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Pseudo-Revolutionaries Unmasked • PRAVDA EDITORIAL, MAY
Card 7 18, 1970
Concerning the 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of

Text
35 China • O. Vladimirov, V. Ryazanov
HTML
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Concerning the 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of
PDF 64 China • I. Alexandrov
T* Renunciation of the Principles of Marxism-Leninism • APROPOS
19* OF THE PARTY RULES ADOPTED AT THE NINTH
80 CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA
###
II
99 Maoism: Its Ideological and Political Essence
Dialectics, Genuine and Spurious • CRITICISM OF THE MAOIST

123 INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF DIALECTICS
Crisis in the Political Development of China
144 [introduction.]
THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND THE POLITICAL

AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S
145 REPUBLIC
153 THE POLITICAL CHANGE: ITS CAUSES AND FORMS
PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE MAOIST POLITICAL

159 SYSTEM
165 Maoism Preaches Poverty
185 Great-Power Chauvinism of Mao Tse-tung
III
The International Communist Movement and the Communist

Party of China • IN CONNECTION WITH THE 50th
195 ANNIVERSARY OF THE CPC
232 Regarding Peking-Washington Contacts
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Questions Requiring an Answer • CONCERNING THE US-

242 CHINA TOP-LEVEL MEETING
254 The Preaching and Practice of the Chinese Leaders
277 Peking Foreign Policy Doctrines and Practice
Concerning the Economic Relations Between the Soviet Union and

285 China (1950–66)
320 Peking Against the Socialist Community
New Strategy for the Same Ends AN ANALYSIS OF MAOIST

332 INTERNATIONAL • POLICY
The Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of China Since the

357 9th Congress of the Communist Party of China
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Pseudo-Revolutionaries
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Unmasked
Card
PRAVDA EDITORIAL, MAY 18, 1970

8
Text
The centenary of the birth of V. I. Lenin has become a holiday for working people p
HTML
the world over. It has developed into a convincing demonstration of the triumph of
PS
PDF
Lenin’s cause, the vitality of Lenin’s ideas and behests. With the name of Lenin,
with his all-triumphant teaching, are linked all the historical accomplishments of our
T* agethe Great October Socialist Revolution and the building of socialism in the
19* USSR, the establishment and consolidation of the world socialist system, the upsurge
of the international working-class movement in the capitalist countries, the collapse
### of colonialism, and the emancipation of the oppressed nations.
The progressive world public has widely observed the Lenin centenary. Celebration p
of the birth centenary of the leader of the world revolution has served for the
Communist and Workers’ Parties, for all the fighters against imperialism, as a
powerful stimulus in their entire ideological and political activities. The fraternal
Parties have increased the struggle for the unity of the communist movement, for the
cohesion of all antiimperialist forces.
In the minds and hearts of revolutionary fighters throughout the world Lenin’s name p
is inseparably linked with the first socialist state and its Communist Party which
consistently implement his behests and continue his cause. The keynote of the Lenin 9
celebrations in the majority of countries was recognition of the outstanding role of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the world revolutionary process,
expression of gratitude to the Leninist Party for its tireless heroic struggle, for its
loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism, for its selfless assistance to
all revolutionary liberation movements.
Socialism has achieved fresh successes in the world-wide battle for the minds and p
hearts of people. It has shown people everywhere the prospect for deliverance from
imperialism, and more and more clearly demonstrates the superiority of its economic,
social and political organisation. The community of socialist countries has become a
force without which, and in defiance of which, not a single major problem of our
time can be solved. The united might of the socialist countries and their active
policy in defence of peace are effectively checking the aggressive ambitions of the
imperialists and preventing the outbreak of a world rocket and nuclear war.
The celebration of the Lenin centenary has vividly reflected the growing tendency
manifested at the International Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties-the
tendency towards united action of all revolutionary and progressive forces of the
world; it has raised to a new level their ideological preparedness, and given a fresh
and mighty impetus to the world revolutionary process which unites the three great
forces of our time-the world socialist system, the international working-class and
national-liberation movements.
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/1.1-Pseudo-Revolutionaries.Unmasked[2012-12-18 3:12:43]
10
I
It is not surprising that the masters of the outgoing world are resorting to lies and p
slander in an attempt to discredit and belittle the historical accomplishments of
Lenin’s homeland, of the fraternal socialist countries, the world communist and
working-class movement, and the fighters for national liberation. There is nothing
new about their attempts to slander socialism, the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet
state.
The Soviet people and entire progressive mankind know the real reasons for the p
anti-socialist actions of imperialism. We first heard them more than half a century
ago. What is worth noting is something else-the fact that during the days when the
peoples of the world were celebrating Lenin’s anniversary the Peking leaders came
out in unison with imperialism’s malicious anti-Soviet and anti-communist campaign.
Peking has timed for the Lenin birth centenary a new phase of fanning animosity
and hatred towards the Soviet Union, the countries of the socialist community, and
the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the world.
Hateful to Mao Tse-tung and his following are the successes of the USSR in the p
development of socialist industry, agriculture, science and technology, the steady rise
in the living standard and cultural level of the masses, the strengthening of the
defensive might of the Soviet Union, the tasks set by our Party for further
intensification of socialist production for the purpose of building the material and
technical basis of communism and strengthening the positions of world socialism. In
its desire to discredit the inspiring example of the Soviet Union and the other 11
countries of the socialist community, Peking propaganda resorts to incredible lies and
distortions, abuses and slander.
Following in the wake of imperialist propagandists Peking repeats the lie about the p
“ aggressiveness” of the USSR and the “crisis” of Soviet economy; it resuscitates
Trotskyite “ideas” about "bourgeois degeneration of Soviet power,” and equates US
imperialism with the Soviet Union which they call "social-imperialism.”
Those in Peking stubbornly try to discredit the principles of socialist p

internationalism underlying the relations between the countries of the socialist
community and declare that such community "does not exist.” Things reached such a
pass that Hitler’s ravings have been dragged out into the open about the need to
“save” the peoples from the "Slav danger.” Following the leaders of the nazi Reich
the Peking leaders are trying to portray the Soviet Union as a "colossus on clay
legs,” asserting that the USSR is only a "paper tiger" and threatening to "pierce it at
one go.”
Such ravings make up the content of a series of articles published in April in the p
Jenmin jihpao, Hungchi and Chiefangchiun pao, and of an article marking May Day.
These publications show that Peking has made it a tradition to resort to methods of p
rabid political and ideological provocations so characteristic of imperialist
propaganda.
Communists and all those who cherish the interests of peace and progress are p
deeply alarmed by the actions of the Chinese leaders in the international arena and
seriously concerned about the destiny of the Chinese revolution.
The June 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties pointed p 12
out that recent events in China and the nature of the resolutions adopted at the 9th
CPC Congress had a negative effect on the entire world situation and on the struggle
of the anti-imperialist forces. The present CPC leaders are pursuing an anti-popular
and anti-Leninist policy, carrying on subversive activities against the countries of the
socialist community and seeking to split the ranks of anti– imperialist forces.
The actions of the Chinese leaders following the International Conference, which p
Peking terms a "black gathering,” show the soundness of the conclusions drawn by
Marxist-Leninist Parties to the effect that the Chinese leaders have actually launched
struggle against the world socialist system, the international communist movement
and the revolutionary fighters all over the world.
All this calls for greater vigilance with respect to Peking’s activities in the
international arena and for watching closely which way the Mao group is leading
China.
II
The entire home and foreign policy course of the Peking leaders is dictated by p
great-power and hegemonistic aspirations. It is for the sake of realizing these
aspirations that China was turned into a proving ground of adventurous experiments,
the burden of which fell heavily upon the shoulders of the Chinese people.
The People’s Republic of China is going through an acute crisis in all spheres of its p
political, economic and cultural life. The Communist Party has been broken up. The
constitutional bodies of people’s power, trade-unions, Komsomol and other 13
democratic organisations and unions of artists and intellectuals have been dissolved.
There is nothing left of the Communist Party except its name, for Mao and his
associates are building up an altogether new political organisation which will serve as
a tool of the militarybureaucratic dictatorship now being enforced in the country.
State power bodies in China are built on the militarist pattern inherited from Chiang p
Kaishek’s rule. All power is concentrated in the hands of the military, Mao’s yes-
men, who are the bosses of the so-called revolutionary committees. The commanders
of military areas, armies and garrisons are supreme masters in the provinces. They
head the "revolutionary committees" and supervise the “regulation” of Party
organisation!?. Army units are quartered at enterprises, educational establishments
and offices. At industrial plants shops and teams are classed as companies and
squads. The same militarist system is being introduced at government offices and
educational institutions. The army controls the country’s economy and culture.
Commanding army officers issue orders, which workers, peasants, office employees p
and students must carry out unconditionally. This is the way society is being run
today in China, this is the way in which the ideas that all Chinese must be "obedient
bulls,” "eternally unrusting screws" and "Mao’s good soldiers" are translated into
practice. The Chinese people are being driven into barracks and are denied access to
knowledge and culture: according to Mao Tse-tung, "the more a person knows, the
more stupid he becomes.” In the last four years not a single work of fiction has 14
been published and no feature film has been released in the country. All museums
and libraries are closed down. Meanwhile, Mao quotation books and his other
“works” are circulated in 3,000 million copies.
During these years more than 70 million children of school age were deprived of
normal education in school. The country fell short of several million specialists, since
the academic process at institutions of higher learning was broken off. Such is the
result of the practical implementation of Mao’s thesis: "Schools are little tombs out
of which can come nothing but evil; they are shallow ponds swarming with turtles.”
Developing this thesis Mao said in 1964: "The course of science may be cut to half
its present length. Confucius used to teach only six arts: ceremonies, music, arrow
shooting, chariot driving, holy books and arithmetic... No matter how many books
you read, you will not become an emperor... The point today is that, in the first
place, there are many subjects and, secondly, there are many books.”
But despite all this, the Chinese rulers claim they are playing the part of Messiah in p
today’s world.
Barracks, ignorance, arbitrariness and servitude-such is the order of things in China p

today. And the Maoists want to thrust it upon other nations, to "hoist the banner of
Mao Tse-tung’s ideas over the whole world.”
The implementation of "Mao Tse-tung’s ideas" has also led to grave consequences p
in the economic sphere. Instead of developing the economy in a planned and
balanced way on the basis of the objective laws of socialism, Mao and his
supporters, having discarded the Leninist principles of economic management and 15
replaced them by voluntarism, have caused the country to embark on the road of "big
leaps" and militarisation. This resulted in total disorganisation of industry and
agriculture.
The PRC’s economy has twice in the last decade been hurled back below the level p
it had reached in 1957. Only the first Chinese five-year plan wa>3 carried out
successfully; this was at a time when the CPC guided the country’s economic
development on the basis of the objective laws of socialism, drawing on the
experience and relying on the all-round support and assistance of the USSR and
other socialist countries. At that time the PRC ranked among the first in the world in
development rates. But the second fiveyear plan was torpedoed by the "big leap,”
and the third by the "cultural revolution.” As a result, industrial production has not
reached the levels mapped by the second and third five-year plans. It has been
marking time on the 1959 level.
According to Chinese statistics, the People’s Republic of China in 1959 produced p

41,500 million kilowatt-hours of electricity, 348 million tons of coal, 3.7 million tons
of oil, and 18.4 million tons of steel, whereas last year it produced 60,000–65,000
million kilowatt-hours of electricity, 210–225 million tons of coal, 12–13 million tons
of oil, and 12–13 million tons of steel. Grain production remained at the 1957 level
and amounted to 185–190 million tons, while the cotton yield does not exceed 1.6
million tons.
It should be taken into account that the increase in population in the country, p
according to Peking statistics, is about 10 million a year. This means that in the last
ten years per capita production of many major industrial and agricultural items has 16
not risen, but decreased.
Basic foods and manufactured goods are being supplied to the population under a p
strict rationing system.
The military-barrack regime in China, which is pictured by her propagandists as a p

kind of kingdom of universal equality, is really a caricature of socialist relations of
production. The Peking leaders have lately been trying to get the national economy
out of its logjam. Emergency measures are being taken to remedy the situation.
Certain negative consequences of the " cultural revolution" in the sphere of
production are being eliminated, especially chaos and anarchy in economic
management. But the Peking leaders are endeavouring to solve this problem
primarily by military-administrative methods,- by methods of coercion. Meanwhile
living standards of the working people remain to be very low: the wages of the
workers in the last four years have shrunk by at least 10–15 per cent and working
hours have been increased.
The hardships of life in China are aggravated by the Peking authorities’ p

concentration of the main effort on militarisation of the country. More than 40 per
cent of the national budget is set for military purposes. This is done to the detriment
of housing construction, which has all but, stopped, agriculture (appropriations for its
modernisation have been slashed), and education, health and cultural advancement of
the people.
The economy of the People’s Republic of China is actually divided into two parts. p
One comprises a narrow group of sectors connected with military production. This
part enjoys overall priority, and has not been subjected to the "cultural revolution" 17
treatment. The other part of the economy consists of the civil production sectors,
which are told to "lean on their own resources,” and not to expect investments.
This military deformity of the economy makes China’s entire economic and social p
development lopsided.
The Peking leaders have distorted the essence of socialist industrialisation. By p

relying on smallscale enterprises they only preserve the country’s economic
backwardness. The social consequences of this policy are also most negative: the
growth of an organised working class is being retarded.
In these conditions, the Peking propagandists seek to divert the attention of the p
population from the disastrous consequences of the economic policy which the
Maoists have imposed on the nation, to deceive the people with vicious lies that the
USSR and other socialist countries are worse off than China, and thus to neutralise
justified discontent and criticism. The Chinese press publishes practically every day
articles about an "economic crisis" in the Soviet Union. The Peking propagandists
turn everything upside down in their attempt to belittle the achievements of the
Soviet people, to conceal from the population of China the truth about our country.
The following facts are, of course, known to the Peking leaders, but they are p
carefully hidden from the people. In the 1960–69 period in the Soviet Union
production of electricity went up from 292,000 million kilowatt-hours to 689,000
million kilowatt-hours; coal, from 510 million to 608 million tons; oil, from 148
million to 328 million tons; steel, from 65.3 million to 110 million tons; and grain, 18
from 125.5 million to 160.5 million tons.
The Soviet Union today ranks first in the world in the extraction of coal, iron ore p
and manganese ore, and holds first place in Europe and second in the world in the
extraction of oil, smelting of steel, production of electricity, and the output of many
key engineering items, chemicals and other important products.
Major successes have also been scored by the working people of other countries of p
the socialist community. For instance, industrial output in the member-states of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance increased 6.3 times in the 1950– 69 period.
During the same period industrial output in the advanced capitalist states rose only
2.7 times. Today, the CMEA countries, whose populations make up only one-tenth of
the world population, account for about one-third of world industrial output, and
their share in world industrial production is steadily rising.
In the past few years the socialist countries took important steps towards raising the p
efficiency of social production through its intensification on the basis of scientific
and technological progress. They are strengthening fraternal cooperation and working
to promote socialist economic integration. The successes of the socialist world not
only serve the interests of the socialist countries, but have a tremendous
revolutionising effect.
The rapid development of the national economy of the countries of the socialist p
community, whose economic growth rate is outstripping that of the capitalist states;
the improvement of the living standard of the working people; the fact that socialism 19
now leads in a number of fields in science and technology-all these real results of
the creative effort of the peoples of the socialist countries most decisively help to
ensure the victory of the forces of peace, democracy and socialism over imperialism.
This is confirmation of the truth of Lenin’s teaching that we can make the greatest p
impact on the world revolution through our economic policy.
It is appropriate to note here that the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of p
China in 1956 pointed out the following: "The main purpose of the entire work of
the Party is to satisfy to the utmost the material and cultural needs of the people.
Thus it is necessary, on the basis of development of production, to improve the life
of the people, which, in turn, is an essential condition for stepping up the production
activity of the masses."/Peking now declares that concern for the people’s welfare is
"black economism" and "bourgeois degeneration.”
Thus, the basic economic law of socialism is being trampled underfoot in the PRC. p
As a result, production is made to serve the purpose not of steadily improving the
material and cultural standards of the working people, but of building up a military
potential necessary for carrying out expansionist activities in the world-aims totally
alien to the interests of the working masses.
The Peking leaders have weakened the positions of the working class, undermined p
its alliance with the peasantry, and destroyed the socialist superstructure in China,
creating antagonistic relations between the main social sections of society.
Today, four years after the launching of the "cultural revolution,” the contradictions p 20
besetting China’s society remain acute, although it would seem that all measures have
been taken to suppress and exterminate the genuinely revolutionary, internationalist
forces in China, against which the "cultural revolution" was directed. This is why the
Chinese press continues to call for the rooting out of the "handful of enemies,” as all
opponents of the anti-Leninist policy are called. Terror reigns in the country. Frame-
up trials continue to be held in large cities ending in group executions in squares and
stadiums in front of thousands of people.
The forcible assimilation of national minorities is one aspect of the anti-popular p

character of the present regime in China. Annually millions of new settlers are being
sent from Peking, Shanghai and other cities to Hsinchiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and
the Kwangsi-Chuang autonomous district. National minorities (that is, 45 million
people!) are doomed to complete forcible absorption and disappearance as national,
ethnic groups. In the course of the "cultural revolution" local autonomy, already
limited, is turned into a fiction. The majority of national personnel and national
intellectuals have been subjected to repression. The districts inhabited by the national
minorities have become centres of "labour armies" and concentration camps. The
age-old culture and distinctive features of the non-Han peoples-the Uigurs,
Mongolians, Tibetans, Chuangs, Kazakhs, Koreans and others-are being
systematically destroyed. This cruel policy has given rise to unrest and led to
uprisings by the national minorities of China.
More and more troops are being dispatched to break their resistance. Many units are p 21
being brought up to the borders of neighbouring states.
The native population is being driven out of the districts bordering on the Soviet p
Union and the Mongolian People’s Republic. Yet despite all this Peking propaganda
finds it possible to praise the order forced upon the national minorities of China and
at the same time slander the Leninist policy of equality, friendship and fraternity of
the peoples of the Soviet Union.
Here, again, the poisonous weapon of sland« tis required to prevent the truth about p
the USSR reaching the Chinese people.
The experience of national construction in the Soviet Union over a period of more p
than half a century has shown that the CPSU and the Soviet state, by implementing
the Leninist principles of national policy, have succeeded in creating and
strengthening the unshakable moral and political unity of all the peoples of the
USSR, have ensured the genuine blossoming of their economy and culture. This is
proved by data on the development of the Union Republics, former backward
outskirts of tsarist Russia. During the years of Soviet power industrial output in
Uzbekistan increased 70 times over the 1913 level, in Tajikistan 76 times, in
Kazakhstan 124 times and in Kirghizia 152 times. These were areas with an almost
100 per cent illiteracy. Today they have institutes, universities and academies of
sciences and a wide network of schools, libraries, theatres and medical
establishments.
The solution of the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union (and this is one of the p
most acute and difficult problems of social life) is a major achievement of our
socialist system, an important step in mankind’s social development. The attempts of 22
the Peking leaders to discredit the Soviet Union’s national policy only succeeded in
exposing their own anti-socialist, great-Han policy.
The barrack “communism” which they try to establish in China runs counter to the
requirements of a socialist society-the development of the productive forces and
utilisation of the results of the scientific and technological revolution; it runs counter
to the vital interests of the masses-improvement of their material and cultural
standards, development of socialist democracy, and provision of genuine equality of
nations; it runs counter to all the objective processes of social development which
spell victory of scientific socialism.
III
The anti-Leninist course of China’s present leadership is reflected in the field of

foreign policy as well. Preparation for war has been declared a long-term political
course for the entire nation. “Legalised” at the CPC’s 9th Congress was Mao’s thesis
which boils down to the idea that war is inevitable and even desirable. "As for the
question of world war,” Mao said, "it is a case of either war provoking a revolution,
or revolution preventing war.” In explaining the meaning of this formula, Lin Piao at
the CPC’s 9th Congress, and later the Chinese press, invariably li iked revolution
with war. Thus, the newspaper Chieh tang jihpao said that revolution "must of
necessity develop into war.” According to this thesis war is not only something that
cannot be avoided; it is even some-
thing that should be sought. The paper deplores the fact that for a quarter of a 23
century now there has been no world war.
In one of their publications Chinese propagandists bluntly state: "The theory that p
war can be avoided is a dangerous one. . . There is no doubt that there will be a
war. The question is only when, whether it will be soon or not. It is impossible to
avoid war. A determined struggle must be waged against views claiming that war can
be avoided in the obtaining situation.”
By preaching war the Maoists are writing off the interests of world socialism, the p
working people in all lands, and the world revolution. The Peking strategists proclaim
that "a civilisation hundreds of thousands of times better" will be built up on the
ruins of "crushed imperialism and social-imperialism.”
Thus at a conference of Party workers in Chengtu, Mao cynically declared: "If, for p
instance, the atomic bomb hits us, there is really nothing one can do except start
building anew after the war when we may possibly obtain somewhat better results
than now.” In the last ten years whenever there was a heightening of international
tensions, the Peking leadership invariably strove to achieve ona aim: that of heating
up the situation still more and of prodding the world towards war.
After the CPC’s 9th Congress the position of the present Chinese leaders on the p
issue of war and peace has been stated time and again in anti– Soviet tirades which
include the most recent articles. The Chinese leadership is trying to represent the
Soviet Union as a more dangerous enemy than US imperialism. The current
campaign of nation-wide militarisation conducted by the Maoists is accompanied by 24
calls for preparing for war against the USSR and the other socialist countries, for
struggle to overthrow the socialist system in these countries.
The Chinese leaders are trying to divert the people’s attention from the deep social p
and political crisis that has seized the country by whipping up a rabid campaign of
jingoism and of hate towards the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and some
of China’s non-socialist neighbours. They are trying to lay the responsibility for all
the suffering and misery which Mao’s adventuristic course has caused the Chinese
people on "external enemies,” among whom Peking puts first not imperialism, but the
Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. The intensity of the
false and provocatory Peking propaganda about the "threat of an attack on the PRC
from the North" is a matter of common knowledge. Also common knowledge are the
unfounded territorial claims that the leaders of the PRC have been making in recent
years to China’s neighbours including the USSR.
To further these claims and stir up hate toward neighbouring nations the leaders of p
the PRC engineered a number of frontier incidents. Behind the smokescreen of the
war hysteria that has been created in China, a policy is being carried out at an
intense pace of suppressing popular resentment, speeding up the country’s
militarisation and propagandising the inevitability of war.
In Peking pretexts are being sought to justify this policy. One such pretext has been p
discovered in the reactionary garbage of feudal notions about China’s exclusiveness,
about its historically ordained role of leader "beneath the heavens.” This chauvinistic
rubbish is clothed in the form of an "ultra– revolutionary" struggle to assert the 25
"thought of Mao" in the world.
Thus all woven into one piece of fabric are petty-bourgeois adventurism and feudal p
greatpower concepts, “super-revolutionary” phrasemongering and what is actually
anti-revolutionary practice.
The Chinese leaders have displayed great skill and cunning in passing themselves p
off as revolutionary fighters, and Peking as the epicentre of the world revolution. If
we were to believe even for a moment the newspaper tirades and the speechifying of
the Peking leaders, one might think that there they were working round the clock to
promote the cause of the world revolution.
If the Chinese leaders wished to remain faithful to Marxism-Leninism and p

proletarian internationalism the PRC could greatly contribute to the actions of the
revolutionary anti-imperialist forces, and imperialism would have a more limited field
for manoeuvring and launching counterattacks against the revolutionary forces.
However, Peking has made a different choice. China’s present leaders must answer
to the socialist countries, the international working-class and national-liberation
movements for having placed the PRC in opposition to the common front of anti-
imperialist forces.
In an attempt to hold back the world revolutionary process, the imperialists are p
uniting their efforts on an international scale. The Chinese leaders, however, are
spearheading their foreign policies against the cohesion of the countries of the
socialist community, they are trying to undermine the allied relations of the socialist
states-members of the Warsaw Treaty, and interfere with the implementation of the
plans for the further development of socialist economic integration. And this, 26
precisely, is what the imperialists have wanted to achieve.
In the last few years there has not been a single instance where, in a crisis world p
situation caused by aggressive actions of the imperialists, the PRC has joined the
socialist community and the anti-imperialist forces in offering rebuff to the forces of
reaction and aggression.
The leaders in Peking are responsible for dooming some detachments of the p
communist and national-liberation movement in Asia and Africa to defeat by
imposing on these detachments their adventurist tactics. Tens of thousands of
courageous fighters who had trusted the advisers from Peking lost their lives, and the
revolutionary movement in some countries suffered serious setbacks and great losses-
such is the bloody result of the adventurist intrigues and provocations of the Peking
"ultra-revolutionaries.”
The escalation of the US imperialist aggression in Indochina, the continuation of p

Israel’s aggressive actions against the Arab states, the military intervention of the
imperialist powers in the domestic affairs of some states-all these actions are
spearheaded against the national-liberation movement and the social progress of
nations.
The Soviet Government’s Statement of May 4, 1970, noted that "the escalation of p
the US aggression in Indochina makes even more imperative the need for unity and
the strengthening of cohesion of all socialist and anti-imperialist and peace forces in
the struggle against aggression.”
Such is the stand of our Party and Government and of the Soviet people. Such is p
the stand to which the fraternal socialist countries and the MarxistLeninist Parties of 27
the world adhere.
Under these conditions the negative consequences of Peking’s adventurist and p

splitting policies, aimed at undermining the bonds between the main detachments of
the anti-imperialist front, become particularly clear.
Thus, in Asia, the Chinese leadership has been conducting for some years a course p
of undermining the progressive regimes, of provoking conflicts between states, of
isolating the national– liberation struggle of peoples from their real alliesthe countries
of the socialist community and the international communist and workers’ movement.
Moreover, this course of Peking is accompanied by attempts to slander the Soviet
Union’s internationalist policies. The "friends of people" from Peking are trying to
present the political, economic and military support given by the CPSU and the
entire Soviet people to the fraternal socialist countries, to peoples fighting against
imperialist aggression, and to developing countries, as part of a " social-imperialist
policy”; they even concoct monstrous lies about "Soviet neocolonialism.”
According to their logic, it would have been better for the nations fighting against p
imperialism to be severed from the basic revolutionary forces of our time and left to
deal single-handed with a strong and treacherous enemy. This, of course, is actually
what the imperialists are dreaming of as they plan their adventures.
In acting in this manner Peking is telling the imperialists that it does not intend to p
take joint measures with the USSR and other socialist countries against imperialist
aggression. Such a stand undoubtedly offers great comfort to the imperialist circles 28
and encourages them to continue to engage in their anti-popular plans and designs.
Yet another proof of this are the recent events in Indochina.
The leaders in Peking have made it quite clear by their actions that they are p
endeavouring to use the heroic struggle of the peoples for freedom for furthering
their own global intrigues, for they proceed from great-Han dreams of becoming
some new emperors of "great China" that would rule at least Asia, if not the entire
world.
Such a policy contradicts the interests of the world socialist system, the international
communist and workers’ movement, the national– liberation struggle of the peoples;
it contradicts the real interests of the Chinese people. "Super– revolutionariness" in
word and betrayal of the class interests of the working people in deed-such is the
meaning of Maoism in international relations.
IV
The current Chinese leadership is compelled to reckon with the tremendous prestige p
enjoyed by Marxism-Leninism. Mao realizes, of course, that he will not be able to
win the masses and keep them under his control with his name and his “ideas”
alone. For a certain period he disguised himself as a Marxist, and now he is even
trying to pass himself for a successor to Marx and Lenin.
There was a time when many of the notions that constitute Mao Tse-tung’s p
“thought” were regarded as mistakes and delusions owing to Mao’s lack of

experience and theoretical background. Mao himself admitted that he "had various 29
non-Marxist views" and that he had "only a cursory bookish knowledge of
Marxism.” Mao often came under criticism in the CPC and in the Comintern.
The developments in China have revealed the real essence of Maoism, a reactionary p
Utopian petty-bourgeois conception, which, on the theoretical plane, is an eclectic
hotch-potch of widely different views including elements of Confucianism,
anarchism. Trotskyism, and petty-bourgeois nationalism.
Mao took the most conservative aspect of Confucianism-the preaching of p

submissiveness, the glorification of authoritarianism, the cult of the supreme ruler.
From petty-bourgeois views Mao borrowed the ideas about the special revolutionary p
character of the peasants, underrating the vanguard role of the working class.
Reactionary Utopian ideas, born of historical backwardness, are elevated by Mao to
the rank of a new theoretical discovery.
Mao took from the bourgeois nationalist doctrines great-power and chauvinistic p
views, transforming them into a Messianic theory about China’s exclusiveness.
To the Trotskyites Mao owes his ideas about the precedence of political aims over p
the objective laws of social development; about the " tightening of the screws" and
the militarisation of society; the theory that socialism cannot triumph anywhere
before the victory of the world revolution; the theory of export of revolution,
according to which a world war is the only way of carrying out a revolution on the
world scale; and, finally, rabid anti-Sovietism and the methods of conducting
subversive activities in the ranks of the international communist and working-class 30
movement.
Maoism is an anti-Leninist political trend based on “Sinoised” social-chauvinism, p

the " Sinoised Marxism" which was declared at the Ninth CPC Congress "an entirely
new stage of Marxism-Leninism,” accompanied by the suggestion that Mao be placed
"on a much higher level than Marx and Lenin.” This is an open attempt to replace
Marxism-Leninism by Mao’s “ideas” and political directives, which, in their class
nature, are alien to the theory and practice of scientific communism.
But this attempt is doomed to failure. The anti-socialist character of Maoism, its p
theoretical impotency cannot be concealed. Spiritual poverty cannot be compensated
for by the Mao cult.
However “ultra-revolutionary” they may sound, Mao’s ideas boil down to aggressive p
greatHan chauvinism. This is the hidden mainspring of Peking’s entire home and
foreign policy. And this is fraught with grave danger, primarily for the cause of
socialism in China.
The latest wave of anti-Soviet hysteria in Peking was caused by Mao himself; this p
was to be expected and is now confirmed by the press. Recent articles from the
Chinese press contain direct references to Mao’s pronouncements aimed at creating
hate towards the Soviet Union among the Chinese people. Significantly, the articles
also quote a statement Mao made in the mid-fifties when he came out with
protestations of friendship and respect for the Soviet Union.
In 1956 Mao asserted at a CPC Central Committee’s Plenary Meeting that "on the p
whole, Leninism has already been discarded in the Soviet Union.” Exactly a year 31
later he said the following at the jubilee session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in
Moscow devoted to the 40th anniversary of the Great October Revolution: "By
creatively applying the Marxist-Leninist theory to the solution of practical problems,
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has ensured for the Soviet people
continuous victories in the building of a new life. The programme of the
construction of communism in the USSR, put forward by the 20th Congress of the
CPSU, is a great model.”
What is all this if not cynical perfidy as regards our Party and people? p
Now that imperialism is pinning its greatest hopes on ideological subversion in the p
struggle against socialism, the subversive activities of the Maoists aimed at the
weakening and collapse of socialist countries, at splitting the communist movement
and mass progressive organisations, are actually making things easier for the class
enemies of the working people. In this the Chinese leaders are steadily drifting
towards anticommunism. A "shuttle communication" is under way between the
Peking propagandists and the bellicose imperialist ideologists: they adopt each other’s
methods, terminology and "arguments,” and both use the poisoned weapon of anti–
communism. No renegade or hireling of the proletariat’s class enemies has ever done
bigger damage to the world revolutionary process than the Peking leaders are doing
today.
The latest articles from the Peking press and the Maoists’ actions in the p
international arena show that Peking has renewed its subversive activities against the
Marxist-Leninist Parties. The knocking together of renegade pro-Peking groups in 32
various countries for fighting the Communist and Workers’ Parties and carrying out
provocatory actions within the ranks of the working-class and national-liberation
movements has become one of the basic elements of the tactics of the Peking
leaders.
The interests of the world revolutionary movement call for resolute action to rebuff
the subversive and splitting intrigues of the Maoists, for maximum unity in the
struggle against imperialism on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism.
***
For China there is only one way of socialist development, and this way was tested p
in practice by the Chinese people themselves in the years of their struggle for
freedom, in the years of creating a new society within the ranks of the socialist
community. It is the Leninist way to which, as developments in China have shown,
the most experienced and mature sections of Communists and non-Party people,
genuine internationalists, remain faithful. It is this way which the fraternal
Communist and Workers’ Parties have been calling on the Chinese people to follow.
Unity and solidarity with the forces of the world socialist community and the p
revolutionary liberation movement, rehabilitation and consolidation of the truly
socialist basis of Chinese society -this is the only course that accords with the
interests of the Chinese people.
The CPSU and the Soviet Government have been consistently pursuing a policy p
aimed at restoring and promoting friendly relations with China. It is not through our 33
fault that these relations have been spoilt and greatly aggravated. The present state of
relations between the PRC and the USSR and other socialist countries is a result of
the chauvinist policies conducted by the Chinese leadership, a result of its departure
from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
While exposing the anti-Leninist, anti-popular essence of the political and p

ideological directives of the present-day rulers of China, waging a principled struggle
against their factionalist activities within the communist movement and their great-
power foreign policy, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government have
been constantly striving to prevent ideological differences from affecting inter-state
relations.
The Soviet Union takes a clear-cut and unambiguous stand on the Peking p
negotiations on the question of normalising the situation along the Soviet-Chinese
borders. Our country believes that it is necessary to reach an agreement that would
permit turning the borders into a line of goodneighbourliness. As it has been
repeatedly emphasised by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government,
we, while not retreating from our just and principled positions and while defending
the interests of our socialist homeland and the inviolability of its frontiers, will
continue doing everything in our power to normalise our inter-state relations with the
People’s Republic of China.
We cannot, however, close our eyes to the fact that Peking is bent on whipping up p
militaristic psychosis, demanding that the people "prepare for famine, prepare for a
war.” Even the launching of a satellite, made possible by the selfless efforts of 34
Chinese scientists, engineers and workers, is used as an occasion for fanning
nationalistic passions and issuing threats against our country.
If all this is being done with a view to bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet p
Union, one must say in advance that these are vain efforts. The Soviet people have
strong nerves. Our people possess everything necessary to uphold the interests of our
homeland.
We proceed from the belief that the vital and long-range interests of the Soviet and p
Chinese peoples are far from being contradictory. In fact they coincide.
“In jointly following the road charted by Lenin, in waging a joint struggle against p
the sinister forces of imperialist reaction, for the triumph of the sacred cause of
socialism and communism,” L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central
Committee, said in his report at the meeting marking the centenary of the birth of
Lenin, "lies the correct path for the future development of relations between China
and the Soviet Union, and between China and other socialist countries.”
The Soviet people proceeding from this historical path, retain a friendly attitude p
towards the Chinese people. A genuinely socialist and internationalist policy is bound
to triumph in China. Such is the objective logic of historical development.
Pravda, May 18, 1970
***

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<< Concerning the 50th Anniversary of >>
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Vladimirov, V. Ryazanov

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<•> Concerning the 50th 35
Anniversary of the Communist Party

TOC of China
Card O. Vladimirov, V. Ryazanov

Text July 1, 1971, marked the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party p
HTML of China. In the past half-century it has traversed a long and devious road of great
PS achievements as well as grave setbacks. In 1921 small groups of Communists united
PDF to form the Communist Party of China. Relying on the support and experience of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, of the entire international communist
T* movement, the Communist Party of China grew into a mighty vanguard of the
19*
Chinese revolution. It guided this revolution and led the Chinese people to an
### historic victory in October 1949.
People’s China led by the Communist Party became part of the socialist camp, and p
established friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other fraternal states. With
their help the Chinese people concentrated their efforts on strengthening the national
independence of the People’s Republic of China, eliminating the remnants of the
semi– colonial, semi-feudal system and implementing broad democratic reforms. In
accordance with the will of the multi-million working masses the Communist Party
of China led the country along the road of building a socialist society, as defined in
the decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC held in September 1956. The first five-
year plan for the country’s economic development was fulfilled in 1957. The 36
Communist Party of China emerged as a major contingent of the world communist
movement and enjoyed great prestige. It participated in the international meetings of
communist and workers’ parties in 1957 and 1960.
But in the late 1950’s the CPC leadership initiated a foreign and home policy p
which deviated from Marxism-Leninism and essentially contradicted the principles of
proletarian internationalism and the basic laws of socialist construction. It began to
pursue a policy which combined petty-bourgeois adventurism with great-power
chauvinism, camouflaged with “left” phraseology; it openly embarked on a course of
undermining the unity of the socialist community, of splitting the world communist
movement. Peking began to organise Maoist groups in a number of countries, in an
obvious attempt to unite them and turn them against the world communist movement.
This resulted in a considerable weakening of the positions of the Communist Party
and the working class within China and an upsurge of petty-bourgeois, anarchist
elements.
After adopting an ideological and political line which is incompatible with p

Leninism, on the main questions concerning the international situation and the world
communist movement, the Peking leaders demanded that the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union abandon the line adopted by the 20th CPSU Congress and the CPSU
Programme. They conducted intensive anti-Soviet propaganda, presented territorial
claims to the Soviet Union and even brought the matters to armed border clashes in
the spring and summer of 1969.
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/1.2-50th.Anniversary.of.CPC-Vladimirov,Ryazanov[2012-12-18 3:12:56]
The CPSU, together with other fraternal parties, resolutely countered the attempts to p
distort the Marxist-Leninist teaching and to sow discord in the socialist community, 37
the world communist movement and the anti-imperialist front. The CPSU Central
Committee and the Soviet Government displayed restraint and refused to be
provoked while doing everything they could to improve relations with China. The
last one and a half years have seen some signs of a normalisation of USSRPRC
relations, thanks to the initiative and efforts of the Soviet Union. At the same time
the Chinese leadership continued to pursue an anti-Soviet line in their propaganda
and policy; the 9th CPC Congress confirmed in its resolutions an anti– Marxist
course, hostile to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Peking’s actions in
the international arena testify that the foreign policy of the PRC has in fact broken
away from proletarian internationalism and lost its class, socialist content.
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, said at

the 1969 Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties: "It is a big and serious task
to make an all-round MarxistLeninist analysis of the class content of the events in
China over the last few years, and of the roots of the present line of the CPC
leaders, which is jeopardising the socialist gains of the Chinese people.” It is all the
more appropriate, on the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, to
review the path it has travelled, to consider its glorious and hard destiny.
The Communist Party of China was founded as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type. p
At its First Congress the party set the task of carrying out a socialist revolution, 38
establishing the dictatorships of the proletariat and building a classless, communist
society. The Congress adopted a decision on the party’s joining the Comintern. In
early 1922 Lenin had meetings with Chinese Communists.
The emergence and development of the Communist Party of China proceeded in p

extremely complex conditions as a result of China’s economic, social, political and
cultural backwardness and the insufficient numerical strength of the Chinese
proletariat. The general revolutionary movement in China comprised three different
currents: the struggle of the peasantry and the petty national bourgeoisie against the
survivals of feudalism, the nation-wide movement against colonial imperialist
oppression, for national independence, and the proletariat’s struggle for socialism.
At the time when the CPC came into being the working-class movement in China p
was just beginning, and had not yet accumulated the necessary experience in class
struggle. The November 1927 Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee
pointed out: "The CPC began to take shape as a political trend and as a party at a
time when the Chinese proletariat had not yet established itself as a class and when
the class movement of workers and peasants was just emerging. The upsurge of the
national-liberation movement in China, in which the bourgeoisie and especially the
pettybourgeois intelligentsia played a major role in the earlier period, took place long
before the class awareness and class struggle of the exploited masses assumed an
appreciable scale.”
The formation of the revolutionary vanguard of the Chinese proletariat was p

adversely affected by the fact that prior to the Great October Socialist Revolution in 39
Russia Marxism was unknown in China. In the words of Mao Tse-tung, the gun
salvoes of the October Revolution brought MarxismLeninism to China.
In his ‘Left-Wing’ Communism - an Infantile Disorder Lenin wrote the following p

with regard to the history of the establishment of a proletarian party in this country:
"Russia achieved Marxismthe only correct revolutionary theory-through the agony she
experienced in the course of half a century of unparalleled torment and sacrifice, of
unparalleled revolutionary heroism, incredible energy, devoted searching, study,
practical trial, disappointment, verification, and comparison with European experience.
...Russia, in the second half of the nineteenth century, acquired a wealth of
international links and excellent information on the forms and theories of the world
revolutionary movement, such as no other country possessed.” [39•1
The Chinese revolutionaries had had no such experience. p
Thus the formation of the Communist Party in China proceeded in extremely p

difficult conditions. But nevertheless it was a natural and necessary result of the
revolutionary movement which emerged in China under the mighty impact of the
October Revolution, which awakened the revolutionary activity of the working class,
the broad working masses, including the peoples of the colonial and dependent
countries, in all parts of the world.
The "May 4 Movement" was a response to the October Revolution and showed that p
the working people of China were ready for a decisive struggle against imperialist
oppression. It was necessary then to merge the Marxist circles into a party capable of 40
leading the struggle of the young working class, and the democratic and national-
liberation forces against social oppression, against imperialism. Such a party came
into being in the 1920s. Moreover, a strong Marxist core was formed within the
communist movement in China with the help of the Comintern, which set a correct
political course.
The Second Congress which took place in July 1922 confirmed the CPC’s striving p
to become a truly proletarian party. "We must be a real political party created by the
proletarian masses, imbued with a revolutionary spirit, and ready to fight for the
interests of the proletariat and lead the proletarian revolutionary movement,” said the
Resolution on the CPC’s Rules. The Congress called for organisation of the party
after the Bolshevik model and adopted a resolution on joining the Comintern, which
subsequently guided the political and organizing activity of the Chinese Communists.
The world communist movement invariably came to the help of the Chinese
revolutionaries whenever they made mistakes.
The documents of the 2nd, 3rd (June 1923) and 4th (January 1925) Congresses p
regarded the proletariat as the party’s mainstay, the vanguard and then the leader of
the revolution, and the peasantry as the proletariat’s chief ally whose active support
was vitally important for the Chinese revolution. By the time of the 5th Congress
(April-May 1927) the CPC had nearly 58,000 members, more than 50 per cent of
whom were workers and about 19 per cent peasants.
The 6th Congress was an important landmark in the development of the Communist p
Party of China. It was held in June and July 1928 and was attended by a delegation 41
of the Comintern Executive. In February of the same year the 9th plenary meeting of
the Comintern Executive adopted a Resolution on the Chinese Question which
summed up the current developments and the specific features of the revolutionary
movement in China and pointed out that "the Comintern Executive has directed all
its sections to support the Chinese revolution in every way.” Guided by this
resolution the Congress adopted documents which in effect constituted the first
comprehensive programme of the CPC. It outlined the main tasks of the Chinese
revolution: expulsion of the imperialists and unification of the country, complete

elimination of landlord ownership of land and liberation of the peasantry from all
feudal bonds, struggle for the power of Soviets of workers’, peasants’ and soldiers’
deputies as the best form of government for implementing the democratic dictatorship
of the working class and peasantry in China. On the advice of the Comintern
Executive delegation the 6th CPC Congress gave special attention to the development
of the peasant movement and guerrilla struggle under the slogan of agrarian
revolution, with the aim of creating a regular Red Army of workers and peasants
based on guerrilla detachments.
This showed a truly Marxist approach to the problems of the Chinese revolution, the p
solutions to which were worked out by the Communists– internationalists.
But along with the Marxist, internationalist trend in the CPC another, essentially p
petty-bourgeois and nationalist, group was taking shape. At the time of the upsurge
of the national liberation movement radical elements of the petty bourgeoisie joined
the party in great numbers. "Lifted by the wave of revolutionary enthusiasm of the 42
initial period, lacking theoretical Marxist-Leninist schooling, ignorant of the
experience of the international proletarian movement, isolated from the exploited
lower strata of the Chinese people and having taken no part in the class struggle of
the workers and peasants, a considerable part of these revolutionary petty-bourgeois
elements, far from being assimilated by the party and becoming consistent proletarian
revolutionaries, brought into the CPC all the political instability, inconsistency and
indecision, the inability to organise, non-proletarian habits and traditions, prejudices
and illusions characteristic of the petty-bourgeois revolutionary,” stressed the
November 1927 Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee. This tendency,
associated mostly with Mao Tse-tung, later developed into a petty-bourgeois and
nationalist trend which came to be known as Maoism.
The struggle between the Marxist, internationalist trend guided by the ideas p
underlying the Great October Socialist Revolution and the petty– bourgeois,
nationalist trend marked the entire history of the Communist Party of China. This
struggle was reflected in the decisions of the party congresses, in the theories and the
practical activity of the CPC leadership. The conflict between these two trends has
been and remains characteristic of the Communist Party of China. Mao Tse-tung and
his historiographers seek to distort the true picture, to confuse the issue. To this end
they oppose the "true line" of Mao Tse-tung to a host of “wrong” lines, whose
number grows in Peking publications every year. Recently most of the party cadres
have been labelled "those vested with power in the party and following the capitalist 43
road.”
The Marxist-Leninist, internationalist part of the CPC was guided by the theses set p
forth in Lenin’s works and in the documents of the international communist
movement. These theses include the definition of the essential feature of the Chinese
revolution as a combination of the struggle against feudal survivals and the struggle
against imperialism; the need to promote the peasant movement and the revolutionary
struggle in the countryside and to set up strongholds when the revolution is in
decline; the expediency of an alliance with the petty and national bourgeoisie at the
bourgeoisdemocratic stage of the revolution,- the thesis that in China armed
revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution; the necessity of the union of
the Chinese revolutionaries with the USSR, and others. It was the implementation of
these theses by the Communist Party of China that made possible the victory of the
Chinese revolution in 1949. The attitude of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist faction
was quite different. It did not and could not make any positive contribution to the
development of the communist movement in China. The revolutionary movement

suffered setbacks and defeats whenever the petty-bourgeois nationalists wittingly or
unwittingly distorted the Marxist-Leninist theses.
Moreover, in the early years of CPC history the Maoists from time to time p
attempted to make the party follow their line, but were rebuffed and had to retreat. It
is significant that Mao Tse-tung attended only three out of the six CPC congresses
held at that time, and at the 5th Congress was deprived of the right to vote. The
Maoists launched fierce attacks on the CPC when the party met with difficulties. 44
After the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek coup in April 1927 the Communist Party of p
China functioned in conditions of ruthless terror from many sides -from the central
Kuomintang government and the separatist military cliques, from the troops of the
Western imperialist colonialists and the Japanese invaders. The party incurred heavy
losses when the Chinese Red Army retreated to the remote north-western regions of
the country following the tactics of the Maoists. Many fine sons of the party gave
their lives in the struggle for the cause of the working people. The loss of the tried
cadres devoted to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism seriously
weakened the position of the CPC.
This was used to advantage by the representatives of the petty-bourgeois trend. In p

early 1935 they conducted the "enlarged session of the CPC Central Committee
Politbureau" in Tsungyi and captured important posts in the party leadership. In the
autumn of 1941, when the Soviet Union and the entire international communist
movement were concentrating their efforts on the struggle against nazism, they
launched a "drive to streamline the style of work" in the CPC. The aim of the
campaign was to turn the Communist Party of China from the Marxist-Leninist stand
to a petty-bourgeois, nationalist ideological and political platform (the 22 works
selected for compulsory study during the “campaign” were mostly articles and
speeches of Mao Tse-tung, Kang Sheng and other Orthodox Maoists) and remove the
opponents by conducting campaigns of physical and moral terror. After more than
three years of struggle the petty-bourgeois nationalists managed to get the upper 45
hand-the 7th CPC Congress held in 1945 was conducted in an atmosphere of
deification of Mao Tse-tung and it approved "Mao Tsetung’s ideas" as the
ideological platform of the Communist Party of China.
At the same time the obtaining situation and the revolutionary enthusiasm of the p
Chinese people forced the petty-bourgeois nationalists to remain in the mainstream of
the revolutionary struggle.
In 1935 the 7th Comintern Congress advanced the idea of a united anti-imperialist p
front, stressing its particular importance for countries in colonial bondage at a time
of imperialist expansion. In keeping with this thesis a united front of the Communist
Party and Kuomintang in the struggle of resistance against Japanese imperialism
(1937–45) was proclaimed in China, which furnished the basis for rallying all
segments of the Chinese people for the struggle against the foreign invaders. The
petty-bourgeois nationalists sabotaged the united front, seeking every opportunity to
undermine it. Yet they could not ignore the essential needs of the Chinese national-
liberation movement, the courageous struggle of the Marxist-Leninist section of the
CPC leadership for consistent implementation of the Comintern line, and were forced
to retreat. The united front policy helped to make the CPC a mass party, the
vanguard of the Chinese people, a political force of nation-wide significance.
The victory of the Soviet Union over Hitler nazism and militarist Japan was of p
tremendous importance for the Chinese revolution. In 1945–49 the centre of the
Chinese revolutionary movement shifted to Manchuria where active preparation began
with Soviet assistance for the final phase of the struggle for liberating China from 46
colonial and social oppression.
The routing of militarist Japan, in which the Soviet Union played a decisive role, p
strengthened the revolutionary forces in China. The People’s Liberation Army had
then a safe rear and was able to reorganise and improve its combat equipment with
the Japanese arms and materiel captured by the Soviet troops.
The revolutionary forces of China received extensive material assistance from the p
Soviet Union. In Manchuria the Soviet Army and Soviet civilian organisations helped
in every way to rehabilitate the economy, to repair communication lines destroyed
during the war. Thanks to Soviet aid the main railways in central and southern
Manchuria were restarted in a short time and large formations of the People’s
Liberation Army of China were able to regroup and concentrate, which helped to
complete the rout of the Kuomintang army and its expulsion from Manchuria, and
furnished favourable conditions for the decisive offensive in the south.
The Chinese people were able to express their will freely in the areas liberated from p
the Japanese by the Soviet Army and began to set up people’s democratic bodies of
power.
At that time the USSR Government did everything to prevent open military p
intervention by the United States in China, above all in Manchuria.
The visits by Chinese delegations from the people’s democratic regions of p

Manchuria to the Soviet Union in 1945 and 1949 and other forms of consultation (a
group of Soviet party officials stayed in Manchuria from 1945 to maintain close
contact with the North-Eastern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee; in early 1949
a responsible representative of the CPSU had a meeting with the Chinese leaders) 47
were of great importance to the CPC for elaborating a correct political line. This
assistance was all the more valuable since the petty-bourgeois, nationalist section of
the CPC leadership, and Mao Tse-tung first of all, went from one extreme to another
in assessing the forces in the Chinese revolution. In 1945–46, for example, they
overestimated their forces and displayed " revolutionary impatience,” ignoring the
need to conserve forces in order to prepare conditions for a decisive blow and the
need to combine the political and diplomatic forms of struggle with the build-up of
the military potential. On the contrary, in 1948–49, after the Kuomintang offensive
and the loss of Yenan in 1947, the same group in the CPC leadership showed
disbelief in the possibility of an early victory and proved helpless in dealing with
practical questions connected with the establishment of people’s power all over
China.
Manchuria with its well-developed industry and the large share of the country’s p
working class, its strong party organisations, and also thanks to the fact that it
borders on the Soviet Union, became in 1945–49 a strategic bridgehead from which
the People’s Liberation Army was able to launch a powerful offensive and quickly
liberate the whole country from the Chiang Kai-shekites and their imperialist patrons.
The long and heroic struggle of the Chinese people was crowned with a glorious p
victory. In the vanguard were Communists true to Marxism– Leninism and
proletarian internationalism. At every stage of that struggle the Communist Party of
China had leaders who represented everything best in the Chinese revolutionary
48
movement. These were the Chinese Communists whose real role was subsequently
ignored or wilfully distorted by the Maoists for the sake of extolling Mao Tse-tung
as the only leader of the Chinese revolutionary movement and creating a myth about
his infallability. Many of them perished in revolutionary battles or were forced out
from the CPC leadership, but their glorious memory lives on.
The fraternal union of the Chinese revolutionaries and the USSR compensated for
the relative weakness and disunity of the Chinese working class; it promoted the
consolidation of the internal forces of the Chinese revolution and protected them
against the import of counter-revolution. The victory of the Chinese people
convincingly proved the correctness of Lenin’s thesis that ”. . .this revolutionary
movement of the peoples of the East can now develop effectively, can reach a
successful issue, only in direct association with the revolutionary struggle of our
Soviet Republic against international imperialism.” [48•1
II
The formation of the People’s Republic of China and the establishment in China of p
people’s demo- : cratic power under the guidance of the Commun- i ist Party, the
extensive and disinterested assistance I of the USSR and other fraternal countries,
and the changed balance of class forces in the international arena in favour of
socialism opened before the Chinese people broad possibilities of successful building
of socialism. In the first years after the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China the Communist Party drafted concrete ways of carrying out socialist 49
construction. In 1953 the CPC’s general line in the transition period was made
public, which called for mobilising all the forces for making China a mighty socialist
state.
In 1956, the 8th CPC Congress elaborated and endorsed the course of building a p
socialist society in the People’s Republic of China. At the same time the Congress
proclaimed that "the Communist Party of China is guided in its activity by Marxism-
Leninism. Marxism-Leninism alone correctly interprets the laws of social
development, shows the correct ways of building socialism and communism.” This
thesis did away with the idea of "Sinoised Marxism" and with "Mao Tse-tung’s
thought" as the CPC’s ideological platform set forth at the 7th Party Congress in
1945.
The cause of socialism seemed to have acquired a strong foundation in China. But p
the petty– bourgeois nationalists in the CPC leadership did not lay down their arms.
They continued to deal underhand blows at the section of the party leadership and
rank-and-filers that adhered to positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism.
In the mid-50’s the People’s Republic of China entered "the core of the p
revolutionary course,” to use Lenin’s expression. Radical changes were carried out in
the non-socialist economic sectors. The achievements of the first five-year plan
period furnished the basis for further advancement, for organising large-scale socialist
production under strict government control. The prospect of complete elimination of
the petty-owner element became quite real. This naturally aroused the resistance of
that element, greater vacillations, which, in turn, affected the petty-bourgeois, 50
nationalist elements in the CPC leadership. "In April 1956 ... we began to advance
our own line of construction,” Mao Tsetung admitted at a meeting of the CPC
Central Committee in 1958.
Lenin characterised the vacillations of the pettyowner element as follows: "This p

wavering flows in two ‘streams’: petty-bourgeois reformism, i.e., servility to the
bourgeoisie covered by a cloak of sentimental democratic and ‘Social-Democratic’
phrases and fatuous wishes; and petty-bourgeois revolutionism-menacing, blustering
and boastful in words, but a mere bubble of disunity, disruption and brainlessness in
deeds.” [ 50•1
At first Mao Tse-tung and his followers took the road of petty-bourgeois reformism. p
Even within the framework of CPC’s general orientation to scientific socialism they
advanced "new political stipulations,” which reflect right-wing opportunism.
In April 1956 the Maoists proclaimed a "course of prolonged coexistence of the p

Communist Party with bourgeois-democratic parties and reciprocal control between
them" (italics added) which in practice undermined the CPC’s leading role in society
and provided the bourgeois parties which remained in the People’s Republic of
China with an effective instrument for struggle for power. In practice the Maoist
slogan "May hundred flowers blossom" amounted to legalising anti-Marxist, anti-
socialist views and undermined the authority of the proletarian ideology in the
country. The theory of "contradictions within the people" which considered the
contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie as non–
antagonistic, lulled the vigilance of the working people and played into the hands of 51
the enemies of socialism.
The national bourgeoisie took advantage of these "new stipulations" to launch an p

open attack on socialism in the spring of 1957. The social and political system in the
People’s Republic of China, the system of economic management, all public
organisations were being criticised and discredited. Demands were made to annul the
changes that had been carried out in capitalist industry, handicraft production and
agriculture. Calls were made for physical extermination of Communists, for smashing
the CPC and its leadership. The petty-bourgeois, nationalist CPC leaders, concerned
about their own safety, above all else, hastened to introduce corrections in their "new
stipulations.” The working class and the Communists beat back the bourgeois
onslaught. But the shift in the CPC leadership’s policy to the right, the proclaiming
of opportunist “courses” and “slogans” had done their job-they further increased the
influence of the petty– bourgeois ideology.
The successful completion of the first five-year plan, the growth of the country’s p
economic and military might and of the international prestige of the Communist
Party of China and the People’s Republic of China were appraised by the Maoist
leaders from a petty-bourgeois standpoint. Now they turned eagerly to petty-
bourgeois revolutionism, reflected by the so-called three red banners policy
announced in 1958. Replacing the former CPC general line which provided a definite
plan of socialist construction a new "general line" was proclaimed in the form of a
vague appeal: "To strain all forces, to strive forward, to build socialism according to
the principle ’more, faster, better and more economically.’ " The "great leap" and the 52
setting up of "people’s communes" were declared the basis of the country’s economic
policy. In the international arena the line was to heighten tension, attain world
hegemony, worsen relations with the USSR and other socialist states.
The Communist Party of China found itself unable to cope with the consequences of p
these " innovations,” and a considerable portion of its membership began to waver.
This happened not only because the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres had been
paralysed and ousted from leadership by that time. The fact is that owing to the
specific conditions in which the party had developed, and to the cadres policy that
had been pursued for many years by the petty-bourgeois section in the party, the
petty-owner elements had become the dominating trend in the Communist Party of
China.
According to official Chinese data, in the late 50s the share of workers among party p
members was 14 per cent and of peasants, 69 per cent.
We must not forget in this connection Lenin’s warning that ”. .. we constantly p

regard as workers people who have not had the slightest real ex- I perience of large-
scale industry. There has been case after case of petty bourgeois, who have become
workers by chance and only for a very short time, being classed as
workers”. [ 52•1 Thus it happens that the proletarian character of a party does not
rule out a possible predominance, and in a very short time, of petty-owner elements.
Neither should we forget Lenin’s teaching that whenever former small owners join p
the party in vast numbers ”. . .the proletarian policy of the party is not determined 53
by the character of its membership, but by the enormous undivided prestige enjoyed
by the small group which might be called the Old Guard of the Party.” [53•1
To be sure, the difficulties faced by the Communist Party of China were not p
insurmountable. As experience shows, the petty-bourgeois threat can be coped with if
the party follows the Marxist– Leninist teaching at all times and in everything, if it
tirelessly works to strengthen the alliance of the working class and the peasantry
under the leadership of the former, if it is guided by the basic interests of the
working people. Yet the Maoists staked on petty-bourgeois prejudices, ignoring the
basic interests of the working class, the peasantry and the working intelligentsia.
Moreover, the systematic “purges” struck first of all at the party old guard,
eliminating the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres.
The home and foreign policy advanced by the petty-bourgeois, nationalist section in p
the CPC leadership had a disastrous effect on China’s economy and brought about
real calamities in the country. Added to this were severe droughts and floods for
three years in succession. As a result, according to various estimates, the gross
national product in the People’s Republic of China fell by one-third, industrial output
was halved and the national income shrunk by more than one-quarter.
In the face of this the CPC leadership made changes in its home policy, although p
the "three red banners" slogan was not officially retracted. At the cost of tremendous
efforts of the working people and thanks to the return, to a certain extent, to
socialist economic forms, the People’s Republic of China managed to regain the 54
1957 level of industrial and agricultural production by the end of 1964. But the
country’s population grew considerably during this period. In 1964 China exploded
its first atomic bomb and joined the nuclear-rocket arms race despite its limited
resources. Enormous sums had also been spent by Peking since 1960 for propaganda
and subversion against the world communist movement and for pursuing its great-
power foreign policy. The rupture of the PRC’s cooperation with socialist states did
irreparable damage to the country. As a result, difficulties continued to mount in
China.
The strife inside the CPC leadership was further aggravated. The key issue now was p
the question of the country’s further development. The choice was between returning
to the time-tested practice of socialist construction in close cooperation with the
Soviet Union and other fraternal countries, and following the petty-bourgeois,
nationalist road. In his talks with foreign visitors Mao Tse-tung admitted that attitude
to the Soviet Union represented a main aspect of the strife within the CPC
leadership.
It should be stressed that the positions of the working class in the PRC were p
seriously weakened at that time. The destruction, during the "big leap,” of large-scale
industry which Lenin called the proletariat’s "vital basis" and the curtailment of
industrialisation deprived it of its class strength and undermined its ability to resist
petty-bourgeois vacillations. Meanwhile the influence of the pettyowner, anarchist
element on developments in the country and its fluctuations continued despite the
fact that agriculture was put on a cooperative basis. Lenin thus characterised the main 55
features of this element: "It will take collectives, collective farms and communes
years to change this.” [55•1 The Maoists took advantage of all these factors to get
the upper hand in the CPC leadership.
Quite obviously this course of events was not fatally inevitable, even in the
complex conditions of the People’s Republic of China. After the successful
completion of the first five-year plan in 1957 the country was on the threshold of
new achievements in economic and cultural development, in promoting democracy,
and in foreign affairs. Such achievements would undoubtedly have taken place had
the CPC leadership pursued a genuinely Marxist-Leninist policy, had it safeguarded
and enhanced the party’s leading role, had it promoted in every way the growth of
the ranks of the working class, its political awareness and its influence in society.
But it was China’s misfortune that the party and the country came to be guided by
the representatives of petty-bourgeois, nationalist views and aspirations. Their activity
furnished conditions for further attacks by the small-owner element against the
working class, which gradually turned into a frontal assault. It began at a signal
from Mao Tse-tung who called for "opening fire at the headquarters" (i.e., party
organisations). It became the notorious "cultural revolution.”
III
Lenin wrote the following with regard to the possible outcome of the struggle p
against the anarchist element represented by the small owner: 56
“Either we subordinate the petty bourgeoisie to our control and accounting (we can p
do this if we organise the poor, that is, the majority of the population or semi-
proletarians, round the politically conscious proletarian vanguard), or they will
overthrow our workers’ power as surely and as inevitably as the revolution was
overthrown by the Napoleons and the Cavaignacs who sprang from this very soil of
petty proprietorship. That is how the question stands. That is the only view we can
take of the matter. . .” [56•1
The negative results of the "cultural revolution" are generally known. The situation p
in the People’s Republic of China developed in the direction of the second variant
predicted by Lenin. In the course of the "cultural revolution" the political system of
the People’s Republic of China as a state governed by the working class was
destroyed. The bodies of people’s power ceased to function. The Communist Party of
China itself as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type was paralysed from top to
bottom. The trade unions, the Young Communist League, all other public
organisations, including the young pioneers, were disbanded. All spheres of socio-
political, economic and cultural life were put under the army’s control. The result
was what Lenin called a "shitt of power,” the ousting of the working class from the
real bodies of power and the loss by its party of the leading position in society. A
military-bureaucratic dictatorship came into being in China. The proletarian ideology–

MarxismLeninism-was deprived of its leading role in society and replaced with "Mao
Tse-tung’s ideas.”
In order to step up and legalise this process of “shift of power" the Maoists broke p 57
away completely from the ideological and organisational principles formulated by the
Communist Party of China at its 8th Congress in 1956. This took place at the 9th
CPC Congress held in April 1969. The Congress confirmed the omnipotence of the
army whose representatives headed the "revolutionary committees" that replaced the
elective local bodies of power in the course of the "cultural revolution.” The army
actually seized the highest party organs set up by the Congress, for career servicemen
formed a majority of the members and candidate members of the Central Committee
Politbureau (15 out of 25) and the CPC Central Committee (145 out of 279); this
did not include persons who formerly served in the army or were closely connected
with it. The Congress advanced as a programme slogan the preparation for war and
approved the Maoist thesis on militarising the country. The Party Rules adopted by
the Congress proclaim "Mao Tse-tung’s thought" to be Marxism-Leninism of the
modern epoch. Though the Maoists use the term "democratic centralism" quite often
in the official press, in reality all their activity is aimed at abolishing inner-party
democracy and establishing barracks rules in the party. The Party Rules in effect
envisaged the creation, under the name of the Communist Party of China, of a new
political organisation which would serve as an obedient tool of the military-
bureaucratic dictatorship.
However, the formation of such an organisation dragged out in the face of serious p
difficulties. Thus Peking propagandists are forced to return once again to the question
of "streamlining and upbuilding the party organisations,” "cleaning up the party,” etc. 58
On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China the work of
forming provincial party committees was stepped up, although many district and other
local party organizations had not yet been established. The delegates to the
conferences (called “congresses” by the Chinese press) which form provincial party
committees were in fact appointed by the heads of the respective "revolutionary
committees.” The latter became the leaders of the new party committeesnearly all of
them being representatives of the army.
One indication that the petty-bourgeois nationalists are running into difficulties is the p
fact that they are forced to restore the former organisational structure which was
crushed during the "cultural revolution" under their instructions. The party Central
Committee continues to exist, though only formally, as does its Politbureau, and
medium– level and lower party links are being formed, though slowly. They have
been and are being "set up" by methods far removed from the Marxist-Leninist party
norms. Their members are predominantly servicemen, while the Politbureau includes
people closely connected with Mao Tse-tung (his wife, his private secretary, his
former bodyguard, etc). But this structure may come to play a positive part should
conditions in the party and the country take a favourable turn. Besides, the present
CPC leadership is faced with the necessity of reinstating some of the former party
cadres, who were persecuted or discredited during the "cultural revolution.”
Another indication of such difficulties encountered by the Maoists is that despite the p
many years of propaganda and mass “brainwashing” and the “re-cducation" of the 59
CPC members and party functionaries in the "May 7 schools,” which differ only
slightly from concentration camps, and the worst manifestations of the personality
cult, the attempt to inculcate "Mao Tse-tung’s thought" in the minds of the Chinese
Communists and the advanced sections of the Chinese people has obviously met with
resistance. Only this can explain why, in the conditions obtaining in the People’s
Republic of China today, the Peking press has suddenly begun pointing out the need
to study the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. There is little doubt that the main
purpose of this “study” is to bolster the influence of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist
ideology-"Mao Tse-tung’s thought"-under the slogan of " disseminating Marxism-
Leninism.” The People’s Republic of China has printed, along with Mao Tse-tung’s
works, ten million copies of the works of Marx and Lenin. This is, of course, a
mere drop in the ocean, considering the enormous population of the People’s
Republic of China and the fact that during the "cultural revolution" the number of
copies of Mao Tse-tung’s “quotations” and other works exceeded the astronomical
figure of three thousand million, and that the publication of Mao Tse-tung’s works is
continuing.
The resistance encountered by the Maoists in implementing their plans testify to the p
unceasing opposition offered by the healthy forces inside the CPC. The true
Communists of China are in a difficult position now, but they are there, and in no
small number. They have the constructive programme for China’s development along
the socialist road and the decisions of the 8th CPC Congress, which the 9th
Congress had nothing to counter with.
However complicated the present situation in China may be, the resurgence of the p 60
Communist Party of China as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type, its reunification
with the world communist movement, the return of the People’s Republic of China
to the road of scientific socialism and friendship with the USSR, its cohesion with
the socialist community-these are objective demands of Chinese society. All the more
so since there remain elements of the socialist basis in China. And despite the fact
that these surviving socialist elements in the economy and social structure are
neutralised by the military-bureaucratic dictatorship and deformed by the anti-socialist
policy, so long as the economic basis of society has not undergone qualitative,
radical changes, it can serve as the basis for China’s development in a positive
direction.
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at

the 1969 Meeting of the Communist and Workers’ Parties: "We do not identify the
declarations and actions of the present Chinese leadership with the aspirations,
wishes and true interests of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people.
We are deeply convinced that China’s genuine national renascence and its socialist
development will be best served not by struggle against the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, against the whole communist movement, but by alliance and
fraternal cooperation with them.”
***
The 50-year experience of the Communist Party of China is highly instructive not p
only to the parties functioning in countries whose level of development is similar to
that of China, but to the entire communist movement. The main conclusion to be 61
drawn from this experience is that a Communist Party must constantly strengthen its
combat efficiency. Lenin stressed, when speaking of the need for a determined
struggle against the forces and traditions of the old society: "The force of habit in
millions and tens of millions is a most formidable force. Without a party of iron that
has been tempered in the struggle, a party enjoying the confidence of all honest
people in the class in question, a party capable of watching and influencing the
mood of the masses, such a struggle cannot be waged successfully.” [61•1
The fate of the Communist Party of China confirms once again Lenin’s thesis that p
the struggle ".. .against the most deep-rooted petty-bourgeois national prejudices,
looms ever larger with the mounting exigency of the task of converting the
dictatorship of the proletariat from a national dictatorship (i.e., existing in a single
country and incapable of determining world politics) into an international one (i.e., a
dictatorship of the proletariat involving at least several advanced countries, and
capable of exercising a decisive influence upon world politics as a whole).” [61•2
These words deserve special attention in our time when the world socialist system is
emerging as a decisive factor in mankind’s development.
Maoism as an ideological and political trend is essentially hostile to Marxism- p

Leninism; it substitutes sophistry and eclecticism for materialist dialectics and
voluntarism, for a materialist interpretation of history. A parasite drawing sustenance
from socialist ideology, this trend in effect denies the guiding role of the working 62
class in the socialist transformation of society, the role of the Communist Party as
the vanguard of the working class, and in every way belittles the role of the masses
in history. While employing anti-imperialist verbiage the Maoists are in fact opposed
to the international communist movement; they engage in subversive activities against
the Marxist-Leninist parties and seek to force their nationalist programme on the
latter.
That is why in waging a struggle against Maoism one must proceed from an p
awareness of the incompatibility of the aims of Maoism as a form of social-
chauvinism with the aims of the world communist and liberation movement, with the
basic principles of Marxism-Leninism concerning socialist construction, international
affairs and revolutionary strategy and tactics. The defence of violence and
overestimation of the power of the bayonet, great-power chauvinism and claims for
world hegemony, the so-called revolution in the sphere of superstructure, which
means substitution of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship for the people’s democratic
social system, and militarisation of society-all this has nothing in common with
scientific socialism.
That is why the 24th CPSU Congress fully approved the principled Leninist line p
and the concrete steps taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet
Government in Soviet-Chinese relations. It noted: "In a situation in which the
Chinese leaders came out with their own specific ideological– political platform,
which is incompatible with Leninism, and which is aimed against the socialist
countries and at creating a split of the international communist and the whole anti- 63
imperialist movement, the CC CPSU has taken the only correct stand-a stand of
consistently defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism, utmost strengthening of
the unity of the world communist movement, and protection of the interests of our
socialist Motherland.”
Our party, all Soviet people firmly reject the slanderous fabrications of the Chinese p
propagandists with regard to the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government,
borrowed from the arsenal of Chiang Kai-shek clique and other anti-communist
fanatics.
At the same time the 24th Congress confirmed the CPSU’s course of normalising p
relations between the USSR and the PRC, of restoring good– neighbourly relations
and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party Soviet p
Communists send fraternal greetings to the Communists and working people of
China. The Soviet people are convinced that ultimately good-neighbourly relations
and friendship will be restored between the USSR and the People’s Republic of
China, since this meets the basic interests of the Chinese and Soviet peoples, the
interests of the world socialist system, of the revolutionary, liberation movement of
all the oppressed, the interests of universal peace.
Kommunist, No. 10, 1971
***

TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 39•1 ] Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 31, pp. 25–26.
[ 48•1 ] Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 30, p. 151.
[ 55•1 ] Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 32, p. 27fi.
[ 56•1 ] Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 32, p. 332. 56
[ 61•1 ] Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 31, pp. 44–45.
[ 61•2 ] Ibid., p. 148.
< >

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<•> Concerning 64
the 50th Anniversary

TOC of the Communist Party of China
Card I. Alexandrov

Text Half a century ago, on July 1, 1921, the inaugural congress of the Communist Party p
HTML of China (CPC) took place in Shanghai. It proclaimed the foundation of the
PS Communist Party of China, a proletarian party of a new type. The congress
PDF documents stated that the Party’s aim was to bring about the dictatorship of the
proletariat, build socialism and fight for communism, and that the Party was
T* connected with the Communist International.
19*
Since then the CPC has traversed a long and thorny path. It headed the struggle of
###
the Chinese people for national and social liberation, led them to the victory of the
revolution, and directed China along the socialist road of development. The Party
was able to fulfil this task because the Communists, guided by the great Marxist-
Leninist teaching, expressed the aspirations of the people and waged an unremitting
struggle against imperialism, the compradore bourgeoisie and feudal lords, against
petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, left-wing and right-wing deviations, chauvinism
and nationalism. The Marxist-Leninist, internationalist– minded members of the Party
constantly fought against the petty-bourgeois, nationalist forces to bring about the
triumph of the ideals of scientific communism.
65
I
The founding of the Communist Party of China was a result of the stepped-up p
political activity of the rising working class and the upsurge of the revolutionary
democratic and national-liberation movement in the country in the wake of the Great
October Socialist Revolution and the successes of young Soviet Russia.
Li Ta-chao, pioneer of Marxism in China and, later on, a co-founder of the CPC p
and one of its leading theorists, a Communist-internationalist, said the following
about the significance of the October Revolution for China:
“We should greet the Russian revolution with pride as the beacon of a new world p
civilisation. We have to lend an attentive ear to the news from new Russia which is
being built on the principles of freedom and humanism. Only then shall we keep up
with world progress.”
In China, the struggle for social emancipation of the working people was closely p
tied in with the tasks of antinimperialist struggle. The main obstacle to the revolution
at the time was imperialism which had made the country its semi-colony. Lenin’s
view that capital is "an international force" was confirmed in the course of the
liberation struggle which developed in China under the Party’s guidance. An
international alliance of workers, their international brotherhood, is needed to
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/1.3-50th.Anniversary.of.CPC-Alexandrov[2012-12-18 3:13:07]
vanquish this force, he wrote. The Communist Party and the people of the Soviet
Union, the world communist and workers’ movement became a reliable ally for the
CPC and the working people of China.
The Communist International and the Soviet Communists gave the Chinese p
revolutionaries the necessary practical assistance in organising the first Marxist 66
groups which appeared in China after the anti-imperialist "Fourth of May Movement"
of 1919, and in rallying them on the basis of proletarian Marxist-Leninist ideology.
The decisions of the Second Congress of the Communist International and Lenin’s
speeches at this congress on the national and colonial questions served as an impetus
and ideological basis for the unification of Chinese Marxist-revolutionaries. The
Communist International gave considerable assistance to the Chinese revolutionaries
in assimilating Marxist-Leninist theory and the experience of the Leninist Party of
Bolsheviks.
Right from the first the CPC found itself in the crucible of the national-democratic p
revolution and put forward an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal programme. The period
between the first and third congresses of the CPC, that is prior to 1924, was a
period of Party organisational and ideological growth. In 1922 the CPC was admitted
to the Communist International. At its Third Congress (1923) the Party advanced the
policy of building a united national-revolutionary front with the Kuomintang then
headed by the great revolutionary democrat Sun Yat-sen.
The anti-imperialist action of the people, with the working class as its chief force, p
kept mounting in China. For this reason it became urgent for the CPC to ensure
proletarian hegemony in the national revolution at that time. The Hong Kong and
Canton sailors’ strike, the general strike of the Shanghai workers, and the growth of
the peasant movement in the country showed that the proletariat was the main
support of the Party, the vanguard of the revolution, and that the peasantry was the 67
principal ally of the proletariat, an ally without whose support the victory of the
revolution in China was impossible.
The counter-revolutionary coup staged in 1927 by the right wing of the Kuomintang p
headed by Chiang Kai-shek led to the collapse of the united front. The Communist
Party of China and those supporting it were subjected to bloody terror. Hundreds of
thousands of sons and daughters of the Chinese people were victimised. Among
those who perished were such outstanding leaders of the CPC as Hsiang Chung-fa
and Chu Chiu-po, CPC Central Committee General Secretaries,- Peng Pai, a
prominent leader of the peasant movement; Chang Tai-lei, CPC leader and organiser
of the Young Communist League of China; Su Chaocheng, leader of the famous
Canton Commune, and Fang Chih-min, founder of one of the first revolutionary
bases of the CPC.
Another feature that complicated the situation was the right-wing deviation that p
developed in the CPC at the time. It led to undermining the Party’s ties with the
masses, hampered making use of the experience of the world communist movement
and implementing Comintern recommendations. The Sixth CPC Congress (1928),
convened at such a critical time for the Party, discussed the tasks of the Party in the
new situation. The Congress resolutions were elaborated with a view to the
international experience of the revolutionary movement and dealt with basic problems
such as the strategy and tactics of developing the agrarian revolution, the building of
the armed forces and the establishment of strongholds in the rural areas. The
directive worked out by the Congress defined ways of developing the Chinese
revolution.
The late twenties and first half of the 30’s again proved quite complex for the p 68
Party. The Communists were constantly persecuted by the reactionaries. In the Party
proper petty-bourgeois elements became active and in the mid-30’s seized the key
Party positions.
The Chiang Kai-shekites launched terror against the CPC, while conducting an anti- p
Soviet campaign, followed by armed provocations on the Soviet-Chinese frontier. The
Chinese Communist– internationalists resolutely exposed the reactionary meaning of
Chiang Kai-shek’s slogan calling for war against the Soviet Union and slanderously
trying to accuse the USSR of "red imperialism.”
Everyone is aware of the disaster which befell the Chinese people as a result of this p
counter– revolutionary policy. Subsequent events showed that every time the enemies
of China, the enemies of socialism inside the country attempted to weaken the
revolutionary movement, to make it deviate from the right course, they inevitably
whipped up a wave of anti-Sovietism. Such was the case in the years of the struggle
for the liberation of China. The same was true of nationalist and bourgeois elements
later on.
In that trying period for the CPC, the Soviet Communists initiated a mighty p
international movement in defence of the Chinese patriots. The Comintern called
upon all the Communists of the world to render "every kind of support to the
Chinese revolution.”
The Japanese imperialist aggression against China caused a reshuffling of forces in p

the country, and made the question of saving the nation paramount. Speaking at the
Comintern in 1936, G. Dimitrov stressed that the task of the CPC, was to "achieve 69
unification of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people against the Japanese
invaders.” The CPC Central Committee took the initiative in establishing a united
anti-Japanese front. This slogan conformed to the main interests of the Chinese
people and, because of its importance in the anti-Japanese struggle, the CPC became
a very influential national force.
The war against Japan was long and hard. The defeat of Hitlerite fascism and p
Japanese militarism made possible China’s final liberation from the Japanese
invaders. The decisive part in winning victory over these ultra-reactionary forces of
imperialism was played by the Soviet Union. This provided highly favourable
conditions for the victory of the people’s revolutions in a number of countries of
Europe and Asia, including China. The liberation mission of the Soviet Union in the
Far East, the routing of Japan’s crack Kwangtung Army, the liberation of Manchuria
with the active participation of the troops of the Mongolian People’s Republic, the
Chinese and Korean guerrillasall this resulted not only in the surrender of Japan and
ridding China of the foreign yoke, but also predetermined the possibilities for the
subsequent defeat of the Chiang Kai-shekites. Thanks to the Soviet Union, US
intervention of China was prevented.
The military-revolutionary base set up by the Chinese Communists with the p

assistance of the Soviet Army and Soviet civilian specialists in Manchuria greatly
contributed to the victory of the Chinese revolution. This was the bridgehead from
which the completely reorganised, trained and rearmed National Liberation Army
under the leadership of the Communist Party of China drove out the Kuomintang 70
reactionaries from China.
The victory of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution in China was a
major event which greatly influenced world development. The success of that
revolution marked the victory of Marxism-Leninism in China. International solidarity,
the close ties of Chinese revolutionaries with the international communist and
working-class movement, the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union and other
countries of the world socialist system ensured the victory of the Chinese people, the
Chinese workers, peasants and intelligentsia in the many-year selfless struggle they
had waged under the leadership of the Communist Party of China.
II
The victory of the revolution paved the way for the Chinese people to radical p
political, social and economic transformations. The objective requirements of the
further development of the revolution, with China taking the socialist road, as well as
the threat posed by imperialism, made it imperative for China to establish the closest
friendly ties with the USSR and other socialist countries which could render the PRC
the necessary political, military and economic support and assistance.
True to the great principles of proletarian, socialist internationalism, the CPSU and p
the Soviet people, just as during the years of revolutionary struggle, rendered the
Chinese people all the necessary support in building socialism. With the assistance of
the USSR more than 250 large modern industrial enterprises and other projects were
built in China. As the leaders of the CPC admitted, these enterprises became "the 71
backbone of China’s industry.” "The assistance of the Soviet Union in the economic
construction of our country," Jenmin jihpao wrote at that time, "both quantitatively
and in scale is unprecedented in history.”
During the first decade following the founding of the PRC, the basis of socialism p
was laid in the country-an economic basis which provided opportunities for further
socialist construction.
The 8th CPC Congress, held in 1956 under the banner of strengthening the Marxist- p
Leninist forces in the Party, occupies a special place in the Party’s history, in the
life of the Chinese people. It confirmed the general line of building socialism in
close alliance with the countries of the world socialist system.
The 8th CPC Congress gave a principled rebuff to the nationalist and chauvinist p
tendencies in ideology and policy which had been manifested in the Party and the
country. In the "Fundamental Theses of the Programme" of the CPC Rules adopted
by the Congress, the ideological-theoretical foundation of the Party was resolutely
stressed: "The Communist Party of China is guided in its activities by Marxism-
Leninism.”
Having mapped out concrete ways and means of continuing socialist transformations p
and having determined the major tasks in developing the country’s national economy,
the 8th Congress stressed that the basic aim of the Party’s entire activities is "the
fullest satisfaction of the material and cultural requirements of the life of the people.”
In the foreign policy sphere the Congress defined as the major task the need "to p
continue to strengthen and consolidate the eternal and inviolable fraternal friendship 72
with the great Soviet Union and all People’s Democracies.”
Aware of the complex tasks of socialist construction facing the Party and the p
country, and mindful of the lessons of CPC development, the Congress urged the
Party to be vigilant and resolutely combat all manifestations of great-power
chauvinism and petty-bourgeois nationalist ideology. The resolution of the Eighth

Congress read: "If we submit to the influence of non-proletarian ideology, display
conceit and complacency, fancy ourselves infallible, and stop learning with all
modesty, we shall, as before, fail to avoid the evil of subjectivism.” Further
developments showed how timely this warning was.
Nurturing plans which were entirely at variance with the line of the Eighth p
Congress, the greatpower nationalist elements within the CPC considered the time
was not ripe to implement them and, concealing their true intentions, had to vote for
the basic propositions of the Congress. Later on, however, Mao Tse-tung and his
following took action to scuttle the Congress decisions. They opened the lock-gate to
the surging wave of petty– bourgeois pressure on the Party and the working class.
Capitalising on the Chinese people’s desire to build socialism in the shortest possible
space, advocates of this course used “left”-revolutionary slogans to plunge the
country into the voluntarist "great leap" experiments. At the 1959 Lushan Plenum of
the CPC Central Committee, Marxist-Leninist forces in the Communist Party of
China characterised this line as an expression of "petty-bourgeois fanaticism,” for
which even then the Chinese people had paid dearly.
The nationalist group in the CPC leadership kept enforcing their own platform on p 73
the Party and the country. By working up nationalist and jingoist sentiments, they
sought to gear Chinese home and foreign policies to the attainment of hegemonic
aims in the international arena.
The present leaders of the Communist Party of China spoke out against the world p
communist movement line jointly evolved by communist and workers’ Parties, the
CPC included. They put forth their own ideological and political platform,
inconsistent with Leninism on major questions concerning international affairs and
socialist upbuilding. Since the CPSU and other fraternal parties upholding Marxism-
Leninism had effectually thwarted all attempts to revise this science from “left”-
opportunist and nationalist positions, the Peking leadership launched an unprecedented
smear campaign and subversive activity against our Party and other fraternal parties.
This activity was extended to include not only the socialist system and the
communist movement but also the entire anti-imperialist front.
Such a policy evoked opposition in the CPC ranks and among the vast masses of p
the Chinese people. To do away with this opposition, Mao Tsetung and his followers
started a fight against Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres within the CPC,
against politically-conscious workers, peasants and intellectuals. This was the primary
goal of the "cultural revolution" which dealt the CPC a telling blow and during
which many outstanding Party veterans and hundreds of thousands of Communists
fell victim to reprisals.
At the 9th Congress of the CPC Mao Tse-tung and his entourage tried to legalise p
their home and foreign policy line, which in essence was hostile to Marxism- 74
Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and to make it an enduring programme.
Speaking about the construction of socialism in China they, at the same time, came
up with the thesis on the “impossibility” of the victory of socialism before the
triumph of the world revolution. Breaking away from Marxist-Leninist principles of
socialist construction they made the task of " preparing for war" and turning the
entire country into a military camp the goal of China’s economic development and
the country’s socio-political life. Militant anti-Sovietism became a programmatic task.
The objective laws of socio-economic development, as well as the basic interests of p
the Chinese people require a genuinely socialist policy based on the principles of
scientific communism.
However, the economic foundations of socialism, laid in the first decade of the p
PRC, are now subjected to dangerous deformation as a result of the policy pursued
by the present Chinese leadership who seek to place the country’s resources at the
service of their great-power and hegemonic aims. This policy imperils the socialist
gains of the Chinese people and impedes the country’s progress.
The attempts of the present Chinese leadership to cast aspersions on the experience p
of the USSR and other fraternal parties, and statements made against the socialist
community create additional obstacles to building socialism in China.
As to hostile fabrications concerning CPSU policy and the Soviet state, they are
resolutely rejected by the Soviet people. It is all the more harmful to sow discord
between the USSR and China when the imperialists are stepping up hostile activities
against the socialist countries and freedom-loving peoples. US imperialism and 75
Japanese militarism nurture aggressive plans against China as well as the USSR.
Therefore, the policy of using anti– Sovietism to flirt with imperialism, of supporting
territorial claims of the Japanese revanchists encourages the reactionary circles of the
United States, Japan and other imperialist powers and harms the anti-imperialist
front. Now, more than ever before, the situation in the world and in Asia demands
solidarity and joint action of all anti-imperialist and revolutionary forces. This was
stressed again at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties.
The trend of present-day world development fully confirms the urgency and great
importance of this conclusion.
III
The Soviet people and our Communist Party have regarded and continue to regard p
the development of friendship and cooperation with the Chinese people and the
Chinese Communists as an important prerequisite for strengthening the positions of
world socialism and promoting the unity of the international communist movement
and the entire anti-imperialist front.
It is precisely this that determines the principled and consistent line of the CPSU p
and the Soviet state in relation to China. This policy, its aims and essence were
clearly described in the decisions of the 23rd and 24th Congresses of our Party, at
plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee and in speeches by Comrade L. I.
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
After thoroughly analysing questions pertaining to Sino-Soviet relations, the 24th p 76

