Arc Flash Analysis: Investigation, Simulation and

Sensitive Parameter Exploration

Saeed Mohajeryami, Mahmoodreza Arefi, Zia Salami, IEEE senior member
Energy Production and Infrastructure Center (EPIC)
Electrical and Computer Engineering Department
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Charlotte, NC, USA
Email: {smohajer, marefi, zsalami}@uncc.edu

Abstract—This paper conducts an investigation on the sen-
sitivity of incident energy to critical arc flash parameters. In
order to perform such task, the authors explore the causes of
arc flash by presenting the underlying concepts associated with
short-circuit fault analysis, and use these concepts to model and
simulate arc flash scenarios by employing IEEE 1584 standard.
An electrical system representative of a small industrial plant
is modeled and simulated using ETAP software. Then, arc flash
analyses are performed on the system and the effect of incident
energy on various parameters is presented and discussed. The
results of this work could inform field personnel of the concepts
and sensitive parameters associated with arc flash analyses with
the intention of allowing them to quickly and safely recognize
methods for incident energy mitigation.
Index Terms—Arc flash; sensitivity analysis; incident energy
reduction, fault clearing time, ETAP
I. I NTRODUCTION
Electrical workers are exposed to arc flash hazards that re-
quire equipment be de-energized during maintenance periods.
This contributes to a significant loss of system functionality
resulting in costly outages. Industry standards and health and
safety regulations require the implementation of arc flash
analyses on electrical equipment; however, the standards are
often equivocal in terminology and difficult to determine when
to appropriately apply. Arc flash analyses require the use of
various parameters combined in complex calculations. These
exhaustive procedures make it nearly impossible to perform
an accurate arc flash assessment in the field. Qualified field
personnel need to understand the contributing factors of an arc
flash and available retrofit methods for reducing the associated
incident energy.
An arc flash is a rapid release of energy due to an arcing
fault caused by a short-circuit between two energized conduc-
tors. The electrical arc that occurs between these energized
conductors is, with exception to the laser, the hottest known
substance on earth. The arc can reach temperatures up to and
beyond 20,000 K, which is approximately four times as hot as
the sun’s surface [1] . During an arc flash, injuries might hap-
pen from inhaled gases, blinding light, flying shrapnel, shock
waves and thermal radiation [2]. Besides, the arc flash could
cause severe damages to equipment by releasing substantial
amount of undesirable energy. Consequently, it is critical to
study this phenomenon to avoid the aforementioned problems.
Lee, who is widely considered the pioneer of electrical
arc flash, in his seminal work [1], quantified the potential
burn hazards and educated personnel about the safety im-
plications. Two more notable works following [1], which
provided significant conclusions involving arcing faults were
[3] and [4]. The authors in [3] determined the incident energy
at various distances from an arcing fault, which was the
first discussion on the directional effect of an arc within an
enclosure. Also, in [4], the authors defined incident energy in
regards to the fault duty and explored the variables required to
obtain this measurable value. It is from this work that much
of the 2000 Edition of the National Fire Protection Agency
(NFPA) entitled ”Standard for Electrical Safety Requirements
for Employee Workplaces,” which is considered as one of the
primary governing industry standards for arc flash safety, was
developed. These papers, also, provided the foundation for
further research that resulted in the development of another
primary governing industry standard IEEE Standard 1584-
