MISSION COMMAND ANALYSIS:

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM F. GARRISON AT THE BATTLE OF MOGADISHU,

Captain Wahyu Wuhono Widhi Nugroho (Indonesian Army)

ECCC 01-18, Team Echo
8 January 2017

0
 According to Peter Parret in Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and

His Time, "War is... a continuation of political activity by other means."1 In 1992, political

strife between the Somalia National Alliance (SNA) under Muhammad Farrah Aided and

the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) resulted in multiple raids on the

UNOSOM. The United Nations (UN) eventually demanded the United States (US) to

deploy the Task Force Ranger. US Government approved to launch Operation Gothic

Serpent under Major General William F. Garrison, “an experienced special operation

officer.” The TFR mission was to capture Aided and weaken his network.2

Before the Battle of Mogadishu, TFR conducted six raid missions out of seven

assigned.5 Due to inaccurate intelligence; they only accomplished at the fifth raid while

capturing Osman Atto, Aided’s financier. During all six raids, TFR operated at night with

minor enemy resistances and no friendly forces loss, but inflicted numerous civil

casualties. The TFR always employed a combination of aerial assault, fast ground

vehicle attack, and suppressive aerial fire support. The mission priority following a

successful raid or prisoner capture was a quick, immediate retrograde.6

On the seventh raid, inaccurate intelligence regarding Aided’s meeting with his two

lieutenants near the Bakara Market led TFR into the Battle of Mogadishu. For the first

time, MG William F. Garrison decided to launch the raid at midday in the center of

Aided’s stronghold area. The SNA implemented surprise tactics which included shooting

down several helicopters, blocking reinforcements, and surrounding TFR with an armed

mob. During this raid, TFR suffered two Blackhawk losses, 18 casualties, and 84

severely wounded Soldiers. Faced with this challenging situation, MG William F.

Garrison ineffectively exercised the commander roles which include “understand,”

1
“visualize,” “describe,” “direct,” and “assess,” which resulted in the TFR’s defeat at the

Battle of Mogadishu, forcing the US Government to retreat from Somalia.

In the operations process, understanding is a cornerstone for the commander to

develop a situation’s context.7 Understanding is process to grasp the operation

environment's nature and significance. 8 Developing a complete situational

understanding and framing of the problem relies on analysis of the operational variables

and mission variables.9 Prior to the TFR’s operations, Aided was not popular amongst

the local populace. However, during the Battle of Mogadishu, it was evident that popular

opinion had shifted. In this battle, Somali became wrathful and helped Aided to kill TFR

Soldiers.10 They brought their weapons, burned trash and tires, blocked roads and

surrounded TFR positions.11 Due to this shift, TFR soldiers reported encountering more

fire than they had expected in Mogadishu. 12 Aided and his clan had been waiting for the

right moment to conduct a surprise counter-attack.13

MG William F. Garrison failed to understand the social and information of operational

variables, and civil consideration of mission variable. Somalia is a tribal-state under

multiple warlords upon clans. SNA’s communication relied upon runner, which made

TFR’s sophisticated SIGINT ineffective. Additionally, the complex clan system made

human intelligence (HUMINT) collection very difficult in addition to a lack of HUMINT

assets. MG William F. Garrison ignored his untrustworthy intelligence assets which kept

him from fully understanding the enemy situation. Unchecked civil collateral damage

from previous raids bolstered Aided’s support from the local populace. This condition

created new militia forces who augmented the SNA’s forces and incited an angry civilian

population resulting in numerous armed mobs. This factor eventually allowed Aided to

2
overwhelm and surprise the TFR. The vengeful civilians in the crowds became an

unexpected combat multiplier for the enemy. During stability operations, MG William F.

Garrison should be shaping the population’s support to maximize TFR’s advantage and

reduce enemy’s resources. However, he neglected to thoroughly analyze the civil

consideration factor which resulted in an inaccurate assessment of enemy movement

and influence.