CPSU Congress fully approved and confirmed the principled Leninist course and
concrete steps taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government
with regard to Soviet-Chinese relations. When Chinese leaders advanced their
ideological-political platform which is incompatible with Leninism and spearheaded
against the socialist countries and at splitting the international communist movement
and the anti-imperialist movement in general, the CPSU Central Committee took to
the position of consistently upholding the principles of MarxismLeninism, making
every effort to strengthen the unity of the world communist movement and protecting
the interests of the socialist community of nations.
At the same time, the CPSU is firmly against carrying over existing serious p
ideological differences to inter-state relations. It strives to normalise relations

between the USSR and the PRC, and does everything to restore the good-
neighbourly, friendly relations between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.
The CPSU proceeds from the assumption that the objective requirements of China’s p
socialistoriented development provide opportunities for this normalisation. The long-
term vital interests of the peoples of the USSR and China do not clash; on the
contrary, they make it imperative to restore and develop their cooperation and
friendship.
The numerous constructive steps for normalising relations with the PRC which were p
taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government, are widely
known and approved of.
Soon after the meeting of the heads of government of the two countries held in p 77
Peking in 1969 on the initiative of the USSR, Soviet-Chinese talks on border
questions began. Taking a constructive approach to this matter, the Soviet side
proposes that measures be taken to promote mutual understanding and a final
solution of all border disputes be achieved by concluding a new border treaty.
However, in order for the talks to be successful both partners must show goodwill
and seek to reach an agreement.
Of late the PRC Government, too, has made statements to the effect that ideological p
differences "should not interfere with the maintenance of state relations between
China and the Soviet Union on the basis of the five principles of peaceful
coexistence.” We take into consideration the statements by the Chinese side of their
willingness not to carry over ideological differences to inter-state relations.
Expressing the will of our Party and the people, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in the p
Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress:
“We shall never forsake the national interests of the Soviet state. The CPSU will
continue tirelessly to work for the cohesion of the socialist countries and the world
communist movement on a MarxistLeninist basis. At the same time, our Party and
the Soviet Government are deeply convinced that an improvement in relations
between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China would be in line with
the fundamental, long-term interests of both countries, the interests of socialism, the
freedom of the peoples, and stronger peace. That is why we are prepared in every
way to help not only to normalise relations but also to restore neighbourliness and 78
friendship between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China and express
the confidence that this will eventually be achieved.” This just and constructive stand
of the CPSU and the Soviet state in relation to the PRC meets with the
understanding and approval of fraternal socialist countries, communist and workers’
parties, all progressive and peace-loving forces, including the Chinese people.
***
The difficult half-century road of the Communist Party of China confirms that p
Marxism-Leninism alone equips the revolutionaries with a clear understanding of the
objective laws and trends of social development and a scientific approach to evolving
strategy and tactics in the struggle for the transformation of the world and the
construction of socialism and communism. Fidelity to MarxismLeninism and
proletarian internationalism guarantees the success of the activities of the
Communists. Inversely, when a detachment of the world communist movement
departs from these principles it is doomed to defeat and harms the common cause of
the world army of the Communists.
Chinese Communist-internationalists have invariably stressed that unity with the p

CPSU, the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is of vital
importance for the victory of the revolution and successful advancement along the
road of socialism. On the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, the
Soviet Communists, the Soviet people pay their respects to the heroism and
selflessness of the Chinese Communists, to all who, fighting for the implementation 79
of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, have not spared
and do not spare efforts for the Chinese revolution to triumph, for China’s
advancement along the road of progress and socialism.
Pravda, July 1, 1971
***

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<< Concerning the 50th Anniversary of Renunciation of the Principles of >>

the Communist Party of China • O. Marxism-Leninism • APROPOS OF
Vladimirov, V. Ryazanov THE PARTY RULES ADOPTED
AT THE NINTH CONGRESS OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
CHINA

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<•> Renunciation of the Principles 80
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TOC APROPOS OF THE PARTY RULES ADOPTED AT
Card THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST
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Text
HTML
N. Lomdkin and N. Petrovichev p
PS
PDF
The International Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties held in Moscow p
in June 1969 was a major success of the communist, working-class and liberation
T*
movements. It was an important step towards greater international cohesion of
19*
Communists on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
###
Immense importance attaches to the conclusion made at the Conference to the effect p
that Communists must consistently uphold their principles, work for the triumph of
Marxism-Leninism and, depending on the specific situation, combat right and “left”
opportunist distortions of theory and policy, and adopt an uncompromising stand
against revisionism, dogmatism and “left” sectarian adventurism. Fidelity to Marxism-
Leninism and proletarian internationalism is a vital condition for the correct
orientation and successful activity of the Communist and Workers’ Parties.
The harm that can be inflicted on the world communist movement by a departure p
from Marxism-Leninism and a rupture with internationalism is shown by the actions
of the present leadership of the Communist Party of China. This was thoroughly 81
analysed at the Conference by L. I. Brezhnev, who led the CPSU delegation.
"Almost ten years ago,” he said, "Mao Tse-tung and his supporters mounted an
attack on the principles of scientific communism. In its numerous statements on
questions of theory the CPC leadership has step by step revised the principled line of
the communist movement. In opposition to this it has laid down a special line of its
own on all the fundamental questions of our day.. .
“The facts show that the Chinese leadership speaks of struggle against imperialism p
while in fact helping the latter, directly or indirectly, by everything it does. It helps
the imperialists by seeking to split the united front of the socialist states. It helps
them by its incitement and its obstructions to relaxation of international tension at|
ttmes of acute international crises. It helps them by striving to hamper the emergence
of a broad anti-imperialist front, by seeking to split the international mass
organisations of youth, women and scientists, the peace movement, the trade union
movement, and so on.
“Naturally, the imperialists make the most of Peking’s present orientation in the p
field of foreign policy as a trump in their political struggle against world socialism
and the liberation movement.”
The actions of the CPC leaders were also criticised by the heads of delegations p
from the absolute majority of other Parties represented at the Conference.
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/1.4-Renunciation.of.Principles.of.Marxism-Leninism[2012-12-18 3:13:23]
It is a pity that the CPC leadership did not want to listen to this criticism. They p
continue to stand in the way of the unity of the socialist countries, unity based on
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and are not giving up their 82
attempts to split the international communist and working-class movement. The
propaganda put out by the Chinese leaders is grist to the mill of the reactionary,
imperialist forces striving to break up the community of the socialist countries.
The erroneous and harmful tenets of the Maoists and their anti-Leninist line were p
given the status of official Party policy at the Ninth Congress of the CPC, which
was held last year. In effect, the character of the decisions passed by that Congress
was predetermined by the artificially created situation in which the Congress itself
was prepared and held. In the course of the "cultural revolution" the lawfully elected
leading Party organs were uprooted. The "revolutionary committees" headed by the
military took over the management of Party affairs. The old Party cadres and all who
disagreed with the Maoist line or doubted that it was correct were defamed, put on
the list of the "black gang,” and subjected to mockery and repressions. Everything
was done to foster a turbid wave of anti-Sovietism and nationalistic passion. In a
situation like this there naturally could be no question of a free discussion of
questions worrying the Party and the country.
Delegates to the Ninth Congress were not elected but nominated from among the p
Maoists. There are grounds for stating that this was not a regular congress of the
Communist Party of China, which has fine revolutionary traditions, but the first
congress of a new political organisation called upon to serve China’s military–
bureaucratic leadership. This is admitted, though indirectly, by the Maoists
themselves. How else is one to interpret, for instance, their official slogan: "Long 83
live the great victory of the Ninth All– China Congress of the Communist Party of
China"? A victory over whom or over what? All the indications are that this is a
victory over the Party’s healthy forces, over those who make the Party a Marxist-
Leninist organisation that had once occupied a prominent place and enjoyed
recognition in the world communist and working-class movements.
A new situation fraught with serious negative consequences for the cause of p
communism has thus arisen. Marxist-Leninists, naturally, cannot fail to see this or
pass it over in silence. They feel that their duty is to expose the anti-Leninist, anti-
popular essence of the Maoists’ ideological and political concepts.
New Party Rules were adopted at the Ninth Congress of the CPC. There is, of p
course, nothing unusual in the very fact that new Rules have been adopted. Every
revolutionary party bases its activity on the two main documents-the Programme and
Rules. The Programme determines the nature of the Party, and clearly sets out and
scientifically substantiates its aims. The Rules define the Party’s organisational
principles, the norms of its inner life and the methods of work used by Party
organisations. There is a close link between the Programme and the Rules. While the
Programme is the foundation of the Party’s ideological unity, the Rules are the
foundation of its organisational cohesion. Without organisational unity there cannot
be ideological unity and, conversely, ideological unity is inconceivable without
organisational unity.
In working out a more or less long-term strategic line, each Marxist-Leninist party p 84
sees to it that its organisational forms, the rules governing its life and the methods
used in its practical work conform to the new political tasks and ensure their
fulfilment. Therefore, from time to time Communist and Workers’ Parties amend or
supplement the operating Rules or adopt new Rules.
Life introduces corrections into the specific forms of the parties’ organisational p
make-up and into the methods of work employed by them, and this must be
reflected and recorded in their Rules. Organisationally, in the choice of the forms
and methods of its work and in its entire political activity, the Party relies on
revolutionary theory r.id on a comprehensive and thorough analysis of coucrel?
historical conditions.
Soviet Communists know from their own ex- | perience how important it is to make
sure that I the Party Rules and the provisions recorded in I it should conform to the
requirements of the day ’ and enable the Party to successfully carry out its tasks. For
that reason they understand the concern that the fraternal parties show for this I
problem.
I p
In the case of the Communist Party of China, this is a particularly pressing problem p
for a number of reasons. We shall recall only two circumstances. First, although
nearly fifty years have passed since the CPC was founded, it has no Programme to
this day and this adds weight to its Rules as the only basic Party document. Second,
in flagrant violation of the Rules operating earlier, no Party Congress was convened
for thirteen years. Consequently, it is important to enhance the role of the Rules and 85
introduce into them provisions that would prevent violations of inner-Party democracy
and serve as a guarantee that the principles and norms of Party life are strictly
observed by all its members.
This is the approach that should be taken if the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the p
party is used as the guideline.
What, in fact, are the new CPC Rules that have been adopted at the Ninth p
Congress? A close scrutiny provides grounds for saying that they flagrantly
contravene the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the party and run counter to the views
of the Communists on the questions of party development. In all respects the new
Rules are not an improvement of but a step back from the former Rules, which were
passed in 1956 by the Eighth Congress of the CPC. They constitute a direct retreat
from the Marxist-Leninist positions that were adopted by that Congress. The Rules
have been reinterpreted with numerous additions so as to turn the party into an
obedient tool of the present leadership for carrying out their greatpower, chauvinistic
policies.
In the former Rules of the CPC the first section was headed "Fundamental p
Provisions of the Programme.” It gave a definition of the Party and the cardinal
principles underlying its development. It outlined the ways and means of achieving
socialist transformations in China and named the tasks that had to be carried out in
the sphere of industrialisation, agriculture, science and culture and in the matter of
attaining a higher standard of living. Tasks were formulated also with regard to the
national relations, and it was emphasised that "particular attention must be paid to 86
preventing and surmounting greatHan chauvinism.” On the whole, this section
actually filled the void caused by the absence of a Programme. In the new Rules,
this section has been cut by two-thirds. If we bear in mind that the Communist Party
of China has no Programme, this curtailment is in itself puzzling, to say the least.
Moreover, the content of the new section upsets everything worthy of description as
a Marxist party.
The new Rules of the CPC actually endorse the hegemonistic, divisive, anti-Soviet p
foreign policy of its present leadership. The former Rules stated: "The Party bends
every effort to promote and strengthen friendship with the camp of peace, democracy
and socialism headed by the Soviet Union.”
The new Rules declare that the CPC "unites with genuinely Marxist-Leninist p
parties" and jointly with them fights to defeat imperialism headed by the USA, and
modern revisionism,” it being understood that the Chinese leaders regard the "Soviet
revisionists" as the hub of this revisionism. Everybody knows what the Maoists mean
by "genuinely Marxist-Leninist parties.” These are the divisive, subversive groups set
up by them in various countries and consisting of renegades and turncoats who act
on their instructions. Although they are numerically weak and ill-assorted, they have
inflicted quite a lot of harm on the world communist movement, and for this they
are lavishly praised by Peking. The Peking leaders classify as “revisionists” the
overwhelming majority of the Communist and Workers’ Parties adhering to Marxism-
Leninism and rejecting the theoretically untenable and politically erroneous and 87
harmful Maoist tenets.
They accuse the Communist Parties of France, India, the United States of America, p
Italy, Latin America and many others of the deadly sins of “revisionism” and
"apostasy.” Naturally, they make every effort to slander the Communist Parties of
many socialist countries, above all, the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee,
which they regard as enemy No. 1. Matters have reached a point where the Chinese
leaders place in the same category imperialism and the Soviet Union, the country that
blazed the road to socialism and is now leading the way to communism. Barefaced,
undisguised anti-Sovietism is one of the major if not the key element of Maoist
foreign policy.
Many of the participants in the 1969 International Conference of Communist and p

Workers’ Parties denounced this line of the Peking leadership. They underscored the
colossal role that the Soviet Union and the CPSU had played in the historic battle
against imperialism, for the triumph of the cause of peace, national liberation,
democracy and socialism.
The present CPC leaders see our Leninist Party as being the main obstacle standing p
in the way of their hegemonistic ambitions. That is why they have specially written
anti-Sovietism into the Rules as official party policy. Though, formerly, the Chinese
leadership was also free-handed in its anti-Soviet attacks, now it has received even
greater freedom of action-the new Rules allow opposition to and open acts of
hostility against the CPSU and other communist and workers’ parties.
The new Rules of the CPC revise the Party’s ideological and theoretical foundations p 88
and replace Marxism-Leninism with Maoism. It was stated in the former Rules: "In
its activity the Communist Party of China is guided by Marxism-Leninism. Only
Marxism-Leninism correctly explains the laws of social development and correctly
indicates the ways of building socialism and communism.” In the new Rules it is
recorded: "The Communist Party of China is guided by Marxism-Leninism and the
thought of MaoTse-tung as its theoretical foundation determining its ideals. The
thought of Mao Tse-tung is the Marxism-Leninism of the epoch when imperialism
moves to its total collapse and socialism advances towards victory throughout the
world.” Although the words “Marxism-Leninism” are used there this is nothing more
than camouflage. The only reason they are used is to delude people inexperienced in
politics and ease the transition from Marxism-Leninism to Maoism.
There is not the least doubt that it is a question of precisely such a transition. What p
else explains the fact that the provision in the Rules about the "thought of Mao Tse-
tung" is assessed by Chinese propaganda as a "great victory of the cultural
revolution"? Mentioning MarxismLeninism in order to distract attention, the authors
of the new Rules give it an interpretation Which emasculates it completely. In their
view, which is recorded in the Rules, Mao Tse-tung "inherited, upheld and
developed Marxism– Leninism, and raised it to a new level.” The purpose of these
and similar arguments is starkly clear: Maoism is the modern Marxism-Leninism and
is, therefore, the guide. Marx and Lenin belong to the past. In the world today there
is only one "leader,” Mao, and one has to follow him without burdening oneself with 89
thoughts about where and how he will lead.
Of course, Marxism-Leninism is by no means a fossilised teaching. As no other p

theory it is linked with life, with the working-class and national-liberation
movements, with the struggle for socialism and communism. As a science, it
demands that it should be treated as such, that it should be constantly developed and
advanced. But the Marxist-Leninist teaching has nothing in common with a revision
of its basic propositions, with attempts to evolve national variants.
Such attempts are leading to the rejection of Marxism-Leninism as an integral p

science of the laws of social development, of the construction of socialism and
communism. They destroy the very foundation of the internationalist unity of the
international communist and working-class movement, breaking it up into national
"islands.”
Having invented "Sinoised Marxism,” the present Chinese leaders have thereby p
made it clear that “conventional” Marxism, i.e., Marxism in its true and generally
accepted sense, does not suit them. They have gone even further, declaring that the
thought of Mao Tse-tung is the "summit of Marxism-Leninism of our epoch.”
However, no subterfuges over wording can conceal the obvious fact that the "thought
of MaoTse-tung" is a glaring contradiction of MarxismLeninism.
The new Rules of the CPC officially propagate the personality cult, which is alien p
to MarxismLeninism, in the Party and in the country as a whole.
It should be remembered that the report to the 8th CPC Congress on the changes in p 90
the Rules said in part that the CPC "rejects the deification of a personality as alien
to its policies.” The former Rules stressed that "activities putting the personality
above the party" are inadmissible within the party, that the party should be especially
concerned with "modesty and discretion.” These lines have disappeared from the new
Rules which, instead, now enthrone Mao Tse-tung as the leader of the Communist
Party of China. Not only is the emperor named, but his successor also. "Comrade
Lin Piao,” say the Rules "is always holding high the great red banner of Mao Tse-
tung’s ideas; he is the most devoted and persistent adherent of the proletarian
revolutionary line of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Comrade Lin Piao is the closest
comrade-in-arms of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the continuer of his cause.” Thus, it
is declared in advance who is to “inherit” and “supervise” the party.
All of these statements of course, directly contradict the scientific, materialistic p

teaching on the question of personality and the role of parties, classes and the people
at large in history. As is known, Marxism-Leninism accords to proletarian parties and
their leaders a high role in the struggle for the revolutionary transformation of
society. Without a party and experienced leaders, the working class is incapable of
achieving success in the struggle for the triumph of communist ideals. But Marxism-
Leninism bases its teaching on the decisive role played by the working people in
history, at the same time paying tribute to those leaders who correctly understand
and express the basic interests of the working class and all working people. This is
the cornerstone of the Marxist– Leninist philosophy, of the communist outlook.
In the past the Chinese leaders repeatedly declared their fidelity to the Marxist- p 91
Leninist doctrine on the decisive role of the working people in social development.
They proclaimed their belief in the people. But later this line was abandoned and a
new policy emerged-one of unrestrained glorification of the person of Mao Tse-tung
who was henceforward to be reverently worshipped. Immodesty and self-advertisment
of the CPC leadership know no bounds. Even the comparison of Mao with the sun
seems inadequate to some of his worshippers for the sun shines only in the daytime,
while Mao Tse-tung "shines always.” Anyone guilty of casting the slightest doubt on
the infallibility of Mao or of glorifiying him with insufficient zeal, is anathematised,
described as a "black revisionists" and persecuted. As for the mass of the people,
Mao Tse-tung said about them the following: the Chinese people are "a blank sheet
of paper on which the most beautiful hieroglyphs can be written and the most
beautiful pictures drawn.” And indeed the Maoists are busily “writing” and
“drawing” for all they are worth. The multi– million people with an ancient culture
are looked upon as being no more than an object of political self-seeking. What is
this if not an outrage against everything that is sacred for all Communists, for their
ideology?
In the new Rules of the CPC the provisions on membership of the Party have been p
drastically amended. The purpose of these amendments is to renew the Party’s
composition in the direction desired by the Maoists. It is suggested that those "who
fail to reform after educational work has been conducted with them" should be
forced to leave the Party, and that "the Party organisations should be constantly 92
improved by removing the unworthy and enlisting the new.” Facts show that the
words "removing the unworthy" are directed not against actual class enemies but
against people who do not share the Maoist ideas, against those who can be
suspected of disloyalty to the aims of the Maoists. People linked with "Soviet
revisionism,” i.e., those who have preserved their friendly feelings towards the Soviet
Union and its Leninist Party, are classified as the most dangerous.
Proving the necessity of the so-called regulation within the party, Lin Piao said, p
menacingly, at the 9th CPC Congress: "Anyone who dares to come forward against
Chairman Mao Tse-tung and against his ideas, no matter what the circumstances,
will be censured by the party and punished by the whole country.”
As regards the ruling on "enlisting the new,” its meaning is elucidated by the p
simplified procedures of admission to Party membership and the introduction of new
provisions opening the floodgates to petty-bourgeois elements. In the former Rules it
was stated that only a person who does not exploit the labour of others can be a
member of the CPC. Today this demand has been deleted from the Rules, although
in China, according to the admission of the Maoists themselves, its significance has
not diminished to this day. Under the present Rules the "Chinese worker, poor
peasant, lower middle peasant, revolutionary serviceman or other revolutionary
element" can become a member of the CPC. One can understand the purpose of this
wording in the Rules if one bears in mind that the Maoists regard as genuine
revolutionary elements the hungweipings and tsaofans and all who unquestioningly 93
follow the Maoist chauvinistic, divisive, anti-Soviet policy. This opens wide the door
to Party membership precisely for these elements and allows the present CPC
leadership to bring into the Party the forces which it regards as its mainstay.
No data on the CPC’s social composition or, as a matter of fact, any other data p
characterising the situation in the country have been published for a long time. No
information of this kind is contained even in the documents of the Ninth Congress
of the CPC. It is known that in 1957 the CPC had nearly 13 million members of
whom less than 14 per cent were workers. There are grounds for believing that as a
result of the disbandment of workers’ organisations and the mass injection of "new
blood" into the Party through the admission of hungweipings and other elements, this
percentage is today even smaller. The organisational principles of Marxism–
Leninism require that the Party should be built up on a democratic foundation
allowing for the utmost encouragement of the initiative and activity of Communists.
In all questions of the Party’s policy and practical work, Party members should have
the decisive say. Lenin stressed that only he is worthy of the lofty name of
Communist who independently ponders over his Party’s destiny and bears a personal
responsibility for it.
There was a time when in the CPC this was recognised as an indispensable p
condition of the Party’s militancy. In the former Rules it was stated, for example,
that it was necessary "to take effective measures to promote inner-Party democracy
and to encourage the activity and creative initiative of all Party members.” There is 94
not a word about this in the new Rules, where the accent is on something quite
different. In effect, the purport of the amendments is to abolish inner-Party
democracy, enforce barrack practices in the Party and turn Communists into
submissive, mechanical executors of the leadership’s instructions. To justify these
amendments it is stated that in China there "is a threat of subversion from within
and of aggression by the imperialists and modern revisionism.”
The demand that all Party members should be absolutely, categorically and p
unconditionally true to the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" creates an atmosphere in the
Party which leaves no room for inner-Party democracy and a free exchange of
opinions. However, this is not all. Although, like the old, the new Rules provide for
convening periodic congresses of the CPC, Party congresses in the localities and
Party meetings, they contain the addition to the effect that "in special cases they
(congresses, meetings.-Author) may be convened earlier or postponed.” Nothing is
said about who has to decide on this and under what circumstances this may be
done. The door is thus opened wide to arbitrary decisions, to a “legal” infringement
of one of the key norms of Party life. True, even when this reservation was non-
existent, the CPC leadership ignored the provision in the Rules on the time-limit for
convening congresses and meetings, but now this can be justified with references to
the Rules.
The former Rules envisaged a democratic procedure for forming the Party’s leading p
organs. It stated: "Elections shall be held by secret ballot, and the electors shall be
ensured the right to criticise, outvote or replace any candidate.” In lieu of this 95
provision, the current Rules contain a deliberately loosely worded clause to the effect
that "the leading Party organs at all levels shall be elected on the basis of democratic
consultations.” Obviously, this can be interpreted in any way and given any
meaning, which is evidently what the Maoists want.
A new provision has been introduced, stating that "the convocation of congresses p
and the composition of the Party committees in the localities and in the Army shall
be approved by higher Party organisations.” This affords the Maoists the possibility
of manipulating the composition of the leading Party organs at their own discretion
and appointing to leading positions persons devoted to them. Significantly, the
provisions on central and local Party control commissions have been deleted
altogether. The setting up of Party control agencies is no longer envisaged.
There are clauses consolidating the position held by Mao Tse-tung and his p
entourage in the CPC. These clauses endow the Chairman of the CC, his Deputy
and the Standing Committee of the CC Political Bureau (altogether five persons)
with virtually unlimited power. In particular, it is stated in the Rules that "some
necessary compact and operational organs to conduct the current work of the Party,
the Government and the Army are established under the guidance of the Chairman,
Deputy Chairman and Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CC.” The
purpose of this is, first, to justify antedatedly the disbandment, in the course of the
"cultural revolution,” of democratically elected Party committees and the setting up
of organs not envisaged by the Rules, such as the notorious headquarters for "cultural 96
revolution" affairs, and, second, to give the top leadership a free hand in the future.
If necessary, they will establish "compact and operational" agencies legally and rely
on them in the struggle against any opposition.
The position occuppied by ruling parties such as that of the Communist Parties in p
socialist countries requires that the forms and methods of their work and the
principles underlying their leadership of state and public organisations should be
clearly denned in their Rules. This has been done in the Rules of the CPSU and
other fraternal parties. The former Rules of the CPC also contained the appropriate
provisions, which specified the functions of Party organs at all levels, spoke clearly
of the need to rule collectively and denned the Party’s relations with state and public
organisations. There were sections headed "Party Groups of the Leadership in
NonParty Organisations" and "The Party and the Young Communist League.” None
of these provisions and sections is to be found in the new Rules. Instead, there is a
provision stating: "The state organs of power of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
the People’s Liberation Army as well as the Young Communist League, the
revolutionary mass organisations of workers, poor peasants, lowest middle peasants
and Red Guards, and other revolutionary mass organisations shall be subordinate to
the leadership of the Party.”
It is hard to reconcile this provision with the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the role p
played by the Communist Party and the character of its relations with state and
public organisations. Worded as an order it, too, serves the purpose of placing all 97
power in the hands of the Party leadership with Mao at the head.
Leninism teaches us that in exercising political leadership of all state and public
organisations the Party does not have recourse to administration by injunction and
does not take over their functions. Being the nucleus of socialist society’s political
structure and coordinating and directing the work of the mass organisations of
working people, the Communist Party at the same time bends every effort to enable
them to operate with self-assurance and confidence within the context of their rights
and functions. This means that in societies building socialism and communism, along
with the growth of the tasks to be carried out, the upswing of the people’s
activeness and the heightening of the Party’s role, a process is under way of the
enhancement of the role played by state and public organisations, and of the
development and improvement of socialist democracy. This is one of the laws
governing the development of socialist society, and one of the many laws the
Maoists are grossly violating.
***
The CPSU’s point of departure is that the Soviet and Chinese peoples have common p
basic interests, and it is doing everything in its power to sustain fraternal friendship
between them. At the same time, the Soviet Communists and all other Marxist-
Leninists consider it their duty to wage an uncompromising struggle against the
divisive policy, great-power foreign-policy line and anti-Leninist and anti-popular
ideological and political tenets of the Peking leaders.
An analysis of the amendments introduced into the Rules by the Ninth Congress as p 98
compared with the Rules adopted by the Eighth Congress shows that while formally
retaining the Party’s former name, the CPC leadership is steering towards the
creation of a fundamentally different political organisation. Underlying its structure
and activity are the personality cult, extreme centralism, militarism and the
renunciation of inner-Party democracy. In its aims and tasks this is a nationalistic
and chauvinistic organisation with pronounced anti-Soviet tendencies.
In short, the new Rules of the CPC are an open revision and abandonment of the p
Marxist– Leninist principles of party development. The future will show whether the
CPC has the strength to halt the process of degeneration, to resume the positions of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and to rejoin the united front of
the world’s Communist and Workers’ Parties. This would conform to the vital
interests of the Chinese people and to the interests of the world proletariat and the
working people of all countries.
Kommunist, No. 4, 1970
***

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Maoism: Its Ideological

TOC
and Political Essence
Card
Emacs-File-stamp: "/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/20071228/199.tx" 100
Text P. Fedoseyeu p
HTML
PS The course of world development and the events in China clearly show the hostility p
PDF towards socialism and Marxism-Leninism of the special ideological and political
platform set forth by the Chinese leadership on fundamental issues of international
T* life and the world communist movement.
19*
The theoretical and practical activities of the Maoists, their efforts to split the p
### revolutionary forces, and their great-power and hegemonic ambitions do serious harm
to the anti-imperialist struggle, to the world communist and workingclass movement,
to the forces fighting for democracy and national freedom and to the entire cause of
socialism and the social progress of mankind.
Strongly rebuffing Maoism, Marxist-Leninists consider it necessary to expose

completely its ideological and political essence and its social roots. Great attention
was devoted to these questions in the Report of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union delivered by Leonid Brezhnev to the 24th
Party Congress and in his speech at the International Meeting of Communist and
Workers’ Parties in Moscow in June, 1969. Communists all over the world have
studied these questions deeply and are continuing to do so, as was shown by the
speeches of many other participants in the 1969 Meeting and as has also been 101
demonstrated at the Congresses of a number of fraternal Parties.
***
The ruling core of the Maoists consists of a rather narrow group of interdependent p
people, who, in one form or another, are dependent on Mao and his closest
associates. This group carefully conceals its real convictions and aims, seeking to
present Maoism as a certain "development of Marxism in modern conditions.” As
one can see, Mao and the Maoist leadership need this kind of camouflage to confuse
the issue of the social support of the current Peking regime.
An analysis of the history and present-day essence of the ideology and policy of the p
Mao Tse-tung group shows that Maoism now finds support, first and foremost, in the
nationalistically-minded non-proletarian, petty-bourgeois, and, to a considerable
extent, declasse strata of Chinese society.
In the past, too, the Mao Tse-tung group represented a petty-bourgeois nationalistic p
trend. However, its non-proletarian essence was not so clearly shown during the stage
of national– liberation struggle, when it was necessary to unite different social forces
against imperialism. The differences of principle between Maoism and scientific
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/2.1-Maoism-Its.Ideological.and.Political.Essence[2012-12-18 3:13:31]
communism were revealed after the victory of people’s power in China, when
fundamental socio-economic changes were in progress.
The experience of many countries shows that the pressure of the ideology and p
psychology of the petty bourgeoisie on the proletarian front increases sharply during 102
the course of a revolution, and especially when socialism is in the process of being
built, when a drastic breaking-up of old social relations takes place. It is precisely at
such a turning-point that petty-bourgeois leaders go over from a petty-bourgeois
revolutionary stand to one of struggle against the proletarian leadership of society.
And this was what happened in China too.
Literature on Maoism frequently expounds the view that Maoism is an ideology, an p

expression of the interests of the undeveloped, backward peasant masses, which have
for centuries constituted the great majority of the population of China. But this
opinion is unacceptable. To accept it would mean admitting that the Maoists have an
extensive social base in the form of the peasantry, and, by the same token, that the
peasantry is responsible for the anti-popular essence of the Maoist policy.
To regard Maoism as an expression of the views of the entire peasantry means p

identifying the petty-bourgeois, primitive, anarchistic prejudices of the peasantry with
its fundamental interests. Indeed, can it be asserted without deviating from Marxism-
Leninism, that the "cultural revolution,” the smashing-up of the Party, tradeunion,
and YCL organisations, and the destruction of socialist democracy express the vital
interests of the peasantry? Of course not.
The bonds linking Maoism with the ideology of the Chinese peasantry are not p
straightforward. They are of a complicated and contradictory nature, and can be
correctly understood only on the basis of a consideration of the class essence of 103
Maoism as a petty-bourgeois, nationalistic socio-political trend.
Marx and Engels disclosed the social heterogeneity and dual nature of the peasantry. p
They showed how to distinguish between its prejudices and reason, between its past
and its future, between its small-proprietor narrow-mindedness and its natural
gravitation, as a toiling class, towards an alliance with the revolutionary proletariat in
the struggle for a new life free from exploiters and parasites. Opponents of Marxism
alleged that Lenin, in his criticism of petty-bourgeois reaction, identified the whole
of the peasantry with it. In refutation of this falsification, Lenin said: "I was not
attacking the working peasants when I spoke of the petty-bourgeois element. Let us
leave the working peasants alone-that’s not what I am talking about. But among the
peasantry there are working peasants and pettybourgeois peasants, who live like petty
proprietors at the expense of others; the working peasants are exploited by others,
but they want to live at their own expense.” [ 103•1
Both Marx and Lenin repeatedly pointed to the crying contradictions in the life and p
activities of the peasantry, which in some conditions spontaneously and energetically
rose up in struggle against the exploiters, and, in others, either humbly let themselves
be led off to be shot or whipped by the police, or else even made up the basis of
the support for the reactionary forces.
This is, to a considerable extent, also true of the Chinese peasantry, which, earlier, p
under feudalism and patriarchalism had become stratified and, therefore, disunited.
The bulk of the Chinese peasantry was cruelly exploited, and starvation was 104
common. Spiritually enslaved by feudal ideology with its ruler cult and worship of
the traditions of ancestors, the Chinese peasants, being in their mass downtrodden,
illiterate and scattered, for many years remained very submissive and fully
subordinated to the authorities. The backwardness and patriarchalism of the Chinese
peasantry were a major source of the national narrow-mindedness and the nationalist
outlook.
At the same time, the Chinese peasantry has rich revolutionary traditions. More than p
once it rose in struggle against the landowners. Furthermore, the peasantry made up
the main force of the revolutionary armies both in the nationalliberation struggle and
in the revolution. The Chinese peasantry quickly took to cooperative farming on the
road of socialist development of the countryside. It was precisely these peasant
masses, who, under the leadership of the working class and its vanguard, the Party
of MarxistLeninists, could have become an active force in working for the triumph
of a genuinely socialist way of development.
But this, regretfully, did not take place. Starting from the late fifties, and especially p
in the course of the "big leap" drive, and, later, in the "cultural revolution,” a serious
blow was struck at the organisations of the working class and the Party. The Party
divorced itself to a considerable extent from the working class and the peasantry,
and disunity was deliberately sown among the working class. As for the peasants,
most of them were deceived by the pseudorevolutionary slogans of the Maoists. The
rest were intimidated by a terror campaign, and, although they did not accept the 105
"cultural revolution,” neither did they dare to put up any open resistance.
In the process of its moulding and development, Maoism came under the political p
and ideological influence of the urban petty bourgeoisiethe relatively large army of
artisans and handicraftsmen, and petty businessmen and tradesmen. This social
grouping came into being in feudal China, and its members were, for the most part,
distinguished by their conservative views and nationalist outlook.
But the urban petty bourgeoisie is not 100 per cent reactionary. A sizable section of p
it took an active part in the Chinese revolution. It, too, under the leadership of the
working class, could have taken the socialist road together with the overwhelming
majority of the people.
The tragedy of the Chinese revolution is that in the struggle between the two p
courses-the course of proletarian internationalism and that of petty-bourgeois
nationalism-the latter prevailed at a certain stage. In these conditions, the Party was
unable to withstand the pressure of the petty bourgeoisie and to secure the leading
role of the working class.
The national bourgeoisie has still been preserved in China. It was not subjected to p
repressions in the years of the "cultural revolution.” Representatives of the exploiting
classes which, as admitted by the Maoists themselves, comprise more than 50 million
people, hold important positions in the management of the economy, and continue to
exert an influence on the economic and political life of the country. Because they
subscribe to a nationalistic ideology and are advocates of great-Han chauvinism, the 106
nationalbourgeois elements support the nationalistic ideas and actions of the Maoists.
A particularly complicated question is that of the attitude of the Maoists towards the p
working class. They keep talking all the time about the leading role of the working
class and the Communist Party, about the dictatorship of the proletariat, about the
proletarian revolutionary character, etc. However, the ideology and policy of the
Maoists are actually of an anti-proletarian nature, although, in pursuit of their aims,
by means of demagogy, they try to make use of certain sections of the workers.
It is generally known that the Chinese working class is heterogeneous. Its greater p
part consists of the peasants of yesterday, who have not gone through a real
schooling of socialism and internationalism. But it has a militant core, which has
many revolutionary traditions. As was shown by the events in the "cultural
revolution,” it was precisely the militant core of the working class which came to the
aid of the Party organisations which were attacked by the hungweipings. In the
factories and plants the Maoists failed to achieve the scale of the "cultural
revolution" which they desired. Although the working class of China is still
relatively small in number (it barely exceeds 10 million in a country with a
population of over 700 million), it was the backbone of the Chinese revolution and
of the cause of socialism in China and it still is. The working class is the real force
which is exerting a restraining influence on the spreading and consolidation of
Maoism in the life of the country.
The army officers’ circles exerted a great influence on the rise and evolution of p 107
Maoism. These circles have always played an active part in the social and political
life of China.
In the history of China, militarism for centuries represented a relatively independent, p

influential force, and energetically intervened in political life. In the course of
revolutionary wars, many officers went over to the side of the struggling people.
Although they were the opponents of imperialism, and of the landlords and the
comprador bourgeoisie, most of these military men, nevertheless, did not become
either internationalists or Marxists. Many military men joined the Communist Party,
but only some of them acquired Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary training, and
those who did were subsequently purged. A large number of sincere internationalists,
real supporters of socialism, were expelled from the army. Mao Tse-tung, leaning
upon nationalistically-minded elements loyal to him, reformed the army, implanting in
it a spirit of nationalism and great-power chauvinism, a spirit of blind subordination
and idolisation of his personality.
At the same time Mao Tse-tung and his retinue fear the army, especially its p
revolutionary backbone of career officers who went through the crucible of the war
for national liberation. Unquestionably a considerable section of the career command
personnel of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, which has splendid revolutionary
traditions and experience in fighting not only the internal counter-revolution but also
international imperialism, cannot be indifferent to the fact that the Maoists are
transforming the people’s army into an all-China police force-a force directed against
the people and designed for their suppression. Although drawing the army into the 108
work of the "cultural revolution" did help the Maoist regime to strengthen itself, at
the same time it led to the intensification of the discontent within the Chinese army
and the freeing of a certain section of the servicemen from their illusions and a
fanatical faith in the wisdom of the "great helmsman.” It also enabled many of the
army men to understand, from their own experience, the danger of the anti-popular
course of Mao Tse-tung and his entourage. Therefore, as was only to be expected,
the army has now become a dangerous hotbed of anti-Maoist moods, and that is why
the Maoists are carrying out purge after purge, and repression after repression against
many career military men, ruthlessly suppressing in its very embryo the antiMaoist
movement in the People’s Liberation Army of China.
Removed from under the control of Party and state bodies, and placed at the service p
of the hegemonic, chauvinistic ambitions of Mao and his group, even before the
development of the "cultural revolution,” the army was preparing to carry out the
role allotted to it. This was the militarisation of all public life-conducted under the
sham slogan of “revolutionisation”-and the establishment of a military-bureaucratic

order in the country. But, having carried out the " cultural revolution,” in which the
army played the decisive role, Mao then struck a blow at the army leadership, so
that now Lin Piao no longer figures as Mao’s "successor,” as had been announced at
the Ninth Congress of the CPC.
The reason for this manoeuvre of Mao’s is quite clear, although Peking prefers to p
keep silent about it. The revelation of the substance of the intrigues that permeate all 109
of Mao’s activities and the entire existence of the Maoist top clique would not do
the "great helmsman" any good, and this is understood very well in Peking.
Maoism claims to be accepted by different strata of the country as an all-national p

ideology and a political doctrine expressing the national interests of the entire
Chinese people. The nationalistic aims are even advanced as a unifying factor. This
shows the nature of the petty bourgeoisie, which strives to “rise” above the classes
and present its egoistic interests as the interests of the nation as a whole.
The Peking leadership thoroughly camouflages its petty-bourgeois class nature and p
tries to manoeuvre between the different classes, taking advantage of the weakness
and lack of organisation of the proletariat. These tactics make it difficult to discern
the class nature of Maoism and they also serve as a means of attracting to its side
politically unstable elements drawn from different classes of the population.
Marx and Lenin called such tactics Bonapartism, which, in a way, grew out of the p
revolution and was called on to defend it, although it had actually always served the
bourgeois or pettybourgeois reaction. Lenin cited Kerenskyism, which served as a
cover for an anti-proletarian policy, as an example of Bonapartism of modern times.
In exposing Bonapartism, he defined its characteristics as reliance on the military,
manoeuvring between the classes, and unbridled social and nationalistic demagogy.
An analysis shows that the policy and tactics of Maoism have quite a number of p
features resembling those of Bonapartism, in the specific Chinese setting, of course: 110
firstly, a reliance on army circles loyal to Mao; secondly, a reliance on a
combination of different, sometimes diametrically opposed, social forces, on a
manoeuvring between classes, making use first of some social groups, then of others,
first of high-school and college students, then of working youth, and especially of
the petty-bourgeois, backward peasant strata of the population, lumpen-proletarian
elements, etc; thirdly, boundless social and political demagogy: the shouting of the
most revolutionary slogans covering a reactionary– chauvinistic policy, verbal calls
for defending the proletarian line covering its actual rejection in home and foreign
policy, appeals to the people in words and their suppression in deeds.
Marx included among the Bonapartist manifestations the deification of the supreme p
leader and the mystical faith of the broad masses in the ruling personality. Mao Tse-
tung exerted every possible effort to have his personality glorified and his views
advertised, and he placed his favourites in the most important posts in the party, the
army and in the machinery of state.
The "barrack-room communism" now being implanted in China is in keeping with p

the moods and needs of the society’s petty-bourgeois and lumpen-proletarian strata.
It corresponds to the hegemonic ambitions of the Maoists, for it helps them to carry
out the militarisation of the economy and the entire life in the country for the sake
of the realisation of the great-power adventurist plans in the international arena.
For an understanding of the essence of Maoism, a consideration of its historical, p
ideological and theoretical origins is quite important. The lengthy domination of 111
feudalism and militarism, economic and cultural backwardness, the undeveloped
public and social relations, the small number of proletarians and the absolute
predominance of petty-bourgeois elements created special difficulties for China’s
revolutionary development.
The militarists’ traditional participation in ruling the country and the extensive p
dissemination in the course of centuries of one of the reactionary aspects of
Confucianism-the cult of the supreme ruler-facilitated the establishment of a military-
bureaucratic regime with an idolised ruler at the head.
The Maoists made use of historical and demographic facts for their own ends to p
spread great-power and chauvinistic moods. China has rich historical traditions. For a
long time the country held the leading place in Eastern Asia. China is the home of
an ancient culture. The Chinese are the most numerous people in the world. The
existence of a comparatively high civilisation was made use of by the feudal rulers
of China for cultivating chauvinistic views on the superiority of the Chinese. All
other nations were declared “wild” and "barbarous,” and all "barbarians.” China’s
eternal enemies. For thousands of years the idea was cultivated in China that she was
the centre of the world. That is how the Chinese ethnocentrism was formed, later
acquiring the features of great-Han chauvinism.
In the period of the anti-imperialist struggle nationalism was the ideological weapon p
of the progressive forces which were fighting for national liberation and social
progress. It was the ideological basis for rallying and uniting the broadest sections of 112
the Chinese population, pushing into the background in some cases social
differentiation and differences in class interests. After the victory of the anti-
imperialist, democratic revolution in China and its growth into a socialist revolution,
nationalism exhausted itself as an ideological basis for uniting the progressive forces
of the nation in its struggle against foreign capital-its struggle for national
independence. A very sharp conflict ensued in Chinese society between nationalism
and internationalism.
In present-day conditions Chinese nationalism, which has grown into great-Han

chauvinism, has been fully adopted as a weapon of Mao Tsetung’s ruling group.
Great-Han chauvinism is the basic motif of anti-Sovietism and the activities of the
Maoists which are designed to disrupt the socialist community and the world
communist, workers’ and anti-imperialist movements.
***
The principles of Marxism-Leninism are alien to the Maoists. But they understand p
very well that there is no other ideology capable now of winning over the minds of
the peoples of the world. That is why the Maoists decided to monopolise the right to
interpret and “develop” Marxism-Leninism, to transform it in their own way and
thereby to turn it into an instrument for achieving their great-Han, hegemonic aims.
Initially this was called "the creative application" of Marxism-Leninism in China’s p

specific conditions. It was done under the guise of the realisation of Lenin’s thesis to 113
the effect that the peoples of the East have to find their own ways of carrying out
Marxist ideas. Then appeared the formula of "Sinoised Marxism,” which for a long
time was viewed by some Marxists as the process of creative quests for ways and
means of developing the revolution and the transition to socialism in the specific
conditions of China. But the Maoists had their own understanding of this formula.
For them this was an important step towards adapting Marxism to their own
nationalistic schemes and aims. This began to reveal itself with the appearance of the
assertion that Mao Tse-tung’s ideas are an interpretation of Marxism for all the
countries of the East. Thus the concept of "Asian Marxism" made its appearance.
The next step was taken during the "cultural revolution" and at the Ninth Congress
of the CPC, when Mao was proclaimed to be the teacher of all peoples, the only
Marxist theoretician of the entire world communist movement, and Mao’s ideas the
apex of scientific thought, the Marxism-Leninism of the current epoch. But this
slogan is only a cover. The real meaning of the decisions of the Ninth CPC
Congress is that an attempt was made to replace Marxism by Maoism. That is how
the concealed, previously thoroughly camouflaged chauvinistic, hegemonic schemes
of the Maoists were revealed.
In their attempt to achieve the recognition of Mao Tse-tung as the only leading p
world theoretician and law-maker in the sphere of ideas, and the CPC as the centre
of the entire revolutionary movement, the M.aoists hurled accusations of degeneration
and revisionism, and of compromise with imperialism, against large and authoritative
Communist Parties, including the CPSU, and against the entire world communist 114
movement. All who do not agree with Mao Tse-tung are haughtily
“excommunicated” from Marxism– Leninism, from the revolution and from
socialism, and declared to be enemies. A fierce struggle covered by Marxist phrases
and revolutionary slogans has been launched against the " dissenters.” And in this
struggle no methods are barred, not even military provocations.
What then is Maoism from the standpoint of its ideological and theoretical content? p
The influence and eclectic mixture of the most diverse doctrines, views, theories and p
concepts are clearly felt in the sum-total of the political, economic, philosophical,
sociological and tactical concepts of Mao and the Maoists. These include:
feudal Chinese philosophy (mostly Confucianism and Taoism), and as a rule that p
part of this philosophy is taken which is characterised by scholasticism, idealism,
primitive dialectics, the preaching of the spirit of submission, the glorification of
imperial power, and the exaggeration of the role of the subjective factor in history;
petty-bourgeois socialism, especially Proudhonism with its utmost vulgarisation of p

Hegel’s idealistic dialectics and understanding of the unity of opposites as the
mechanical sum of “bad” and “good” phenomena irrespective of their socio-
economic, class substance;
the petty-bourgeois-peasant, semi-Narodnik, semi-avantgardist views ascribing p

spontaneous revolutionism to the peasantry;
the bourgeois-nationalistic, great-power and chauvinistic assertion of the p

exclusiveness of China;
Trotskyite views, which were more or less widespread in the Chinese revolutionary p 115
movement in the twenties and early thirties;
anarchist ideas, which acquired considerable influence in China at the start of the p
twenties. Mao Tse-tung, according to his own admission, went in for anarchism quite
actively in that period.
It is through the prism of all these views that Mao Tse-tung accepted certain ideas p
of MarxismLeninism. As far as Marxist-Leninist theory in general is concerned,
neither Mao Tse-tung nor his closest associates ever made a systematic study of it,
limiting themselves to reading popular articles. Mao has never had an integral
Marxist-Leninist world outlook.
The Maoists widely used Trotskyite views and adapted them to their interests. p
Maoism ignores the objective laws of social development, as does Trotskyism, and
exaggerates the role of the subjective factor in social processes. Adventurism in
politics, and voluntarism and subjectivism in economics are characteristic for both.
An antiMarxist, anti-Leninist concept of the world revolutionary process is a feature
common to both Maoism and Trotskyism. For demagogic purposes the Maoists made
use of the Trotskyite theory of "the export of revolution,” regarding world war as the
only way of solving the problems of revolution on an international scale. Finally,
characteristic of both Maoism and Trotskyism is the tactics of splitting the
revolutionary forces, with crude slanderous attacks against the Marxist-Leninist
parties and the socialist states, rabid anti-Sovietism and subversive activities within
the ranks of the international working-class and communist movement. 116
An idealistic-voluntaristic theory of violence (in which a subjective-idealist, p

militarist interpretation is substituted for the materialist interpretation of history) is
the basis of Maoist ideology.
The theoretical construction of Maoism is pivoted on "Sinoised dialectics,” and p

particularly on Mao’s “teaching” on contradictions, which is called upon to serve as
the theoretical basis of the strategy and tactics of the Maoists, as a justification of
their negation of a principled class policy, and of their policy of making unprincipled
deals with the forces of imperialism and all kinds of renegades from Marxism. Most
characteristic in this respect is the way the Maoists artificially devise the "great
contradictions" of our time, declaring as enemies of the peoples fighting for freedom
the "two superpowers" the United States and the Soviet Union: the citadel of
imperialism, the bulwark of world reaction, is placed on the same level as the first
socialist country, this powerful force of world progress. This false concept is further
proof that the Maoists have turned away from the Marxist-Leninist appraisal of the
main contradictions of the present day, from a principled class approach to the
alignment of forces in the world arena.
The Maoists have greatly surpassed Proudhon in the “art” of arbitrarily designing p
contradictions. They proclaim a state of “unity” or of "struggle,” of anyone with
anyone, so long as this facilitates the attainment of their greatpower, hegemonistic
aims.
These, in the most general way, are the ideological background of Mao Tse-tung p 117
and his followers. And it is no accident that the ideology and policy of Maoism quite
often link up with the ideology and policy of imperialism. It is no accident, either,
that the theoretical revelations and deeds of the Maoists are invariably lauded to the
skies by imperialist ideologists and politicians, and are used by them in their battle
against the forces of peace and democracy, of social progress and socialism.
While noting the eclectic nature of Mao Tsetung’s views, it should be borne in p
mind, that, as a retrospective approach to his ideas clearly shows, great-power
nationalism is the leading and organising force behind his miscellany of ideas. From
diverse ideological and theoretical concepts, Mao Tse-tung is primarily interested in
taking and using those that serve nationalist and great-Han-chauvinist aims. This
emphasises the purely utilitarian and pragmatic nature of the theory and practice of
Maoism. Mao Tse-tung and his followers advance and uphold those theoretical
theses and political slogans which directly serve their ends in the present historical
period, and they bury in oblivion those of their own conclusions which have ceased
to be in accord with their utilitarian aims, without showing any concern for logic or
the continuity of ideas.
Devoid of a firm, stable social support, the Maoist petty-bourgeois nationalist group
goes from one extreme to another in its domestic and foreign policies, as it seeks the
support of both the leftist extremist elements, and, directly or indirectly, of the most
reactionary circles of bourgeois society.
*** 118
Maoism, in its theoretical principles and political practices is in basic contradiction p

with, and hostile to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The essence
of Maoism is certainly not a revolutionary, but a reactionary ideology. Maoism adds
grist to the mill of imperialism and reaction. Therefore the struggle against Maoism
should be regarded primarily from the viewpoint of the incompatibility of the aims
of Maoism-as a form of social-chauvinism-with the objectives of the world
communist movement and the national-liberation movement, and with the basic
principles of Marxism-Leninism on fundamental issues of socialist construction,
world development, and revolutionary strategy and tactics.
The most eloquent and concentrated expression of Maoism was seen in the course p
of the " cultural revolution" and in the resolutions of the Ninth CPC Congress,
which is an important landmark in the development of Maoist policies, strategy and
tactics, and is of decisive importance for an understanding of the innermost
tendencies of Maoism, and of its long-term goals.
The recent interpretation by the Maoists of the basic principles of Marxism- p

Leninism, the political course of the Maoists both inside the country and in
international relations, as also in the communist movement, and the resolutions of the
Ninth CPC Congress, cannot be explained away as a dogmatic-sectarian “leftist”
interpretation of Marxism-Leninism.
Maoism is a Chinese version of social– chauvinism, with Chinese social militarism p

as its nucleus. This is an anti-Leninist political trend, which endeavours to adapt 119
Marxism-Leninism to greatHan nationalist aims and to make a demagogicutilitarian
use of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and of the revolutionary and communist movement, to
attain these goals. At the same time the Maoists camouflage their selfish, great-power
designs and plans with clamorous revolutionary phrases.
Even as it declares its irreconcilability with imperialism, the Mao group weakens p
and splits the world’s anti-imperialist forces, undermines the national-liberation
movement and specifically interferes with the establishment of unity of action to
support the just struggle of the peoples of Indochina, and actually pursues a policy of
conciliation with the imperialist forces, on an antiSoviet foundation.
Although the Maoists shout a lot about socialism, they have launched a wild p
political campaign against most of the socialist countries, have started pursuing a
course of outright hostility to the USSR, and are creating in China a situation of war
hysteria.
Although verbally they champion the idea of world revolution, and make much ado p
about their "revolutionary nature,” Mao’s supporters at the same time slander the
working class of the capitalist countries, accusing it of reformist degeneration. They
also attack most of the Communist Parties, and undermine the workers’ and
democratic movement.
Events of the past decade show that the Maoists are indifferent to the destinies of p
the revolution, if its development does not conform to their great-Han nationalistic
interests. But they understand very well that only an orientation towards revolution
can offer any historical prospect. That is why they are so amazingly insistent-and 120
unstinting in efforts and means-in their attempt to use the world revolutionary
process for their own ends, and theoretically and politically to occupy a leading
position in it, so as to mould it to the requirements of Chinese nationalism: the
implementation of the ambitious dreams of the supporters of the great-Han policy
contemplating China as the centre of the world. This is the strategic design of the
Maoist leadership.
The whole policy of the Maoists has shown a great discrepancy between their words p
and deeds, and between their theoretical concepts and practice. While proclaiming
themselves the most resolute fighters against imperialism and declaring that
imperialism is a "paper tiger,” they actually do nothing but shout slogans and at the
same time link up with imperialism on the basis of anti-Sovietism.
The Mao Tse-tung group, which adheres to the stand of great-power chauvinism, p
preserves leading positions in the PRC. However, in Chinese society and in the
world arena there are powerful social, political and ideological forces at work whose
efforts are directed at the protection, strengthening and development of socialist
gains, the restoration and consolidation of the theory and policy of Marxism-
Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism in China.
Maoism is opposed in the first place by the objective tendency of the socialist p
development of the country. This is embodied primarily in the foundations of
socialism built by the efforts of the Chinese working class and all the working
people of China with the aid of the USSR and the other socialist countries. The 121
military– bureaucratic degeneration of some elements of the political superstructure
does not mean the automatic collapse of the socialist basis. Of course, deformations
in the basis can and do take place under the influence of reactionary changes in the
superstructure.
Broad sections of the Chinese population are interested in carrying out a socialist p
policy in China-the main core of the working class, the progressive part of the
peasantry, broad masses of the intelligentsia, and the revolutionary section of the
army. The Maoists cannot ignore the interests and sentiments of these strata. Indeed,
Maoism clings like a parasite to the socialist sentiments and strivings of the Chinese
working people. A great many Chinese Communists take a socialist stand. Although
genuine Communists have suffered a temporary defeat in the struggle against
Maoism, they have not given up.
The world socialist system, its successes and the principled Leninist policy of the p
Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, exert an influence
on the development of the political struggle in China. Broad sections of the Chinese
people remember that the USSR is the first country of socialism, and they remember
the aid which the USSR rendered the working people of China during the years of
the anti– imperialist struggle, the revolution and the construction of socialism. No
anti-Soviet hysteria can do away with this sympathy.
The world communist and working-class movement also affects developments in p
China. The condemnation of Maoism by the majority of the Communist Parties of

the world and the resolute criticism of Maoism at the International Meeting of 1969, 122
at the Congresses and in the press of the fraternal Parties cannot fail to have an
influence on the situation in China.
The ideology and policy of Maoism do not correspond to the objective course of the p
development of society and the requirements of the socialist development of China.
Maoism suffers one defeat after another and its ultimate failure is historically
inevitable. There can be no doubt that the Communists, the working class and all the
working people of China will find the strength to embark once again on the road of
a close unity with the fraternal peoples of the socialist countries and ensure the
success of the great cause of socialism in the PRC.
This prospect is met by the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state. The November p
Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee noted that the Politbureau of the
Central Committee is consistently carrying out the line of the 24th Congress
regarding the People’s Republic of China and expressed full agreement with the
position of the Politbureau in solving associated practical questions. The Soviet
Union is working for the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese inter-state relations. This
aim is also promoted by the ideological-political struggle against “left-wing”
revisionism which Lenin called "petty-bourgeois revolutionism.”
Genuine Marxist-Leninists regard the exposure of the anti-Leninist chauvinistic p

ideology and policy of Maoism as essential to the strengthening of the unity of
world socialism, the communist movement and the anti-imperialist movement.
Pravda, December 5, 1971
***

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normal
Notes
[ 103•1] Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 27, p. 311.
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TOC CRITICISM OF THE MAOIST INTERPRETATION
Card AND APPLICATION OF DIALECTICS

Text V. Lektorsky, p
HTML G. Batishchev, V. Kurayeu
PS
PDF The 24th CPSU Congress emphasised that criticism of bourgeois and revisionist p
concepts remains an important component of the Party’s theoretical work. "The
T* Congress considers,” says the Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress on the Report
19* of the CPSU Central Committee, "that the creative development and propagation of
the Marxist– Leninist teaching and the struggle against attempts to revise it must
###
remain a central task in the Party’s ideological work.” [123•1
Revisionist concepts of both right and “left” varieties, and the Maoist ideology in p
particular, are particularly dangerous forms of the many attempts that have been
made to rob Marxist– Leninist theory of its revolutionary content and misrepresent
socialist and communist construction. While posing as defenders of the “purity” of
Marxism-Leninism and employing “Marxist” and “revolutionary” terms, the Maoists
seek to foist on the world communist and workers’ movement an ideological and
political platform of their own which is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. They 124
have launched a virulent campaign against the CPSU and the Soviet Union, setting
out with their divisive policy to undermine the revolutionary struggle and sow
discord in the ranks of the anti-imperialist fighters. ”. . .the Chinese leaders,” Leonid
Brezhnev said in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Party
Congress, "have put forward an ideological-political platform of their own which is
incompatible with Leninism on the key questions of international life and the world
communist movement, and have demanded that we should abandon the line of the
20th Congress and the Programme of the CPSU.” [124•1
Characteristic of the Maoist revision of MarxistLeninist theory is the attempt to p

“substantiate” the splitting actions of the Chinese leaders and their adventurist policy
by references to materialist dialectics. This circumstance makes it imperative for
Marxist scholars to examine such claims critically in order to distinguish between
true materialist dialectics and the distorted versions put out by the Maoists.
Some years ago a blatant ideological campaign was launched in China against the p
"theory of combining two into one" and advocating "the principle of dividing one
into two.” Ostensibly, the campaign was directed against distortions and falsifications
of the core of materialist dialectics, the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.
But its actual aims were utilitarian-political, not scientific, since its purpose was to
justify the special views held by Mao and his adherents. The polemic over the
problem of contradictions, of the unity and struggle of opposites flared up (or, to be 125
more exact, was artificially produced) precisely when there was a need for
"philosophical substantiation" of the policy of splitting the ranks of the international
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/2.2-Dialectics,Genuine.and.Spurious[2012-12-18 3:13:44]
communist and working-class movement and conducting an openly anti-Soviet line.

The "theory of dividing one into two,” which served as philosophical justification of
the need for a prolonged confrontation between classes under socialism, provided
tremendous scope for arbitrary construction of ever new “ contradictions” and
"antagonisms,” and creating a sociopolitical atmosphere for encouraging the
interminable political squabbles and clashes and the use of extreme measures and the
military– bureaucratic dictatorship.
The actual socio-political and ideological aim of the spate of bombast let loose in p
China in 1963–64 around the law of the unity and struggle of opposites is obvious.
It has been exhaustively demonstrated in a number of works of Marxist theoreticians,
some of which were printed in the journal Questions ot Philosophy. [ 125•1 The
Maoist interpretation and application turned dialectics into a political gimmick,
demagogically designed to camouflage and vindicate Mao Tse-tung’s political line. If
this presented a purely historical interest, referring even to the very recent past, there
would hardly be any need to return to an analysis of the specifically Maoist
interpretation and application of materialist dialectics. As it is, it is still very much
the practice in present-day China to twist Marxist dialectics to the advantage of the 126
Maoist line of thought.
The most recent and instructive example of the Maoist interpretation and application
of materialist dialectics is provided by the article "The Theory of Combining Two
into One" published in the March 1971 issue of the magazine Hungchi. Coming from
"a group of authors of revolutionary criticism" of the Higher Party School of the
CPC Central Committee, the article criticises the "reactionary and absurd thesis of
’combining two into one’ advocated and spread by the traitor and provocateur Liu
Shao-chi" and gives the “correct” i.e., Maoist, interpretation of the law of the unity
and struggle of opposites. As the authors see it, reduced to simple terms, the basic
law of materialist dialectics means that "in human society and in Nature the whole
always splits up into unequal parts" which are engaged in a constant struggle,
leading to "one side overcoming the other, defeating and destroying the other.” For
instance, the revolutionary always destroys the reactionary, the correct destroys the
erroneous, etc. "By advancing the proposition of the division of one into two,” the
authors go on to say, "Mao Tse-tung has summed up most profoundly and
laconically the law of the unity and , struggle of opposites, and has pinpointed the
very I gist of materialist dialectics. Mao Tse-tung has | demonstrated that both in
Nature and in human I society and consciousness there exist contradictions and
struggle, not the law of ’combining two into one’.” All talk of combining opposites
is , nothing more or less than theoretical substantia- | tion of the "counter-
revolutionary, revisionist line j directed against the socialist revolution with the aim 127
of combining the proletariat with the bourgeoisie, Marxism with revisionism, and
socialism with imperialism and social-imperialism.” The present polemic between
those who adhere to the "theory of dividing one into two" versus those who support
"the theory of combining two into one" is regarded as a "reflection of the bitter and
complex class struggle of that period (the first half of the 60’s) in the ideological
sphere within and without the country. In the final analysis, the point at issue was
whether the dictatorship of the proletariat should be upheld and the socialist system
consolidated or the proletarian dictatorship should be liquidated and the capitalist
system restored.” If one adds to this the opinion expressed by the present Peking
propagandists that "the reactionary and thoroughly metaphysical ’theory of combining
two into one’ has been dominant in the USSR since the mid-50’s as the
interpretation of the law of the unity and struggle of opposites and serves as
theoretical justification for the ’restoration of capitalism’ in that country and as an
instrument of ’collusion with the US imperialism’,” one will readily see that the
latest campaign of “repudiating” the "theory of combining two into one" has
farreaching political and ideological aims. But what are these aims and what, in
general, is the place and the real value of Maoist “dialectics” in the present-day
political and ideological struggle?
***
The Maoists have grown very fond of the formula of the need to "divide one into p
two,” which they view as the ultimate philosophical justification of their splitting
policies. They have grown so fond of it that the thesis of the "synthesis of opposites 128
into one" appears to them as out– andout "revisionism.” Characteristically, however,
Mao Tse-tung and his adherents only recall that "the division of one into two" is
progressive and inevitable when they find it politically advantageous, completely
“forgetting” about it when, for some reason or other, they consider it
disadvantageous. They are particularly outspoken in lauding the benefits of “division”
when it concerns the communist movement, the differences and contradictions within
its ranks, for then the Maoists find it highly beneficial to themselves. One can hardly
deny that, for it is indeed beneficial, only the question is-to whom? General
formulas, however sound, keep “silent” on that question. This accounts for the
predilection of Peking “ dialecticians” for endless repetition of general and abstract
schemes which they stick like labels on concrete and particular cases whenever it is
thought "advantageous,” but which they refrain from using when it appears to be
disadvantageous to them. Advantageous or disadvantageous-such, in the final
analysis, is the criterion of acceptability (and practical use) of a given dialectical
proposition employed by the Maoists.
The language of materialist dialectics has, in Maoist hands, become simply a p

euphemism, at once a realisation and a disguise for practical political action, a kind
of instrument kit consisting of a meagre collection of labels and nicknames. The
Maoists’ treatment of the theoretical wealth accumulated by materialist dialectics is a
striking example of unprincipled, purely the pragmatic comprehension and use of
ideas which, irrespective of how they came about or their nature, are regarded as 129
very pliant material that does not commit one to anything, and which can be used as
one pleases, turning it inside out if necessary, so long as the desired effect is
achieved. The history of social thought knows a number of examples of a well-
developed social idea being used for two diametrically opposed purposes. One, when
it becomes the property of those social forces whose aspirations and vital needs
accord with the idea, social forces which have achieved a sufficient level of spiritual
development and are able to perceive its inner meaning and make it their ideological
banner. The other, when it is appropriated by people who are far removed from such
an idea, who seize on it, not for its real content, but because of its appeal, the
authority of its originators and the effectiveness of its implications.
Marxism has long emerged as the most influential world outlook of our time known p
for its convincingness. Its appeal is recognised even by those who are not Marxists.
But it has so much to offer it is a tempting inducement to social forces which, alien
to and often far removed from Marxism, lack a banner of their own that will carry
weight and evoke the desired response.
Attempts to “borrow” and use some elements of Marxism have been made more p
than once by various petty-bourgeois, nationalistic and other circles at crucial
moments or when starved for ideas. Their leaders often cannot resist the appeal of
Marxism. "Extremely wide sections of the classes that cannot avoid Marxism in
formulating their aims,” Lenin wrote in 1910, "had assimilated that doctrine in an
extremely one-sided and mutilated fashion. They had learnt by rote certain ’slogans/ 130
certain answers to tactical questions, without having understood the Marxist criteria
for these answers.” [130•1 Even then Lenin warned against the danger of this
tendency, which leads to the emasculation of the inner spirit of Marxism, to the
drowning out of its essence by slogan-shouting, so that "nothing but the phraseology"
remains of it.
However, in those days this tendency had not yet reached the point it has today p
under Maoism; and while the utilitarian tendencies must be described, and were
described by Lenin in his time, as vulgarisation, they may appear as something not
far short of refined thought compared with present-day samples. In the writings of
Maoists, whether they be newspaper or even magazine articles, formulas such as
"division of one into two" and empty slogans do not merely supplant logical
thinking; they go so far as to lend verbal decisions an almost physically tangible
character by their sheer bluntness, their grossness in putting across the practical
political motive.
However, paradoxical as it may seem, it is precisely this extreme down-to-earth p

attitude and practical candidness that causes them to soar to the heights of
abstraction. The most specific is found in close proximity with the infinitely general,
and is, moreover, derived from the latter. So, while appearing to talk about
particulars, they do not merely express particular, ordinary ideas taking shape in
people’s minds and subject to their critical comprehension, but utter incontrovertible, 131
absolute truths. This unlimited universalisation of the most banal things, this constant
performance of dizzying leaps from “ global” generalities to particulars, and constant
attempts to pontificate, uttering "universal truths,” are garbed in the terminology of
Marxist dialectics, the idea being that only this ludicrous exploitation of some of the
turns of phrase typical of Marxist dialectics make it truly authentic!
In the rhetoric of Mao and his followers one can find any number of such "great p
leaps" from the most general to the most particular. A typical feature of this mode
of thinking is the art of making such "great leaps" without bothering to investigate
the particular cases or to ensure consistency in the transition from the general phrase
to a particular problem or the real state of affairs. This kind of logic is applied each
time there is theoretical substantiation of Maoism’s political actions. In seeking to
substantiate a thesis on the need to split the international communist movement, for
instance, the line of reasoning adopted is as follows: any process in nature, society
or thought develops through the "division of one into two.” No process can take
place without the "division of one into two.” Hence, the international communist
movement, too, must be "divided into two" which is viewed as a triumph of
dialectics.
It is not so difficult to understand why unbridled universalisation-constantly p

recurring flights towards “absolute” and “universal” truths– predominates in Maoist
writings. Absolute universality is proclaimed, not for the sake of disinterested
intellectualism, scientific cognition or ideology, but simply to give these writings the
character of unchallengeable authority. Any particular, concrete proposition can be 132
scrutinised, critically appraised, verified, corrected in some aspects or even rejected
altogether. In the case of particulars, one can dare to sort them out for oneself. But
when the voice of the oracle is heard, when the demands proclaimed are those of the
world absolute which bestows on people "universal truth" through the lips of its
earthly ambassadors, then all other voices must remain silent!
The procedure, then, is simple enough. First, the universe is supplied with a set of p
abstract formulas and slogans, which are “urgently” needed, a kind of quiver with
appropriate ideological arrows, and then, with much fanfare, it is discovered that the
necessary slogan has been “shot” by the universe itself.
It must be remembered that this hovering among the "universal truths" is p

simultaneously called upon to disguise the very earthly political passions which are
the cause of the action being justified and the source of practical slogans. These
passions are presented as the "essence of the world,” which allegedly is responsible
for them and which is garbed in dialectical terminology. As a result the crux of the
matter seems to lie in dialectics, after it has been subjected to such barefaced
manipulation.
When put to such use, the dialectical terminology becomes a device of political p
demagogy, the language of such demagogy, designed to influence people who respect
Marxist-Leninist theory. Direct justification of any act of brazen voluntarism by
abstract universal philosophisms is meant to create a semblance of profound
philosophical substantiation of what is in fact a freakish and essentially harmful 133
policy. You object to the split in the ranks of the international communist movement.
Well, then you are opposed to the thesis of "dividing one into two,” hence also to
dialectics. You maintain that the main law of dialectics is not reduced to the struggle
of opposites but presupposes also “unity” of opposites. Then you are betraying the
line of Chairman Mao and preach capitulation in face of the domestic bourgeoisie
and collusion with international imperialism.
It is hardly necessary to go to any length to prove that genuine materialist dialectics p

has nothing to do with such unprincipled use of it. Nevertheless, some explanations
and comparisons are in order, if only to take a closer look at the patterns of thought
whereby Maoists not only betray the spirit of dialectics, but break even with the
terminological semblance of " dialecticalness,” even with the letter they have
borrowed from the dialectical vocabulary. With this end in view let us go back to
the Maoist "principle of dividing one into two" and the bitter, mutually destructive
antagonism between extremes, which they misrepresent as the dialectical law of the
unity and struggle of opposites.
That the Maoists in this case have fallen foul of the letter of Marxist-Leninist p
dialectics, is perfectly obvious, for in the Maoist reading of this law unity has been
dropped, so that what remains is struggle all the way through. Anyone at all familiar
with the rudiments of dialectics will know that, according to Marx, "what constitutes
dialectical movement is the coexistence of two contradictory sides, their conflict and
their fusion into a new category." [134•1 Lenin, too, repeatedly spoke of the need 134
to be able to unite, or synthesise, opposites. In his speech "On the Trade Unions" he
pointed out that those who studied Marxism even superficially "have learned how
and when opposites can and must be combined,” drawing the important conclusion
that ".. .in the three and a half years of our revolution we have actually combined
opposites again and again." [ 134•2 Moreover, the law of the unity and struggle of
opposites and the Maoist "principle of dividing one into two" lie within totally
different frames of reference. Indeed, the two could be compared only if the law of
the unity and struggle of opposites were simply an abstract universal ontological
statement of facts (“everything in the world is such that in the given case or
example this or that takes place”) along with other such statements. However, in
reality the entire spirit of dialectics, especially in its consistent, Marxist embodiment,
its whole message-the message of concreteness-is directed against empirical facts
being “explained” by superimposing on them universalised rules, by-passing the
complex chain of intermediate links connecting the methodological principles of the
highest order with empirics, bypassing the investigation of the specific whole
whereby, and in the context of which, particular facts can be explained. Dialectical
laws in general and the law of the unity and struggle of opposites in particular, as
Lenin stressed, stem from the whole experience of the cognitive work of man’s
thought: each is "a law of cognition (and . . .a law of the objective 135
world.)” [ 135•1 Nothing, therefore, is further removed from materialist dialectics
and more alien to it than an attempt to present it as a set of abstract rules covering
everything under the sun and excluding, by their very nature, a creative approach to
anything.
Having shown that the universalised " principle of dividing one into two" is p
incompatible with anything in dialectics, it is only natural to consider if there is
anything, any concept, with which it can be compared, and to attempt to compare
the latter with dialectics to find the connecting links.
Such a concept (if it can indeed be called a concept) exists in the folklore, p
mythology and religions of many peoples-the concept of two world principles locked
in eternal conflict. In such a world, indeed, there is no unity, and strife and absolute
division rule supreme. The question of a whole does not arise for the simple reason
that from the outset two principles are presupposed, which have nothing in common,
are not related in any positive way, hence, the eternal conflict between them can
never be resolved. Being omnipresent, they rend asunder every object into warring
extremes and plunge them into a futile and ruthless universal holocaust. But because
the opposing absolutes are supposed to have nothing in common, precisely by virtue
of their absolute disunity and absolute insurmountable division, the war of extremes
has no perspective of any kind, it does not and cannot result in any progress, any
synthesis, nothing new can emerge from it: the same drama repeats itself over and 136
over again. For the victory of one extreme immediately leads to its being split, in
turn, into the same feuding poles.
It is fairly evident that this archaic mythologem which paints a lurid picture of the p
world as a perpetual St. Bartholomew Massacre sheds no light on the logic and real
problems of real struggle. It can only serve as a means of fanning mass hysteria.
But it is this mythologem which the Maoist ideologists, who have advanced the p
slogan: " Revolutionary division is a good thing, not a bad thing,” regard as an
example and a model for their world outlook. In accepting the mythologem about the
impossibility of combining extremes, these ideologists devote their current campaign
to “rebuffing” the idea of unity of opposites, rebuffing not even the idea, but the
word "unity,” which inspires them with mortal fear. As they themselves admit, "the
gist of the theory of combining two into one" lies in the word "combination.”
A devout revolutionist obsessed by "division which is a good thing" has no right to p

practise or contemplate any kind of "combination,” he is even forbidden to
pronounce this heretical and hateful word. This line, if pursued to its logical limit,
could predictably lead the fanatics of interminable division to change the slogan
"Workers of all countries, unite!" into "Workers of all countries, disunite!" And in
this way they would betray their true political motives.
Let us examine, then, the relation between the historical tradition of dialectics and p
the archaic mythology of universal duality, division and destruction. Casting a
retrospective look at the past ages, we see that dialectics proper originated and took 137
root precisely in contrast to the mythologem about the two world absolutes, to the
fatalism of the eternal confrontation of opposites, to the idea that the world is
doomed to revolve forever in one and the same circle. The core of dialectics has
always been, not dualism, not repetition of fate, not statics, but development spurred
by contradictions, creation of the new in the process of destruction and elimination
of the old.
Denial, too, holds a definite place in dialectics, but it is truly dialectical denial, and p
not a nihilistic one, a denial that draws a clearcut line between the idea of the
struggle of opposites, or, to be more precise, their unity and struggle, [ 137•1 in the
sense of a general outlook, of dialectical logic; a struggle in the direct social
meaning of the word, implying the interaction of human wills as a result of which
people part with their past, with the obsolete, and build their future, on the one
hand; and the specifically antagonistic forms of the social struggle, on the other. One
of the rudiments of Marxism is that neither in the first, nor in the second
interpretations of the concept of contradiction does the struggle of opposites represent
the extrapolation to the entire world of the cult of fierce hostility or the attribution to
Nature and culture of constant pugnacity. At the same time genuine Marxism
essentially differs from the Maoist version in its interpretation of the essence and the
role of antagonistic forms in social development.
Let us explain briefly what it means. In examining antagonisms by themselves it is p 138

impossible theoretically to understand correctly either their nature or the nature of
contradictions generally. For a correct understanding of the nature of antagonisms it
is necessary to reveal scientifically the character of the contradictions (and the
“struggle” of opposites) in general, so as to explain on this basis the specifics of
antagonistic forms. This leads, in Marxism, to the following picture: in an
antagonistic society a class struggle ultimately develops because the progressive, or
revolutionary, class seeks to resolve the contradictions inherent in the old society and
to break through its confines in order to create a new society, while the conservative,
or reactionary, class opposes this solution and this creation (or even strives to restore
the old), attempting to restrict activity to the framework of the obsolete social
structures. Hence, the class struggle is being waged over two alternatives: either to
resolve the contradictions, i.e., the historical tasks and problems, the nature of which
constitutes the "struggle of opposites,” or to reproduce them in the old form and to
obstruct the solution of the historical tasks and problems. So in essence it is a
struggle for the creation, for the synthesis of the new,- hence, consistent
revolutionaries are, by their historical mission, true champions of the creation of the
new, for the sake of which they negate the obstacles standing in their way.
The inability to examine antagonisms from the standpoint of the universal nature of p
contradictions, the inability to understand the specific character of the antagonistic
contradictions, cannot be regarded merely as an innocent gnosiological mistake. In 139
dealing with such an "inability,” one must not forget which social forces are apt to
reduce the antagonistic type of contradictions to some distinct and absolutised
essence, to an ideological principle. It is characteristic of “ultra-left” extremists to
have a tendency to regard as the criterion of revolutionariness, not creation
representing sober-minded historical responsibility, but irresponsible fanatical
militancy blinded by the spirit of total destruction and nihilism. Absolutisation of the
antagonistic form of contradictions provides them with a concept that suits their
ends.
In reality, the antagonistic form of contradiction is an effect of certain objective p

causes– contradictions, historical tasks, etc. And the real sense of this antagonistic
confrontation of hostile class forces ultimately is manifested in whether they fight tor
or against the solution of these contradictions and tasks. It is manifested also in
whether these social forces seek to transform the objective logic of the "unity and
struggle of opposites" into a logic of building new social relations and structures, or
to destroy the conditions for such creative work. Whenever an antagonistic
contradiction is treated by itself, the objective tasks and problems either disappear
from view altogether or are regarded as some purely derivative thing, as something
artificial, as some enemy scheming. In this case, what is required of a revolutionary
is not a thorough understanding of the real, subtle and intricate dialectics of history,
in its concrete situations, but unbridled bellicosity, a professed determination "to
annihilate the enemy,” as well as a readiness to resort to the most ferocious, most 140
violent measures against those who, unaffected by the passion for " universal division
into two,” try to understand the objective logic of social development instead of
inventing high-sounding slogans. Lenin in his time showed how irresponsible this
"super– revolutionarism" with its extremely “left” phrases was.
By revolutionarism Marxism means not vindictive destruction or bellicose hysterics

justified by the absolutised form of antagonism, but, on the contrary, a form of
social activity which theoretically and practically overcomes the inert framework of
the antiquated antagonistic class society and works out new forms of a socialist and
communist society. Truly revolutionary activity is activity based upon the creative
energy of the masses, so that even at the height of the struggle against the political,
class enemy the inner logic of the historical process is never lost sight of. Genuine
revolutionaries will never allow the real laws of the class struggle to be supplanted
by doctrinaire mythologising. Genuine revolutionaries know how to subject even the
most drastic and rapid breakdown of antiquated social structures to the logic of
creation of the new, the logic of their most humanistic aims-the aims of building the
new society precluding social antagonisms. Absolutisation of the role of antagonistic
contradictions in the process of establishment and development of socialist society
and the cult of militant destruction are phenomena alien to the dialectics of resolving
real contradictions. At the same time ultra-left, nihilist destructiveness denies the
creative, problematic content of the struggle for socialism and communism and is
essentially reactionary. When the Maoists act as preachers of revolutionariness that is 141
tantamount to destructiveness they become apostles of reactionary "revolutionariness.”
***
It will be seen that the "absolute truths" of the Maoist ideologists, when put to the p
test, prove to be mere euphemisms for a situative political tactic mythologically
codified by the symbolics of the political passions of the time. All the “ dialectical”
talk about "division of one into two" and other world ontological depths supposedly
fathomed by them turns out in reality to be nothing but pompous garb disguising
both the splitting policies of the Maoists in the international communist movement
and their repressive measures within the country.
The true dialectics of Marx and Lenin is, primarily, a method used for an objective p
and scientific examination of reality, the Alpha and Omega of it being a concrete
analysis of a concrete subject, without any disguises or substitutions. In contrast, in
the hands of the Maoists, dialectics has become something incompatible with any
kind of analysis. Even calling a spade a spade is out of the question, not to speak of
a thoroughgoing analysis. As a result, the ideological heralds of universal truths are
not concerned about a vitally important action to be taken or the reaction to the
difficulties and problems in which the Chinese politicians have become entangled,
but only doctrinaire fancies. The real result of attempts to blame everything on
universal rules, of the sleight of hand involving their substitution for the earthly
political passions, has been merely to translate their very concrete failures, their 142
destructive measures, their internecine strife and splitting policies into the language
of universal recommendations. After causing enormous political harm at home these
ideologists are trying to make a universal law of this mess and to impose this law
upon the world. Having proved totally incapable of drawing any lesson from their
sad experience of "dividing one into two" they undertake to teach others the
universal truths. And so the Maoists accuse our Party of all the mortal sins because
it has “revised” those universal truths, which, they assent, call for world-wide
dissension and strife, violent rebellion and vindictive repression.
“Viewing socialist society from the standpoint of division of one into two, it must p
be admitted,” say the authors of the article referred to above, "that throughout the
socialist stage, from beginning to end, there are classes, class contradictions, class
struggle, a struggle between two paths-the socialist and the capitalist, there is a
danger of the restoration of capitalism.”
The attempts of the present Chinese leaders to practise this theoretical p

recommendation based upon references to the law of the unity and struggle of
opposites show that the Maoist "class struggle" is spearheaded against the working
masses of China, against the world socialist system and the international working-
class movement. Its purpose is deliberate provocation of conflicts between socially
homogeneous classes fanned to the point of class antagonisms.
The progress of a developed socialist society in which the exploiting classes have p
been destroyed is free from antagonisms. Any attempt to introduce into it the 143
methods of “division” into mutually opposed classes, any tendency deliberately to
identify the uncompromising class struggle the proletariat is waging against hostile
bourgeois and revisionist ideologies with the creative quest in the constructive
endeavour to consolidate and develop socialism, are utterly inadmissible and alien to
the nature of socialism, and to the creative dialectics of its development. Such
dialectics has nothing in common with the pitiable myths which the Maoists have
adopted as their weapon and which increasingly reveal themselves as miserable fakes
of Marxist dialectics.
Voprosy filosofii, No. 8, 1971
***

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Notes
[ 123•1] Information Bulletin Nos. 7-8, 1971, Peace and Socialism Publishers, pp.
235–236
[ 124•1] Information Bulletin, Nos. 7-8, 1971, Peace and Socialism Publishers, p. 15.
[ 125•1] E. V. Ilyenkov, Dialectics or Eclecticism. No. 7, 1968; L. P. Delyusin,

’Discussion on Socialism in China and Contemporary Reality, No. I, 1969; E. Ya.
Batalov, Destruction of Practice, No. 3, 1969.
[ 130•1] Lenin, Coll Works, Vol. 17, pp. 42–43. 130
[ 134•1] Marx The Poverty of Philosophy, M., 1955, p. 126.
[ 137•1] We may recall here Lenin’s definition: " Dialectics is the teaching which
shows how opposites can be.. . identical.. .” (Coll. Works, Vol. 38, p. 109), i. e., not
only combined, but in unity leading to identity.
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<•> Crisis in the Political 144
Development of China

TOC [introduction.]