2002, entitled ”IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard
Calculations” [5]. This standard, which is employed in this
paper, focuses on calculation methods for determining arc fault
currents, arc flash hazard marking, arc in enclosures and arc
in open air, and provides for selection of personal protective
equipment.
In general, arc-flash studies could be classified into four
groups: understanding of arc-flash hazards [6], [7], arc-flash
calculations [8], personnel and equipment protection [9], [10]
and reduction of incident energy [11], [12].
According to these categories, a major concern is how
to decrease the amount of incident energy and bring it to
an acceptable level. Therefore, it is crucial to study the
relationship between incident energy and system parameters.
Although several researches have been carried out to conduct
such study, these works fail to address the incident energy’s
sensitivity to adjusted parameters.
This paper; therefore, attempts to determine the sensitivity
of incident energy to critical arc flash parameters. In order to
perform such task, the authors explore the causes of arc flash
by presenting the underlying concepts associated with short-
circuit fault analysis, and use these concepts to model and
simulate an arc flash scenario, representative of the potential
danger in a power plant.
 The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II
presents a model for calculation of arcing current and incident
energy. Then, in section III, an electrical system representative
of a small industrial plant is modeled and simulated using
ETAP software. Afterwards, in section IV, several sensitive
arc flash parameters are defined, modeled and examined, and
the results are provided. Section V closes the paper by drawing
conclusions.
II. E MPRICALLY DERIVED MODEL FOR ARCING CURRENT
AND INCIDENT ENERGY CALCULATIONS
In IEEE’s 1584-2002 standard, an empirically derived
model for determining arcing current and incident energy is
introduced. According to the standard, the model is intended
for applications where faults will escalate to three-phase [8].
In order to calculate the incident energy released by arc
flash, it is necessary to compute three-phase arcing current.
For system with voltages under 1000 V, (1) is used to calculate
the arcing current.
log(Ia ) = K + 0.662 log(Ibf ) + 0.0966V + 0.000526G
(1)
+0.5588V (log(Ibf )) − 0.00304(log(Ibf ))
Where:
Ia is the arcing current (kA);
K is -0.153 for open conurations (no enclosure) and
is -0.097 for box configurations (enclosed
equipment);
I bf is the bolted fault current for three-phase faults (kA);
V is the system voltage (kV);
G is the gap between conductors (mm).
However, for system with voltages of 1000 V and higher,
there is no distinction between open and box configurations
and (2) is used to calculate the arcing current.
Converting from normalized energy provides the following
t 610x
E = 4.184Cf En ( )( ) (4)
0.2 Dx
Where:
E is the incident energy (J/cm2 );
Cf is the calculation factor of 1.0 for voltages above 1kV
and is 1.5 for voltages at or below 1 kV;
t is the arcing time (seconds);
x is the distance exponent;
D is the distance from the possible arc point
to the person (mm).
III. I MPLEMENTATION
A. Modeling
To account for various industry configurations, a system that
include a wide range of characteristics is modeled in ETAP
software. The system is supplied by the utility through a 23 kV
transmission system. The maximum and minimum available
short-circuit current supplied by the utility is defined as 12.5
kA and 7.4 kA, respectively, with an X/R ratio of 6.2 and 5.33,
respectively. The system is fed through a delta-wye 250 MVA
step-down transformer supplying a 4.16 kV switchgear. The
switchgear bus (SWGR) feeds a 600 V Motor Control Center
(MCC) through a delta-wye, 1000 kVA transformer, which
in turn supplies a 208 V distribution power panel through a
delta-wye, 500 kVA transformer. The single-line diagram of
the system is shown in Fig.1.

