L'antiquité classique

Irony and Logic : The Ἀντιλεγειν Paradox and Antisthenes' Purpose

H. D. Rankin

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Rankin H. D. Irony and Logic : The Ἀντιλεγειν Paradox and Antisthenes' Purpose. In: L'antiquité classique, Tome 43, fasc. 1,
1974. pp. 316-320;

http://www.persee.fr/doc/antiq_0770-2817_1974_num_43_1_1746

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 6
ν

IRONY AND LOGIC . THE 'ΑΝΤΙΛΕΓΕΙΝ PARADOX

AND ANTISTHENES' PURPOSE

In this discussion I propose to consider the view that Antisthenes'

deployment of the ουκ εστίν άντίλέγειν paradox had a markedly ironical protrep-
tic purpose reaching beyond its, strictly speaking, 'logical' attack on Plato's είδη.
Antisthenes, like Gorgias, was prepared to admit a very small measure of
validity to arguments that asserted 'being'. Gorgias' essay on το μη δν was
probably a model of convoluted irony arising from his scepticism about the
capacity of λόγος to describe accurately what Ms' or 'is not' '. In περί του μη
δντος ή περί φύσεως- he asserted that λόγος was έτερος των υποκειμένων, and άπα
των έξωθεν προπιπτόντων ημϊν πραγμάτων συνίσταται, τουτέση των άσθητών (D-
Κ Β, 3.31, 31-5ff). Antisthenes' view of λόγος was that at best it constitued a
mere indicator of what a thing 'is' ·. even οικείος λόγος does not necessarily
in an ontological continuum with the thing it designates : he merely
that a name (or presumably any word capable of being used as a name)
that something 'is' that belongs or corresponds to the name : he did not
strictly imply that the name and what it designates were continuous :
διό 'Αντισθένης ωετο εύήθως μηθέν άξιων λέγεσθαι πλην τφ οίκείω λόγω,
εν εφ' ενός · εξ ων συνέβαινε μη είναι άντίλέγειν, σχεδόν δέ μηδέ φεύδεσθαι
(Αγ., Met. 1024 b, 32-34; Mullach 47; Caizzi 47A:)2.
The metaphor in οικείος implies a fixed 'relationship' between them rather than
that they share one φύσις s .
Gorgias, in mentioning αισθητά as components of λόγος, might be regarded as
hinting that λόγος was capable of describing what things were 'like' in respect of
their apprehension by the senses : that λόγος was constituted from data of the
senses and thus provided us with an image of what things were like, but itself
remained separate from things themselves. Although both Gorgias and
were very sceptical and cautious in this way about metaphysical
between λόγοι and what λόγοι described, Antisthenes seems to have
had his scepticism further hardened by the influence upon him of Socrates'
radical questioning of meanings of words accompanied by frequent

1 W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists, Cambridge (1971) 270f; M. C. Valeton,

Gorgiae Leontini Liber, Groningen (1876) ch. 2 passim.
? Guthrie, op. cit. 21 If.
s See note 8 below.
 IRONY AND LOGIC 317

professions of ignorance. Like others, however, he is represented as using

language (i.e. generally speaking, λογού quite confidently as an instrument of
research. However, in no sense is Socrates represented by Plato or others as
being confident that he has exhausted the resources of this instrument ; for in
spite of his assertions of ignorance and doubt, he continues in his pursuit of
and definition, undaunted by άπορίαι*. Apart from the paradoxes
associated with his name5, a basic assumption of Socrates' 'philosophy' seems
to have been that investigation by means of λόγοι was worth doing.
We find that Antisthenes, strictly speaking, only allows the validity of briefly
expressed tautologies ; which, valid though they may be, are yet apparently
trivial. Outside the restrictive grid in which Ά is A' : οίκείφ λόγφ and εν εφ'
ενός ; λόγοι would appear according to him to have only the status of metaphor
or some expression of 'likeness'. Non- tautological predicates seem capable of
describing what a subject is 'like' (olov) and not what it 'is' 6. It is possible that
Antisthenes allowed (or at least did not specifically exclude) that a λόγος which
was uneconomically μακρός might have some kind of validity in defining (apart
from describing) ; but the length of such a λόγος precludes its effective use 7 ,
and it is not specifically regarded as valid, like the single-word predicate of the
οικείος λόγος. By means of the mysterious but someliow arid metaphor of
in the word οικείος 8 ; Ά is A' can tell us presumably that A is identified