Card
L. Gudoshnikov, B. Topornin p
Text
HTML Developments in China clearly show that the notorious "cultural revolution" is p
PS entering the final stage of its long-drawn-out existence. This is shown particularly by
PDF the political manoeuvres of the Mao Tse-tung group aimed at stabilising and
consolidating its rule, stemming the tide of wanton tyranny, lawlessness and the
T* deliberate derangement of the life of society and state that they themselves let loose,
19* and confining it within the strict and definite limits of the “new” order. No longer
bothering to keep up the pretence of struggle against bourgeois influences in art,
### science and education and against all those "following the bourgeois path,” the
Peking leaders have lately been openly pursuing purely political objectives in order
to maintain their power.
There is no doubt that the political development of China is an extremely involved

process, multi-dimensional and contradictory externally as well as internally. This is
because its essence, forms and trends are due to economic, political and social
factors-which differ as to the force, time and duration of their action-and also to the
special national features and historical traditions of the vast country. Concealed
behind the ample evidence of opposition-often indistinct and even imperceptible-of
the social forces, is shrewd calculation and the cunning political line of the Maoist
ruling clique.
***

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MAP
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<•> THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND THE 145
POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
CHINESE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
TOC
Card It emerges more and more clearly that what is now taking place in China is a p
radical restructuring of the entire social-political, and especially state-legal,
Text mechanism that was established after the victorious revolution and the proclamation
HTML of a People’s Republic in China and was fixed in essence in the 1954 Constitution.
PS Much of the political organisation of Chinese society have since been destroyed,
PDF although the Constitution and many other laws, constituent acts, policy documents
and fundamental party decisionsincluding the documents of the 8th CPC Congress-
T* have not been repealed or much amended. At the same time new bodies and
19* organisations are springing up in China, and a political system is emerging which is
evidently called upon to perform the functions of a Maoist dictatorship.
###
It is no accident that Mao Tse-tung and his group should have set out to destroy by p
force the state apparatus and the entire political system of China as they had been
until early 1966, when the notorious "cultural revolution" was unleashed. The fact of
the matter is that the mechanism of people’s government in China was built and
developed on the Leninist principles of socialist statehood, which were studied and
applied in practice, as well as on the basis of the experience accumulated by the
Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.
Although the conditions under which China had to develop were extremely p 146
challenging and difficult owing to the economic and cultural backwardness inherited
from the past, to the small working class and to the influence of the semifeudal
habits and customs, the people’s government very soon achieved considerable success
in developing and building up democratic institutions and arousing the political
consciousness of the people. Under the 1954 Constitution, the People’s Republic of
China was declared a people’s democracy led by the working class and based on the
alliance of workers and peasants. The working people exercised their power through
a system of representative bodies-assemblies of people’s representatives-which were
set up both in town and countryside. The state apparatus was built on the principle
of democratic centralism, a combination of collective and oneman management, and
control by the people. The leading role belonged to the Communist Party of China
which proceeded under the banner of Marxism-Leninism together with the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties. The CPC relied in
its activities on the United Popular Democratic Front which comprised all the
democratic classes, parties and groups, popular organisations and democratic elements
not in the Party.
But both the structure and the working of such a mechanism had their defects. This p
was due to lack of experience and competent personnel and, particularly to the
Maoist distortions, which were perceptible even at the earliest stages of China’s
post-revolutionary development, although not as clearly as now. As a social-political
and theoretical-ideological current. Maoism did not take shape at once, showing 147
suddenly against the background of the "cultural revolution,” but emerged and gained
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/2.3.1-The.Cultural.Revolution[2012-12-18 3:13:59]
in strength gradually, leaning on the petty^bourgeois element and playing on the

backward nationalistic, hegemonic ambitions of the immature masses. The mechanism
of people’s power that had been developed failed to conform to the Maoist idea of
the content and form of power, being alien to it in principle. Moreover, the
continued existence of such a mechanism even after repeated campaigns for
“amendment” and "improvement,” against the “right-leading” and “bourgeois”
elements, made it impossible for the Maoists to feel politically secure.
The Maoist political-legal doctrine was more than a revision and denial of the p
fundamental primary principles of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the substance and
political forms of power during the establishment and strengthening of the socialist
system. The doctrine is based primarily on the thesis that the "dictatorship of the
proletariat is a dictatorship exercised by the masses.” [147•1 This proposition
which Mao Tse-tung laid down as early as 1957, [147•2 and which was widely
publicised during the "cultuml revolution,” made it possible to disregard the leading
role of the working class and ignore its genuine needs and interests as well as its
views. At the same time it suggested that society should be divided, not on a class
principle but according to political views or, to be more precise, on people’s attitude 148
to the policies of the Maoist rulers. All the social forces that supported the
adventuristic nationalist and hegemonic Maoist line were assumed to be "the people,”
while all those under the least suspicion of being disobedient or disrespectful to the
"great helmsman" were declared enemies of the people and "capitalist– supporters.”
Maoist ideologists often refer to the special features of China’s social development p
and especially to the fact that the peasants form the bulk of the population while the
proletariat is very small. Indeed, this is of importance to social reforms. The Chinese
revolution was carried through and the first successes in socialist construction
achieved largely because the CPC had managed to win over and lead the peasantry.
But the concrete historical conditions should have precisely made it of primary
concern to the government and Party to provide for the leadership of the working
class, to help enhance its leading position in the alliance with the peasants and to
work to introduce proletarian ideology among the rural population. Under such
conditions the bodies of political power must be particularly careful not to let the
influence of the petty-bourgeois element among the peasantry eclipse or distort the
interests and aims of the workers, the genuine exponents of social progress and
consistent fighters for socialism, who although not numerous by comparison, are to
lead society.
The Maoists, however, have no faith in the creative ability and revolutionary energy p
of the people; moreover, they are suspicious of any voluntary activity or initiative of
the workers. Instead, they offer a grotesquely inflated personality cult which serves 149
to suppress the democratic relations and norms of the party and public life, as well
as criticism and control from below, and enforces unquestioning blind obedience to
the will of the absolute "leader.” Nor are the masses required to understand the
meaning and purpose of the decisions for, as the Chinese press points out, you must
"carry out Mao’s instructions no matter whether you have as yet grasped their
meaning or not.” [149•1
Taking its cue from the semi-feudal traditions of deifying the supreme ruler, the p
peasants’ ageold habit of obedience to authority, etc., Maoist propaganda is, in effect,
trying to preserve and perpetuate the political apathy of the masses and to implant a
system of bureaucratic administration and handle all social and political issues in a
subjective way.
These days the Peking leaders never recall what the classics of Marxism-Leninism p
had to say about the role played by the individual in history in general and in
revolutionary change in particular. They try to put it out of people’s minds that V.
Lenin, the head of the Party and the Soviet state, resolutely checked all attempts to
extol his work. The Maoists fiercely attack the resolutions of the CPSU and other
fraternal communist and workers’ parties which condemn the manifestations of the
personality cult in some countries and which preclude subjectivism and arbitrary
action by individuals. Carrying on " unreserved propaganda of Mao’s ideas and
arming the people with them" [150•1 is declared to be the main point of the 150
Maoist doctrine.
To Lenin’s conception of democratic centralism which he saw as a combination of p

the management of society from a single centre and on a single plan, and of
subordination of the lower to the higher bodies, with an overall development of local
initiative and creative activity of the masses, the ideologists of Maoism oppose a
scheme of their own. It boils down to the most rigorous centralism, the unreasoning
execution of all directives "from the top,” and to a rigid official hierarchy in the
Party apparatus as well as that of the government. Moreover, the very concept of
democracy-which, one might think, presupposes the extensive development of various
forms of government by the people and the enlistment of broad sections of the
population in public activities-is now interpreted in China as something synonymous
with "centralised leadership" and a means of enforcing centrally-made decisions.
"The Most Recent Directives of Chairman Mao,” which are quoted in the joint
editorial of Jenmin jihpao, Chiehfangchiun poo and Hungchi of January 1, 1969,
state that democracy must provide for "proper centralism.”
It is plain that the Maoist political-legal doctrine extremely exaggerates the role of p
coercion in the carrying out of social reforms. It views compulsion as very nearly
the key to all social problems including those (e.g., in the economic field) which
require a different approach, such as reasonable estimates, a wise distribution of
manpower, or provision of the necessary facilities. The slogans "Power comes from 151
the barrel of a gun" and "Politics takes command,” which were adopted long ago at
the time of the armed struggle against the Japanese invaders, the Maoist rulers
retained in peace-time and not only while revolutionary government was being
established but also later on, during the building of socialism. With the start of the
"cultural revolution,” with the hungweipings and tsaofans going on the rampage and
the army acting as a shield, violence actually became the Maoists’ sole means of
handling, not only all political issues that presented themselves, but also those arising
in the sphere of science, culture and education.
Of course Marxism-Leninism never denied that proletarian power might have to p

resort to violence in order to carry out its functions. Nevertheless, Lenin often
underlined that ”. . .the dictatorship of the proletariat is not only the use of force
against the exploiters, and not even mainly the use of force.” [151•1 The main
thing about the state power of the proletariat is its constructive and creative aspect
which manifests itself in the way it organises the people for the building of
socialism.
As they shift the centre of gravity to the use of force, the Maoists openly ignore the p
Constitution and defy socialist law. The Maoists instituted repressive actions against
the working people long before the "cultural revolution.” They carried out this policy
by sending the local bodies of power obligatory quotas of so many per cent of the 152
population to be dealt with as enemies of the people. The rules concerning the
administration of justice by the courts alone, the independence of the judges, and
centralised Procuracy were declared harmful and "bourgeois.” Practically nothing was
done to codify laws while proposals for endorsing new codes voiced at the 8th
Congress of the CPC, came to be viewed two years later as "subversion of the
people’s democratic dictatorship”. The Maoist rulers regarded the citizens’ democratic
rights and liberties as empty declarations which, if anything, ought to be limited and
curtailed, not enhanced by legal and material safeguards.
The political-legal views of the Maoist rulers and the entire ideological and
theoretical platform of the nationalistic, adventuristic and megalomaniac course
imposed on China by its present Peking leadership, are not in any sense an
adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the complex and special features of the vast
country. Still less are they the "acme of revolutionary theory,” as Mao’s followers
claim. Rather, they are a hotchpotch of quasi-revolutionary phrases and bombastic
slogans betraying lack of faith in the creative capacity of the people and a denial of
the leading role of the proletariat, and put forward to excuse violence, the cult of
personality, and extreme nationalism. And what is most important, these are not
isolated mistakes such as may be due to growing-pains or a fresh outbreak of the
infantile disorder of leftism in communism, but rather a fully-developed system of
anti– Leninist views and a betrayal of the key principles and objectives of the world
communist movement.
***

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[ 147•1] Jenmin jihpan, July 19, 1968.
[ 147•2] See Mao Tse-tung, Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,
M., 1967.
[ 149•1] Jenmin jihjiao, June 16, 1967.
[ 150•1] Jenmin jihpao, January 16, 1969. 150
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<•> THE POLITICAL CHANGE: ITS CAUSES AND FORMS 153

TOC The causes, motive forces and forms of the political coup the Maoists are trying to p
bring off under the guise of the "cultural revolution" certainly need to be studied and
Card analysed further. For example, we still have to find satisfactory explanation of why it
was that the Maoists were able to set off the so-called "cultural revolution,” destroy
Text much of the former social-political and state-legal system, and begin to establish the
HTML mechanism of an absolute military-bureaucratic dictatorship. Why was there no force
PS within the Party and the state strong enough and sufficiently well-organised to stand
PDF in the way of Mao Tsetung and his group, to defend the purity of Marxist-Leninist
teachings and provide for China’s successful advance along the socialist road?
T*
19* Of course an examination of these questions will require a most detailed and p
extensive analysis of a variety of social factors.
###
Notwithstanding their boastful declarations, the Maoists have not yet managed to p
achieve complete victory. Chinese developments connected with the "cultural
revolution" are not yet over. At the same time it would be useful to noteeven if only
tentatively and touching mainly on the political-legal sphere-some of the
circumstances that have played an essential part in Chinese affairs.
The first thing to point out is the inadequate general development of the political p
life in China, the absence of sufficiently strong traditions and habits of socialist
democratism. This may be explained in part by the historical past of China whose 154
downtrodden people not only suffered from semi-feudal forms of exploitation but
were also deprived of elementary rights and liberties and were oppressed by military
cliques and foreign interference. It is equally noteworthy, however, that after the
Chinese revolution had been accomplished and people’s government established, not
enough was done to end the onerous legacy of the past. The socialist democratic
forms stipulated in the 1954 Constitution were never completely realised. Even at the
time when they were most active, representative bodies never played quite so
important a part as they were legally entitled to. They did not exercise the necessary
control over the executive bodies and their organisational work among the people,
e.g., the relations between deputies and constituents, was nothing more than a
formality.
As is known, Lenin considered the realisation of democratic principles-such as the p

raising of the political and cultural level of the working people sufficiently to ensure
their effective participation in governmetit-of paramount importance. Speaking at the
8th Congress of the RCP (Bolsheviks) he stressed that there remained no legislative
”. . .hindrances, but so far we have not reached the stage at which the working
people could participate in government. Apart from the law, there is still the level of
culture, which you cannot subject to any law.” [154•1 In a situation of this kind
the organising and guiding effort of the Communist Party and socialist state in
developing the political awareness, activities and initiative of the people becomes
particularly important. But in China the party and state development proceeded in 155
such a manner that it not only failed to further the cause of socialist democracy but
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/2.3.2-Political.Change-Its.Causes.and.Forms[2012-12-18 3:20:31]
actually held back all progress in that direction.
It must be borne in mind that although at the preceding stages of China’s p

development Mao Tse-tung had not always revealed his political schemes and at
times had been forced to follow the Marxist-Leninist line, he had nevertheless caused
considerable harm in the matter of the formation and building up of people’s
government. As the demagogic "big leap" and " people’s communes" policies
succeeded one another, many bodies and institutions were thrown out of gear, and
many thousands of genuine Communists were dismissed from office and viciously
abused. Nor is it to be left out of account that Mao’s policy led to the isolation and
estrangement of the Party and state from the population so that the working people
came to look at the state bodies, laws, and even important Party and government
officials as a force hostile to the people.
Every now and then the normal course of political life in China has been p
interrupted by vociferous campaigns accompanied by mass-scale repression. For
example, as they were preparing their "big leap,” the Maoists launched a " struggle
against the rightist bourgeois elements.” At first this seemed to be aimed at the
bourgeois liberal intellectuals from the democratic parties but soon spread to the
Chinese Communist Party and to government institutions. The campaign swiftly
developed into a mass persecution of Communists who were sincerely trying to carry
out the resolutions of the 8th CPC Congress, democratise the social and political life 156
and establish fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries. The policy of "people’s communes" in the countryside, besides dealing a
blow at the agricultural production, actually caused the destruction of representative
bodies in the countryside and discredited a large number of local leaders devoted to
the Party.
Not only did the Maoists disregard the need to observe revolutionary law, but they p
went out of their way to paralyse the very institutions whose function was to
strengthen overall civil discipline and maintain socialist law and order. As early as
the late fifties they started a rabid persecution of the workers in political and legal
institutions, particularly of the courts, procurator’s offices and the people’s control
organisations. Many prominent workers in these institutions, devoted champions of
law and order, were dismissed from office and branded as " counterrevolutionary
elements" who had wormed themselves into the Party. During the "big leap" the
fundamentally wrong practice of setting up "task groups" was started. These groups
performed the combined functions of the courts, procurator’s offices and public
security bodies. The Committee of People’s Control, which was established soon
after the victorious revolution and which rested on the system of local bodies and on
the active citizens as a whole, was first reorganised into a common ministry, and
later on, both central and local people’s control agencies were finally eliminated.
Already before the "cultural revolution" the part played by the system of p
representative bodies in the country’s life was very small. Most of the important 157
decisions-e.g., on the "big leap" and "people’s communes"-were adopted without
being submitted to the All-China Assembly of People’s Representatives, which was
not even convoked, or to local elected bodies. People’s assemblies were no longer
called regularly, their activities were more and more circumscribed and finally
stopped altogether. Since the launching of the "big leap" policy, elections to
representative bodies have been held only once, in 1964, although under the law
there should have been during that time at least two elections to the AllChina
Assembly of People’s Representatives and four, to the local people’s assemblies.
Real power, both in the centre and at grassroots level, gradually shifted to the
executive bodies which became increasingly ponderous and unwieldy, and pervaded
by officialism and sycophancy. State administration separated itself from the people
by walls of red tape.
The Communist Party of China continued to lose its former standards of p

organisation and efficiency, forfeiting its prestige among the working people to a
considerable extent because, on the one hand, the more progressive cadres were now
and again subjected to persecution, being made the target of “purges” and assorted "
campaigns,” and, on the other hand, because it based its activities on peremptory
army-style commands and one-man decisions instead of on the state bodies. The
principle "The first secretary of the Party Committee is the commander-in-chief,”
which the Maoists have propounded in Party work at all levels since the late fifties
and early sixties, in actual practice meant that many decisions were made by just one 158
individual. This destroyed confidence in collective leadership, and at the same time
caused the state institutions to develop a formal, indifferent and irresponsible attitude.
All the revolutionary triumphs and socialist gains of the Chinese were ascribed to p
Mao, and all blunders and flops were attributed to the machinations of his enemies
or failure to understand his "great directives.” There arose a situation in China where
important Party and government leaders, whose great services to the people were
well-known, could not-if they objected to Mao’s policies and the actions of his
aides-speak out against the Mao personality cult and had no option but to support it
publicly, often excusing their particular view by their concern to see the ideas of
"the reddest sun" translated into life to the very best effect.
At the beginning of the "cultural revolution" the Peking leaders increasingly set out p
to make use of young people and even schoolchildren, misrepresenting the outrages
perpetrated by the hungweipings and tsaofans as a largely spontaneous mass
movement. The Maoists deliberately set these young storm troopers upon their own
real or imaginary opponents, encouraging savage acts of terrorism. It is significant
that in the widely circulated resolution of the CPC Central Committee of August 8,
1966, the prospective hungweipings were granted free pardon in advance for any
crimes and offences they might commit "in the course of the movement" short of
murder, poisoning, arson, sabotage, theft of state secrets and counter-revolutionary
crimes " whereof explicit evidence should be available.”
Still, Mao and his followers depended mainly on the army. China’s armed forces 159
played a decisive role in the progress of events, becoming the Maoists’ "steel wall"
and mainstay. It was not by chance that the army was not broken up, reorganised or
even seriously criticised. The removal of some military commanders and even
disturbances in some army units were due to the political purge reflecting the course
of events in China rather than to any other cause. The special features of the
formation, leadership and ideological guidance of the army were used by the
Maoists, who had seized commanding positions in the army in good time, to divorce
it from the people and educate it in the spirit of iron discipline and blind obedience
to Mao Tse-tung. In actual fact, the army has long been independent of Party and
government control and, as developments have shown, has placed itself above
society.
***

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< THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE >

AND THE POLITICAL AND MAOIST POLITICAL SYSTEM
LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC


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<•> PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE MAOIST 159
POLITICAL SYSTEM

TOC
What are the characteristics of the Maoist political system that is developing? Time p
Card is sure to make its corrections in the answer, for the propensity of Mao Tse-tung
and his supporters for shifting ground and turning right about, for dealing in
Text demagoguery and just deceiving the people must naturally leave its mark on China’s
HTML social and public life. Notwithstanding this, the outline of the Maoist dictatorship
PS emerges quite clearly.
PDF
As things stand, political power in China has been seized by a tiny group led by p 160
T* Mao Tsetung. This group is controlling the social and public life and has taken on
19* itself the functions of the top party and government bodies. From the standpoint of
Chinese constitutional law a group of this kind cannot be identified with any of the
### established institutes of the political system and chiefly resembles the half-advisory,
halfruling institutions of a monarchy or an absolute dictatorship. The "Maoist
headquarters,” as the dictator group is officially described, is a vague enough notion,
not fixed in any legal or other act; it has neither a clear-cut structure, nor an
apparatus of its own, nor any fixed body of people. Moreover, the circle of Mao’s
followers keeps contracting and extending by turns as the objectionable ones are
kicked out or-as happens more seldom-those who win back their place by
“repentance” or zealous prosecution of Maoist objectives, return.
Placed at the hub of the entire political mechanism is "Chairman Mao,” whose p
moves and decisions are never debated. Mao’s prestige serves to cover unprecedented
infractions of democracy and law, savage repression and outrages against those
suspected of "sedition.” This inflated prestige is used by the Maoists to ensure the
obedience of the multi-million people. Mao Tse-tung has appointed Lin Piao,
Minister for Defence, his official successor, as if Mao were a monarch.
Liu Shao-chi, who had been elected Chairman of the Chinese People’s Republic p
under the Constitution, was persecuted as the "black band leader,” "power-holder
who follows the capitalist path" and finally removed from all his jobs in the party 161
and government without the slightest regard for law. The All-China Assembly of
People’s Representatives and its Standing Committee are no longer convened and
have practically stopped functioning. As for the State Council of China, it is still
carrying on in certain respects but is kept under strict supervision by the Maoist
ruling clique.
In the provinces, autonomous areas, centrallygoverned cities and, more recently, also p
in the countries and communes, "revolutionary committees" have been set up. These
have replaced Party committees as well as local assemblies of people’s
representatives and their executive bodies, people’s committees. To all intents and
purposes, the Maoists hope that the "revolutionary committees,” described in the
Chinese press as an "outstanding victory of the cultural revolution,” will be their
ohief support and will provide the basis for the new political mechanism.
"Revolutionary committees" are formed of carefully picked “loyal” military men, the
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/2.3.3-The.Maoist.Political.System[2012-12-18 3:20:38]
old cadres, and representatives of the "revolutionary masses.” The leading place in
these committees, with respect both to the number of seats and amount of influence,
is, in most instances, reserved for the army. The Maoists have been wary of
announcing an election to the "revolutionary committees,” although in 1966 they
made declarations to the effect that these new bodies of power would be elective.
The army holds a special place in the system of the military-bureaucratic p

dictatorship, and the Peking rulers pay careful attention to keeping it under control.
Today the Chinese armed forces are not so much concerned with national defence as 162
with the management of the state, the economy, and education. They have thus
become the chief instrument of Mao’s policies. The army, which was in the
background early in the " cultural revolution,” is now setting the pace of China’s
social development. With its assistance, Mao Tsetung crushes his opponents and also
deals with those who, like the hungweipings, used to loom large in the political
scene but then got out of hand and even became dangerous to the regime. The army
has become the chief means of maintaining public order and labour discipline, which,
in itself, is without precedent in the history of world socialism. Army units have
invaded the factories, where, under the guise of Maoist propaganda, have taken
charge of production, forcing the workers to work without any material incentive.
The Mao dictatorship relies on a system of brutal suppression and intimidation of p

the people. Apart from the army, punitive functions are exercised by a formidable
apparatus commanding numerous prison camps and prisons. The merger of public
security agencies, the courts and people’s procuracy into the "committees for
stamping out counter-revolution" or "departments of proletarian dictatorship" had
been a flagrant violation of the Constitution. These departments have, from time to
time, staged so-called trials which are held in absolute contempt of the defendants’
rights. These travesties of trials often terminate in public executions.
The military-bureaucratic dictatorship is propped up by numerous prison camps and p

prisons. Besides imprisonment, another current method of suppression practised on a 163
mass scale is the exiling of city dwellers to the country.
In the process of rebuilding the political system the Maoists have uprooted p
influential and strong organisations such as the All-China Federation of Trade
Unions and the Young Communist League. These organisations, which had extensive
revolutionary experience and were devoted to Marxism-Leninism and friendship with
the Soviet Union, seemed dangerous to the Maoists. Yet, as they would like to pass
off the "cultural revolution" as a popular movement and draw the mass of the
working people into their gambles, the Peking leaders have lately started to organise
"work brigades for the propagation of Mao’s ideas.” These brigades are usually
mustered and directed by servicemen and fulfil auxiliary functions in restoring order
in the provinces. "Work brigades" are eagerly exploited by the Maoists who seek to
show in this way how loyal they are to the slogan of working-class leadership. They
also rely on these brigades to get rid of the hungweipings-so that no blame should
attach to the army-and achieve political stability.
Recently the Maoist ruling clique set some schemes on foot concerning the p
Communist Party of China. It is well known that during the " cultural revolution" the
CPC had to take many hard knocks. More than 130 of 174 members and candidate
members of the CPC Central Committee elected by the 8th Congress were subjected
to persecution. The Political Bureau and Secretariat are not functioning. Party
committees in the provinces, autonomous regions, towns and communes are
paralysed. The "cultural revolution group" while claiming to speak on behalf of the
Party, actually set the hungweipings and tsaofans upon the Party and attacked and 164
took repressive action against Communist Party officials. However, in late 1968, the
Peking leaders started on another course, setting out to purge the Party, substitute
Maoism for Marxism-Leninism, replenish the Party by recruiting new members from
among the tsaofans, restructure the Party apparatus and make further use of the army
style of work. They want to turn the Party into an obedient tool. They mean to turn
to account the Party’s revolutionary past, its distinguished liberation-war record, its
prestige among the working people, and its immense organisational and educational
potential. For all practical purposes, what they are setting up in China under the
name of the Communist Party of China is a new political organisation which is
intended to serve as a support for Maoist rule.
Soviet State and Law, No. 5, 1969
***

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<•> Maoism Preaches Poverty 165

TOC A Arzamastseu p
Card
Poverty is not an inevitable accompaniment of mankind’s development. It is p
unavoidable only as long as the productive forces are not sufficiently developed and
Text the economy has not risen above a production level that meets only immediate
HTML needs. Exploitation in class society, new requirements and the accumulation of
PS wealth aggravate poverty and awaken in the people a desire to put an end to
PDF oppression and privation. However, insufficient economic development has for a long
time prevent the possibility of discovering the correct way for ending poverty. This
T*
became possible only when Marxism came into being in the middle of the 19th
19*
century. Till then numerous Utopias were evolved in a futile attempt to discover the
### laws of social development.
Solution of this problem is a complex and contradictory process. The developed p

production is certainly essential for the elimination of inequality and poverty.
Historical experience shows, however, that advanced production in itself cannot bring
about social harmony. It is necessary only to consider the example of the USA. The
social factor is no less important. On the other hand, the beneficial effect of the
social element may be negligible in the absence of sufficient material prerequisites.
The basic mistake of most Utopian projects was precisely this: overestimation of the
social factor and underestimation of the material one. Many Utopians saw the source
of social evils in the sphere of distribution of the good things of life. They asserted 166
that the wealth created by human labour should immediately be made the property of
all on an equal basis. This demand was best expressed by the sort of egalitarian
communism which praised, for the sake of primitive equality, the "noble simplicity"
of the poor who have no requirements, rejected culture, proclaimed the primacy of
village over town, and regimented everyday life. This doctrine was first advanced by
the preachers of early Christian communities. In the Middle Ages it was promoted by
Thomas Mvinzer, and in modern times by Tammaso Campanella, Gabriel Mably,
Domenico Morelli and other Utopian Communists. The bourgeois egalitarian
socialism of William Godwin and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon is in spirit close to this
doctrine. However, the experience of primitively-communist sects, fraternities, towns
and communities of various epochs proves that such equality is unattainable.
Economic and ideological alienation assumed unheard-of dimensions in these
communities. The worker had to be satisfied with the bare minimum, while his
whole life depended on the authorities.
The current revival of certain features of primitive communism in China, as p

reflected in the policy of the "people’s communes,” the "both worker and peasant"
course, the setting up of self-sufficient, autarkic economic cells and the "introduction
of rationally lower wages and salaries,” presents a vain attempt to solve the problem
of poverty and hunger with the help of the outdated and fallacious concept of
levelling.
Only socialism which unites the material and social factors is capable of resolving p
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/2.4-Maoism.Preaches.Poverty[2012-12-18 3:20:49]
this problem and ending poverty. Socialist revolution cuts the very roots of poverty 167
and ends the glaring inequality of people. The all-round development of production
and the attainment on this basis of complete social homogeneity are essential for the
elimination of poverty. To achieve this takes more than good intentions, since
production has its own laws of development. One must have certain capital, establish
a new labour discipline and a new organisation of labour, teach people new skills
and techniques and make the workers interested in the results of their efforts.
The only way to get rid of poverty is through creating a more advanced mode of p
production and through raising labour productivity.
Beginning the reorganisation of production presents great difficulties, especially in p

economically backward countries where a socialist revolution has occurred. The
discrepancy between the advanced socio-political system and the poor economic base
may result in grave complications, and even in the loss of the socialist gains. The
efforts of the working class in fighting the imminent dangers and endeavouring to
get production going are opposed by all the evils and difficulties inherited from the
past-an underdeveloped economy, famine, poverty and the resultant demoralisation of
certain sections of the people, and their loss of interest in work. This is what the
young Soviet Republic experienced just after the revolution. The imperialist war
followed by the civil war had completely disrupted the country’s feeble economy.
Famine and economic dislocation threatened to destroy the world’s first socialist
state. Higher labour productivity was the only way out, but labour productivity was
falling steadily, and factories and plants were closing down because of famine. Lenin 168
wrote: "We get a sort of vicious circle: in order to raise productivity of labour we
must save ourselves from starvation, and in order to save ourselves from starvation
we must raise productivity of labour.” [168•1
The republic could not count on external economic aid. It had to rely on its own p
strength to break the vicious circle. The strength came from the revolutionary
enthusiasm of the people who made sacrifices in the name of victory and a better
future. The accomplishment of tasks, which would be unthinkable at other times, is
made possible by revolutionary heroism each time a new social system is born. The
October Socialist Revolution evoked an unprecedented enthusiasm. For the first time
in history people were making a revolution for themselves, and for the first time in
history they had real opportunity to display their capabilities. The heroism at the
fronts of the civil war was rivalled by the heroism of the workers in the rear, of
which the communist subbotniks were only one example. Conscientious work had a
great effect on the economic life of the country. It raised labour productivity and
improved labour discipline.
An atmosphere of general inspiration and the readiness of the working people to p

sacrifice themselves at the initial stage creates the impression that revolutionary
enthusiasm is enough to put an end to all difficulties. "... We expected to accomplish
economic tasks just as great as the political and military tasks we had accomplished
by relying directly on this enthusiasm,” Lenin said. [168•2 However, “pure” 169
heroism cannot last forever, and Lenin saw the danger in time. In his speech at the
combined meeting of the delegates of the 8th Congress of Soviets and members of
the AllRussia and Moscow Councils of Trade Unions who were also members of the
Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on December 30,1920, Lenin pointed to the
need and importance of material incentive for shock work: "The preference part of
priority implies preference in consumption as well. Otherwise, priority is a pipe
dream, a fleeting cloud, and we are, after all, materialists. The workers are also
materialists; if you say shock work, they say, let’s have the bread, and the clothes,
and the beef.” [169•1
It was enthusiasm, bolstered as far as possible by material incentive, that made it p

possible to break the vicious circle. This was an important discovery of Marxism.
The combination of moral and material stimuli will remain an effective lever of
economic development till the time when communism is built.
The problem of socialist changes also faced China after the 1949 socialist p
revolution. Its economy was then even more backward than that of Russia in 1917.
The pulse-beat of economic life could hardly be felt after the many years of
Japanese occupation and the civil war. The few undamaged industrial enterprises
were lost in the ocean of primitive farm production, and were unable to exert any
noticeable influence. The feeble links between various parts of the country were
breaking. Famine was rife. The Communist Party of China set about the task of
ending the famine, the poverty and the rural backwardness, and of attaining 170
abundance. The external conditions were favourable. The country received
comprehensive economic, cultural and military assistance from the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries. Neither was popular enthusiasm lacking. The vast country
began socialist construction. Factories and plants were rehabilitated and reconstructed,
and new industries were built with the help of the Soviet Union. The moral uplift
and material incentive promoted labour productivity and a new labour discipline. By
following this road China could build an advanced socialist economy in a few
decades. There were no insurmountable obstacles in the way, since socialism met the
basic demands of both the working class and the peasantry. The danger lay
elsewhere.
Under certain conditions politics is known to conflict temporarily with its economic p
base and hinder its development. State leadership in China fell into the hands of
people whose petty– bourgeois views and sentiments kept them from becoming true
Marxists. The initial successes in China and the people’s willingness to work
selflessly for the common cause evoked adventurist leanings in the leadership who
sought to ignore the laws of social development, which is so characteristic of the
petty bourgeoisie. Primitive petty-bourgeois mentality raised to the level of ideology
culminated in voluntarism, the personality cult, nationalism and anti-Sovietism.
Lenin’s tested formula for successful socialist development-enthusiasm plus material p

incentivehas been altered by Mao Tse-tung to enthusiasm plus poverty. The new
formula flatly rejects all material incentive, making enthusiasm the one and only 171
motive force. Mao Tse-tung’s variety of enthusiasm is evidently devoid of the
element of awareness and reason and borders on fanaticism. Although exaltation
whipped up by extreme nationalism can take hold of a section of the population,
mostly the youth, it cannot be universal or lasting. Reality with its daily cares is a
sobering factor, and the intoxication cannot last.
The second half of the formula, poverty, is inseparable from the first. A person p
seized by “ super-revolutionary” enthusiasm, according to Mao, need not and should
not possess any material benefits beyond the bare minimum. Poverty should be part
of universal self-denial.
It is no accident that the Maoists have made use of this idea. Poverty and equality p
have been always regarded by the oppressed as being as closely related as their
opposites-wealth and inequality. All egalitarian Utopias emphasise and praise poverty
as the key requisite of universal equality. Poverty was lauded by Proudhon, one of
the founders of petty-bourgeois egalitarian socialism, who even developed an
economic theory to justify the perpetuity of poverty. He held that nature had given
man two opposed qualities-a limitless capacity to consume and a limited capacity to
work. Poverty was therefore claimed to be man’s natural condition to which man
must reconcile himself. "It is clear that we cannot even think of escaping tihis
poverty-tHie law of our nature and our society,” wrote Proudhon. "Poverty is a
boon, and should be regarded as the basis of our joys.” [171•1 This was said over
a hundred years ago, at the time of the first industrial revolution, and is being 172
repeated by Mao Tse-tung in the age of atomic energy and of turbulent scientific
and technological advancement.
In Maoism the Leninist principle of material incentive gives way to the idealisation p
of " poverty.” But can poverty as it exists in real life serve as a stimulus to work?
Poverty means hunger, cold, disease, stupefaction, humiliation, and a degree of
dehumanisation to which man could never be Teconciled. It invariably evokes
protest, bitterness and resistance. Work becomes senseless when it fails to provide a
tolerable living for the worker. Real poverty does not go together with construction,
least of all socialist construction. Mao Tse-tung advanced his own "programme of
attitude" to poverty, praising poverty as a blessing. He stated: "In addition to its
other special features, the 600-million population of China is conspicuous for its
poverty. This may seem bad but is in fact good. Poverty calls for changes, action,
revolution. On a spotlessly clean sheet of paper one can write the most beautiful
hieroglyphs, create the newest and most beautiful pictures.” [172•1
So the way out of the difficulty was to accept poverty, to adorn it with a halo of p
sanctity and nobility, to turn it into something to be sought after and carried with
pride and delight by everyone. Only then would it become a source of joy, creative
quest, selfless labour and heroism.
Having received this instruction of Mao’s, the Chinese ideological machine swung p
into action. Its main job now was to create a new type of worker who would labour
for the good of society, demanding no material remuneration. All newspapers, 173
magazines and the radio joined in the drive to “emancipate” the individual. The
purpose was to instil in people an aversion to material well-being, comfort and
cultural advancement-to free their souls from the "chimeras of civilisation."’ The
ideal held up was for a man to reduce his requirements to the bare minimum, the
resulting vacuum to be filled with love for the leader and nationalistic ravings about
the hegemony of the "Greater China.” Such a person should derive consolation for
the loss of material and cultural benefits from the grandeur and might of his country.
It is obviously a case of wishful thinking when the Chinese press serves the reader p
with numerous instances of cures from egoism and greed. For example: "Formerly
one young communemember would not do hard work and was angry when he was
given very few work-units. Recently, when the commune-members had to bring
fertilizer from a place 13 kilometres away, he brought more than 50 kilograms on a
yoke. He was asked: ’How many units do you want this time?’ He replied: ’I don’t
care for work-units any more, for I am tilling the land in the name of the
revolution.’ " [ 173•1 The commune member completely suppressed his egoism
and got rid of the state of dissatisfaction which people erroneously call poverty !
Poverty is often unavoidable in the transitional stage between capitalism and p

socialism. But Mao presents poverty as being a desirable state in itself. Poverty is
claimed to be a force that will lead people to communism. To be sure, this is not 174
the communism o£ which millions dream and which the classics of Marxism
prophesied, but a "special Chinese communism.” The "great helmsman" visualises the
road to it as a road of moral purification from the vice of material and cultural
requirements. The kingdom of “pure” communism will come when people do away
with all “revisionist” survivals, learn to make do with little, and get rid of their
personal interests; when class distinctions will be removed and social equality
achieved. "And the objective world which is to be remoulded,” Mao Tse-tung wrote
in his article On Practice, "includes the opponents of remoulding, who must undergo
a stage ot compulsory remoulding (i.e. the recalcitrants should go to concentration
camps or do field work in remote areas-A A.) before they can pass to a stage of
conscious remoulding. When the whole of mankind consciously remoulds itself and
changes the world, the era of world communism will dawn." [174•1 (Emphasis
added-A. A.} When speaking of communism, Mao does not say a word about
economic development or the improvement of living standards. This is only to be
expected, since his kind of communism "is not far distant.” To achieve it the
working people only have to perform a revolution in their souls.
It is not our intention to belittle the importance of "consciously transforming p

oneself.” Communism is not all economy, well-being and cultural development. It is
also a highly organised society. But to reduce one’s "conscious transformation" to
ascetic self-sacrifice and mortification of the flesh and spirit means to violate the
human and social nature of man. Man’s awareness and discipline should manifest 175
themselves, not in suppressing the acquired cultural demands but in regarding himself
as a creator and master who is responsible for everything that takes place in society.
History of social thought knows numerous instances of the artificial transformation p

of real, objective hardship-the constant companion of the working man in the world
of private propertyinto exclusively subjective, idealised hardship existing only in the
human brain. To remove such hardship is not at all difficult-switch your thought to
something else and you will attain peace of mind and tranquillity. This is how the
German Young Hegelians, the Bauer brothers, and their followers in their time
fought the Prussian feudal reality. They held that the evils plaguing the workers
existed only in the minds of the sufferers. Real life remains outside the field of
vision of philistine philosophers, its investigation being unworthy of a thinker. The
consciousness of select personalities is proclaimed the creative force of history. Its
beneficial influence on the uncritical consciousness of workers will, it is claimed,
finally free the working people from the slavery of their own ideas, and make them
change their opinion of themselves and the world around them. After this
metamorphosis society will arrive at socialism.
The methodological basis of such transformations is speculative dialectics. Real p

poverty as a phenomenon alienated from man is taken only in a speculative form
and is abstracted into "poverty in general.” This category is then considered as an
independent entity. After that, hunger, privation, and disease, as manifestations of
real poverty, are easily made into the products of our imagination. As a result we 176
have, on the one hand, the general concept of poverty existing as an independent
entity outside the human world, and, on the other, various kinds of poverty (hunger,
privation, etc.) born of "poverty in general.” Having performed this operation, the
critical philosopher finds himself in a purely theoretical medium, beyond the confines
of reality. It is not so hard for the speculative ideologist to attain any victory he
chooses, such as turning poverty into a blessing. All it takes is for a worker to put
out of his mind the thought that he is poor. Marx pointed out that this bravery of the
Young Hegelians stemmed from Hegelian idealism. "He (Hegel-A A.) stands the
world on its head and can therefore dissolve in the head all the limitations which
naturally remain in existence for evil sensuousness, for real man.” [ 176•1 But
Hegel was a great thinker, and his speculative contradictions often contained
"elements of the true characteristic of human relations;" the Young Hegelians were
pygmies. That is why the speculative method of Bruno Bauer and his circle was a
caricature of Hegel’s method, devoid of any understanding of the dialectics of social
life.
Let us turn to Mao Tse-tung. To give a semblance of scientific substantiation to the p

idea that poverty becomes a blessing, the "great helmsman" also uses or, rather,
abuses, dialectics. His sayings, couched in Marxist terms, sound very much like the
maxims of ancient Chinese philosophers. That is why a comparison of the Young
Hegelian and Maoist dialectics can only be made on the basis of Mao’s final 177
conclusions. In his speech at the llth enlarged sitting of the Supreme State
Conference on February 27, 1957, Mao said: "In certain conditions bad may lead to
good results and good, in its turn, may lead to bad results.” (Mao Tse-tung, On the
Question of the Correctly Resolving Contradictions Within the People, M., 1957, p.
43.) Mao illustrates this thesis by the following examples:
The counter-revolution in Hungary was bad, but it became good in the process of its p
suppression. Hungary got rid of its enemies and grew stronger,
Japan’s attack on China was bad. But China learned a great deal in the course of p
the war and was victorious. Thus a bad thing became good.
It will be bad if a third world war breaks out. But a nuclear war conflagration will p
finally do away with the capitalist world, and that is good. .. If one is to employ this
kind of logic, not only poverty, but also war, counter-revolution and disease can be
made out to be good things! In other words, everything that brings misfortune to
people, particularly to working people, and which they vigorously resist, is, according
to Mao, a source of future happiness. Now we can understand these words of
Mao’s: "It is terrible to think of the time when all people will become rich.” To him
this would mean the end of development, for "only poverty calls for change, action,
revolution.” According to Mao, it follows that not the striving to end poverty, but
poverty itself, is an inexhaustible source of creative energy and progress. There is
nothing scientific about this reasoning, not even a thought to exclude or prevent what 178
is bad. The arch-dialectical verbiage camouflages a plain statement of facts and the
unwillingness to analyse them in all their complexity.
The ideal of a poor worker, "as undemanding as a pumpkin,” capable of limiting p

his requirements and making do with very little, meets with little sympathy among
workers and intellectuals. Since not everybody was as quick of comprehension as
Chairman Mao would like, and the souls of many had been thoroughly permeated
with “capitalist” and “revisionist” delusions, the Mao clique had to class them as
enemies of “ communism” and subject them to the severe repression prescribed by
the demands of the "stage of transformation based on coercion.” Concentration camps
were set up all over the country. Millions of people familiar with any cultural and
technological achievements, with the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist philosophy,
are being banished from towns for "re-education by labour" in the village. Barracks
discipline is introduced at factories and in rural communes, and civil administration
is replaced by military rule. In keeping with the so-called principle of unity of
industry, agriculture and military service, everyone is obliged, besides his main
occupation, to work in agriculture (if he is an industrial worker) or in industry (if he
is a peasant), and also to undergo military training. Conscious discipline is out of the
question and order at production enterprises is maintained exclusively through non–
economic coercion. The military uniform is an indispensable part of every working
collective. The private life of every Chinese is strictly regimented. He must devote
all his free time to studying the leader’s maxims. Everything that might remind 179
people of material or cultural values is to be destroyed. Monuments are being pulled
down, books are being destroyed, and musical works are prohibited. Universal
levelling is also reflected in clothing-blue trousers and a buttoned-up cloth or quilted
jacket have become a compulsory uniform for everybody. This is how the ideals of
egalitarian communism are put into practice and a regimented society is created.
The attempt to establish barrack-room communism in a country which had social p

ownership of the means of production naturally invited several questions . Why did
Mao Tse-tung select poverty as a means of implementing his adventurist plans? Is
egalitarian communism possible in practice?
The preaching of asceticism, and of universal poverty as the most effective means p
of ending social inequality, accompanied many actions of peasants and artisans in the
Middle Ages (T. Miinzer, the Taborite movement in Bohemia, etc.). It was also
present in the first actions of the proletariat (the Babouvists). So strong were these
sentiments that Marx paid considerable attention to this trend in communist thinking
at the beginning of his socio-political activity when his materialist and communist
outlook was taking shape. He devoted one chapter of his Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts ot 1844 to the criticism of egalitarian communism. Marx’s basic idea
was that this primitive communism, with its praiseworthy intention of doing away
with private property and creating a just society, had not gone beyond, had in fact
not even attained to, private property. It strove not to master all the wealth created 180
in conditions of predominant private property, not to transform and greatly expand
the economic, political and cultural base of man’s liberation from exploitation, of
satisfying the requirements of people, and of the fuller manifestation of their
abilities, but, on the contrary, to discard everything that had been achieved. The
reason given for this attitude is that the available material and cultural benefits
cannot be shared by all because of the limited means required for their production.
Hence the rejection of culture and talent for the sake of primitive, arithmetical
equality. The negative attitude of egalitarian communism to private property is
nothing but envy by poor private property of the richer private property. "How little
this annulment of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the
abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilisation, the regression to the
unnatural simplicity of the poor and undemanding man who has not only failed to
go beyond private property, but has not yet even attained to it,” wrote Marx, adding
that crude egalitarian communism is "in its first form only a generalisation and
consummation of this relationship.” [ 180•1 That is why it reflects all the iniquity
of the old world. Work is not an end in itself in this society but a means of
obtaining a certain amount of food. A guaranteed food minimum becomes the only
aim in life, the summit of happiness. The production of life’s necessities (bread,
vegetables, etc.) is accordingly declared the most important activity. Physical labour 181
is opposed to mental work as the only worthy occupation. The individual is reduced
to the state of a dumb animal blindly following the orders of the leader of its herd.
Under such a “communism” equality in work and income does not compensate for a
man’s loss of individuality and the wealth of multi-faceted activity aimed at
transforming the world.
Marx said that the transfer of private property to common ownership would be p
accomplished by a communism which would keep intact all the wealth of previous
development and would return "man to himself as a social (i.e. human)
man.” [ 181•1 The necessity of its establishment is conditioned by the entire
history of industrial development. Incomplete communism of the egalitarian kind
looks backwards, not forwards, in proving its right to existence, and seeks
justification in the existing state of affairs. It cannot count on the future and is
destined to share the fate of private property whose prisoner it is. The universal
spread of poverty does not save mankind from social upheavals. ".. .and. with
destitution,” wrote Marx and Engels, "the struggle for necessities and all the old
filthy business would necessarily be reproduced.” [181•2
Ideas of equal distribution have been appearing in countries with mainly small-scale p
production both in agriculture and industry, where abundance of products is only a
dream. They have always held a place of prominence in Chinese social Utopia. To 182
many progressive thinkers egalitarianism and poverty seemed the only way of ending
hunger and oppression. These ideas are to be found in the works of the ancient
Chinese philosophers, Lao-tse and Mo-tse, and of the thinkers of modern times, such
as Kung Tse-chen, Hung Hsiu-chuan and others. Still fresh in the people’s memory
is the first peasant state, Tai Ping Tien kuo-the Heavenly State of Great Welfare
(1851–64)-where the first attempt was made to introduce equality in land tenure.
Hung Hsiuchuan, the ideologist and leader of the Taiping uprising, wrote: "It is
necessary that all inhabitants of the Heavenly Empire enjoy equally and jointly the
great happiness granted by our true master, the heavenly father, the Lord God; that
land be tilled jointly, that food be taken together, that clothing be used and money
expended jointly. Equality must be observed everywhere, all should be properly fed
and clothed.” [ 182•1 Taiping laws obliged every peasant family to give the entire
harvest to the state without compensation, saving only what was absolutely necessary.
The surplus thus collected was distributed among artisans in towns and used for the
upkeep of the army and administration. This organisation of life evoked no protest
among the masses in view of the everpresent danger of returning to bondage under
landlords.
The ideals of egalitarian communism played a progressive role in feudal times. The p
idea of universal equality was an immense mobilising force among the poorest
peasants, based as it was on the demand to confiscate the landlords’ land. The
peasant uprisings undermined the foundations of feudalism and prepared conditions 183
for the emergence of new social relations.
The Maoists’ dependence on poverty as an accelerator of economic development, p

and their narrow petty-bourgeois interpretation of communism as egalitarian, barrack-
room communism, doom the people as a whole to privation and misery. "Regression
to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and undemanding man" is contrary to the
human and social nature of modern man, and it shackles his freedom and conscious
activity by restricting it exclusively to the satisfaction of primitive needs. This
activity cannot be a life necessity for the individual. It becomes instead a coercive
force, a heavy burden, something that is devoid of any creative element. In this case
the development of production cannot be promoted either by poverty, or by "big
leaps,” or by " cultural revolution.”
This "vicious circle" can be broken only by recognising human dignity. Full p
development of all aspects of human life can be ensured only by socialism whose
productive efforts will be used, in Lenin’s words, not only to meet the daily needs
"but with the object of ensuring full wellbeing and free, all-round development for
all the members of society.” [183•1 The half-century history of socialism has
borne out this thesis of Lenin’s. The great accomplishments in science, technology
and culture are the fruits of the labour of the new man whose interests coincide with
the final goal of the socialist mode of production. "The scientific conception of
communism has nothing in common either with the pharisical “philosophy” of 184
poverty as a “blessing” or with the bourgeois-philistine cult of things. Material
wealth in the Marxist– Leninist understanding is created to satisfy the reasonable

requirements of people and is a necessary prerequisite for the development of human
abilities, for the individual to find fulfilment.” [184•1 The attempt to revive
egalitarian communism in the epoch of the triumphant ideas of scientific communism
and of the scientific and technological revolution, can only be viewed as a
reactionary petty-bourgeois Utopia.
Philosophical Sciences, No. 3, 1971
***

TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 168•2] Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. S3, p. 58.
[ 171•1] P. J. Proudhon, Poverty as an Economic Principle, Moscow, 1908, p. 16.
[ 172•1] Hungchi, "About One Cooperative,” 1958, No. 1.
[ 173•1] China Reconstructs, 1968, No. 9, p. 40.
[ 174•1] Mao Tse-tung, Sel. Works, L., 1954, Vol. 1, p. 297.
[ 176•1] K. Marx and F. Engels, The Holy Family, M. 1956, p. 254.
[ 180•1] K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, M., 1967, pp. 93,
94.
[ 181•1] K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, M., 1967, p. 95.
[ 181•2] K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, M., 1964, p. 46.
[ 182•1] Selected Works of Progressive Chinese Thinkers of the Modern Times, M.,
1961, p. 69.
[ 184•1] On the Centenary of the Birth of V. 1, Lenin. Theses of the Central

Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M., p. 54.
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<•> Great-Power Chauvinism 185
of Mao Tse-tung

TOC
Card T. Rakhimou, V. Bogoslovsky p
The "cultural revolution" in the Chinese People’s Republic demonstrated that the p
Text
country’s outlying areas were the most troublesome for its organisers. For instance,
HTML
Tibet and Sinkiang were thê last provinces in the country to set up the so-called
PS
PDF
revolutionary committees. This happened on September 5, 1968. Official press reports
still carry warnings to the effect that "class enemies there have refused to accept
T* their defeat and continue to hinder the country’s progress to socialism.”
19*
The Maoists find it difficult to effectively administer the outlying areas inhabited by p
### nonChinese nationalities, not just because they lie far from Peking, but mainly
because the local people know from long and bitter experience the meaning of the
"nationalities policy" pursued by Mao Tse-tung and his group.
Relations between nationalities in a multi– national state are always complicated. p

And China, with her more than 100 nationalities and ethnic groups numbering a total
of nearly 45 million people, has a formidable problem. All these peoples are
officially referred to as "national minorities.” But many of them, such, for instance,
as the Uigurs (4 million people), Mongolians (1.5 mln), Tibetans (3 mln), Chuangs
(nearly 8 mln) live in compact groups and outnumber other nationalities over large
areas. Their histories span centuries, and they have had long periods of independent 186
development. Most of the non-Chinese peoples differ greatly from the Hans (the
Chinese) both ethnically and culturally. They also profess different faiths.
The Chinese state became multi-national in the course of centuries of conquest. The p
annexed lands were intensively colonised. Meanwhile the conquered nations were
partly exterminated and partly assimilated by the Chinese. This naturally caused the
non-Chinese peoples to distrust the Chinese.
All this made it necessary for the Communist Party of China and the state to p
proceed with caution in dealing with the nationalities question, to take the interests
of all peoples inhabiting Chinese territory into account, and to strictly observe
Marxist-Leninist theses on the nationalities question.
In the early years of the People’s Republic of China, when Communist- p

internationalists still predominated in the CPC and the Mao group had not yet thrust
its openly chauvinistic course on the Party leadership, a great deal was done to raise
the living standards and the cultural level of the non-Chinese peoples. A number of
industrial enterprises were built in the areas populated by the minorities, an agrarian
reform was carried out and schools and health facilities were opened. State and Party
authorities of the PRC worked out a positive programme for solving the nationalities
question. "All nationalities are equal,” said Article 3 of the Constitution of the PRC
(1954). "Discrimination against, or oppression of, any nationality, and acts which
undermine the unity of the nationalities are prohibited.” The Party Rules adopted by 187
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/2.5-Great-Power.Chauvinism.of.Mao.Tse-tung[2012-12-18 3:20:56]
the 8th Congress in 1956 demanded: "The Communist Party of China must make
special efforts to raise the status of the national minorities, help them to attain self–
government, endeavour to train cadres from among the national minorities, accelerate
their economic and cultural advance, bring about complete equality between all the
nationalities and strengthen the unity and fraternal relations among them. . . Special
attention must be paid to the prevention and correction of tendencies of great-Hanism
on the part of Party members and government workers of Han nationality.”
All this seemed to tend towards solving the nationalities question in the PRC. But p
great-power chauvinistic tendencies, affecting the legal status of the non-Chinese
nationalities in particular, made themselves increasingly felt in the policy of the
Chinese leadership.
From the very first these peoples, numbering 45 million, were denied the right to p
self– determination, to statehood. They were granted so-called regional autonomy.
"The People’s Republic of China,” says Article 3 of the Constitution, "is a unified
multi-national state. . . Regional autonomy applies in areas entirely or largely
inhabited by national minorities. The national autonomous areas are an inalienable
part of the People’s Republic of China.”
But the status of "regional autonomy" (an empty word since autonomous regions are p
as “ independent” as provinces) was granted only to five (out of the one hundred)
national minorities. Among the nationalities denied this right are the Yitsu (3.3 mln),
Miao (2.5 mln), Manchurians (2.4 mln), Koreans (1.2 mln). But even the peoples 188
(the Tibetans, Uigurs, Tungans, Mongolians, Chuangs) that were nominally granted
the right to "regional autonomy" were allocated territories demarcated in a rather
peculiar way. The Tibetan people were actually torn apart, and less than half of them
now live in the Tibetan Autonomous Region while the rest reside in the provinces of
Chinghai, Szechwan and Yunnan. The Mongolians in “autonomous” Inner Mongolia
constitute a mere 10 per cent of the local population and may be rightly called a
national minority.
These great-power tendencies in treating the nationalities question have become p

predominant since the about-turn in domestic and foreign policies of the Mao group
in the late 1950’s. The "cultural revolution" made it clear that the CPC policy vis-a-
vis the nationalities inhabiting China is to “sinoise” them against their will.
The non-Chinese peoples are all but divested of political rights. All the people’s p
committees called upon to represent the interests of the national minorities, have
been dissolved. Power has been transferred to the so-called revolutionary committees
set up by the army command on Peking’s orders and under complete army control.
The "revolutionary committees" are headed by Chinese. Thus the "revolutionary
committee" of Inner Mongolia is under Teng Haiching, one-time Deputy Commander
of the Peking Military Area, that of the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Regionunder
Lun Shu-chin, former commander of the Hunan Military Area.
Acts of repression on a mass scale and persecution of the local cadres, party p
functionaries, statesmen, intellectuals have become commonplace. The mass drive to 189
eliminate the so-called Rightist deviation and Pan-Turkism was let loose in 1958 in
the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region. Many people were slandered and victimised,
among them Liya Samedi, a prominent Uigur writer. Chairman of the local Writers’
Union, Ibrahim Turdy, a poet, Abdurahim Saidi, mayor of Urumchi, and Ganibatyr, a
revolutionary and a staunch fighter for the people’s cause during the time of the
Kuomintang.
There was wide-spread persecution of the national minorities during the "cultural p
revolution.” Practically all the intelligentsia and Party and state cadres of the
minorities were accused of counter-revolutionary activities and complicity with
imperialism and "Soviet revisionism.” Among those victimised are Ulanfu, Chairman
of the People’s Committee of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Alternate
Politbureau Member of the CC CPC, and Iminov, Vice– Chairman of the People’s
Committee of the SinkiangUigur Autonomous Region.
The notorious "big leap" and the "people’s communes" had an even more harmful p
effect on the minorities than on China at large. Production slumped at the few
factories that were in existence. Farm production declined and famine struck whole
regions.
The economy of China’s outlying areas is largely colonial in character. The few p
industrial enterprises are either put to military use, or the products they manufacture
are shipped to the country’s central areas. The engineers and skilled workers they
employ are the Chinese settlers from central areas. The local nationalities do
unskilled arduous jobs only. In this way the advancement of the working class in the 190
country’s outlying areas is intentionally retarded.
The only type of construction still undertaken there is the building of strategic p
roads, air fields, and atomic-weapon testing grounds. Non-Chinese peoples are forced
to work on these projects en masse.
Communes were set up in the areas populated by the minorities in order to seize as p
much as possible of their produce so as to feed and clothe the countless thousands
of Chinese soldiers stationed in the national areas, and to supply the big cities.
The migration of the Chinese to the national areas undermines the economy of those p
areas and lowers the status of the local population. The Chinese in the Sinkiang-
Uigur and Tibet areas now constitute approximately half the local population. The
proportion of Mongolians in Inner Mongolia has been halved. The settlers are given
the best plots in Sinkiang where there has always been a shortage of arable land. In
Inner Mongolia pastures are being put to the plough to provide new settlers with
land.
According to official propaganda the Chinese are being resettled en masse, and p
most of the 25 million citizens being sent to the countryside will go to the national
areas. Calls to revert to the communes of the "big leap" period are becoming more
frequent.
By colonising the outlying areas, the Maoist group does not merely seek to p
“relieve” the country’s central areas of “redundant” people, or get rid of trouble-
makers. The mass migrations of the Chinese have the objective of turning the local
populations into national minorities by saturating the resettlement areas with the 191
Hans, thereby preparing the ground for an eventual assimilation of the non-Chinese
peoples. Nor do the Maoists intend to postpone the assimilation, and measures are
being undertaken to that end. On numerous occasions girls of Uigur, Kazakh, Tibetan
and other nationalities have been compelled to marry Chinese on pain of severe
punishment.
But measures towards “cultural” assimilation are even more serious. p
For years now the languages other than Chinese have been "sinoised.” The p
minorities are forced to adopt the Chinese script, and not only internationally
accepted words, but also the basic vocabularies are being superceded by the Chinese
vocabulary. The minorities are no more taught their native languages at school. One
of the charges levelled against Ulanfu was that he demanded that the Mongolian
language be taught at national schools at least on a par with Chinese.
The Maoists have even worked out "theoretical premises" towards assimilating the p
non-Chinese peoples. In 1960 Sinkiang Hungchi wrote that the nationalities of the
PRC were merging into a single entity on the basis of the Chinese nationality. It was
echoed by Sinkiang jihpao which went so far as to claim that the assimilation was
"Marxist and communist.” "Those who oppose such assimilation oppose socialism,
communism and historical materialism.” These are not empty words. Those who
demand that modern industry be built in the outlying areas, that a working class be
formed there, that local engineering and managerial personnel be trained and national
cultures promoted, are branded as exponents of “black” views and supporters for "an
open revision of the fundamental principles of MarxismLeninism.” The implications 192
of such charges are clear enough.
It is very easy to see the essential difference between Marxist-Leninist theses on p

mutual rapprochement and the ultimate merging of nations and these distorted
"theories.” The Maoists deliberately confuse the rapprochement of nations (which
occurs in the period of socialist and communist construction during the full-scale
economic and cultural advancement of socialist nations) with the merging of nations,
which will lead to the creation of a single world language and culture on the basis
of many languages and cultures. This can only happen after communism triumphs
throughout the world.
In this connection it is significant that the new Party Rules adopted at the so-called p
9th Party Congress make no mention of the nationalities policy or the non-Chinese
peoples. The Maoists make believe that non-Chinese peoples no longer exist in the
PRC, that they have already been assimilated.
It is only natural that the great-power, chauvinistic policy pursued by Mao and his p
group is encountering the growing resistance of the nonChinese peoples, which often
takes the form of armed action such as the continuing guerrilla struggle being waged
by thousands of Tibetans, and the numerous instances of armed action by
Mongolians, Chuangs, Uigurs. In January, 1969, over 4,000 people were killed in an
armed clash in Sinkiang.
There is every reason to believe that the “ troublesome” regions will cause Mao p
Tse-tung and his group even more trouble in the years ahead.
The nationalities question in the PRC can be solved only on a genuine Marxist- p 193
Leninist basis The rich experience accumulated in the course ot the economic and
cultural development of the national minorities in other socialist countries could serve
as a useful guide.
Asia and Africa Today, No. 7, 1969
194
***

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<•> III 195

The International Communist

TOC
Movement and the Communist
Card
Party of China
IN CONNECTION WITH THE 50th ANNIVERSARY
Text
HTML OF THE CPC

PS 196
PDF V. Glunin, A. Grigoryev, K. Kukushkin, M. Yuryev p
T* Founded fifty years ago, in July 1921, the Communist Party of China radically p
19* transformed the development of the Chinese people’s revolutionary struggle for
national and social emancipation. It led the popular revolution, whose triumph in
### 1949 gave birth to the Chinese People’s Republic. The development of the new
China began with the abolition of feudalism and of the domination of China by the
imperialist powers, with revolutionary changes in town and country, initiated by the
Communist Party of China with the building in the 1950’s of the foundations for
socialist industrial and cultural development, and with collectivisation in the
countryside. The membership of the Communist Party grew from about 60 in 1921 to
nearly 20 million in the mid-1960’s. [196•1
The Communist Party of China has traversed a complex and difficult path during p 197
the last half-century. It has known ups and downs at the various stages of its
development, both before the victory of the people’s revolution and also during the
existence of People’s Republic of China. On the way to victory, the CPC had twice-
in 1927 and 1934-experienced the bitterness of defeat. But that did not break the
will of the Chinese Communists to fight. Thousands and millions of new fighters
took the place of the fallen. The Party was outstandingly successful as leader and
organiser of the working people in the period of economic rehabilitation (1949–52)
and of the first five-year plan (1953–57), and enjoyed increasing prestige at home
and in the international arena. In the first half of the 1960’s, the Party shouldered all
the difficulties caused by the adventuristic "big leap" policy that the Mao Tse-tung
group had imposed on the Party and country.
In the course of its history, the CPC has experienced sharp clashes and long periods p
of intraParty struggle, sometimes open and sometimes hidden, which reflected the
confrontation of the two opposing tendencies in the Party development-the Marxist-
Leninist, internationalist line and the nationalistic line.
The Party gained extensive experience of fighting and mass organising during the p
course of the national revolution (1925–27), during the revolutionary struggle under
the slogan of Soviets (1927–36), during the liberation war against the Japanese
invaders (1937–45) and the civil war against the Kuomintang reactionary forces
(1946– 49) and during the construction of the People’s Republic of China. Within
the Party there were experienced organisers and military leaders who were looked on 198
as the backbone of the Party because of their revolutionary staunchness and devotion
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/3.1-International.Communist.Movement.and.the.CPC-[2012-12-18 3:21:04]
to the people’s cause.
The rich experience of the Communist Party of China forms part of the treasure- p
house of the world revolutionary movement. The names of Li Ta-chao, Chu Chiu-po,
Chang Tai-lei, Teng Chung-hsia, Pen Pai and other prominent leaders of the Party,
its founders, organisers and theorists, are revered by Communists and revolutionaries
all over the world. Their great work cannot be depreciated by the deviations that
have taken place in the development of the PRC and the CPC, by imperialism’s
slander regarding the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese Communists, or by the
unbridled campaign launched by the Maoists in recent years to defame the Party, its
noble traditions and tested cadres, and veterans of the revolution.
The fifty-year history of the Communist Party of China provides ample food for p
thought in connection with the fate of the revolutionary and communist movement in
China and other countries with a similar socio-economic structure. There is no need
to prove the vast scientific and political significance of analysing the major processes
that determined the essence and paths of development of the CPC. Even our
ideological and political opponents are well aware of this fact. The history of the
CPC and the elucidation cf the key facts and stages in its development have long
been the subject of acute ideological controversy. Since the early 1960’s, when the
divergence of the Mao Tse-tung group from the concerted line of the international
communist movement became conspicuous, the interpretation of Maoism and its 199
course have come to the fore as one of the central problems of the ideological
struggle, in which the Marxist-Leninist treatment of the history of the Chinese
revolution and the Chinese Communist Party is opposed by bourgeois historians of
various persuasions, by Maoists, revisionists and “Left” radicals.
An analysis of bourgeois works dealing with the history of the Chinese Communist p
Party brings out a common feature: nearly all the works devoted to the general
problems, to separate periods or even to separate events in the history of the CPC
somehow concentrate on the question of its relationships (political, ideological, etc.)
with the international communist and revolutionary movement-with the Comintern
and its largest section, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and with the
countries and communist parties of the world socialist system.
Since the time when the first anti-Marxist versions of the history of the Chinese p
Communist Party appeared, a certain change has taken place in the bourgeois
treatment of the Chinese Party’s relationships with the international communist
movement. In the 1920’s-40’s, bourgeois authors tended to present the CPC as a
“hand” and “weapon” of the Comintern. After the victory of the Chinese revolution,
the American Sinologists (J. Fairbank, B. Schwartz, R. North, and C.
Brandt [ 199•1 ) put forward the idea that the Chinese Emacs-File-stamp: 200
"/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/20071228/299.tx" people had triumphed
in 1949 because the Party leadership had acted counter to the theory, practice and
recommendations of the international communist movement. Attempts were also made
to reduce the CPC’s political course in the 1940’s to the ideas and principles of Mao
Tse-tung. As the Maoist leadership of the Chinese Communist Party stepped up its
outright attack on the concerted line of the international communist movement, this
view began to predominate in bourgeois Sinology. It has been developed and “
deepened” in the works of American and West European Sinologists dealing with the
Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, in biographies of Mao Tse-
tung, and in books and articles on Maoism. The “deepened” view consisted in the
tracing, by many American and West European Sinologists, of Mao Tse-tung’s “
special” course, which had allegedly determined the ultimate victory of the Chinese
revolution and the opposition of his line to that of the Comintern, back to the 1930’s
and even the 1920’s. The works, published in the 1960’s, of S. Schram, Y.
Chen [ 200•1 and especially of J. E. Rue [ 200•2 , all develop this theme.
Setting up the Communist Party of China in opposition to the international p

communist movement shows the attempt to play upon the nationalistic ambitions of
some of the Chinese leaders. In other words, the ideas advanced by bourgeois
Sinologists paved the way for those circles in capitalist countries which counted on 201
the "erosion of world communism" and on the nationalistic degeneration of certain
groups in the leadership of the socialist countries and the communist and workers’
parties. The attacks of our ideological opponents are therefore directed against one of
the major sources of strength of the international revolutionary movement, namely,
the unity of its various contingents of its main streams-the socialist countries, the
working-class and the national-liberation movements. The theories of bourgeois
Sinologists coincide with, and in some cases draw on, the distorted ideas of Maoist
historiography, one of the central themes of which is also the opposition of Mao’s
“special” course (presented as that of the whole Party) to the concerted policy of the
international communist movement.
The essence of the Maoist version of the history of the Chinese Communist Party, p
spelled out in a number of official documents issued by the Maoist leadership and in
books on the Party history circulated in the 1950’s in the PRC and elsewhere, is
this: already in the 1920’s, Mao Tsetung had drawn up his own–"the only correct"–
line for the development of the Chinese revolution; but it did not become the Party’s
policy until the mid-1930’s, until he and his followers came to the leadership of the
Communist Party of China. The entire history of the Party is accordingly divided into
two major stages-the "stage of defeats" (before Mao’s advent to power) and the stage
in which the Party and the revolution in China achieved victory, allegedly by
translating Mao Tse-tung’s “ideas” and "principles" into reality. [ 202•1 In the 202
1940’s-50’s, the Maoist versions and assessments of the history of the Chinese
Communist Party insisted on the thesis that the Party’s policy, its ideological and
political platform and its best cadres were shaped without any help from the
international communist movement. We quote literally from the resolution of the
Central Committee of the CPC concerning the decision of the Presidium of the
Comintern Executive Committee to disband the Comintern: "The best cadres of the
Chinese Communist Party were moulded without the slightest outside
help.” [ 202•2 In his report, "On the Party" to the CPC’s Seventh Congress (1945),
which whipped up the personality cult of Mao Tse-tung and endorsed his “ideas”
Liu Shao-chi said that the CPC’s platform consists of ”. . . great theories ot their
own. . ." ( ItalicsAuthors). ”. . .Since the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party
there has been created and developed unique, integrated, and correct theory
concerning the people’s revolution and national reconstruction in China,” the report
added. "This theory is none other than Mao Tse-tung’s theory of the Chinese
revolution-Comrade Mao Tsetung’s theory and policy in regard to Chinese history,
Chinese society and the Chinese revolution.” [202•3
Ever since the late 1950’s, when the Maoists began to follow and propagate their p
"special course,” their opposition to the policy of the international communist 203
movement became increasingly evident. Chinese textbooks and other publications no
longer contain even the well-known facts about the interaction of the CPC and the
Chinese revolution with the forces and contingents of the world revolutionary
process; nor do they mention the assistance given to the CPC by the Comintern, the
world revolutionary movement, the CPSU and the Soviet state. [203•1
In the course of the "cultural revolution,” the falsification of the history of the p
Chinese Communist Party, its relationships with the international communist
movement became still more blatant. Earlier Mao Tse-tung was depicted as the
Party’s sole “infallible” leader, whereas now he is also represented as its one and
only founder. "The CPC was founded and fostered by Mao Tse-tung," [ 203•2 Lin
Piao said in his report to the Ninth Congress of the CPC. We are presented with a
frankly idealistic outline of the history of the Chinese Communist Party-its successes
are attributed to Mao Tse-tung alone. All the former outlines and works which gave 204
an already falsified version of the history of the CPC and the PRC are now
considered to be “inadequate” and said to "belittle the role of Mao Tse-tung and his
ideas in the history of the CPC and the international communist movement.” Because
they mentioned just a few facts about the assistance of the Comintern and the CPSU
to the CPC, the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese revolution, their authors
are accused in official publications of showing sympathy with "contemporary
revisionism.” The Maoist leadership’s latest directive article, published on the
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, likewise outlined
the Party’s history without making any mention whatsoever of the international
communist movement. [ 204•1
Although Maoist and bourgeois historiographers may have different motives, they all p
exploit the fact that the events connected with the history of the Chinese Communist
Party have been inadequately studied until recently in order to distort the real nature
of the relations between the CPC and the international communist movement.
While examining in the present article the problems of the relationships of the CPC p
with the international communist movement, the authors have based themselves on
recently published Soviet historical works which are the outcome of research into
new factual material concerning the history of the Chinese revolution and the
Chinese Communist Party. [ 204•2
In the period of the Comintern’s foundation and formation, V. Lenin worked on the p 205
fundamentals of the relationships of the international communist movement with the
communist and other revolutionary forces in the colonial and dependent countries in
the new historical era ushered in by the Great October Socialist Revolution.
We shall recall the chief points of Lenin’s approach to the problems of the p
interaction between the international communist movement and its contingents and
other revolutionary forces in the Eastern countries.
When he advanced the policy of establishing the closest international ties between p
the communist and working-class movement in the developed countries and the
communist and nationalliberation movement in the East, Lenin was proceeding from
the fact that the efforts of the Communists of various countries, and their policy of
international cohesion and mutual assistance provided a means for realising the
potentialities stemming from the objective concurrence of the basic interests of the 206
world’s revolutionary forces in their fight against imperialism and all forms of
exploitation. [ 206•1
At the same time, Lenin stressed that regulating that interaction and establishing p
stable international ties were by no means an easy process that would take place
automatically. He maintained that in the colonial and dependent countries of the East,
this process, together with the tremendous political development of their
revolutionary forces, might bring about specific, “ secondary” difficulties owing to
the preponderance there of non-proletarian strata and to the various nationalistic
prejudices of the masses. The experience of the first contacts with the representatives
of various trends of national revolutionary forces in the Eastern countries brought
Lenin to the conclusion that the involvement of the non– proletarian masses there in
revolutionary activity might, besides resulting in naked nationalism, prompt the
representatives of these forces to “repaint” the non-proletarian liberation trends and
platforms in the "colour of communism.” [ 206•2 Lenin pointed to the possibility,
under these circumstances, of a partial, distorted perception of the principles of the
international communist movement, and of a mechanical adoption of certain tactical
slogans without understanding their essence and the reason why they had been
advanced in the first place.
The development of the revolutionary forces in China at all its stages and the p
history of the Chinese Communist Party have borne out Lenin’s prediction about the 207
importance and character of the interaction of the international communist movement
with its separate national contingents. The interaction and close ties of the CPC with
the international communist movement, and the allround assistance it received from
the Comintern and communist parties were a powerful impetus and one of the
decisive prerequisites for the victory of the revolution in China. At the same time,
Lenin’s warning against the possibility of the Marxist doctrine being distorted by
representatives of the nationalistic, non-proletarian forces provides a key to
understanding the social and gnoseological roots of the theory and practice of
Maoism.
China’s revolutionary movement of the 1920” s40’s bore the imprint of the directing p
theoretical, political and organisational activity of the Comintern. At the most
important stages of the development of the Chinese revolution, the Comintern’s
assistance to the Chinese Communist Party and close connection with it, armed the
Party with decisions and conclusions based on the achievements of the theoretical
and political thought of the world communist and liberation movement. The young
Communist Party of China was able to utilise in its struggle the experience of the
Marxist-Leninist parties with the Comintern as their centre and forum, and rely on
their support. That is an example of the big part played by the international factor in
the formation and development of the communist parties and the communist
movement in colonial and dependent countries. The foundation in July 1921 of the
Chinese Communist Party at its First Congress was the first major landmark of this 208
interaction and represented the result of the tremendous work done by the first
Chinese Marxists and the Comintern’s envoys in order to disseminate the ideas of
Marxism-Leninism and the October Revolution, and to organise China’s
revolutionary forces that were attracted to Marxism. The first communist groups in
China were founded with the direct organisational and other help of the Comintern.
There can be no doubt that had the Comintern not provided assistance in the form of
instructions, advice, funds, training of leaders, laborious political and organisational
work in which its representatives engaged daily in China, the pre-foundation period
in the history of the Chinese Communist Party would have dragged on for many
years. [ 208•1
Without underestimating the role of the objective internal factors favouring the p
dissemination of Marxism-Leninism in China, or the importance of the work and
creative search of Chinese Communists, full credit must be given to the immense
help of the Comintern and the CPSU in elaborating the theoretical and political
foundations of the Marxist conception of the 1925–27 revolution in China, and in
building up the Party during the period of the preparation and accomplishment of the
revolution.
For the Chinese Communist Party, one of the most difficult aspects of the Chinese p
revolution was the theoretical and practical problem of combining and interrelating
the national and class features of the revolutionary movement. To supplement the
theses of the Comintern’s Fourth Congress on the Eastern question with reference to 209
the conditions of China, the Comintern Executive Committee adopted, on January 12,
1923, a special resolution "On the Chinese Communist Party’s Attitude Towards the
Kuomintang,” which proved the necessity for setting up a unified front in China and
elaborated a concrete means by which this might be achieved-by the Communists’
joining the Kuomintang while retaining the independence of the Chinese Communist
Party. [ 209•1 For the first time the Comintern squarely faced the CPC with the
peasant question. The Directive of the Comintern Executive Committee to the Third
CPC Congress on January 12, 1923, stated: "The peasant question is the central issue
of the entire policy. . . Only by placing the slogans of the antiimperialist front on an
agrarian basis can we hope for real success.” That is why the CPC, being the
political leader of the masses in the unified front, "is obliged constantly to propel the
Kuomintang towards an agrarian revolution." [209•2 In the same Directive, the
Comintern raised the question of a people’s liberation war in China against the
militarists, feudal lords and foreign imperialists as a means of developing the Chinese
democratic revolution. Proceeding from this general principle and replying to the
request of Sun Yat-sen, the CPSU and the Soviet state actively helped the
Kuomintang to build up the National Revolutionary Army of China, and to plan and
carry out its operations.
On the basis of Lenin’s ideas contained in the resolutions that the Second and p 210
Fourth Congresses of the Comintern passed on the colonial question, the Comintern
Executive Committee, in a number of directives to the CPC and in special
resolutions on the Chinese question-particularly Resolutions VI (March 1926) and
VII ( NovemberDecember 1926) of extended plenary meetingsgave profound
theoretical backing and practical recommendations on such fundamental problems of
the Chinese revolution as the character of a revolution and the place of the various
classes in it, the hegemony of the proletariat and its allies, the agrarian question, the
tactics of the united national front, the role and applicability of armed struggle,
relationship of the national and class features of the revolution, and so on. A
selfstyled theorist, Mao Tse-tung later arrogated some of these instructions to
himself, distorting them in the petty-bourgeois, nationalistic manner.
The Comintern’s help facilitated the spread and consolidation of internationalist ideas p
among the Chinese Communists and the shaping in its leadership of a communist
internationalist group that resolutely combated any manifestations of nationalism and
other anti-proletarian views in the Party. As a result of the interaction of the
Communist Party of China and the international communist movement during the
years of the formation of the CPC, and of the Comintern’s consistent line towards a
united front against both “Left” and Right vacillations in the ranks of the CPC, the
Party had already become an important factor in the country’s political life by the
mid1920’s, i.e., in the period of the 1925–27 revolution.
The elaboration of the revolutionary strategy and tactics by the Chinese Communist p 211
Party in close cooperation with the Comintern was a prolonged and complex process
in the course of which various conclusions and recommendations were tested in
practice, incorrect or obsolete principles were cast aside, the successes of the
revolution were summed up and the causes of its failures (especially in the period of
struggle under the slogan of Soviets) analysed. In Marxist literature these matters are
not made sufficiently clear because the events of this difficult, and at times
contradictory, period in the history of the CPC have been but poorly studied.
Maoist historiography is largely responsible for that. In the official document of the p
Central Committee of the CPSU entitled "Resolutions on Some Questions in the
History of Our Party,” [211•1 which set stereotyped patterns for all works on the
history of the CPC published in China, the Maoists have crossed out all the Party’s
experience in those years, and under the pretext of criticising the "Wang Ming-Po
Ku line" they virtually deny any positive role played by the Comintern in mapping
out the strategy and tactics of the Chinese Communist Party. The Maoists assert that
the Party leadership of those days, headed by Wang Ming and Po Ku, was
“unaware” of the need to build up armed forces for the Party took a wrong approach
to the agrarian question, and did not realise the importance of organising
revolutionary bases in the countryside and of the proper balance between the Party’s 212
work in town and country, i.e., it totally "failed to understand" and “rejected” the
correct line of the Chinese revolution, allegedly already drawn up by Mao Tsetung in
those years.
Furthermore, after the event, the Maoists laid claim to the credit for having critically p
interpreted and summed up the rich and complicated experience of the revolutionary
struggle in that period-credit that legitimately belongs to the international communist
movement and to the Marxist-Leninist forces within the CPC. The Comintern, jointly
with representatives of those MarxistLeninist forces, drew up a number of valuable
conclusions and recommendations on the fundamental questions of the Party’s
strategy and tactics, whose practical implementation ensured the further development
of the Party and its armed forces and the triumph of the revolution in
China. [ 212•1
A major milestone in the cooperation between the international communist p

movement and the Chinese Communist Party in that period was the Sixth CPC
Congress (June-July 1928), which took place in Moscow with the participation of the
delegations of the Comintern Executive Committee and the communist parties of the
Soviet Union and other countries. The Sixth Congress summed up the experience and
lessons of the struggle of the CPC during the revolution of 1925–27 and gave a
correct appraisal of its nature and present stage of its development. Embracing all 213
aspects of the Party’s work, the decisions of the Congress became practically the first
comprehensive programme of the Communist Party of China. [213•1 The ideas
embodied in these decisions and their further development and realisation in the early
1930’s became an integral part of the strategy and tactics of the CPC. Of paramount
importance for all the subsequent activity of the Chinese Communist Party was the
acceptance by the Congress of the Comintern’s assessment of the Chinese revolution
as a bourgeois-democratic one. [ 213•2 This dealt a blow to the attempts of the
Trotskyite and “Leff’-sectarian elements within the Party to distort the immediate
tasks of the revolutionary struggle and provided the soundly-based forces with a
basis for combating the “Left”-extremist tendencies that constantly showed up in the
Party.
After summing up the experience of the revolutionary struggle in China, the Sixth p
Congress of the Communist Party of China, at the recommendation of the Comintern,
adopted the tactics for the immediate future of making a retreat and rallying its
forces in the towns, while waging fullscale guerrilla warfare and building up
revolutionary bases (Soviet zones) and a Red Army in the countryside. [ 214•1 The 214
experience of the revolutionary struggle at the time of the Sixth Congress was as yet
uncapable of indicating how the revolution would proceed: whether the revolutionary
struggle would centre in town (as the 1925–27 revolution did), or whether the
revolutionary forces would rally at their bases in the countryside. Subsequent
developments showed that despite the temporary abatement of the revolutionary

movement in the towns, the revolutionary bases and armed forces of the Party in
many rural areas gained strength.
In 1930–31 the Comintern, having analysed this situation never before witnessed by p
the revolutionary movement, boldly mapped out new ways of development for the
Chinese revolution. The letter of the Comintern Executive Committee to the CC CPC
regarding the Li Li-san doctrines (September 1930) and the resolution of the
Comintern Executive Committee Presidium on the tasks of the Communist Party of
China (August 1931) set out the chief task as that of reinforcing the Red Army,
which "shall become the centre for rallying and organising the revolutionary forces
and the key lever for heightening the entire revolutionary movement...”; they
proposed the idea of "encircling the towns, including the major and largest ones, by
a ring of peasant revolts." [214•2 These objectives, based on the Comintern’s
recommendations, were formulated in the CC CPC decisions of April 4, 1932: "The 215
specific feature of the Chinese revolution is manifested in the fact that the proletariat
is leading the masses and extending Soviet power from the countryside to the towns,
and from small towns to big cities.” [215•1 These Comintern and CPC documents
demonstrate the inconsistency of Maoist historiography’s assertions that the course
towards unfolding the revolution in rural areas and towards encircling the towns by
the revolutionary countryside was advanced by Mao Tse-tung to counter the allegedly
erroneous lines of the CPC leadership of those days. Contrary to the Comintern’s
course towards achieving proletarian leadership in the Chinese revolution, Mao Tse-
tung made an absolute of the importance of peasant war and in effect rejected the
idea of proletarian leadership. Today the Maoists are trying to extend their anti–
Marxist views on the importance of the peasant war in China to the world
revolutionary process.
A big part in building up the armed forces of the Communist Party of China was p
played by the Comintern’s recommendations (worked out by the organisers of the
armed forces of the CPC and Soviet Communists-experienced military leaders)
concerning the foundations for the formation, the strategy and tactics of China’s Red
Army and the principles of its relations with the population. The implementation of
these recommendations allowed the Chinese Communist Party, in 1932–33, to become 216
a major political as well as military force.
The Comintern’s help in exploring the agrarian and peasant question was particularly p
important for the Communist Party of China, which from 1927 to 1949 operated
mainly in rural areas. The decisions of the Party’s Sixth Congress on the agrarian
question and the peasant movement [216•1 were the first comprehensive,
scientifically-based platform of the Party. On the whole, the policy on the agrarian-
peasant question, laid down in the CPC decisions and Comintern recommendations in
the late 1920’s-early 1930’s, served the Chinese Communist Party as a reliable guide
throughout the subsequent period of its revolutionary activity in the countryside. It
was precisely these decisions and the experience of these years (the principles of
determining class appurtenance, etc.) that formed the basis of the Party’s decisions on
agrarian reorganisation in the late 1940’s-early 1950’s. [216•2
The Party’s attention to the agrarian-peasant question, its organisational work in p

preparing the peasantry for the agrarian revolution, and the development in the
countryside of bodies of power, armed forces, the economy, educational and other
institutions, resulted in the fact that by the mid1930’s it had accumulated abundant
experience as practically the ruling party. This experience became one of the chief
sources of strength for the Party and one of the requisites for its victory. 217
The Seventh Congress of the Comintern (1935) and its historic decisions opened up p
a new stage in the development of the world communist and national-liberation
movements. Its decisions also signified a turning point in the development of the
Communist Party of China and the Chinese revolution. The policy of the united
national front brought the Communist Party allies from the population at large and
turned it into a powerful political force. During the period from the Seventh
Congress of the Comintern to the victory of the people’s revolution in 1949, the
CPC grew into a more than three-million party, having at its disposal a strong army,
vast liberated areas, and enjoying the support of the masses and of the entire
international communist movement, particularly the Soviet Union and the CPSU.
The fulfilment of the decisions of the Comintern’s Seventh Congress proceeded in p

the face of a fierce struggle between the internationalist forces and the petty-
bourgeois, nationalistic forces within the CPC. [217•1 This was because there was
a massive flow of peasants, petty-bourgeois elements and former members of the
exploiting classes into the Party (they totalled more than 90 per cent of its
membership by 1945), and to the weakness of the proletarian core and the
preponderance of nationalistically-minded elements in the Party leadership.
The struggle within the Party immediately centred on the attitude towards the p
Comintern’s directives and decisions and on the correlation of the national and
international tasks of the liberation movement in China. The Chinese Communist- 218
internationalists, one of whose leaders was Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu), defended
the course aimed at the unification of all potential allies into a single national front
for struggle against Japanese imperialism. They interwove into a single whole the
national and international tasks of the Chinese revolution, regarding the cohesion and
support of all contingents of the international communist movement as the most
important factor for the victory of the revolution in every individual country,
particularly in China.
The nationalistic, petty-bourgeois^forces within the Chinese Communist Party, with p