log(Ia ) = 0.00402 + 0.983 log(Ibf ) (2)

For both voltage cases, it is required to calculate a second

arcing current that is equal to 85% of the first arc duration.
Variations in the arcing current and the required time for the
upstream overcurrent device to open, are accounted for by this
second arc duration. The incident energy is then calculated
using both arc durations; the higher energy of the two is used.
Once the arcing current is determined, the incident energy
could be found by (3).

log(En ) = K1 + K2 + 1.081log(Ia ) + 0.0011G (3)

Where:
En is the arcing current (kA);
K1 is -0.792 for open configurations (no enclosure) and
is -0.555 for box configurations (enclosed
equipment);
K2 is 0 for open configurations (no enclosure) and
is -0.113 for box configurations (enclosed
equipment);
G is the gap between conductors (mm). Fig. 1: Single line diagram of the test system
B. Simulation
The test system is modeled with system parameters accord-
ing to IEEE 1584 and short-circuit simulation is performed
for the maximum and minimum available short-circuit values
from the utility. Using the bolted fault current (IBF) values, the
arcing current (IA) and incident energy (E) were determined.
The results are provided in Table I and II for maximum and
minimum utility Short-Circuit Current, respectively.
It is worth mentioning that in the arc flash analysis, Up-
stream Over Current Protection Devices (OCPD) that did not
clear the arcing current in less than two seconds (120 cycles)
were manually fixed to two seconds in accordance with IEEE
1584.
IV. R ESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, one at a time, incident energy parameters are
adjusted and an arc flash analysis is performed while holding
all other contributing factors constant. The parameter sensitiv-
ity is determined by comparing the resulting incident energy
values to those of the base case. By isolating incident energy
parameters, it is possible to determine the most significant
factors in reducing the potential hazard of work performed
on energized electrical equipment. In this paper, the following
four contributing arc flash parameters are investigated.
• The distance (in inches) from an electrical component to
the worker performing work (D);
• The gap between conductors (in mm) of the electrical
equipment where an arc can occur (G);
• The time (in seconds) required to clear the arcing current
(t);
• The available short-circuit current (in kA) provided by
the utility(isc).
To gain a consistent comparison of sensitivity, each param-
eter’s base value is adjusted by the same ratio: one-fourth,
one-half, twice, quadruple, and octuplet. In the following
subsections the sensitivity of incident energy to four critical
arc flash parameters is examined and the results are provided.
A. Incident energy vs. distance from energized equipment
At each bus, the base distance from a worker to a live
part, 36 inches for the SWGR and 18 inches for all other
buses, is adjusted and simulated. With all other parameters
held constant, the resulting incident energy for variations in
the working distance at each bus is provided in Table III.
Moreover, for illustration purpose, the results at bus 7 and
the SWGR are shown in Fig. 2.
As the distance from an exposed electrical part to a worker
grew smaller, the incident energy drastically increased; as
the distance grew larger, the incident energy decreased. This
showed an inverse relationship between incident energy and
distance. The incident energy at the varying distance parame-
ters for the entire system is shown in Table III.

TABLE I: SIMULATED SHORT-CIRCUIT BOLTED FAULT CURRENT,

ARCING CURRENT AND INCIDENT ENERGY FOR MAXIMUM
UTILITY SHORT-CIRCUIT CURRENT
Ibf Simulated IA Simulated E Simulated
Bus
(kA) (kA) (cal/cm2 )
SWGR 41.54 39.349 0.495
Bus 3 41.19 38.102 1.011
Bus 4 31.09 29.604 0.772
Bus 5 15.65 12.937 94.387
MCC 14.46 11.04 73.909
Bus 7 14.10 11.706 0.995
Bus 8 14.19 11.663 0.992
Bus 9 13.44 11.778 1.002
Bus 10 13.40 11.18 0.95
PWR PNL 6.10 3.19 18.83 Fig. 2: Incident energy vs. distance from energized equipment at bus 7 and
Bus 13 2.03 1.43 0.07 the SWGR