According to Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0: The Operations

Process, “Commander's visualization is the mental process of developing situational

understanding, determining the desired end state, and envisioning an operational

approach by which the force will achieve that end state.” 14 The Commander builds their

visualization under collaboration with higher, subordinate and adjacent commanders,

the staff, and unified action partners.15 MG William F. Garrison planned his execution

with a focus on rapid offensive actions.16 He integrated helicopters as a close combat

attack (CCA) asset and the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) as

fast ground support. However, helicopters became a liability when they crashed down

which forced TFR to shift their mission from an offensive to rescue. 17 Additionally, the

HMMWV proved to be vulnerable in urban conflict, due to soft armor.

MG William F. Garrison never requested armor assets as part its force package from

higher and unified action partners.18 He declined to actively collaborate with his unified

action partners, which could have augmented TFR with additional armor assets,

reinforcement forces, and intelligence assets. Following the suppression of TFR forces,

MG William F. Garrison finally requested armor assets and reinforcement forces from

UNOSOM’s Quick Reaction Forces (QRF). MG William F. Garrison failed to visualize

3
how to efficiently employ his troops despite inherent operational constraints, which

ultimately led to a flawed operational approach. This situation drove him to

conceptualize his course of action incorrectly which affected the progression of battle.

His inability to comprehend the operational environment and visualize the operation

process proved to be calamitous.

According to ADRP 5-0, “After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it

to their staffs and subordinates to facilitate shared understanding and purpose.” 19

Describe is a process to ensure subordinates understand their visualization well enough

to begin course of action development. 20 Commanders describe their visualization

including commander’s intent, the operational approach in planning guidance,

commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), and essential elements of

friendly information (EEFI).21 During the Battle of Mogadishu, many TFR soldiers

believed that the raid would be swift with minor resistance. 22 They reduced combat

loads by carrying less ammo and removing water, armor plates, and night vision

goggles (NVG).23 Pilots were unprepared for possible threats despite intelligence reports

that the SNA had downed a QRF Blackhawk a week earlier.24 This situation created

more casualties, reduced their capability, and became a turning point which allowed the

SNA to seize the initiative.

MG William F. Garrison was unable to describe his operational approach to his

subordinate efficiently. He shared an incorrect situational understanding which resulted

in his subordinate being unaware and unprepared for the enemy threats. MG William F.

Garrison also failed to protect his essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). The

SNA easily monitored TFR’s combat rehearsals, since TFR’s base only 3 miles away

4
from Mogadishu. As a result, the enemy comprehended TFR’s tactics and were able to

develop effective countermeasures. Ultimately, the SNA trapped the TFR with their most

deadly course of action (MDCOA).

According to ADRP 5-0, “Direct is a process to drive all aspects of operations by

establishing their commander’s intent, setting achievable objectives, and issuing clear

tasks to subordinate units.”25 This action includes the preparation and approval of plans

and orders, allocation of resources to exploit opportunities and counter threats, the

committing of reserve forces as required, and the assignment of tasks, control

measures, and task organization.26 During Operation Gothic Serpent, TFR employed

helicopters as CCA and airlift which provided speed and surprise at decisive points

unrestricted by nighttime operation.27 However, the Blackhawk helicopter proved more

vulnerable to RPG fire than anticipated.28 Once two of them crashed, the enemy forced

TFR to stretch their forces beyond the limits.29 TFR had lack of reaction force for

rescuing downed crew. TFR’s CSAR helicopter could not reach the second downed

Blackhawk because of its limited assets. The ground forces attempted a rescue but got

lost because of the massive blockades. The command and control (C2) helicopter were

also unable to steer the lost unit, due to heavy fire and smoke.

MG William F. Garrison was incapable of directing his staff to anticipate the enemy’s

MDCOA and to build risk reduction control measures. He failed to plan an operation that

would adequately protect his aerial assets as a tactical-decisive point. Moreover, MG

William F. Garrison neglected to prepare for reserve forces which provide flexibility and

adaptability. He also was unable to provide a robust medical evacuation plan to recover

his available forces. Furthermore, he failed to create a C2 contingency plan, as

5
indicated by C2 forces inability to guide his ground forces in unfamiliar urban terrain.