MaS’Tse-tung as their spokesman, took a chauvinist, egoistic approach to the
question of internationalism and international support. For quite a long time,
especially when the Party’s own forces were relatively small (1935–37), they
contended that a direct armed attack by the Soviet Union together with the
Communist Party of China against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek would be the best
international help to the Chinese revolution and the world revolutionary process.
They were not much interested in the Soviet Union’s fate in the face of the growing
threat of attack by Nazi Germany, or in the fate of the international anti-fascist camp
and the united national anti-Japanese front in China itself. During the Second World
War, the nationalistic forces within the Chinese Communist Party sought to make the
best of international support not so much for waging war against Japanese
imperialism as for preserving and increasing their own armed forces.
The development cf the Chinese revolution after the Seventh Congress of the p
Comintern, and until its victory in 1949, proved that, despite all the attempts of 219
Mao’s nationalistic leadership of the CPC to steer the liberation struggle along the
"specific Chinese path,” the revolutionary movement in China triumphed as part of
the world liberation process. This was practical confirmation of the universal
applicability of Marxist-Leninist teaching and the importance of the united action of
all the contingents of the world communist movement.
The victory of the Chinese revolution was the result of the alliance between the p
international communist movement and the national-liberation, mainly peasant,
movement in China. This alliance materialised in the form of the ideological and
political support given to the CPC and the Chinese revolution by the international
communist movement, as well as in economic, moral, military and diplomatic
assistance from the Soviet Union and later on from the People’s Democracies.
The victory of the revolution in China became possible as a result of the radical p
changes that took place in the international situation after the Second World War.
The aggressive forces of imperialism were checked by the unprecedented might and
prestige of the Soviet Union, the formation of the world socialist system and by the
powerful upsurge of the communist and nationalliberation movements in the world.
The only imperialist power that had gained in strength at the time-the USA-was
compelled under the circumstances to refrain from direct military intervention in
China. Besides, it was more concerned with the rehabilitation of capitalist Europe,
where the influence of the communist parties had increased. 220
The victory of the people’s revolution in China was made possible by the execution p
of the fundamental strategic plans jointly worked out by the Comintern and the
Chinese Communist Party to give impetus to the liberation movement (the policy of
the united national front; the peasant movement as the main part of the democratic
revolution in China; the leadership of the Communist Party in the peasants’ armed
struggle as the basic factor for the victory of the revolution; the alliance of the
Chinese liberation movement with the international proletariat and primarily with the
USSR and the socialist camp). So the Chinese people won their historic victory
against domestic reaction and the foreign forces of imperialism in close fraternal
unity with and assistance of the forces of the world communist movement.
The carrying out of the basic tasks of the people’s democratic revolution in the p
interests of the working people as a whole paved the way for China’s advancement
along the socialist path. The successes scored by China in the early years of the
people’s power-when increased fraternal help was coming from the Soviet Union,
when there was all-round cooperation between the two countries and their parties,
and when there was wide publicity in China of the Soviet example and experience-
created a favourable situation for the further growth of the proletarian, Marxist–
Leninist forces and tendencies inside the Chinese Communist Party. On the other
hand, the Maoist petty-bourgeois nationalist trend in the Party as yet lacked a firm
foothold to mount a counteroffensive. It was manoeuvring, biding time, accumulating 221
strength and searching for a stratagem suited to the new historical situation. This
enabled the Party’s internationalist forces, with the support of the CPSU and the
world communist movement, to take the initiative and put the Party and country on
the path of socialism.
The Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China (September 1956) was a p
significant event in the life of the Party and the Chinese people. It summed up the
experience of one of the largest communist parties over a long period, during which
the people’s revolution had triumphed and the first achievements in socialist
construction had been made. At the time of the Eighth Congress the CPC had
10,700,000 members and candidate members (14 per cent of them workers, 69 per
cent peasants, 12 per cent intellectuals). [221•1 Such a composition was bound to
affect its ideology, policy and activity. The petty-bourgeois, nationalistic tendencies
in the Party continued to exist and develop covertly. The fate of socialism in China
depended on the outcome of the struggle between the nationalistic tendencies and the
proletarian, internationalist forces. And the outcome could not but affect the interests
of the international communist movement as a whole.
The main feature of the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC is that they p
endorsed the Party’s general line towards socialist construction in conformity with
the general principles of Marxism-Leninism, on the basis of close cooperation and
fraternal mutual assistance with the world socialist community and all progressive,
revolutionary trends of the day. The consistent realisation of the socialist programme 222
hammered out by the Eighth Congress was to ensure for China continuing social
progress and a speedy growth of the productive forces, which meant a better
standard of living for the working people as a whole.
In the years between 1949 and 1957, the People’s Republic of China, following the p
basic principles of building socialist society, and relying on the help and international
solidarity of the socialist countries and their parties, made the first substantial steps
towards the construction of socialism. But this was fiercely opposed by the petty-
bourgeois forces and trends. The development of the Communist Party of China and
the Chinese People’s Republic in that period was not straightforward, but highly
complicated, contradictory and confused. By the end of the period there was an
unmistakable growth of the pettybourgeois, nationalistic trends, which the Party was
incapable of overcoming.
In the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, the nationalistic forces interfered with the p
Party’s constructive interaction with the international communist movement, its
course of development on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, and its pursuance of the
concerted line of the international communist movement. They imposed the "big
leap" policy on the Party by exploiting, on the one hand, certain weaknesses in the
Party (the disunity of its organisations, feeble democratism, the personality cult of
Mao Tse-tung, etc.), and, on the other, by making great use of avantgardist slogans
when the country was in a state of animation and indulging in nationalistic
distortions of the true causes of the successes of the People’s Republic. The basic 223
features of the Mao group’s “special” course were the opposition of the policy of the
CPC to the concerted line of the fraternal parties and the attempt to revise its
fundamental precepts. Soviet party and political literature quite comprehensively and
explicitly shows the sources, causes and essence of that “special” course in the
PRC’s domestic and foreign policy as a continuation in the new conditions of the
confrontation between the two lines, the two trends inside the Communist Party of
China. [ 223•1 The “special” course and its consequences (sharp economic and
political crisis) ultimately led to the "cultural revolution" and initiated a new stage in
the intra-Party struggle.
An analysis of the Chinese Communist Party’s complex development, especially p

after the advancement of the “special” course, prompts certain conclusions concerning
the attitude of the various forces within the CPC to interaction with the international
communist movement, and concerning the influence of the international communist
movement on the positions of different forces within the CPC. The intricate
composition of the CPC and the numerical preponderance of members of non-
proletarian background, influenced by all sorts of nationalistic and pseudo-socialist
theories, brought about differences in the approach to the platform and policy of the 224
international communist movement within the CPC. These differences, with all their
shades, may be classified into two major categories.
The genuine internationalists in the ranks of the CPC-Li Ta-chao, Chang Tai-lei, p
Chu Chiu-po, Yun Tai-ying, Su Chao-cheng, Teng Chung-hsia, Peng Pai and many
others who had made a decisive contribution to the dissemination in China of
Marxist-Leninist ideas and implanted internationalist traditions in the Party with the
aim of mastering Marxist-Leninist theory and using it as a basis for the political line
of the CPC– proceeded from the fact that Marxism-Leninism is a universal

internationalist doctrine. Boldly raising the problems of the specific development of
the working-class and peasant movement in China, and taking account of the special
role of the particular forms of political struggle and of the special features of the
Party’s formation and activity, they never considered these special features to be
justification for renouncing the combination of the national and international tasks of
the Communist Party of China and those of the world communist movement as a
whole. When combating nationalism and chauvinism in the Party and elsewhere, they
based themselves on their conviction in the unity of all contingents of the world
communist movement. They have always maintained that the most important factor
for the favourable development of the Chinese revolution is solidarity with the
international communist movement and support from the Soviet people.
The nationalistic forces had a different attitude to international unity and interaction p 225
with the fraternal parties, and to assistance from the Comintern, the CPSU and the
Soviet Government. In the course of the history of the CPC, they have worn all sorts
of disguises, ranging from an attempt to receive help unilaterally from the
Comintern, the CPSU and other fraternal parties, to an almost unconcealed attempt to
play on the contradictions between the forces of socialism, democracy and progress
on the one hand, and international imperialism on the other. They have always
regarded the world communist movement and the forces of socialism, whose help
they sought to use in furtherance the nationalisticallyunderstood interests of China, as
a “third” force.
As early as the 1920’s and 1930’s, various avantgardist theories and platforms p
became a characteristic ideological cover for such nationalistic view in the CPC. For
example, Cheng Chaolin, subsequently expelled from the Party for his Trotskyite
views, put forward the idea of transferring the centre of the world revolution to
China. [ 225•1 In 1930 a group of CPC leaders headed by Li Li-san, propagated
and tried to carry through a programme according to which the Chinese revolution
was to become the main seat, the “pillar” of the world revolution. Li Li-san and his
followers counted on an "international war" by which they hoped to “prompt” the
world revolution, thereby “guaranteeing” the successful development of the revolution
in China. Mao Tsetung too backed up these views. [225•2
The “special” course persistently imposed by the Mao group on the Party and the p 226
country ever since the late 1950’s has hidden under its avantgardist veil all the
elements involved in the nationalistic approach to relations with the forces of world
socialism and the international communist movement.
However, the policy of the nationalistic forces in the CPC could not completely p
destroy the influence exercised by the ideological and political platform of the
international communist movement, and by its experience and its recommendations,
on the political and ideological positions of the Party.
The status of the CPC as a section of the Comintern and, more important, the entire p
course of the Chinese revolution-which had borne out the correctness of the
Comintern’s main conclusions and recommendations relating to the strategy and
tactics of the Communist Party of China-the high prestige of the Comintern and the
CPSU among the majority of Chinese Communists played an important role in that
even the nationalistic elements in the Party’s leadership had to take the Comintern’s
experience and recommendations into account when choosing the Party’s political
course. Yet the nationalists were either unable to, or did not want to, assimilate
entirely the platform of the international communist movement, although they
adopted, employed and "crammed,” as Lenin put it, certain tactical slogans. Inside
the Party, covertly or openly, clumsy conceptions and theories were advanced that 227
exaggerated the importance of various aspects of the situation in China and the
experience of the Chinese Communist Party, giving a narrow interpretation of the
results of the Party’s work and those of the entire revolutionary process in the
country-an interpretation that took no account of objective factors, both national and
international. On the other hand, the pursuance of the political courses mapped out
by the international communist movement facilitated the advancement of the CPC in
the general current of revolutionary struggle and at times veiled the real attitude of
the nationalists within its ranks towards Marxism-Leninism and the general platform
of the international communist movement.
The history of the Communist Party of China shows that in the periods when the p
Party’s international ties were weakened (either as a result of objective causes or
vacillations in its leadership), the nationalist forces within the Party increased their
activity. That was precisely the case in 1934–35, when the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party, during the retreat from Kiangsi in the north-west of the
country, had no liaison with the Comintern for some time. The same is true of the
period of the Second World War, especially the years of the Great Patriotic War of
the Soviet people.
The nationalists knew that, in order to improve their own position in the Party, it p
was necessary to weaken the Party’s ties with the international communist movement
and to lessen the influence of its platform and experience on the Party. The
offensives of the nationalistic forces were always accompanied by attacks, 228
camouflaged or open, on the line of the international communist movement, and by
their attempts to discredit and distort it. Li Li-san and his followers imposed their
platform under the slogan "The Comintern misunderstands the situation in China.”
The advent of the Mao group to the Party leadership in the late 1930’s-early 1940’s
was likewise accompanied by attacks on the Comintern’s platform, which were
masked by criticism of the "Wang Ming-Po Ku line,” and by the calls to "do away
with foreign patterns" and to "give Marxism a Chinese interpretation.” The new stage
of the offensive by the nationalistic forces in the CPC in the late 1950’s, and their
imposition on the Party of the "big leap" and "people’s communes" course, were also
prepared and accompanied first by covert, and then by more and more open “
criticism” of the international experience of socialist construction, of the concerted
foreign policy course followed by the socialist countries, and of the international
communist movement’s concerted general line enshrined in the Declarations and
Statements adopted by the Moscow Meetings of Communist and Workers’ Parties in
1957 and 1960. The Maoists concentrated their attacks on the USSR and the CPSU
because, as Communists all over the world have correctly noted, the Peking leaders
regard the prestige of the USSR and the CPSU as the chief obstacle to the spread of
their ideas and influence. At the same time, the attacks on the CPSU were meant to
pave the way for revising the general line of the world communist movement.
The historical experience of the CPC prompts another important conclusion. Up to p

1957, the ties of the CPC with the CPSU and other communist parties, the stand of 229
its internationalist forces and the striving of most of its leaders to rely on the help of
world socialism, created the necessary external and domestic conditions for wiping
out the avantgardist and nationalistic trends and the resulting sharp crises within the
Party. The departure of the Party’s leaders in the late 1950’s from the concerted line
of the international communist movement gave the nationalist forces considerable
freedom of action.
That conclusion is borne out by the lessons of the intra-Party struggle during the
last decade, and by the course and results of the massive Maoist onslaught on the
Communist Party of China, called the "cultural revolution.” Soviet publications have
dealt at length with the causes, development and results of the "cultural
revolution.” [ 229•1 We should like only to emphasise that one of the causes of
the severe defeat suffered by the Party was the vacillation of a considerable number
of its leaders (including those who became victims of the "cultural revolution”) on
the fundamental questions of the general line, and their departure, temporary though
it may have been, from a number of its basic principles. This circumstance enabled
the Mao group gradually to oppose the Party’s platform to the general line of the
international communist movement, to isolate the anti-Maoists in the Party from the
international movement, and to carry out the ideological re-orientation of the
country’s population, especially the young people who were later charged with the 230
task of destroying the leading bodies of the Party.
***
The history of the Communist Party of China over these past years shows that its p
departure and self-isolation from the international communist movement and from its
general line and experience, led to serious mistakes in the Party’s activity, to great
intra-Party crises and damage, and to the loss of revolutionary gains. The way out of
the critical situation in which the CPC found itself as a result of the actions of the
Maoist group is to restore relations with the international communist and working-
class movement, to return to the latter’s concerted line, and to base the Party’s entire
activity on Marxism– Leninism. The fifty-year development of the Communist Party
of China has borne out the importance and relevance of the Leninist proposition
that.. . "The urgency of the struggle against. . . the most deep-rooted petty-bourgeois
national prejudices, looms ever larger with the mounting exigency of the task of
converting the dictatorship of the proletariat from a national dictatorship (i.e., existing
in a single country and incapable of determining world politics) into an international
one (i.e., a dictatorship of the proletariat involving at least several advanced
countries, and capable of exercising a decisive influence upon world politics as a
whole).” [ 230•1 While combating Maoism as the ideological and political trend of
petty– bourgeois nationalism, it is essential first of all to see that it is incompatible 231
with the objectives of the world communist and liberation movements and with those
of the Chinese Communist Party’s development along the socialist path.
That is why the 24th Congress of the CPSU, which fully approved the principled p
Leninist course and the steps taken by the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government in
Soviet-Chinese relations, noted: "In a situation in which the Chinese leaders came
out with their own specific ideological-political platform, which is incompatible with
Leninism, and which is aimed against the socialist countries and at creating a split
of the international communist and the whole anti– imperialist movement, the CC
CPSU has taken the only correct stand-a stand of consistently defending the
principles of Marxism-Leninism, utmost strengthening of the unity of the world
communist movement, and protection of the interests of our socialist
Motherland.” [ 231•1 The Congress also endorsed the consistent course of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union towards normalising relations between the
USSR and the Chinese People’s Republic and establishing good– neighbourliness and
friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples: "Improvement of relations
between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China would meet the vital,
long-term interests of both countries, the interests of world socialism, the interests of
intensifying the struggle against imperialism.” [231•2
Voprosy htorii, No. 8, 1971
***

TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 196•1] Official data regarding the membership of the Communist Party of China
over the last ten years are not available. In his speech made on June 30, 1961, on
the occasion of the Chinese Party’s 40th anniversary, Liu Shao-chi said the Party had
over 17 million members (Jenmin jihfiao, July 1, 19G1).
[ 199•1] C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, J. K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese

Communism, Cambridge, 1952; R. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, Stanford
University Press, 1958; B. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao,
Cambridge, 1958.
[ 200•1] S. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, L., 1963; Y. Chen, Mao
Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution, L., 1966.
[ 200•2] J. E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927–35, Stanford, 19G6.
[ 202•1] For a detailed account of the Maoist historiography of the CPC, see: V.
Glunin, A. Grigoryev, Maoist Falsifications in the History of the Chinese Communist
Party, Moscow State University Gazette, Vostokovedeniye (Oriental Studies), No. 1,
1970.
[ 202•2] Chicnhfang jihpao, May 27, 1943.
[ 202•3] Liu Shao-chi, On the Party, Peking, 1954, pp. 30, 31.
[ 203•1] The influence of the Maoist historiography of the CPC on bourgeois

Sinology during those years is particularly clear in J. E. Rue’s book to which we
have already referred. Written in a quasi-scientific manner (with a multitude of
references, imposing contents, index, bibliography, etc.), it is an absolutely uncritical
reproduction of the basic assertions of Maoist historiography. We need only say that
in his principal conclusions, Rue relies on the 1951–53 editions of Mao Tse-tungs
early works (although at that time practically all of Mao’s works were heavily
revised and re– edited), and on Mao’s own biography authorised by himself and
expounded by Edgar Snow; Rue completely ignores the CPC’s documents and press
of those years—the most valuable and reliable sources.
[ 203•2] Jenmin jihpao, April 27, 19G9.
[ 204•1] Jenmin jihpao, July 1, 1971.
[ 204•2] See B. Liebzon, K. Shirinya, Turning Point in the Comintern’s Policy, M,

1965; Birth Centenary of Sun Yatsen, 1866–1966, Collection of Articles, M., 1966; 0.
Borisov, B. Koloskov, The CPSU’s Efforts for the Unity and Cohesion of Today’s
Revolutionary Forces, M., 1967; The USSR’s Leninist Policy Towards China,
Collection of Articles, M., 1968; Roots of the Present Events in China, M., 1968; M.
F. Yuryev, The Chinese Revolution of 1925–27, M., 1968; 0. Vladimirov, V.
Pyazantsev, Some Questions Relating to the History of the Chinese Communist Party,
Kommunist, No. 9, 1968; The Comintern, A Short Historical Essay, M., 1969; The
Comintern and the East, Collection of Articles, M., 1969; China Today, M., 1969;
New Documents of the Comintern, Kommunist, No. 4, 1969; The Chinese People’s
Republic, M., 1970; Prominent Soviet Communists and the Revolution in China,
Collection of Articles, M., 1970; L. P. Delyusin, The Dispute Over Socialism, M.,
1970; 0. Borisov, B. Koloskov, Soviet-Chinese Relations, 194.5-70, A Short Essay,
M., 1971.
[ 206•1] See Lenin and the Comintern, M., 1970, p. 199.
[ 206•2] Ibid., p. 201.
[ 208•1] For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 242–299.
[ 209•1] See The Comintern’s Strategy and Tactics in the National-Colonial

Revolution as Exemplified by China, M., 1934, pp. 112–113.
[ 209•2] Ibid., pp. 114–115.
[ 211•1] Adopted by the Seventh Plenary Meeting (sixth convocation) of the CC

CPG in April 1945, on the eve of the Seventh CPC Congress (see Mao Tse-tung,
Scl. Works, London, 1956, Vol. 4, pp. 171–218.).
[ 212•1] For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 313– 349.
[ 213•1] The Sixth Congress passed the decision to prepare the official programme
of the Party for the next congress. The decision, as everyone knows, remains
unfulfilled up to this day (see Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the CPC,
Book 6, Resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the CPC, M., 1930).
[ 213•2] In that period Mao Tse-tung believed that the revolution in China had
entered the socialist stage (see Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the CPC,
Book 2, M., 1930, pp. 80–81).
[ 214•1] That course was endorsed in the resolutions on the agrarian revolution, the
peasant movement and on the building of Soviet zones and the Red Army (see
Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Hook 6).
[ 214•2] The Comintern’s Strategy and Tactics in the NationalColoninl Revolution as

Exemplified by China, pp. 289, 296.
[ 215•1] CC CPC resolution "On Opportunist Vacillations in the Party’s Ranks Over
the Question of the Primary Victory of the Chinese Revolution," Materials on the
Third “Left” Line, Collected Documents and Materials, Vol. 1, Peking, 1957, p. 85)
(Chinese ed.).
[ 216•1] See Policy Documents of Communist Parties in tlte East, M., 1934, pp. 34–
51; Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Book 6.
[ 216•2] In 1947–48, several documents of the early 1930’s were re-issued in full to
be used as a guide for the agrarian reform.
[ 217•1] For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 350–379.
[ 221•1] Sec Materials of the Eighth All-China Congress of the Communist Parly of
China, M., 1956, p. 65.
[ 223•1] Sec B. Xancgin, A. Mironov, Ya. Mikhailov, On Events in China M., 1967;
Roots of the Present Events in China; A. Bovin, L. Delyusin, ’The Political Crisis in
China, M., 1968; Perilous Course, Collection of Articles, M., 1969; The Anti-
Imperialist Essence of the Views and Policy of Mao Tse-tung, M., 1969; Yu.
Yaremenko, The "Big Leap" and "People’s Communes" in China, M., 1969; Foreign
Policy of the Chinese People’s Republic, M., 1971.
[ 225•1] See Hsian Dao, No. 128, November 7, 1925, p. 1182.
[ 225•2] For details of the leftist platform emerging in the CPC in 1930, see Letter
of the Comintern Executive Committee to the CC CPC Regarding the Li Li-san
Doctrines; The Comintern’s Strategy and Tactics in the National-Colonial Revolution
as Exemplified by China, p. 290; The Comintern and the East, pp. 313–349.
[ 229•1] See The Present Situation in China and tlic CPC, Kommunist, No. 4, 19G9;
Policy of the Mao Tse-tung Group on the International Arena, Kommunist, No. 5,
1969.
[ 231•1] 24th Congress of the CPSU, Documents, APN Publishing House, M., 1971,
p. 212.
[ 231•2] Ibid., p. 213.
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<•> Regarding Peking-Washington 232
Contacts

TOC
Card I. Alexandrou p
As has been reported, talks were recently held in Peking between Premier Chou En- p
Text
lai and the US President’s adviser Kissinger. During the talks, Chou En-lai, on
HTML
behalf of the Government of the Chinese People’s Republic, invited President Nixon
PS
PDF
to visit China, and the invitation was accepted.
Addressing American televiewers. President Nixon called his forthcoming trip to p

T*
19*
Peking a visit in the name of peace. He declared that the purpose of the planned
meeting was to establish new relations with China, adding that this decision would
### do no harm to America’s "old friends,” and was not directed against any country.
Nixon’s statement is being cited by circles close to the Administration as an p

expression of Washington’s “peace-making” policy. Yet, there is a big difference
between the preaching and practice of the US ruling circles. In deeds the United
States continues the aggressive war in Indochina, supports the Israeli extremists, and
hinders a relaxation of tension in Europe. It is not any accident that many people in
the United States itself view the contacts with Peking as a continuation of this
reactionary anti-communist line.
In China there have been no official comments on Nixon’s forthcoming visit. Anti- p
imperialist sentiments continue to be expressed and loud assurances are given about
support for the anti– imperialist movement of nations. At the same time, the anti- 233
Soviet policy and the “splitting” activities against the anti-imperialist, revolutionary
forces do not cease.
The confidential Sino-American talks, the agreement on the US President’s visit to p

China and its possible consequences for international developments-all this has given
rise to lively discussion in the world press. Some sections of the world public
apprehended such a far-reaching advance in Chinese-American contacts as a great
sensation.
Such a reaction to the news can probably be explained by the fact that the true p
political intentions of the two countries are veiled by a dense propaganda screen and
that the declarations and statements of the two governments are quite often in
complete contradiction to their actual political line. All this time Peking is known to
have been calling for an uncompromising fight against US imperialism, and for the
overthrow of the Nixon Administration, while the United States has just as
demonstratively boycotted the People’s China and supported the Chiang Kai-shek
regime in Taiwan.
In the press and speeches, statesmen and public leaders have voiced the most p
diverse opinions and very often given contrasting assessments of the Peking-
Washington contacts.
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/3.2-Regarding.Peking-Washington.Contacts[2012-12-18 3:21:15]
Still, a great many of the views expressed have had one thing in common- p
satisfaction at the opportunity to normalise relations between the Chinese People’s
Republic and the United States However, the reasons behind this satisfaction vary
considerably.
Some say that the recognition by Washington of the PRC signifies a turn towards p
realism in the policy of the US Administration. It is also noted that the invitation 234
extended to President Nixon to visit Peking apparently means a desire on the part of
the Chinese leadership to secure a special position in the international arena by
means of a detente with a number of capitalist states, and a prompt one with the
United States.
Reactionary anti-communist quarters link with the Chinese-American contacts the p

hopes to undermine the unity of the anti-imperialist forces and weaken the position
of world socialism.
The most reactionary press of the USA interprets the President’s forthcoming visit p
as a foreign policy manoeuvre dictated by the aims and interests of anti-communism.
The New York Daily News wrote with utter cynicism about the hope that President
Nixon had been pursuing a far– reaching Machiavellian policy of setting Red China
and Red Russia against each other.
The US big press is not quite as frank but, nevertheless, outspoken enough in its p
comments on the direction of Washington’s strategy. The New York Times wrote that
the White House would like to capitalise on the coinciding intention of both Peking
and Washington (although the latter has its own, special reasons) so as to bring
pressure to bear on the USSR and its foreign policy. The newspaper quotes
Washington officials who allege that Nixon’s visit to Peking will become a turning
point in US diplomacy and that the Chinese leaders are worthy partners in such an
affair. The New York Post reported that Washington’s present contacts with Peking
had been the result of the strategic decision that neither China’s interests nor her
potential capabilities were a threat to American might and influence and that
Moscow was the only real danger.
The US bourgeois press also notes that Peking’s invitation has done Nixon a good p 235
turn in his electoral campaign and has helped him to elude the demands that serious
consideration should be given to the new peace initiative of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and an end should be
put to the dirty US war in Vietnam.
While giving its approval to Washington’s and Peking’s move, the West-European p
bourgeois press expresses anxiety that Washington does not hesitate to solve its
problems at the expense of its allies in military-political blocs and to disregard them
by flirting with China. The London Times remarks that the ideological dispute
between Washington and Peking has been put aside by both and that the nationalistic
interests have taken the upper hand. The West German press, along with the
enthusiastic comments of the extreme right-wing newspapers of the Springer concern,
refers to the hegemonic, global aspirations of the United States and points out that
Washington’s move "has dealt a blow at the Third World countries.”
The progressive press stresses that the peoples would like the Sino-American p
contacts to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the consolidation
of peace, but notes at the same time that both sides give more than sufficient
evidence to cause serious doubts about their real intentions.
Rude Pravo, organ of the Central Commitec of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, p
writes:
“As to the attempt to normalise relations between the Chinese People’s Republic p
and the United States, the world public is unanimous that such an act, which, 236
incidentally, has been urged ever since 1969, could only be welcomed if it meant a
policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. For, indeed,
it has been the absurd policy of the United States for many years to ignore the
existence of a new social system in China.”
The Hungarian Nepszabadsag notes that the peoples and the governments of the p
socialist countries more than anyone else have exerted efforts to secure a firm and
lasting peace. The socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, have, for over 20
year, been defending the interests of the Chinese people, urging international
recognition of the PRC and the restoration of its lawful rights in the United Nations.
The newspaper says that anti-Sovietism is a platform on which the ChineseAmerican
detente is taking place.
“It is difficult to predict how the relations between the USA and China will develop p
in the future,” writes the Polish Trybuna Ludu. "One thing is, however, clear:
China’s departure from the socialist community and the departure of the Communist
Party of China from the world communist movement were meant, above all, to clear
the way for broader contacts with the imperialist states and the United States in
particular.”
The Bulgarian News Agency in a commentary published by Rabotnichesko Delo p

says: "The implications of the contemplated rapprochement are becoming clearer
against the political background on which it is taking place. On the one hand, this is
a deliberate anti-communist US policy whose essence, just as of the entire policy of
imperialism, is aggressiveness towards the socialist community and particularly
towards its leading force, the Soviet Union. On the other hand, this is the policy of 237
rabid anti-Soviet propaganda conducted by the Chinese leaders and their efforts to
split the international communist and working-class movement and weaken the anti-
imperialist front. Under such circumstances the question can be raised: Isn’t it the
intention to join forces along a definite direction-an intention having nothing in
common with a genuine concern for peace and international understanding-that
underlies the desire for ’ normalisation’?”
Commenting on the US President’s forthcoming visit to China, the communist press, p

together with the entire progressive press, speculates on what effect this step will
have on the situation in Indochina.
L’Humanite, the newspaper of the French Communist Party, emphasises that it is US p

imperialism that is committing aggression in Indochina and has inspired the reign of
terror in Indonesia. The American imperialists waged a scorched-earth war in Korea,
and they were the authors of the notorious "Guam doctrine" which sets Asians
against Asians. "The policy of US imperialism, which is opposed to a relaxation of
international tensions,” says the newspaper, "depends on differences among the anti-
imperialist forces.”
President Nixon’s decision to visit China, says Akahata, the Japanese Communist p
Party newspaper, means the bankruptcy of the aggressive US policy in Indochina.
The present rapprochement with China, according to the newspaper, is a typical
example of the divide-and-rule policy.
No one should be deceived about Mr. Nixon’s motives, says the Morning Star, the p
newspaper of the British Communists. As before, he is the leadcr of an imperialist 238
power waging a brutal aggressive war in Indochina. One of Nixon’s goals is to
provoke still greater differences between the socialist countries, the newspaper
remarks.
In its editorial on July 19, 1971, the Vietnamese Nhan Dan wrote that the p
implementation of the Nixon doctrine had led to the intensified military activity of
US imperialism in that region of the world. The newspaper added that the US policy
was aimed at scraping together an alliance of counter-revolutionary forces in every
region and also at splitting the socialist countries.
“Nixon’s policy," Nhan Dan pointed out, "has ended in failure. It is driven into a p
corner. The whole of the United States and all the world loudly demand: End the
aggressive war in Vietnam immediately and bring all US soldiers home! Finding
himself in this predicament, Nixon began a feverish search for a way out. But he
went in the wrong direction. The door for exit was open, but he has entered a blind
alley.”
The Daily World of the US Communists, referring to the Peking-Washington p

contacts, writes that the contradiction between the motives and aims proclaimed by
Nixon, and the real policy and actions, gave rise to natural suspicions.
The Lebanese Al-Nida remarks that the interest of the West in China was growing p
as the Peking leadership stepped up its anti-Soviet, divisionist tactics.
The progressive press of Asian, African and Latin American countries assesses the p
moves towards a Peking-Washington rapprochement as testifying to the hegemonistic
aspirations of the ruling quarters of both powers. It is pointed out that the talks
about Nixon’s official visit to China help to expose the Maoist propaganda which 239
served to camouflage the moves taken by the Chinese leaders to reach an
understanding with imperialism. The Cairo AlGoumhouria says that the forthcoming
visit to Peking cloaks the intention of US diplomacy to divide the anti-imperialist
camp and, above all, drive a wedge between the USSR and the People’s China.
Thus, the world comments on the Chinese– American negotiations reflect the p
attitude of modern political and class forces to the basis and aims of the detente
between Washington and Peking. All the progressive, peace-loving forces are
watching closely the manoeuvres of certain circles which would like to use the
normalisation of ChineseAmerican relations to the detriment of socialism, of the
international communist and workers’ movement, and of the peoples which are
fighting imperialist aggression.
The Soviet Union does not see in the ChineseAmerican contacts any cause for p
sensation. Soviet people regard the contacts from the viewpoint of the Marxist-
Leninist analysis of the international situation and of the basic tendencies of world
development that was made at the 24th CPSU Congress. The congress clearly defined
the Soviet Union’s policy in its relations with the Chinese People’s Republic and the
United States, and international developments confirm the correctness of this policy.
The Soviet Communist Party and state support the normalising of relations between
the USSR and the PRC and the restoring of friendship between the two peoples,
which would be in the interests of both countries, of world socialism and would help
to step up the struggle against imperialism. But the Soviet Union is waging a
consistent struggle against the anti-Leninist platform of the Chinese leadership, and 240
its splitting tactics aimed at undermining the anti-imperialist front, the socialist
community and the world communist and workers’ movement. It rejects the great-
power chauvinistic policy of Peking and the slanderous fabrications of Chinese
propaganda about the policy of the Soviet Communist Party and state.
The Soviet Union unswervingly implements the principle of peaceful coexistence. It p

is ready to develop relations with the USA as well if this is in the interests of the
Soviet and American peoples and the interests of universal peace. But the Soviet
Union will continue to oppose firmly the aggressive actions of the USA and the
policy of force. Together with the revolutionary, anti– imperialist front, the USSR
will continue the struggle to curb aggressors and frustrate their dangerous schemes.
The Soviet Union, in close cooperation with the fraternal socialist states, consistently p
pursues the Leninist foreign policy for consolidating peace, security, freedom and the
independence of nations, and the positions of world socialism. Proof of this is the
support and all-round assistance that the Soviet Union and the other socialist
countries give to the heroic people of Vietnam, the patriots of Laos and Cambodia,
the peoples of the Arab East and to all the peoples in their just liberation struggle.
The Soviet Union believes that the well-known proposals put forward by the DRV
Government, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South
Vietnam, the United National Front of Cambodia and the Patriotic Front of Laos are
a constructive and realistic basis for solving the Indochina problem. The Soviet 241
people support these proposals.
Future developments will reveal more clearly the actual intentions of Peking and p
Washington. The Soviet Communist Party and state will take into account all the
possible consequences of the Sino-American contacts. Any hopes Peking and
Washington may entertain of using these contacts to bring pressure to bear on the
USSR or the states of the socialist community are unrealistic.
The Soviet Union believes that political decisions should be aimed, not at p
complicating the international situation, but at easing tensions. Undoubtedly, the long-
term interests of the Chinese and American peoples, just as the interests of all
peoples, call for decisions which would strengthen peace and security, and not for
political plotting against other states. As history shows, such plots eventually turn
against those who sponsored them.
The Soviet Union, as in the past, is ready to cooperate actively with all states, p
including the PRC and the USA, in the name of universal peace and the freedom,
independence, progress and prosperity of nations.
Pravda, July 25, 1971
***

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<< The International Communist Questions Requiring an Answer • >>

Movement and the Communist Party CONCERNING THE US-CHINA
of China • IN CONNECTION WITH TOP-LEVEL MEETING
THE 50th ANNIVERSARY OF
THE CPC

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<•> TITLE: A Destructive Policy
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harmful to the cause of socialism, and the world revolutionary
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[BEGIN]
__TITLE__
A DESTRUCTIVE
POLICY
__TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2007-12-28T11:24:00-0800
__TRANSMARKUP__ "Y. Sverdlov"
__SUBTITLE__
[the Chinese leadership
and the causes of socialism and the
world revolutionary and liberation movements]
 Novosti Press Agency Publishing House

 Moscow, 1972
[1]
[2]
 This is a collection of articles from the Soviet press,

exposing the policy of the Chinese leadership for what it
is---a policy harmful to the cause of socialism, and the
world revolutionary and liberation movements.
[3]
[4]
CONTENTS
I
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/index.txt[2012-12-18 3:21:41]
Pseudo-Revolutionaries Unmasked.....
8
0. Vladimiroi', V. Ryazanov, Concerning the 50th

Anniversary of the Communist Party of China . 35
1. Alexandrov, Concerning the 50th Anniversary of
the Communist Party of China . . . . . 64

N. Lomakin, N. Petrovichev, Renunciation of the
Principles of Marxism-Leninism.....80
II
P. Fedoseyev, Maoism: Its Ideological and Political
Essence............100
V. Lektorsky, G. Batishchev, V. Kurayev, Dialectics,
Genuine and Spurious........123
L. Gudoshnikov, B. Topornin, Crisis in the Political
Development of China........144
A. Arzamastsev, Maoism Preaches Poverty . . 165

T. Rakhimov, V. Bogoslovsky, Great-Power
Chauvinism of Mao Tse-tung.......185
[5]
Ill
V. Glunin, A. Grigorycv, K, Kukushkin, M. Yuryev,

The International Communist Movement and the
Communist Party of China......196
/. Alexandrov, Regarding Peking-Washington

Contacts ............232
G. Arbatov, Questions Requiring an Answer . . 242

/. Alexandrov, The Preaching and Practice of the
Chinese Leaders.........2;>4
L. Kirichenko, Peking Foreign Policy Doctrines and
Practice............277
Yu. Uladimirov, Concerning the Economic Relations

Between the Soviet Union and China (1950--66) . 285
A. Nadezhdin, Peking Against the Socialist
Community ............320
O. Ivanov, New Strategy for the Same Ends . . 332

D. Vostokov, The Foreign Policy of the People's
Republic of China Since the 9th Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party.......357
[6]
__ALPHA_LVL1__
I
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Pseudo-Revolutionaries
 Unmasked
 PRAVDA EDITORIAL, MAY 18, 1970
[7]
__NOTE__ LVL2 moved from here one page back.
 The centenary of the birth of V. I. Lenin has

become a holiday for working people the world
over. It has developed into a convincing
demonstration of the triumph of Lenin's cause, the
vitality of Lenin's ideas and behests. With the name
of Lenin, with his all-triumphant teaching, are
linked all the historical accomplishments of our
agethe Great October Socialist Revolution and the
building of socialism in the USSR, the
establishment and consolidation of the world socialist
system, the upsurge of the international working-class
movement in the capitalist countries, the collapse
of colonialism, and the emancipation of the
oppressed nations.
 The progressive world public has widely

observed the Lenin centenary. Celebration of the
birth centenary of the leader of the world
revolution has served for the Communist and Workers'
Parties, for all the fighters against imperialism,
as a powerful stimulus in their entire ideological
and political activities. The fraternal Parties have
increased the struggle for the unity of the
communist movement, for the cohesion of all
antiimperialist forces.
 In the minds and hearts of revolutionary

fighters throughout the world Lenin's name is
inseparably linked with the first socialist state and
its Communist Party which consistently
implement his behests and continue his cause. The
keynote of the Lenin celebrations in the majority
of countries was recognition of the outstanding
role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
in the world revolutionary process, expression of
gratitude to the Leninist Party for its tireless
heroic struggle, for its loyalty to the principles
of proletarian internationalism, for its selfless
assistance to all revolutionary liberation
movements.
 Socialism has achieved fresh successes in the

world-wide battle for the minds and hearts of
people. It has shown people everywhere the
prospect for deliverance from imperialism, and more
and more clearly demonstrates the superiority of
its economic, social and political organisation.
The community of socialist countries has become
a force without which, and in defiance of which,
not a single major problem of our time can be
solved. The united might of the socialist
countries and their active policy in defence of peace
are effectively checking the aggressive ambitions
of the imperialists and preventing the outbreak
of a world rocket and nuclear war.
 The celebration of the Lenin centenary has

vividly reflected the growing tendency
manifested at the International Conference of Communist
and Workers' Parties-the tendency towards
united action of all revolutionary and progressive
forces of the world; it has raised to a new level
their ideological preparedness, and given a fresh
and mighty impetus to the world revolutionary
process which unites the three great forces of our
time-the world socialist system, the international
working-class and national-liberation movements.
<h2 class="ALPHA_LVL3">
I</h2>
 It is not surprising that the masters of the

outgoing world are resorting to lies and slander in
an attempt to discredit and belittle the
historical accomplishments of Lenin's homeland, of the
fraternal socialist countries, the world communist
and working-class movement, and the fighters for
national liberation. There is nothing new about
their attempts to slander socialism, the policy of
the CPSU and the Soviet state.
 The Soviet people and entire progressive
mankind know the real reasons for the anti-socialist
actions of imperialism. We first heard them more
than half a century ago. What is worth noting
is something else-the fact that during the days
when the peoples of the world were celebrating
Lenin's anniversary the Peking leaders came out
in unison with imperialism's malicious anti-Soviet
and anti-communist campaign. Peking has timed
for the Lenin birth centenary a new phase of
fanning animosity and hatred towards the
Soviet Union, the countries of the socialist
community, and the Communist and Workers' Parties of
the world.
 Hateful to Mao Tse-tung and his following are

the successes of the USSR in the development of
socialist industry, agriculture, science and
technology, the steady rise in the living standard and
cultural level of the masses, the strengthening of the
defensive might of the Soviet Union, the tasks set
by our Party for further intensification of socialist
production for the purpose of building the
material and technical basis of communism and
strengthening the positions of world socialism. In its
desire to discredit the inspiring example of the
10
Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist

community, Peking propaganda resorts to
incredible lies and distortions, abuses and slander.
 Following in the wake of imperialist

propagandists Peking repeats the lie about the ``
aggressiveness'' of the USSR and the ``crisis'' of Soviet
economy; it resuscitates Trotskyite `ìdeas'' about
"bourgeois degeneration of Soviet power,'' and
equates US imperialism with the Soviet Union
which they call "social-imperialism.''
 Those in Peking stubbornly try to discredit the

principles of socialist internationalism underlying
the relations between the countries of the socialist
community and declare that such community
"does not exist.'' Things reached such a pass that
Hitler's ravings have been dragged out into the
open about the need to ``save'' the peoples from
the "Slav danger.'' Following the leaders of the
nazi Reich the Peking leaders are trying to
portray the Soviet Union as a "colossus on clay legs,''
asserting that the USSR is only a "paper tiger"
and threatening to "pierce it at one go.''
 Such ravings make up the content of a series
of articles published in April in the Jenmin
jihpao, Hungchi and Chiefangchiun pao, and of an
article marking May Day.
 These publications show that Peking has made

it a tradition to resort to methods of rabid
political and ideological provocations so characteristic
of imperialist propaganda.
 Communists and all those who cherish the

interests of peace and progress are deeply alarmed
by the actions of the Chinese leaders in the
international arena and seriously concerned about the
destiny of the Chinese revolution.
 The June 1969 International Conference of
11
Communist and Workers' Parties pointed out

that recent events in China and the nature of the
resolutions adopted at the 9th CPC Congress had
a negative effect on the entire world situation and
on the struggle of the anti-imperialist forces. The
present CPC leaders are pursuing an anti-popular
and anti-Leninist policy, carrying on subversive
activities against the countries of the socialist
community and seeking to split the ranks of anti--
imperialist forces.
 The actions of the Chinese leaders following

the International Conference, which Peking terms
a "black gathering,'' show the soundness of the
conclusions drawn by Marxist-Leninist Parties to
the effect that the Chinese leaders have actually
launched struggle against the world socialist
system, the international communist movement and
the revolutionary fighters all over the world.
 All this calls for greater vigilance with respect

to Peking's activities in the international arena
and for watching closely which way the Mao group
is leading China.
II</h3>
 The entire home and foreign policy course of

the Peking leaders is dictated by great-power and
hegemonistic aspirations. It is for the sake of
realizing these aspirations that China was turned
into a proving ground of adventurous
experiments, the burden of which fell heavily upon
the shoulders of the Chinese people.
 The People's Republic of China is going

through an acute crisis in all spheres of its
political, economic and cultural life. The
Communist Party has been broken up. The constitutional
bodies of people's power, trade-unions,
12
Komsomol and other democratic organisations and

unions of artists and intellectuals have been
dissolved. There is nothing left of the Communist Party
except its name, for Mao and his associates are
building up an altogether new political
organisation which will serve as a tool of the
militarybureaucratic dictatorship now being enforced in
the country.
 State power bodies in China are built on the

militarist pattern inherited from Chiang
Kaishek's rule. All power is concentrated in the hands
of the military, Mao's yes-men, who are the
bosses of the so-called revolutionary committees. The
commanders of military areas, armies and
garrisons are supreme masters in the provinces. They
head the "revolutionary committees" and
supervise the ``regulation'' of Party organisation!?. Army
units are quartered at enterprises, educational
establishments and offices. At industrial plants
shops and teams are classed as companies and
squads. The same militarist system is being
introduced at government offices and educational
institutions. The army controls the country's economy
and culture.
 Commanding army officers issue orders, which

workers, peasants, office employees and students
must carry out unconditionally. This is the way
society is being run today in China, this is the
way in which the ideas that all Chinese must
be "obedient bulls,'' "eternally unrusting screws"
and "Mao's good soldiers" are translated into
practice. The Chinese people are being driven into
barracks and are denied access to knowledge and
culture: according to Mao Tse-tung, "the more
a person knows, the more stupid he becomes.''
In the last four years not a single work of
13
fiction has been published and no feature film has

been released in the country. All museums and
libraries are closed down. Meanwhile, Mao
quotation books and his other ``works'' are
circulated in 3,000 million copies.
 During these years more than 70 million

children of school age were deprived of normal
education in school. The country fell short of
several million specialists, since the academic process
at institutions of higher learning was broken off.
Such is the result of the practical implementation
of Mao's thesis: "Schools are little tombs out
of which can come nothing but evil; they are
shallow ponds swarming with turtles.'' Developing
this thesis Mao said in 1964: "The course of
science may be cut to half its present length.
Confucius used to teach only six arts: ceremonies, music,
arrow shooting, chariot driving, holy books and
arithmetic... No matter how many books you
read, you will not become an emperor... The point
today is that, in the first place, there are many
subjects and, secondly, there are many books.''
 But despite all this, the Chinese rulers claim

they are playing the part of Messiah in today's
world.
 Barracks, ignorance, arbitrariness and

servitude-such is the order of things in China today.
And the Maoists want to thrust it upon other
nations, to "hoist the banner of Mao Tse-tung's ideas
over the whole world.''
 The implementation of "Mao Tse-tung's ideas"

has also led to grave consequences in the
economic sphere. Instead of developing the economy
in a planned and balanced way on the basis of
the objective laws of socialism, Mao and his
supporters, having discarded the Leninist
14
principles of economic management and replaced

them by voluntarism, have caused the country to
embark on the road of "big leaps" and
militarisation. This resulted in total disorganisation of
industry and agriculture.
 The PRC's economy has twice in the last

decade been hurled back below the level it had
reached in 1957. Only the first Chinese five-year
plan wa>3 carried out successfully; this was at a
time when the CPC guided the country's
economic development on the basis of the objective
laws of socialism, drawing on the experience and
relying on the all-round support and assistance
of the USSR and other socialist countries. At
that time the PRC ranked among the first in the
world in development rates. But the second
fiveyear plan was torpedoed by the "big leap,'' and
the third by the "cultural revolution.'' As a result,
industrial production has not reached the levels
mapped by the second and third five-year plans.
It has been marking time on the 1959 level.
 According to Chinese statistics, the People's

Republic of China in 1959 produced 41,500
million kilowatt-hours of electricity, 348 million
tons of coal, 3.7 million tons of oil, and 18.4
million tons of steel, whereas last year it produced
60,000--65,000 million kilowatt-hours of
electricity, 210--225 million tons of coal, 12--13 million
tons of oil, and 12--13 million tons of steel. Grain
production remained at the 1957 level and
amounted to 185--190 million tons, while the
cotton yield does not exceed 1.6 million tons.
 It should be taken into account that the

increase in population in the country, according
to Peking statistics, is about 10 million a year.
This means that in the last ten years per capita
15
production of many major industrial and

agricultural items has not risen, but decreased.
 Basic foods and manufactured goods are being

supplied to the population under a strict
rationing system.
 The military-barrack regime in China, which

is pictured by her propagandists as a kind of
kingdom of universal equality, is really a
caricature of socialist relations of production. The
Peking leaders have lately been trying to get the
national economy out of its logjam. Emergency
measures are being taken to remedy the
situation. Certain negative consequences of the "
cultural revolution" in the sphere of production are
being eliminated, especially chaos and anarchy
in economic management. But the Peking leaders
are endeavouring to solve this problem primarily
by military-administrative methods,- by methods
of coercion. Meanwhile living standards of the
working people remain to be very low: the wages
of the workers in the last four years have shrunk
by at least 10--15 per cent and working hours have
been increased.
 The hardships of life in China are aggravated
by the Peking authorities' concentration of the
main effort on militarisation of the country. More
than 40 per cent of the national budget is set
for military purposes. This is done to the
detriment of housing construction, which has all but,
stopped, agriculture (appropriations for its
modernisation have been slashed), and education,
health and cultural advancement of the people.
 The economy of the People's Republic of China

is actually divided into two parts. One comprises
a narrow group of sectors connected with
military production. This part enjoys overall priority,
16
and has not been subjected to the "cultural

revolution" treatment. The other part of the economy
consists of the civil production sectors, which are
told to "lean on their own resources,'' and not
to expect investments.
 This military deformity of the economy makes

China's entire economic and social development
lopsided.
 The Peking leaders have distorted the essence

of socialist industrialisation. By relying on
smallscale enterprises they only preserve the country's
economic backwardness. The social consequences
of this policy are also most negative: the growth
of an organised working class is being retarded.
 In these conditions, the Peking propagandists

seek to divert the attention of the population
from the disastrous consequences of the economic
policy which the Maoists have imposed on the
nation, to deceive the people with vicious lies that
the USSR and other socialist countries are worse
off than China, and thus to neutralise justified
discontent and criticism. The Chinese press publishes
practically every day articles about an "economic
crisis" in the Soviet Union. The Peking
propagandists turn everything upside down in their attempt
to belittle the achievements of the Soviet people, to
conceal from the population of China the truth
about our country.
 The following facts are, of course, known to the

Peking leaders, but they are carefully hidden from
the people. In the 1960--69 period in the Soviet
Union production of electricity went up from
292,000 million kilowatt-hours to 689,000 million
kilowatt-hours; coal, from 510 million to 608
million tons; oil, from 148 million to 328 million tons;
__PRINTERS_P_17_COMMENT__
2--193
17
steel, from 65.3 million to 110 million tons; and

grain, from 125.5 million to 160.5 million tons.
 The Soviet Union today ranks first in the

world in the extraction of coal, iron ore and
manganese ore, and holds first place in Europe
and second in the world in the extraction of oil,
smelting of steel, production of electricity, and
the output of many key engineering items,
chemicals and other important products.
 Major successes have also been scored by the

working people of other countries of the
socialist community. For instance, industrial output in
the member-states of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance increased 6.3 times in the 1950--
69 period. During the same period industrial
output in the advanced capitalist states rose only
2.7 times. Today, the CMEA countries, whose
populations make up only one-tenth of the world
population, account for about one-third of world
industrial output, and their share in world
industrial production is steadily rising.
 In the past few years the socialist countries

took important steps towards raising the
efficiency of social production through its intensification
on the basis of scientific and technological
progress. They are strengthening fraternal
cooperation and working to promote socialist economic
integration. The successes of the socialist world
not only serve the interests of the socialist
countries, but have a tremendous revolutionising
effect.
 The rapid development of the national

economy of the countries of the socialist community,
whose economic growth rate is outstripping that
of the capitalist states; the improvement of the
living standard of the working people; the fact
18
that socialism now leads in a number of fields

in science and technology-all these real results
of the creative effort of the peoples of the
socialist countries most decisively help to ensure
the victory of the forces of peace, democracy and
socialism over imperialism.
 This is confirmation of the truth of Lenin's

teaching that we can make the greatest impact
on the world revolution through our economic
policy.
 It is appropriate to note here that the Eighth

Congress of the Communist Party of China in
1956 pointed out the following: "The main
purpose of the entire work of the Party is to satisfy
to the utmost the material and cultural needs
of the people. Thus it is necessary, on the basis
of development of production, to improve the life
of the people, which, in turn, is an essential
condition for stepping up the production activity
of the masses."/Peking now declares that
concern for the people's welfare is "black
economism" and "bourgeois degeneration.''
 Thus, the basic economic law of socialism is

being trampled underfoot in the PRC. As a
result, production is made to serve the purpose not
of steadily improving the material and cultural
standards of the working people, but of building
up a military potential necessary for carrying out
expansionist activities in the world-aims totally
alien to the interests of the working masses.
 The Peking leaders have weakened the

positions of the working class, undermined its
alliance with the peasantry, and destroyed the
socialist superstructure in China, creating antagonistic
relations between the main social sections of
society.
19
 Today, four years after the launching of the

"cultural revolution,'' the contradictions besetting
China's society remain acute, although it would
seem that all measures have been taken to
suppress and exterminate the genuinely
revolutionary, internationalist forces in China, against
which the "cultural revolution" was directed. This
is why the Chinese press continues to call for the
rooting out of the "handful of enemies,'' as all
opponents of the anti-Leninist policy are called.
Terror reigns in the country. Frame-up trials
continue to be held in large cities ending in group
executions in squares and stadiums in front of
thousands of people.
 The forcible assimilation of national
minorities is one aspect of the anti-popular character
of the present regime in China. Annually millions
of new settlers are being sent from Peking,
Shanghai and other cities to Hsinchiang, Tibet, Inner
Mongolia and the Kwangsi-Chuang autonomous
district. National minorities (that is, 45 million
people!) are doomed to complete forcible
absorption and disappearance as national, ethnic groups.
In the course of the "cultural revolution" local
autonomy, already limited, is turned into a fiction.
The majority of national personnel and national
intellectuals have been subjected to repression. The
districts inhabited by the national minorities have
become centres of "labour armies" and
concentration camps. The age-old culture and distinctive
features of the non-Han peoples-the Uigurs,
Mongolians, Tibetans, Chuangs, Kazakhs, Koreans and
others-are being systematically destroyed. This
cruel policy has given rise to unrest and led to
uprisings by the national minorities of China.
 More and more troops are being dispatched to
20
break their resistance. Many units are being

brought up to the borders of neighbouring states.
 The native population is being driven out of the

districts bordering on the Soviet Union and the
Mongolian People's Republic. Yet despite all this
Peking propaganda finds it possible to praise the
order forced upon the national minorities of China
and at the same time slander the Leninist policy
of equality, friendship and fraternity of the
peoples of the Soviet Union.
 Here, again, the poisonous weapon of sland«

tis required to prevent the truth about the USSR
reaching the Chinese people.
 The experience of national construction in the

Soviet Union over a period of more than half
a century has shown that the CPSU and the
Soviet state, by implementing the Leninist principles
of national policy, have succeeded in creating and
strengthening the unshakable moral and political
unity of all the peoples of the USSR, have ensured
the genuine blossoming of their economy and
culture. This is proved by data on the development of
the Union Republics, former backward outskirts
of tsarist Russia. During the years of Soviet power
industrial output in Uzbekistan increased 70 times
over the 1913 level, in Tajikistan 76 times, in
Kazakhstan 124 times and in Kirghizia 152 times.
These were areas with an almost 100 per cent
illiteracy. Today they have institutes, universities and
academies of sciences and a wide network of
schools, libraries, theatres and medical
establishments.
 The solution of the nationalities problem in

the Soviet Union (and this is one of the most
acute and difficult problems of social life) is
a major achievement of our socialist system, an
21
important step in mankind's social development.

The attempts of the Peking leaders to discredit
the Soviet Union's national policy only succeeded
in exposing their own anti-socialist, great-Han
policy.
 The barrack ``communism'' which they try to

establish in China runs counter to the
requirements of a socialist society-the development of
the productive forces and utilisation of the results
of the scientific and technological revolution; it
runs counter to the vital interests of the
masses-improvement of their material and cultural
standards, development of socialist democracy,
and provision of genuine equality of nations; it
runs counter to all the objective processes of
social development which spell victory of
scientific socialism.
III</h3>
 The anti-Leninist course of China's present

leadership is reflected in the field of foreign policy
as well. Preparation for war has been declared a
long-term political course for the entire nation.
``Legalised'' at the CPC's 9th Congress was Mao's
thesis which boils down to the idea that war is
inevitable and even desirable. "As for the question of
world war,'' Mao said, "it is a case of either war
provoking a revolution, or revolution preventing
war.'' In explaining the meaning of this formula,
Lin Piao at the CPC's 9th Congress, and later the
Chinese press, invariably li iked revolution with
war. Thus, the newspaper Chieh tang jihpao said
that revolution "must of necessity develop into
war.'' According to this thesis war is not only
something that cannot be avoided; it is even some-
22
thing that should be sought. The paper deplores

the fact that for a quarter of a century now there
has been no world war.
 In one of their publications Chinese

propagandists bluntly state: "The theory that war can be
avoided is a dangerous one. . . There is no doubt
that there will be a war. The question is only when,
whether it will be soon or not. It is impossible to
avoid war. A determined struggle must be waged
against views claiming that war can be avoided in
the obtaining situation.''
 By preaching war the Maoists are writing off

the interests of world socialism, the working
people in all lands, and the world revolution. The
Peking strategists proclaim that "a civilisation
hundreds of thousands of times better" will be
built up on the ruins of "crushed imperialism and
social-imperialism.''
 Thus at a conference of Party workers in

Chengtu, Mao cynically declared: "If, for instance,
the atomic bomb hits us, there is really nothing one
can do except start building anew after the war
when we may possibly obtain somewhat better
results than now.'' In the last ten years whenever
there was a heightening of international tensions,
the Peking leadership invariably strove to achieve
ona aim: that of heating up the situation still more
and of prodding the world towards war.
 After the CPC's 9th Congress the position of the

present Chinese leaders on the issue of war and
peace has been stated time and again in anti--
Soviet tirades which include the most recent articles.
The Chinese leadership is trying to represent the
Soviet Union as a more dangerous enemy than US
imperialism. The current campaign of nation-wide
militarisation conducted by the Maoists is
23
accompanied by calls for preparing for war against the

USSR and the other socialist countries, for struggle
to overthrow the socialist system in these
countries.
 The Chinese leaders are trying to divert the

people's attention from the deep social and political
crisis that has seized the country by whipping up
a rabid campaign of jingoism and of hate towards
the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and
some of China's non-socialist neighbours. They are
trying to lay the responsibility for all the suffering
and misery which Mao's adventuristic course has
caused the Chinese people on "external enemies,''
among whom Peking puts first not imperialism,
but the Soviet Union and other countries of the
socialist community. The intensity of the false and
provocatory Peking propaganda about the "threat
of an attack on the PRC from the North" is a
matter of common knowledge. Also common
knowledge are the unfounded territorial claims that the
leaders of the PRC have been making in recent
years to China's neighbours including the USSR.
 To further these claims and stir up hate toward

neighbouring nations the leaders of the PRC
engineered a number of frontier incidents. Behind the
smokescreen of the war hysteria that has been
created in China, a policy is being carried out at
an intense pace of suppressing popular resentment,
speeding up the country's militarisation and
propagandising the inevitability of war.
 In Peking pretexts are being sought to justify

this policy. One such pretext has been discovered
in the reactionary garbage of feudal notions about
China's exclusiveness, about its historically
ordained role of leader "beneath the heavens.'' This
chauvinistic rubbish is clothed in the form of an "ultra--
24
revolutionary" struggle to assert the "thought of

Mao" in the world.
 Thus all woven into one piece of fabric are

petty-bourgeois adventurism and feudal
greatpower concepts, ``super-revolutionary''
phrasemongering and what is actually anti-revolutionary
practice.
 The Chinese leaders have displayed great skill

and cunning in passing themselves off as
revolutionary fighters, and Peking as the epicentre of
the world revolution. If we were to believe even
for a moment the newspaper tirades and the
speechifying of the Peking leaders, one might think
that there they were working round the clock to
promote the cause of the world revolution.
 If the Chinese leaders wished to remain faithful

to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism the PRC could greatly contribute to the
actions of the revolutionary anti-imperialist forces,
and imperialism would have a more limited field
for manoeuvring and launching counterattacks
against the revolutionary forces. However, Peking
has made a different choice. China's present
leaders must answer to the socialist countries, the
international working-class and national-liberation
movements for having placed the PRC in
opposition to the common front of anti-imperialist forces.
 In an attempt to hold back the world

revolutionary process, the imperialists are uniting their
efforts on an international scale. The Chinese
leaders, however, are spearheading their foreign
policies against the cohesion of the countries of the
socialist community, they are trying to undermine
the allied relations of the socialist states-members
of the Warsaw Treaty, and interfere with the
implementation of the plans for the further
25
development of socialist economic integration. And this,

precisely, is what the imperialists have wanted to
achieve.
 In the last few years there has not been a

single instance where, in a crisis world situation
caused by aggressive actions of the imperialists, the
PRC has joined the socialist community and the
anti-imperialist forces in offering rebuff to the
forces of reaction and aggression.
 The leaders in Peking are responsible for

dooming some detachments of the communist and
national-liberation movement in Asia and Africa
to defeat by imposing on these detachments their
adventurist tactics. Tens of thousands of
courageous fighters who had trusted the advisers from
Peking lost their lives, and the revolutionary
movement in some countries suffered serious
setbacks and great losses-such is the bloody result
of the adventurist intrigues and provocations of
the Peking "ultra-revolutionaries.''
 The escalation of the US imperialist aggression

in Indochina, the continuation of Israel's
aggressive actions against the Arab states, the military
intervention of the imperialist powers in the
domestic affairs of some states-all these actions are
spearheaded against the national-liberation
movement and the social progress of nations.
 The Soviet Government's Statement of May 4,
1970, noted that "the escalation of the US
aggression in Indochina makes even more imperative the
need for unity and the strengthening of cohesion
of all socialist and anti-imperialist and peace
forces in the struggle against aggression.''
 Such is the stand of our Party and Government

and of the Soviet people. Such is the stand to which
26
the fraternal socialist countries and the

MarxistLeninist Parties of the world adhere.
 Under these conditions the negative

consequences of Peking's adventurist and splitting policies,
aimed at undermining the bonds between the main
detachments of the anti-imperialist front, become
particularly clear.
 Thus, in Asia, the Chinese leadership has been

conducting for some years a course of
undermining the progressive regimes, of provoking
conflicts between states, of isolating the national--
liberation struggle of peoples from their real
alliesthe countries of the socialist community and the
international communist and workers' movement.
Moreover, this course of Peking is accompanied
by attempts to slander the Soviet Union's
internationalist policies. The "friends of people" from
Peking are trying to present the political, economic
and military support given by the CPSU and the
entire Soviet people to the fraternal socialist
countries, to peoples fighting against imperialist
aggression, and to developing countries, as part of a "
social-imperialist policy''; they even concoct
monstrous lies about "Soviet neocolonialism.''
 According to their logic, it would have been

better for the nations fighting against imperialism
to be severed from the basic revolutionary forces
of our time and left to deal single-handed with a
strong and treacherous enemy. This, of course, is
actually what the imperialists are dreaming of as
they plan their adventures.
 In acting in this manner Peking is telling the

imperialists that it does not intend to take joint
measures with the USSR and other socialist
countries against imperialist aggression. Such a
stand undoubtedly offers great comfort to the
27
imperialist circles and encourages them to
continue to engage in their anti-popular plans and
designs. Yet another proof of this are the recent
events in Indochina.
 The leaders in Peking have made it quite clear

by their actions that they are endeavouring to
use the heroic struggle of the peoples for
freedom for furthering their own global intrigues,
for they proceed from great-Han dreams of
becoming some new emperors of "great China" that
would rule at least Asia, if not the entire world.
 Such a policy contradicts the interests of the

world socialist system, the international
communist and workers' movement, the national--
liberation struggle of the peoples; it contradicts the
real interests of the Chinese people. "Super--
revolutionariness" in word and betrayal of the class
interests of the working people in deed-such is
the meaning of Maoism in international
relations.
IV</h3>
 The current Chinese leadership is compelled to

reckon with the tremendous prestige enjoyed by
Marxism-Leninism. Mao realizes, of course, that
he will not be able to win the masses and keep
them under his control with his name and his
`ìdeas'' alone. For a certain period he disguised
himself as a Marxist, and now he is even trying
to pass himself for a successor to Marx and
Lenin.
 There was a time when many of the notions

that constitute Mao Tse-tung's ``thought'' were
regarded as mistakes and delusions owing to
Mao's lack of experience and theoretical
background. Mao himself admitted that he "had
28
various non-Marxist views" and that he had "only a

cursory bookish knowledge of Marxism.'' Mao
often came under criticism in the CPC and in
the Comintern.
 The developments in China have revealed the

real essence of Maoism, a reactionary Utopian
petty-bourgeois conception, which, on the
theoretical plane, is an eclectic hotch-potch of widely
different views including elements of
Confucianism, anarchism. Trotskyism, and petty-bourgeois
nationalism.
 Mao took the most conservative aspect of

Confucianism-the preaching of submissiveness, the
glorification of authoritarianism, the cult of the
supreme ruler.
 From petty-bourgeois views Mao borrowed the

ideas about the special revolutionary character of
the peasants, underrating the vanguard role of
the working class. Reactionary Utopian ideas,
born of historical backwardness, are elevated by
Mao to the rank of a new theoretical discovery.
 Mao took from the bourgeois nationalist

doctrines great-power and chauvinistic views,
transforming them into a Messianic theory about
China's exclusiveness.
 To the Trotskyites Mao owes his ideas about

the precedence of political aims over the
objective laws of social development; about the "
tightening of the screws" and the militarisation of
society; the theory that socialism cannot triumph
anywhere before the victory of the world
revolution; the theory of export of revolution,
according to which a world war is the only way of
carrying out a revolution on the world scale; and,
finally, rabid anti-Sovietism and the methods of
conducting subversive activities in the ranks of
29
the international communist and working-class

movement.
 Maoism is an anti-Leninist political trend

based on ``Sinoised'' social-chauvinism, the "
Sinoised Marxism" which was declared at the Ninth
CPC Congress "an entirely new stage of
Marxism-Leninism,'' accompanied by the suggestion
that Mao be placed "on a much higher level than
Marx and Lenin.'' This is an open attempt to
replace Marxism-Leninism by Mao's `ìdeas'' and
political directives, which, in their class nature,
are alien to the theory and practice of scientific
communism.
 But this attempt is doomed to failure. The

anti-socialist character of Maoism, its theoretical
impotency cannot be concealed. Spiritual poverty
cannot be compensated for by the Mao cult.
 However `ùltra-revolutionary'' they may
sound, Mao's ideas boil down to aggressive
greatHan chauvinism. This is the hidden mainspring
of Peking's entire home and foreign policy. And
this is fraught with grave danger, primarily for
the cause of socialism in China.
 The latest wave of anti-Soviet hysteria in

Peking was caused by Mao himself; this was to be
expected and is now confirmed by the press.
Recent articles from the Chinese press contain
direct references to Mao's pronouncements aimed at
creating hate towards the Soviet Union among
the Chinese people. Significantly, the articles also
quote a statement Mao made in the mid-fifties
when he came out with protestations of
friendship and respect for the Soviet Union.
 In 1956 Mao asserted at a CPC Central

Committee's Plenary Meeting that "on the whole,
Leninism has already been discarded in the Soviet
30
Union.'' Exactly a year later he said the

following at the jubilee session of the USSR Supreme
Soviet in Moscow devoted to the 40th
anniversary of the Great October Revolution: "By
creatively applying the Marxist-Leninist theory to the
solution of practical problems, the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union has ensured for the
Soviet people continuous victories in the building
of a new life. The programme of the construction
of communism in the USSR, put forward by the
20th Congress of the CPSU, is a great model.''
 What is all this if not cynical perfidy as

regards our Party and people?
 Now that imperialism is pinning its greatest

hopes on ideological subversion in the struggle
against socialism, the subversive activities of the
Maoists aimed at the weakening and collapse of
socialist countries, at splitting the communist
movement and mass progressive organisations,
are actually making things easier for the class
enemies of the working people. In this the
Chinese leaders are steadily drifting towards
anticommunism. A "shuttle communication" is under
way between the Peking propagandists and the
bellicose imperialist ideologists: they adopt each
other's methods, terminology and "arguments,''
and both use the poisoned weapon of anti--
communism. No renegade or hireling of the
proletariat's class enemies has ever done bigger damage
to the world revolutionary process than the
Peking leaders are doing today.
 The latest articles from the Peking press and

the Maoists' actions in the international arena
show that Peking has renewed its subversive
activities against the Marxist-Leninist Parties. The
knocking together of renegade pro-Peking groups
31
in various countries for fighting the Communist

and Workers' Parties and carrying out
provocatory actions within the ranks of the working-class
and national-liberation movements has become
one of the basic elements of the tactics of the
Peking leaders.
 The interests of the world revolutionary

movement call for resolute action to rebuff the
subversive and splitting intrigues of the Maoists, for
maximum unity in the struggle against
imperialism on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism.
__*_*_*__
 For China there is only one way of socialist

development, and this way was tested in practice
by the Chinese people themselves in the years of
their struggle for freedom, in the years of
creating a new society within the ranks of the socialist
community. It is the Leninist way to which, as
developments in China have shown, the most
experienced and mature sections of Communists and
non-Party people, genuine internationalists,
remain faithful. It is this way which the fraternal
Communist and Workers' Parties have been
calling on the Chinese people to follow.
 Unity and solidarity with the forces of the

world socialist community and the revolutionary
liberation movement, rehabilitation and
consolidation of the truly socialist basis of Chinese society
-this is the only course that accords with the
interests of the Chinese people.
 The CPSU and the Soviet Government have

been consistently pursuing a policy aimed at
restoring and promoting friendly relations with
32
China. It is not through our fault that these relations
have been spoilt and greatly aggravated. The
present state of relations between the PRC and
the USSR and other socialist countries is a result
of the chauvinist policies conducted by the
Chinese leadership, a result of its departure from the
principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism.
 While exposing the anti-Leninist, anti-popular

essence of the political and ideological directives
of the present-day rulers of China, waging a
principled struggle against their factionalist
activities within the communist movement and their
great-power foreign policy, the CPSU Central
Committee and the Soviet Government have been
constantly striving to prevent ideological
differences from affecting inter-state relations.
 The Soviet Union takes a clear-cut and

unambiguous stand on the Peking negotiations on the
question of normalising the situation along the
Soviet-Chinese borders. Our country believes that
it is necessary to reach an agreement that would
permit turning the borders into a line of
goodneighbourliness. As it has been repeatedly
emphasised by the CPSU Central Committee and
the Soviet Government, we, while not retreating
from our just and principled positions and while
defending the interests of our socialist homeland
and the inviolability of its frontiers, will continue
doing everything in our power to normalise our
inter-state relations with the People's Republic of
China.
 We cannot, however, close our eyes to the fact

that Peking is bent on whipping up militaristic
psychosis, demanding that the people "prepare
for famine, prepare for a war.'' Even the
3--193
33
launching of a satellite, made possible by the selfless

efforts of Chinese scientists, engineers and
workers, is used as an occasion for fanning
nationalistic passions and issuing threats against our
country.
 If all this is being done with a view to

bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union, one
must say in advance that these are vain efforts.
The Soviet people have strong nerves. Our people
possess everything necessary to uphold the
interests of our homeland.
 We proceed from the belief that the vital and

long-range interests of the Soviet and Chinese
peoples are far from being contradictory. In fact
they coincide.
 `Ìn jointly following the road charted by

Lenin, in waging a joint struggle against the
sinister forces of imperialist reaction, for the triumph
of the sacred cause of socialism and communism,''
L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee, said in his report at the
meeting marking the centenary of the birth of Lenin,
"lies the correct path for the future development
of relations between China and the Soviet Union,
and between China and other socialist countries.''
 The Soviet people proceeding from this

historical path, retain a friendly attitude towards the
Chinese people. A genuinely socialist and
internationalist policy is bound to triumph in China.
Such is the objective logic of historical
development.
 Pravda, May 18, 1970
[34]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Concerning the 50th
 Anniversary of the Communist Party
 of China
 O. Vladimirov, V. Ryazanov
 July 1, 1971, marked the 50th anniversary of

the foundation of the Communist Party of China.
In the past half-century it has traversed a long and
devious road of great achievements as well as
grave setbacks. In 1921 small groups of Communists
united to form the Communist Party of China.
Relying on the support and experience of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, of the entire
international communist movement, the Communist
Party of China grew into a mighty vanguard of the
Chinese revolution. It guided this revolution and
led the Chinese people to an historic victory in
October 1949.
 People's China led by the Communist Party

became part of the socialist camp, and established
friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other
fraternal states. With their help the Chinese
people concentrated their efforts on strengthening the
national independence of the People's Republic of
China, eliminating the remnants of the semi--
colonial, semi-feudal system and implementing broad
democratic reforms. In accordance with the will
of the multi-million working masses the
Communist Party of China led the country along the road
of building a socialist society, as defined in the
decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC held in
September 1956. The first five-year plan for the
3*
35
country's economic development was fulfilled in 1957.

The Communist Party of China emerged as a major
contingent of the world communist movement and
enjoyed great prestige. It participated in the
international meetings of communist and workers'
parties in 1957 and 1960.
 But in the late 1950's the CPC leadership

initiated a foreign and home policy which deviated from
Marxism-Leninism and essentially contradicted the
principles of proletarian internationalism and the
basic laws of socialist construction. It began to
pursue a policy which combined petty-bourgeois
adventurism with great-power chauvinism,
camouflaged with ``left'' phraseology; it openly embarked
on a course of undermining the unity of the
socialist community, of splitting the world communist
movement. Peking began to organise Maoist groups
in a number of countries, in an obvious attempt
to unite them and turn them against the world
communist movement. This resulted in a
considerable weakening of the positions of the Communist
Party and the working class within China and an
upsurge of petty-bourgeois, anarchist elements.
 After adopting an ideological and political line

which is incompatible with Leninism, on the main
questions concerning the international situation
and the world communist movement, the Peking
leaders demanded that the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union abandon the line adopted by the 20th
CPSU Congress and the CPSU Programme. They
conducted intensive anti-Soviet propaganda,
presented territorial claims to the Soviet Union and
even brought the matters to armed border clashes
in the spring and summer of 1969.
 The CPSU, together with other fraternal parties,
resolutely countered the attempts to distort the
36
Marxist-Leninist teaching and to sow discord in

the socialist community, the world communist
movement and the anti-imperialist front. The CPSU
Central Committee and the Soviet Government
displayed restraint and refused to be provoked
while doing everything they could to improve
relations with China. The last one and a half years
have seen some signs of a normalisation of
USSRPRC relations, thanks to the initiative and efforts
of the Soviet Union. At the same time the Chinese
leadership continued to pursue an anti-Soviet line
in their propaganda and policy; the 9th CPC
Congress confirmed in its resolutions an anti--
Marxist course, hostile to the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries. Peking's actions in the
international arena testify that the foreign policy of the
PRC has in fact broken away from proletarian
internationalism and lost its class, socialist content.

 General Secretary of the CPSU Central

Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, said at the 1969
Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties: "It is a
big and serious task to make an all-round
MarxistLeninist analysis of the class content of the events
in China over the last few years, and of the roots
of the present line of the CPC leaders, which is
jeopardising the socialist gains of the Chinese
people.'' It is all the more appropriate, on the 50th
anniversary of the Communist Party of China, to
review the path it has travelled, to consider its
glorious and hard destiny.
I</h3>
 The Communist Party of China was founded as

a party of the Marxist-Leninist type. At its First
Congress the party set the task of carrying out a
37
socialist revolution, establishing the dictatorships

of the proletariat and building a classless,
communist society. The Congress adopted a decision on
the party's joining the Comintern. In early 1922
Lenin had meetings with Chinese Communists.
 The emergence and development of the
Communist Party of China proceeded in extremely
complex conditions as a result of China's economic,
social, political and cultural backwardness and the
insufficient numerical strength of the Chinese
proletariat. The general revolutionary movement in
China comprised three different currents: the
struggle of the peasantry and the petty national
bourgeoisie against the survivals of feudalism, the
nation-wide movement against colonial imperialist
oppression, for national independence, and the
proletariat's struggle for socialism.
 At the time when the CPC came into being the
working-class movement in China was just
beginning, and had not yet accumulated the necessary
experience in class struggle. The November 1927
Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee
pointed out: "The CPC began to take shape as a
political trend and as a party at a time when the
Chinese proletariat had not yet established itself
as a class and when the class movement of
workers and peasants was just emerging. The upsurge
of the national-liberation movement in China, in
which the bourgeoisie and especially the
pettybourgeois intelligentsia played a major role in the
earlier period, took place long before the class
awareness and class struggle of the exploited
masses assumed an appreciable scale.''
 The formation of the revolutionary vanguard of

the Chinese proletariat was adversely affected by
the fact that prior to the Great October Socialist
38
Revolution in Russia Marxism was unknown in

China. In the words of Mao Tse-tung, the gun
salvoes of the October Revolution brought
MarxismLeninism to China.
 In his `Left-Wing' Communism - an Infantile

Disorder Lenin wrote the following with regard to
the history of the establishment of a proletarian
party in this country: "Russia achieved
Marxismthe only correct revolutionary theory-through the
agony she experienced in the course of half a
century of unparalleled torment and sacrifice, of
unparalleled revolutionary heroism, incredible
energy, devoted searching, study, practical trial,
disappointment, verification, and comparison with
European experience. ...Russia, in the second half of the
nineteenth century, acquired a wealth of
international links and excellent information on the forms
and theories of the world revolutionary movement,
such as no other country possessed.''~^^1^^
 The Chinese revolutionaries had had no such

experience.
 Thus the formation of the Communist Party in

China proceeded in extremely difficult conditions.
But nevertheless it was a natural and necessary
result of the revolutionary movement which
emerged in China under the mighty impact of the
October Revolution, which awakened the revolutionary
activity of the working class, the broad working
masses, including the peoples of the colonial and
dependent countries, in all parts of the world.
 The "May 4 Movement" was a response to the

October Revolution and showed that the working
people of China were ready for a decisive struggle
against imperialist oppression. It was necessary
then to merge the Marxist circles into a party
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 31, pp. 25--26.
39
capable of leading the struggle of the young working

class, and the democratic and national-liberation
forces against social oppression, against
imperialism. Such a party came into being in the 1920s.
Moreover, a strong Marxist core was formed
within the communist movement in China with the help
of the Comintern, which set a correct political
course.
 The Second Congress which took place in July

1922 confirmed the CPC's striving to become a
truly proletarian party. "We must be a real political
party created by the proletarian masses, imbued
with a revolutionary spirit, and ready to fight for
the interests of the proletariat and lead the
proletarian revolutionary movement,'' said the 
Resolution on the CPC's Rules. The Congress called for
organisation of the party after the Bolshevik
model and adopted a resolution on joining the
Comintern, which subsequently guided the political
and organizing activity of the Chinese Communists.
The world communist movement invariably came
to the help of the Chinese revolutionaries
whenever they made mistakes.
 The documents of the 2nd, 3rd (June 1923) and
4th (January 1925) Congresses regarded the
proletariat as the party's mainstay, the vanguard and
then the leader of the revolution, and the
peasantry as the proletariat's chief ally whose active
support was vitally important for the Chinese
revolution. By the time of the 5th Congress (April-May
1927) the CPC had nearly 58,000 members, more
than 50 per cent of whom were workers and about
19 per cent peasants.
 The 6th Congress was an important landmark in

the development of the Communist Party of China.
It was held in June and July 1928 and was
40
attended by a delegation of the Comintern Executive.