TABLE II: SIMULATED SHORT-CIRCUIT BOLTED FAULT CURRENT, TABLE III: SIMULATED BUS INCIDENT ENERGY VALUES AT
ARCING CURRENT AND INCIDENT ENERGY FOR MINIMUM VARYING DISTANCES FROM ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
UTILITY SHORT-CIRCUIT CURRENT
Ibf Simulated IA Simulated E Simulated Incident Energy (cal/cm2 )
Bus 1 1
(kA) (kA) (cal/cm2 ) Bus ID 4
Base 2
Base Base 2 Base 4 Base 8 Base
SWGR 29.627 28.229 0.348 SWGR 1.9 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1
Bus 3 28.976 27.619 0.714 Bus 3 16.2 4.0 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.0
Bus 4 24.13 23.072 0.589 Bus 4 12.3 3.1 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.0
Bus 5 15.304 12.664 92.234 Bus 5 1510.2 377.5 94.4 23.6 5.9 1.5
MCC 14.166 10.833 72.409 MCC 718.9 230.5 73.9 23.7 7.6 2.4
Bus 7 13.817 11.483 0.975 Bus 7 15.9 4.0 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.0
Bus 8 13.767 11.443 0.971 Bus 8 15.9 4.0 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.0
Bus 9 13.905 11.552 0.981 Bus 9 16.0 4.0 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.0
Bus 10 12.564 10.483 0.93 Bus 10 15.2 3.8 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.0
PWR PNL 5.966 3.157 18.79 PWR PNL 183.1 58.7 18.8 6.0 1.9 0.6
Bus 13 2.057 1.45 0.07 Bus 13 1.1 0.3 0.067 0.3 0.0 0.0
B. Incident energy vs. gap between conductor width
The base case gap width between phase conductors is
102 mm at the SWGR bus, 25 mm at the MCC bus, 15
mm at the PWR PNL bus and 13 mm at all other buses.
These values are adjusted by the particular ratios and the
resultant incident energy at each bus is presented in Table
IV. Besides, for illustration purpose, the results at bus 7 and
the SWGR are shown in Fig. 3. Fig. 3 shows the variance
in incident energy at the SWGR and Bus 7 by increasing the
gap between conductors; however, it is very unlikely that a
conductor gap’s value would range between 200 800 mm
(2*Base G, 4*Base G and 8*Base G for base gap of 102 mm
at the SWGR). Additionally, it should be noted that several of
the ranges tested are outside of those recommended by IEEE
1584 ”Equipment and Voltage Class Factors” [8], implying
that IEEE 1584’s empirical model can no longer be used to
accurately determine arc flash results.
The relationship of incident energy and the gap between
conductors is not consistent for all buses. As a matter of
fact, for the SWGR bus, Bus 3, Bus 4 and Bus 13, the
incident energy has a direct relationship with the gap width;
as the gap increased or decreased, the incident energy reacts
similarly. However, for all other buses, the incident energy has
an inverse relationship with the gap width; as the gap increased
or decreased, the incident energy reacts inversely.
Furthermore, it is determined that for bus voltage levels
above 1 kV the incident energy has a direct relationship to
the gap width; nevertheless, for voltages below 1 kV the
incident energy has an inverse relationship to the gap width.
The exception to this is the 208 V Bus 13, whose incident
energy has a direct relationship to the gap width despite its
voltage level below 1 kV.
C. Incident energy vs. fault clearing time
The upstream Fault Clearing Time (FCT) of OCPD for each
bus is adjusted from the base case. The type of Protective
Devices (PD) and FCT base values for all buses are listed in
Table V.
The incident energy at each bus for the varying FCT ratios
is shown in Table VI.
Moreover, for illustration purpose, the effect on incident
energy by varying the FCT at Bus 5, the MCC bus and the
PWR PNL bus’ upstream OCPD is shown in Fig.4.
As the time increases for each PD to clear its bus’ arcing
fault, the incident energy increases showing a direct relation-
ship. To accurately model the incident energy’s sensitivity to
time, the FCT is was not fixed to two seconds for the base case,
as this would not have shown time’s effect on incident energy
for arcing faults lasting longer than 120 cycles. From Table V,
it is understood that Bus 4, Bus 5 and the MCC bus showed
a lack of coordination in the system as their upstream OCPDs
did not clear the arcing fault, but instead the PD of one, two
and three buses away cleared the fault, respectively. Bus 4 had
a hazard category of 0; thus, its coordination was not critical;
however, Bus 5, the MCC bus and the PWR PNL bus, each

TABLE V: TYPE OF PD AND FCT BASE VALUES FOR ALL BUSES

Bus Type Protecting device FCT Base Value
SWGR Fuse 1 0.01 seconds
Bus 3 Fuse 3 0.01 seconds
Bus 4 Fuse 1 0.01 seconds
Bus 5 Fuse 1 2.12 seconds
MCC Fuse 1 4.39 seconds
Bus 7 CB 7 0.023 seconds
Bus 8 CB 8 0.023 seconds
Bus 9 CB 9 0.023 seconds
Bus 10 CB 10 0.023 seconds
PWR PNL CB 10 38.066 seconds
Fig. 3: Incident energy vs. gap between conductor width at SWGR and bus 7 Bus 13 CB 13 0.01 seconds

