
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.66 The only basis on which the prosecutor
and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing
more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment
whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end
that the interests of justice and of the public will be served.67 The ruling on the motion must disclose the
strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence
on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.69
On whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates the equal protection clause
 69

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the
Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether
or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to
declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of
the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165
is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
1.
TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court, equal protection clause
2.
PONENTE: Peralta
3.
FACTS:
Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.
4.
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in
view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession.
Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of said law
violates:
The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now
Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in
the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative
disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules
instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. – The Cooperative Code
provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market
Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption
of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon.
Mangotara, et al. – Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt
from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770,
which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it
contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive
branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice,
and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED
2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution;
and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government. The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the
Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.
ISSUES:

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version
1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of the thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug
Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure. cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative of the Constitutional right to issued for the purpose.
equal protection of the law.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:

HELD:

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

FIRST ISSUE: YES
 70

Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
nature. prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor
and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
more and nothing less than the evidence on record. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
or weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand,
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If
the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. By
the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of
disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an
“important,” “essential,” “highly desirable,” and “legitimate” component of the administration of justice.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.” There is
give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessionsto avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea
bargaining is to be encouragedbecause the chief virtues of the system – speed, economy, and finality –
can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right
nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under
the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on
the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of
guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that
the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of discretion should not
amount to a grave abuse thereof.