In February of the same year the 9th plenary
meeting of the Comintern Executive adopted a 
Resolution on the Chinese Question which summed up
the current developments and the specific features
of the revolutionary movement in China and
pointed out that "the Comintern Executive has
directed all its sections to support the Chinese
revolution in every way.'' Guided by this resolution the
Congress adopted documents which in effect
constituted the first comprehensive programme of the
CPC. It outlined the main tasks of the Chinese
revolution: expulsion of the imperialists and
unification of the country, complete elimination of
landlord ownership of land and liberation of the
peasantry from all feudal bonds, struggle for the
power of Soviets of workers', peasants' and soldiers'
deputies as the best form of government for
implementing the democratic dictatorship of the
working class and peasantry in China. On the
advice of the Comintern Executive delegation the
6th CPC Congress gave special attention to the
development of the peasant movement and guerrilla
struggle under the slogan of agrarian revolution,
with the aim of creating a regular Red Army of
workers and peasants based on guerrilla
detachments.
 This showed a truly Marxist approach to the

problems of the Chinese revolution, the solutions
to which were worked out by the Communists--
internationalists.
 But along with the Marxist, internationalist trend

in the CPC another, essentially petty-bourgeois and
nationalist, group was taking shape. At the time of
the upsurge of the national liberation movement
radical elements of the petty bourgeoisie joined
41
the party in great numbers. "Lifted by the wave

of revolutionary enthusiasm of the initial period,
lacking theoretical Marxist-Leninist schooling,
ignorant of the experience of the international
proletarian movement, isolated from the exploited
lower strata of the Chinese people and having taken
no part in the class struggle of the workers and
peasants, a considerable part of these
revolutionary petty-bourgeois elements, far from being
assimilated by the party and becoming consistent
proletarian revolutionaries, brought into the CPC all
the political instability, inconsistency and
indecision, the inability to organise, non-proletarian
habits and traditions, prejudices and illusions
characteristic of the petty-bourgeois revolutionary,''
stressed the November 1927 Plenary Meeting of the
CPC Central Committee. This tendency, associated
mostly with Mao Tse-tung, later developed into
a petty-bourgeois and nationalist trend which
came to be known as Maoism.
 The struggle between the Marxist,

internationalist trend guided by the ideas underlying the Great
October Socialist Revolution and the petty--
bourgeois, nationalist trend marked the entire history
of the Communist Party of China. This struggle
was reflected in the decisions of the party
congresses, in the theories and the practical activity
of the CPC leadership. The conflict between these
two trends has been and remains characteristic of
the Communist Party of China. Mao Tse-tung and
his historiographers seek to distort the true
picture, to confuse the issue. To this end they oppose
the "true line" of Mao Tse-tung to a host of
``wrong'' lines, whose number grows in Peking
publications every year. Recently most of the party
cadres have been labelled "those vested with
42
power in the party and following the capitalist

road.''
 The Marxist-Leninist, internationalist part of the

CPC was guided by the theses set forth in Lenin's
works and in the documents of the international
communist movement. These theses include the
definition of the essential feature of the Chinese
revolution as a combination of the struggle against
feudal survivals and the struggle against
imperialism; the need to promote the peasant movement
and the revolutionary struggle in the countryside
and to set up strongholds when the revolution is
in decline; the expediency of an alliance with the
petty and national bourgeoisie at the
bourgeoisdemocratic stage of the revolution,- the thesis that
in China armed revolution is fighting against
armed counter-revolution; the necessity of the union
of the Chinese revolutionaries with the USSR, and
others. It was the implementation of these theses
by the Communist Party of China that made
possible the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949.
The attitude of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist
faction was quite different. It did not and could not
make any positive contribution to the development
of the communist movement in China. The
revolutionary movement suffered setbacks and defeats
whenever the petty-bourgeois nationalists
wittingly or unwittingly distorted the Marxist-Leninist
theses.
 Moreover, in the early years of CPC history the

Maoists from time to time attempted to make the
party follow their line, but were rebuffed and had
to retreat. It is significant that Mao Tse-tung
attended only three out of the six CPC congresses
held at that time, and at the 5th Congress was
deprived of the right to vote. The Maoists launched
43
fierce attacks on the CPC when the party met with

difficulties.
 After the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek coup in

April 1927 the Communist Party of China
functioned in conditions of ruthless terror from many sides
-from the central Kuomintang government and
the separatist military cliques, from the troops of
the Western imperialist colonialists and the
Japanese invaders. The party incurred heavy losses
when the Chinese Red Army retreated to the
remote north-western regions of the country following
the tactics of the Maoists. Many fine sons of the
party gave their lives in the struggle for the cause
of the working people. The loss of the tried cadres
devoted to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism seriously weakened the position of
the CPC.
 This was used to advantage by the

representatives of the petty-bourgeois trend. In early 1935 they
conducted the "enlarged session of the CPC
Central Committee Politbureau" in Tsungyi and
captured important posts in the party leadership.
In the autumn of 1941, when the Soviet Union
and the entire international communist
movement were concentrating their efforts on the
struggle against nazism, they launched a "drive to
streamline the style of work" in the CPC. The aim
of the campaign was to turn the Communist Party
of China from the Marxist-Leninist stand to a
petty-bourgeois, nationalist ideological and political
platform (the 22 works selected for compulsory
study during the ``campaign'' were mostly articles
and speeches of Mao Tse-tung, Kang Sheng and
other Orthodox Maoists) and remove the
opponents by conducting campaigns of physical and
moral terror. After more than three years of struggle
44
the petty-bourgeois nationalists managed to get

the upper hand-the 7th CPC Congress held in
1945 was conducted in an atmosphere of
deification of Mao Tse-tung and it approved "Mao
Tsetung's ideas" as the ideological platform of the
Communist Party of China.
 At the same time the obtaining situation and the

revolutionary enthusiasm of the Chinese people
forced the petty-bourgeois nationalists to remain in
the mainstream of the revolutionary struggle.
 In 1935 the 7th Comintern Congress advanced

the idea of a united anti-imperialist front, stressing
its particular importance for countries in colonial
bondage at a time of imperialist expansion. In
keeping with this thesis a united front of the
Communist Party and Kuomintang in the struggle of
resistance against Japanese imperialism (1937--45)
was proclaimed in China, which furnished the
basis for rallying all segments of the Chinese people
for the struggle against the foreign invaders. The
petty-bourgeois nationalists sabotaged the united
front, seeking every opportunity to undermine it.
Yet they could not ignore the essential needs of the
Chinese national-liberation movement, the
courageous struggle of the Marxist-Leninist section of
the CPC leadership for consistent implementation
of the Comintern line, and were forced to retreat.
The united front policy helped to make the CPC a
mass party, the vanguard of the Chinese people, a
political force of nation-wide significance.
 The victory of the Soviet Union over Hitler

nazism and militarist Japan was of tremendous
importance for the Chinese revolution. In 1945--49
the centre of the Chinese revolutionary movement
shifted to Manchuria where active preparation
began with Soviet assistance for the final phase of
45
the struggle for liberating China from colonial and

social oppression.
 The routing of militarist Japan, in which the

Soviet Union played a decisive role, strengthened
the revolutionary forces in China. The People's
Liberation Army had then a safe rear and was able
to reorganise and improve its combat equipment
with the Japanese arms and materiel captured by
the Soviet troops.
 The revolutionary forces of China received

extensive material assistance from the Soviet Union.
In Manchuria the Soviet Army and Soviet civilian
organisations helped in every way to rehabilitate
the economy, to repair communication lines
destroyed during the war. Thanks to Soviet aid the
main railways in central and southern Manchuria
were restarted in a short time and large formations
of the People's Liberation Army of China were able
to regroup and concentrate, which helped to
complete the rout of the Kuomintang army and its
expulsion from Manchuria, and furnished favourable
conditions for the decisive offensive in the south.
 The Chinese people were able to express their

will freely in the areas liberated from the Japanese
by the Soviet Army and began to set up people's
democratic bodies of power.
 At that time the USSR Government did

everything to prevent open military intervention by the
United States in China, above all in Manchuria.
 The visits by Chinese delegations from the

people's democratic regions of Manchuria to the
Soviet Union in 1945 and 1949 and other forms of
consultation (a group of Soviet party officials
stayed in Manchuria from 1945 to maintain close
contact with the North-Eastern Bureau of the CPC
Central Committee; in early 1949 a responsible
46
representative of the CPSU had a meeting with the

Chinese leaders) were of great importance to the
CPC for elaborating a correct political line. This
assistance was all the more valuable since the
petty-bourgeois, nationalist section of the CPC
leadership, and Mao Tse-tung first of all, went from one
extreme to another in assessing the forces in the
Chinese revolution. In 1945--46, for example, they
overestimated their forces and displayed "
revolutionary impatience,'' ignoring the need to conserve
forces in order to prepare conditions for a decisive
blow and the need to combine the political and
diplomatic forms of struggle with the build-up of
the military potential. On the contrary, in 1948--49,
after the Kuomintang offensive and the loss of
Yenan in 1947, the same group in the CPC
leadership showed disbelief in the possibility of an early
victory and proved helpless in dealing with
practical questions connected with the establishment
of people's power all over China.
 Manchuria with its well-developed industry and

the large share of the country's working class, its
strong party organisations, and also thanks to the
fact that it borders on the Soviet Union, became in
1945--49 a strategic bridgehead from which the
People's Liberation Army was able to launch a
powerful offensive and quickly liberate the whole
country from the Chiang Kai-shekites and their
imperialist patrons.
 The long and heroic struggle of the Chinese

people was crowned with a glorious victory. In the
vanguard were Communists true to Marxism--
Leninism and proletarian internationalism. At every
stage of that struggle the Communist Party of
China had leaders who represented everything best in
the Chinese revolutionary movement. These were
47
the Chinese Communists whose real role was

subsequently ignored or wilfully distorted by the
Maoists for the sake of extolling Mao Tse-tung as
the only leader of the Chinese revolutionary
movement and creating a myth about his infallability.
Many of them perished in revolutionary battles or
were forced out from the CPC leadership, but their
glorious memory lives on.
 The fraternal union of the Chinese

revolutionaries and the USSR compensated for the relative
weakness and disunity of the Chinese working
class; it promoted the consolidation of the internal
forces of the Chinese revolution and protected them
against the import of counter-revolution. The
victory of the Chinese people convincingly proved the
correctness of Lenin's thesis that ''. . .this
revolutionary movement of the peoples of the East can
now develop effectively, can reach a successful
issue, only in direct association with the
revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic against
international imperialism.''~^^1^^
II</h3>
 The formation of the People's Republic of China

and the establishment in China of people's demo- :
cratic power under the guidance of the Commun- i
ist Party, the extensive and disinterested assistance I
of the USSR and other fraternal countries, and the
changed balance of class forces in the international
arena in favour of socialism opened before the
Chinese people broad possibilities of successful
building of socialism. In the first years after the
establishment of the People's Republic of China the
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 30, p. 151.
48
Communist Party drafted concrete ways of

carrying out socialist construction. In 1953 the CPC's
general line in the transition period was made
public, which called for mobilising all the forces for
making China a mighty socialist state.
 In 1956, the 8th CPC Congress elaborated and

endorsed the course of building a socialist society
in the People's Republic of China. At the same
time the Congress proclaimed that "the Communist
Party of China is guided in its activity by
Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism alone correctly
interprets the laws of social development, shows
the correct ways of building socialism and
communism.'' This thesis did away with the idea of
"Sinoised Marxism" and with "Mao Tse-tung's
thought" as the CPC's ideological platform set
forth at the 7th Party Congress in 1945.
 The cause of socialism seemed to have acquired

a strong foundation in China. But the petty--
bourgeois nationalists in the CPC leadership did not lay
down their arms. They continued to deal
underhand blows at the section of the party leadership
and rank-and-filers that adhered to positions of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
 In the mid-50's the People's Republic of China
entered "the core of the revolutionary course,'' to
use Lenin's expression. Radical changes were
carried out in the non-socialist economic sectors. The
achievements of the first five-year plan period
furnished the basis for further advancement, for
organising large-scale socialist production under strict
government control. The prospect of complete
elimination of the petty-owner element became quite
real. This naturally aroused the resistance of that
element, greater vacillations, which, in turn,
4--193
49
affected the petty-bourgeois, nationalist elements in the

CPC leadership. "In April 1956 ... we began to
advance our own line of construction,'' Mao
Tsetung admitted at a meeting of the CPC Central
Committee in 1958.
 Lenin characterised the vacillations of the

pettyowner element as follows: "This wavering flows
in two `streams': petty-bourgeois reformism, i.e.,
servility to the bourgeoisie covered by a cloak of
sentimental democratic and `Social-Democratic'
phrases and fatuous wishes; and petty-bourgeois
revolutionism-menacing, blustering and boastful
in words, but a mere bubble of disunity, disruption
and brainlessness in deeds.''~^^1^^
 At first Mao Tse-tung and his followers took the

road of petty-bourgeois reformism. Even within
the framework of CPC's general orientation to
scientific socialism they advanced "new political
stipulations,'' which reflect right-wing opportunism.
 In April 1956 the Maoists proclaimed a "course

of prolonged coexistence of the Communist Party
with bourgeois-democratic parties and reciprocal
control between them" (italics added) which in
practice undermined the CPC's leading role in
society and provided the bourgeois parties which
remained in the People's Republic of China with an
effective instrument for struggle for power. In
practice the Maoist slogan "May hundred flowers
blossom" amounted to legalising anti-Marxist,
anti-socialist views and undermined the authority of
the proletarian ideology in the country. The
theory of "contradictions within the people" which
considered the contradiction between the working
class and the national bourgeoisie as non--
antagonistic, lulled the vigilance of the working people
_-_-_
 ~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 33, p. 21.
50
and played into the hands of the enemies of

socialism.
 The national bourgeoisie took advantage of these

"new stipulations" to launch an open attack on
socialism in the spring of 1957. The social and
political system in the People's Republic of China, the
system of economic management, all public
organisations were being criticised and discredited.
Demands were made to annul the changes that had
been carried out in capitalist industry, handicraft
production and agriculture. Calls were made for
physical extermination of Communists, for
smashing the CPC and its leadership. The petty-bourgeois,
nationalist CPC leaders, concerned about their own
safety, above all else, hastened to introduce
corrections in their "new stipulations.'' The working class
and the Communists beat back the bourgeois
onslaught. But the shift in the CPC leadership's
policy to the right, the proclaiming of opportunist
``courses'' and ``slogans'' had done their job-they
further increased the influence of the petty--
bourgeois ideology.
 The successful completion of the first five-year

plan, the growth of the country's economic and
military might and of the international prestige of the
Communist Party of China and the People's
Republic of China were appraised by the Maoist leaders
from a petty-bourgeois standpoint. Now they
turned eagerly to petty-bourgeois revolutionism,
reflected by the so-called three red banners policy
announced in 1958. Replacing the former CPC
general line which provided a definite plan of
socialist construction a new "general line" was
proclaimed in the form of a vague appeal: "To strain all
forces, to strive forward, to build socialism
according to the principle 'more, faster, better and more
4*
51
economically.'~" The "great leap" and the setting

up of "people's communes" were declared the
basis of the country's economic policy. In the
international arena the line was to heighten tension,
attain world hegemony, worsen relations with the
USSR and other socialist states.
 The Communist Party of China found itself

unable to cope with the consequences of these "
innovations,'' and a considerable portion of its
membership began to waver. This happened not only
because the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist
cadres had been paralysed and ousted from leadership
by that time. The fact is that owing to the specific
conditions in which the party had developed, and
to the cadres policy that had been pursued for
many years by the petty-bourgeois section in the
party, the petty-owner elements had become the
dominating trend in the Communist Party of China.
 According to official Chinese data, in the late

50s the share of workers among party members
was 14 per cent and of peasants, 69 per cent.
 We must not forget in this connection Lenin's

warning that ''. .. we constantly regard as
workers people who have not had the slightest real ex- I
perience of large-scale industry. There has been
case after case of petty bourgeois, who have
become workers by chance and only for a very short
time, being classed as workers''.~^^1^^ Thus it happens
that the proletarian character of a party does not
rule out a possible predominance, and in a very
short time, of petty-owner elements.
 Neither should we forget Lenin's teaching that

whenever former small owners join the party in
vast numbers ''. . .the proletarian policy of the
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 33, p. 254.


52
party is not determined by the character of its

membership, but by the enormous undivided prestige
enjoyed by the small group which might be called
the Old Guard of the Party.''~^^1^^
 To be sure, the difficulties faced by the

Communist Party of China were not insurmountable. As
experience shows, the petty-bourgeois threat can be
coped with if the party follows the Marxist--
Leninist teaching at all times and in everything, if it
tirelessly works to strengthen the alliance of the
working class and the peasantry under the leadership
of the former, if it is guided by the basic interests
of the working people. Yet the Maoists staked on
petty-bourgeois prejudices, ignoring the basic
interests of the working class, the peasantry and the
working intelligentsia. Moreover, the systematic
``purges'' struck first of all at the party old guard,
eliminating the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist
cadres.
 The home and foreign policy advanced by the

petty-bourgeois, nationalist section in the CPC
leadership had a disastrous effect on China's economy
and brought about real calamities in the country.
Added to this were severe droughts and floods for
three years in succession. As a result, according to
various estimates, the gross national product in the
People's Republic of China fell by one-third,
industrial output was halved and the national income
shrunk by more than one-quarter.
 In the face of this the CPC leadership made

changes in its home policy, although the "three red
banners" slogan was not officially retracted. At the
cost of tremendous efforts of the working people
and thanks to the return, to a certain extent, to
_-_-_
53
socialist economic forms, the People's Republic of

China managed to regain the 1957 level of
industrial and agricultural production by the end of 1964.
But the country's population grew considerably
during this period. In 1964 China exploded its first
atomic bomb and joined the nuclear-rocket arms
race despite its limited resources. Enormous sums
had also been spent by Peking since 1960 for
propaganda and subversion against the world
communist movement and for pursuing its great-power
foreign policy. The rupture of the PRC's
cooperation with socialist states did irreparable damage to
the country. As a result, difficulties continued to
mount in China.
 The strife inside the CPC leadership was further

aggravated. The key issue now was the question
of the country's further development. The choice
was between returning to the time-tested practice
of socialist construction in close cooperation with
the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries, and
following the petty-bourgeois, nationalist road. In
his talks with foreign visitors Mao Tse-tung
admitted that attitude to the Soviet Union
represented a main aspect of the strife within the CPC
leadership.
 It should be stressed that the positions of the

working class in the PRC were seriously
weakened at that time. The destruction, during the "big
leap,'' of large-scale industry which Lenin called
the proletariat's "vital basis" and the curtailment of
industrialisation deprived it of its class strength
and undermined its ability to resist petty-bourgeois
vacillations. Meanwhile the influence of the
pettyowner, anarchist element on developments in the
country and its fluctuations continued despite the
fact that agriculture was put on a cooperative
54
basis. Lenin thus characterised the main features of

this element: "It will take collectives, collective
farms and communes years to change this.''~^^1^^ The
Maoists took advantage of all these factors to get
the upper hand in the CPC leadership.
 Quite obviously this course of events was not

fatally inevitable, even in the complex conditions
of the People's Republic of China. After the
successful completion of the first five-year plan in 1957
the country was on the threshold of new
achievements in economic and cultural development, in
promoting democracy, and in foreign affairs. Such
achievements would undoubtedly have taken place
had the CPC leadership pursued a genuinely
Marxist-Leninist policy, had it safeguarded and
enhanced the party's leading role, had it promoted in
every way the growth of the ranks of the working
class, its political awareness and its influence in
society. But it was China's misfortune that the
party and the country came to be guided by the
representatives of petty-bourgeois, nationalist views
and aspirations. Their activity furnished conditions
for further attacks by the small-owner element
against the working class, which gradually turned
into a frontal assault. It began at a signal from
Mao Tse-tung who called for "opening fire at the
headquarters" (i.e., party organisations). It
became the notorious "cultural revolution.''
III</h3>
 Lenin wrote the following with regard to the
possible outcome of the struggle against the
anarchist element represented by the small owner:
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 32, p. 27fi.
55
 `Èither we subordinate the petty bourgeoisie to our

control and accounting (we can do this if we
organise the poor, that is, the majority of the
population or semi-proletarians, round the politically
conscious proletarian vanguard), or they will
overthrow our workers' power as surely and as
inevitably as the revolution was overthrown by the
Napoleons and the Cavaignacs who sprang from this
very soil of petty proprietorship. That is how the
question stands. That is the only view we can take
of the matter. . .''~^^1^^
 The negative results of the "cultural revolution"

are generally known. The situation in the People's
Republic of China developed in the direction of
the second variant predicted by Lenin. In the
course of the "cultural revolution" the political system
of the People's Republic of China as a state
governed by the working class was destroyed. The bodies
of people's power ceased to function. The
Communist Party of China itself as a party of the
Marxist-Leninist type was paralysed from top to
bottom. The trade unions, the Young Communist
League, all other public organisations, including the
young pioneers, were disbanded. All spheres of
socio-political, economic and cultural life were put
under the army's control. The result was what
Lenin called a "shitt of power,'' the ousting of the
working class from the real bodies of power and the
loss by its party of the leading position in society.
A military-bureaucratic dictatorship came into
being in China. The proletarian ideology--
MarxismLeninism-was deprived of its leading role in
society and replaced with "Mao Tse-tung's ideas.''
 In order to step up and legalise this process of
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 32, p. 332.

56
56
``shift of power" the Maoists broke away
completely from the ideological and organisational
principles formulated by the Communist Party of China
at its 8th Congress in 1956. This took place at the
9th CPC Congress held in April 1969. The
Congress confirmed the omnipotence of the army
whose representatives headed the "revolutionary
committees" that replaced the elective local bodies of
power in the course of the "cultural revolution.''
The army actually seized the highest party organs
set up by the Congress, for career servicemen
formed a majority of the members and candidate
members of the Central Committee Politbureau
(15 out of 25) and the CPC Central Committee
(145 out of 279); this did not include persons who
formerly served in the army or were closely
connected with it. The Congress advanced as a
programme slogan the preparation for war and
approved the Maoist thesis on militarising the
country. The Party Rules adopted by the Congress
proclaim "Mao Tse-tung's thought" to be
Marxism-Leninism of the modern epoch. Though the
Maoists use the term "democratic centralism"
quite often in the official press, in reality all their
activity is aimed at abolishing inner-party
democracy and establishing barracks rules in the party.
The Party Rules in effect envisaged the creation,
under the name of the Communist Party of China,
of a new political organisation which would serve
as an obedient tool of the military-bureaucratic
dictatorship.
 However, the formation of such an organisation

dragged out in the face of serious difficulties. Thus
Peking propagandists are forced to return once
again to the question of "streamlining and
upbuilding the party organisations,'' "cleaning up the
57
party,'' etc. On the eve of the 50th anniversary of

the Communist Party of China the work of
forming provincial party committees was stepped up,
although many district and other local party
organizations had not yet been established. The
delegates to the conferences (called ``congresses'' by the
Chinese press) which form provincial party
committees were in fact appointed by the heads of the
respective "revolutionary committees.'' The latter
became the leaders of the new party
committeesnearly all of them being representatives of the
army.
 One indication that the petty-bourgeois

nationalists are running into difficulties is the fact that
they are forced to restore the former organisational
structure which was crushed during the "cultural
revolution" under their instructions. The party
Central Committee continues to exist, though only
formally, as does its Politbureau, and medium--
level and lower party links are being formed, though
slowly. They have been and are being "set up" by
methods far removed from the Marxist-Leninist
party norms. Their members are predominantly
servicemen, while the Politbureau includes people
closely connected with Mao Tse-tung (his wife, his
private secretary, his former bodyguard, etc). But
this structure may come to play a positive part
should conditions in the party and the country
take a favourable turn. Besides, the present CPC
leadership is faced with the necessity of
reinstating some of the former party cadres, who were
persecuted or discredited during the "cultural
revolution.''
 Another indication of such difficulties

encountered by the Maoists is that despite the many years
of propaganda and mass ``brainwashing'' and the
58
``re-cducation" of the CPC members and party

functionaries in the "May 7 schools,'' which differ only
slightly from concentration camps, and the worst
manifestations of the personality cult, the attempt
to inculcate "Mao Tse-tung's thought" in the minds
of the Chinese Communists and the advanced
sections of the Chinese people has obviously met with
resistance. Only this can explain why, in the
conditions obtaining in the People's Republic of
China today, the Peking press has suddenly begun
pointing out the need to study the works of Marx,
Engels and Lenin. There is little doubt that the main
purpose of this ``study'' is to bolster the influence
of the petty-bourgeois, nationalist ideology-"Mao
Tse-tung's thought"-under the slogan of "
disseminating Marxism-Leninism.'' The People's
Republic of China has printed, along with Mao Tse-tung's
works, ten million copies of the works of Marx
and Lenin. This is, of course, a mere drop in the
ocean, considering the enormous population of the
People's Republic of China and the fact that
during the "cultural revolution" the number of copies
of Mao Tse-tung's ``quotations'' and other works
exceeded the astronomical figure of three thousand
million, and that the publication of Mao Tse-tung's
works is continuing.
 The resistance encountered by the Maoists in
implementing their plans testify to the unceasing
opposition offered by the healthy forces inside the
CPC. The true Communists of China are in a
difficult position now, but they are there, and in no
small number. They have the constructive
programme for China's development along the socialist
road and the decisions of the 8th CPC Congress,
which the 9th Congress had nothing to counter
with.
59
 However complicated the present situation in

China may be, the resurgence of the Communist
Party of China as a party of the Marxist-Leninist
type, its reunification with the world communist
movement, the return of the People's Republic of
China to the road of scientific socialism and
friendship with the USSR, its cohesion with the socialist
community-these are objective demands of
Chinese society. All the more so since there remain
elements of the socialist basis in China. And despite
the fact that these surviving socialist elements in
the economy and social structure are neutralised
by the military-bureaucratic dictatorship and
deformed by the anti-socialist policy, so long as the
economic basis of society has not undergone
qualitative, radical changes, it can serve as the basis
for China's development in a positive direction.
 General Secretary of the CPSU Central

Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 1969
Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties: "We
do not identify the declarations and actions of the
present Chinese leadership with the aspirations,
wishes and true interests of the Communist Party
of China and the Chinese people. We are deeply
convinced that China's genuine national renascence
and its socialist development will be best served
not by struggle against the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, against the whole communist
movement, but by alliance and fraternal
cooperation with them.''
__*_*_*__
 The 50-year experience of the Communist Party

of China is highly instructive not only to the parties
functioning in countries whose level of
development is similar to that of China, but to the entire
60
communist movement. The main conclusion to be
drawn from this experience is that a Communist
Party must constantly strengthen its combat
efficiency. Lenin stressed, when speaking of the need
for a determined struggle against the forces and
traditions of the old society: "The force of habit
in millions and tens of millions is a most
formidable force. Without a party of iron that has been
tempered in the struggle, a party enjoying the
confidence of all honest people in the class in
question, a party capable of watching and
influencing the mood of the masses, such a struggle
cannot be waged successfully.''~^^1^^
 The fate of the Communist Party of China

confirms once again Lenin's thesis that the struggle
".. .against the most deep-rooted petty-bourgeois
national prejudices, looms ever larger with the
mounting exigency of the task of converting the
dictatorship of the proletariat from a national
dictatorship (i.e., existing in a single country and
incapable of determining world politics) into an
international one (i.e., a dictatorship of the
proletariat involving at least several advanced countries,
and capable of exercising a decisive influence upon
world politics as a whole).''~^^2^^ These words deserve
special attention in our time when the world
socialist system is emerging as a decisive factor in
mankind's development.
 Maoism as an ideological and political trend is

essentially hostile to Marxism-Leninism; it
substitutes sophistry and eclecticism for materialist
dialectics and voluntarism, for a materialist
interpretation of history. A parasite drawing sustenance
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 31, pp. 44--45.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 148.
61
from socialist ideology, this trend in effect denies

the guiding role of the working class in the
socialist transformation of society, the role of the
Communist Party as the vanguard of the working class,
and in every way belittles the role of the masses
in history. While employing anti-imperialist
verbiage the Maoists are in fact opposed to the
international communist movement; they engage in
subversive activities against the Marxist-Leninist
parties and seek to force their nationalist
programme on the latter.
 That is why in waging a struggle against
Maoism one must proceed from an awareness of the
incompatibility of the aims of Maoism as a form of
social-chauvinism with the aims of the world
communist and liberation movement, with the basic
principles of Marxism-Leninism concerning
socialist construction, international affairs and
revolutionary strategy and tactics. The defence of
violence and overestimation of the power of the bayonet,
great-power chauvinism and claims for world
hegemony, the so-called revolution in the sphere of
superstructure, which means substitution of a
military-bureaucratic dictatorship for the people's
democratic social system, and militarisation of
society-all this has nothing in common with
scientific socialism.
 That is why the 24th CPSU Congress fully

approved the principled Leninist line and the
concrete steps taken by the CPSU Central Committee and
the Soviet Government in Soviet-Chinese relations.
It noted: "In a situation in which the Chinese
leaders came out with their own specific ideological--
political platform, which is incompatible with
Leninism, and which is aimed against the socialist
countries and at creating a split of the international
62
communist and the whole anti-imperialist

movement, the CC CPSU has taken the only correct
stand-a stand of consistently defending the
principles of Marxism-Leninism, utmost strengthening
of the unity of the world communist movement,
and protection of the interests of our socialist
Motherland.''
 Our party, all Soviet people firmly reject the

slanderous fabrications of the Chinese
propagandists with regard to the policy of the CPSU and the
Soviet Government, borrowed from the arsenal of
Chiang Kai-shek clique and other anti-communist
fanatics.
 At the same time the 24th Congress confirmed

the CPSU's course of normalising relations between
the USSR and the PRC, of restoring good--
neighbourly relations and friendship between the
Soviet and Chinese peoples.
 On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the

Chinese Communist Party Soviet Communists send
fraternal greetings to the Communists and
working people of China. The Soviet people are
convinced that ultimately good-neighbourly relations and
friendship will be restored between the USSR and
the People's Republic of China, since this meets
the basic interests of the Chinese and Soviet
peoples, the interests of the world socialist system, of
the revolutionary, liberation movement of all the
oppressed, the interests of universal peace.
 Kommunist, No. 10, 1971
[63]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Concerning
 the 50th Anniversary
 of the Communist Party of China
 I. Alexandrov
 Half a century ago, on July 1, 1921, the

inaugural congress of the Communist Party of China
(CPC) took place in Shanghai. It proclaimed the
foundation of the Communist Party of China, a
proletarian party of a new type. The congress
documents stated that the Party's aim was to bring
about the dictatorship of the proletariat, build
socialism and fight for communism, and that the
Party was connected with the Communist
International.
 Since then the CPC has traversed a long and

thorny path. It headed the struggle of the Chinese
people for national and social liberation, led them
to the victory of the revolution, and directed
China along the socialist road of development. The
Party was able to fulfil this task because the
Communists, guided by the great Marxist-Leninist
teaching, expressed the aspirations of the people and
waged an unremitting struggle against
imperialism, the compradore bourgeoisie and feudal lords,
against petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, left-wing
and right-wing deviations, chauvinism and
nationalism. The Marxist-Leninist, internationalist--
minded members of the Party constantly fought against
the petty-bourgeois, nationalist forces to bring
about the triumph of the ideals of scientific
communism.
64
I</h3>
 The founding of the Communist Party of China
was a result of the stepped-up political activity of
the rising working class and the upsurge of the
revolutionary democratic and national-liberation
movement in the country in the wake of the Great
October Socialist Revolution and the successes of
young Soviet Russia.
 Li Ta-chao, pioneer of Marxism in China and,

later on, a co-founder of the CPC and one of its
leading theorists, a Communist-internationalist,
said the following about the significance of the
October Revolution for China:
 ``We should greet the Russian revolution with

pride as the beacon of a new world civilisation.
We have to lend an attentive ear to the news from
new Russia which is being built on the principles
of freedom and humanism. Only then shall we
keep up with world progress.''
 In China, the struggle for social emancipation

of the working people was closely tied in with the
tasks of antinimperialist struggle. The main
obstacle to the revolution at the time was imperialism
which had made the country its semi-colony.
Lenin's view that capital is "an international force"
was confirmed in the course of the liberation
struggle which developed in China under the Party's
guidance. An international alliance of workers,
their international brotherhood, is needed to
vanquish this force, he wrote. The Communist Party
and the people of the Soviet Union, the world
communist and workers' movement became a reliable
ally for the CPC and the working people of China.
 The Communist International and the Soviet

Communists gave the Chinese revolutionaries the
5--193
65
necessary practical assistance in organising the

first Marxist groups which appeared in China
after the anti-imperialist "Fourth of May
Movement" of 1919, and in rallying them on the basis
of proletarian Marxist-Leninist ideology. The
decisions of the Second Congress of the Communist
International and Lenin's speeches at this congress
on the national and colonial questions served as an
impetus and ideological basis for the unification
of Chinese Marxist-revolutionaries. The
Communist International gave considerable assistance to
the Chinese revolutionaries in assimilating
Marxist-Leninist theory and the experience of the
Leninist Party of Bolsheviks.
 Right from the first the CPC found itself in the
crucible of the national-democratic revolution and
put forward an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal
programme. The period between the first and third
congresses of the CPC, that is prior to 1924, was
a period of Party organisational and ideological
growth. In 1922 the CPC was admitted to the
Communist International. At its Third Congress
(1923) the Party advanced the policy of building
a united national-revolutionary front with the
Kuomintang then headed by the great revolutionary
democrat Sun Yat-sen.
 The anti-imperialist action of the people, with

the working class as its chief force, kept
mounting in China. For this reason it became urgent for
the CPC to ensure proletarian hegemony in the
national revolution at that time. The Hong Kong
and Canton sailors' strike, the general strike of the
Shanghai workers, and the growth of the peasant
movement in the country showed that the
proletariat was the main support of the Party, the
vanguard of the revolution, and that the peasantry was
66
the principal ally of the proletariat, an ally without

whose support the victory of the revolution in
China was impossible.
 The counter-revolutionary coup staged in 1927

by the right wing of the Kuomintang headed by
Chiang Kai-shek led to the collapse of the united
front. The Communist Party of China and those
supporting it were subjected to bloody terror.
Hundreds of thousands of sons and daughters of
the Chinese people were victimised. Among those
who perished were such outstanding leaders of the
CPC as Hsiang Chung-fa and Chu Chiu-po, CPC
Central Committee General Secretaries,- Peng Pai,
a prominent leader of the peasant movement;
Chang Tai-lei, CPC leader and organiser of the
Young Communist League of China; Su
Chaocheng, leader of the famous Canton Commune, and
Fang Chih-min, founder of one of the first
revolutionary bases of the CPC.
 Another feature that complicated the situation

was the right-wing deviation that developed in the
CPC at the time. It led to undermining the Party's
ties with the masses, hampered making use of the
experience of the world communist movement and
implementing Comintern recommendations. The
Sixth CPC Congress (1928), convened at such a
critical time for the Party, discussed the tasks of the
Party in the new situation. The Congress
resolutions were elaborated with a view to the
international experience of the revolutionary movement
and dealt with basic problems such as the strategy
and tactics of developing the agrarian revolution,
the building of the armed forces and the
establishment of strongholds in the rural areas. The
directive worked out by the Congress defined ways of
developing the Chinese revolution.
67
 The late twenties and first half of the 30's again
proved quite complex for the Party. The
Communists were constantly persecuted by the
reactionaries. In the Party proper petty-bourgeois elements
became active and in the mid-30's seized the key
Party positions.
 The Chiang Kai-shekites launched terror against

the CPC, while conducting an anti-Soviet
campaign, followed by armed provocations on the
Soviet-Chinese frontier. The Chinese Communist--
internationalists resolutely exposed the reactionary
meaning of Chiang Kai-shek's slogan calling for
war against the Soviet Union and slanderously
trying to accuse the USSR of "red imperialism.''
 Everyone is aware of the disaster which befell

the Chinese people as a result of this counter--
revolutionary policy. Subsequent events showed that
every time the enemies of China, the enemies of
socialism inside the country attempted to weaken
the revolutionary movement, to make it deviate
from the right course, they inevitably whipped up
a wave of anti-Sovietism. Such was the case in the
years of the struggle for the liberation of China.
The same was true of nationalist and bourgeois
elements later on.
 In that trying period for the CPC, the Soviet

Communists initiated a mighty international
movement in defence of the Chinese patriots. The
Comintern called upon all the Communists of the
world to render "every kind of support to the
Chinese revolution.''
 The Japanese imperialist aggression against

China caused a reshuffling of forces in the
country, and made the question of saving the nation
paramount. Speaking at the Comintern in 1936,
68
G. Dimitrov stressed that the task of the CPC, was

to "achieve unification of the overwhelming
majority of the Chinese people against the Japanese
invaders.'' The CPC Central Committee took the
initiative in establishing a united anti-Japanese front.
This slogan conformed to the main interests of the
Chinese people and, because of its importance in
the anti-Japanese struggle, the CPC became a
very influential national force.
 The war against Japan was long and hard. The
defeat of Hitlerite fascism and Japanese
militarism made possible China's final liberation from
the Japanese invaders. The decisive part in
winning victory over these ultra-reactionary forces of
imperialism was played by the Soviet Union. This
provided highly favourable conditions for the
victory of the people's revolutions in a number of
countries of Europe and Asia, including China. The
liberation mission of the Soviet Union in the Far
East, the routing of Japan's crack Kwangtung
Army, the liberation of Manchuria with the active
participation of the troops of the Mongolian
People's Republic, the Chinese and Korean
guerrillasall this resulted not only in the surrender of Japan
and ridding China of the foreign yoke, but also
predetermined the possibilities for the subsequent
defeat of the Chiang Kai-shekites. Thanks to the
Soviet Union, US intervention of China was
prevented.
 The military-revolutionary base set up by the

Chinese Communists with the assistance of the
Soviet Army and Soviet civilian specialists in
Manchuria greatly contributed to the victory of the
Chinese revolution. This was the bridgehead from
which the completely reorganised, trained and
rearmed National Liberation Army under the
69
leadership of the Communist Party of China drove out

the Kuomintang reactionaries from China.
 The victory of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal

democratic revolution in China was a major event
which greatly influenced world development. The
success of that revolution marked the victory of
Marxism-Leninism in China. International
solidarity, the close ties of Chinese revolutionaries with
the international communist and working-class
movement, the assistance rendered by the Soviet
Union and other countries of the world socialist
system ensured the victory of the Chinese people,
the Chinese workers, peasants and intelligentsia in
the many-year selfless struggle they had waged
under the leadership of the Communist Party of
China.
II</h3>
 The victory of the revolution paved the way for

the Chinese people to radical political, social and
economic transformations. The objective
requirements of the further development of the revolution,
with China taking the socialist road, as well as the
threat posed by imperialism, made it imperative
for China to establish the closest friendly ties with
the USSR and other socialist countries which could
render the PRC the necessary political, military
and economic support and assistance.
 True to the great principles of proletarian,

socialist internationalism, the CPSU and the Soviet
people, just as during the years of revolutionary
struggle, rendered the Chinese people all the
necessary support in building socialism. With the
assistance of the USSR more than 250 large modern
industrial enterprises and other projects were built
70
in China. As the leaders of the CPC admitted, these

enterprises became "the backbone of China's
industry.'' "The assistance of the Soviet Union in the
economic construction of our country," Jenmin
jihpao wrote at that time, "both quantitatively and
in scale is unprecedented in history.''
 During the first decade following the founding

of the PRC, the basis of socialism was laid in the
country-an economic basis which provided
opportunities for further socialist construction.
 The 8th CPC Congress, held in 1956 under the

banner of strengthening the Marxist-Leninist
forces in the Party, occupies a special place in the
Party's history, in the life of the Chinese people.
It confirmed the general line of building socialism
in close alliance with the countries of the world
socialist system.
 The 8th CPC Congress gave a principled rebuff
to the nationalist and chauvinist tendencies in
ideology and policy which had been manifested in the
Party and the country. In the "Fundamental
Theses of the Programme" of the CPC Rules adopted
by the Congress, the ideological-theoretical
foundation of the Party was resolutely stressed: "The
Communist Party of China is guided in its
activities by Marxism-Leninism.''
 Having mapped out concrete ways and means

of continuing socialist transformations and having
determined the major tasks in developing the
country's national economy, the 8th Congress stressed
that the basic aim of the Party's entire activities
is "the fullest satisfaction of the material and
cultural requirements of the life of the people.''
 In the foreign policy sphere the Congress

defined as the major task the need "to continue to
strengthen and consolidate the eternal and
71
inviolable fraternal friendship with the great Soviet

Union and all People's Democracies.''
 Aware of the complex tasks of socialist

construction facing the Party and the country, and
mindful of the lessons of CPC development, the
Congress urged the Party to be vigilant and resolutely
combat all manifestations of great-power
chauvinism and petty-bourgeois nationalist ideology. The
resolution of the Eighth Congress read: "If we
submit to the influence of non-proletarian ideology,
display conceit and complacency, fancy ourselves
infallible, and stop learning with all modesty, we
shall, as before, fail to avoid the evil of
subjectivism.'' Further developments showed how timely
this warning was.
 Nurturing plans which were entirely at variance

with the line of the Eighth Congress, the
greatpower nationalist elements within the CPC
considered the time was not ripe to implement them and,
concealing their true intentions, had to vote for
the basic propositions of the Congress. Later on,
however, Mao Tse-tung and his following took
action to scuttle the Congress decisions. They opened
the lock-gate to the surging wave of petty--
bourgeois pressure on the Party and the working class.
Capitalising on the Chinese people's desire to build
socialism in the shortest possible space, advocates
of this course used ``left''-revolutionary slogans to
plunge the country into the voluntarist "great
leap" experiments. At the 1959 Lushan Plenum of
the CPC Central Committee, Marxist-Leninist
forces in the Communist Party of China characterised
this line as an expression of "petty-bourgeois
fanaticism,'' for which even then the Chinese people
had paid dearly.
 The nationalist group in the CPC leadership
72
kept enforcing their own platform on the Party

and the country. By working up nationalist and
jingoist sentiments, they sought to gear Chinese
home and foreign policies to the attainment of
hegemonic aims in the international arena.
 The present leaders of the Communist Party of

China spoke out against the world communist
movement line jointly evolved by communist and
workers' Parties, the CPC included. They put forth
their own ideological and political platform,
inconsistent with Leninism on major questions
concerning international affairs and socialist
upbuilding. Since the CPSU and other fraternal parties
upholding Marxism-Leninism had effectually
thwarted all attempts to revise this science from
``left''-opportunist and nationalist positions, the
Peking leadership launched an unprecedented
smear campaign and subversive activity against
our Party and other fraternal parties. This activity
was extended to include not only the socialist
system and the communist movement but also the
entire anti-imperialist front.
 Such a policy evoked opposition in the CPC

ranks and among the vast masses of the Chinese
people. To do away with this opposition, Mao
Tsetung and his followers started a fight against
Marxist-Leninist, internationalist cadres within the
CPC, against politically-conscious workers,
peasants and intellectuals. This was the primary goal
of the "cultural revolution" which dealt the CPC a
telling blow and during which many outstanding
Party veterans and hundreds of thousands of
Communists fell victim to reprisals.
 At the 9th Congress of the CPC Mao Tse-tung

and his entourage tried to legalise their home and
foreign policy line, which in essence was hostile
73
to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism, and to make it an enduring programme.
Speaking about the construction of socialism in
China they, at the same time, came up with the
thesis on the `ìmpossibility'' of the victory of
socialism before the triumph of the world revolution.
Breaking away from Marxist-Leninist principles of
socialist construction they made the task of "
preparing for war" and turning the entire country into
a military camp the goal of China's economic
development and the country's socio-political life.
Militant anti-Sovietism became a programmatic
task.
 The objective laws of socio-economic

development, as well as the basic interests of the Chinese
people require a genuinely socialist policy based
on the principles of scientific communism.
 However, the economic foundations of socialism,

laid in the first decade of the PRC, are now
subjected to dangerous deformation as a result of the
policy pursued by the present Chinese leadership
who seek to place the country's resources at the
service of their great-power and hegemonic aims.
This policy imperils the socialist gains of the
Chinese people and impedes the country's progress.
 The attempts of the present Chinese leadership

to cast aspersions on the experience of the USSR
and other fraternal parties, and statements made
against the socialist community create additional
obstacles to building socialism in China.
 As to hostile fabrications concerning CPSU

policy and the Soviet state, they are resolutely
rejected by the Soviet people. It is all the more harmful
to sow discord between the USSR and China when
the imperialists are stepping up hostile activities
against the socialist countries and freedom-loving
74
peoples. US imperialism and Japanese militarism

nurture aggressive plans against China as well as
the USSR. Therefore, the policy of using anti--
Sovietism to flirt with imperialism, of supporting
territorial claims of the Japanese revanchists
encourages the reactionary circles of the United States,
Japan and other imperialist powers and harms the
anti-imperialist front. Now, more than ever before,
the situation in the world and in Asia demands
solidarity and joint action of all anti-imperialist and
revolutionary forces. This was stressed again at
the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and
Workers' Parties. The trend of present-day world
development fully confirms the urgency and great
importance of this conclusion.
III</h3>
 The Soviet people and our Communist Party

have regarded and continue to regard the
development of friendship and cooperation with the
Chinese people and the Chinese Communists as an
important prerequisite for strengthening the positions
of world socialism and promoting the unity of the
international communist movement and the entire
anti-imperialist front.
 It is precisely this that determines the principled

and consistent line of the CPSU and the Soviet
state in relation to China. This policy, its aims and
essence were clearly described in the decisions of
the 23rd and 24th Congresses of our Party, at
plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee and
in speeches by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
75
 After thoroughly analysing questions pertaining

to Sino-Soviet relations, the 24th CPSU Congress
fully approved and confirmed the principled
Leninist course and concrete steps taken by the CPSU
Central Committee and the Soviet Government
with regard to Soviet-Chinese relations. When
Chinese leaders advanced their ideological-political
platform which is incompatible with Leninism and
spearheaded against the socialist countries and at
splitting the international communist movement
and the anti-imperialist movement in general, the
CPSU Central Committee took to the position of
consistently upholding the principles of
MarxismLeninism, making every effort to strengthen the
unity of the world communist movement and
protecting the interests of the socialist community of
nations.
 At the same time, the CPSU is firmly against

carrying over existing serious ideological
differences to inter-state relations. It strives to normalise
relations between the USSR and the PRC, and does
everything to restore the good-neighbourly,
friendly relations between the Soviet and Chinese
peoples.
 The CPSU proceeds from the assumption that
the objective requirements of China's
socialistoriented development provide opportunities for
this normalisation. The long-term vital interests
of the peoples of the USSR and China do not clash;
on the contrary, they make it imperative to restore
and develop their cooperation and friendship.
 The numerous constructive steps for normalising

relations with the PRC which were taken by the
CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet
Government, are widely known and approved of.
76
 Soon after the meeting of the heads of

government of the two countries held in Peking in 1969
on the initiative of the USSR, Soviet-Chinese talks
on border questions began. Taking a constructive
approach to this matter, the Soviet side proposes
that measures be taken to promote mutual
understanding and a final solution of all border disputes
be achieved by concluding a new border treaty.
However, in order for the talks to be successful
both partners must show goodwill and seek to
reach an agreement.
 Of late the PRC Government, too, has made

statements to the effect that ideological
differences "should not interfere with the maintenance of
state relations between China and the Soviet Union
on the basis of the five principles of peaceful
coexistence.'' We take into consideration the statements
by the Chinese side of their willingness not to
carry over ideological differences to inter-state
relations.
 Expressing the will of our Party and the people,

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in the Report of the
CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress:
 ``We shall never forsake the national interests of

the Soviet state. The CPSU will continue tirelessly
to work for the cohesion of the socialist countries
and the world communist movement on a
MarxistLeninist basis. At the same time, our Party and the
Soviet Government are deeply convinced that an
improvement in relations between the Soviet Union
and the People's Republic of China would be in
line with the fundamental, long-term interests of
both countries, the interests of socialism, the
freedom of the peoples, and stronger peace. That is
why we are prepared in every way to help not
only to normalise relations but also to restore
77
neighbourliness and friendship between the Soviet Union

and the People's Republic of China and express the
confidence that this will eventually be achieved.''
This just and constructive stand of the CPSU
and the Soviet state in relation to the PRC meets
with the understanding and approval of fraternal
socialist countries, communist and workers' parties,
all progressive and peace-loving forces, including
the Chinese people.
__*_*_*__
 The difficult half-century road of the Communist

Party of China confirms that Marxism-Leninism
alone equips the revolutionaries with a clear
understanding of the objective laws and trends of
social development and a scientific approach to
evolving strategy and tactics in the struggle for the
transformation of the world and the construction
of socialism and communism. Fidelity to
MarxismLeninism and proletarian internationalism
guarantees the success of the activities of the Communists.
Inversely, when a detachment of the world
communist movement departs from these principles it
is doomed to defeat and harms the common cause
of the world army of the Communists.
 Chinese Communist-internationalists have

invariably stressed that unity with the CPSU, the
Soviet Union and the international communist
movement is of vital importance for the victory
of the revolution and successful advancement
along the road of socialism. On the 50th
anniversary of the Communist Party of China, the
Soviet Communists, the Soviet people pay their
respects to the heroism and selflessness of the
78
Chinese Communists, to all who, fighting for the

implementation of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism
and proletarian internationalism, have not spared
and do not spare efforts for the Chinese
revolution to triumph, for China's advancement along
the road of progress and socialism.
 Pravda, July 1, 1971
[79]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Renunciation of the Principles
 of Marxism-Leninism
 APROPOS OF THE PARTY RULES ADOPTED AT
 THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST
 PARTY OF CHINA
 N. Lomdkin and N. Petrovichev
 The International Conference of Communist

and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in June
1969 was a major success of the communist,
working-class and liberation movements. It was
an important step towards greater international
cohesion of Communists on the principles of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
 Immense importance attaches to the conclusion

made at the Conference to the effect that
Communists must consistently uphold their principles,
work for the triumph of Marxism-Leninism and,
depending on the specific situation, combat right
and ``left'' opportunist distortions of theory and
policy, and adopt an uncompromising stand
against revisionism, dogmatism and ``left'' sectarian
adventurism. Fidelity to Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism is a vital condition
for the correct orientation and successful
activity of the Communist and Workers' Parties.
 The harm that can be inflicted on the world

communist movement by a departure from
Marxism-Leninism and a rupture with
internationalism is shown by the actions of the present
leadership of the Communist Party of China. This
80
was thoroughly analysed at the Conference by

L. I. Brezhnev, who led the CPSU delegation.
"Almost ten years ago,'' he said, "Mao Tse-tung
and his supporters mounted an attack on the
principles of scientific communism. In its
numerous statements on questions of theory the CPC
leadership has step by step revised the principled
line of the communist movement. In opposition
to this it has laid down a special line of its own
on all the fundamental questions of our day.. .
 ``The facts show that the Chinese leadership

speaks of struggle against imperialism while in
fact helping the latter, directly or indirectly, by
everything it does. It helps the imperialists by
seeking to split the united front of the socialist
states. It helps them by its incitement and its
obstructions to relaxation of international tension
at| ttmes of acute international crises. It helps
them by striving to hamper the emergence of a
broad anti-imperialist front, by seeking to split
the international mass organisations of youth,
women and scientists, the peace movement, the
trade union movement, and so on.
 ``Naturally, the imperialists make the most of

Peking's present orientation in the field of
foreign policy as a trump in their political struggle
against world socialism and the liberation
movement.''
 The actions of the CPC leaders were also

criticised by the heads of delegations from the
absolute majority of other Parties represented at
the Conference.
 It is a pity that the CPC leadership did not want

to listen to this criticism. They continue to stand
in the way of the unity of the socialist countries,
unity based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
6---193
81
internationalism, and are not giving up their

attempts to split the international communist and
working-class movement. The propaganda put out
by the Chinese leaders is grist to the mill of the
reactionary, imperialist forces striving to break up
the community of the socialist countries.
 The erroneous and harmful tenets of the

Maoists and their anti-Leninist line were given the
status of official Party policy at the Ninth
Congress of the CPC, which was held last year. In
effect, the character of the decisions passed by
that Congress was predetermined by the
artificially created situation in which the Congress
itself was prepared and held. In the course of the
"cultural revolution" the lawfully elected leading
Party organs were uprooted. The "revolutionary
committees" headed by the military took over
the management of Party affairs. The old Party
cadres and all who disagreed with the Maoist
line or doubted that it was correct were defamed,
put on the list of the "black gang,'' and
subjected to mockery and repressions. Everything was
done to foster a turbid wave of anti-Sovietism
and nationalistic passion. In a situation like this
there naturally could be no question of a free
discussion of questions worrying the Party and
the country.
 Delegates to the Ninth Congress were not

elected but nominated from among the Maoists.
There are grounds for stating that this was not
a regular congress of the Communist Party of
China, which has fine revolutionary traditions,
but the first congress of a new political
organisation called upon to serve China's military--
bureaucratic leadership. This is admitted, though
indirectly, by the Maoists themselves. How else is one
82
to interpret, for instance, their official slogan:

"Long live the great victory of the Ninth All--
China Congress of the Communist Party of China"?
A victory over whom or over what? All the
indications are that this is a victory over the Party's
healthy forces, over those who make the Party a
Marxist-Leninist organisation that had once
occupied a prominent place and enjoyed recognition in
the world communist and working-class
movements.
 A new situation fraught with serious negative

consequences for the cause of communism has
thus arisen. Marxist-Leninists, naturally, cannot
fail to see this or pass it over in silence. They
feel that their duty is to expose the anti-Leninist,
anti-popular essence of the Maoists' ideological
and political concepts.
 New Party Rules were adopted at the Ninth

Congress of the CPC. There is, of course,
nothing unusual in the very fact that new Rules have
been adopted. Every revolutionary party bases
its activity on the two main documents-the
Programme and Rules. The Programme
determines the nature of the Party, and clearly sets
out and scientifically substantiates its aims. The
Rules define the Party's organisational principles,
the norms of its inner life and the methods of
work used by Party organisations. There is a
close link between the Programme and the Rules.
While the Programme is the foundation of the
Party's ideological unity, the Rules are the
foundation of its organisational cohesion. Without
organisational unity there cannot be ideological
unity and, conversely, ideological unity is
inconceivable without organisational unity.
6*
83
 In working out a more or less long-term

strategic line, each Marxist-Leninist party sees to it
that its organisational forms, the rules
governing its life and the methods used in its
practical work conform to the new political tasks and
ensure their fulfilment. Therefore, from time to
time Communist and Workers' Parties amend or
supplement the operating Rules or adopt new
Rules.
 Life introduces corrections into the specific

forms of the parties' organisational make-up and
into the methods of work employed by them, and
this must be reflected and recorded in their Rules.
Organisationally, in the choice of the forms
and methods of its work and in its entire
political activity, the Party relies on revolutionary
theory r.id on a comprehensive and thorough
analysis of coucrel? historical conditions.
 Soviet Communists know from their own ex- |

perience how important it is to make sure that I
the Party Rules and the provisions recorded in I
it should conform to the requirements of the day '
and enable the Party to successfully carry out its
tasks. For that reason they understand the
concern that the fraternal parties show for this I
problem.
I
 In the case of the Communist Party of China,

this is a particularly pressing problem for a
number of reasons. We shall recall only two
circumstances. First, although nearly fifty years have
passed since the CPC was founded, it has no
Programme to this day and this adds weight to its
Rules as the only basic Party document. Second,
in flagrant violation of the Rules operating earlier,
no Party Congress was convened for thirteen years.
Consequently, it is important to enhance the role
84
of the Rules and introduce into them provisions

that would prevent violations of inner-Party
democracy and serve as a guarantee that the
principles and norms of Party life are strictly
observed by all its members.
 This is the approach that should be taken if
the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the party is
used as the guideline.
 What, in fact, are the new CPC Rules that have
been adopted at the Ninth Congress? A close
scrutiny provides grounds for saying that they
flagrantly contravene the Marxist-Leninist
teaching on the party and run counter to the views of
the Communists on the questions of party
development. In all respects the new Rules are not
an improvement of but a step back from the
former Rules, which were passed in 1956 by the
Eighth Congress of the CPC. They constitute a
direct retreat from the Marxist-Leninist positions
that were adopted by that Congress. The Rules
have been reinterpreted with numerous additions
so as to turn the party into an obedient tool of
the present leadership for carrying out their
greatpower, chauvinistic policies.
 In the former Rules of the CPC the first

section was headed "Fundamental Provisions of the
Programme.'' It gave a definition of the Party
and the cardinal principles underlying its
development. It outlined the ways and means of
achieving socialist transformations in China and
named the tasks that had to be carried out in
the sphere of industrialisation, agriculture, science
and culture and in the matter of attaining a
higher standard of living. Tasks were
formulated also with regard to the national relations, and
it was emphasised that "particular attention must
85
be paid to preventing and surmounting

greatHan chauvinism.'' On the whole, this section
actually filled the void caused by the absence of
a Programme. In the new Rules, this section has
been cut by two-thirds. If we bear in mind that
the Communist Party of China has no
Programme, this curtailment is in itself puzzling, to say
the least. Moreover, the content of the new
section upsets everything worthy of description as
a Marxist party.
 The new Rules of the CPC actually endorse

the hegemonistic, divisive, anti-Soviet foreign
policy of its present leadership. The former Rules
stated: "The Party bends every effort to promote
and strengthen friendship with the camp of peace,
democracy and socialism headed by the Soviet
Union.''
 The new Rules declare that the CPC "unites
with genuinely Marxist-Leninist parties" and
jointly with them fights to defeat imperialism
headed by the USA, and modern revisionism,'' it
being understood that the Chinese leaders regard
the "Soviet revisionists" as the hub of this
revisionism. Everybody knows what the Maoists
mean by "genuinely Marxist-Leninist parties.''
These are the divisive, subversive groups set
up by them in various countries and consisting
of renegades and turncoats who act on their
instructions. Although they are numerically weak
and ill-assorted, they have inflicted quite a lot
of harm on the world communist movement, and
for this they are lavishly praised by Peking. The
Peking leaders classify as ``revisionists'' the
overwhelming majority of the Communist and
Workers' Parties adhering to Marxism-Leninism and
86
rejecting the theoretically untenable and

politically erroneous and harmful Maoist tenets.
 They accuse the Communist Parties of France,

India, the United States of America, Italy,
Latin America and many others of the deadly
sins of ``revisionism'' and "apostasy.'' Naturally,
they make every effort to slander the Communist
Parties of many socialist countries, above all,
the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee,
which they regard as enemy No. 1. Matters have
reached a point where the Chinese leaders place
in the same category imperialism and the Soviet
Union, the country that blazed the road to
socialism and is now leading the way to
communism. Barefaced, undisguised anti-Sovietism is one
of the major if not the key element of Maoist
foreign policy.
 Many of the participants in the 1969

International Conference of Communist and Workers'
Parties denounced this line of the Peking
leadership. They underscored the colossal role that the
Soviet Union and the CPSU had played in the
historic battle against imperialism, for the triumph
of the cause of peace, national liberation,
democracy and socialism.
 The present CPC leaders see our Leninist Party

as being the main obstacle standing in the way of
their hegemonistic ambitions. That is why they
have specially written anti-Sovietism into the Rules
as official party policy. Though, formerly, the
Chinese leadership was also free-handed in its
anti-Soviet attacks, now it has received even
greater freedom of action-the new Rules allow
opposition to and open acts of hostility against the
CPSU and other communist and workers' parties.
 The new Rules of the CPC revise the Party's
87
ideological and theoretical foundations and

replace Marxism-Leninism with Maoism. It was
stated in the former Rules: "In its activity the
Communist Party of China is guided by
Marxism-Leninism. Only Marxism-Leninism correctly
explains the laws of social development and
correctly indicates the ways of building socialism
and communism.'' In the new Rules it is
recorded: "The Communist Party of China is guided
by Marxism-Leninism and the thought of
MaoTse-tung as its theoretical foundation
determining its ideals. The thought of Mao Tse-tung is
the Marxism-Leninism of the epoch when
imperialism moves to its total collapse and socialism
advances towards victory throughout the world.''
Although the words ``Marxism-Leninism'' are used
there this is nothing more than camouflage. The
only reason they are used is to delude people
inexperienced in politics and ease the transition from
Marxism-Leninism to Maoism.
 There is not the least doubt that it is a

question of precisely such a transition. What else
explains the fact that the provision in the Rules
about the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" is
assessed by Chinese propaganda as a "great victory of
the cultural revolution"? Mentioning
MarxismLeninism in order to distract attention, the
authors of the new Rules give it an interpretation
Which emasculates it completely. In their view,
which is recorded in the Rules, Mao Tse-tung
"inherited, upheld and developed Marxism--
Leninism, and raised it to a new level.'' The
purpose of these and similar arguments is starkly
clear: Maoism is the modern Marxism-Leninism
and is, therefore, the guide. Marx and Lenin
belong to the past. In the world today there is
88
only one "leader,'' Mao, and one has to follow

him without burdening oneself with thoughts
about where and how he will lead.
 Of course, Marxism-Leninism is by no means
a fossilised teaching. As no other theory it is
linked with life, with the working-class and
national-liberation movements, with the struggle for
socialism and communism. As a science, it
demands that it should be treated as such, that it
should be constantly developed and advanced. But
the Marxist-Leninist teaching has nothing in
common with a revision of its basic propositions, with
attempts to evolve national variants.
 Such attempts are leading to the rejection of

Marxism-Leninism as an integral science of the
laws of social development, of the construction of
socialism and communism. They destroy the very
foundation of the internationalist unity of the
international communist and working-class
movement, breaking it up into national "islands.''
 Having invented "Sinoised Marxism,'' the

present Chinese leaders have thereby made it
clear that ``conventional'' Marxism, i.e.,
Marxism in its true and generally accepted sense, does
not suit them. They have gone even further,
declaring that the thought of Mao Tse-tung is
the "summit of Marxism-Leninism of our epoch.''
However, no subterfuges over wording can
conceal the obvious fact that the "thought of
MaoTse-tung" is a glaring contradiction of
MarxismLeninism.
 The new Rules of the CPC officially propagate

the personality cult, which is alien to
MarxismLeninism, in the Party and in the country as a
whole.
 It should be remembered that the report to the
89
8th CPC Congress on the changes in the Rules said

in part that the CPC "rejects the deification of a
personality as alien to its policies.'' The former
Rules stressed that "activities putting the
personality above the party" are inadmissible within the
party, that the party should be especially
concerned with "modesty and discretion.'' These lines
have disappeared from the new Rules which,
instead, now enthrone Mao Tse-tung as the leader
of the Communist Party of China. Not only is the
emperor named, but his successor also. "Comrade
Lin Piao,'' say the Rules "is always holding high
the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's ideas; he
is the most devoted and persistent adherent of the
proletarian revolutionary line of Comrade Mao
Tse-tung. Comrade Lin Piao is the closest
comrade-in-arms of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the
continuer of his cause.'' Thus, it is declared in
advance who is to `ìnherit'' and ``supervise'' the party.

 All of these statements of course, directly

contradict the scientific, materialistic teaching on the
question of personality and the role of parties,
classes and the people at large in history. As is
known, Marxism-Leninism accords to proletarian
parties and their leaders a high role in the struggle
for the revolutionary transformation of society.
Without a party and experienced leaders, the
working class is incapable of achieving success in the
struggle for the triumph of communist ideals. But
Marxism-Leninism bases its teaching on the
decisive role played by the working people in history,
at the same time paying tribute to those leaders
who correctly understand and express the basic
interests of the working class and all working
people. This is the cornerstone of the Marxist--
Leninist philosophy, of the communist outlook.
90
 In the past the Chinese leaders repeatedly

declared their fidelity to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine
on the decisive role of the working people in
social development. They proclaimed their belief in
the people. But later this line was abandoned and
a new policy emerged-one of unrestrained
glorification of the person of Mao Tse-tung who was
henceforward to be reverently worshipped.
Immodesty and self-advertisment of the CPC leadership
know no bounds. Even the comparison of Mao
with the sun seems inadequate to some of his
worshippers for the sun shines only in the daytime,
while Mao Tse-tung "shines always.'' Anyone
guilty of casting the slightest doubt on the
infallibility of Mao or of glorifiying him with insufficient
zeal, is anathematised, described as a "black
revisionists" and persecuted. As for the mass of the
people, Mao Tse-tung said about them the
following: the Chinese people are "a blank sheet of
paper on which the most beautiful hieroglyphs can
be written and the most beautiful pictures drawn.''
And indeed the Maoists are busily ``writing'' and
``drawing'' for all they are worth. The multi--
million people with an ancient culture are looked
upon as being no more than an object of political
self-seeking. What is this if not an outrage against
everything that is sacred for all Communists, for
their ideology?
 In the new Rules of the CPC the provisions

on membership of the Party have been
drastically amended. The purpose of these amendments
is to renew the Party's composition in the
direction desired by the Maoists. It is suggested that
those "who fail to reform after educational work
has been conducted with them" should be forced
to leave the Party, and that "the Party
91
organisations should be constantly improved by

removing the unworthy and enlisting the new.''
Facts show that the words "removing the
unworthy" are directed not against actual class
enemies but against people who do not share the
Maoist ideas, against those who can be
suspected of disloyalty to the aims of the Maoists.
People linked with "Soviet revisionism,'' i.e., those
who have preserved their friendly feelings
towards the Soviet Union and its Leninist Party,
are classified as the most dangerous.
 Proving the necessity of the so-called regulation

within the party, Lin Piao said, menacingly, at
the 9th CPC Congress: "Anyone who dares to
come forward against Chairman Mao Tse-tung and
against his ideas, no matter what the
circumstances, will be censured by the party and punished
by the whole country.''
 As regards the ruling on "enlisting the new,''

its meaning is elucidated by the simplified
procedures of admission to Party membership and
the introduction of new provisions opening the
floodgates to petty-bourgeois elements. In the
former Rules it was stated that only a person
who does not exploit the labour of others can
be a member of the CPC. Today this demand
has been deleted from the Rules, although in
China, according to the admission of the Maoists
themselves, its significance has not diminished to
this day. Under the present Rules the "Chinese
worker, poor peasant, lower middle peasant,
revolutionary serviceman or other revolutionary
element" can become a member of the CPC. One
can understand the purpose of this wording in
the Rules if one bears in mind that the Maoists
regard as genuine revolutionary elements the
92
hungweipings and tsaofans and all who
unquestioningly follow the Maoist chauvinistic, divisive,
anti-Soviet policy. This opens wide the door to
Party membership precisely for these elements
and allows the present CPC leadership to bring
into the Party the forces which it regards as its
mainstay.
 No data on the CPC's social composition or,

as a matter of fact, any other data
characterising the situation in the country have been
published for a long time. No information of this
kind is contained even in the documents of the
Ninth Congress of the CPC. It is known that
in 1957 the CPC had nearly 13 million members
of whom less than 14 per cent were workers.
There are grounds for believing that as a result
of the disbandment of workers' organisations and
the mass injection of "new blood" into the Party
through the admission of hungweipings and other
elements, this percentage is today even smaller.
The organisational principles of Marxism--
Leninism require that the Party should be built up
on a democratic foundation allowing for the
utmost encouragement of the initiative and activity
of Communists. In all questions of the Party's
policy and practical work, Party members should
have the decisive say. Lenin stressed that only
he is worthy of the lofty name of Communist who
independently ponders over his Party's destiny
and bears a personal responsibility for it.
 There was a time when in the CPC this was

recognised as an indispensable condition of the
Party's militancy. In the former Rules it was
stated, for example, that it was necessary "to
take effective measures to promote inner-Party
democracy and to encourage the activity and
93
creative initiative of all Party members.'' There

is not a word about this in the new Rules, where
the accent is on something quite different. In
effect, the purport of the amendments is to abolish
inner-Party democracy, enforce barrack practices
in the Party and turn Communists into
submissive, mechanical executors of the leadership's
instructions. To justify these amendments it is
stated that in China there "is a threat of subversion
from within and of aggression by the
imperialists and modern revisionism.''
 The demand that all Party members should be
absolutely, categorically and unconditionally true
to the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" creates an
atmosphere in the Party which leaves no room for
inner-Party democracy and a free exchange of
opinions. However, this is not all. Although, like
the old, the new Rules provide for convening
periodic congresses of the CPC, Party congresses
in the localities and Party meetings, they
contain the addition to the effect that "in special
cases they (congresses, meetings.-Author) may
be convened earlier or postponed.'' Nothing is
said about who has to decide on this and under
what circumstances this may be done. The door
is thus opened wide to arbitrary decisions, to a
``legal'' infringement of one of the key norms
of Party life. True, even when this reservation
was non-existent, the CPC leadership ignored the
provision in the Rules on the time-limit for
convening congresses and meetings, but now this
can be justified with references to the Rules.
 The former Rules envisaged a democratic

procedure for forming the Party's leading organs.
It stated: "Elections shall be held by secret
ballot, and the electors shall be ensured the right
94
to criticise, outvote or replace any candidate.''

In lieu of this provision, the current Rules
contain a deliberately loosely worded clause to the
effect that "the leading Party organs at all
levels shall be elected on the basis of democratic
consultations.'' Obviously, this can be
interpreted in any way and given any meaning, which
is evidently what the Maoists want.
 A new provision has been introduced, stating

that "the convocation of congresses and the
composition of the Party committees in the localities
and in the Army shall be approved by higher
Party organisations.'' This affords the Maoists
the possibility of manipulating the composition
of the leading Party organs at their own
discretion and appointing to leading positions persons
devoted to them. Significantly, the provisions on
central and local Party control commissions have
been deleted altogether. The setting up of Party
control agencies is no longer envisaged.
 There are clauses consolidating the position

held by Mao Tse-tung and his entourage in the
CPC. These clauses endow the Chairman of the
CC, his Deputy and the Standing Committee of
the CC Political Bureau (altogether five persons)
with virtually unlimited power. In particular, it
is stated in the Rules that "some necessary
compact and operational organs to conduct the
current work of the Party, the Government and the
Army are established under the guidance of the
Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Standing
Committee of the Political Bureau of the CC.'' The
purpose of this is, first, to justify antedatedly the
disbandment, in the course of the "cultural
revolution,'' of democratically elected Party
committees and the setting up of organs not
95
envisaged by the Rules, such as the notorious

headquarters for "cultural revolution" affairs, and, second,
to give the top leadership a free hand in the
future. If necessary, they will establish "compact
and operational" agencies legally and rely on
them in the struggle against any opposition.
 The position occuppied by ruling parties such

as that of the Communist Parties in socialist
countries requires that the forms and methods
of their work and the principles underlying their
leadership of state and public organisations should
be clearly denned in their Rules. This has
been done in the Rules of the CPSU and other
fraternal parties. The former Rules of the CPC
also contained the appropriate provisions, which
specified the functions of Party organs at all
levels, spoke clearly of the need to rule
collectively and denned the Party's relations with state
and public organisations. There were sections
headed "Party Groups of the Leadership in
NonParty Organisations" and "The Party and the
Young Communist League.'' None of these
provisions and sections is to be found in the new
Rules. Instead, there is a provision stating: "The
state organs of power of the dictatorship of the
proletariat, the People's Liberation Army as well
as the Young Communist League, the
revolutionary mass organisations of workers, poor
peasants, lowest middle peasants and Red Guards,
and other revolutionary mass organisations shall
be subordinate to the leadership of the Party.''
 It is hard to reconcile this provision with the

Marxist-Leninist teaching on the role played by
the Communist Party and the character of its
relations with state and public organisations.
Worded as an order it, too, serves the purpose of
96
placing all power in the hands of the Party

leadership with Mao at the head.
 Leninism teaches us that in exercising

political leadership of all state and public
organisations the Party does not have recourse to
administration by injunction and does not take over
their functions. Being the nucleus of socialist
society's political structure and coordinating and
directing the work of the mass organisations of
working people, the Communist Party at the
same time bends every effort to enable them to
operate with self-assurance and confidence within
the context of their rights and functions. This
means that in societies building socialism and
communism, along with the growth of the tasks to be
carried out, the upswing of the people's
activeness and the heightening of the Party's role, a
process is under way of the enhancement of the
role played by state and public organisations, and
of the development and improvement of socialist
democracy. This is one of the laws governing the
development of socialist society, and one of the
many laws the Maoists are grossly violating.
__*_*_*__
 The CPSU's point of departure is that the

Soviet and Chinese peoples have common basic
interests, and it is doing everything in its power
to sustain fraternal friendship between them. At
the same time, the Soviet Communists and all
other Marxist-Leninists consider it their duty to
wage an uncompromising struggle against the
divisive policy, great-power foreign-policy line
and anti-Leninist and anti-popular ideological and
political tenets of the Peking leaders.
7--193
97
 An analysis of the amendments introduced

into the Rules by the Ninth Congress as
compared with the Rules adopted by the Eighth
Congress shows that while formally retaining the
Party's former name, the CPC leadership is
steering towards the creation of a fundamentally
different political organisation. Underlying its
structure and activity are the personality cult, extreme
centralism, militarism and the renunciation of
inner-Party democracy. In its aims and tasks this
is a nationalistic and chauvinistic organisation
with pronounced anti-Soviet tendencies.
 In short, the new Rules of the CPC are an open

revision and abandonment of the Marxist--
Leninist principles of party development. The
future will show whether the CPC has the strength
to halt the process of degeneration, to resume the
positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism and to rejoin the united front
of the world's Communist and Workers' Parties.
This would conform to the vital interests of the
Chinese people and to the interests of the world
proletariat and the working people of all
countries.
 Kommunist, No. 4, 1970
[98]
__ALPHA_LVL1__
II
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Maoism: Its Ideological
 and Political Essence
[99]
__NOTE__ LVL2 moved from here one page (and one file) back.
 P. Fedoseyeu
 The course of world development and the

events in China clearly show the hostility
towards socialism and Marxism-Leninism of the
special ideological and political platform set
forth by the Chinese leadership on fundamental
issues of international life and the world
communist movement.
 The theoretical and practical activities of the
Maoists, their efforts to split the revolutionary
forces, and their great-power and hegemonic
ambitions do serious harm to the anti-imperialist
struggle, to the world communist and
workingclass movement, to the forces fighting for
democracy and national freedom and to the entire
cause of socialism and the social progress of
mankind.
 Strongly rebuffing Maoism, Marxist-Leninists

consider it necessary to expose completely its
ideological and political essence and its social
roots. Great attention was devoted to these
questions in the Report of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
delivered by Leonid Brezhnev to the 24th Party
Congress and in his speech at the International
Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in
Moscow in June, 1969. Communists all over the
world have studied these questions deeply and
are continuing to do so, as was shown by the
100
speeches of many other participants in the 1969

Meeting and as has also been demonstrated at
the Congresses of a number of fraternal Parties.
__*_*_*__
 The ruling core of the Maoists consists of a

rather narrow group of interdependent people,
who, in one form or another, are dependent on
Mao and his closest associates. This group
carefully conceals its real convictions and aims,
seeking to present Maoism as a certain "development
of Marxism in modern conditions.'' As one can
see, Mao and the Maoist leadership need this
kind of camouflage to confuse the issue of the
social support of the current Peking regime.
 An analysis of the history and present-day

essence of the ideology and policy of the Mao
Tse-tung group shows that Maoism now finds
support, first and foremost, in the
nationalistically-minded non-proletarian, petty-bourgeois, and,
to a considerable extent, declasse strata of
Chinese society.
 In the past, too, the Mao Tse-tung group

represented a petty-bourgeois nationalistic trend.
However, its non-proletarian essence was not so
clearly shown during the stage of national--
liberation struggle, when it was necessary to unite
different social forces against imperialism. The
differences of principle between Maoism and
scientific communism were revealed after the victory
of people's power in China, when fundamental
socio-economic changes were in progress.
 The experience of many countries shows that

the pressure of the ideology and psychology of
101
the petty bourgeoisie on the proletarian front

increases sharply during the course of a revolution,
and especially when socialism is in the process
of being built, when a drastic breaking-up of old
social relations takes place. It is precisely at such
a turning-point that petty-bourgeois leaders go
over from a petty-bourgeois revolutionary stand
to one of struggle against the proletarian
leadership of society. And this was what happened in
China too.
 Literature on Maoism frequently expounds the

view that Maoism is an ideology, an expression
of the interests of the undeveloped, backward
peasant masses, which have for centuries
constituted the great majority of the population of
China. But this opinion is unacceptable. To
accept it would mean admitting that the Maoists
have an extensive social base in the form of the
peasantry, and, by the same token, that the
peasantry is responsible for the anti-popular essence
of the Maoist policy.
 To regard Maoism as an expression of the

views of the entire peasantry means identifying
the petty-bourgeois, primitive, anarchistic
prejudices of the peasantry with its fundamental
interests. Indeed, can it be asserted without
deviating from Marxism-Leninism, that the "cultural
revolution,'' the smashing-up of the Party,
tradeunion, and YCL organisations, and the
destruction of socialist democracy express the vital
interests of the peasantry? Of course not.
 The bonds linking Maoism with the ideology

of the Chinese peasantry are not straightforward.
They are of a complicated and contradictory
nature, and can be correctly understood only on
the basis of a consideration of the class essence
102
of Maoism as a petty-bourgeois, nationalistic
socio-political trend.
 Marx and Engels disclosed the social

heterogeneity and dual nature of the peasantry. They
showed how to distinguish between its prejudices
and reason, between its past and its future,
between its small-proprietor narrow-mindedness and
its natural gravitation, as a toiling class, towards
an alliance with the revolutionary proletariat in
the struggle for a new life free from exploiters
and parasites. Opponents of Marxism alleged
that Lenin, in his criticism of petty-bourgeois
reaction, identified the whole of the peasantry
with it. In refutation of this falsification, Lenin
said: "I was not attacking the working peasants
when I spoke of the petty-bourgeois element. Let
us leave the working peasants alone-that's not
what I am talking about. But among the
peasantry there are working peasants and
pettybourgeois peasants, who live like petty
proprietors at the expense of others; the working
peasants are exploited by others, but they want to
live at their own =
__NOTE__ Footnote marker definitely missing from end of this quote.
expense.''^^1^^
 Both Marx and Lenin repeatedly pointed to

the crying contradictions in the life and activities
of the peasantry, which in some conditions
spontaneously and energetically rose up in struggle
against the exploiters, and, in others, either
humbly let themselves be led off to be shot or
whipped by the police, or else even made up the
basis of the support for the reactionary forces.
 This is, to a considerable extent, also true of

the Chinese peasantry, which, earlier, under
feudalism and patriarchalism had become stratified
and, therefore, disunited. The bulk of the Chinese
_-_-_
103
peasantry was cruelly exploited, and starvation

was common. Spiritually enslaved by feudal
ideology with its ruler cult and worship of the
traditions of ancestors, the Chinese peasants, being
in their mass downtrodden, illiterate and
scattered, for many years remained very submissive and
fully subordinated to the authorities. The
backwardness and patriarchalism of the Chinese
peasantry were a major source of the national
narrow-mindedness and the nationalist outlook.
 At the same time, the Chinese peasantry has

rich revolutionary traditions. More than once it
rose in struggle against the landowners.
Furthermore, the peasantry made up the main force of
the revolutionary armies both in the
nationalliberation struggle and in the revolution. The
Chinese peasantry quickly took to cooperative
farming on the road of socialist development of
the countryside. It was precisely these peasant
masses, who, under the leadership of the
working class and its vanguard, the Party of
MarxistLeninists, could have become an active force in
working for the triumph of a genuinely socialist
way of development.
 But this, regretfully, did not take place.

Starting from the late fifties, and especially in the
course of the "big leap" drive, and, later, in
the "cultural revolution,'' a serious blow was
struck at the organisations of the working class
and the Party. The Party divorced itself to a
considerable extent from the working class and the
peasantry, and disunity was deliberately sown
among the working class. As for the peasants,
most of them were deceived by the
pseudorevolutionary slogans of the Maoists. The rest
were intimidated by a terror campaign, and,
104
although they did not accept the "cultural

revolution,'' neither did they dare to put up any open
resistance.
 In the process of its moulding and

development, Maoism came under the political and
ideological influence of the urban petty
bourgeoisiethe relatively large army of artisans and
handicraftsmen, and petty businessmen and tradesmen.
This social grouping came into being in feudal
China, and its members were, for the most part,
distinguished by their conservative views and
nationalist outlook.
 But the urban petty bourgeoisie is not 100 per

cent reactionary. A sizable section of it took an
active part in the Chinese revolution. It, too,
under the leadership of the working class, could
have taken the socialist road together with the
overwhelming majority of the people.
 The tragedy of the Chinese revolution is that

in the struggle between the two courses-the course
of proletarian internationalism and that of
petty-bourgeois nationalism-the latter prevailed at
a certain stage. In these conditions, the Party was
unable to withstand the pressure of the petty
bourgeoisie and to secure the leading role of the
working class.
 The national bourgeoisie has still been

preserved in China. It was not subjected to
repressions in the years of the "cultural revolution.''
Representatives of the exploiting classes which, as
admitted by the Maoists themselves, comprise
more than 50 million people, hold important
positions in the management of the economy, and
continue to exert an influence on the economic
and political life of the country. Because they
subscribe to a nationalistic ideology and are
105
advocates of great-Han chauvinism, the

nationalbourgeois elements support the nationalistic ideas
and actions of the Maoists.
 A particularly complicated question is that of

the attitude of the Maoists towards the working
class. They keep talking all the time about the
leading role of the working class and the
Communist Party, about the dictatorship of the
proletariat, about the proletarian revolutionary
character, etc. However, the ideology and policy of
the Maoists are actually of an anti-proletarian
nature, although, in pursuit of their aims, by
means of demagogy, they try to make use of
certain sections of the workers.
 It is generally known that the Chinese

working class is heterogeneous. Its greater part
consists of the peasants of yesterday, who have not
gone through a real schooling of socialism and
internationalism. But it has a militant core, which
has many revolutionary traditions. As was shown
by the events in the "cultural revolution,'' it was
precisely the militant core of the working class
which came to the aid of the Party organisations
which were attacked by the hungweipings. In
the factories and plants the Maoists failed to
achieve the scale of the "cultural revolution"
which they desired. Although the working class
of China is still relatively small in number (it
barely exceeds 10 million in a country with a
population of over 700 million), it was the
backbone of the Chinese revolution and of the cause
of socialism in China and it still is. The working
class is the real force which is exerting a
restraining influence on the spreading and consolidation
of Maoism in the life of the country.
 The army officers' circles exerted a great
106
influence on the rise and evolution of Maoism.