TABLE IV: SIMULATED BUS INCIDENT ENERGY VALUES AT TABLE VI: SIMULATED BUS INCIDENT ENERGY VALUES AT
VARYING GAP BETWEEN CONDUCTOR WIDTHS VARIOUS UPSTREAM OCPD FCTS

Incident Energy (cal/cm2 ) Incident Energy (cal/cm2 )

1 1 1 1
Bus ID 4
Base 2
Base Base 2 Base 4 Base 8 Base Bus ID 4
Base 2
Base Base 2 Base 4 Base 8 Base
SWGR 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.1 3.0 SWGR 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 2.0 4.0
Bus 3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 Bus 3 0.3 0.5 1.0 2.0 4.0 8.1
Bus 4 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 Bus 4 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.5 3.1 6.2
Bus 5 99.4 97.4 94.4 88.2 77.1 58.8 Bus 5 25.0 50.0 83.6 200.1 400.2 800.4
MCC 81.2 78.4 73.9 65.3 51.0 31.2 MCC 40.6 79.7 133.8 324.5 648.9 1297.8
Bus 7 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 Bus 7 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.9 3.9 7.8
Bus 8 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 Bus 8 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.9 3.9 7.8
Bus 9 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 Bus 9 0.3 0.5 1.0 2.0 3.9 7.8
Bus 10 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 Bus 10 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.9 3.7 7.4
PWR PNL 19.3 19.1 18.8 18.2 17.1 15.1 PWR PNL 89.6 235.0 300.6 716.6 1433.6 2866.2
Bus 13 0.065 0.066 0.067 0.073 0.074 0.076 Bus 13 0.0 0.0 0.067 0.1 0.2 0.4
 Fig. 4: Incident Energy vs. FCT at Bus 5, the MCC and the PWR PN