MG William F. Garrison’s failure to appropriately “direct” resulted in TFR incurring

unnecessary casualties.

According to ADRP 5-0, “Commanders continuously assess the situation to

comprehend current conditions better and determine how the operation is

progressing.”30 Assessing is a continuous cycle throughout the operation process

including plan, prepare, and execute. The Battle of Mogadishu was TFR’s first midday

raid mission to capture Aided’s lieutenants. Based on his intelligence report, MG William

F. Garrison believed Aided’s presence in a meeting with his two lieutenants in the

vicinity of Bakara Market. Launching a midday raid on the enemy’s stronghold created

four significant disadvantage for TFR. First, TFR lost the favorable night operation

advantage. Second, Aided’s militia would be more aggressive under “khat” drug effect.

Khat is a stimulant derived from a shrub that is native to East Africa region which made

its user felt more energetic and vigilant.31 Third, public activity and civilians would

become a burden for the assault forces. Fourth, conducted the operation with

predictable tactics in an enemy’s favorable condition. All of these points enabled the

enemy to implement their MDCOA.

The inherent vulnerability of HMMWV and helicopters also had worsened that

disadvantage. MG William F. Garrison believed the most suitable tactics would be to

strike with surprise and speed.32 He decided to use superior fire support from CCA to

mitigate his lack of armor assets. However, the CCA assault in Mogadishu during

midday resulted in additional civilian casualties and collateral damage. This situation

attributed to the local populace’s hatred toward TFR’s efforts and resulted in more

6
civilians augmenting Aided’s armed mobs. In the offensive missions, MG William F.

Garrison should capitalize on an enemy’s weakness while avoiding the enemy’s

strength.33 However, his decision eventually brought TFR into a deadly ambush and

massive blockade during the chaotic battle. His fallacy in assessing the situation

steered the TFR into Aided’s brutal trap.

Under the tactical perspective, MG William F. Garrison achieved mission success.

TFR conducted the assault in the enemy’s main strongpoint under the unfavorable

condition but seized 24 prisoners including two of Aided’s lieutenant. 34 According to

Mark Bowden in Blackhawk Down – A Story Of Modern War, “It was a complex, difficult,

and dangerous assignment, and despite terrible setbacks and losses, and against

overwhelming odds, the mission was accomplished.”35

Despite TFR’s tactical accomplishment, the Battle of Mogadishu was a strategic

failure.36 The Battle of Mogadishu proved to be a costly achievement, with 18 Soldiers

killed and 84 severely wounded. The images of Somalian’s mob dragging the dead body

of US Soldier reduced US political interest in Somalia. The loss of political interest was

tantamount to the withdrawal of US forces as war is the execution of political will

through physical coercion. The redeployment of US forces ultimately led to the SNA’s

declaration of strategic victory and proclaimed Aided’s as the President of Somalia. 37

This set of events repeated a similar situation that resulted in the withdrawal from the

Vietnam War.

The Battle of Mogadishu presented several lessons for the future commanders.

Understanding the operational environment, including operation variables and mission

variables, is fundamental in exercising the commander’s role. In the stability operation,

7
the understanding of civil consideration, social and political factor is more significant to

shape the populace support. Building an accurate visualization requires active

collaboration with the higher echelon, staff, subordinate, adjacent commanders, and

unified action partners. The commander must describe the operational approach and

ensure subordinate prepared for evolving conditions. One pivotal role of the commander

in operation process is the direction for the staff to develop a robust plan to achieve end

state while emphasizing on risk mitigation. Correct assessment of past, present, and

future condition will allow the commander to exercise effective decision making which

facilitating mission success. In conclusion, MG William F. Garrison had failed to

understand the operation environment, unable to build visualization with the unified

action partners, incapable of describing an effective operational approach, been

unsuccessful in directing his staff to develop a robust plan, and assessed the situation

contexts wrongly. His fallacy in exercising “understand,” “visualize,” “describe,” “direct,”

and “assess,” as part of the commander’s role inflicted a significant TFR’s casualties,

the forcing of US forces withdrawal from Somalia, and the enemy’s strategic victory.