These circles have always played an active part
in the social and political life of China.
 In the history of China, militarism for

centuries represented a relatively independent,
influential force, and energetically intervened in
political life. In the course of revolutionary wars,
many officers went over to the side of the
struggling people. Although they were the opponents
of imperialism, and of the landlords and the
comprador bourgeoisie, most of these military
men, nevertheless, did not become either
internationalists or Marxists. Many military men
joined the Communist Party, but only some of them
acquired Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary
training, and those who did were subsequently
purged. A large number of sincere internationalists,
real supporters of socialism, were expelled from
the army. Mao Tse-tung, leaning upon
nationalistically-minded elements loyal to him, reformed
the army, implanting in it a spirit of nationalism
and great-power chauvinism, a spirit of blind
subordination and idolisation of his personality.
 At the same time Mao Tse-tung and his retinue

fear the army, especially its revolutionary
backbone of career officers who went through the
crucible of the war for national liberation.
Unquestionably a considerable section of the career
command personnel of the Chinese People's
Liberation Army, which has splendid revolutionary
traditions and experience in fighting not only
the internal counter-revolution but also
international imperialism, cannot be indifferent to the
fact that the Maoists are transforming the
people's army into an all-China police force-a force
directed against the people and designed for
107
their suppression. Although drawing the army
into the work of the "cultural revolution" did
help the Maoist regime to strengthen itself, at
the same time it led to the intensification of the
discontent within the Chinese army and the
freeing of a certain section of the servicemen from
their illusions and a fanatical faith in the
wisdom of the "great helmsman.'' It also enabled
many of the army men to understand, from their
own experience, the danger of the anti-popular
course of Mao Tse-tung and his entourage.
Therefore, as was only to be expected, the army has
now become a dangerous hotbed of anti-Maoist
moods, and that is why the Maoists are carrying
out purge after purge, and repression after
repression against many career military men,
ruthlessly suppressing in its very embryo the
antiMaoist movement in the People's Liberation
Army of China.
 Removed from under the control of Party and

state bodies, and placed at the service of the
hegemonic, chauvinistic ambitions of Mao and
his group, even before the development of the
"cultural revolution,'' the army was preparing
to carry out the role allotted to it. This was the
militarisation of all public life-conducted under
the sham slogan of ``revolutionisation''-and the
establishment of a military-bureaucratic order in
the country. But, having carried out the "
cultural revolution,'' in which the army played the
decisive role, Mao then struck a blow at the
army leadership, so that now Lin Piao no longer
figures as Mao's "successor,'' as had been
announced at the Ninth Congress of the CPC.
 The reason for this manoeuvre of Mao's is

quite clear, although Peking prefers to keep
108
silent about it. The revelation of the substance of

the intrigues that permeate all of Mao's activities
and the entire existence of the Maoist top clique
would not do the "great helmsman" any good,
and this is understood very well in Peking.
 Maoism claims to be accepted by different

strata of the country as an all-national ideology
and a political doctrine expressing the national
interests of the entire Chinese people. The
nationalistic aims are even advanced as a unifying
factor. This shows the nature of the petty
bourgeoisie, which strives to ``rise'' above the classes
and present its egoistic interests as the interests
of the nation as a whole.
 The Peking leadership thoroughly camouflages

its petty-bourgeois class nature and tries to
manoeuvre between the different classes, taking
advantage of the weakness and lack of
organisation of the proletariat. These tactics make it
difficult to discern the class nature of Maoism and
they also serve as a means of attracting to its
side politically unstable elements drawn from
different classes of the population.
 Marx and Lenin called such tactics

Bonapartism, which, in a way, grew out of the revolution
and was called on to defend it, although it had
actually always served the bourgeois or
pettybourgeois reaction. Lenin cited Kerenskyism,
which served as a cover for an anti-proletarian
policy, as an example of Bonapartism of modern
times. In exposing Bonapartism, he defined its
characteristics as reliance on the military,
manoeuvring between the classes, and unbridled
social and nationalistic demagogy.
 An analysis shows that the policy and tactics

of Maoism have quite a number of features
109
resembling those of Bonapartism, in the specific

Chinese setting, of course: firstly, a reliance on
army circles loyal to Mao; secondly, a reliance
on a combination of different, sometimes
diametrically opposed, social forces, on a manoeuvring
between classes, making use first of some social
groups, then of others, first of high-school and
college students, then of working youth, and
especially of the petty-bourgeois, backward
peasant strata of the population, lumpen-proletarian
elements, etc; thirdly, boundless social and
political demagogy: the shouting of the most
revolutionary slogans covering a reactionary--
chauvinistic policy, verbal calls for defending the
proletarian line covering its actual rejection in home
and foreign policy, appeals to the people in
words and their suppression in deeds.
 Marx included among the Bonapartist

manifestations the deification of the supreme leader
and the mystical faith of the broad masses in
the ruling personality. Mao Tse-tung exerted
every possible effort to have his personality
glorified and his views advertised, and he placed
his favourites in the most important posts in the
party, the army and in the machinery of state.
 The "barrack-room communism" now being

implanted in China is in keeping with the moods
and needs of the society's petty-bourgeois and
lumpen-proletarian strata. It corresponds to the
hegemonic ambitions of the Maoists, for it helps
them to carry out the militarisation of the
economy and the entire life in the country for the
sake of the realisation of the great-power
adventurist plans in the international arena.
 For an understanding of the essence of

Maoism, a consideration of its historical, ideological
110
and theoretical origins is quite important. The

lengthy domination of feudalism and militarism,
economic and cultural backwardness, the
undeveloped public and social relations, the small
number of proletarians and the absolute
predominance of petty-bourgeois elements created
special difficulties for China's revolutionary
development.
 The militarists' traditional participation in

ruling the country and the extensive dissemination
in the course of centuries of one of the
reactionary aspects of Confucianism-the cult of the
supreme ruler-facilitated the establishment of a
military-bureaucratic regime with an idolised ruler
at the head.
 The Maoists made use of historical and

demographic facts for their own ends to spread
great-power and chauvinistic moods. China has
rich historical traditions. For a long time the
country held the leading place in Eastern Asia.
China is the home of an ancient culture. The
Chinese are the most numerous people in the
world. The existence of a comparatively high
civilisation was made use of by the feudal rulers
of China for cultivating chauvinistic views on the
superiority of the Chinese. All other nations
were declared ``wild'' and "barbarous,'' and all
"barbarians.'' China's eternal enemies. For
thousands of years the idea was cultivated in China
that she was the centre of the world. That is
how the Chinese ethnocentrism was formed, later
acquiring the features of great-Han chauvinism.
 In the period of the anti-imperialist struggle
nationalism was the ideological weapon of the
progressive forces which were fighting for
national liberation and social progress. It was the
111
ideological basis for rallying and uniting the

broadest sections of the Chinese population,
pushing into the background in some cases social
differentiation and differences in class interests.
After the victory of the anti-imperialist,
democratic revolution in China and its growth into a
socialist revolution, nationalism exhausted itself
as an ideological basis for uniting the
progressive forces of the nation in its struggle against
foreign capital-its struggle for national
independence. A very sharp conflict ensued in
Chinese society between nationalism and
 In present-day conditions Chinese nationalism,

which has grown into great-Han chauvinism, has
been fully adopted as a weapon of Mao
Tsetung's ruling group. Great-Han chauvinism is
the basic motif of anti-Sovietism and the
activities of the Maoists which are designed to disrupt
the socialist community and the world
communist, workers' and anti-imperialist movements.
__*_*_*__
 The principles of Marxism-Leninism are alien

to the Maoists. But they understand very well
that there is no other ideology capable now of
winning over the minds of the peoples of the
world. That is why the Maoists decided to
monopolise the right to interpret and ``develop''
Marxism-Leninism, to transform it in their own
way and thereby to turn it into an instrument for
achieving their great-Han, hegemonic aims.
 Initially this was called "the creative

application" of Marxism-Leninism in China's specific
conditions. It was done under the guise of the
112
realisation of Lenin's thesis to the effect that the

peoples of the East have to find their own ways
of carrying out Marxist ideas. Then appeared the
formula of "Sinoised Marxism,'' which for a
long time was viewed by some Marxists as the
process of creative quests for ways and means
of developing the revolution and the transition
to socialism in the specific conditions of China.
But the Maoists had their own understanding of
this formula. For them this was an important
step towards adapting Marxism to their own
nationalistic schemes and aims. This began to
reveal itself with the appearance of the assertion
that Mao Tse-tung's ideas are an interpretation
of Marxism for all the countries of the East.
Thus the concept of "Asian Marxism" made its
appearance. The next step was taken during the
"cultural revolution" and at the Ninth Congress
of the CPC, when Mao was proclaimed to be
the teacher of all peoples, the only Marxist
theoretician of the entire world communist
movement, and Mao's ideas the apex of scientific
thought, the Marxism-Leninism of the current
epoch. But this slogan is only a cover. The real
meaning of the decisions of the Ninth CPC
Congress is that an attempt was made to replace
Marxism by Maoism. That is how the concealed,
previously thoroughly camouflaged chauvinistic,
hegemonic schemes of the Maoists were revealed.

 In their attempt to achieve the recognition of

Mao Tse-tung as the only leading world
theoretician and law-maker in the sphere of ideas, and
the CPC as the centre of the entire revolutionary
movement, the M.aoists hurled accusations of
degeneration and revisionism, and of compromise
with imperialism, against large and authoritative
113
Communist Parties, including the CPSU, and

against the entire world communist movement.
All who do not agree with Mao Tse-tung are
haughtily `èxcommunicated'' from Marxism--
Leninism, from the revolution and from socialism,
and declared to be enemies. A fierce struggle
covered by Marxist phrases and revolutionary
slogans has been launched against the "
dissenters.'' And in this struggle no methods are
barred, not even military provocations.
 What then is Maoism from the standpoint of

its ideological and theoretical content?
 The influence and eclectic mixture of the most

diverse doctrines, views, theories and concepts
are clearly felt in the sum-total of the political,
economic, philosophical, sociological and tactical
concepts of Mao and the Maoists. These include:~
 feudal Chinese philosophy (mostly
Confucianism and Taoism), and as a rule that part of this
philosophy is taken which is characterised by
scholasticism, idealism, primitive dialectics, the
preaching of the spirit of submission, the
glorification of imperial power, and the exaggeration
of the role of the subjective factor in history;
 petty-bourgeois socialism, especially

Proudhonism with its utmost vulgarisation of Hegel's
idealistic dialectics and understanding of the
unity of opposites as the mechanical sum of
``bad'' and ``good'' phenomena irrespective of
their socio-economic, class substance;
 the petty-bourgeois-peasant, semi-Narodnik,

semi-avantgardist views ascribing spontaneous
revolutionism to the peasantry;
 the bourgeois-nationalistic, great-power and

chauvinistic assertion of the exclusiveness of
China;
114
 Trotskyite views, which were more or less

widespread in the Chinese revolutionary
movement in the twenties and early thirties;
 anarchist ideas, which acquired considerable

influence in China at the start of the twenties.
Mao Tse-tung, according to his own admission,
went in for anarchism quite actively in that
period.
 It is through the prism of all these views that

Mao Tse-tung accepted certain ideas of
MarxismLeninism. As far as Marxist-Leninist theory in
general is concerned, neither Mao Tse-tung nor
his closest associates ever made a systematic
study of it, limiting themselves to reading
popular articles. Mao has never had an integral
Marxist-Leninist world outlook.
 The Maoists widely used Trotskyite views and

adapted them to their interests. Maoism ignores
the objective laws of social development, as does
Trotskyism, and exaggerates the role of the
subjective factor in social processes. Adventurism in
politics, and voluntarism and subjectivism in
economics are characteristic for both. An
antiMarxist, anti-Leninist concept of the world
revolutionary process is a feature common to both
Maoism and Trotskyism. For demagogic
purposes the Maoists made use of the Trotskyite theory
of "the export of revolution,'' regarding world
war as the only way of solving the problems of
revolution on an international scale. Finally,
characteristic of both Maoism and Trotskyism is
the tactics of splitting the revolutionary forces,
with crude slanderous attacks against the
Marxist-Leninist parties and the socialist states, rabid
anti-Sovietism and subversive activities within the
115
ranks of the international working-class and

 An idealistic-voluntaristic theory of violence

(in which a subjective-idealist, militarist
interpretation is substituted for the materialist
interpretation of history) is the basis of Maoist
ideology.
 The theoretical construction of Maoism is

pivoted on "Sinoised dialectics,'' and particularly
on Mao's ``teaching'' on contradictions, which is
called upon to serve as the theoretical basis of
the strategy and tactics of the Maoists, as a
justification of their negation of a principled
class policy, and of their policy of making
unprincipled deals with the forces of imperialism
and all kinds of renegades from Marxism. Most
characteristic in this respect is the way the
Maoists artificially devise the "great contradictions"
of our time, declaring as enemies of the peoples
fighting for freedom the "two superpowers"~the
United States and the Soviet Union: the citadel
of imperialism, the bulwark of world reaction, is
placed on the same level as the first socialist
country, this powerful force of world progress.
This false concept is further proof that the
Maoists have turned away from the Marxist-Leninist
appraisal of the main contradictions of the
present day, from a principled class approach to the
alignment of forces in the world arena.
 The Maoists have greatly surpassed Proudhon

in the `àrt'' of arbitrarily designing
contradictions. They proclaim a state of `ùnity'' or of
"struggle,'' of anyone with anyone, so long as
this facilitates the attainment of their
greatpower, hegemonistic aims.
116
 These, in the most general way, are the
ideological background of Mao Tse-tung and his
followers. And it is no accident that the ideology and
policy of Maoism quite often link up with the
ideology and policy of imperialism. It is no
accident, either, that the theoretical revelations
and deeds of the Maoists are invariably lauded
to the skies by imperialist ideologists and
politicians, and are used by them in their battle
against the forces of peace and democracy, of
social progress and socialism.
 While noting the eclectic nature of Mao

Tsetung's views, it should be borne in mind, that, as
a retrospective approach to his ideas clearly
shows, great-power nationalism is the leading
and organising force behind his miscellany of
ideas. From diverse ideological and theoretical
concepts, Mao Tse-tung is primarily interested
in taking and using those that serve nationalist
and great-Han-chauvinist aims. This emphasises
the purely utilitarian and pragmatic nature of the
theory and practice of Maoism. Mao Tse-tung
and his followers advance and uphold those
theoretical theses and political slogans which directly
serve their ends in the present historical period,
and they bury in oblivion those of their own
conclusions which have ceased to be in accord with
their utilitarian aims, without showing any
concern for logic or the continuity of ideas.
 Devoid of a firm, stable social support, the

Maoist petty-bourgeois nationalist group goes
from one extreme to another in its domestic and
foreign policies, as it seeks the support of both
the leftist extremist elements, and, directly or
indirectly, of the most reactionary circles of
bourgeois society.
117
__*_*_*__
 Maoism, in its theoretical principles and

political practices is in basic contradiction with, and
hostile to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism. The essence of Maoism is
certainly not a revolutionary, but a reactionary
ideology. Maoism adds grist to the mill of
imperialism and reaction. Therefore the struggle
against Maoism should be regarded primarily from
the viewpoint of the incompatibility of the aims
of Maoism-as a form of social-chauvinism-with
the objectives of the world communist movement
and the national-liberation movement, and with
the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism on
fundamental issues of socialist construction, world
development, and revolutionary strategy and
tactics.
 The most eloquent and concentrated expression

of Maoism was seen in the course of the "
cultural revolution" and in the resolutions of the
Ninth CPC Congress, which is an important
landmark in the development of Maoist policies,
strategy and tactics, and is of decisive importance
for an understanding of the innermost
tendencies of Maoism, and of its long-term goals.
 The recent interpretation by the Maoists of the

basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, the
political course of the Maoists both inside the country
and in international relations, as also in the
communist movement, and the resolutions of the
Ninth CPC Congress, cannot be explained away
as a dogmatic-sectarian ``leftist'' interpretation of
Marxism-Leninism.
 Maoism is a Chinese version of social--

chauvinism, with Chinese social militarism as its
nucleus. This is an anti-Leninist political trend, which
118
endeavours to adapt Marxism-Leninism to

greatHan nationalist aims and to make a
demagogicutilitarian use of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and of
the revolutionary and communist movement, to
attain these goals. At the same time the Maoists
camouflage their selfish, great-power designs and
plans with clamorous revolutionary phrases.
 Even as it declares its irreconcilability with

imperialism, the Mao group weakens and splits the
world's anti-imperialist forces, undermines the
national-liberation movement and specifically
interferes with the establishment of unity of action
to support the just struggle of the peoples of
Indochina, and actually pursues a policy of
conciliation with the imperialist forces, on an
antiSoviet foundation.
 Although the Maoists shout a lot about

socialism, they have launched a wild political
campaign against most of the socialist countries,
have started pursuing a course of outright
hostility to the USSR, and are creating in China a
situation of war hysteria.
 Although verbally they champion the idea of
world revolution, and make much ado about their
"revolutionary nature,'' Mao's supporters at the
same time slander the working class of the
capitalist countries, accusing it of reformist
degeneration. They also attack most of the Communist
Parties, and undermine the workers' and
democratic movement.
 Events of the past decade show that the

Maoists are indifferent to the destinies of the
revolution, if its development does not conform to their
great-Han nationalistic interests. But they
understand very well that only an orientation towards
revolution can offer any historical prospect. That
119
is why they are so amazingly insistent-and

unstinting in efforts and means-in their attempt to
use the world revolutionary process for their own
ends, and theoretically and politically to occupy
a leading position in it, so as to mould it to the
requirements of Chinese nationalism: the
implementation of the ambitious dreams of the
supporters of the great-Han policy contemplating
China as the centre of the world. This is the
strategic design of the Maoist leadership.
 The whole policy of the Maoists has shown a

great discrepancy between their words and deeds,
and between their theoretical concepts and
practice. While proclaiming themselves the most
resolute fighters against imperialism and
declaring that imperialism is a "paper tiger,'' they
actually do nothing but shout slogans and at the same
time link up with imperialism on the basis of
anti-Sovietism.
 The Mao Tse-tung group, which adheres to the

stand of great-power chauvinism, preserves
leading positions in the PRC. However, in Chinese
society and in the world arena there are
powerful social, political and ideological forces at work
whose efforts are directed at the protection,
strengthening and development of socialist gains,
the restoration and consolidation of the theory
and policy of Marxism-Leninism and the
principles of proletarian internationalism in
China.
 Maoism is opposed in the first place by the

objective tendency of the socialist development
of the country. This is embodied primarily in the
foundations of socialism built by the efforts of the
Chinese working class and all the working
people of China with the aid of the USSR and the
120
other socialist countries. The military--

bureaucratic degeneration of some elements of the
political superstructure does not mean the automatic
collapse of the socialist basis. Of course,
deformations in the basis can and do take place under
the influence of reactionary changes in the
superstructure.
 Broad sections of the Chinese population are

interested in carrying out a socialist policy in
China-the main core of the working class, the
progressive part of the peasantry, broad masses
of the intelligentsia, and the revolutionary
section of the army. The Maoists cannot ignore the
interests and sentiments of these strata. Indeed,
Maoism clings like a parasite to the socialist
sentiments and strivings of the Chinese working
people. A great many Chinese Communists take
a socialist stand. Although genuine Communists
have suffered a temporary defeat in the struggle
against Maoism, they have not given up.
 The world socialist system, its successes and

the principled Leninist policy of the Soviet Union
and the other countries of the socialist
community, exert an influence on the development of
the political struggle in China. Broad sections of
the Chinese people remember that the USSR is
the first country of socialism, and they remember
the aid which the USSR rendered the working
people of China during the years of the anti--
imperialist struggle, the revolution and the
construction of socialism. No anti-Soviet hysteria can do
away with this sympathy.
 The world communist and working-class

movement also affects developments in China. The
condemnation of Maoism by the majority of the
Communist Parties of the world and the resolute
121
criticism of Maoism at the International Meeting

of 1969, at the Congresses and in the press of
the fraternal Parties cannot fail to have an
influence on the situation in China.
 The ideology and policy of Maoism do not
correspond to the objective course of the
development of society and the requirements of the
socialist development of China. Maoism suffers
one defeat after another and its ultimate failure
is historically inevitable. There can be no doubt
that the Communists, the working class and all
the working people of China will find the strength
to embark once again on the road of a close
unity with the fraternal peoples of the socialist
countries and ensure the success of the great cause of
socialism in the PRC.
 This prospect is met by the policy of the CPSU

and the Soviet state. The November Plenary
Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee noted
that the Politbureau of the Central Committee is
consistently carrying out the line of the 24th
Congress regarding the People's Republic of
China and expressed full agreement with the
position of the Politbureau in solving associated
practical questions. The Soviet Union is working
for the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese inter-state
relations. This aim is also promoted by the
ideological-political struggle against ``left-wing''
revisionism which Lenin called "petty-bourgeois
revolutionism.''
 Genuine Marxist-Leninists regard the exposure

of the anti-Leninist chauvinistic ideology and
policy of Maoism as essential to the strengthening
of the unity of world socialism, the communist
movement and the anti-imperialist movement.
 Pravda, December 5, 1971
[122]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Dialectics,
 Genuine and Spurious
 CRITICISM OF THE MAOIST INTERPRETATION
 AND APPLICATION OF DIALECTICS
 V. Lektorsky,

 G. Batishchev, V. Kurayeu
 The 24th CPSU Congress emphasised that

criticism of bourgeois and revisionist concepts remains
an important component of the Party's
theoretical work. "The Congress considers,'' says the
Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress on the Report
of the CPSU Central Committee, "that the creative
development and propagation of the Marxist--
Leninist teaching and the struggle against attempts
to revise it must remain a central task in the
Party's ideological work.''~^^1^^
 Revisionist concepts of both right and ``left''

varieties, and the Maoist ideology in particular,
are particularly dangerous forms of the many
attempts that have been made to rob Marxist--
Leninist theory of its revolutionary content and
misrepresent socialist and communist construction.
While posing as defenders of the ``purity'' of
Marxism-Leninism and employing ``Marxist'' and
``revolutionary'' terms, the Maoists seek to foist
on the world communist and workers' movement
an ideological and political platform of their own
which is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Information Bulletin Nos. 7-8, 1971, Peace and Socialism

Publishers, pp. 235--236
123
They have launched a virulent campaign against

the CPSU and the Soviet Union, setting out with
their divisive policy to undermine the
revolutionary struggle and sow discord in the ranks of the
anti-imperialist fighters. ''. . .the Chinese leaders,''
Leonid Brezhnev said in the Report of the CPSU
Central Committee to the 24th Party Congress,
"have put forward an ideological-political
platform of their own which is incompatible with
Leninism on the key questions of international
life and the world communist movement, and have
demanded that we should abandon the line of the
20th Congress and the Programme of the CPSU.''~^^1^^
 Characteristic of the Maoist revision of

MarxistLeninist theory is the attempt to ``substantiate''
the splitting actions of the Chinese leaders and
their adventurist policy by references to
materialist dialectics. This circumstance makes it
imperative for Marxist scholars to examine such claims
critically in order to distinguish between true
materialist dialectics and the distorted versions put
out by the Maoists.
 Some years ago a blatant ideological campaign

was launched in China against the "theory of
combining two into one" and advocating "the
principle of dividing one into two.'' Ostensibly,
the campaign was directed against distortions and
falsifications of the core of materialist dialectics,
the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.
But its actual aims were utilitarian-political, not
scientific, since its purpose was to justify the
special views held by Mao and his adherents. The
polemic over the problem of contradictions, of the
unity and struggle of opposites flared up (or, to
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ Information Bulletin, Nos. 7-8, 1971, Peace and Socialism
Publishers, p. 15.
124
be more exact, was artificially produced)

precisely when there was a need for "philosophical
substantiation" of the policy of splitting the ranks
of the international communist and working-class
movement and conducting an openly anti-Soviet
line. The "theory of dividing one into two,''
which served as philosophical justification of the
need for a prolonged confrontation between
classes under socialism, provided tremendous scope
for arbitrary construction of ever new ``
contradictions'' and "antagonisms,'' and creating a
sociopolitical atmosphere for encouraging the
interminable political squabbles and clashes and the use
of extreme measures and the military--
bureaucratic dictatorship.
 The actual socio-political and ideological aim

of the spate of bombast let loose in China in
1963--64 around the law of the unity and
struggle of opposites is obvious. It has been
exhaustively demonstrated in a number of works of
Marxist theoreticians, some of which were printed in the
journal Questions ot Philosophy.~^^1^^ The Maoist
interpretation and application turned dialectics into
a political gimmick, demagogically designed to
camouflage and vindicate Mao Tse-tung's political
line. If this presented a purely historical interest,
referring even to the very recent past, there
would hardly be any need to return to an
analysis of the specifically Maoist interpretation and
application of materialist dialectics. As it is, it is
still very much the practice in present-day China
_-_-_
~^^1^^ E. V. Ilyenkov, Dialectics or Eclecticism. No. 7, 1968;

L. P. Delyusin, 'Discussion on Socialism in China and
Contemporary Reality, No. I, 1969; E. Ya. Batalov, Destruction
of Practice, No. 3, 1969.
125
to twist Marxist dialectics to the advantage of the

Maoist line of thought.
 The most recent and instructive example of the

Maoist interpretation and application of
materialist dialectics is provided by the article "The
Theory of Combining Two into One" published
in the March 1971 issue of the magazine
Hungchi. Coming from "a group of authors of
revolutionary criticism" of the Higher Party
School of the CPC Central Committee, the article
criticises the "reactionary and absurd thesis of
'combining two into one' advocated and spread
by the traitor and provocateur Liu Shao-chi" and
gives the ``correct'' i.e., Maoist, interpretation of
the law of the unity and struggle of opposites. As
the authors see it, reduced to simple terms, the
basic law of materialist dialectics means that "in
human society and in Nature the whole always
splits up into unequal parts" which are engaged
in a constant struggle, leading to "one side
overcoming the other, defeating and destroying the
other.'' For instance, the revolutionary always
destroys the reactionary, the correct destroys the
erroneous, etc. "By advancing the proposition of
the division of one into two,'' the authors go on
to say, "Mao Tse-tung has summed up most
profoundly and laconically the law of the unity and ,
struggle of opposites, and has pinpointed the very I
gist of materialist dialectics. Mao Tse-tung has |
demonstrated that both in Nature and in human I
society and consciousness there exist
contradictions and struggle, not the law of 'combining two
into one'.'' All talk of combining opposites is ,
nothing more or less than theoretical substantia- |
tion of the "counter-revolutionary, revisionist line j
directed against the socialist revolution with
126
the aim of combining the proletariat with the

bourgeoisie, Marxism with revisionism, and
socialism with imperialism and social-imperialism.''
The present polemic between those who adhere
to the "theory of dividing one into two" versus
those who support "the theory of combining two
into one" is regarded as a "reflection of the
bitter and complex class struggle of that period (the
first half of the 60's) in the ideological sphere
within and without the country. In the final
analysis, the point at issue was whether the
dictatorship of the proletariat should be upheld and the
socialist system consolidated or the proletarian
dictatorship should be liquidated and the
capitalist system restored.'' If one adds to this the
opinion expressed by the present Peking
propagandists that "the reactionary and thoroughly
metaphysical 'theory of combining two into one' has
been dominant in the USSR since the mid-50's
as the interpretation of the law of the unity and
struggle of opposites and serves as theoretical
justification for the 'restoration of capitalism' in
that country and as an instrument of 'collusion
with the US imperialism','' one will readily see
that the latest campaign of ``repudiating'' the
"theory of combining two into one" has
farreaching political and ideological aims. But what
are these aims and what, in general, is the place
and the real value of Maoist ``dialectics'' in the
present-day political and ideological struggle?
__*_*_*__
 The Maoists have grown very fond of the

formula of the need to "divide one into two,'' which
they view as the ultimate philosophical
justification of their splitting policies. They have grown
127
so fond of it that the thesis of the "synthesis of

opposites into one" appears to them as out--
andout "revisionism.'' Characteristically, however,
Mao Tse-tung and his adherents only recall that
"the division of one into two" is progressive and
inevitable when they find it politically
advantageous, completely ``forgetting'' about it when, for
some reason or other, they consider it
disadvantageous. They are particularly outspoken in
lauding the benefits of ``division'' when it concerns
the communist movement, the differences and
contradictions within its ranks, for then the
Maoists find it highly beneficial to themselves. One
can hardly deny that, for it is indeed beneficial,
only the question is-to whom? General formulas,
however sound, keep ``silent'' on that question.
This accounts for the predilection of Peking ``
dialecticians'' for endless repetition of general and
abstract schemes which they stick like labels on
concrete and particular cases whenever it is
thought "advantageous,'' but which they refrain
from using when it appears to be disadvantageous
to them. Advantageous or disadvantageous-such,
in the final analysis, is the criterion of
acceptability (and practical use) of a given dialectical
proposition employed by the Maoists.
 The language of materialist dialectics has, in
Maoist hands, become simply a euphemism, at
once a realisation and a disguise for practical
political action, a kind of instrument kit consisting
of a meagre collection of labels and nicknames.
The Maoists' treatment of the theoretical wealth
accumulated by materialist dialectics is a striking
example of unprincipled, purely the pragmatic
comprehension and use of ideas which,
irrespective of how they came about or their nature, are
128
regarded as very pliant material that does not

commit one to anything, and which can be used
as one pleases, turning it inside out if necessary,
so long as the desired effect is achieved. The
history of social thought knows a number of
examples of a well-developed social idea being used
for two diametrically opposed purposes. One,
when it becomes the property of those social
forces whose aspirations and vital needs accord
with the idea, social forces which have achieved
a sufficient level of spiritual development and are
able to perceive its inner meaning and make it
their ideological banner. The other, when it is
appropriated by people who are far removed
from such an idea, who seize on it, not for its
real content, but because of its appeal, the
authority of its originators and the effectiveness of its
implications.
 Marxism has long emerged as the most

influential world outlook of our time known for its
convincingness. Its appeal is recognised even
by those who are not Marxists. But it has so
much to offer it is a tempting inducement to
social forces which, alien to and often far
removed from Marxism, lack a banner of their own
that will carry weight and evoke the desired
response.
 Attempts to ``borrow'' and use some elements

of Marxism have been made more than once by
various petty-bourgeois, nationalistic and other
circles at crucial moments or when starved for
ideas. Their leaders often cannot resist the
appeal of Marxism. "Extremely wide sections of the
classes that cannot avoid Marxism in formulating
their aims,'' Lenin wrote in 1910, "had
assimilated that doctrine in an extremely one-sided and
9--193
129
mutilated fashion. They had learnt by rote

certain 'slogans/ certain answers to tactical
questions, without having understood the Marxist
criteria for these answers.''~^^1^^ Even then Lenin
warned against the danger of this tendency, which
leads to the emasculation of the inner spirit of
Marxism, to the drowning out of its essence by
slogan-shouting, so that "nothing but the
phraseology" remains of it.
 However, in those days this tendency had not

yet reached the point it has today under Maoism;
and while the utilitarian tendencies must be
described, and were described by Lenin in his time,
as vulgarisation, they may appear as something
not far short of refined thought compared with
present-day samples. In the writings of
Maoists, whether they be newspaper or even
magazine articles, formulas such as "division of one
into two" and empty slogans do not merely
supplant logical thinking; they go so far as to lend
verbal decisions an almost physically tangible
character by their sheer bluntness, their
grossness in putting across the practical political
motive.
 However, paradoxical as it may seem, it is

precisely this extreme down-to-earth attitude and
practical candidness that causes them to soar to
the heights of abstraction. The most specific is
found in close proximity with the infinitely
general, and is, moreover, derived from the latter.
So, while appearing to talk about particulars,
they do not merely express particular, ordinary
ideas taking shape in people's minds and
subject to their critical comprehension, but utter
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll Works, Vol. 17, pp. 42--43.

130
130
incontrovertible, absolute truths. This unlimited

universalisation of the most banal things, this
constant performance of dizzying leaps from ``
global'' generalities to particulars, and constant
attempts to pontificate, uttering "universal truths,''
are garbed in the terminology of Marxist
dialectics, the idea being that only this ludicrous
exploitation of some of the turns of phrase typical
of Marxist dialectics make it truly authentic!
 In the rhetoric of Mao and his followers one

can find any number of such "great leaps"
from the most general to the most particular. A
typical feature of this mode of thinking is the art
of making such "great leaps" without bothering
to investigate the particular cases or to ensure
consistency in the transition from the general
phrase to a particular problem or the real state
of affairs. This kind of logic is applied each time
there is theoretical substantiation of Maoism's
political actions. In seeking to substantiate a
thesis on the need to split the international
communist movement, for instance, the line of reasoning
adopted is as follows: any process in nature,
society or thought develops through the "division
of one into two.'' No process can take place
without the "division of one into two.'' Hence,
the international communist movement, too, must
be "divided into two" which is viewed as a
triumph of dialectics.
 It is not so difficult to understand why

unbridled universalisation-constantly recurring flights
towards `àbsolute'' and `ùniversal'' truths--
predominates in Maoist writings. Absolute
universality is proclaimed, not for the sake of
disinterested intellectualism, scientific cognition or ideology,
but simply to give these writings the character
9*
131
of unchallengeable authority. Any particular,

concrete proposition can be scrutinised, critically
appraised, verified, corrected in some aspects or
even rejected altogether. In the case of
particulars, one can dare to sort them out for oneself.
But when the voice of the oracle is heard, when
the demands proclaimed are those of the world
absolute which bestows on people "universal
truth" through the lips of its earthly
ambassadors, then all other voices must remain silent!
 The procedure, then, is simple enough. First,

the universe is supplied with a set of abstract
formulas and slogans, which are `ùrgently''
needed, a kind of quiver with appropriate ideological
arrows, and then, with much fanfare, it is
discovered that the necessary slogan has been ``shot''
by the universe itself.
 It must be remembered that this hovering

among the "universal truths" is simultaneously
called upon to disguise the very earthly political
passions which are the cause of the action being
justified and the source of practical slogans. These
passions are presented as the "essence of the
world,'' which allegedly is responsible for them
and which is garbed in dialectical terminology.
As a result the crux of the matter seems to lie in
dialectics, after it has been subjected to such
barefaced manipulation.
 When put to such use, the dialectical

terminology becomes a device of political demagogy, the
language of such demagogy, designed to
influence people who respect Marxist-Leninist theory.
Direct justification of any act of brazen
voluntarism by abstract universal philosophisms is
meant to create a semblance of profound
philosophical substantiation of what is in fact a
132
freakish and essentially harmful policy. You object to

the split in the ranks of the international
communist movement. Well, then you are opposed to
the thesis of "dividing one into two,'' hence also
to dialectics. You maintain that the main law of
dialectics is not reduced to the struggle of
opposites but presupposes also `ùnity'' of
opposites. Then you are betraying the line of Chairman
Mao and preach capitulation in face of the
domestic bourgeoisie and collusion with
international imperialism.
 It is hardly necessary to go to any length to

prove that genuine materialist dialectics has
nothing to do with such unprincipled use of it.
Nevertheless, some explanations and comparisons
are in order, if only to take a closer look at the
patterns of thought whereby Maoists not only
betray the spirit of dialectics, but break even
with the terminological semblance of "
dialecticalness,'' even with the letter they have borrowed
from the dialectical vocabulary. With this end in
view let us go back to the Maoist "principle of
dividing one into two" and the bitter, mutually
destructive antagonism between extremes, which
they misrepresent as the dialectical law of the
unity and struggle of opposites.
 That the Maoists in this case have fallen foul
of the letter of Marxist-Leninist dialectics, is
perfectly obvious, for in the Maoist reading of this
law unity has been dropped, so that what remains
is struggle all the way through. Anyone at all
familiar with the rudiments of dialectics will
know that, according to Marx, "what constitutes
dialectical movement is the coexistence of two
contradictory sides, their conflict and their fusion
133
into a new category."~^^1^^ Lenin, too, repeatedly

spoke of the need to be able to unite, or synthesise,
opposites. In his speech "On the Trade Unions"
he pointed out that those who studied Marxism
even superficially "have learned how and when
opposites can and must be combined,'' drawing
the important conclusion that ".. .in the three
and a half years of our revolution we have
actually combined opposites again and again."^^2^^
Moreover, the law of the unity and struggle of
opposites and the Maoist "principle of dividing one
into two" lie within totally different frames of
reference. Indeed, the two could be compared
only if the law of the unity and struggle of
opposites were simply an abstract universal
ontological statement of facts (`èverything in the world
is such that in the given case or example this or
that takes place'') along with other such
statements. However, in reality the entire spirit of
dialectics, especially in its consistent, Marxist
embodiment, its whole message-the message of 
concreteness-is directed against empirical facts being
`èxplained'' by superimposing on them
universalised rules, by-passing the complex chain of
intermediate links connecting the methodological
principles of the highest order with empirics,
bypassing the investigation of the specific whole
whereby, and in the context of which, particular
facts can be explained. Dialectical laws in
general and the law of the unity and struggle of
opposites in particular, as Lenin stressed, stem from
the whole experience of the cognitive work of
man's thought: each is "a law of cognition (and
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Marx The Poverty of Philosophy, M., 1955, p. 126.
~^^2^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 32, p. 27.
134
. . .a law of the objective world.)''~^^1^^ Nothing,
therefore, is further removed from materialist
dialectics and more alien to it than an attempt to
present it as a set of abstract rules covering
everything under the sun and excluding, by their
very nature, a creative approach to anything.
 Having shown that the universalised "

principle of dividing one into two" is incompatible with
anything in dialectics, it is only natural to
consider if there is anything, any concept, with which
it can be compared, and to attempt to compare
the latter with dialectics to find the connecting
links.
 Such a concept (if it can indeed be called a

concept) exists in the folklore, mythology and
religions of many peoples-the concept of two
world principles locked in eternal conflict. In
such a world, indeed, there is no unity, and
strife and absolute division rule supreme. The
question of a whole does not arise for the simple
reason that from the outset two principles are
presupposed, which have nothing in common, are
not related in any positive way, hence, the
eternal conflict between them can never be resolved.
Being omnipresent, they rend asunder every
object into warring extremes and plunge them into
a futile and ruthless universal holocaust. But
because the opposing absolutes are supposed to
have nothing in common, precisely by virtue of
their absolute disunity and absolute
insurmountable division, the war of extremes has no
perspective of any kind, it does not and cannot
result in any progress, any synthesis, nothing new
can emerge from it: the same drama repeats
_-_-_
135
itself over and over again. For the victory of one

extreme immediately leads to its being split, in
turn, into the same feuding poles.
 It is fairly evident that this archaic

mythologem which paints a lurid picture of the world
as a perpetual St. Bartholomew Massacre sheds
no light on the logic and real problems of real
struggle. It can only serve as a means of
fanning mass hysteria.
 But it is this mythologem which the Maoist
ideologists, who have advanced the slogan: "
Revolutionary division is a good thing, not a bad
thing,'' regard as an example and a model for
their world outlook. In accepting the
mythologem about the impossibility of combining
extremes, these ideologists devote their current
campaign to ``rebuffing'' the idea of unity of
opposites, rebuffing not even the idea, but the word
"unity,'' which inspires them with mortal fear.
As they themselves admit, "the gist of the theory
of combining two into one" lies in the word
"combination.''
 A devout revolutionist obsessed by "division

which is a good thing" has no right to practise
or contemplate any kind of "combination,'' he is
even forbidden to pronounce this heretical and
hateful word. This line, if pursued to its logical
limit, could predictably lead the fanatics of
interminable division to change the slogan "Workers
of all countries, unite!" into "Workers of all
countries, disunite!" And in this way they would
betray their true political motives.
 Let us examine, then, the relation between the

historical tradition of dialectics and the archaic
mythology of universal duality, division and
destruction. Casting a retrospective look at the past
136
ages, we see that dialectics proper originated and

took root precisely in contrast to the
mythologem about the two world absolutes, to the
fatalism of the eternal confrontation of opposites, to
the idea that the world is doomed to revolve
forever in one and the same circle. The core of
dialectics has always been, not dualism, not
repetition of fate, not statics, but development spurred
by contradictions, creation of the new in the
process of destruction and elimination of the old.
 Denial, too, holds a definite place in dialectics,

but it is truly dialectical denial, and not a
nihilistic one, a denial that draws a clearcut line
between the idea of the struggle of opposites, or, to
be more precise, their unity and struggle,^^1^^ in the
sense of a general outlook, of dialectical logic; a
struggle in the direct social meaning of the word,
implying the interaction of human wills as a
result of which people part with their past, with
the obsolete, and build their future, on the one
hand; and the specifically antagonistic forms of
the social struggle, on the other. One of the
rudiments of Marxism is that neither in the first,
nor in the second interpretations of the concept
of contradiction does the struggle of opposites
represent the extrapolation to the entire world of
the cult of fierce hostility or the attribution to
Nature and culture of constant pugnacity. At the
same time genuine Marxism essentially differs
from the Maoist version in its interpretation of
the essence and the role of antagonistic forms
in social development.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ We may recall here Lenin's definition: "Dialectics is the

teaching which shows how opposites can be.. . identical.. .''
(Coll. Works, Vol. 38, p. 109), i. e., not only combined, but
in unity leading to identity.
137
 Let us explain briefly what it means. In

examining antagonisms by themselves it is
impossible theoretically to understand correctly either
their nature or the nature of contradictions
generally. For a correct understanding of the nature
of antagonisms it is necessary to reveal
scientifically the character of the contradictions (and
the ``struggle'' of opposites) in general, so as to
explain on this basis the specifics of
antagonistic forms. This leads, in Marxism, to the
following picture: in an antagonistic society a class
struggle ultimately develops because the
progressive, or revolutionary, class seeks to resolve the
contradictions inherent in the old society and to
break through its confines in order to create a
new society, while the conservative, or
reactionary, class opposes this solution and this creation
(or even strives to restore the old), attempting
to restrict activity to the framework of the
obsolete social structures. Hence, the class
struggle is being waged over two alternatives: either
to resolve the contradictions, i.e., the historical
tasks and problems, the nature of which
constitutes the "struggle of opposites,'' or to
reproduce them in the old form and to obstruct the
solution of the historical tasks and problems. So in
essence it is a struggle for the creation, for the
synthesis of the new,- hence, consistent
revolutionaries are, by their historical mission, true
champions of the creation of the new, for the
sake of which they negate the obstacles standing
in their way.
 The inability to examine antagonisms from the
standpoint of the universal nature of
contradictions, the inability to understand the specific
character of the antagonistic contradictions, cannot
138
be regarded merely as an innocent gnosiological

mistake. In dealing with such an "inability,'' one
must not forget which social forces are apt to
reduce the antagonistic type of contradictions to
some distinct and absolutised essence, to an
ideological principle. It is characteristic of `ùltra-left''
extremists to have a tendency to regard as the
criterion of revolutionariness, not creation
representing sober-minded historical responsibility,
but irresponsible fanatical militancy blinded by
the spirit of total destruction and nihilism.
Absolutisation of the antagonistic form of
contradictions provides them with a concept that suits
their ends.
 In reality, the antagonistic form of

contradiction is an effect of certain objective causes--
contradictions, historical tasks, etc. And the real
sense of this antagonistic confrontation of hostile
class forces ultimately is manifested in whether
they fight tor or against the solution of these
contradictions and tasks. It is manifested also in
whether these social forces seek to transform the
objective logic of the "unity and struggle of
opposites" into a logic of building new social
relations and structures, or to destroy the conditions
for such creative work. Whenever an antagonistic
contradiction is treated by itself, the objective
tasks and problems either disappear from view
altogether or are regarded as some purely
derivative thing, as something artificial, as some
enemy scheming. In this case, what is required of
a revolutionary is not a thorough understanding
of the real, subtle and intricate dialectics of
history, in its concrete situations, but unbridled
bellicosity, a professed determination "to annihilate
the enemy,'' as well as a readiness to resort to
139
the most ferocious, most violent measures against

those who, unaffected by the passion for "
universal division into two,'' try to understand the
objective logic of social development instead of
inventing high-sounding slogans. Lenin in his time
showed how irresponsible this "super--
revolutionarism" with its extremely ``left'' phrases was.
 By revolutionarism Marxism means not
vindictive destruction or bellicose hysterics justified by
the absolutised form of antagonism, but, on the
contrary, a form of social activity which
theoretically and practically overcomes the inert
framework of the antiquated antagonistic class society
and works out new forms of a socialist and
communist society. Truly revolutionary activity is
activity based upon the creative energy of the
masses, so that even at the height of the struggle
against the political, class enemy the inner logic
of the historical process is never lost sight of.
Genuine revolutionaries will never allow the real
laws of the class struggle to be supplanted by
doctrinaire mythologising. Genuine
revolutionaries know how to subject even the most drastic
and rapid breakdown of antiquated social
structures to the logic of creation of the new, the logic
of their most humanistic aims-the aims of
building the new society precluding social
antagonisms. Absolutisation of the role of antagonistic
contradictions in the process of establishment and
development of socialist society and the cult of
militant destruction are phenomena alien to the
dialectics of resolving real contradictions. At the
same time ultra-left, nihilist destructiveness
denies the creative, problematic content of the
struggle for socialism and communism and is
essentially reactionary. When the Maoists act as
140
preachers of revolutionariness that is tantamount

to destructiveness they become apostles of 
reactionary "revolutionariness.''
__*_*_*__
 It will be seen that the "absolute truths" of the

Maoist ideologists, when put to the test, prove
to be mere euphemisms for a situative political
tactic mythologically codified by the symbolics of
the political passions of the time. All the ``
dialectical'' talk about "division of one into two" and
other world ontological depths supposedly
fathomed by them turns out in reality to be nothing
but pompous garb disguising both the splitting
policies of the Maoists in the international
communist movement and their repressive measures
within the country.
 The true dialectics of Marx and Lenin is,

primarily, a method used for an objective and
scientific examination of reality, the Alpha and Omega
of it being a concrete analysis of a concrete
subject, without any disguises or substitutions. In
contrast, in the hands of the Maoists, dialectics
has become something incompatible with any
kind of analysis. Even calling a spade a spade is
out of the question, not to speak of a
thoroughgoing analysis. As a result, the ideological
heralds of universal truths are not concerned about
a vitally important action to be taken or the
reaction to the difficulties and problems in which
the Chinese politicians have become entangled,
but only doctrinaire fancies. The real result of
attempts to blame everything on universal rules,
of the sleight of hand involving their substitution
for the earthly political passions, has been
141
merely to translate their very concrete failures, their

destructive measures, their internecine strife and
splitting policies into the language of universal
recommendations. After causing enormous
political harm at home these ideologists are trying to
make a universal law of this mess and to impose
this law upon the world. Having proved totally
incapable of drawing any lesson from their sad
experience of "dividing one into two" they
undertake to teach others the universal truths. And
so the Maoists accuse our Party of all the mortal
sins because it has ``revised'' those universal
truths, which, they assent, call for world-wide
dissension and strife, violent rebellion and
vindictive repression.
 ``Viewing socialist society from the standpoint

of division of one into two, it must be
admitted,'' say the authors of the article referred to
above, "that throughout the socialist stage, from
beginning to end, there are classes, class
contradictions, class struggle, a struggle between two
paths-the socialist and the capitalist, there is a
danger of the restoration of capitalism.''
 The attempts of the present Chinese leaders to

practise this theoretical recommendation based
upon references to the law of the unity and
struggle of opposites show that the Maoist "class
struggle" is spearheaded against the working
masses of China, against the world socialist
system and the international working-class
movement. Its purpose is deliberate provocation of
conflicts between socially homogeneous classes
fanned to the point of class antagonisms.
 The progress of a developed socialist society in
which the exploiting classes have been destroyed
is free from antagonisms. Any attempt to
142
introduce into it the methods of ``division'' into

mutually opposed classes, any tendency deliberately
to identify the uncompromising class struggle
the proletariat is waging against hostile
bourgeois and revisionist ideologies with the
creative quest in the constructive endeavour to
consolidate and develop socialism, are utterly
inadmissible and alien to the nature of socialism, and to
the creative dialectics of its development. Such
dialectics has nothing in common with the
pitiable myths which the Maoists have adopted as
their weapon and which increasingly reveal
themselves as miserable fakes of Marxist dialectics.
 Voprosy filosofii, No. 8, 1971
[143]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Crisis in the Political
 Development of China
__ALPHA_LVL3__
[introduction.]
 L. Gudoshnikov, B. Topornin
 Developments in China clearly show that the

notorious "cultural revolution" is entering the
final stage of its long-drawn-out existence. This is
shown particularly by the political manoeuvres
of the Mao Tse-tung group aimed at stabilising
and consolidating its rule, stemming the tide of
wanton tyranny, lawlessness and the deliberate
derangement of the life of society and state that
they themselves let loose, and confining it within
the strict and definite limits of the ``new'' order.
No longer bothering to keep up the pretence of
struggle against bourgeois influences in art, science
and education and against all those "following
the bourgeois path,'' the Peking leaders have
lately been openly pursuing purely political
objectives in order to maintain their power.
 There is no doubt that the political

development of China is an extremely involved process,
multi-dimensional and contradictory externally as
well as internally. This is because its essence,
forms and trends are due to economic, political
and social factors-which differ as to the force,
time and duration of their action-and also to the
special national features and historical traditions
of the vast country. Concealed behind the ample
evidence of opposition-often indistinct and even
imperceptible-of the social forces, is shrewd
calculation and the cunning political line of the
Maoist ruling clique.
144
__ALPHA_LVL3__
THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND THE
 POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
 CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
 It emerges more and more clearly that what

is now taking place in China is a radical
restructuring of the entire social-political, and
especially state-legal, mechanism that was established
after the victorious revolution and the
proclamation of a People's Republic in China and was
fixed in essence in the 1954 Constitution. Much
of the political organisation of Chinese society
have since been destroyed, although the
Constitution and many other laws, constituent acts,
policy documents and fundamental party
decisionsincluding the documents of the 8th CPC
Congress-have not been repealed or much amended.
At the same time new bodies and organisations
are springing up in China, and a political
system is emerging which is evidently called upon
to perform the functions of a Maoist
dictatorship.
 It is no accident that Mao Tse-tung and his

group should have set out to destroy by force
the state apparatus and the entire political system
of China as they had been until early 1966, when
the notorious "cultural revolution" was
unleashed. The fact of the matter is that the mechanism
of people's government in China was built and
developed on the Leninist principles of socialist
statehood, which were studied and applied in
practice, as well as on the basis of the experience
accumulated by the Soviet Union and other
countries of the socialist community.
 Although the conditions under which China
10--193
145
had to develop were extremely challenging and

difficult owing to the economic and cultural
backwardness inherited from the past, to the small
working class and to the influence of the
semifeudal habits and customs, the people's
government very soon achieved considerable success
in developing and building up democratic
institutions and arousing the political consciousness
of the people. Under the 1954 Constitution, the
People's Republic of China was declared a
people's democracy led by the working class and
based on the alliance of workers and peasants.
The working people exercised their power through
a system of representative bodies-assemblies
of people's representatives-which were set up
both in town and countryside. The state
apparatus was built on the principle of democratic
centralism, a combination of collective and
oneman management, and control by the people.
The leading role belonged to the Communist
Party of China which proceeded under the
banner of Marxism-Leninism together with the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other
fraternal parties. The CPC relied in its activities
on the United Popular Democratic Front which
comprised all the democratic classes, parties and
groups, popular organisations and democratic
elements not in the Party.
 But both the structure and the working of such

a mechanism had their defects. This was due
to lack of experience and competent personnel
and, particularly to the Maoist distortions, which
were perceptible even at the earliest stages of
China's post-revolutionary development, although
not as clearly as now. As a social-political and
theoretical-ideological current. Maoism did not
146
take shape at once, showing suddenly

against the background of the "cultural revolution,''
but emerged and gained in strength gradually,
leaning on the petty^bourgeois element and
playing on the backward nationalistic, hegemonic
ambitions of the immature masses. The
mechanism of people's power that had been developed
failed to conform to the Maoist idea of the
content and form of power, being alien to it in
principle. Moreover, the continued existence of such
a mechanism even after repeated campaigns for
`àmendment'' and "improvement,'' against the
``right-leading'' and ``bourgeois'' elements, made
it impossible for the Maoists to feel politically
secure.
 The Maoist political-legal doctrine was more

than a revision and denial of the fundamental
primary principles of the Marxist-Leninist
doctrine on the substance and political forms of
power during the establishment and strengthening
of the socialist system. The doctrine is based
primarily on the thesis that the "dictatorship of the
proletariat is a dictatorship exercised by the
masses.''~^^1^^ This proposition which Mao Tse-tung laid
down as early as 1957,~^^2^^ and which was widely
publicised during the "cultuml revolution,'' made
it possible to disregard the leading role of the
working class and ignore its genuine needs
and interests as well as its views. At the same
time it suggested that society should be divided,
not on a class principle but according to
political views or, to be more precise, on people's
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Jenmin jihpan, July 19, 1968.
~^^2^^ See Mao Tse-tung, Correct Handling of Contradictions

Among the People, M., 1967.
10*
147
attitude to the policies of the Maoist rulers. All

the social forces that supported the adventuristic
nationalist and hegemonic Maoist line were
assumed to be "the people,'' while all those under
the least suspicion of being disobedient or
disrespectful to the "great helmsman" were declared
enemies of the people and "capitalist--
supporters.''
 Maoist ideologists often refer to the special

features of China's social development and
especially to the fact that the peasants form the bulk
of the population while the proletariat is very
small. Indeed, this is of importance to social
reforms. The Chinese revolution was carried
through and the first successes in socialist
construction achieved largely because the CPC had
managed to win over and lead the peasantry. But
the concrete historical conditions should have
precisely made it of primary concern to the
government and Party to provide for the
leadership of the working class, to help enhance its
leading position in the alliance with the peasants
and to work to introduce proletarian ideology
among the rural population. Under such
conditions the bodies of political power must be
particularly careful not to let the influence of the
petty-bourgeois element among the peasantry
eclipse or distort the interests and aims of the
workers, the genuine exponents of social progress
and consistent fighters for socialism, who although
not numerous by comparison, are to lead society.
 The Maoists, however, have no faith in the

creative ability and revolutionary energy of the
people; moreover, they are suspicious of any
voluntary activity or initiative of the workers.
148
Instead, they offer a grotesquely inflated

personality cult which serves to suppress the democratic
relations and norms of the party and public life,
as well as criticism and control from below, and
enforces unquestioning blind obedience to the will
of the absolute "leader.'' Nor are the masses
required to understand the meaning and purpose of
the decisions for, as the Chinese press points out,
you must "carry out Mao's instructions no
matter whether you have as yet grasped their
meaning or not.''~^^1^^
 Taking its cue from the semi-feudal traditions

of deifying the supreme ruler, the peasants'
ageold habit of obedience to authority, etc., Maoist
propaganda is, in effect, trying to preserve and
perpetuate the political apathy of the masses and
to implant a system of bureaucratic
administration and handle all social and political issues in
a subjective way.
 These days the Peking leaders never recall

what the classics of Marxism-Leninism had to say
about the role played by the individual in
history in general and in revolutionary change in
particular. They try to put it out of people's minds
that V. Lenin, the head of the Party and the
Soviet state, resolutely checked all attempts to
extol his work. The Maoists fiercely attack the
resolutions of the CPSU and other fraternal
communist and workers' parties which condemn the
manifestations of the personality cult in some
countries and which preclude subjectivism and
arbitrary action by individuals. Carrying on "
unreserved propaganda of Mao's ideas and arming
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ Jenmin jihjiao, June 16, 1967.
149
the people with them"~^^1^^ is declared to be the

main point of the Maoist doctrine.
 To Lenin's conception of democratic centralism

which he saw as a combination of the
management of society from a single centre and on a
single plan, and of subordination of the lower
to the higher bodies, with an overall
development of local initiative and creative activity of
the masses, the ideologists of Maoism oppose a
scheme of their own. It boils down to the most
rigorous centralism, the unreasoning execution of
all directives "from the top,'' and to a rigid
official hierarchy in the Party apparatus as well as
that of the government. Moreover, the very
concept of democracy-which, one might think,
presupposes the extensive development of various
forms of government by the people and the
enlistment of broad sections of the population in
public activities-is now interpreted in China as
something synonymous with "centralised
leadership" and a means of enforcing centrally-made
decisions. "The Most Recent Directives of
Chairman Mao,'' which are quoted in the joint
editorial of Jenmin jihpao, Chiehfangchiun poo and
Hungchi of January 1, 1969, state that democracy
must provide for "proper centralism.''
 It is plain that the Maoist political-legal

doctrine extremely exaggerates the role of coercion
in the carrying out of social reforms. It views
compulsion as very nearly the key to all social
problems including those (e.g., in the economic
field) which require a different approach, such as
reasonable estimates, a wise distribution of
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Jenmin jihpao, January 16, 1969.

150
150
manpower, or provision of the necessary facilities.

The slogans "Power comes from the barrel of a
gun" and "Politics takes command,'' which were
adopted long ago at the time of the armed
struggle against the Japanese invaders, the Maoist
rulers retained in peace-time and not only while
revolutionary government was being established
but also later on, during the building of
socialism. With the start of the "cultural revolution,''
with the hungweipings and tsaofans going on the
rampage and the army acting as a shield, violence
actually became the Maoists' sole means of
handling, not only all political issues that presented
themselves, but also those arising in the sphere
of science, culture and education.
 Of course Marxism-Leninism never denied that

proletarian power might have to resort to violence
in order to carry out its functions. Nevertheless,
Lenin often underlined that ''. . .the
dictatorship of the proletariat is not only the use of
force against the exploiters, and not even mainly
the use of force.''~^^1^^ The main thing about the state
power of the proletariat is its constructive and
creative aspect which manifests itself in the way
it organises the people for the building of
socialism.
 As they shift the centre of gravity to the use

of force, the Maoists openly ignore the
Constitution and defy socialist law. The Maoists
instituted repressive actions against the working
people long before the "cultural revolution.''
They carried out this policy by sending the
local bodies of power obligatory quotas of so
_-_-_
151
many per cent of the population to be dealt with

as enemies of the people. The rules concerning
the administration of justice by the courts alone,
the independence of the judges, and centralised
Procuracy were declared harmful and "bourgeois.''
Practically nothing was done to codify laws while
proposals for endorsing new codes voiced at the
8th Congress of the CPC, came to be viewed
two years later as "subversion of the people's
democratic dictatorship''. The Maoist rulers
regarded the citizens' democratic rights and
liberties as empty declarations which, if anything,
ought to be limited and curtailed, not enhanced
by legal and material safeguards.
 The political-legal views of the Maoist rulers
and the entire ideological and theoretical
platform of the nationalistic, adventuristic and
megalomaniac course imposed on China by its present
Peking leadership, are not in any sense an
adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the complex and
special features of the vast country. Still less are
they the "acme of revolutionary theory,'' as
Mao's followers claim. Rather, they are a
hotchpotch of quasi-revolutionary phrases and
bombastic slogans betraying lack of faith in the
creative capacity of the people and a denial of the
leading role of the proletariat, and put forward
to excuse violence, the cult of personality, and
extreme nationalism. And what is most
important, these are not isolated mistakes such as may
be due to growing-pains or a fresh outbreak of
the infantile disorder of leftism in communism,
but rather a fully-developed system of anti--
Leninist views and a betrayal of the key principles
and objectives of the world communist
movement.
152
__ALPHA_LVL3__
THE POLITICAL CHANGE: ITS CAUSES AND FORMS
 The causes, motive forces and forms of the

political coup the Maoists are trying to bring off
under the guise of the "cultural revolution"
certainly need to be studied and analysed further.
For example, we still have to find satisfactory
explanation of why it was that the Maoists were
able to set off the so-called "cultural revolution,''
destroy much of the former social-political and
state-legal system, and begin to establish the
mechanism of an absolute military-bureaucratic
dictatorship. Why was there no force within the
Party and the state strong enough and sufficiently
well-organised to stand in the way of Mao
Tsetung and his group, to defend the purity of
Marxist-Leninist teachings and provide for China's
successful advance along the socialist road?
 Of course an examination of these questions

will require a most detailed and extensive
analysis of a variety of social factors.
 Notwithstanding their boastful declarations, the

Maoists have not yet managed to achieve
complete victory. Chinese developments connected
with the "cultural revolution" are not yet over.
At the same time it would be useful to
noteeven if only tentatively and touching mainly on
the political-legal sphere-some of the
circumstances that have played an essential part in Chinese
affairs.
 The first thing to point out is the inadequate

general development of the political life in
China, the absence of sufficiently strong traditions
and habits of socialist democratism. This may be
explained in part by the historical past of China
153
whose downtrodden people not only suffered

from semi-feudal forms of exploitation but were
also deprived of elementary rights and liberties
and were oppressed by military cliques and
foreign interference. It is equally noteworthy,
however, that after the Chinese revolution had been
accomplished and people's government
established, not enough was done to end the onerous
legacy of the past. The socialist democratic forms
stipulated in the 1954 Constitution were never
completely realised. Even at the time when they
were most active, representative bodies never
played quite so important a part as they were
legally entitled to. They did not exercise the
necessary control over the executive bodies and
their organisational work among the people, e.g.,
the relations between deputies and constituents,
was nothing more than a formality.
 As is known, Lenin considered the realisation

of democratic principles-such as the raising of
the political and cultural level of the working
people sufficiently to ensure their effective
participation in governmetit-of paramount
importance. Speaking at the 8th Congress of the RCP
(Bolsheviks) he stressed that there remained no
legislative ''. . .hindrances, but so far we have not
reached the stage at which the working people
could participate in government. Apart from the
law, there is still the level of culture, which you
cannot subject to any law.''~^^1^^ In a situation of
this kind the organising and guiding effort of
the Communist Party and socialist state in
developing the political awareness, activities and
initiative of the people becomes particularly
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 29, p. 183. 
154
important. But in China the party and state

development proceeded in such a manner that it
not only failed to further the cause of socialist
democracy but actually held back all progress in
that direction.
 It must be borne in mind that although at the

preceding stages of China's development Mao
Tse-tung had not always revealed his political
schemes and at times had been forced to follow
the Marxist-Leninist line, he had nevertheless
caused considerable harm in the matter of the
formation and building up of people's
government. As the demagogic "big leap" and "
people's communes" policies succeeded one another,
many bodies and institutions were thrown out
of gear, and many thousands of genuine
Communists were dismissed from office and viciously
abused. Nor is it to be left out of account that
Mao's policy led to the isolation and
estrangement of the Party and state from the population
so that the working people came to look at the
state bodies, laws, and even important Party and
government officials as a force hostile to the
people.
 Every now and then the normal course of

political life in China has been interrupted by
vociferous campaigns accompanied by mass-scale
repression. For example, as they were preparing
their "big leap,'' the Maoists launched a "
struggle against the rightist bourgeois elements.'' At
first this seemed to be aimed at the bourgeois
liberal intellectuals from the democratic parties
but soon spread to the Chinese Communist
Party and to government institutions. The campaign
swiftly developed into a mass persecution of
Communists who were sincerely trying to carry out
155
the resolutions of the 8th CPC Congress,

democratise the social and political life and establish
fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries. The policy of "people's
communes" in the countryside, besides dealing
a blow at the agricultural production, actually
caused the destruction of representative bodies
in the countryside and discredited a large
number of local leaders devoted to the Party.
 Not only did the Maoists disregard the need
to observe revolutionary law, but they went out
of their way to paralyse the very institutions
whose function was to strengthen overall civil
discipline and maintain socialist law and order.
As early as the late fifties they started a rabid
persecution of the workers in political and
legal institutions, particularly of the courts,
procurator's offices and the people's control
organisations. Many prominent workers in these
institutions, devoted champions of law and order, were
dismissed from office and branded as "
counterrevolutionary elements" who had wormed
themselves into the Party. During the "big leap" the
fundamentally wrong practice of setting up "task
groups" was started. These groups performed the
combined functions of the courts, procurator's
offices and public security bodies. The
Committee of People's Control, which was established
soon after the victorious revolution and which
rested on the system of local bodies and on the
active citizens as a whole, was first reorganised
into a common ministry, and later on, both
central and local people's control agencies were
finally eliminated.
 Already before the "cultural revolution" the

part played by the system of representative
156
bodies in the country's life was very small. Most

of the important decisions-e.g., on the "big leap"
and "people's communes"-were adopted without
being submitted to the All-China Assembly of
People's Representatives, which was not even
convoked, or to local elected bodies. People's
assemblies were no longer called regularly, their
activities were more and more circumscribed and
finally stopped altogether. Since the launching of
the "big leap" policy, elections to
representative bodies have been held only once, in 1964,
although under the law there should have been
during that time at least two elections to the
AllChina Assembly of People's Representatives and
four, to the local people's assemblies. Real power,
both in the centre and at grassroots level,
gradually shifted to the executive bodies which
became increasingly ponderous and unwieldy, and
pervaded by officialism and sycophancy. State
administration separated itself from the people
by walls of red tape.
 The Communist Party of China continued to

lose its former standards of organisation and
efficiency, forfeiting its prestige among the
working people to a considerable extent because, on
the one hand, the more progressive cadres were
now and again subjected to persecution, being
made the target of ``purges'' and assorted "
campaigns,'' and, on the other hand, because it based
its activities on peremptory army-style commands
and one-man decisions instead of on the state
bodies. The principle "The first secretary of the
Party Committee is the commander-in-chief,''
which the Maoists have propounded in Party
work at all levels since the late fifties and early
sixties, in actual practice meant that many
157
decisions were made by just one individual. This

destroyed confidence in collective leadership, and
at the same time caused the state institutions
to develop a formal, indifferent and irresponsible
attitude.
 All the revolutionary triumphs and socialist

gains of the Chinese were ascribed to Mao, and
all blunders and flops were attributed to the
machinations of his enemies or failure to understand
his "great directives.'' There arose a situation in
China where important Party and government
leaders, whose great services to the people were
well-known, could not-if they objected to Mao's
policies and the actions of his aides-speak out
against the Mao personality cult and had no
option but to support it publicly, often excusing
their particular view by their concern to see the
ideas of "the reddest sun" translated into life
to the very best effect.
 At the beginning of the "cultural revolution"

the Peking leaders increasingly set out to make
use of young people and even schoolchildren,
misrepresenting the outrages perpetrated by the
hungweipings and tsaofans as a largely
spontaneous mass movement. The Maoists deliberately
set these young storm troopers upon their own
real or imaginary opponents, encouraging
savage acts of terrorism. It is significant that in the
widely circulated resolution of the CPC Central
Committee of August 8, 1966, the prospective
hungweipings were granted free pardon in
advance for any crimes and offences they might
commit "in the course of the movement" short of
murder, poisoning, arson, sabotage, theft of state
secrets and counter-revolutionary crimes "
whereof explicit evidence should be available.''
158
 Still, Mao and his followers depended mainly

on the army. China's armed forces played a
decisive role in the progress of events, becoming
the Maoists' "steel wall" and mainstay. It was
not by chance that the army was not broken up,
reorganised or even seriously criticised. The
removal of some military commanders and even
disturbances in some army units were due to the
political purge reflecting the course of events in
China rather than to any other cause. The special
features of the formation, leadership and
ideological guidance of the army were used by the
Maoists, who had seized commanding positions
in the army in good time, to divorce it from the
people and educate it in the spirit of iron
discipline and blind obedience to Mao Tse-tung. In
actual fact, the army has long been independent
of Party and government control and, as
developments have shown, has placed itself above
society.
__ALPHA_LVL3__
PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE MAOIST
 POLITICAL SYSTEM
 What are the characteristics of the Maoist

political system that is developing? Time is sure
to make its corrections in the answer, for the
propensity of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters
for shifting ground and turning right about, for
dealing in demagoguery and just deceiving the
people must naturally leave its mark on China's
social and public life. Notwithstanding this, the
outline of the Maoist dictatorship emerges quite
clearly.
159
 As things stand, political power in China has

been seized by a tiny group led by Mao
Tsetung. This group is controlling the social and
public life and has taken on itself the functions
of the top party and government bodies. From
the standpoint of Chinese constitutional law a
group of this kind cannot be identified with any
of the established institutes of the political
system and chiefly resembles the half-advisory,
halfruling institutions of a monarchy or an absolute
dictatorship. The "Maoist headquarters,'' as the
dictator group is officially described, is a vague
enough notion, not fixed in any legal or other
act; it has neither a clear-cut structure, nor an
apparatus of its own, nor any fixed body of
people. Moreover, the circle of Mao's followers keeps
contracting and extending by turns as the
objectionable ones are kicked out or-as happens
more seldom-those who win back their place by
``repentance'' or zealous prosecution of Maoist
objectives, return.
 Placed at the hub of the entire political

mechanism is "Chairman Mao,'' whose moves and
decisions are never debated. Mao's prestige
serves to cover unprecedented infractions of
democracy and law, savage repression and outrages
against those suspected of "sedition.'' This
inflated prestige is used by the Maoists to ensure
the obedience of the multi-million people. Mao
Tse-tung has appointed Lin Piao, Minister for
Defence, his official successor, as if Mao were a
monarch.
 Liu Shao-chi, who had been elected Chairman

of the Chinese People's Republic under the
Constitution, was persecuted as the "black band
leader,'' "power-holder who follows the capitalist
160
path" and finally removed from all his jobs in

the party and government without the slightest
regard for law. The All-China Assembly of
People's Representatives and its Standing
Committee are no longer convened and have practically
stopped functioning. As for the State Council of
China, it is still carrying on in certain respects
but is kept under strict supervision by the Maoist
ruling clique.
 In the provinces, autonomous areas,

centrallygoverned cities and, more recently, also in the
countries and communes, "revolutionary
committees" have been set up. These have replaced
Party committees as well as local assemblies of
people's representatives and their executive
bodies, people's committees. To all intents and
purposes, the Maoists hope that the "revolutionary
committees,'' described in the Chinese press as
an "outstanding victory of the cultural
revolution,'' will be their ohief support and will provide
the basis for the new political mechanism.
"Revolutionary committees" are formed of
carefully picked ``loyal'' military men, the old cadres,
and representatives of the "revolutionary
masses.'' The leading place in these committees, with
respect both to the number of seats and amount
of influence, is, in most instances, reserved for
the army. The Maoists have been wary of
announcing an election to the "revolutionary
committees,'' although in 1966 they made
declarations to the effect that these new bodies of
power would be elective.
 The army holds a special place in the system

of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship, and the
Peking rulers pay careful attention to keeping it
under control. Today the Chinese armed forces
11--193
161
are not so much concerned with national defence

as with the management of the state, the
economy, and education. They have thus become the
chief instrument of Mao's policies. The army,
which was in the background early in the "
cultural revolution,'' is now setting the pace of China's
social development. With its assistance, Mao
Tsetung crushes his opponents and also deals with
those who, like the hungweipings, used to loom
large in the political scene but then got out of
hand and even became dangerous to the regime.
The army has become the chief means of
maintaining public order and labour discipline, which,
in itself, is without precedent in the history of
world socialism. Army units have invaded the
factories, where, under the guise of Maoist
propaganda, have taken charge of production,
forcing the workers to work without any material
incentive.
 The Mao dictatorship relies on a system of

brutal suppression and intimidation of the people.
Apart from the army, punitive functions are
exercised by a formidable apparatus commanding
numerous prison camps and prisons. The merger
of public security agencies, the courts and people's
procuracy into the "committees for stamping out
counter-revolution" or "departments of
proletarian dictatorship" had been a flagrant violation of
the Constitution. These departments have, from
time to time, staged so-called trials which are
held in absolute contempt of the defendants'
rights. These travesties of trials often terminate
in public executions.
 The military-bureaucratic dictatorship is
propped up by numerous prison camps and prisons.
Besides imprisonment, another current method of
162
suppression practised on a mass scale is the

exiling of city dwellers to the country.
 In the process of rebuilding the political

system the Maoists have uprooted influential and
strong organisations such as the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions and the Young Communist
League. These organisations, which had extensive
revolutionary experience and were devoted to
Marxism-Leninism and friendship with the Soviet
Union, seemed dangerous to the Maoists. Yet,
as they would like to pass off the "cultural
revolution" as a popular movement and draw the
mass of the working people into their gambles,
the Peking leaders have lately started to organise
"work brigades for the propagation of Mao's
ideas.'' These brigades are usually mustered and
directed by servicemen and fulfil auxiliary
functions in restoring order in the provinces. "Work
brigades" are eagerly exploited by the Maoists
who seek to show in this way how loyal they are
to the slogan of working-class leadership. They
also rely on these brigades to get rid of the
hungweipings-so that no blame should attach to the
army-and achieve political stability.
 Recently the Maoist ruling clique set some

schemes on foot concerning the Communist Party
of China. It is well known that during the "
cultural revolution" the CPC had to take many hard
knocks. More than 130 of 174 members and
candidate members of the CPC Central Committee
elected by the 8th Congress were subjected to
persecution. The Political Bureau and Secretariat
are not functioning. Party committees in the
provinces, autonomous regions, towns and communes
are paralysed. The "cultural revolution group"
while claiming to speak on behalf of the Party,
11*
163
actually set the hungweipings and tsaofans upon

the Party and attacked and took repressive action
against Communist Party officials. However, in
late 1968, the Peking leaders started on another
course, setting out to purge the Party, substitute
Maoism for Marxism-Leninism, replenish the
Party by recruiting new members from among
the tsaofans, restructure the Party apparatus and
make further use of the army style of work. They
want to turn the Party into an obedient tool.
They mean to turn to account the Party's
revolutionary past, its distinguished liberation-war
record, its prestige among the working people,
and its immense organisational and educational
potential. For all practical purposes, what they
are setting up in China under the name of the
Communist Party of China is a new political
organisation which is intended to serve as a
support for Maoist rule.
 Soviet State and Law, No. 5, 1969
[164]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Maoism Preaches Poverty
 A Arzamastseu
 Poverty is not an inevitable accompaniment of

mankind's development. It is unavoidable only
as long as the productive forces are not
sufficiently developed and the economy has not risen above
a production level that meets only immediate
needs. Exploitation in class society, new
requirements and the accumulation of wealth aggravate
poverty and awaken in the people a desire to put
an end to oppression and privation. However,
insufficient economic development has for a long
time prevent the possibility of discovering the
correct way for ending poverty. This became
possible only when Marxism came into being in the
middle of the 19th century. Till then numerous
Utopias were evolved in a futile attempt to
discover the laws of social development.
 Solution of this problem is a complex and

contradictory process. The developed production is
certainly essential for the elimination of
inequality and poverty. Historical experience shows,
however, that advanced production in itself
cannot bring about social harmony. It is necessary
only to consider the example of the USA. The
social factor is no less important. On the other
hand, the beneficial effect of the social element
may be negligible in the absence of sufficient
material prerequisites. The basic mistake of most
Utopian projects was precisely this:
overestimation of the social factor and underestimation of
the material one. Many Utopians saw the source
165
of social evils in the sphere of distribution of the

good things of life. They asserted that the wealth
created by human labour should immediately be
made the property of all on an equal basis. This
demand was best expressed by the sort of
egalitarian communism which praised, for the sake of
primitive equality, the "noble simplicity" of the
poor who have no requirements, rejected culture,
proclaimed the primacy of village over town, and
regimented everyday life. This doctrine was first
advanced by the preachers of early Christian
communities. In the Middle Ages it was promoted
by Thomas Mvinzer, and in modern times by
Tammaso Campanella, Gabriel Mably, Domenico
Morelli and other Utopian Communists. The
bourgeois egalitarian socialism of William
Godwin and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon is in spirit close
to this doctrine. However, the experience of
primitively-communist sects, fraternities, towns and
communities of various epochs proves that such
equality is unattainable. Economic and ideological
alienation assumed unheard-of dimensions in
these communities. The worker had to be satisfied
with the bare minimum, while his whole life
depended on the authorities.
 The current revival of certain features of

primitive communism in China, as reflected in the
policy of the "people's communes,'' the "both
worker and peasant" course, the setting up of
self-sufficient, autarkic economic cells and the
"introduction of rationally lower wages and
salaries,'' presents a vain attempt to solve the
problem of poverty and hunger with the help of the
outdated and fallacious concept of levelling.
 Only socialism which unites the material and

social factors is capable of resolving this
166
problem and ending poverty. Socialist revolution cuts

the very roots of poverty and ends the glaring
inequality of people. The all-round development
of production and the attainment on this basis
of complete social homogeneity are essential for
the elimination of poverty. To achieve this takes
more than good intentions, since production has
its own laws of development. One must have
certain capital, establish a new labour discipline and
a new organisation of labour, teach people new
skills and techniques and make the workers
interested in the results of their efforts.
 The only way to get rid of poverty is through

creating a more advanced mode of production and
through raising labour productivity.
 Beginning the reorganisation of production

presents great difficulties, especially in economically
backward countries where a socialist revolution
has occurred. The discrepancy between the
advanced socio-political system and the poor
economic base may result in grave complications,
and even in the loss of the socialist gains. The
efforts of the working class in fighting the
imminent dangers and endeavouring to get
production going are opposed by all the evils and
difficulties inherited from the past-an underdeveloped
economy, famine, poverty and the resultant
demoralisation of certain sections of the people,
and their loss of interest in work. This is what
the young Soviet Republic experienced just after
the revolution. The imperialist war followed by
the civil war had completely disrupted the
country's feeble economy. Famine and economic
dislocation threatened to destroy the world's first
socialist state. Higher labour productivity was the
only way out, but labour productivity was falling
167
steadily, and factories and plants were closing

down because of famine. Lenin wrote: "We get
a sort of vicious circle: in order to raise
productivity of labour we must save ourselves from
starvation, and in order to save ourselves from
starvation we must raise productivity of labour.''~^^1^^
 The republic could not count on external

economic aid. It had to rely on its own strength to
break the vicious circle. The strength came from
the revolutionary enthusiasm of the people who
made sacrifices in the name of victory and a
better future. The accomplishment of tasks, which
would be unthinkable at other times, is made
possible by revolutionary heroism each time a new
social system is born. The October Socialist
Revolution evoked an unprecedented enthusiasm.
For the first time in history people were
making a revolution for themselves, and for the
first time in history they had real opportunity to
display their capabilities. The heroism at the
fronts of the civil war was rivalled by the
heroism of the workers in the rear, of which the
communist subbotniks were only one example.
Conscientious work had a great effect on the
economic life of the country. It raised labour
productivity and improved labour discipline.
 An atmosphere of general inspiration and the

readiness of the working people to sacrifice
themselves at the initial stage creates the impression
that revolutionary enthusiasm is enough to put
an end to all difficulties. "... We expected to
accomplish economic tasks just as great as the
political and military tasks we had accomplished by
relying directly on this enthusiasm,'' Lenin said.~^^2^^
_-_-_
~^^2^^ Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. S3, p. 58.
168
However, ``pure'' heroism cannot last forever,

and Lenin saw the danger in time. In his speech
at the combined meeting of the delegates of the
8th Congress of Soviets and members of the
AllRussia and Moscow Councils of Trade Unions
who were also members of the Russian
Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on December 30,1920,
Lenin pointed to the need and importance of
material incentive for shock work: "The preference
part of priority implies preference in
consumption as well. Otherwise, priority is a pipe dream,
a fleeting cloud, and we are, after all, materialists.
The workers are also materialists; if you say
shock work, they say, let's have the bread, and
the clothes, and the beef.''~^^1^^
 It was enthusiasm, bolstered as far as possible

by material incentive, that made it possible to
break the vicious circle. This was an important
discovery of Marxism. The combination of moral
and material stimuli will remain an effective
lever of economic development till the time when
communism is built.
 The problem of socialist changes also faced

China after the 1949 socialist revolution. Its
economy was then even more backward than that of
Russia in 1917. The pulse-beat of economic life
could hardly be felt after the many years of
Japanese occupation and the civil war. The few
undamaged industrial enterprises were lost in the
ocean of primitive farm production, and were
unable to exert any noticeable influence. The
feeble links between various parts of the country
were breaking. Famine was rife. The Communist
Party of China set about the task of ending the
_-_-_
169
famine, the poverty and the rural backwardness,

and of attaining abundance. The external
conditions were favourable. The country received
comprehensive economic, cultural and military
assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries. Neither was popular enthusiasm
lacking. The vast country began socialist
construction. Factories and plants were rehabilitated and
reconstructed, and new industries were built with
the help of the Soviet Union. The moral uplift and
material incentive promoted labour productivity
and a new labour discipline. By following this
road China could build an advanced socialist
economy in a few decades. There were no
insurmountable obstacles in the way, since socialism
met the basic demands of both the working class
and the peasantry. The danger lay elsewhere.
 Under certain conditions politics is known to

conflict temporarily with its economic base and
hinder its development. State leadership in China
fell into the hands of people whose petty--
bourgeois views and sentiments kept them from
becoming true Marxists. The initial successes in
China and the people's willingness to work
selflessly for the common cause evoked adventurist
leanings in the leadership who sought to ignore
the laws of social development, which is so
characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie. Primitive
petty-bourgeois mentality raised to the level of
ideology culminated in voluntarism, the
personality cult, nationalism and anti-Sovietism.
 Lenin's tested formula for successful socialist

development-enthusiasm plus material
incentivehas been altered by Mao Tse-tung to enthusiasm
plus poverty. The new formula flatly rejects all
material incentive, making enthusiasm the one
170
and only motive force. Mao Tse-tung's variety
of enthusiasm is evidently devoid of the element
of awareness and reason and borders on
fanaticism. Although exaltation whipped up by extreme
nationalism can take hold of a section of the
population, mostly the youth, it cannot be universal
or lasting. Reality with its daily cares is a
sobering factor, and the intoxication cannot last.
 The second half of the formula, poverty, is

inseparable from the first. A person seized by ``
super-revolutionary'' enthusiasm, according to Mao,
need not and should not possess any material
benefits beyond the bare minimum. Poverty should be
part of universal self-denial.
 It is no accident that the Maoists have made

use of this idea. Poverty and equality have been
always regarded by the oppressed as being as
closely related as their opposites-wealth and
inequality. All egalitarian Utopias emphasise and
praise poverty as the key requisite of universal
equality. Poverty was lauded by Proudhon, one
of the founders of petty-bourgeois egalitarian
socialism, who even developed an economic theory
to justify the perpetuity of poverty. He held that
nature had given man two opposed qualities-a
limitless capacity to consume and a limited
capacity to work. Poverty was therefore claimed
to be man's natural condition to which man must
reconcile himself. "It is clear that we cannot even
think of escaping tihis poverty-tHie law of our
nature and our society,'' wrote Proudhon. "Poverty
is a boon, and should be regarded as the basis
of our joys.''~^^1^^ This was said over a hundred
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ P. J. Proudhon, Poverty as an Economic Principle,

Moscow, 1908, p. 16.
171
years ago, at the time of the first industrial

revolution, and is being repeated by Mao Tse-tung
in the age of atomic energy and of turbulent
scientific and technological advancement.
 In Maoism the Leninist principle of material

incentive gives way to the idealisation of "
poverty.'' But can poverty as it exists in real life serve
as a stimulus to work? Poverty means hunger,
cold, disease, stupefaction, humiliation, and a
degree of dehumanisation to which man could
never be Teconciled. It invariably evokes protest,
bitterness and resistance. Work becomes senseless
when it fails to provide a tolerable living for the
worker. Real poverty does not go together with
construction, least of all socialist construction.
Mao Tse-tung advanced his own "programme of
attitude" to poverty, praising poverty as a
blessing. He stated: "In addition to its other special
features, the 600-million population of China is
conspicuous for its poverty. This may seem bad
but is in fact good. Poverty calls for changes,
action, revolution. On a spotlessly clean sheet of
paper one can write the most beautiful
hieroglyphs, create the newest and most beautiful
pictures.''~^^1^^
 So the way out of the difficulty was to accept

poverty, to adorn it with a halo of sanctity and
nobility, to turn it into something to be sought
after and carried with pride and delight by
everyone. Only then would it become a source of joy,
creative quest, selfless labour and heroism.
__FIX__ Look for underlining within a certain distance

of a footnote region bar. 2007.12.29.
 Having received this instruction of Mao's, the

Chinese ideological machine swung into action.
Its main job now was to create a new type of
worker who would labour for the good of society,
_-_-_
 ~^^1^^ Hungchi, "About One Cooperative,'' 1958, No. 1.
172
demanding no material remuneration. All

newspapers, magazines and the radio joined in the
drive to `èmancipate'' the individual. The purpose
was to instil in people an aversion to material
well-being, comfort and cultural advancement-to
free their souls from the "chimeras of
civilisation."' The ideal held up was for a man to reduce
his requirements to the bare minimum, the
resulting vacuum to be filled with love for the leader
and nationalistic ravings about the hegemony of
the "Greater China.'' Such a person should derive
consolation for the loss of material and cultural
benefits from the grandeur and might of his
country.
 It is obviously a case of wishful thinking when

the Chinese press serves the reader with
numerous instances of cures from egoism and greed.
For example: "Formerly one young
communemember would not do hard work and was angry
when he was given very few work-units.
Recently, when the commune-members had to bring
fertilizer from a place 13 kilometres away, he
brought more than 50 kilograms on a yoke. He
was asked: 'How many units do you want this
time?' He replied: 'I don't care for work-units
any more, for I am tilling the land in the name
of the revolution.'~"~^^1^^ The commune member
completely suppressed his egoism and got rid of the
state of dissatisfaction which people erroneously
call poverty~!
 Poverty is often unavoidable in the transitional

stage between capitalism and socialism. But Mao
presents poverty as being a desirable state in
itself. Poverty is claimed to be a force that will
lead people to communism. To be sure, this is
_-_-_
 ~^^1^^ China Reconstructs, 1968, No. 9, p. 40.
173
not the communism o£ which millions dream and

which the classics of Marxism prophesied, but a
"special Chinese communism.'' The "great
helmsman" visualises the road to it as a road of
moral purification from the vice of material and
cultural requirements. The kingdom of ``pure''
communism will come when people do away with
all ``revisionist'' survivals, learn to make do with
little, and get rid of their personal interests; when
class distinctions will be removed and social
equality achieved. "And the objective world
which is to be remoulded,'' Mao Tse-tung wrote
in his article On Practice, "includes the
opponents of remoulding, who must undergo a
stage ot compulsory remoulding (i.e. the
recalcitrants should go to concentration camps or do
field work in remote areas-A A.) before they
can pass to a stage of conscious remoulding.
When the whole of mankind consciously remoulds
itself and changes the world, the era of world
communism will dawn." ^^1^^ (Emphasis added-A. A.}
When speaking of communism, Mao does not say
a word about economic development or the
improvement of living standards. This is only
to be expected, since his kind of communism "is
not far distant.'' To achieve it the working people
only have to perform a revolution in their souls.

 It is not our intention to belittle the importance
of "consciously transforming oneself.''
Communism is not all economy, well-being and cultural
development. It is also a highly organised society.
But to reduce one's "conscious transformation"
to ascetic self-sacrifice and mortification of the
flesh and spirit means to violate the human and
social nature of man. Man's awareness and
_-_-_
 ~^^1^^ Mao Tse-tung, Sel. Works, L., 1954, Vol. 1, p. 297.
174
discipline should manifest themselves, not in

suppressing the acquired cultural demands but in
regarding himself as a creator and master who
is responsible for everything that takes place in
society.
 History of social thought knows numerous

instances of the artificial transformation of real,
objective hardship-the constant companion of the
working man in the world of private
propertyinto exclusively subjective, idealised hardship
existing only in the human brain. To remove such
hardship is not at all difficult-switch your thought
to something else and you will attain peace of
mind and tranquillity. This is how the German
Young Hegelians, the Bauer brothers, and their
followers in their time fought the Prussian
feudal reality. They held that the evils plaguing the
workers existed only in the minds of the
sufferers. Real life remains outside the field of
vision of philistine philosophers, its investigation
being unworthy of a thinker. The consciousness
of select personalities is proclaimed the creative
force of history. Its beneficial influence on the
uncritical consciousness of workers will, it is
claimed, finally free the working people from the
slavery of their own ideas, and make them change
their opinion of themselves and the world around
them. After this metamorphosis society will
arrive at socialism.
 The methodological basis of such

transformations is speculative dialectics. Real poverty as a
phenomenon alienated from man is taken only
in a speculative form and is abstracted into
"poverty in general.'' This category is then
considered as an independent entity. After that,
hunger, privation, and disease, as manifestations of
175
real poverty, are easily made into the products of

our imagination. As a result we have, on the one
hand, the general concept of poverty existing as
an independent entity outside the human world,
and, on the other, various kinds of poverty
(hunger, privation, etc.) born of "poverty in
general.'' Having performed this operation, the
critical philosopher finds himself in a purely
theoretical medium, beyond the confines of reality. It
is not so hard for the speculative ideologist to
attain any victory he chooses, such as turning
poverty into a blessing. All it takes is for a
worker to put out of his mind the thought that he is
poor. Marx pointed out that this bravery of the
Young Hegelians stemmed from Hegelian
idealism. "He (Hegel-A A.) stands the world on its
head and can therefore dissolve in the head all
the limitations which naturally remain in
existence for evil sensuousness, for real man.''~^^1^^ But
Hegel was a great thinker, and his speculative
contradictions often contained "elements of the
true characteristic of human relations;" the
Young Hegelians were pygmies. That is why the
speculative method of Bruno Bauer and his circle
was a caricature of Hegel's method, devoid of
any understanding of the dialectics of social life.