had hazard categories greater than 4 implying that no work Fig. 5: Time-current characteristic curve of bus 5 and mcc protective devices
should be performed on them while energized. Each of these
three buses had FCTs greater than 120 cycles allowing them
to be fixed at two seconds. By performing this, the PWL PNL
bus’ hazard category is reduced to 3; Bus 5 and the MCC bus’
hazard categories remains greater than 4. The coordination of
these two bus’ PDs is shown in Fig. 5. The arcing current at
Bus 5 and the MCC bus, without the FCT fixed to two seconds,
was 11.0 kA and 9.38 kA, respectively which is shown in Fig.
6. These current values are 85% of the arcing current of their
corresponding buses and are used because of their increase on
the incident energy. The Time- Current Characteristics (TCC)
curve shows that for both of the arcing currents, approximately
9.38 kA and 11.0 kA, the system is not coordinated. For the
MCC bus’ arcing current, its protective device CB6, does not
fully open. As a result, the arcing current is not cleared and
travels upstream to the next PD. At this PD, Fuse 4, it is
apparent that there is no selectivity in coordination; Fuse 4
is equipped to handle the current from Bus 5 and the MCC Fig. 6: Selectively coordinated time-current characteristic curve of bus 5 and
MCC protective devices
bus, yet the lack of coordination shows Fuse 1 is set to clear
the faults before Fuse 4 has a chance; thus, removing current
from all downstream system devices.
D. Incident energy vs. available short circuit currents
A new thermal magnetic Circuit Breaker (CB) is used in
place of CB6. This PD has a much smaller continuous current With the coordination parameters set back to that of the base
as well as instantaneous current rating. As a result, the amount case, the maximum available short-circuit current provided by
of time required to clear the 9.38 kA arcing current on the the utility is adjusted from the base case of 12.5 kA, by the
MCC bus is reduced from 4.39 seconds by Fuse 1, to 0.021 defined ratios, and its effect on incident energy is shown in
seconds by the newly inserted CB’s instantaneous trip region, Table VII.
shown in Fig. IV. This FCT provides an incident energy that The available short-circuit current has a direct relationship
is highest for the initial arcing current, not 85% of the arcing to the incident energy. The increase of available short-circuit
current; thus, increasing the fault current at the PD from current provides a greater short-circuit current value on the
9.38 kA to 11.04 kA. The resulting incident energy reduces primary side of transformer 1 (XFMR1), which in turn pro-
the hazard category from greater than 4, to 0. Adjusting the vides greater short-circuit values throughout the system. This
Bussmann fuse settings of Fuse 4 from 600E to 150E ensures increase in short-circuit current increases the arcing current
the system is selectively coordinated. The 11.0 kA arcing which increases the FCT of PDs. As shown in Fig. 4 and
current at Bus 5 is cleared by its upstream OCPD, Fuse 4, presented in Table VI, the increase in FCT is directly propor-
in 0.349 seconds, as opposed to Fuse 1’s clearing time of tional to incident energy and thus, incident energy increases.
2.12 seconds. By appropriately coordinating the system, the Although incident energy is affected by available short-circuit
incident energy is reduced, lowering the hazard category at current, it typically is not a subject of consideration when
Bus 5 to level 3. attempting to mitigate the hazards of an arc flash. The cus-
 TABLE VII: SIMULATED BUS INCIDENT ENERGY VALUES AT
VARIOUS UTILITY AVAILABLE SHORT-CIRCUIT CURRENTS to combine their findings and address some potential concerns.
Preparing a single standard that covers all scenarios and
Incident Energy (cal/cm2 ) avoids confusion should be the vanguard of technical research
Bus ID 1
Base 1
Base Base 2 Base 4 Base 8 Base regarding arc flash analyses.
4 2
SWGR 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 There is still much debate to the over/under conservativeness
Bus 3 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.9 of IEEE’s 1584 Std. due to its empirical data. The empirical
Bus 4 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2
Bus 5 85.6 91.3 94.4 96.0 96.8 97.3 model covers only the range of system characteristics tested
MCC 67.8 71.8 73.9 75.0 75.6 75.9 in IEEE’s laboratories, requiring the use of other standards
Bus 7 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 for characteristics outside the tested ranges. A deeper analysis
Bus 8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Bus 9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 of the underlying arc flash properties for a wider range of
Bus 10 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 conditions may prove in the development of not only a more
PWR PNL 18.7 18.8 18.8 18.9 18.9 18.9 accurate empirical method, but also a more accurate theoretical
Bus 13 0.1 0.1 0.067 0.1 0.1 0.1
method.
Another area of concern arises over the current method
tomer usually cannot change the amount of available current of analyzing single-phase arcing faults. The IEEE 1584 Std.
that the utility provides; however, it is possible to reduce the treats single-phase faults as three-phase faults as it states
available current through current limiting devices that increase this is a conservative approach, assuming single-phase faults
the system impedance. For each parameter analyzed, only the eventually escalate to three-phase. Further research into single-
maximum available short-circuit current is used. It is inferred phase arcing faults may prove the over conservativeness of this
that because of the linear nature of the best-fit line, as well as assumption, or in specific circumstances, discredit it altogether.
the linearity of the multiplying parameter ratios, any effect a The economic concerns resulting from an arc flash incident are
parameter has on its relationship to incident energy at max- second only to those of personal safety. Continuous research of
imum available short-circuit current, it would similarly have this topic will provide greater system efficiency, reduce costs
on its relationship to incident energy at minimum available related to equipment failure and outages, and provide a safer
short-circuit current. working environment for field personnel.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
V. C ONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The authors would like to thank Mr. Daniel R. Potton for
This paper investigated the underlying concepts of an arc his invaluable contributions to this work.
flash and presented an approach for performing the analysis on
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