8
 Notes

1. Peter Peret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Time,
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 393.

2. Clayton K.S. Chun, Gothic Serpent - Black Hawk Down – Mogadishu 1993,
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 17.

3. Ibid, 16.

4. Ibid, 27.

5. Ibid, 28.

6. Ibid, 74.

7. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0: The Operations Process,

(Washington DC: Department of the Army Headquarter, 2012), 1-3.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down – A Story Of Modern War, (New York:
Penguin Books, 2000), 230.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid, 169.

13. Ibid, 230.

14. ADRP 5-0: The Operations Process, (Washington DC: Department of the
Army Headquarter, 2012), 1-4.

15. Ibid.

16. Clayton K.S. Chun, Gothic Serpent - Black Hawk Down – Mogadishu 1993,
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 74.

17. Ibid, 73.

18. Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down – A Story Of Modern War, (New York:
Penguin Books, 2000), 340.

9
 19. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0: The Operations Process,
(Washington DC: Department of the Army Headquarter, 2012), 1-5.
20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Clayton K.S. Chun, Gothic Serpent - Black Hawk Down – Mogadishu 1993,
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 74.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0: The Operations Process,
(Washington DC: Department of the Army Headquarter, 2012), 1-6.

26. Ibid.

27. Clayton K.S. Chun, Gothic Serpent - Black Hawk Down – Mogadishu 1993,
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 73.

28. Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down – A Story Of Modern War, (New York:
Penguin Books, 2000), 338.

29. Ibid.

30. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0: The Operations Process,
(Washington DC: Department of the Army Headquarter, 2012), 1-6.

31. Philipa Hay, “The Consumption of Khat and Other Drugs in Somali
Combatants: A Cross-Sectional Study,” US National Library of Medicine National
Institutes of Health, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2121109/ (accessed
January 5, 2018).

32. Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down – A Story Of Modern War, (New York:
Penguin Books, 2000), 349.

33. Norman M Wade, The Operations and Training Smart Book, 2nd ed, (Texas:
Lightning Press, 1999), 6-81.

34. Benjamin Runkle, “The Lost Lessons of Black Hawk Down,” Texas National
Security Network-University of Texas, https://www.warontherocks.com/2013/10/the-lost-
lessons-of-black-hawk-down (accessed December 30, 2017).

35. Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down – A Story Of Modern War, (New York:
Penguin Books, 2000), 333.

10
 36. Clayton K.S. Chun, Gothic Serpent - Black Hawk Down – Mogadishu 1993,
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 76.

37. Clayton K.S. Chun, Gothic Serpent - Black Hawk Down – Mogadishu 1993,
(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 72.

11
 Bibliography

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0: The Operations Process. Washington
DC: Department of the Army Headquarter, 2012.

Bowden, Mark. Blackhawk Down – A Story Of Modern War. New York: Penguin Books,
2000.

Chun, Clayton K.S. Gothic Serpent - Black Hawk Down – Mogadishu 1993. New York:
Osprey Publishing, 2012.

Hay, Philipa. “The Consumption of Khat and Other Drugs in Somali Combatants: A
Cross-Sectional Study.” US National Library of Medicine National Institutes of
Health. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2121109/ (accessed
January 5, 2018).

Peret, Peter. Clausewitz and the state: The Man, His Theories, and His Time. New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007.

Runkle, Benjamin. “The Lost Lessons of Black Hawk Down.” Texas National Security
Network-University of Texas. https://www.warontherocks.com/2013/10/the-lost-
lessons-of-black-hawk-down (accessed December 30, 2017).

Wade, Norman M. The Operations and Training Smart Book, 2nd Ed. Texas: Lightning
Press, 1999.

12