 Let us turn to Mao Tse-tung. To give a

semblance of scientific substantiation to the idea that
poverty becomes a blessing, the "great
helmsman" also uses or, rather, abuses, dialectics. His
sayings, couched in Marxist terms, sound very
much like the maxims of ancient Chinese
philosophers. That is why a comparison of the Young
_-_-_
~^^1^^ K. Marx and F. Engels, The Holy Family, M. 1956,

p. 254.
176
Hegelian and Maoist dialectics can only be made

on the basis of Mao's final conclusions. In his
speech at the llth enlarged sitting of the Supreme
State Conference on February 27, 1957, Mao
said: "In certain conditions bad may lead to good
results and good, in its turn, may lead to bad
results.'' (Mao Tse-tung, On the Question of
the Correctly Resolving Contradictions Within
the People, M., 1957, p. 43.) Mao illustrates this
thesis by the following examples:
 The counter-revolution in Hungary was bad,

but it became good in the process of its
suppression. Hungary got rid of its enemies and grew
stronger,
 Japan's attack on China was bad. But China

learned a great deal in the course of the war and
was victorious. Thus a bad thing became good.
 It will be bad if a third world war breaks out.

But a nuclear war conflagration will finally do
away with the capitalist world, and that is good. ..
If one is to employ this kind of logic, not only
poverty, but also war, counter-revolution and
disease can be made out to be good things! In
other words, everything that brings misfortune to
people, particularly to working people, and which
they vigorously resist, is, according to Mao, a
source of future happiness. Now we can
understand these words of Mao's: "It is terrible to
think of the time when all people will become
rich.'' To him this would mean the end of
development, for "only poverty calls for change,
action, revolution.'' According to Mao, it follows
that not the striving to end poverty, but poverty
itself, is an inexhaustible source of creative energy
and progress.
There is nothing scientific about this reasoning,
12--193
177
not even a thought to exclude or prevent what is

bad. The arch-dialectical verbiage camouflages a
plain statement of facts and the unwillingness to
analyse them in all their complexity.
 The ideal of a poor worker, "as undemanding

as a pumpkin,'' capable of limiting his
requirements and making do with very little, meets with
little sympathy among workers and intellectuals.
Since not everybody was as quick of
comprehension as Chairman Mao would like, and the souls
of many had been thoroughly permeated with
``capitalist'' and ``revisionist'' delusions, the Mao
clique had to class them as enemies of ``
communism'' and subject them to the severe repression
prescribed by the demands of the "stage of
transformation based on coercion.'' Concentration
camps were set up all over the country. Millions
of people familiar with any cultural and
technological achievements, with the fundamentals of
Marxist-Leninist philosophy, are being banished
from towns for "re-education by labour" in the
village. Barracks discipline is introduced at
factories and in rural communes, and civil
administration is replaced by military rule. In
keeping with the so-called principle of unity of
industry, agriculture and military service, everyone
is obliged, besides his main occupation, to work
in agriculture (if he is an industrial worker) or
in industry (if he is a peasant), and also to
undergo military training. Conscious discipline is
out of the question and order at production
enterprises is maintained exclusively through non--
economic coercion. The military uniform is an
indispensable part of every working collective. The
private life of every Chinese is strictly
regimented. He must devote all his free time to studying
178
the leader's maxims. Everything that might

remind people of material or cultural values is to
be destroyed. Monuments are being pulled down,
books are being destroyed, and musical works are
prohibited. Universal levelling is also reflected in
clothing-blue trousers and a buttoned-up cloth or
quilted jacket have become a compulsory uniform
for everybody. This is how the ideals of egalitarian
communism are put into practice and a regimented
society is created.
 The attempt to establish barrack-room

communism in a country which had social ownership
of the means of production naturally invited
several questions ~. Why did Mao Tse-tung select
poverty as a means of implementing his
adventurist plans? Is egalitarian communism possible in
practice?
 The preaching of asceticism, and of universal

poverty as the most effective means of ending
social inequality, accompanied many actions of
peasants and artisans in the Middle Ages
(T. Miinzer, the Taborite movement in Bohemia,
etc.). It was also present in the first actions of
the proletariat (the Babouvists). So strong were
these sentiments that Marx paid considerable
attention to this trend in communist thinking at
the beginning of his socio-political activity when
his materialist and communist outlook was
taking shape. He devoted one chapter of his 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts ot 1844 to
the criticism of egalitarian communism. Marx's
basic idea was that this primitive communism,
with its praiseworthy intention of doing away
with private property and creating a just society,
had not gone beyond, had in fact not even
attained to, private property. It strove not to master
12*
179
all the wealth created in conditions of

predominant private property, not to transform and
greatly expand the economic, political and cultural
base of man's liberation from exploitation, of
satisfying the requirements of people, and of the
fuller manifestation of their abilities, but, on the
contrary, to discard everything that had been
achieved. The reason given for this attitude is
that the available material and cultural benefits
cannot be shared by all because of the limited
means required for their production. Hence the
rejection of culture and talent for the sake of
primitive, arithmetical equality. The negative
attitude of egalitarian communism to private
property is nothing but envy by poor private
property of the richer private property. "How little this
annulment of private property is really an
appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract
negation of the entire world of culture and
civilisation, the regression to the unnatural simplicity of
the poor and undemanding man who has not only
failed to go beyond private property, but has not
yet even attained to it,'' wrote Marx, adding that
crude egalitarian communism is "in its first form
only a generalisation and consummation of this
relationship.''~^^1^^ That is why it reflects all the
iniquity of the old world. Work is not an end in
itself in this society but a means of obtaining
a certain amount of food. A guaranteed food
minimum becomes the only aim in life, the
summit of happiness. The production of life's
necessities (bread, vegetables, etc.) is accordingly
declared the most important activity. Physical
_-_-_
~^^1^^ K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,

M., 1967, pp. 93, 94.
180
labour is opposed to mental work as the only
worthy occupation. The individual is reduced to the
state of a dumb animal blindly following the
orders of the leader of its herd. Under such a
``communism'' equality in work and income does
not compensate for a man's loss of individuality
and the wealth of multi-faceted activity aimed
at transforming the world.
 Marx said that the transfer of private property

to common ownership would be accomplished by
a communism which would keep intact all the
wealth of previous development and would
return "man to himself as a social (i.e. human)
man.''~^^1^^ The necessity of its establishment is
conditioned by the entire history of industrial
development. Incomplete communism of the
egalitarian kind looks backwards, not forwards, in
proving its right to existence, and seeks
justification in the existing state of affairs. It cannot
count on the future and is destined to share the
fate of private property whose prisoner it is. The
universal spread of poverty does not save
mankind from social upheavals. ".. .and. with 
destitution,'' wrote Marx and Engels, "the struggle
for necessities and all the old filthy business
would necessarily be reproduced.''~^^2^^
 Ideas of equal distribution have been

appearing in countries with mainly small-scale
production both in agriculture and industry, where
abundance of products is only a dream. They
have always held a place of prominence in
_-_-_
~^^1^^ K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,

M., 1967, p. 95.
~^^2^^ K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, M., 1964,

p. 46.
181
Chinese social Utopia. To many progressive thinkers

egalitarianism and poverty seemed the only way
of ending hunger and oppression. These ideas are
to be found in the works of the ancient Chinese
philosophers, Lao-tse and Mo-tse, and of the
thinkers of modern times, such as Kung Tse-chen,
Hung Hsiu-chuan and others. Still fresh in the
people's memory is the first peasant state, Tai
Ping Tien kuo-the Heavenly State of Great
Welfare (1851--64)-where the first attempt was made
to introduce equality in land tenure. Hung
Hsiuchuan, the ideologist and leader of the Taiping
uprising, wrote: "It is necessary that all
inhabitants of the Heavenly Empire enjoy equally and
jointly the great happiness granted by our true
master, the heavenly father, the Lord God; that
land be tilled jointly, that food be taken together,
that clothing be used and money expended
jointly. Equality must be observed everywhere, all
should be properly fed and clothed.''~^^1^^ Taiping
laws obliged every peasant family to give the
entire harvest to the state without compensation,
saving only what was absolutely necessary. The
surplus thus collected was distributed among artisans
in towns and used for the upkeep of the army and
administration. This organisation of life evoked no
protest among the masses in view of the
everpresent danger of returning to bondage under
landlords.
 The ideals of egalitarian communism played a

progressive role in feudal times. The idea of
universal equality was an immense mobilising force
among the poorest peasants, based as it was on
the demand to confiscate the landlords' land. The
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Selected Works of Progressive Chinese Thinkers of the

Modern Times, M., 1961, p. 69.
182
peasant uprisings undermined the foundations of

feudalism and prepared conditions for the
emergence of new social relations.
 The Maoists' dependence on poverty as an

accelerator of economic development, and their
narrow petty-bourgeois interpretation of communism
as egalitarian, barrack-room communism, doom
the people as a whole to privation and misery.
"Regression to the unnatural simplicity of the
poor and undemanding man" is contrary to the
human and social nature of modern man, and it
shackles his freedom and conscious activity by
restricting it exclusively to the satisfaction of
primitive needs. This activity cannot be a life
necessity for the individual. It becomes instead a
coercive force, a heavy burden, something that is
devoid of any creative element. In this case the
development of production cannot be promoted
either by poverty, or by "big leaps,'' or by "
cultural revolution.''
 This "vicious circle" can be broken only by
recognising human dignity. Full development of
all aspects of human life can be ensured only by
socialism whose productive efforts will be used,
in Lenin's words, not only to meet the daily
needs "but with the object of ensuring full
wellbeing and free, all-round development for all the
members of society.''~^^1^^ The half-century history
of socialism has borne out this thesis of Lenin's.
The great accomplishments in science, technology
and culture are the fruits of the labour of the new
man whose interests coincide with the final goal
of the socialist mode of production. "The scientific
conception of communism has nothing in common
_-_-_
183
either with the pharisical ``philosophy'' of poverty

as a ``blessing'' or with the bourgeois-philistine
cult of things. Material wealth in the Marxist--
Leninist understanding is created to satisfy the
reasonable requirements of people and is a necessary
prerequisite for the development of human
abilities, for the individual to find fulfilment.''~^^1^^ The
attempt to revive egalitarian communism in the
epoch of the triumphant ideas of scientific
communism and of the scientific and technological
revolution, can only be viewed as a reactionary
petty-bourgeois Utopia.
 Philosophical Sciences, No. 3, 1971
_-_-_
~^^1^^ On the Centenary of the Birth of V. 1, Lenin. Theses of

the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, M., p. 54.
[184]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Great-Power Chauvinism
 of Mao Tse-tung
 T. Rakhimou, V. Bogoslovsky
 The "cultural revolution" in the Chinese

People's Republic demonstrated that the country's
outlying areas were the most troublesome for its
organisers. For instance, Tibet and Sinkiang were
thê last provinces in the country to set up the
so-called revolutionary committees. This
happened on September 5, 1968. Official press reports
still carry warnings to the effect that "class
enemies there have refused to accept their defeat
and continue to hinder the country's progress to
socialism.''
 The Maoists find it difficult to effectively

administer the outlying areas inhabited by
nonChinese nationalities, not just because they lie
far from Peking, but mainly because the local
people know from long and bitter experience the
meaning of the "nationalities policy" pursued by
Mao Tse-tung and his group.
 Relations between nationalities in a multi--

national state are always complicated. And China,
with her more than 100 nationalities and ethnic
groups numbering a total of nearly 45 million
people, has a formidable problem. All these
peoples are officially referred to as "national
minorities.'' But many of them, such, for instance, as
the Uigurs (4 million people), Mongolians (1.5
mln), Tibetans (3 mln), Chuangs (nearly 8 mln)
live in compact groups and outnumber other
nationalities over large areas. Their histories span
185
centuries, and they have had long periods of

independent development. Most of the non-Chinese
peoples differ greatly from the Hans (the Chinese)
both ethnically and culturally. They also profess
different faiths.
 The Chinese state became multi-national in the

course of centuries of conquest. The annexed
lands were intensively colonised. Meanwhile the
conquered nations were partly exterminated and
partly assimilated by the Chinese. This naturally
caused the non-Chinese peoples to distrust the
Chinese.
 All this made it necessary for the Communist

Party of China and the state to proceed with
caution in dealing with the nationalities question,
to take the interests of all peoples inhabiting
Chinese territory into account, and to strictly
observe Marxist-Leninist theses on the
nationalities question.
 In the early years of the People's Republic of
China, when Communist-internationalists still
predominated in the CPC and the Mao group had
not yet thrust its openly chauvinistic course on
the Party leadership, a great deal was done to
raise the living standards and the cultural level
of the non-Chinese peoples. A number of
industrial enterprises were built in the areas populated
by the minorities, an agrarian reform was carried
out and schools and health facilities were opened.
State and Party authorities of the PRC worked
out a positive programme for solving the
nationalities question. "All nationalities are equal,'' said
Article 3 of the Constitution of the PRC (1954).
"Discrimination against, or oppression of, any
nationality, and acts which undermine the unity
of the nationalities are prohibited.'' The Party
186
Rules adopted by the 8th Congress in 1956

demanded: "The Communist Party of China must
make special efforts to raise the status of the
national minorities, help them to attain self--
government, endeavour to train cadres from among the
national minorities, accelerate their economic and
cultural advance, bring about complete equality
between all the nationalities and strengthen the
unity and fraternal relations among them. . .
Special attention must be paid to the prevention and
correction of tendencies of great-Hanism on the
part of Party members and government workers
of Han nationality.''
 All this seemed to tend towards solving the

nationalities question in the PRC. But great-power
chauvinistic tendencies, affecting the legal status
of the non-Chinese nationalities in particular,
made themselves increasingly felt in the policy
of the Chinese leadership.
 From the very first these peoples, numbering

45 million, were denied the right to self--
determination, to statehood. They were granted so-called
regional autonomy. "The People's Republic of
China,'' says Article 3 of the Constitution, "is a
unified multi-national state. . . Regional autonomy
applies in areas entirely or largely inhabited by
national minorities. The national autonomous
areas are an inalienable part of the People's
Republic of China.''
 But the status of "regional autonomy" (an

empty word since autonomous regions are as ``
independent'' as provinces) was granted only to
five (out of the one hundred) national minorities.
Among the nationalities denied this right are the
Yitsu (3.3 mln), Miao (2.5 mln), Manchurians
(2.4 mln), Koreans (1.2 mln).
187
But even the peoples (the Tibetans, Uigurs,

Tungans, Mongolians, Chuangs) that were
nominally granted the right to "regional autonomy"
were allocated territories demarcated in a rather
peculiar way. The Tibetan people were actually
torn apart, and less than half of them now live in
the Tibetan Autonomous Region while the rest
reside in the provinces of Chinghai, Szechwan
and Yunnan. The Mongolians in `àutonomous''
Inner Mongolia constitute a mere 10 per cent of
the local population and may be rightly called a
national minority.
 These great-power tendencies in treating the

nationalities question have become predominant
since the about-turn in domestic and foreign
policies of the Mao group in the late 1950's. The
"cultural revolution" made it clear that the CPC
policy vis-a-vis the nationalities inhabiting China
is to ``sinoise'' them against their will.
 The non-Chinese peoples are all but divested

of political rights. All the people's committees
called upon to represent the interests of the
national minorities, have been dissolved. Power has
been transferred to the so-called revolutionary
committees set up by the army command on
Peking's orders and under complete army control.
The "revolutionary committees" are headed by
Chinese. Thus the "revolutionary committee" of
Inner Mongolia is under Teng Haiching, one-time
Deputy Commander of the Peking Military Area,
that of the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous
Regionunder Lun Shu-chin, former commander of the
Hunan Military Area.
 Acts of repression on a mass scale and

persecution of the local cadres, party functionaries,
statesmen, intellectuals have become commonplace.
188
The mass drive to eliminate the so-called Rightist

deviation and Pan-Turkism was let loose in 1958
in the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region. Many
people were slandered and victimised, among
them Liya Samedi, a prominent Uigur writer.
Chairman of the local Writers' Union, Ibrahim
Turdy, a poet, Abdurahim Saidi, mayor of
Urumchi, and Ganibatyr, a revolutionary and a staunch
fighter for the people's cause during the time of
the Kuomintang.
 There was wide-spread persecution of the

national minorities during the "cultural revolution.''
Practically all the intelligentsia and Party and
state cadres of the minorities were accused of
counter-revolutionary activities and complicity
with imperialism and "Soviet revisionism.''
Among those victimised are Ulanfu, Chairman of
the People's Committee of the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region, and Alternate Politbureau
Member of the CC CPC, and Iminov, Vice--
Chairman of the People's Committee of the
SinkiangUigur Autonomous Region.
 The notorious "big leap" and the "people's

communes" had an even more harmful effect on
the minorities than on China at large. Production
slumped at the few factories that were in
existence. Farm production declined and famine struck
whole regions.
 The economy of China's outlying areas is

largely colonial in character. The few industrial
enterprises are either put to military use, or the
products they manufacture are shipped to the
country's central areas. The engineers and skilled
workers they employ are the Chinese settlers
from central areas. The local nationalities do
unskilled arduous jobs only. In this way the
189
advancement of the working class in the country's

outlying areas is intentionally retarded.
 The only type of construction still undertaken

there is the building of strategic roads, air fields,
and atomic-weapon testing grounds. Non-Chinese
peoples are forced to work on these projects en
masse.
 Communes were set up in the areas populated

by the minorities in order to seize as much as
possible of their produce so as to feed and clothe
the countless thousands of Chinese soldiers
stationed in the national areas, and to supply the
big cities.
 The migration of the Chinese to the national
areas undermines the economy of those areas and
lowers the status of the local population. The
Chinese in the Sinkiang-Uigur and Tibet areas
now constitute approximately half the local
population. The proportion of Mongolians in Inner
Mongolia has been halved. The settlers are given
the best plots in Sinkiang where there has always
been a shortage of arable land. In Inner Mongolia
pastures are being put to the plough to provide
new settlers with land.
 According to official propaganda the Chinese

are being resettled en masse, and most of the 25
million citizens being sent to the countryside will
go to the national areas. Calls to revert to the
communes of the "big leap" period are becoming
more frequent.
 By colonising the outlying areas, the Maoist

group does not merely seek to ``relieve'' the
country's central areas of ``redundant'' people, or
get rid of trouble-makers. The mass migrations
of the Chinese have the objective of turning the
local populations into national minorities by
190
saturating the resettlement areas with the Hans,

thereby preparing the ground for an eventual
assimilation of the non-Chinese peoples. Nor do the
Maoists intend to postpone the assimilation, and
measures are being undertaken to that end. On
numerous occasions girls of Uigur, Kazakh,
Tibetan and other nationalities have been compelled
to marry Chinese on pain of severe punishment.

 But measures towards ``cultural'' assimilation

are even more serious.
 For years now the languages other than

Chinese have been "sinoised.'' The minorities are
forced to adopt the Chinese script, and not only
internationally accepted words, but also the basic
vocabularies are being superceded by the Chinese
vocabulary. The minorities are no more taught
their native languages at school. One of the
charges levelled against Ulanfu was that he demanded
that the Mongolian language be taught at
national schools at least on a par with Chinese.
 The Maoists have even worked out "theoretical

premises" towards assimilating the non-Chinese
peoples. In 1960 Sinkiang Hungchi wrote that the
nationalities of the PRC were merging into a
single entity on the basis of the Chinese
nationality. It was echoed by Sinkiang jihpao which went
so far as to claim that the assimilation was
"Marxist and communist.'' "Those who oppose
such assimilation oppose socialism, communism
and historical materialism.'' These are not empty
words. Those who demand that modern industry
be built in the outlying areas, that a working
class be formed there, that local engineering and
managerial personnel be trained and national
cultures promoted, are branded as exponents of
``black'' views and supporters for "an open
191
revision of the fundamental principles of

MarxismLeninism.'' The implications of such charges are
clear enough.
 It is very easy to see the essential difference

between Marxist-Leninist theses on mutual
rapprochement and the ultimate merging of nations
and these distorted "theories.'' The Maoists
deliberately confuse the rapprochement of nations
(which occurs in the period of socialist and
communist construction during the full-scale
economic and cultural advancement of socialist
nations) with the merging of nations, which will
lead to the creation of a single world language
and culture on the basis of many languages and
cultures. This can only happen after communism
triumphs throughout the world.
 In this connection it is significant that the new

Party Rules adopted at the so-called 9th Party
Congress make no mention of the nationalities
policy or the non-Chinese peoples. The Maoists
make believe that non-Chinese peoples no longer
exist in the PRC, that they have already been
assimilated.
 It is only natural that the great-power,

chauvinistic policy pursued by Mao and his group is
encountering the growing resistance of the
nonChinese peoples, which often takes the form of
armed action such as the continuing guerrilla
struggle being waged by thousands of Tibetans,
and the numerous instances of armed action by
Mongolians, Chuangs, Uigurs. In January, 1969,
over 4,000 people were killed in an armed clash
in Sinkiang.
 There is every reason to believe that the ``
troublesome'' regions will cause Mao Tse-tung and
his group even more trouble in the years ahead.
192
 The nationalities question in the PRC can be

solved only on a genuine Marxist-Leninist basis
The rich experience accumulated in the course
ot the economic and cultural development of the
national minorities in other socialist countries
could serve as a useful guide.
 Asia and Africa Today, No. 7, 1969
13--193
[193]
[194]
__ALPHA_LVL1__
III
__ALPHA_LVL2__
The International Communist
 Movement and the Communist
 Party of China
 IN CONNECTION WITH THE 50th ANNIVERSARY
 OF THE CPC
13*
[195]
__NOTE__ LVL2 moved from here one page back.
 V. Glunin, A. Grigoryev,

K. Kukushkin, M. Yuryev
 Founded fifty years ago, in July 1921, the

Communist Party of China radically transformed the
development of the Chinese people's revolutionary
struggle for national and social emancipation. It
led the popular revolution, whose triumph in
1949 gave birth to the Chinese People's Republic.
The development of the new China began with
the abolition of feudalism and of the domination
of China by the imperialist powers, with
revolutionary changes in town and country, initiated
by the Communist Party of China with the
building in the 1950's of the foundations for socialist
industrial and cultural development, and with
collectivisation in the countryside. The
membership of the Communist Party grew from about 60
in 1921 to nearly 20 million in the mid-1960's.~^^1^^
 The Communist Party of China has traversed
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Official data regarding the membership of the

Communist Party of China over the last ten years are not
available. In his speech made on June 30, 1961, on the occasion
of the Chinese Party's 40th anniversary, Liu Shao-chi said
the Party had over 17 million members (Jenmin jihfiao,
July 1, 19G1).
196
a complex and difficult path during the last

half-century. It has known ups and downs at the
various stages of its development, both before the
victory of the people's revolution and also during
the existence of People's Republic of China. On
the way to victory, the CPC had twice-in 1927
and 1934-experienced the bitterness of defeat.
But that did not break the will of the Chinese
Communists to fight. Thousands and millions of
new fighters took the place of the fallen. The
Party was outstandingly successful as leader and
organiser of the working people in the period of
economic rehabilitation (1949--52) and of the first
five-year plan (1953--57), and enjoyed increasing
prestige at home and in the international arena.
In the first half of the 1960's, the Party
shouldered all the difficulties caused by the adventuristic
"big leap" policy that the Mao Tse-tung group
had imposed on the Party and country.
 In the course of its history, the CPC has

experienced sharp clashes and long periods of
intraParty struggle, sometimes open and sometimes
hidden, which reflected the confrontation of the
two opposing tendencies in the Party
development-the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist line
and the nationalistic line.
 The Party gained extensive experience of

fighting and mass organising during the course of the
national revolution (1925--27), during the
revolutionary struggle under the slogan of Soviets
(1927--36), during the liberation war against the
Japanese invaders (1937--45) and the civil war
against the Kuomintang reactionary forces (1946--
49) and during the construction of the People's
Republic of China. Within the Party there were
experienced organisers and military leaders who
197
were looked on as the backbone of the Party

because of their revolutionary staunchness and
devotion to the people's cause.
 The rich experience of the Communist Party

of China forms part of the treasure-house of the
world revolutionary movement. The names of Li
Ta-chao, Chu Chiu-po, Chang Tai-lei, Teng
Chung-hsia, Pen Pai and other prominent leaders
of the Party, its founders, organisers and theorists,
are revered by Communists and revolutionaries
all over the world. Their great work cannot be
depreciated by the deviations that have taken
place in the development of the PRC and the CPC,
by imperialism's slander regarding the
revolutionary struggle of the Chinese Communists, or by
the unbridled campaign launched by the Maoists
in recent years to defame the Party, its noble
traditions and tested cadres, and veterans of the
revolution.
 The fifty-year history of the Communist Party

of China provides ample food for thought in
connection with the fate of the revolutionary and
communist movement in China and other
countries with a similar socio-economic structure.
There is no need to prove the vast scientific and
political significance of analysing the major
processes that determined the essence and paths of
development of the CPC. Even our ideological
and political opponents are well aware of this
fact. The history of the CPC and the elucidation
cf the key facts and stages in its development
have long been the subject of acute ideological
controversy. Since the early 1960's, when the
divergence of the Mao Tse-tung group from the
concerted line of the international communist
movement became conspicuous, the interpretation
198
of Maoism and its course have come to the fore

as one of the central problems of the ideological
struggle, in which the Marxist-Leninist treatment
of the history of the Chinese revolution and the
Chinese Communist Party is opposed by
bourgeois historians of various persuasions, by
Maoists, revisionists and ``Left'' radicals.
 An analysis of bourgeois works dealing with
the history of the Chinese Communist Party brings
out a common feature: nearly all the works
devoted to the general problems, to separate periods
or even to separate events in the history of the
CPC somehow concentrate on the question of its
relationships (political, ideological, etc.) with the
international communist and revolutionary
movement-with the Comintern and its largest section,
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and
with the countries and communist parties of the
world socialist system.
 Since the time when the first anti-Marxist

versions of the history of the Chinese Communist
Party appeared, a certain change has taken place
in the bourgeois treatment of the Chinese Party's
relationships with the international communist
movement. In the 1920's-40's, bourgeois authors
tended to present the CPC as a ``hand'' and
``weapon'' of the Comintern. After the victory of
the Chinese revolution, the American Sinologists
(J. Fairbank, B. Schwartz, R. North, and
C. Brandt~^^1^^) put forward the idea that the Chinese
_-_-_
~^^1^^ C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, J. K. Fairbank, A Documentary

History of Chinese Communism, Cambridge, 1952;
R. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, Stanford
University Press, 1958; B. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and
the Rise of Mao, Cambridge, 1958.
199
people had triumphed in 1949 because the Party

leadership had acted counter to the theory,
practice and recommendations of the international
communist movement. Attempts were also made
to reduce the CPC's political course in the 1940's
to the ideas and principles of Mao Tse-tung. As
the Maoist leadership of the Chinese Communist
Party stepped up its outright attack on the
concerted line of the international communist
movement, this view began to predominate in
bourgeois Sinology. It has been developed and ``
deepened'' in the works of American and West
European Sinologists dealing with the Chinese
revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, in
biographies of Mao Tse-tung, and in books and
articles on Maoism. The ``deepened'' view consisted
in the tracing, by many American and West
European Sinologists, of Mao Tse-tung's ``
special'' course, which had allegedly determined the
ultimate victory of the Chinese revolution and
the opposition of his line to that of the
Comintern, back to the 1930's and even the 1920's. The
works, published in the 1960's, of S. Schram,
Y. Chen~^^1^^ and especially of J. E. Rue~^^2^^, all
develop this theme.
 Setting up the Communist Party of China in

opposition to the international communist
movement shows the attempt to play upon the
nationalistic ambitions of some of the Chinese leaders.
In other words, the ideas advanced by bourgeois
_-_-_
~^^1^^ S. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, L.,

1963; Y. Chen, Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution,
L., 1966.
~^^2^^ J. E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927--35,

Stanford, 19G6.
200
Sinologists paved the way for those circles in

capitalist countries which counted on the "erosion
of world communism" and on the nationalistic
degeneration of certain groups in the leadership
of the socialist countries and the communist and
workers' parties. The attacks of our ideological
opponents are therefore directed against one of
the major sources of strength of the international
revolutionary movement, namely, the unity of its
various contingents of its main streams-the
socialist countries, the working-class and the
national-liberation movements. The theories of
bourgeois Sinologists coincide with, and in some cases
draw on, the distorted ideas of Maoist
historiography, one of the central themes of which is
also the opposition of Mao's ``special'' course
(presented as that of the whole Party) to the
concerted policy of the international communist
movement.
 The essence of the Maoist version of the

history of the Chinese Communist Party, spelled out
in a number of official documents issued by the
Maoist leadership and in books on the Party
history circulated in the 1950's in the PRC and
elsewhere, is this: already in the 1920's, Mao
Tsetung had drawn up his own--"the only correct"--
line for the development of the Chinese
revolution; but it did not become the Party's policy
until the mid-1930's, until he and his followers
came to the leadership of the Communist Party
of China. The entire history of the Party is
accordingly divided into two major stages-the
"stage of defeats" (before Mao's advent to power)
and the stage in which the Party and the
revolution in China achieved victory, allegedly by
translating Mao Tse-tung's `ìdeas'' and "principles"
201
into reality.~^^1^^ In the 1940's-50's, the Maoist

versions and assessments of the history of the
Chinese Communist Party insisted on the thesis that
the Party's policy, its ideological and political
platform and its best cadres were shaped without
any help from the international communist
movement. We quote literally from the resolution of
the Central Committee of the CPC concerning the
decision of the Presidium of the Comintern
Executive Committee to disband the Comintern: "The
best cadres of the Chinese Communist Party were
moulded without the slightest outside help.''~^^2^^ In
his report, "On the Party" to the CPC's Seventh
Congress (1945), which whipped up the
personality cult of Mao Tse-tung and endorsed his `ìdeas''
Liu Shao-chi said that the CPC's platform consists
of ''. . . great theories ot their own. . ." (
ItalicsAuthors). ''. . .Since the foundation of the Chinese
Communist Party there has been created and
developed unique, integrated, and correct theory
concerning the people's revolution and national
reconstruction in China,'' the report added. "This
theory is none other than Mao Tse-tung's theory
of the Chinese revolution-Comrade Mao
Tsetung's theory and policy in regard to Chinese
history, Chinese society and the Chinese
revolution.''~^^3^^
 Ever since the late 1950's, when the Maoists

began to follow and propagate their "special
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ For a detailed account of the Maoist historiography of

the CPC, see: V. Glunin, A. Grigoryev, Maoist Falsifications
in the History of the Chinese Communist Party, Moscow
State University Gazette, Vostokovedeniye (Oriental
Studies), No. 1, 1970.
~^^2^^ Chicnhfang jihpao, May 27, 1943.
~^^3^^ Liu Shao-chi, On the Party, Peking, 1954, pp. 30, 31.
202
course,'' their opposition to the policy of the

international communist movement became
increasingly evident. Chinese textbooks and other
publications no longer contain even the well-known
facts about the interaction of the CPC and the
Chinese revolution with the forces and
contingents of the world revolutionary process; nor do
they mention the assistance given to the CPC by
the Comintern, the world revolutionary
movement, the CPSU and the Soviet state.~^^1^^
 In the course of the "cultural revolution,'' the

falsification of the history of the Chinese
Communist Party, its relationships with the
international communist movement became still more
blatant. Earlier Mao Tse-tung was depicted as the
Party's sole `ìnfallible'' leader, whereas now he
is also represented as its one and only founder.
"The CPC was founded and fostered by Mao
Tse-tung,"^^2^^ Lin Piao said in his report to the
Ninth Congress of the CPC. We are presented
with a frankly idealistic outline of the history of
the Chinese Communist Party-its successes are
attributed to Mao Tse-tung alone. All the former
_-_-_
~^^1^^ The influence of the Maoist historiography of the CPC

on bourgeois Sinology during those years is particularly
clear in J. E. Rue's book to which we have already referred.
Written in a quasi-scientific manner (with a multitude of
references, imposing contents, index, bibliography, etc.), it
is an absolutely uncritical reproduction of the basic
assertions of Maoist historiography. We need only say that in
his principal conclusions, Rue relies on the 1951--53 editions
of Mao Tse-tungs early works (although at that time
practically all of Mao's works were heavily revised and re--
edited), and on Mao's own biography authorised by himself
and expounded by Edgar Snow; Rue completely ignores
the CPC's documents and press of those years---the most
valuable and reliable sources.
~^^2^^ Jenmin jihpao, April 27, 19G9.
203
outlines and works which gave an already

falsified version of the history of the CPC and the PRC
are now considered to be `ìnadequate'' and said
to "belittle the role of Mao Tse-tung and his ideas
in the history of the CPC and the international
communist movement.'' Because they mentioned
just a few facts about the assistance of the
Comintern and the CPSU to the CPC, the People's
Republic of China and the Chinese revolution,
their authors are accused in official publications
of showing sympathy with "contemporary
revisionism.'' The Maoist leadership's latest directive
article, published on the occasion of the 50th
anniversary of the Communist Party of China,
likewise outlined the Party's history without making
any mention whatsoever of the international
communist movement.~^^1^^
 Although Maoist and bourgeois

historiographers may have different motives, they all exploit
the fact that the events connected with the history
of the Chinese Communist Party have been
inadequately studied until recently in order to
distort the real nature of the relations between the
CPC and the international communist movement.
 While examining in the present article the

problems of the relationships of the CPC with the
international communist movement, the authors
have based themselves on recently published
Soviet historical works which are the outcome of
research into new factual material concerning the
history of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese
Communist Party.^^2^^
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Jenmin jihpao, July 1, 1971.
~^^2^^ See B. Liebzon, K. Shirinya, Turning Point in the

Comintern's Policy, M, 1965; Birth Centenary of Sun
__NOTE__ Footnote cont. on page 205.
204
 In the period of the Comintern's foundation and

formation, V. Lenin worked on the fundamentals
of the relationships of the international
communist movement with the communist and other
revolutionary forces in the colonial and dependent
countries in the new historical era ushered in by
the Great October Socialist Revolution.
 We shall recall the chief points of Lenin's

approach to the problems of the interaction between
the international communist movement and its
contingents and other revolutionary forces in the
Eastern countries.
 When he advanced the policy of establishing

the closest international ties between the
communist and working-class movement in the
developed countries and the communist and
nationalliberation movement in the East, Lenin was
proceeding from the fact that the efforts of the
Communists of various countries, and their policy of
international cohesion and mutual assistance
provided a means for realising the potentialities
_-_-_
__NOTE__ Footnote cont. from page 204.
Yatsen, 1866--1966, Collection of Articles, M., 1966; 0.

Borisov, B. Koloskov, The CPSU's Efforts for the Unity and
Cohesion of Today's Revolutionary Forces, M., 1967; The
USSR's Leninist Policy Towards China, Collection of
Articles, M., 1968; Roots of the Present Events in China, M.,
1968; M. F. Yuryev, The Chinese Revolution of 1925--27,
M., 1968; 0. Vladimirov, V. Pyazantsev, Some Questions
Relating to the History of the Chinese Communist Party,
Kommunist, No. 9, 1968; The Comintern, A Short
Historical Essay, M., 1969; The Comintern and the East,
Collection of Articles, M., 1969; China Today, M., 1969; New
Documents of the Comintern, Kommunist, No. 4, 1969; The
Chinese People's Republic, M., 1970; Prominent Soviet
Communists and the Revolution in China, Collection of
Articles, M., 1970; L. P. Delyusin, The Dispute Over
Socialism, M., 1970; 0. Borisov, B. Koloskov, Soviet-Chinese
Relations, 194.5-70, A Short Essay, M., 1971.
205
stemming from the objective concurrence of the

basic interests of the world's revolutionary forces
in their fight against imperialism and all forms
of exploitation.~^^1^^
 At the same time, Lenin stressed that

regulating that interaction and establishing stable
international ties were by no means an easy process
that would take place automatically. He
maintained that in the colonial and dependent
countries of the East, this process, together with the
tremendous political development of their
revolutionary forces, might bring about specific, ``
secondary'' difficulties owing to the preponderance
there of non-proletarian strata and to the various
nationalistic prejudices of the masses. The
experience of the first contacts with the representatives
of various trends of national revolutionary forces
in the Eastern countries brought Lenin to the
conclusion that the involvement of the non--
proletarian masses there in revolutionary activity might,
besides resulting in naked nationalism, prompt
the representatives of these forces to ``repaint''
the non-proletarian liberation trends and
platforms in the "colour of communism.''^^2^^ Lenin
pointed to the possibility, under these
circumstances, of a partial, distorted perception of the
principles of the international communist
movement, and of a mechanical adoption of certain
tactical slogans without understanding their
essence and the reason why they had been advanced
in the first place.
 The development of the revolutionary forces in

China at all its stages and the history of the
_-_-_
~^^1^^ See Lenin and the Comintern, M., 1970, p. 199.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 201.
206
Chinese Communist Party have borne out Lenin's

prediction about the importance and character of
the interaction of the international communist
movement with its separate national contingents.
The interaction and close ties of the CPC with the
international communist movement, and the
allround assistance it received from the Comintern
and communist parties were a powerful impetus
and one of the decisive prerequisites for the
victory of the revolution in China. At the same time,
Lenin's warning against the possibility of the
Marxist doctrine being distorted by
representatives of the nationalistic, non-proletarian forces
provides a key to understanding the social and
gnoseological roots of the theory and practice of
Maoism.
 China's revolutionary movement of the 1920''
s40's bore the imprint of the directing theoretical,
political and organisational activity of the
Comintern. At the most important stages of the
development of the Chinese revolution, the
Comintern's assistance to the Chinese Communist Party
and close connection with it, armed the Party
with decisions and conclusions based on the
achievements of the theoretical and political
thought of the world communist and liberation
movement. The young Communist Party of China
was able to utilise in its struggle the experience
of the Marxist-Leninist parties with the
Comintern as their centre and forum, and rely on their
support. That is an example of the big part
played by the international factor in the formation
and development of the communist parties and
the communist movement in colonial and
dependent countries. The foundation in July 1921 of
the Chinese Communist Party at its First
207
Congress was the first major landmark of this

interaction and represented the result of the
tremendous work done by the first Chinese Marxists and
the Comintern's envoys in order to disseminate
the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the October
Revolution, and to organise China's revolutionary
forces that were attracted to Marxism. The first
communist groups in China were founded with
the direct organisational and other help of the
Comintern. There can be no doubt that had the
Comintern not provided assistance in the form
of instructions, advice, funds, training of leaders,
laborious political and organisational work in
which its representatives engaged daily in China,
the pre-foundation period in the history of the
Chinese Communist Party would have dragged
on for many years.~^^1^^
 Without underestimating the role of the

objective internal factors favouring the dissemination
of Marxism-Leninism in China, or the importance
of the work and creative search of Chinese
Communists, full credit must be given to the immense
help of the Comintern and the CPSU in
elaborating the theoretical and political foundations of
the Marxist conception of the 1925--27 revolution
in China, and in building up the Party during
the period of the preparation and accomplishment
of the revolution.
 For the Chinese Communist Party, one of the

most difficult aspects of the Chinese revolution
was the theoretical and practical problem of
combining and interrelating the national and class
features of the revolutionary movement. To
supplement the theses of the Comintern's Fourth
_-_-_
~^^1^^ For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 242--299.
208
Congress on the Eastern question with reference

to the conditions of China, the Comintern
Executive Committee adopted, on January 12, 1923, a
special resolution "On the Chinese Communist
Party's Attitude Towards the Kuomintang,'' which
proved the necessity for setting up a unified front
in China and elaborated a concrete means by
which this might be achieved-by the Communists'
joining the Kuomintang while retaining the
independence of the Chinese Communist Party.~^^1^^ For
the first time the Comintern squarely faced the CPC
with the peasant question. The Directive of the
Comintern Executive Committee to the Third CPC
Congress on January 12, 1923, stated: "The
peasant question is the central issue of the entire
policy. . . Only by placing the slogans of the
antiimperialist front on an agrarian basis can we
hope for real success.'' That is why the CPC,
being the political leader of the masses in the
unified front, "is obliged constantly to propel the
Kuomintang towards an agrarian revolution." ^^2^^
In the same Directive, the Comintern raised the
question of a people's liberation war in China
against the militarists, feudal lords and foreign
imperialists as a means of developing the Chinese
democratic revolution. Proceeding from this
general principle and replying to the request of
Sun Yat-sen, the CPSU and the Soviet state
actively helped the Kuomintang to build up the
National Revolutionary Army of China, and to plan
and carry out its operations.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ See The Comintern's Strategy and Tactics in the

National-Colonial Revolution as Exemplified by China, M.,
1934, pp. 112--113.
~^^2^^ Ibid., pp. 114--115.
14--193
209
 On the basis of Lenin's ideas contained in the

resolutions that the Second and Fourth
Congresses of the Comintern passed on the colonial
question, the Comintern Executive Committee, in a
number of directives to the CPC and in special
resolutions on the Chinese question-particularly
Resolutions VI (March 1926) and VII (
NovemberDecember 1926) of extended plenary
meetingsgave profound theoretical backing and practical
recommendations on such fundamental problems
of the Chinese revolution as the character of a
revolution and the place of the various classes
in it, the hegemony of the proletariat and its
allies, the agrarian question, the tactics of the
united national front, the role and applicability of
armed struggle, relationship of the national and
class features of the revolution, and so on. A
selfstyled theorist, Mao Tse-tung later arrogated
some of these instructions to himself, distorting
them in the petty-bourgeois, nationalistic manner.
 The Comintern's help facilitated the spread and

consolidation of internationalist ideas among the
Chinese Communists and the shaping in its
leadership of a communist internationalist group
that resolutely combated any manifestations of
nationalism and other anti-proletarian views in
the Party. As a result of the interaction of the
Communist Party of China and the international
communist movement during the years of the
formation of the CPC, and of the Comintern's
consistent line towards a united front against both
``Left'' and Right vacillations in the ranks of the
CPC, the Party had already become an important
factor in the country's political life by the
mid1920's, i.e., in the period of the 1925--27
revolution.
210
 The elaboration of the revolutionary strategy

and tactics by the Chinese Communist Party in
close cooperation with the Comintern was a
prolonged and complex process in the course of
which various conclusions and recommendations
were tested in practice, incorrect or obsolete
principles were cast aside, the successes of the
revolution were summed up and the causes of its
failures (especially in the period of struggle under
the slogan of Soviets) analysed. In Marxist
literature these matters are not made sufficiently clear
because the events of this difficult, and at times
contradictory, period in the history of the CPC
have been but poorly studied.
 Maoist historiography is largely responsible for

that. In the official document of the Central
Committee of the CPSU entitled "Resolutions on Some
Questions in the History of Our Party,''~^^1^^ which
set stereotyped patterns for all works on the
history of the CPC published in China, the Maoists
have crossed out all the Party's experience in
those years, and under the pretext of criticising
the "Wang Ming-Po Ku line" they virtually deny
any positive role played by the Comintern in
mapping out the strategy and tactics of the
Chinese Communist Party. The Maoists assert that
the Party leadership of those days, headed by
Wang Ming and Po Ku, was `ùnaware'' of the
need to build up armed forces for the Party took
a wrong approach to the agrarian question, and
did not realise the importance of organising
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Adopted by the Seventh Plenary Meeting (sixth

convocation) of the CC CPG in April 1945, on the eve of the
Seventh CPC Congress (see Mao Tse-tung, Scl. Works,
London, 1956, Vol. 4, pp. 171--218.).
14*
211
revolutionary bases in the countryside and of the

proper balance between the Party's work in town
and country, i.e., it totally "failed to understand"
and ``rejected'' the correct line of the Chinese
revolution, allegedly already drawn up by Mao
Tsetung in those years.
 Furthermore, after the event, the Maoists laid

claim to the credit for having critically
interpreted and summed up the rich and complicated
experience of the revolutionary struggle in that
period-credit that legitimately belongs to the
international communist movement and to the
Marxist-Leninist forces within the CPC. The
Comintern, jointly with representatives of those
MarxistLeninist forces, drew up a number of valuable
conclusions and recommendations on the
fundamental questions of the Party's strategy and
tactics, whose practical implementation ensured the
further development of the Party and its armed
forces and the triumph of the revolution in
China.~^^1^^
 A major milestone in the cooperation between

the international communist movement and the
Chinese Communist Party in that period was the
Sixth CPC Congress (June-July 1928), which took
place in Moscow with the participation of the
delegations of the Comintern Executive
Committee and the communist parties of the Soviet Union
and other countries. The Sixth Congress summed
up the experience and lessons of the struggle of
the CPC during the revolution of 1925--27 and
gave a correct appraisal of its nature and present
_-_-_
~^^1^^ For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 313--
349.
212
stage of its development. Embracing all aspects

of the Party's work, the decisions of the Congress
became practically the first comprehensive
programme of the Communist Party of China.~^^1^^ The
ideas embodied in these decisions and their
further development and realisation in the early
1930's became an integral part of the strategy and
tactics of the CPC. Of paramount importance for
all the subsequent activity of the Chinese
Communist Party was the acceptance by the Congress
of the Comintern's assessment of the Chinese
revolution as a bourgeois-democratic one.^^2^^ This
dealt a blow to the attempts of the Trotskyite and
``Leff'-sectarian elements within the Party to
distort the immediate tasks of the revolutionary
struggle and provided the soundly-based forces
with a basis for combating the ``Left''-extremist
tendencies that constantly showed up in the Party.

 After summing up the experience of the

revolutionary struggle in China, the Sixth Congress of
the Communist Party of China, at the
recommendation of the Comintern, adopted the tactics for
the immediate future of making a retreat and
rallying its forces in the towns, while waging
fullscale guerrilla warfare and building up
revolutionary bases (Soviet zones) and a Red Army in
_-_-_
~^^1^^ The Sixth Congress passed the decision to prepare the

official programme of the Party for the next congress. The
decision, as everyone knows, remains unfulfilled up to this
day (see Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the
CPC, Book 6, Resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the
CPC, M., 1930).
~^^2^^ In that period Mao Tse-tung believed that the revolution

in China had entered the socialist stage (see Verbatim
Report of the Sixth Congress of the CPC, Book 2, M., 1930,
pp. 80--81).
213
the countryside.~^^1^^ The experience of the

revolutionary struggle at the time of the Sixth Congress
was as yet uncapable of indicating how the
revolution would proceed: whether the revolutionary
struggle would centre in town (as the 1925--27
revolution did), or whether the revolutionary
forces would rally at their bases in the countryside.
Subsequent developments showed that despite the
temporary abatement of the revolutionary
movement in the towns, the revolutionary bases and
armed forces of the Party in many rural areas
gained strength.
 In 1930--31 the Comintern, having analysed this

situation never before witnessed by the
revolutionary movement, boldly mapped out new ways
of development for the Chinese revolution. The
letter of the Comintern Executive Committee to
the CC CPC regarding the Li Li-san doctrines
(September 1930) and the resolution of the
Comintern Executive Committee Presidium on the
tasks of the Communist Party of China (August
1931) set out the chief task as that of reinforcing
the Red Army, which "shall become the centre
for rallying and organising the revolutionary
forces and the key lever for heightening the entire
revolutionary movement...''; they proposed the
idea of "encircling the towns, including the major
and largest ones, by a ring of peasant revolts." ^^2^^
These objectives, based on the Comintern's
_-_-_
~^^1^^ That course was endorsed in the resolutions on the

agrarian revolution, the peasant movement and on the building
of Soviet zones and the Red Army (see Verbatim Report
of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,
Hook 6).
~^^2^^ The Comintern's Strategy and Tactics in the

NationalColoninl Revolution as Exemplified by China, pp. 289, 296.
214
recommendations, were formulated in the CC CPC

decisions of April 4, 1932: "The specific feature of
the Chinese revolution is manifested in the fact
that the proletariat is leading the masses and
extending Soviet power from the countryside to the
towns, and from small towns to big cities.''~^^1^^
These Comintern and CPC documents demonstrate
the inconsistency of Maoist historiography's
assertions that the course towards unfolding the
revolution in rural areas and towards encircling
the towns by the revolutionary countryside was
advanced by Mao Tse-tung to counter the
allegedly erroneous lines of the CPC leadership of those
days. Contrary to the Comintern's course towards
achieving proletarian leadership in the Chinese
revolution, Mao Tse-tung made an absolute of
the importance of peasant war and in effect
rejected the idea of proletarian leadership. Today
the Maoists are trying to extend their anti--
Marxist views on the importance of the peasant war
in China to the world revolutionary process.
 A big part in building up the armed forces of

the Communist Party of China was played by the
Comintern's recommendations (worked out by the
organisers of the armed forces of the CPC and
Soviet Communists-experienced military leaders)
concerning the foundations for the formation, the
strategy and tactics of China's Red Army and the
principles of its relations with the population.
The implementation of these recommendations
allowed the Chinese Communist Party, in 1932--33,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ CC CPC resolution "On Opportunist Vacillations in the

Party's Ranks Over the Question of the Primary Victory of
the Chinese Revolution," Materials on the Third ``Left''
Line, Collected Documents and Materials, Vol. 1, Peking,
1957, p. 85) (Chinese ed.).
215
to become a major political as well as military

force.
 The Comintern's help in exploring the agrarian

and peasant question was particularly important
for the Communist Party of China, which from
1927 to 1949 operated mainly in rural areas. The
decisions of the Party's Sixth Congress on the
agrarian question and the peasant movement~^^1^^
were the first comprehensive, scientifically-based
platform of the Party. On the whole, the policy
on the agrarian-peasant question, laid down in
the CPC decisions and Comintern
recommendations in the late 1920's-early 1930's, served the
Chinese Communist Party as a reliable guide
throughout the subsequent period of its
revolutionary activity in the countryside. It was
precisely these decisions and the experience of these
years (the principles of determining class
appurtenance, etc.) that formed the basis of the Party's
decisions on agrarian reorganisation in the late
1940's-early 1950's.~^^2^^
 The Party's attention to the agrarian-peasant

question, its organisational work in preparing the
peasantry for the agrarian revolution, and the
development in the countryside of bodies of power,
armed forces, the economy, educational and other
institutions, resulted in the fact that by the
mid1930's it had accumulated abundant experience
as practically the ruling party. This experience
became one of the chief sources of strength for
_-_-_
~^^1^^ See Policy Documents of Communist Parties in tlte East,

M., 1934, pp. 34--51; Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party, Book 6.
~^^2^^ In 1947--48, several documents of the early 1930's were

re-issued in full to be used as a guide for the agrarian
reform.
216
the Party and one of the requisites for its victory.
 The Seventh Congress of the Comintern (1935)

and its historic decisions opened up a new stage
in the development of the world communist and
national-liberation movements. Its decisions also
signified a turning point in the development of
the Communist Party of China and the Chinese
revolution. The policy of the united national front
brought the Communist Party allies from the
population at large and turned it into a powerful
political force. During the period from the
Seventh Congress of the Comintern to the victory
of the people's revolution in 1949, the CPC grew
into a more than three-million party, having at
its disposal a strong army, vast liberated areas,
and enjoying the support of the masses and of
the entire international communist movement,
particularly the Soviet Union and the CPSU.
 The fulfilment of the decisions of the

Comintern's Seventh Congress proceeded in the face of
a fierce struggle between the internationalist
forces and the petty-bourgeois, nationalistic forces
within the CPC.~^^1^^ This was because there was a
massive flow of peasants, petty-bourgeois
elements and former members of the exploiting
classes into the Party (they totalled more than
90 per cent of its membership by 1945), and to
the weakness of the proletarian core and the
preponderance of nationalistically-minded elements
in the Party leadership.
 The struggle within the Party immediately

centred on the attitude towards the Comintern's
directives and decisions and on the correlation of
the national and international tasks of the
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ For details see The Comintern and the East, pp. 350--379.
217
liberation movement in China. The Chinese

Communist-internationalists, one of whose leaders was
Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu), defended the course
aimed at the unification of all potential allies into
a single national front for struggle against
Japanese imperialism. They interwove into a single
whole the national and international tasks of the
Chinese revolution, regarding the cohesion and
support of all contingents of the international
communist movement as the most important
factor for the victory of the revolution in every
individual country, particularly in China.
 The nationalistic, petty-bourgeois^forces within

the Chinese Communist Party, with MaS'Tse-tung
as their spokesman, took a chauvinist, egoistic
approach to the question of internationalism and
international support. For quite a long time,
especially when the Party's own forces were relatively
small (1935--37), they contended that a direct
armed attack by the Soviet Union together with the
Communist Party of China against Japan and
Chiang Kai-shek would be the best international
help to the Chinese revolution and the world
revolutionary process. They were not much
interested in the Soviet Union's fate in the face of the
growing threat of attack by Nazi Germany, or in
the fate of the international anti-fascist camp and
the united national anti-Japanese front in China
itself. During the Second World War, the
nationalistic forces within the Chinese Communist
Party sought to make the best of international
support not so much for waging war against
Japanese imperialism as for preserving and
increasing their own armed forces.
 The development cf the Chinese revolution

after the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, and
218
until its victory in 1949, proved that, despite all

the attempts of Mao's nationalistic leadership of
the CPC to steer the liberation struggle along
the "specific Chinese path,'' the revolutionary
movement in China triumphed as part of the
world liberation process. This was practical
confirmation of the universal applicability of
Marxist-Leninist teaching and the importance of the
united action of all the contingents of the world
 The victory of the Chinese revolution was the

result of the alliance between the international
communist movement and the national-liberation,
mainly peasant, movement in China. This alliance
materialised in the form of the ideological and
political support given to the CPC and the
Chinese revolution by the international communist
movement, as well as in economic, moral,
military and diplomatic assistance from the Soviet
Union and later on from the People's
Democracies.
 The victory of the revolution in China became

possible as a result of the radical changes that
took place in the international situation after the
Second World War. The aggressive forces of
imperialism were checked by the unprecedented
might and prestige of the Soviet Union, the
formation of the world socialist system and by the
powerful upsurge of the communist and
nationalliberation movements in the world. The only
imperialist power that had gained in strength at the
time-the USA-was compelled under the
circumstances to refrain from direct military
intervention in China. Besides, it was more concerned
with the rehabilitation of capitalist Europe, where
219
the influence of the communist parties had
increased.
 The victory of the people's revolution in China

was made possible by the execution of the
fundamental strategic plans jointly worked out by
the Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party
to give impetus to the liberation movement (the
policy of the united national front; the peasant
movement as the main part of the democratic
revolution in China; the leadership of the
Communist Party in the peasants' armed struggle as the
basic factor for the victory of the revolution; the
alliance of the Chinese liberation movement with
the international proletariat and primarily with
the USSR and the socialist camp). So the Chinese
people won their historic victory against domestic
reaction and the foreign forces of imperialism
in close fraternal unity with and assistance of the
forces of the world communist movement.
 The carrying out of the basic tasks of the

people's democratic revolution in the interests of
the working people as a whole paved the way
for China's advancement along the socialist path.
The successes scored by China in the early years
of the people's power-when increased fraternal
help was coming from the Soviet Union, when
there was all-round cooperation between the two
countries and their parties, and when there was
wide publicity in China of the Soviet example and
experience-created a favourable situation for the
further growth of the proletarian, Marxist--
Leninist forces and tendencies inside the Chinese
Communist Party. On the other hand, the Maoist
petty-bourgeois nationalist trend in the Party as
yet lacked a firm foothold to mount a
counteroffensive. It was manoeuvring, biding time,
220
accumulating strength and searching for a

stratagem suited to the new historical situation. This
enabled the Party's internationalist forces, with
the support of the CPSU and the world
communist movement, to take the initiative and put the
Party and country on the path of socialism.
 The Eighth Congress of the Communist Party

of China (September 1956) was a significant event
in the life of the Party and the Chinese people.
It summed up the experience of one of the largest
communist parties over a long period, during
which the people's revolution had triumphed and
the first achievements in socialist construction had
been made. At the time of the Eighth Congress
the CPC had 10,700,000 members and candidate
members (14 per cent of them workers, 69 per
cent peasants, 12 per cent intellectuals).~^^1^^ Such
a composition was bound to affect its ideology,
policy and activity. The petty-bourgeois,
nationalistic tendencies in the Party continued to exist
and develop covertly. The fate of socialism in
China depended on the outcome of the struggle
between the nationalistic tendencies and the
proletarian, internationalist forces. And the outcome
could not but affect the interests of the
international communist movement as a whole.
 The main feature of the decisions of the Eighth

Congress of the CPC is that they endorsed the
Party's general line towards socialist construction
in conformity with the general principles of
Marxism-Leninism, on the basis of close
cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance with the
world socialist community and all progressive,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Sec Materials of the Eighth All-China Congress of the

Communist Parly of China, M., 1956, p. 65.
221
revolutionary trends of the day. The consistent

realisation of the socialist programme hammered
out by the Eighth Congress was to ensure for
China continuing social progress and a speedy
growth of the productive forces, which meant a
better standard of living for the working people
as a whole.
 In the years between 1949 and 1957, the

People's Republic of China, following the basic
principles of building socialist society, and relying on
the help and international solidarity of the
socialist countries and their parties, made the first
substantial steps towards the construction of
socialism. But this was fiercely opposed by the
petty-bourgeois forces and trends. The
development of the Communist Party of China and the
Chinese People's Republic in that period was not
straightforward, but highly complicated,
contradictory and confused. By the end of the period
there was an unmistakable growth of the
pettybourgeois, nationalistic trends, which the Party
was incapable of overcoming.
 In the late 1950's and early 1960's, the
nationalistic forces interfered with the Party's
constructive interaction with the international
communist movement, its course of development on
the basis of Marxism-Leninism, and its pursuance
of the concerted line of the international
communist movement. They imposed the "big leap"
policy on the Party by exploiting, on the one
hand, certain weaknesses in the Party (the
disunity of its organisations, feeble democratism, the
personality cult of Mao Tse-tung, etc.), and, on
the other, by making great use of avantgardist
slogans when the country was in a state of
animation and indulging in nationalistic distortions
222
of the true causes of the successes of the People's

Republic. The basic features of the Mao group's
``special'' course were the opposition of the policy
of the CPC to the concerted line of the fraternal
parties and the attempt to revise its fundamental
precepts. Soviet party and political literature
quite comprehensively and explicitly shows the
sources, causes and essence of that ``special''
course in the PRC's domestic and foreign policy
as a continuation in the new conditions of the
confrontation between the two lines, the two
trends inside the Communist Party of China.~^^1^^
The ``special'' course and its consequences (sharp
economic and political crisis) ultimately led to
the "cultural revolution" and initiated a new
stage in the intra-Party struggle.
 An analysis of the Chinese Communist Party's

complex development, especially after the
advancement of the ``special'' course, prompts certain
conclusions concerning the attitude of the various
forces within the CPC to interaction with the
international communist movement, and concerning
the influence of the international communist
movement on the positions of different forces
within the CPC. The intricate composition of the
CPC and the numerical preponderance of
members of non-proletarian background, influenced
by all sorts of nationalistic and pseudo-socialist
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ Sec B. Xancgin, A. Mironov, Ya. Mikhailov, On Events

in China M., 1967; Roots of the Present Events in China;
A. Bovin, L. Delyusin, 'The Political Crisis in China, M.,
1968; Perilous Course, Collection of Articles, M., 1969;
The Anti-Imperialist Essence of the Views and Policy of
Mao Tse-tung, M., 1969; Yu. Yaremenko, The "Big Leap"
and "People's Communes" in China, M., 1969; Foreign
Policy of the Chinese People's Republic, M., 1971.
223
theories, brought about differences in the

approach to the platform and policy of the
international communist movement within the CPC.
These differences, with all their shades, may be
classified into two major categories.
 The genuine internationalists in the ranks of

the CPC-Li Ta-chao, Chang Tai-lei, Chu Chiu-po,
Yun Tai-ying, Su Chao-cheng, Teng Chung-hsia,
Peng Pai and many others who had made a
decisive contribution to the dissemination in China
of Marxist-Leninist ideas and implanted
internationalist traditions in the Party with the aim of
mastering Marxist-Leninist theory and using it
as a basis for the political line of the CPC--
proceeded from the fact that Marxism-Leninism is
a universal internationalist doctrine. Boldly
raising the problems of the specific development of
the working-class and peasant movement in
China, and taking account of the special role of the
particular forms of political struggle and of the
special features of the Party's formation and
activity, they never considered these special features
to be justification for renouncing the combination
of the national and international tasks of the
Communist Party of China and those of the world
communist movement as a whole. When
combating nationalism and chauvinism in the Party and
elsewhere, they based themselves on their
conviction in the unity of all contingents of the
world communist movement. They have always
maintained that the most important factor for
the favourable development of the Chinese
revolution is solidarity with the international
communist movement and support from the Soviet
people.

 The nationalistic forces had a different attitude
224
to international unity and interaction with the

fraternal parties, and to assistance from the
Comintern, the CPSU and the Soviet Government.
In the course of the history of the CPC, they have
worn all sorts of disguises, ranging from an
attempt to receive help unilaterally from the
Comintern, the CPSU and other fraternal parties,
to an almost unconcealed attempt to play on the
contradictions between the forces of socialism,
democracy and progress on the one hand, and
international imperialism on the other. They have
always regarded the world communist movement
and the forces of socialism, whose help they
sought to use in furtherance the
nationalisticallyunderstood interests of China, as a ``third'' force.

 As early as the 1920's and 1930's, various

avantgardist theories and platforms became a
characteristic ideological cover for such
nationalistic view in the CPC. For example, Cheng
Chaolin, subsequently expelled from the Party for his
Trotskyite views, put forward the idea of
transferring the centre of the world revolution to
China.~^^1^^ In 1930 a group of CPC leaders headed
by Li Li-san, propagated and tried to carry
through a programme according to which the
Chinese revolution was to become the main seat,
the ``pillar'' of the world revolution. Li Li-san
and his followers counted on an "international
war" by which they hoped to ``prompt'' the world
revolution, thereby ``guaranteeing'' the successful
development of the revolution in China. Mao
Tsetung too backed up these views.~^^2^^
_-_-_
~^^1^^ See Hsian Dao, No. 128, November 7, 1925, p. 1182.
~^^2^^ For details of the leftist platform emerging in the CPC

in 1930, see Letter of the Comintern Executive Committee
15--193
225
 The ``special'' course persistently imposed by

the Mao group on the Party and the country ever
since the late 1950's has hidden under its
avantgardist veil all the elements involved in the
nationalistic approach to relations with the forces
of world socialism and the international
 However, the policy of the nationalistic forces

in the CPC could not completely destroy the
influence exercised by the ideological and political
platform of the international communist
movement, and by its experience and its
recommendations, on the political and ideological positions of
the Party.
 The status of the CPC as a section of the

Comintern and, more important, the entire course
of the Chinese revolution-which had borne out
the correctness of the Comintern's main
conclusions and recommendations relating to the
strategy and tactics of the Communist Party of
China-the high prestige of the Comintern and the
CPSU among the majority of Chinese Communists
played an important role in that even the
nationalistic elements in the Party's leadership had
to take the Comintern's experience and
recommendations into account when choosing the
Party's political course. Yet the nationalists were
either unable to, or did not want to, assimilate
entirely the platform of the international
communist movement, although they adopted,
employed and "crammed,'' as Lenin put it, certain
tactical slogans. Inside the Party, covertly or
_-_-_
to the CC CPC Regarding the Li Li-san Doctrines; The

Comintern's Strategy and Tactics in the National-Colonial
Revolution as Exemplified by China, p. 290; The
Comintern and the East, pp. 313--349.
226
openly, clumsy conceptions and theories were

advanced that exaggerated the importance of
various aspects of the situation in China and the
experience of the Chinese Communist Party, giving
a narrow interpretation of the results of the
Party's work and those of the entire
revolutionary process in the country-an interpretation that
took no account of objective factors, both
national and international. On the other hand, the
pursuance of the political courses mapped out by
the international communist movement facilitated
the advancement of the CPC in the general
current of revolutionary struggle and at times veiled
the real attitude of the nationalists within its
ranks towards Marxism-Leninism and the general
platform of the international communist
movement.
 The history of the Communist Party of China

shows that in the periods when the Party's
international ties were weakened (either as a result
of objective causes or vacillations in its
leadership), the nationalist forces within the Party
increased their activity. That was precisely the
case in 1934--35, when the Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party, during the retreat
from Kiangsi in the north-west of the country,
had no liaison with the Comintern for some time.
The same is true of the period of the Second
World War, especially the years of the Great
Patriotic War of the Soviet people.
 The nationalists knew that, in order to improve

their own position in the Party, it was necessary
to weaken the Party's ties with the international
communist movement and to lessen the influence
of its platform and experience on the Party. The
offensives of the nationalistic forces were always
15*
227
accompanied by attacks, camouflaged or open, on

the line of the international communist
movement, and by their attempts to discredit and
distort it. Li Li-san and his followers imposed their
platform under the slogan "The Comintern
misunderstands the situation in China.'' The advent of
the Mao group to the Party leadership in the
late 1930's-early 1940's was likewise accompanied
by attacks on the Comintern's platform, which
were masked by criticism of the "Wang Ming-Po
Ku line,'' and by the calls to "do away with
foreign patterns" and to "give Marxism a
Chinese interpretation.'' The new stage of the
offensive by the nationalistic forces in the CPC in the
late 1950's, and their imposition on the Party of
the "big leap" and "people's communes" course,
were also prepared and accompanied first by
covert, and then by more and more open ``
criticism'' of the international experience of socialist
construction, of the concerted foreign policy
course followed by the socialist countries, and of
the international communist movement's
concerted general line enshrined in the Declarations and
Statements adopted by the Moscow Meetings of
Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957 and
1960. The Maoists concentrated their attacks on
the USSR and the CPSU because, as Communists
all over the world have correctly noted, the
Peking leaders regard the prestige of the USSR and
the CPSU as the chief obstacle to the spread of
their ideas and influence. At the same time, the
attacks on the CPSU were meant to pave the way
for revising the general line of the world
 The historical experience of the CPC prompts

another important conclusion. Up to 1957, the
228
ties of the CPC with the CPSU and other

communist parties, the stand of its internationalist
forces and the striving of most of its leaders to
rely on the help of world socialism, created the
necessary external and domestic conditions for
wiping out the avantgardist and nationalistic
trends and the resulting sharp crises within the
Party. The departure of the Party's leaders in the
late 1950's from the concerted line of the
international communist movement gave the
nationalist forces considerable freedom of action.
 That conclusion is borne out by the lessons of

the intra-Party struggle during the last decade,
and by the course and results of the massive
Maoist onslaught on the Communist Party of China,
called the "cultural revolution.'' Soviet
publications have dealt at length with the causes,
development and results of the "cultural revolution.''~^^1^^
We should like only to emphasise that one of
the causes of the severe defeat suffered by the
Party was the vacillation of a considerable
number of its leaders (including those who became
victims of the "cultural revolution'') on the
fundamental questions of the general line, and their
departure, temporary though it may have been,
from a number of its basic principles. This
circumstance enabled the Mao group gradually to
oppose the Party's platform to the general line
of the international communist movement, to
isolate the anti-Maoists in the Party from the
international movement, and to carry out the
ideological re-orientation of the country's population,
_-_-_
~^^1^^ See The Present Situation in China and tlic CPC,

Kommunist, No. 4, 19G9; Policy of the Mao Tse-tung Group on
the International Arena, Kommunist, No. 5, 1969.
229
especially the young people who were later

charged with the task of destroying the leading bodies
of the Party.
__*_*_*__
 The history of the Communist Party of China

over these past years shows that its departure
and self-isolation from the international
communist movement and from its general line and
experience, led to serious mistakes in the Party's
activity, to great intra-Party crises and damage,
and to the loss of revolutionary gains. The way
out of the critical situation in which the CPC
found itself as a result of the actions of the
Maoist group is to restore relations with the
international communist and working-class movement,
to return to the latter's concerted line, and to
base the Party's entire activity on Marxism--
Leninism. The fifty-year development of the
Communist Party of China has borne out the importance
and relevance of the Leninist proposition that.. .
"The urgency of the struggle against. . . the most
deep-rooted petty-bourgeois national prejudices,
looms ever larger with the mounting exigency of
the task of converting the dictatorship of the
proletariat from a national dictatorship (i.e.,
existing in a single country and incapable of
determining world politics) into an international one
(i.e., a dictatorship of the proletariat involving at
least several advanced countries, and capable of
exercising a decisive influence upon world
politics as a whole).''~^^1^^ While combating Maoism as
the ideological and political trend of petty--
bourgeois nationalism, it is essential first of all to see
_-_-_
230
that it is incompatible with the objectives of the

world communist and liberation movements and
with those of the Chinese Communist Party's
development along the socialist path.
 That is why the 24th Congress of the CPSU,

which fully approved the principled Leninist
course and the steps taken by the CC CPSU and
the Soviet Government in Soviet-Chinese
relations, noted: "In a situation in which the Chinese
leaders came out with their own specific
ideological-political platform, which is incompatible
with Leninism, and which is aimed against the
socialist countries and at creating a split of the
international communist and the whole anti--
imperialist movement, the CC CPSU has taken the
only correct stand-a stand of consistently
defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism, utmost
strengthening of the unity of the world
communist movement, and protection of the interests of
our socialist Motherland.''~^^1^^ The Congress also
endorsed the consistent course of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union towards normalising
relations between the USSR and the Chinese
People's Republic and establishing good--
neighbourliness and friendship between the Soviet and
Chinese peoples: "Improvement of relations
between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
of China would meet the vital, long-term interests
of both countries, the interests of world socialism,
the interests of intensifying the struggle against
imperialism.''~^^2^^
 Voprosy htorii, No. 8, 1971
_-_-_
~^^1^^ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Documents, APN Publishing

House, M., 1971, p. 212.
~^^2^^ Ibid., p. 213.
231
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Regarding Peking-Washington
 Contacts
 I. Alexandrou
 As has been reported, talks were recently held

in Peking between Premier Chou En-lai and the
US President's adviser Kissinger. During the talks,
Chou En-lai, on behalf of the Government of the
Chinese People's Republic, invited President Nixon
to visit China, and the invitation was accepted.
 Addressing American televiewers. President

Nixon called his forthcoming trip to Peking a visit in
the name of peace. He declared that the purpose of
the planned meeting was to establish new
relations with China, adding that this decision would
do no harm to America's "old friends,'' and was
not directed against any country.
 Nixon's statement is being cited by circles close

to the Administration as an expression of
Washington's ``peace-making'' policy. Yet, there is a big
difference between the preaching and practice of
the US ruling circles. In deeds the United States
continues the aggressive war in Indochina,
supports the Israeli extremists, and hinders a
relaxation of tension in Europe. It is not any accident
that many people in the United States itself view
the contacts with Peking as a continuation of this
reactionary anti-communist line.
 In China there have been no official comments

on Nixon's forthcoming visit. Anti-imperialist
sentiments continue to be expressed and loud
assurances are given about support for the anti--
imperialist movement of nations. At the same time, the
232
anti-Soviet policy and the ``splitting'' activities

against the anti-imperialist, revolutionary forces
do not cease.
 The confidential Sino-American talks, the

agreement on the US President's visit to China and
its possible consequences for international
developments-all this has given rise to lively
discussion in the world press. Some sections of the world
public apprehended such a far-reaching advance in
Chinese-American contacts as a great sensation.
 Such a reaction to the news can probably be

explained by the fact that the true political intentions
of the two countries are veiled by a dense
propaganda screen and that the declarations and
statements of the two governments are quite often in
complete contradiction to their actual political line.
All this time Peking is known to have been
calling for an uncompromising fight against US
imperialism, and for the overthrow of the Nixon
Administration, while the United States has just
as demonstratively boycotted the People's China
and supported the Chiang Kai-shek regime in
Taiwan.
 In the press and speeches, statesmen and public

leaders have voiced the most diverse opinions and
very often given contrasting assessments of the
Peking-Washington contacts.
 Still, a great many of the views expressed have

had one thing in common-satisfaction at the
opportunity to normalise relations between the
Chinese People's Republic and the United States
However, the reasons behind this satisfaction vary
considerably.
 Some say that the recognition by Washington of
the PRC signifies a turn towards realism in the
policy of the US Administration. It is also noted
233
that the invitation extended to President Nixon to

visit Peking apparently means a desire on the part
of the Chinese leadership to secure a special
position in the international arena by means of a
detente with a number of capitalist states, and a
prompt one with the United States.
 Reactionary anti-communist quarters link with

the Chinese-American contacts the hopes to
undermine the unity of the anti-imperialist forces and
weaken the position of world socialism.
 The most reactionary press of the USA

interprets the President's forthcoming visit as a foreign
policy manoeuvre dictated by the aims and
interests of anti-communism. The New York Daily
News wrote with utter cynicism about the hope
that President Nixon had been pursuing a far--
reaching Machiavellian policy of setting Red China
and Red Russia against each other.
 The US big press is not quite as frank but,

nevertheless, outspoken enough in its comments on
the direction of Washington's strategy. The New
York Times wrote that the White House would like
to capitalise on the coinciding intention of both
Peking and Washington (although the latter has
its own, special reasons) so as to bring pressure to
bear on the USSR and its foreign policy. The
newspaper quotes Washington officials who allege that
Nixon's visit to Peking will become a turning
point in US diplomacy and that the Chinese
leaders are worthy partners in such an affair. The New
York Post reported that Washington's present
contacts with Peking had been the result of the
strategic decision that neither China's interests nor her
potential capabilities were a threat to American
might and influence and that Moscow was the only
real danger.
234
 The US bourgeois press also notes that Peking's

invitation has done Nixon a good turn in his
electoral campaign and has helped him to elude the
demands that serious consideration should be
given to the new peace initiative of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of
South Vietnam, and an end should be put to the
dirty US war in Vietnam.
 While giving its approval to Washington's and

Peking's move, the West-European bourgeois
press expresses anxiety that Washington does not
hesitate to solve its problems at the expense of
its allies in military-political blocs and to
disregard them by flirting with China. The London
Times remarks that the ideological dispute
between Washington and Peking has been put aside
by both and that the nationalistic interests have
taken the upper hand. The West German press,
along with the enthusiastic comments of the
extreme right-wing newspapers of the Springer
concern, refers to the hegemonic, global aspirations of
the United States and points out that Washington's
move "has dealt a blow at the Third World
countries.''
 The progressive press stresses that the peoples

would like the Sino-American contacts to
contribute to the relaxation of international tension and
the consolidation of peace, but notes at the same
time that both sides give more than sufficient
evidence to cause serious doubts about their real
intentions.
 Rude Pravo, organ of the Central Commitec of

the Czechoslovak Communist Party, writes:
 `Às to the attempt to normalise relations

between the Chinese People's Republic and the
United States, the world public is unanimous that such
235
an act, which, incidentally, has been urged ever

since 1969, could only be welcomed if it meant
a policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with
different social systems. For, indeed, it has been
the absurd policy of the United States for many
years to ignore the existence of a new social
system in China.''
 The Hungarian Nepszabadsag notes that the

peoples and the governments of the socialist
countries more than anyone else have exerted efforts
to secure a firm and lasting peace. The socialist
countries, particularly the Soviet Union, have, for
over 20 year, been defending the interests of the
Chinese people, urging international recognition
of the PRC and the restoration of its lawful rights
in the United Nations. The newspaper says that
anti-Sovietism is a platform on which the
ChineseAmerican detente is taking place.
 `Ìt is difficult to predict how the relations

between the USA and China will develop in the
future,'' writes the Polish Trybuna Ludu. "One thing
is, however, clear: China's departure from the
socialist community and the departure of the
Communist Party of China from the world communist
movement were meant, above all, to clear the way
for broader contacts with the imperialist states
and the United States in particular.''
 The Bulgarian News Agency in a commentary

published by Rabotnichesko Delo says: "The
implications of the contemplated rapprochement are
becoming clearer against the political background
on which it is taking place. On the one hand, this
is a deliberate anti-communist US policy whose
essence, just as of the entire policy of imperialism,
is aggressiveness towards the socialist community
and particularly towards its leading force, the
236
Soviet Union. On the other hand, this is the policy

of rabid anti-Soviet propaganda conducted by the
Chinese leaders and their efforts to split the
international communist and working-class movement
and weaken the anti-imperialist front. Under such
circumstances the question can be raised: Isn't it
the intention to join forces along a definite
direction-an intention having nothing in common with
a genuine concern for peace and international
understanding-that underlies the desire for '
normalisation'?''
 Commenting on the US President's forthcoming

visit to China, the communist press, together with
the entire progressive press, speculates on what
effect this step will have on the situation in
Indochina.
 L'Humanite, the newspaper of the French

Communist Party, emphasises that it is US imperialism
that is committing aggression in Indochina and
has inspired the reign of terror in Indonesia. The
American imperialists waged a scorched-earth war
in Korea, and they were the authors of the
notorious "Guam doctrine" which sets Asians against
Asians. "The policy of US imperialism, which is
opposed to a relaxation of international tensions,''
says the newspaper, "depends on differences
among the anti-imperialist forces.''
 President Nixon's decision to visit China, says

Akahata, the Japanese Communist Party
newspaper, means the bankruptcy of the aggressive US
policy in Indochina. The present rapprochement
with China, according to the newspaper, is a
typical example of the divide-and-rule policy.
 No one should be deceived about Mr. Nixon's

motives, says the Morning Star, the newspaper of
the British Communists. As before, he is the
237
leadcr of an imperialist power waging a brutal

aggressive war in Indochina. One of Nixon's goals is to
provoke still greater differences between the
socialist countries, the newspaper remarks.
 In its editorial on July 19, 1971, the Vietnamese

Nhan Dan wrote that the implementation of the
Nixon doctrine had led to the intensified military
activity of US imperialism in that region of the
world. The newspaper added that the US policy
was aimed at scraping together an alliance of
counter-revolutionary forces in every region and
also at splitting the socialist countries.
 ``Nixon's policy," Nhan Dan pointed out, "has

ended in failure. It is driven into a corner. The
whole of the United States and all the world
loudly demand: End the aggressive war in Vietnam
immediately and bring all US soldiers home!
Finding himself in this predicament, Nixon began a
feverish search for a way out. But he went in the
wrong direction. The door for exit was open, but
he has entered a blind alley.''
 The Daily World of the US Communists,

referring to the Peking-Washington contacts, writes
that the contradiction between the motives and
aims proclaimed by Nixon, and the real policy
and actions, gave rise to natural suspicions.
 The Lebanese Al-Nida remarks that the interest

of the West in China was growing as the Peking
leadership stepped up its anti-Soviet, divisionist
tactics.
 The progressive press of Asian, African and

Latin American countries assesses the moves towards
a Peking-Washington rapprochement as testifying
to the hegemonistic aspirations of the ruling
quarters of both powers. It is pointed out that the talks
about Nixon's official visit to China help to expose
238
the Maoist propaganda which served to camouflage

the moves taken by the Chinese leaders to reach
an understanding with imperialism. The Cairo 
AlGoumhouria says that the forthcoming visit to
Peking cloaks the intention of US diplomacy to
divide the anti-imperialist camp and, above all,
drive a wedge between the USSR and the People's
China.
 Thus, the world comments on the Chinese--

American negotiations reflect the attitude of modern
political and class forces to the basis and aims of
the detente between Washington and Peking. All
the progressive, peace-loving forces are watching
closely the manoeuvres of certain circles which
would like to use the normalisation of
ChineseAmerican relations to the detriment of socialism,
of the international communist and workers'
movement, and of the peoples which are fighting
imperialist aggression.
 The Soviet Union does not see in the

ChineseAmerican contacts any cause for sensation.
Soviet people regard the contacts from the viewpoint
of the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the
international situation and of the basic tendencies of world
development that was made at the 24th CPSU
Congress. The congress clearly defined the Soviet
Union's policy in its relations with the Chinese
People's Republic and the United States, and
international developments confirm the correctness
of this policy. The Soviet Communist Party and
state support the normalising of relations between
the USSR and the PRC and the restoring of
friendship between the two peoples, which would be in
the interests of both countries, of world socialism
and would help to step up the struggle against
imperialism. But the Soviet Union is waging a
239
consistent struggle against the anti-Leninist platform

of the Chinese leadership, and its splitting
tactics aimed at undermining the anti-imperialist
front, the socialist community and the world
communist and workers' movement. It rejects the
great-power chauvinistic policy of Peking and the
slanderous fabrications of Chinese propaganda
about the policy of the Soviet Communist Party
and state.
 The Soviet Union unswervingly implements the

principle of peaceful coexistence. It is ready to
develop relations with the USA as well if this is
in the interests of the Soviet and American peoples
and the interests of universal peace. But the
Soviet Union will continue to oppose firmly the
aggressive actions of the USA and the policy of
force. Together with the revolutionary, anti--
imperialist front, the USSR will continue the struggle
to curb aggressors and frustrate their dangerous
schemes.
 The Soviet Union, in close cooperation with the

fraternal socialist states, consistently pursues the
Leninist foreign policy for consolidating peace,
security, freedom and the independence of nations,
and the positions of world socialism. Proof of this
is the support and all-round assistance that the
Soviet Union and the other socialist countries give
to the heroic people of Vietnam, the patriots of
Laos and Cambodia, the peoples of the Arab East
and to all the peoples in their just liberation
struggle. The Soviet Union believes that the well-known
proposals put forward by the DRV Government,
the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of South Vietnam, the United National
Front of Cambodia and the Patriotic Front of Laos
are a constructive and realistic basis for solving
240
the Indochina problem. The Soviet people support

these proposals.
 Future developments will reveal more clearly

the actual intentions of Peking and Washington.
The Soviet Communist Party and state will take
into account all the possible consequences of the
Sino-American contacts. Any hopes Peking and
Washington may entertain of using these contacts
to bring pressure to bear on the USSR or the states
of the socialist community are unrealistic.
 The Soviet Union believes that political

decisions should be aimed, not at complicating the
international situation, but at easing tensions.
Undoubtedly, the long-term interests of the Chinese
and American peoples, just as the interests of all
peoples, call for decisions which would strengthen
peace and security, and not for political plotting
against other states. As history shows, such plots
eventually turn against those who sponsored them.
 The Soviet Union, as in the past, is ready to
cooperate actively with all states, including the
PRC and the USA, in the name of universal peace
and the freedom, independence, progress and
prosperity of nations.
 Pravda, July 25, 1971
16--193
[241]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Questions Requiring an Answer
 CONCERNING THE US-CHINA TOP-LEVEL
 MEETING
 G. Arbatov
 The news of the forthcoming visit of the US

President to Peking has lost its novelty. At first a
sensation, it is now a matter for businesslike
discussion of a question of considerable public
interest. People would like to know what effect the
change in US-Chinese relations, which is in the air,
will have on the world situation. Will it lead to a
lessening of tension and normalisation of
international relations, or will it merely further sharpen
the conflicts that are tearing the world, and cause
new ones?
 President Nixon's projected visit to Peking, as

far as it goes, does not give grounds for definite
conclusions about the future of US-Chinese
relations and their effect on world developments.
Nevertheless some ideas are already suggesting
themselves.
I</h3>
 To begin with, it would be interesting to take a

look at the forces in the USA that are behind the
tendency for a change in that country's policy
towards China, a tendency which became apparent
some time ago.
 At first glance, this all seems quite

straightforward. US policy vis-a-vis China began to change
when the unfriendliness of China's leaders towards
the Soviet Union, and their attempts to split the
revolutionary and liberation movements, revealed
242
themselves. This, however, does not mean that all

Americans are in favour of improving US-Chinese
relations solely for the reason that such a course
is counter to the interests of the other socialist
countries.
 The matter is not as simple as it might seem.