4 But we should take account of R. E. Allen's case (Plato's Euthyphro and the
Earlier Theory of Forms, London (1970) ) that there may be evidence even in the early
aporetic and Socratic phase of Plato's works for a more developed view of είδη than is
usually supposed.
5 See M. J. O'Brien's interesting discussion of these paradoxes and their
background: The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Mind, Chapel Hill (1967).
6 Caizzi 44A.
7 H. D. Rankin, "Antisthenes a 'Near-Logician'", in A.C. 39 (1970) 522-527.
8 The image implicit in οικείος seems likely to be Antisthenes' own : Caizzi 73 :
τάγαθά χαλά, τα κακά αισχρά · τά πονηρά νόμιζε ξενικά, hints that he was interested in
the οίκειον Ι άλλότριον contrast, which was somewhat of a τόπος ; there is no need to
elaborate this into a comprehensive theory of Antisthenes, though it is consonant enough
with his αύταρχεϊα ; see L. A. Rostagno, Le idee pedagogiche ne Ila filosofia cinica e
specialmente in Antistene, Turin (1904) 35 ; M. Guggenheim, Antisthenes in Platons
Politeia, in Philol. 60 (1901) 749-54, connects this contrast with comparable expression
used by Thrasymachus, whom he interprets as a kind of persona for Antisthenes in the
Republic. Aristotle's notion of this usage of οικείος is illustrated well enough by Met.
1014a: παρά πάντα δέ και τά οίχείως λεγόμενα και τα κατά ονμβεβηχός, τά μεν ώς
δυνάμενα λέγεται, τά δε ώς ενεργούντα οίον τόν οίκοδομεΐσθαι οικοδόμος η οικοδομών
κτλ. Sometimes it is simply the equivalent of κύριον ·. κύριον όνομα is the
established and familiar term for a thing as distinct from γλώττα, μεταφορά and the
other ξενικά ονόματα. In actual usage however the κύριον όνομα is more especially
to the metaphor. As the metaphor is an άλλότριον όνομα the κύριον όνομα is much
the same thing as the οίχεϊον or 'proper' name for the thing ; cf. Rhet. 3, 2. 1404 b 3 1 to
318 H. D. RANKIN

with itself; though this does not entail that Ά' is identical with its name Ά'.
But something that can be referred to must in some sense 'be', as the 'άντιλέγείν'
paradox implies ; and this paradox carries the further implication that it is
or nearly so, to say anthing that is false (or even to tell lies). This
arises principally from the paronomasia of άντιλέγειν between 'deny' and
'. In terms of this paradox, the brief 'tautological' definitions of the Ά is
A' kind would not have a unique truth- value : all kinds of utterable predicates
would have to be allocated their small share of it ; for if they were completely
false, they could not even be said. But if it is so difficult to say anything that is
purely- false, it is not easy to decide what is purely true, or more true than other
things : thus for real rigour one must fall back upon Ά is A' ; which for both
practical and philosophical purposes is not verry helpful.
It seems likely that in his deployment of this paradox associated with his
'theory of knowledge', Antisthenes was not so much convinced of its
philosophical importance as he was aware of its usefulness in attacking Plato's
είδη with weapons combining Gorgianic scepticism and verbal virtuosity with
Socratic delight in paradox and irony. In order to do this, he used the already
old-fashioned 'αντιλέγειν' paradox, which was probably the most important
motive in his anti-Platonic work, the Satho10. As one who rejected the
of ιππότης η on the grounds that he could not 'see' it in a physical
sense, Antisthenes did not simplistically deny the existence of ιππότης. Under
the terms of the 'άντύέγειν paradox, ιππότης has some being, even if only as
one of the φίλαί èwoïat -. there would hardly be any relevance in referring to
ιππότης if it had not some meaning : nor could it be used if there were not
something for it to mean : even if all it meant was a term of satirical devaluation
for the Platonic είδος. Antisthenes' point is that while είδη are not non-existent ;
they are not special entities (as Plato would have it) but mere εικόνες or èwoccu.

δε χύρίον χαί to οίχεΐον = (i.e. το οίχεΐον) χαί μεταφορά μόναι χρήσψοί προς την τών
φιλών λόγων λέξιν : Ingram Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, Oxford 1909 on Poet.
1457 b 1. The narrowly discriminating phrase εν εφ' ενός suggests that x's name is all
that can be predicated of x, but τάγαθά χαλά, τά χαχά αισχρά suggests that the tautology
could be slightly relaxed.
» In the sense of 'argue against' or 'refute' and 'say that something is not\ cf. Caizzi
65 — Stob. Anthol. II, 2, 15 : ούχ άντίλέγοντα δει τον άντιλέγοντα παύειν, άλλα
διδάσχειν · ουδέ γάρ τόν μαινόμενον άντιμαινόμενός τις ίαται.
Cf. the paronomasiae of μανθάνειν in Euthyd. 276b, 277d : the paradox seems to go
back as far as Protagoras, Euthyd. 286b, Diog. L. 9. 53. See Guthrie, 209ff; K. von
Fritz, Zur Antisthenischen Erkenntnis théorie und Logik, in H. 62 (1927) 453-84
(456flD ; also: Binder & Liesinberghs in M.H. 23 (1966) 37-43.
io Caizzi 36.
>· Caissi 36 ; 50B.
 IRONY AND LOGIC 319

Antisthenes' deployment of ούχ εστίν άντιλέγειν χτλ. may or may not have
been philosophically serious, but it was undoubtedly a sharp instrument of satire
with which to attack Plato's answers to the problems of επιστήμη by means of
the είδη ; and though it is impossible to prove, it is yet reasonable to suggest
that Antisthenes' attacks, however ill-received by Plato, nevertheless had some
influence upon the way in which Plato teased out the difficulties of his theory of
knowledge during his later period. The logical impasse of ούχ εστίν άντιλέγειν
κτλ., while it dilutes the credibility of λόγος as the medium of philosophical
does not in any sense invalidate its capacity to encourage, persuade,
or suggest ; and it is probable that Antisthenes underestimated or ignored this
aspect of Plato's teaching.
Antisthenes was intensely Socratic in stressing the difficulties of 'knowing' in
a hard epistemológica! sense ; and he was Socratic too in his emphasis upon the
importance of αρετή. In asserting the paradox ούχ εστίν άντιλέγειν χτλ. , he may
well have been saying in a Socratically ironical fashion, that people should seek
to achieve αρετή in their actions, rather than pursue by λόγοι an intellectual
from which αρετή of actions is assumed to flow. Thus he could be seen as
having satirized the procedures associated with λόγος and, for his own protreptic
purposes, reduced them to a level of Aristophanic farce. It would be perhaps
in view of his considerable reputation as a writer and thinker, to assume
that he was ignorant of the contents of such works as the Euthydemus or that he
was unaware (in a simple-minded fashion) of the possible answers to their
fallacies. By means of logical play with άντιλέγειν he asserts perhaps that the
world of action and αρετή is important ; and that the world of 'logic' is afflicted
by basic contradictions. If this was so, it was an interesting irony that Plato
should be hoist on the petard of a paradox that he had himself refurbished for
the Euthydemus 1Z, and that the composer of aporetic dialogues should find
to himself the techniques of έλεγχος which he represents Socrates as
to the sophists. If this was so, it was a crowning irony that Antisthenes
should be represented to subsequent generations as simplistic IS in his approach
to logic', when he was perhaps not speaking primarily about 'logic' at all. We
cannot tell for certain whether this was the case or not ; but an atmosphere of
bitter disagreement remains between Antisthenes and Plato and his friends. The
title of the Satho speaks itself, however we may evaluate supposed references to
Antisthenes in Plato's dialogues 14. Plato may have struck back much harder in

'« Euthyd 285c fT.

l* Caizzi 44a : Ar. Met. 1043 b 23 : ώστε ή απορία ην οι Άντισθένειοι xai οι οΰτως
απαίδευτοι ήπόρουν έχει τινά χαφόν, ότι ούχ χτλ. ; Caizzi 47 Α : Ar. Met. 1024 b 32 : δια
'Αντισθένης ωετο εύήθως μηθεν χτλ. ; cf. Caizzi 44Β, 47Β.
'♦ E.g. Theaet 156a ; 174a ; 201d ; 210b ; Soph 251b ; 258e etc., etc. ; see Mullach
Vol. II 267 for a comprehensive list.
 I 320 H. D. RANKIN
{
î
ways which are unrecorded : at all events he had a more bitter tongue than
in his dialogues or those of the Epistles which are accepted as genuine.
Gorgias, the friend and teacher of Antisthenes, referred to Plato, as we are told
by Athenaeus, as νέος Άρχ^χος 1S.

University of Southampton. H. D. Rankin.

15 Athenaeus 505e: Ingemar During, Herodicus the Cratetean. A Study in Anti-

Platonic Tradition (Stockholm), 1941, 73.