Without doubt, the factor just mentioned is largely
responsible for the shifts in official US policy and
in the views of some of those US statesmen who,
only a short while ago, were ready to call a traitor
anyone advocating recognition of the Chinese
People's Republic and an end to US enmity towards
China and the Chinese people. Today many of
these statesmen have turned into ardent advocates
of detente with China. And this, naturally, gives
some food for thought. It also cannot be ignored
that detente with China is being welcomed in many
countries by bitter adversaries of the Soviet Union,
including counter-revolutionary emigrants from
socialist countries and Zionist militants.
 At the same time, there are also people of a

different kind in the USA who stand for better
relations with China. Progressive people in America
have long objected to the cold-war policy of their
government. Supporting efforts directed towards
peace, they have been demanding an improvement
in relations with the Soviet Union and other
socialist states, China included.
 Progressive Americans have been really alarmed

and disappointed by what has taken place in
China in recent years, notably the slide of the Chinese
leadership into nationalistic and chauvinistic
positions in foreign policy. While expressing doubts
as to the motives behind the projected changes in
their country's official policy at the present time,
they nevertheless believe that changes are
16*
243
necessary. They consider that the United States must

change its attitude to China and recognise the
country's right to be installed in the United
Nations, and that it must put an end to its cold-war
policies directed against the USSR, China, the
German Democratic Republic, Cuba, etc. Moreover,
progressive circles in the United States fully
realise that the hard trials which have fallen to the
lot of the Chinese people, and for which the
Peking leadership must bear the main responsibility,
are partly the result of the imperialist policy of
isolating China and putting obstacles in the way
of her peaceful construction.
 Such are the two extreme poles of the rather

motley collection of trends and attitudes which
support the change in US policy towards China.

 But it is not only a change in the attitudes which

can be discerned at the poles of the USA's political
life that is concerned. A change is also to be seen
in the attitudes of the US public at large. This is
due, to a certain extent, to the active campaign for
better relations with China which all progressive
people have been waging for many years.
Furthermore, confronted with troubles of both an
international and a domestic nature, the US public is
growing increasingly aware of the need to put an
end to the cold-war policy and achieve a detente.
This fact cannot be ignored by the US ruling
circles.
 But this is not the whole story. There is also the
matter of the changes which are taking place in
bourgeois public opinion which is generally
shaped by official propaganda. After its hatred
campaign against China, which had gone on for many
years, this propaganda changed its tone and
direction. It is impossible not to associate this change
244
with China's switch-over to anti-Sovietism and

with its policies aimed at splitting the
revolutionary liberation movement.
 It might have been expected that bourgeois

elements in the US would be shocked by the "
cultural revolution" with its excesses, by Peking's
support of all leftist adventuristic forces and extremist
groupings in different countries, including the
USA itself, by its propaganda moves against
peaceful coexistence, and, finally, by its fierce verbal
attacks on the United States. Yet nothing of the
kind happened. The bourgeois element judged
China's policy by her deeds and not by her words.
And her deeds convinced the practical American
bourgeoisie that China, despite the vehemence of
her denunciations, posed no real danger to US
policy, and that in any event China could be dealt
with, no matter what the Peking leaders might say
or the Chinese press write. Name-calling, after all,
never hurts anyone.
 Among bourgeois and petty-bourgeois circles,

which as a rule go on supporting Washington's
official policy until it gets them into trouble, the
belief that China had ceased to be too "
revolutionary,'' too "communistic,'' engendered hopes that,
with Peking's help, the United States would be
able to finish the war in Vietnam to their own
satisfaction. These hopes were greatly encouraged
by the news of Nixon's forthcoming visit to
Peking. Agreement on this visit was most opportune
indeed.
 Washington's imperialist policy had long been

running into tremendous difficulties created by the
heroic resistance put up by the Vietnamese people
and the support given them by the socialist
countries and by progressive people throughout the
245
world. Even in the United States, this war was

regarded as the most unpopular of all the wars
which that country had ever waged. The shock
publication of the secret Pentagon documents
deepened the rift caused by the war. The mounting
public protest in the USA and the new peace
initiatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of
the Republic of South Vietnam gave the Nixon
Administration the alternative of either stopping
the war or exposing itself to the danger of political
defeat. The news of the forthcoming Peking
summit was used to stave off a decision on ending
the war in Vietnam. The US ignored the
Vietnamese peace proposals and there was talk in certain
US circles about the possibility of reaching
agreement on this issue behind the backs of the
Vietnamese people.
 Although discussion of China's attitude to the

Vietnam question deserves a special article, it is
necessary to say a few words about it. The
projected visit of the US President to Peking could have
been presented as a sensation only to credulous
people who implicitly believed the earlier
propaganda about Peking's irreconcilability with US
imperialism. Yet, the timing of the invitation
impressed many, both in the USA and outside it,
as a move obviously prejudicing the cause of the
Vietnamese patriots. The New York Post was
genuinely puzzled and suggested that it was up to
the Sinologists and Maoists to explain why the
Chinese Communists had decided to make things
easier for the President.
 But as far as the United States is concerned, an

analysis of the attitudes prevailing in that country
leads one to the conclusion that the recent
246
Washington-Peking contacts and Nixon's projected trip

to China enjoy wide approval, albeit for different,
often mutually exclusive, reasons.
 Hopes for much support were evidently no

small factor in prompting the decision on the
Peking summit. On the eve of the presidential
elections, the US Government is concentrating on
anything which may help the ruling Republican Party
to defeat its political rivals.
II</h3>
 An understanding of the different motives that

prompt the various political groups and social
strata in the USA to support the idea of improving
relations with China is important, not only to
explain the reasons for the recent developments, but
also to forecast the possible consequences of those
developments. With the emphasis in US-Chinese
relations being shifted to the sphere of political
decisions, the different motives, initially obscure
though they were, are bound to become
increasingly clear.
 This can already be sensed in press comments

and in speeches by US political and public leaders.
And it is becoming increasingly clear that many
Americans feel some anxiety about the possible
long-term results of the political move made by
the US Administration.
 Some of these comments assert that, by deciding

on Nixon's visit to Peking, the US Administration
is evading outstanding political issues such as the
necessity to put an end to the war in Vietnam or
the need for changes in the existing practice of
adopting political decisions by which the President
could plunge the country into war without the
247
knowledge of the public or even the Congress.
Others are concerned about the effect the trip may
have on Soviet-American relations and the
prospects for reducing the arms race and achieving a
detente. And many among the US ruling circles
are beginning to feel uneasy about the possible
impact of the Peking rendezvous on the USA's
relations with its West European allies, with Japan
and other countries. In fact, the news of the
planned visit was received by many of them with
unconcealed alarm, to say nothing of the confusion
it caused in the camp of the US puppets in Taiwan,
Seoul and Saigon.
 These and other problems are making

themselves felt with increasing sharpness in the
discussion, now under way in the USA, on President
Nixon's projected visit to Peking. Even those who
unreservedly approve of this step fully realise
that a meeting as such, even a summit one, cannot
automatically solve the problems facing the
country. Moreover, some US leaders fear possible
disillusionment in the very near future which, after the
great expectations that have been raised, may have
the effect of a political boomerang. What will be
the outcome of Nixon's visit? What will be its
overall effect on the presidential elections to be
held in the fall of 1972? How well has the
President "figured it out"? These are the questions that
some of the leaders of the ruling party are asking
themselves.
 They realise that US policy is up against a

multitude of complicated problems which cannot be
disposed of by a sweeping diplomatic gesture but
which need radical political solutions, at times
painful for Washington. The US President himself
was forced to throw cold water on the overly
248
optimistic at a recent press conference by advising

against entertaining `ìllusions'' about the Peking
trip.
 Many questions connected with the President's

projected visit to Peking, notably those pertaining
to the future of US-Chinese relations and US
policy in general, remain basically unanswered.
Neither Washington nor Peking is in a great hurry
to answer them, their obvious desire being to build
up an atmosphere of secrecy around many things
concerning their relations. According to the US
press, the American public is particularly anxious
about the possible effect of the move undertaken
by the US Administration on US relations with the
socialist countries, particularly with the Soviet
Union. This is understandable, if one takes into
account the political, economic and military
prestige of the Soviet Union on the world scene--
prestige which it has gained as a result of its might
and its peaceful constructive policy-and if one
takes into account the role of the Soviet Union in
world developments. There are many people in the
United States who clearly see that much of what
is important for both countries and for the world
at large depends on US-Soviet relations.
 It is already evident that Americans are very

divided on the subject. Some put forward proposals
to combine efforts to normalise relations with
China with equally vigorous efforts to improve
relations with the Soviet Union and the overall
international situation. Others try to figure out how
best to use every step towards detente with China
for stepping up pressure on the Soviet Union, for
blackmailing it, and for forcing concessions from
it. Still others are advocating a long-term policy
of pitting the governments of "Red China" and
249
``Red Russia" against one another, as the

reactionary New York Daily News put it.
 As regards US official policy, it has so far

confined itself to giving assurances that the Peking
summit, and normalisation of US-Chinese
relations, will not interfere in any way with the
interests of other countries.
 The Soviet people cannot ignore the fact that the
US press itself gives a very ambiguous
interpretation of such assurances. The Washington Post, for
instance, writes that, despite all formal refutations
issued by the US Government, officials in the
Nixon Administration privately express views to the
effect that it is not in the interests of the United
States to dispel the Soviet Union's suspicions about
some details of US-Chinese relations which may
give reason for dissatisfaction or concern in
Moscow.
 It is worth noting that US press comments on

the recent hearings in the Senate commission for
foreign affairs have a definite orientation. Among
the commentators one finds former officials of the
State Department who were victimised in
McCarthy's time for their advocacy of US-Chinese
detente. Explaining their attitude of those days, they
emphasise that they understood detente as a means
of alienating China from the socialist camp. By
taking advantage of Mao's readiness to seek ways
for improving relations with Washington, which
had been in evidence since the forties, they hoped
to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and
China. By such comments, the US press is openly
persuading the reader of the benefits of detente
with China for stepping up anti-Soviet intrigues.

 This line reveals, to say the least, the extreme

political shortsightedness of its initiators. A
250
dialogue, as difficult as it is important, has long been

going on between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Covering a wide range of serious
problems, it requires confidence more than anything
else for successful completion. But what can be
less conducive to confidence than underhand
diplomatic proceedings, backstage intrigues and
duplicity? But let us proceed to the question of how
Washington's official assurances concerning its
intentions should be treated.
 For over twenty years now the Soviet Union has
pressed for the international recognition of the
legitimate rights of the Chinese People's Republic.
It can only be regretted that the United States has
taken so long to acknowledge realities and make
its first steps toward renunciation of its cold-war
policy towards China. It is also to be regretted
that this step has been taken under the
circumstances which cast doubts upon the motives.
 As to the question of what is actually behind

these changes in the American policy, what will
be the outcome of the struggle of various forces
shaping this policy, the answer will be found in
the actions of Washington, and not in the words
about its intentions.
 President Nixon has called his intended visit to

Peking a "peace trip" and Washington wants to
present it as a practical step in pursuance of the
policy of transition "from the era of confrontation
to the era of negotiation" which it proclaimed
several years ago.
 The sincerity of statements is tested only by
practice. And this is true of the case in question,
all the more so since the world public knows that
the speeches and assurances of US politicians have
often been at variance with their deeds.
251
 There are many problems in the tackling of

which the United States could demonstrate whether
its policies are motivated by a desire for peace,
detente and normalisation of the international
situation, or by new imperialist designs which fit
into the traditional scheme of the positions--
ofstrength policy. These are the problems of
Vietnam, the Middle East, European security,
curtailment of the arms race, US relations with the
socialist countries, etc. If the steps toward
improvement of relations with China are accompanied by
a change to a more constructive US attitude to
these and other questions, then we shall have good
reason to take Washington's protestations about its
good will and peaceful intentions seriously. Such a
change would undoubtedly be viewed favourably
in the Soviet Union. A sincere policy aimed at
lessening tension has always met with understanding
and enjoyed support in the Soviet Union. And it is
from this position that we must appraise the
intentions of Peking.
 The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is aimed

at effecting a change in the course of world affairs,
at implementing measures intended to normalise
the situation, and at consolidating peace and
security throughout the world. This is the sum and
substance of the foreign policy course charted by
the 24th CPSU Congress-its proclaimed peace
programme. As was reaffirmed at the 24th Congress,
the Soviet Union is in favour of improving
relations with China and the USA, developing
relations with other countries, and promoting
bilateral, regional and international cooperation aimed
at consolidating peace and the security of nations.
 Among the proposals advanced by the Soviet

Union there are some which require the
252
consideration of all the major powers, including China. In

this context, China's participation in the discussion
and solution of problems such as a curtailment of
the arms race, the complete banning of all
weapons of mass destruction and the replacement of
exclusive military blocs by continental systems of
collective security, is very important.
 Such a development would be to the benefit of

all nations, including the USSR, China and the
USA, and Soviet policy supports it.
 At the present time, however, there are many

reasons to expect a different development of
events, as US policy remains unchanged, except in
relation to China, and presents the main obstacle
to eliminating sharp world conflicts and
normalising the world situation. This being so,
Washington's steps toward detente with China can have
only one meaning. Definite conclusions suggest
themselves accordingly. But the Soviet Union and
world socialism are strong enough to meet any
possible tide of events.
__*_*_*__
 The answer to the major questions arising in

connection with the US President's visit to
Peking and changes in US-Chinese relations will be
provided, not by the words or diplomatic
manoeuvres of the states in question, but by their
actions in the coming months.
 The Soviet Union and other countries will be

keeping a watchful eye on these actions and on
developments in general, for the problems
involved are of great importance for the Soviet Union,
for world socialism, for the entire world situation
and for the cause of world peace.
 Pravda, August 10, 1971
[253]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
The Preaching and Practice
 of the Chinese Leaders
 I. Alexandrov
 The present epoch is characterised by gigantic

revolutionary transformations radically changing
the face of our planet. The forces of world
socialism, of the communist and workers' movement, and
of national liberation are developing their
offensive against the positions of imperialism. This
historic confrontation encompasses all sides of
public life-economy, politics, ideology and culture.
 Experience has convincingly confirmed the
correctness of the conclusion drawn by the
International Conference of Communist and Workers'
Parties in 1969 that "the world system oi socialism is
the decisive force in the anti-imperialist struggle."
It has become a powerful accelerator of the
historical progress that was started by the Great
October Revolution, a mighty bulwark of peace and
the security of the peoples.
 In the countries of socialism, pursuing a

Leninist course of domestic and foreign policy, the
working people of the whole world see a reliable
bulwark of peace, freedom and social progress.
The stronger the fraternal alliance of socialist
countries, the stronger become the forces of peace
and progress in the whole world, and the more
resolute becomes the rebuff to any aggressive
designs of imperialism. The support and aid
given to heroic Vietnam, and to the peoples of
Laos and Cambodia by the USSR, the other
254
socialist countries and by all progressive forces are a

vivid example of this.
 At the same time, the members of the anti--

imperialist front of struggle cannot but be alarmed
by the anti-Leninist, great-power chauvinistic
course of the present leadership of China directed
towards undermining the unity of revolutionary,
anti-imperialist forces and inflicting serious
damage on their common cause.
I</h2>
 More than ten years have passed since the

Chinese leadership, for the first time, openly
proclaimed a special ideological-political platform on the
main issues of our time, the development of world
socialism, and of the communist and workers'
movement.
 They revised the Marxist-Leninist principles of

socialist construction and foreign policy that were
implemented in the first ten years of the PRC's
existence and recorded in the decisions of the 8th
Congress of the CPC (1956). Some time later,
contrary to the Marxist-Leninist line of the
international communist movement jointly worked out by
the communist and workers' parties, including the
CPC, the Chinese leaders advanced their own
``Left'' theses that allegedly were to facilitate the
speediest destruction of imperialism and an
acceleration of the world revolution by any means, not
ruling out a world thermo-nuclear war. They tried
to impose this platform on the international
communist and workers' movement. Actually
Maoism's ``Leftism'' only camouflaged the conceited
hegemonistic designs of the Maoists to which
Peking's entire domestic and foreign policy was
subordinated.
255
 In the field of domestic policy, Mao Tse-tung

and his entourage decided to put the economic
basis, the foundations of socialism that were laid in
the country during the first decade after the
victory of the revolution, at the service of their aims.
Having discarded the decisions of the 8th
Congress of the CPC aimed at the systematic building
of socialism and ensuring the people's well-being,
Mao Tse-tung and his group plunged China into
the voluntarist adventure of the "big leap,'' of
building the "people's communes,'' proclaiming
their intention to effect a transition to
communism in 3-5 years, and declaring that "three years
of hard work would bring ten thousand years of
happiness.'' Apart from other things, the course
of the "big leap" pursued the ambitious aim of
assuming a vanguard position among the socialist
countries. This appealed to the Maoists'
hegemonistic aspirations.
 Built on an anti-scientific, subjectivist--

voluntarist conception, contradicting the objective laws of
socialist construction, the "big leap" has turned
for the Chinese people into a tragedy of vainly
wasted efforts, has led to a serious economic crisis,
and to a still further lowering of the already low
living standards of the people.
 In order to protect themselves from the

discontent of the popular masses, the Mao group blamed
the Party and state cadres, who had allegedly
"poorly followed Mao's instructions,'' for the
failure of the "big leap.''
 Then followed a sharp zigzag in the tactics of the

Chinese leadership, when it stated that it was
impossible to build socialism in China in the lifetime
of the present generation, that this would take
many decades if not centuries. It proclaimed
256
poverty to be the ``basis'' of revolutionism, and the
desire to improve the life of the people-"
revisionism,'' "bourgeois economism.'' They galvanised
the old Trotskyite anti-Leninist thesis of the ``
impossibility'' of successfully building socialism
before the triumph of the world revolution.
 In the sphere of foreign policy the Maoists took

the line of sharpening international tension,
pushing other countries and peoples towards armed
conflicts. They rejected any proposals aimed at
a relaxation of international tension. Peking met
with hostility the treaties on banning nuclear
weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and
under water, and on the non-proliferation of such
weapons, on banning the emplacement of nuclear
weapons on the seabed and ocean floor, rejected
the idea put forward by the Soviet Union of
creating a system of collective security in Asia and
opposed many other constructive proposals of the
socialist countries.
 This course was covered up by noisy ``Leftist''

slogans about the need to immediately destroy
imperialism. Calls for a "people's war" in all
countries, on all continents, were issued. The thesis
"the world can be changed only with the rifle" was
proclaimed as a universal truth.
 No matter what ultra-revolutionary phraseology

was used to cover up this course, its essence
remained unchanged: the striving for hegemony in a
war-devastated world. In this connection even a
nuclear-missile war in which, as estimated by Mao
Tse-tung, half of mankind might perish, was
declared a sort of boon. Speaking with the American
journalist Strong in 1965, Mao called on the
peoples of the world not to fear nuclear war because
"China will survive it.'' On the ruins left by this
17--193
257
war the Maoists intended to build "a civilisation a

thousand times more wonderful,'' naturally,
according to their own recipes. Mao Tse-tung spoke
in detail about this in his conversation with
Jawaharlal Nehru and in his speech at the 1957
Moscow Conference. These ideas were developed in a
number of Chinese articles printed in April 1960
in connection with the 90th anniversary of Lenin's
birth and also in a later period, for instance, in an
article in the May 14, 1969 issue of the Chiehfang
jihpao.
 But the Chinese leadership was not and is not

at all eager to rush into battle against imperialism.
It would like to use for the attainment of its plans
the military and economic might of the socialist
countries, the strength of the international
working class, the possibilities of the national-liberation
movement, trying to turn them into a tool of their
great-power hegemonism. Although the Maoists
declare that they are "prepared for the greatest
national sacrifices" their deeds show differently.
They prefer the position of "sitting on the
mountain and observing the tigers fight.''
 Marxist-Leninist Parties throughout the world

resolutely rejected the ideology, policy, strategy
and tactics of Maoism, subjecting them to a
thorough principled criticism as alien to Marxism--
Leninism, objectively untenable and harmful from
the point of view of the international and national
tasks of the communist, workers' and national--
liberation movement. The Maoist justification of
war evoked indignation and protests from the
broadest segments of the international public.
 Together with the other fraternal Parties the

CPSU consistently upheld the principles of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism,
258
pressing for a strengthening of the position and

the unity of world socialism, the cohesion of the
world communist movement and the national--
liberation, democratic and peace-loving forces in
the struggle against imperialism, reaction and war.
So the CPC leaders took the line of splitting the
communist movement, of creating in other
countries Maoist groups and trends opposing the
fraternal Parties, and of eroding the socialist
community.
 The Chinese leaders spearheaded their struggle

against our Motherland, against our Party and its
consistent Leninist course.
 The Maoists demanded of Soviet Communists

that they renounce the decisions of the 20th
Congress and the CPSU Programme, started intensive
anti-Soviet propaganda and from the middle of
1960 began systematically to organise
provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border, developing
them into armed clashes in the spring and
summer of 1969. In an atmosphere of anti-Soviet
psychosis and militaristic frenzy that was
simultaneously generated in China, the course hostile to
the Soviet Union was proclaimed an official
doctrine at the 9th CPC Congress.
 Mao and his entourage are steadily scaling

down economic and other ties with the USSR and
other socialist countries, while simultaneously
expanding in every way the ties with leading
imperialist powers, first of all with the United States.
 Suffice it to say that the share of socialist

countries in the PRC's foreign trade dropped to 25 per
cent in 1966, as against 68 per cent in 1959. The
volume of Soviet-Chinese trade in 1969 was about
one sixth of that in 1966.
 It is indicative that Peking develops its relations
17*
259
with imperialist countries on the basis of

undisguised anti-Sovietism, to the detriment of the
interests of world socialism and the revolutionary,
national-liberation movement.
 But all the efforts of the Chinese leadership to

split the international communist movement, to
create in Peking a centre opposed to it, to gain
ground in the attainment of its great-power
hegemonistic ambitions by asserting on the
international scene a sort of exclusiveness for China and for
its role as leader of the Third World-"the world
village"-against the "world town"-and thereby to
establish an anti-socialist, anti-Soviet front, proved
futile. The untenability of the strategy and tactics
of the Maoists was proved by the course of
historical development, and their adventuristic aims
turned out to be unattainable.
 The Maoist subversive groups and factions in

various countries, based actually on an anti--
communist, anti-Soviet platform, began to fall apart.
In pursuing their plans to assume leadership of
the Third World on the basis of their extremist
platform, the Chinese leaders encountered the
resistance of peace-loving, developing states,
especially neighbouring ones against which they made
territorial and other claims.
 Serious failures in domestic and foreign policies

led to a socio-political crisis in China and to
widespread dissatisfaction in the ranks of the CPC
and among the working people. A split developed
in the CPC leadership. The Maoists faced the real
danger of having to bear grave responsibility to '
the party and the country.
'
 Precisely these reasons prompted Mao and his

grouping to carry out what actually amounted to
a political coup in the country, implemented in
260
the form of a "cultural revolution" and which, as

admitted by the Chinese leaders themselves, was a
"struggle for power.'' A military-bureaucratic
system began to be implanted in the country.
 Party, trade union, and youth organisations and

unions of creative workers were demolished in the
course of the "cultural revolution" and the
constitutional bodies of people's power were paralysed.
Large masses of Communists, workers, peasants
and especially intellectuals were subjected to
repressions. The ideal of ``democracy'' as proclaimed
in China was to turn the entire people into "loyal
soldiers" and "obedient buffaloes of the great
helmsman.''
 The blow was dealt first of all at those

Communists who saw the perniciousness of the
voluntaristic ideas of the "big leap" and the anti-popular
foreign political course for the cause of socialism
in China, at those who in the period of the
escalation of the American aggression in Vietnam
proposed to settle differences with the CPSU, to achieve
unity of action of the socialist countries in the
struggle against imperialism's aggressive
intrigues.
 At the same time the organisers of the "cultural

revolution" continued the campaign of hatred and
slander against the Soviet Union and other
socialist states, trying to ascribe to them plans of
creating a ``circle'' around China in collusion with
imperialism. Under this pretext the Maoists started
the militarisation of the country, calling upon it
"to prepare for hunger, to prepare for war.'' It is
monstrous, though it is a fact, that the Maoists
began to call for a "cultural revolution" in other
socialist countries, alleging that without such a
revolution "capitalism will be restored.'' Peking went
261
so far as to call for an "assertion of the banner of

Chairman Mao's ideas over the entire globe.''
 The 9th CPC Congress, held in 1969, was called

upon to legalise the military-bureaucratic system
in China. Mao Tse-tung and his group actually
started to build the Communist Party anew,
throwing aside the political, ideological and
organisational principles of the Marxist-Leninist Party. Mao's
ideas were presented at the congress as "the
Marxism-Leninism of the present epoch.'' Declaring a
"ruthless struggle" against "modern revisionism,''
by which Peking has in view the leadership of
most socialist countries and Communist Parties,
the 9th CPC Congress thus signified a new stage in
the evolution of the ideological and political theses
of Maoism as an anti-Leninist, petty-bourgeois,
chauvinistic ideology.
 But the Maoists did not derive the results they
wanted either from the "cultural revolution" or
from the "line of the 9th Congress of the CPC.''
On the contrary, in the period from 1966 to 1969
they aggravated the state of crisis and the
country's even greater international isolation. Although
by methods of violence, terror and demagogy the
Chinese leadership succeeded in suppressing open
resistance to its course and in imposing this course
on the country, it could not help seeing that it
would not be able to overcome by these means
either the domestic crisis or the international
isolation.
 The Chinese leaders could not but realise the

full extent of their defeat and the collapse of their
plans when the 1969 International Conference of
Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow
reaffirmed the unshakable loyalty of the world army
of Communists to the principles of Marxism--
262
Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and

demonstrated the growing unity of the communist ranks
on this principled basis. The Conference
strengthened the position of the international communist,
workers' movement as the most influential political
movement of our time, the vanguard of anti--
imperialist forces in the struggle for the triumph of
the cause of peace, national liberation and
socialism. The Conference highly assessed the role of
the Soviet Union and the CPSU in the liberation
struggle and the USSR's peaceful foreign
policy.
<h3 class="NUMERIC_LVL3">
II</h3>
 The development of the present international

situation is characterised primarily by the growth
of the forces of world socialism, the consolidation
of the unity of the world communist movement
and the cohesion of the forces of the anti--
imperialist front. The historic offensive by revolutionary
forces against imperialism's positions, their
growing activity in the struggle for peace and security
of nations compel the Peking leaders to review
their tactics, to use methods often contrary to
those they had only recently proclaimed.
 The time came when the Chinese leaders had to

mothball some ultra-``Left'' slogans and even to
remove from the front of the stage the persons
who had compromised themselves most by
excessive zeal in promoting the "Mao line" during the
"cultural revolution.'' The Maoists are making a
new zigzag in their policy. And once again Mao
and his group are trying-for the umpteenth time
-to blame the barbaric nature of the "cultural
revolution" with its mass repressions and excesses
on those whom they themselves had set against the
263
CPC, and used to clear the way to the

establishment of their domination. A ``respectable''
appearance is being hastily given to Peking's policy
which is now being pursued by more ingenious
methods.
 Facts show, however, that if any changes have

been made in Peking's tactics they amount only
to a giving up of the attempts to accelerate
implementation of the old line, and not renunciation of
its aims, to the use of subtler methods of
manoeuvering intended to deceive the Chinese people and
also to confuse the international revolutionary
liberation forces.
 Whereas previously the policy of peaceful

coexistence of countries with different social systems,
consistently promoted by the USSR and other
fraternal countries, was labelled in Peking as a ``
betrayal'' and "collusion with imperialism,'' now the
Chinese leadership even teaches others how to
pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence. The
Chinese Government has officially proposed the "five
principles of peaceful coexistence" as the basis of
relations between the PRC and the United States.
At the same time it has enlivened its contacts with
many Western countries, having established
diplomatic relations with a number of them. Peking
has tuned down outright propaganda of the thesis
of the inevitability of a world thermonuclear war
and, more than that, now tries to feign love of
peacefulness.
 The tone of Chinese propaganda statements in

respect of the United Nations Organisation has
also changed. China has started expressing its
obvious desire to restore its rights in that
organisation, although only recently Peking maintained
that it wanted to have nothing to do with it. As is
264
known, the Soviet Union and the other socialist

countries have invariably come out and continue
to come out for the restoration of the lawful rights
of the PRC in the United Nations.
 In reviewing their foreign policy tactics, the

Peking leaders evidently arrived at the conclusion
that the hungweipings damage first of all
China's prestige not only in the socialist and
developing countries, but also in the West. Outwardly the
anti-Soviet campaign carried on in official
statements by Chinese leaders was somewhat altered.
In 1969 the Chinese leaders agreed to a meeting
of heads of the governments of the USSR and the
PRC proposed by the Soviet side and also to the
holding of Soviet-Chinese talks on border and
other questions of intergovernmental relations.
 Striving for a lessening of international tension,

for consolidation of peace and the security of
nations, people of goodwill would like to see a
manifestation of elements of realism in China's
foreign policy behind the changes in the method of
action of the Chinese leadership, elements that
would serve the aims of strengthening the anti--
imperialist front and the cause of peace and
friendship among the peoples. The Soviet people, too,
sincerely want this.
 The question that naturally arises is: what, in

deed, is the essence of the changes in the foreign
policy of the Chinese leadership at the present
stage, and in what measure do they accord with
the aspirations of the peoples, including the people
of China? In fact, this is a question of the
correlation and interconnection of the Chinese
leadership's strategy and tactics in the present
conditions. Only facts, their thorough and objective
analysis can produce the answer.
265
 The facts are such that neither in its statements

nor in its practical deeds, has the Chinese
leadership yet renounced a single provision of its special,
incompatible with Leninism, ideological-political
platform on the main questions of international
life and the world communist movement. The
Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China held in the autumn of
1970 reaffirmed the "militant tasks of the 9th
Congress of the Communist Party of China" and the
advancement to the fore of "intensification of
preparations for war.'' The Chinese leadership
opposes collective security in Europe and Asia, and
the USSR's and Poland's treaties with the FRG.
Peking spares no effort to transfer the situation of
military psychosis to Albania in the hope of
sowing the seeds of tension in the Balkans by this or
other methods. Under cover of bombastic
declarations, the Chinese leadership as before opposes
concrete steps directed at the attainment of
agreements on questions of disarmament and
prohibition of nuclear weapons. The Government of the
People's Republic of China turned down the Soviet
proposal to convene a conference of five nuclear
powers, stating that "China's nuclear weapons
are still in the testing stage...''
 The Chinese leadership continues to engage in

intensive hostile propaganda against our Party and
country. It is in the Soviet Union, in the policy
of the CPSU, in the successes of the working
people of our country and the fraternal countries of
socialism that it sees the main obstacle to the
attainment of its hegemonistic ambitions in the
international arena. The Maoists are trying to keep
from the Chinese people the facts which shed light
on the life of the Soviet people, which show the
266
real course of the historic struggle between the

forces of socialism and imperialism. All the good
that is connected with the Soviet Union, which
supported the Chinese people's revolutionary
struggle in the course of many decades and gave
it fraternal assistance in its advance along the road
of socialism, is deliberately erased from the minds
of the Chinese working people.
 The Chinese leaders continue to declare that

they will conduct an "implacable struggle" against
the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and
Marxist-Leninist Parties. At the close of 1970,
speaking with his old acquaintance, US journalist
E. Snow, Mao Tse-tung said that the ideological
differences between the CPSU and the CPC are
"irreconcilable.''
 The Chinese leaders continue to conduct

subversive activities against the world socialist
community, they oppose the collective international
organisations of socialist countries, the Warsaw
Treaty and the CMEA. In its time Peking deemed
it possible to express its solidarity with the
antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia and their
imperialist patrons and then to bemoan the failure of
their counter-revolutionary plot. Vicious attacks
against socialist Poland sounded from Peking in
unison with the anti-Communists.
 The policy of the Chinese leadership toward

socialist countries clearly shows a striving, which
coincides with the machinations of imperialist
reaction, to set the socialist states at loggerheads,
to set one against the other and to prevent the
implementation of the joint political line of fraternal
countries in the international arena.
 Whereas previously Peking waged a broad

propaganda offensive against all socialist countries, at
267
present it is trying to "narrow the field" of

struggle, and applies a ``differentiated'' approach to
socialist countries in an effort to draw some of them
into the orbit of its policy. In so doing it makes
alluring gestures and promises. For the time being
Peking does not ask much from those it flirts with.
The Chinese leaders would be pleased with any
step which, in their opinion, might cause a crack,
if only a small one, in relations between socialist
countries.
 Lenin wrote: "Capital is an international force.

To vanquish it, an international workers' alliance,
an international workers' brotherhood is needed.
We are opposed to national enmity and discord, to
national exclusiveness. We are internationalists.''~^^1^^
Contrary to Leninism, contrary to the communist
logic of class struggle Peking rejects the idea of
united action of socialist countries, of all the
revolutionary forces in the struggle against
imperialism. Thus the Chinese leadership assumes a grave
responsibility for creating an opportunity for the
imperialists to step up their actions and attempts,
on a number of sectors, to mount a counter--
offensive against the world revolutionary movement,
suppress the liberation movement in South-East
Asia and support the Israeli aggression in the
Middle East.
III</h3>
 Persistent propaganda advancing the demagogic

thesis of struggle against "two superpowers,'' a
thesis absolutely alien to Marxism-Leninism, has
become for the Chinese leadership a means of
continuing its hostile course against the Soviet Union.
The Chinese leadership tries to place US
_-_-_
~^^1^^ "Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 30, p. 293.
268
imperialism, which strives to play the role of a guarantor

and custodian of the international system of
exploitation and oppression, which brings
destruction, death and suffering to many peoples of the
world, side by side with the Soviet Union-the
homeland of Leninism, the first socialist country, the
bulwark of the anti-imperialist struggle of all the
revolutionary forces.
 The Peking leaders need "the theory of two

superpowers" for the same purpose as they did their
old "theory of struggle of the world village against
the world town.'' In both of these theories,
nationalistic, great-power motives take the place of a
class approach. Having failed in their attempts to
divide the world into the economically developed
``town'' and the ``village'' fighting for its liberation
or the developing "village,'' the Peking leaders
decided to narrow "the front of attack" and direct it,
first of all, against the Soviet Union. Now they
urge all countries-capitalist, developing, and
socialist-to fight against the "two superpowers.''
Meanwhile, the Chinese press emphasises that
China will never be a ``superpower'' and during
personal contacts between Chinese leaders and
representatives of different countries it is stressed that
China is the best defender of countries fighting
against the "two superpowers.''
 The term ``superpower'' was borrowed by the

Chinese leaders from the imperialist ideologists of
the USA. The latter invented it in order to defend
capitalist principles, to mislead the American
people, in the first place, and the world public and
somehow to camouflage the imperialist, aggressive
nature of US foreign policy. Characteristically, the
expression "one or two superpowers" has been
heard in Peking during the efforts to establish
269
Sino-American contacts. Apparently it was decided

in expectation of Nixon's visit to tone down the
propaganda hullabaloo: "It is not you we have in
mind.''
 The putting forward of the patently false thesis

of "two superpowers,'' allegedly opposed to all
the other states, is in fact an act of class betrayal.
Peking is trying thus to play down the
confrontation between the two world systems-socialism and
capitalism-trying to evade (and it does evade in
practice) real struggle against imperialism. It
even goes so far as to advise West European states
and monopolies on how they should pool their
efforts in order best to oppose the "one or two
superpowers.'' Meanwhile the Chinese leaders have
legalised their own political flirting with US ruling
circles.
 In an attempt to theoretically ``corroborate'' the

rupture with world socialism, the actual betrayal
of the class interests of the working people, to
justify their line towards a collusion with
imperialism, Mao Tse-tung and his associates deliberately
confuse questions related to the contradictions of
the contemporary world, substituting the
Pekingfabricated formula of "four big contradictions" for
the true contradictions, and especially the main
one-the contradiction between imperialism and
socialism. If this formula is cleared of rhetoric, its
essence boils down to uniting the world in the
interests of the achievement of Peking's
hegemonistic goals under the pretext of resolving these
contradictions and of struggling against "the two
superpowers.'' Not long ago, in an article in the
magazine Hungchi this formula, proclaimed at the
9th Congress of the Communist Party of China,
was directly adapted to the demagogic conception
270
of "the two superpowers.'' And following the usual

ultra-revolutionary phraseology about "colossal
upheavals" and ``re-grouping'' of forces taking
place in the world, the above article upholds
China's tactics of forming blocs with any, including
imperialist, forces for achieving Peking's foreign
policy aims. It would not be amiss to recall that
the thesis of the ``re-grouping'' of forces had been
repeatedly applied by Mao Tse-tung before for
political intrigues.
 The article openly justifies the tactics of political

double-dealing, under the name of "revolutionary
dual tactics.'' One of the latest Peking's "
revolutionary dual tactics" in regard to the Soviet Union,
was the recent interview by the Prime Minister of
the PRC Chou En-lai to The New York Times
observer Reston. Chou En-lai drew attention to the
anti-Soviet essence of Peking's platform and of its
steps aimed at a rapprochement with Washington.
He palmed off to Reston, who was glad to take
up the provocative thesis of a Soviet military threat
to China. In another interview, with a
correspondent of a Yugoslav newspaper, Chou En-lai
discoursed at length about "one or two
superpowers,'' and again spoke of the mythical threat to
China from the North, from the USSR, using the
opportunity to stress some special, ``liberating''
mission of China in Asia.
 As to the threat to China "from the North,'' it

is well known that the Soviet Union has never
presented and does not do so now any territorial
claims to China and believes that the Soviet and
Chinese peoples have no cause for conflicts.
 The CPSU and the working people of the Soviet

Union, like the fraternal Parties and the working
people of the other socialist states, regarded and
271
still regard the development of relations of

friendship and cooperation with the Chinese people,
with the Chinese Communists, as one of the
important conditions for strengthening the position
of world socialism, and consolidating the unity of
the international communist movement and the
entire anti-imperialist front.
 It is this that determines the principled and
consistent line of the CPSU and the Soviet state
in regard to China, a line that has again been
authoritatively confirmed in the Report of the
Central Committee of the CPSU to the 24th
Congress of the Party and in the Resolution of the
Congress, in the Decisions of the Plenary Meetings
of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the
speeches of the General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.
 Our Party and people unanimously approve

the policy of the Central Committee of the CPSU
and the Soviet Government of maintaining
restraint and not yielding to provocations, and of
doing everything the USSR can to achieve the
normalisation of relations with the PRC and the
restoration and development of mutual friendship
and cooperation of the Soviet and the Chinese
peoples on the basis of the principles of
MarxismLeninism and proletarian internationalism.
 The constructive line of the CPSU and the

Soviet Government in relation to the PRC meets
with the understanding and approval of the
fraternal socialist countries, of the Communist and
Workers' Parties, and of all the progressive,
peaceloving forces. It evokes the sympathy of all who
cherish the true national interests of China,
unbreakably bound with the interests of world
272
socialism, of friendship of the PRC with the Soviet

Union.
 This line is an inalienable part of the Leninist

foreign policy of the Soviet Union, of the
allembracing programme of activities of our Party
and the Soviet state in the international arena-a
programme of struggle for the further
consolidation and development of the forces of socialism,
for a relaxation of international tension and for
strengthening peace, for rallying the ranks of the
world communist and working-class movement,
for the consolidation of all the forces coming out
against imperialism and colonialism, reaction and
aggression. The peace programme set forth by
the 24th Congress of the CPSU, answering the
vital interests of the peoples of the entire planet,
has already become a most important factor of
contemporary international life.
 People in the Soviet Union regard with due
appreciation the development of normal relations
between states, and on this plane, the
normalisation of relations between the PRC and the USA
is no exception. But the Soviet people cannot help
giving attention to the fact that in its overtures
to Washington, the Chinese leadership again
frankly stresses its hostility towards the Soviet
Union.
 In so doing, it certainly realises that the ruling

imperialist circles, first of all in the USA, draw
appropriate conclusions from this kind of ``
respectable'' manoeuvres of the Chinese leaders, of
their anti-Soviet direction. And it is no accident,
apparently, that allusions to Peking's present
`òbligingness'' and the possibility of imperialism
cashing in on it, slip into the pages of the
bourgeois American press.
18--193
273
 Of course, while waging a resolute

ideologicalpolitical struggle against the great-power
chauvinistic theses of Peking in its foreign policy course,
we are doing everything to protect the interests
of the Soviet people, who are building
communism, the interests of our friends and allies, against
any encroachments.
 Seeing the unprincipledness, the nationalistic

pragmatism of the Chinese leadership, the public
in many countries of the world is asking the
question: is not a deal being hatched against
socialism behind the scenes in Peking and Washington,
a deal at the expense of the interests of the peoples
fighting for national independence and freedom?
 An examination of the Maoist slogans and the

Maoist practice both at home and in the
international arena gives good reason to pose such a
question.
 The ideological-political essence of the Maoist

platform, its strategic aims, despite all the tactical
manoeuvres of the Chinese leadership, remain
unchanged. The conceptions of the Chinese
leadership and its actions have been and are based on
the anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist ideology of Maoism.
 Maoism has exposed itself in deeds as a
pettybourgeois ideological-political movement basically
alien to Marxism-Leninism, parasitising on the
principles of scientific socialism, on the striving
of the popular masses of China for socialism. The
goals and practice of Maoism are incompatible
with the tasks of the world communist, liberation
movement. Here one should fully take into account
that Maoism, in its present struggle against the
Marxist-Leninist teaching, the communist
movement, the socialist community, objectively links
274
up with the most diverse political forces hostile

to socialism-the imperialists and racialists,
Trotskyites and reformists, forming a kind of "united
front" with them.
 Experience shows that if certain progress has

been made in some spheres of the Chinese
economy in recent years, this was not due to but
despite Maoist concepts. None of the concepts of
Maoism, none of Mao's ideas has stood the
practical test of socialist construction in China and
development of international life. Maoism lacks
any constructive content. The more dangerous
therefore is the striving of the Peking leaders for
hegemony in the world communist movement, and
for leadership in the Third World. The aim and
practice of Maoism are causing tremendous
damage to the international communist and
workingclass movement, to the national liberation and
anti-imperialist struggle. The recipes of the
Maoists are doing irreparable harm to those who give
them credence (we all remember the tragic fate
of the Communist Party of Indonesia and of some
other Communist Parties whose leadership listened
to advice from Peking).
 The Communists are confronted with the task

of enhancing in every way their political vigilance
in the face of the hostile ideology and subversive
actions of Maoism, with the task of further
thoroughly exposing the real essence of Maoist
ideology and policy. The Communists are fighting
resolutely and on a principled basis against the
theory and practice of Maoism, against Maoists'
machinations in the world communist movement,
in the ranks of the anti-imperialist front. They are
waging a consistent ideological and political
18*
275
struggle against the anti-socialist, anti-Leninist platform

of Maoism so that the Chinese people can again
take the path of alliance and fraternal cooperation
with socialist countries, with all revolutionary,
progressive forces of the time, forces fighting tor
peace, national independence, democracy and
socialism.
 Pravda, September 4, 1971
[276]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Peking Foreign Policy
 Doctrines and Practice
 L. Kirichenko
 Observers of the world scene never stop

wondering at the zigzags of Chinese foreign policy.
One might almost think Peking had been
following entirely different policies at different times.
 But although there have been several distinct

periods in China's foreign policy of the past
twenty years, the changes might be likened to
the insulation of electric wire, which may be of
different colours though the wire is the same. The
methods and tactics have changed, but the
essential policy, the objectives have not.
 Though they protested time and again in former

days that they wanted friendly, equal relations
with other nations, though they vowed and swore
fidelity to proletarian internationalism, Mao
Tsetung and his entourage have in fact always
proceeded from the Sinocentrist doctrines cultivated
by the Chinese emperors. They have always
thought in terms of China as a superpower able to
impose its will upon others and ordain the
pattern of international relations; in all periods their
actions have been geared to the object of restoring
the "Celestial Empire" and making China the
``central'' power of the world.
 The first period covered the years 1949--58. The

Chinese People's Republic was weak, it strove to
make maximum use of other coutries' experience
and support to consolidate its position and build
up its economy. Close cooperation was practised
277
with the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries. But even at this period the Chinese leaders
made plans to swallow up the Mongolian People's
Republic and complained about China's having
``lost'' large areas of Southeast Asia which the
armies of the Chinese emperors had reached once
upon a time. At the Asia and Oceania trade union
conference at the end of 1949 the Chinese
representatives declared that all peoples fighting for
national liberation must follow "the path of Mao
Tse-tung.'' In 1950--51 the Maoists tried to impose
their own programme on the Communist Parties
of India and Indonesia: in these predominantly
peasant countries the revolution had, they claimed,
to follow the same lines as in China. Later on
they put out the famous formula about "the wind
from the East beating the wind from the West,''
which was certainly rather equivocal.
 After China successfully completed the first

five-year plan, laying the foundations of an
industrial structure, they decided they could proceed
differently. At home the Chinese leaders launched
the "big leap forward" and started setting up the
communes; the purpose was to make a big spurt
in building Chinese economic and military power,
through maximum restriction of the people's
living standards and all-out mobilization of effort.
Abroad, they tried to get the socialist community
under their thumb and use it for their chauvinist
ends.
 The attempt to gain control of the socialist

community did not succeed; the communist
parties found the doctrine Peking advanced to be
adventurist. Thereupon Peking changed its tactics.
 On June 14, 1963, the leaders of the Communist

Party of China published a document entitled
278
``Proposal Concerning the General Line of the

International Communist Movement" (the "25
points''). In it they denied the decisive influence
of the socialist system on the course of world
development, belittled the struggle of the working
class in the capitalist countries, contraposed the
national-liberation movement to the socialist
world system and the working-class movement,
advocated adventurism in foreign policy and
continuance of the cold war, preached sectarianism
and putschism in questions of revolution, and
sought to justify factionalism in the communist
movement. Anyone who refused to accept the
Maoist "general line" was labelled a "revisionist,''
a "traitor to Marxism.''
 Mao also injected a new meaning into his

"intermediate zones" conception. The way it now
came out was that the two poles in the
worldwide struggle were China, on the one hand, and
US imperialism and the Soviet Union, on the
other, and that between these poles lay all the
other states-socialist, developing, and imperialist.
The countries of this intermediate zone were
treated as reserves and potential allies not only
against US imperialism but against the Soviet
Union. In Lin Piao's 1965 article "Hail the Victory
of the People's War!" was formulated the "people's
war" strategy, the gist of which was that Asia,
Africa and Latin America were the "world
village,'' that it was here the revolution would
develop, and do so on the Chinese model and hence
under China's leadership, and that the world-wide
victory of the socialist revolution would come
through the revolutionary "world village" closing
in on the "world city"-Western Europe and North
America.
279
 On the practical level, the Chinese leaders

attempted at this time to break up the socialist
community and then unite what they could around
Peking. In the Third World they tried to persuade
the Asian, African and Latin American peoples
that China was the staunchest and most consistent
fighter against imperialism -and colonialism, sought
to isolate the national liberation movement from
the socialist countries and the world
communist movement, and impelled the freedom--
fighters towards adventurist action. They set their
face against any move to lessen international
tension, campaigned for armament-building, and
tried to provoke international conflict wherever
possible. In doing so they declared that war
would speed up the world revolutionary process,
that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun.''
In talking like this, Mao was not original. He
was echoing almost word for word the
conception of the ancient philosopher Shang Yang (4th
century B. C.), who declared that "if a country
is poor but bends its efforts to war... it will
certainly become powerful. If a country is rich
but fights no wars... it is certainly enfeebled.''
To be sure, Mao somewhat modified that
conception: he preferred the fighting to be done by
others, and pinned his chief hopes on a nuclear
clash between the USSR and the USA.
 By 1966 it was apparent that Peking had lost

out. The socialist countries, with just one
exception, had declined to support its policy. The Third
World nations had perceived that it was an
adventurist and irresponsible policy, and only two
or three of them had remained on friendly terms
with China. As may be seen from the secret
Pentagon papers now published in the United States,
280
the US Government had taken advantage of

Peking's divisive line to launch its aggressive war
in Indochina. The Chinese leadership and Mao
personally were responsible for having exposed
to attack the Communist Party and other
progressive forces of Indonesia.
 A bitter struggle developed within the Chinese

leadership as a result. Some members of it
criticised Mao's adventurist line, proposed more
realistic policies, objected to the personality cult,
recommended ending Mao's incompetent
interference in the economy.
 Leaning on the army and using the youth whom

they made their dupes, Mao and his group
smashed their opponents. A military-bureaucratic
regime was instituted in the country.
 During the "cultural revolution" the Maoists

attempted to provoke "people's wars" in other
countries, and to start a hungweiping movement
on a world scale. They engaged in hostile actions
against all socialist countries except Albania. They
interfered grossly in the affairs of India and
Burma, Nepal and Ceylon, Laos and Cambodia,
Malaysia and Indonesia and various African nations.
 In the heat of conflict the Maoists revealed

their true intentions to an extent which they now
seem to regret. They threatened to make short
work of other peoples, laid claim to territories
belonging to neighbouring countries, declared
that China must lead the world, vowed to "plant
the banner of Mao Tse-tung" in other countries'
capitals.
 The "cultural revolution" further discredited

Peking. China found herself in oppressive
international isolation. Many of the splinter groups
281
which Maoist agents had formed with so much

difficulty in some countries fell to pieces.
 Starting with the latter half of 1969, as the

"cultural revolution" was back-pedalled, the
methods and tactics of Chinese foreign policy again
began to change. Peking has been trying to make
its policy look respectable. Interference has been
less crude, it has been covered up carefully with
smiling yuan diplomacy. But underneath all this
camouflage the long-term objectives remain the
same.
 By means of a differentiated approach to the

socialist countries the Chinese leaders are trying
to erode the socialist community, to oppose some
countries to others, to get at least some to adopt
an anti-Soviet platform. With some countries
Peking flirts, forgetting that only a short time ago
it was calling them insulting names; against
others it keeps up the hostile campaign. Chinese
propaganda spreads false tales about Soviet
policy and misrepresents the purposes of the Warsaw
Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance. The Chinese leaders gloat no less than
the imperialists over any temporary difficulties
in this or that country.
 Peking is wooing many Asian and African

countries, endeavouring to make them bases of
its activity. Exploiting the difficulties in Pakistan
and the complications between that country and
India, it is trying to catch the Pakistani leaders
in its net. Chinese emissaries are hard at work
in Africa, seen as a convenient field to apply the
Maoist conceptions and an area where it is
relatively easy to create seats of international
conflict. The aid given some Asian and African
nations is meant to break their links with the
282
socialist states, make them dependent on Peking and

turn them into instruments of its policy.
 Peking is extending relations with the

imperialist states; it is anxious to lay hands on their
technological achievements and be able to
influence their policy.
 While posing as "staunch,'' ``firm'' allies of the
national liberation movement and accusing others
of ``collusion'' with imperialism, the Chinese
leaders forget all about their duty to that movement
as soon as they see a chance to make a deal with
the imperialists that will serve their nationalistic
ambitions. That is the light in which the
progressive forces see a number of recent moves by
Peking.
 The main theme in Chinese foreign policy at

the present time is a clamour against "the
monopoly of the two superpowers.'' Ignoring the class
approach and attempting to equate the
imperialist United States and the socialist Soviet Union,
the masters of the "Celestial Empire" have
produced the idea of a united front of the "small
and medium countries.'' This new doctrine is of
much the same order as the "intermediate zones"
conception. Its chief purpose is to prove that it
is for China to be leader of the "small and medium
countries.'' In an interview given a French
journalist last September, the Peking leaders
declared that China was "the only country in the
world capable of ending the world supremacy
of the two superpowers.'' And in statements
repeated recently, China's Premier has offered China
as protector to the ``small'' and ``weak'' countries.
 Referring to the Chinese Premier's remarks

about "the hegemony of the two superpowers,''
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the
283
USA Gus Hall observes (Daily World, June 12):

"Is the role of the Soviet Union and US
imperialism the same in the Mid-East, in Africa, in Latin
America? They are at the opposite dialectical
poles. One is the main force of oppression and
exploitation, the other the main outside force of
support to the forces of liberation and freedom.
To speak about them in general terms as '
superpowers' is a service to US imperialism.''
 We see that whereas formerly Peking laid claim

to leadership of the revolutionary forces of the
contemporary world, now it is calling for a bloc
that would alike embrace socialist countries,
developing nations and imperialist powers. In so
doing it betrays its secret aim-to become, on the
pretence of opposing "the two superpowers,'' the
greatest superpower of all. Isn't it like the
fairytale Wolf trying to imitate Mother Goat's voice
so as to eat up the goat's little ones?
 However the Chinese leaders may disguise

their true ambitions, their policy was and is a
chauvinist, great-power policy fraught with
danger to the peoples and to the cause of peace. That
will come home in time even to those who today
have illusions about it and even repeat the Maoist
rubbish about a "monopoly of the two
superpowers.''
 Only abandonment of chauvinist ambitions and

unprincipled adventurist policies, a return to the
path of normal relations with other countries,
based on generally accepted standards of
intercourse, can bring China the standing and prestige
in the world that the great Chinese people is
entitled to enjoy.
 New Times, No. 30, 1971
[284]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Concerning the Economic Relations
 Between the
 Soviet Union
 and China (1950--66)
 Yu. Vladimirov
 The events which have taken place in China in

recent years make it quite clear that the Maoist
group which usurped power in the country with
the help of the armed forces, is following a policy
that is directly opposed to Marxism-Leninism
and proletarian internationalism. Defying all the
revolutionary forces of our time, the Maoists have
launched China on a path of economic, political,
ideological and military adventurism that has not
only harmed the cause of socialism in that country
and jeopardised the socialist gains of the Chinese
people, but has weakened the socialist community
of nations and precipitated serious differences in
the international communist movement, thereby
greatly harming the cause of socialism throughout
the world.
 Being well aware of the fact that the main

barrier to the accomplishment of their adventuristic,
great-power ambitions is the Soviet Union and
its Communist Party, the Maoists have declared
the Party of Lenin and the world's first state of
working people to be their main enemy. Besides
their continuous slandering of our country the
Maoists are attempting to whip up hatred for the
285
Soviet Union which has always stood as the

symbol of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism. As part of this campaign
the Maoists are presenting Soviet-Chinese
economic relations in such a way as to belittle the
importance of Soviet economic aid to China, and
are accusing the USSR of wanting to subjugate
China to its economic and political interests. In
their efforts to keep the world national-liberation
movement apart from the Soviet Union, the
socialist community and the international
communist movement, with the aim of turning it into a
tool of their great-power policy, the Maoists are
misrepresenting the nature of Soviet economic
assistance to the Chinese People's Republic by
describing China as a ``victim'' of Soviet foreign
economic policy, and are ``warning'' the countries
of Asia, Africa and Latin America against
having any economic or other contacts with the
USSR.
 Imperialist propaganda seizes upon such

Maoist pronouncements in order to defame the
socialist community and impugn the cause of
communism as a whole. However, no slander or
fabrications by the enemies of the Soviet Union and
communism can conceal the fact that while China
was marching together with the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries it scored major successes
in overcoming the economic, social, ideological
and political effects of the country's long period
under the domination of foreign imperialists and
its own feudal bureaucracy, and great successes
in the subsequent construction of the foundations
of socialism. Conversely, when China, under the
pressure of the Maoists, isolated itself from the
Soviet Union and other socialist states by its
286
policy of hostility, it ran into a blind alley and

was thrown back more than ten years in its
development. The Maoists have been unable to blot
out the memory of the internationalist aid,
unprecedented in scale and effectiveness, which the
Soviet Union rendered to China in its economic
development. Neither the Chinese people nor the
rest of the world have forgotten it.
 The economic ties between the USSR and the
People's Republic of China, dealt with in this
article, are an important aspect of Soviet-Chinese
relations. A study of these ties affords a good idea
of the state of Soviet-Chinese relations in the period
between 1950 and 1966.~^^1^^
 At the beginning of the 1950's China was an

economically and technically backward country.
The war in Korea in which the People's Republic
of China took part, and the economic blockade
organised by the imperialist states delayed the
overcoming of this backwardness and the
building of the foundations of socialism in China. In
those conditions the People's Republic of China
found it very difficult to rebuild its national
economy, to effect deep-going socio-economic
changes, and to build the foundations of socialism.
_-_-_
~^^1^^ This period is marked, on one side, by the conclusion on

February 14, 1950, of a Soviet-Chinese Treaty of
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance which paved the way
for comprehensive inter-state relations between the USSR
and the People's Republic of China, and, on the other, by
the llth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China (August, 1966) at which the
Maoists, contrary to the interests of the socialist countries,
and especially against the interests of the Chinese people,
enunciated their anti-Soviet line as the official policy of the
People's Republic of China, stretching Soviet-Chinese
relations to breaking point.
287
The People's Republic of China was in need of

all-round assistance. The only country whose
assistance could, in its scale and technical level,
meet the requirements of the PRC was the
Soviet Union, and this assistance the Soviet Union
was ready to provide in line with the principles
of proletarian internationalism.
 China required massive investments, large

quantities of modern industrial equipment, and
experienced engineers, technicians, and skilled
workers in order to restore its national economy
and eliminate its economic backwardness and
its dependence on the imperialist states, and to
build the material and technical basis of
socialism. In the first years after the formation of the
People's Republic of China the country had none
of these things. The magnitude of the economic
and technical assistance rendered by the Soviet
Union to China was unprecedented in its scale
and effectiveness. The USSR provided this
assistance at the most critical period for the People's
Republic of China, when the restoration and
development of the national economy was a question
of life and death for new China. In that
complicated domestic and international situation Soviet
economic and technical assistance provided the
means for solving extremely difficult political,
social, economic and other problems. This
assistance enabled the People's Republic of China
to restore and reconstruct its national economy in
record time and lay the foundations of a modern
industry which made it possible for China to
eliminate the economic backwardness of the country
and build the material and technical basis of
socialism.
 Soviet assistance to China was not in the form
288
of surplus goods it could find no use for. The

Soviet Union shared with the People's Republic
of China what it often needed itself. In this the
Soviet Union was motivated by a desire to help
the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese
people to turn China into an industrial socialist
state and an ally in the common struggle for the
triumph of communism. The Soviet Union was
also guided by its desire to strengthen the
socialist community as a whole-this powerful factor
of the world revolutionary process.
 Helped by the Soviet Union, the Chinese people

restored the war-ravaged economy over the short
period between 1950 and 1959, and built more
than 250 large industrial enterprises, factories and
various industrial projects, all of them complete
with the latest machinery and equipment.~^^1^^ Besides
expanding and modernising the old industries,
such as the production of iron and steel, non--
ferrous metals, and power industry, China now had
brand-new industries for the manufacture of
aircraft, cars, tractors, power and heavy
machinery, instrument-making, electro-technical and
radio-technical industries, and some important
branches of the chemical industry. The factories
and plants built in the People's Republic of
China with Soviet assistance, helped to raise the
country's annual output to the following: cast
iron--8.7 million tons, steel--8.4 million tons,
rolled metal--6.5 million tons, coal--17.2 million tons,
aluminium--38 thousand tons, ammonia--150
_-_-_
~^^1^^ See 0. Borisov, B. Koloskov, The Policy of the Soviet

Union '-Towards the People's Republic of China: Socialist
Internationalism i?i Action; The Leninist Policy of the
USSR Toward.': China, Collection of Articles, M.. 1968,
p. 201.
19--193
289
thousand tons, sulphuric acid-250 thousand tons,

heavy machinery-60 thousand tons, mining
equipment-20 thousand tons, oil processing and
chemical equipment-40 thousand tons, steam and
hydraulic turbines (capacity)-1.7 million kw.,
power generators (capaoity)-0.6 million kw.,
tractors (in conventional units)-42 thousand,
lorries-30 thousand, metal-cutting machines-3.7
thousand, and steam boilers for thermal power
stations-total capacity of 7 thousand tons of steam
an hour. At the power stations built and
reconstructed with Soviet assistance, turbo-generators
with an aggregate capacity of 4 million kw. were
put into operation.~^^1^^ In 1960 the factories and
plants built with Soviet assistance turned out
30 per cent of the total production of cast iron
in the country, about 40 per cent of the steel,
more than 50 per cent of the rolled metal, 80 per
cent of the lorries, more than 90 per cent of the
tractors, 30 per cent of the synthetic amonia,
25 per cent of power, 55 per cent of the steam
and hydraulic turbines, about 20 per cent of the
power generators, 25 per cent of the aluminium,
over 10 per cent of the heavy machinery, etc.^^2^^
 The 250 large industrial projects built with

Soviet technical assistance are only a part of the
sweeping fifteen-year programme of Soviet
technical assistance to the People's Republic of China
providing for the construction, reconstruction and
expansion of more than 400 large industrial
_-_-_
~^^1^^ See O. Borisov, B. Koloskov. The Policy of the Soviet

Union Towards the People's Republic of China: Socialist
Internationalism in Action; The Leninist Policy of the
USSR Towards China, Collection of Articles, M., 1968,
pp. 202--203.
 ^^2^^ Ibid., p. 203.
290
enterprises, factories and individual projects. The

scale of this programme is evident from the fact
that the USSR undertook to help the People's
Republic of China to build 12 metal-smelting plants
and factories with a designed annual capacity of
28 million tons of cast iron, 30 million tons of
steel and 25 million tons of rolled metal; three
plants for the production of aluminium with a
total capacity of 738 thousand tons a year;
factories for the production of tin with a total
capacity of 25 thousand tons a year; seven plants
for the manufacture of metallurgical, mining,
oilrefining and chemical equipment with a total
capacity of 240 thousand tons of goods a year;
seventeen plants for the production of steam, gas
and hydraulic turbines and generators for them,
with a total annual capacity of 11.2 million kw;
100 factories and plants working for national
defence.~^^1^^ This programme would have been
implemented had it not been for the Maoist group
which began, in 1961, to scale down the scientific
and technical and other ties with the Soviet
Union.
 When work began in China on the restoration

of its national economy .and on the implementation
of the extensive programme for economic
rehabilitation, it had very few skilled engineers,
technicians or scientists. That is why China found it
extremely difficult to build a socialist economy
unaided, especially its industry. Because of this,
the Soviet Union, between 1950 and 1960, sent
over ten thousand highly skilled specialists to
China, and organised the training of Chinese
scientific and technical personnel and workers at
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Op. cit, p. 201.
19*
291
Soviet industrial establishments, at colleges, and

at design and research organisations. In the period
between 1951 and 1962, more than eight thousand
Chinese citizens received their industrial and
technical training in the Soviet Union. In the same
period more than 11 thousand Chinese students
and postgraduates studied at Soviet educational
establishments. About one thousand scientific
workers from the Academy of Sciences of China
underwent training at research institutes of the
USSR Academy of Science. In addition to this,
over 1,500 Chinese engineers, technicians and
scientists visited the Soviet Union to study the
scientific and technological achievements and
experience of this country.
 The assistance the USSR rendered to China in

the scientific and technical sphere was of
tremendous significance for socialist construction in
the People's Republic of China. Over the 1954--
59 period alone, the USSR handed over more than
24 thousand sets of scientific and technical papers
to China. The scope and effectiveness of Soviet
assistance in this sphere is evident from the fact
that in China at present all industries without
exception turn out certain types of products
which have been developed according to Soviet
blueprints, technical specifications and
technological papers handed over to China. All those papers
which foreign experts valued at thousands of
millions of dollars, were turned over to China free
of charge. However, the value of Soviet
assistance lay, not so much in its monetary value, as
in the fact that China would not have been able to
get from elsewhere the up-to-date technical and
engineering information she needed in order to
undertake extensive economic reconstruction.
292
None of the advanced capitalist countries wanted

to help China to overcome her economic
backwardness. But even if any of them had agreed to
do so, the People's Republic of China would
either have had to pay large sums in foreign
currency (which China did not have at that time)
for this assistance, or would have had to sacrifice
its political and economic independence.
Moreover, the Soviet Union, in 1950--61, extended to
China long-term credits on easy terms, totalling
1,816 million foreign exchange (convertible)
roubles.~^^1^^
 Besides economic, scientific and technical aid

to China for the development of her national
economy, the Soviet Union played an important
role in building up China's modern defence
industry. In addition to technical assistance in
building factories and plants for defence and
equipping them with modern machinery, the Soviet
Union furnished China with a great deal in the
way of blueprints and technological specifications
for the production of modern armaments and
military equipment. China also received large
amounts of modern military materiel, armaments,
and other equipment for the People's Liberation
Army of China.
 Trade played an important part in the system

of Soviet-Chinese economic relations over the
period under review. The People's Republic of
China received from the Soviet Union all that
was necessary for the restoration and development
of her national economy, and exported her own
goods to the Soviet Union in return for the
_-_-_
~^^1^^ M. A. Suslov, On the Struggle of the CPSU for the

Unity of International Communist Movement, M., 1964, p. 53.
293
financial and other forms of assistance. The

following figures illustrate the importance of
SovietChinese trade for the People's Republic of China.
Before the creation of the People's Republic of
China a mere five per cent of China's foreign
trade was with the USSR,^^1^^ but in 1950 this was
increased to 23 per cent, and in 1958 to 50 per
cent.^^2^^ During the first five-year plan period
(1953--57) in China, 57.1 per cent of China's
foreign trade was with the USSR.
 Because of the bad economic situation in the

People's Republic of China in the first few years
of its existence (a backward economy crippled
by war, and rather poor export possibilities), and
in view of its need for rapid economic
rehabilitation and development, as well as for increased
defence capability, the Soviet Union made
sizeable economic and military credits available to
China. These enabled China to import from the
USSR large amounts of goods, which were of
vital importance for the restoration and
development of China's economy, for the
strengthening of her national defence and for ensuring the
vital needs of the Chinese people. Between 1949
and 1955 the Soviet exports to China exceeded
its imports from it. Over a period of six years
this excess of export over import ran into 947.3
million roubles.
 The active balance in Soviet-Chinese trade
meant therefore that the Soviet Union allocated
from its national income and extended to China
_-_-_
~^^1^^ An Economic Profile of Mainland China, Studies

prepared for the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the
United States. US Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1967, p. 592.
~^^2^^ See Our Friend China, M., 1959, p. 371.
294
long-term credits for the urgent economic needs

of the People's Republic of China. As the People's
Republic of China used up the Soviet credits in
the restoration and development of its national
economy, its resources increased and export
possibilities grew accordingly. Beginning in 1956,
when the national economy of China had been
completely restored and developed, and when
many of its branches met the targets of the
first five-year plan ahead of schedule, it began
to pay off its debts to the Soviet Union. It was
from 1956 on that China's exports to the USSR
exceeded her imports from this country. Over
nine years (1956--64) the People's Republic of
China overcame the imbalance in its trade with
the Soviet Union by additional deliveries of
commodities and by making some payments in
foreign currency.
 The structure and character of Soviet export

to China were determined primarily by our
country's desire to render the greatest possible
assistance to a fraternal country in the restoration
of its national economy, in the satisfaction of the
vital needs of the Chinese people, in the creation
of a firm basis for socialist industrialisation and
for the development of the People's Republic of
China on socialist lines. During the restoration
period in China, the main Soviet export items
to China were machines and equipment, ferrous
metals, oil products, etc. Between 1950 and 1952,
the Soviet Union delivered to China 276.93
million roubles worth of machinery and equipment,
or 21.6 per cent of the total cost of Soviet exports
to China in that period. Moreover, while in the
first several years of the restoration period the
Soviet Union delivered mostly separate types of
295
machinery and equipment necessary for the

restoration and reconstruction of industrial projects
built before the establisment of the PRC, in later
years, after 1951, the Soviet export to China
consisted to an increasing extent of complete
sets of plant. The reason for this was that the
USSR began providing equipment for 50
industrial establishments, which had been completed
or were being built with its help. These included
the Anshan metal-manufacturing combine, the
Fengman hydro-power station, and the thermal
power stations in the cities of Penhsihu, Taiyuan,
Chungching, and Sian. During the first five-pear
plan period when the People's Republic of China
was launching an extensive programme of
industrialisation and the country needed machinery
and equipment, the Soviet Union supplied 639
million roubles' worth of industrial plant.~^^1^^
Machinery and equipment made up almost half of
Soviet exports to China. In 1957 the share of
complete sets of plant in Soviet exports to China
was 77 per cent. At a time when the steel
industry of the People's Republic of China was
just being restored and the country was
producing no more than 1.3 million tons a year, the
Soviet Union shipped 943 thousand tons of iron
and steel to China between 1950 and 1952, or '
40 per cent of Chinese production for that
period. During the first five-year plan period when
China was suffering from a metal shortage the !
Soviet Union shipped 300,825 million roubles'
worth of rolled steel and tubing which were in I
short supply in China (almost two million tons).
_-_-_
~^^1^^ See M. Sladkovsky. Development of Trade Between the

Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.
Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 1959, No. 10, p. 7.
296
 In old China the highest output of petroleum

products ever reached (mainly obtained from
shale) was 320 thousand tons. Local oil refineries
operated exclusively on imported oil. It was
because of this that Soviet shipments of petroleum
products were of such great importance to the
People's Republic of China. In the years of
reconstruction China produced 943 thousand tons
of petroleum products (including 216,000 tons
of benzine and 71,500 tons of kerosine). Over
the same period the Soviet Union delivered to
China 1.5 million tons of petroleum products
(including 506,000 tons of benzine, 477,000 tons
of kerosine, 160,000 tons of diesel fuel, and
154,000 tons of lubricants). As a result of
Soviet assistance the output of petroleum products
in the People's Republic of China rose from
436,000 tons in 1952 to 1,460,000 tons in 1957.
But in spite of this increase the Soviet Union
remained China's main supplier of petroleum
products. In the course of the first five-year plan
period the Soviet Union delivered about seven
million tons of petroleum products to the People's
Republic of China. In 1957 alone the USSR
exported 1,803 thousand tons of petroleum products
to the People's Republic of China.~^^1^^
 In the first few years after the formation of

the People's Republic of China the Soviet Union
exported to it large quantities of cotton fabrics
and other consumer goods, such as sugar, shoes,
clothing, and tobacco. However, as the national
_-_-_
~^^1^^ See M. Sladkovsky, Soviet-Chinese Economic

Cooperation. Ten Years of the People's Republic of China, M.,
1959, p. 186; M. Sladkovsky, Development of Trade
Between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China,
pp. 4, 7, 8.
297
economy of China was being restored and as it

became more and more capable of supplying its
population with consumer goods, their import
from the USSR was sharply reduced and stopped
altogether at the end of the first five-year plan
period.
 The People's Republic of China greatly

benefited from the import of goods from the Soviet
Union. The economic blockade and embargo on
trade with China imposed by the United States
and other imperialist states made the socialist
countries, and especially the Soviet Union, the
only supply source of modern means of
production for the People's Republic of China. "Over
a number of years means of production
dominated our import. It helped greatly to restore and
develop industrial and farm production, and
speeded up the successful socialist
industrialisation of the country,'' wrote Yeh Chi-Chuang,
PRC Minister of Foreign Trade. "We would
like to emphasise the fact that the fraternal
socialist countries, and especially the Soviet Union,
rendered us tremendous disinterested aid which
helped to expedite socialist construction in our
country and create the mainstay of socialist
industrialisation.''~^^1^^
 China also imported Soviet goods which it

used for the strengthening of its defences. The
delivery of goods for military purposes was
particularly intensive in 1950--53 when the People's
Republic of China and the Korean People's
Democratic Republic were fighting against
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Yeh Chi-Chuang. The Foreign Trade of Our Country

Over the Past Decade, Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 1959,
No. 10, p. 14.
298
American imperialism and China was defending its

frontiers. But even after the war the shipment
of Soviet weapons rated high in China's import,
while the country was modernising its armed
forces. As the modernisation of the People's
Liberation Army of China came to an end, and
defence industry enterprises built with Soviet
assistance were completed, the import of military
equipment from the Soviet Union was sharply
reduced. The large military deliveries from the
Soviet Union between 1950 and 1957 were of
tremendous importance for the People's Republic
of China. On the one hand they helped to quickly
re-equip the People's Liberation Army of China
with modern weapons. On the other hand, the
Soviet deliveries of weapons, munitions and
equipment enabled China to use considerable
manpower and material resources to speed up
the process of restoration and peaceful
development of China's national economy.
 Soviet deliveries to China not only helped to

satisfy China's economic demands, to strengthen
its defence potential and meet the vital needs of
the Chinese people, but also helped to develop
China's export capacity. China needed greatly to
increase exports to meet the bill for its growing
import of industrial goods which it needed for the
restoration and reconstruction of its national
economy and later for launching an extensive
programme of economic development. At the same
time China wanted to export the goods which
were in fairly large supply on the home market.
Considering the economic situation in China and
its export possibilities, the Soviet Union
imported from China, between 1950 and 1960, raw
materials for the production of foodstuffs, rare and
299
alloying metals (tin, mercury, tungsten,

molybdenic concentrates, spodumen, beryllium, etc.), textile
fibre (raw silk, wool, jute, hemp, etc.), textiles
(silks and woollens, linen table cloths, and other
articles), such raw materials as tung oil, ethereal
oils, bristle, hides, etc., some chemicals, hand--
crafted articles, haberdashery, rugs, etc.
 At the same time, having rehabilitated the

national economy destroyed by the nazi invaders, the
Soviet Union was speeding up socialist
construction. Beginning with 1953, a large number of
measures were taken in the USSR to ensure the
growth of all the branches of the national
economy, especially agriculture. The economic
advance in the Soviet Union led to a marked
improvement in living standards. In an effort to
satisfy the needs of th'e Soviet people as far as
possible and to promote the further progress of the
Soviet economy, the Soviet Communist Party
concentrated on the development of our country's
internal reserves and resources. However, the
import of goods from abroad was welcome at this
time and this favoured the export of Chinese goods
to the Soviet Union.
 Right from the first years of its existence the

People's Republic of China exported most of its
goods to the Soviet Union and it is not possible
to overestimate the importance of the capacious
and stable Soviet market for China, especially at
the time when she was boycotted by the United
States and many other capitalist countries. Even
in 1957 when the imperialist policy of economic
blockade and trade embargo had failed,~^^1^^ and
_-_-_
~^^1^^ In 1957 the capitalist countries of the West relaxed their

restrictions on trade with China. They were compelled to
300
more than 70 countries and areas of the world

had established economic relations with the
Chinese Peopled Republic,~^^1^^ its export to the Soviet
Union was as follows: 100 per cent of its export
of jute sacking, 96 per cent of coconut oil, 87.1
per cent of apples, 76.6 per cent of wool, 69.5 per
cent of tin preserves, 66.8 per cent of tobacco,
64.8 per cent of frozen pork, 59.1 per cent of
peanuts in the shell, 58.1 per cent of citrus fruit,
50.8 per cent of frozen veal and mutton, 50.1 per
cent of soya beans, 41.3 per cent of resins, 37.6
per cent of shelled peanuts, 36.9 per cent of bristle,
31.6 per cent of rice, 28.7 per cent of tea, 91
per cent of tungsten concentrate, 85.2 per cent
of tin, 82.9 per cent of molybdenum concentrate,
80 per cent of cement, 53.4 per cent of cast iron,
28.4 per cent of caustic soda, 95.3 per cent of
woollen textile, 62.5 per cent of manufactured
silk.
 It should also be borne in mind that the

People's Republic of China, as a newly developing
country, with its poor choice and quality of goods,
found it difficult to get into the world market,
and to withstand the competition of other
developing countries, as well as of the economically
_-_-_
do so by the economic difficulties in the capitalist world

and by the adverse situation on the capitalist market.
Besides they saw that China was getting all that was
necessary from her trade with the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries. On May 30, 1957, Britain announced that it
would sell to China goods open for sale to the USSR and
the countries of people's democracy. Similar
announcements were made later by Holland, Denmark, Norway,
Belgium, Portugal, France, West Germany, Japan and
Italy. As a result, 33.9 per cent of China's foreign trade in
1957 was with the capitalist countries.

 ~^^1^^ Duivai Maoi (Foreign Trade), 1958, No.~1.
301
advanced capitalist states. It was only China's close

economic ties with the socialist countries, and
especially with the USSR, that enabled her to export
large quantities of industrial and agricultural^^1^^
raw material and other commodities at fixed
prices.
 Trade between the Soviet Union and the

People's Republic of China in 1950--67 was carried
out under the inter-governmental trade
agreement signed on April 19, 1950. The goods from
the USSR to China and from China to the USSR
were delivered in accordance with inventories
which were reviewed and agreed upon by both
sides -every year. The trade agreement of April
19, 1950, was pronounced effective from
January 1 to December 31, 1950, that is, for a term of
one year. However, the governments of the USSR
and the People's Republic of China regularly
extended the term of this agreement by a further
year. This means that, in effect, Soviet-Chinese
trade was carried on without a long-term trade
agreement.~^^2^^ Nevertheless it is wrong to say, as
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Unprocessed and processed agricultural raw material and

the produce from farmers' subsidiary plots of land made
up 90.7 per cent (in 1950) and 71.6 per cent (in 1957) of
China's exports. See Ten Great Years. Statistics of the
Economic and Cultural Achievements of the People's
Republic of China, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1960,
p. 176.
~^^2^^ On April 23, 1958, the governments of the USSR and

China signed a treaty on trade and navigation. In this
document the two sides expressed a desire to take all the
necessary measures to develop and consolidate commercial
relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The
treaty stipulated that the governments of the USSR and
China would conclude agreements, including long-term
ones, for promoting goods turnover to meet the needs of the
national economy of each of the signatory states. The USSR
302
some bourgeois authorities do, that Soviet-Chinese
trade had no long-term legal basis, and that it
was the Soviet Union which did not want to
commit itself to any long-term trade agreement with
the People's Republic of China. The fact is that, in
the first place, in the period between 1950 and
1964 Soviet-Chinese trade meant more than a mere
commercial operation. Soviet exports to the
People's Republic of China included, besides purely
commercial deliveries, deliveries under an
economic aid programme and under a military aid
programme. Chinese exports to the USSR included
trade deliveries and payment for Soviet
economic and military credits to China and interest on
them. As for economic aid, military aid and
credits, they were extended to the People's Republic
of China on the basis of long-term agreements.
In the second place, the Soviet Union repeatedly
suggested that both sides review the question of
signing a long-term agreement in order to
provide for stable commercial ties between the USSR
and China. The Chinese side, however,
permanently declined to discuss this question.
 All practical questions concerning Soviet--

Chinese trade relations were regulated at first by "The
General Terms of Delivery of Goods by Soviet and
Chinese Foreign Trade Organisations,'' signed
on March 29, 1952, and later by "The General
Terms of Delivery of Goods from the Soviet Union
to the People's Republic of China and from the
People's Republic of China to the Soviet Union"
_-_-_
and the People's Republic of China also announced that

they would accord each other favoured-nation treatment
on all questions concerning trade and other types of
econoni'c relations.
303
which were discussed and signed by both sides

twice-on February 12, 1955, and on April 10,
1957. "The General Terms" included a large
number of questions concerning Soviet-Chinese trade,
including "terms of delivery, dates of delivery,
quantity and quality of goods, containers and
markings, consignment notifications, payment
procedure, sanctions, complaints, arbitration, and
general matters.''
 The question of prices is of tremendous
importance for the Soviet-Chinese trade relations. In its
letter to the Central Committee of the Soviet
Communist Party of February 29, 1964, the Mao
Tsetung group said that prices on many goods and
equipment imported from the Soviet Union were
much higher than those on the world market.~^^1^^
That is not true. The Soviet-Chinese trade
agreement of April 19, 1950, stipulated that prices in
Soviet-Chinese trade would be determined "on the
basis of world market prices in roubles.'' In the
course of the Soviet-Chinese trade talks in 1950
all sale and purchase prices were based on the
world capitalist market prices of equivalent
commodities for the preceding year. This system of
price setting was largely in use until 1958. The
principle of stability of prices used in trade
between the USSR and China, as well as in trade
between the USSR and other socialist countries,
was aimed at protecting the prices established in
trade between socialist countries from the
harmful effects of the unstable capitalist market. This
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Correspondence between the Central Committee of the

Communist Party of China and the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Peking, Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1964, p. 33.
304
inevitably led to situations when the USSR and

China sold each other goods at prices either higher
or lower than those on the world capitalist
market. According to some Chinese sources, the prices
of various machines imported by China from the
USSR during, and immediately after, the Korean
war were some 20--30 per cent lower, and on some
types of equipment for heavy industry 30--60 per
cent lower than the prices of the equivalent types
of equipment on the British and American
markets.~^^1^^ Somewhat later, as a result of a change in
prices on the world capitalist market, the Soviet
Union, in turn, could buy wool, rice, jute, tung
oil, black tea, raw silk, tin, tungsten concentrate,
etc., at prices which were lower than those on
the world market.^^2^^
 Following this change in prices on the world

market which affected the prices of certain goods
in Soviet-Chinese trade, some price readjustments
were made in the course of 1950--58, by
agreement between the two trading partners. In 1958
prices were again reviewed by mutual consent.
The new prices were set by both sides in line with
average annual prices on the major world
markets for 1957 and have since remained unchanged
by agreement between the two sides.
 The principle of price setting was worked out

in two letters (April 23, 1958, and February 26,
1959) exchanged between the sides, and was
reaffirmed in annual trade protocols on the Soviet--
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ Sec Peng Ming, The History of Friendship Between the
Soviet and Chinese Peoples, in Chinese, Peking, 1955
p. 138.
 ^^2^^ Yeh Chi-chuang, Speech at the 4th Session of the

AllChina Assembly of People's Representatives, July 11, 1957,
Jenmin Jihpao, July 12, 1957.
20--193
305
Chinese trade at the suggestion of the Chinese side

and with the consent of the Soviet side. Thus the
Chinese statements made after 1960 that the
prices on many types of Soviet goods and
equipment were much higher than the prices which
existed on the world market, and that for this
reason trade with the Soviet Union brought no
returns to China are at variance with the facts. The
prices adopted in 1958 by both sides still operate
in Soviet-Chinese trade.
 Another question raised in connection with

Soviet-Chinese trade is that of the quality of goods
exchanged between the two countries. Some
bourgeois propagandists who are concerned not so
much with the economic interests of the People's
Republic of China as with the fast growth of
Soviet trade with many countries and who regard the
Soviet Union as a serious competitor on the world
market, are trying to convince the trading
partners of the USSR (especially the developing
countries) that Soviet goods are of an inferior quality
and they refer to "China's experience" in this
matter. But as no direct statements about poor
quality of Soviet goods have been made by Chinese
officials, these propagandists resort to dubious
methods. One American authority on Sino-Soviet
economic relations, Chy-yuan Cheng,^^1^^ cited some
Chinese official figures on breakage of imported
Soviet equipment, which had actually been caused
by the lack of experience of Chinese workers and
technicians. This was in order to cause doubts
about the quality of Soviet-made goods.
 It is possible, of course, that the flood of
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Chy-yuan Cheng. Op. cit.

300
306
machinery, equipment and other goods which was

sent to China from the USSR over many years,
contained some substandard samples. For
example, the People's Republic of China often
imported large quantities of first models of the latest
Soviet equipment. This fact was hailed with great
satisfaction in China. The Chinese press
repeatedly pointed out that the Soviet Union had helped
China install equipment which factories and plants
in the USSR did not have themselves. It stands
to reason that some of this equipment, which had
not passed the test of time, must have had faults
which called for readjustment of design. In every
case such faulty equipment was either replaced
or brought up to the required standards by
Soviet specialists and at the expense of the Soviet
side, in accordance with established international
commercial practice. The Chinese goods imported
to the Soviet Union were treated in a similar way:
when a commodity from China did not meet the
required standards the responsibility for it was
borne by the Chinese side. On the whole the
quality of Soviet goods delivered to China was high.
The 250 industrial enterprises, factories and
projects built with Soviet assistance and equipped
with Soviet-made machinery, tens of thousands of
machine tools and instruments manufactured from
Soviet blueprints and with the help of Soviet
equipment and now working at Chinese factories
are evidence of this.
 The volume of trade turnover between China

and the USSR rose in the 1950--59 period (in 1953
it doubled over the 1950 figure and in 1959 was
43 per cent higher than in 1953), and fell
beginning with 1960. This is a specific feature of
Soviet-Chinese economic relations. In 1966 the
20*
307
volume of trade exchange between the USSR and

China was only 15.5 per cent of its 1959 volume
and was 50 per cent less than the 1950 volume.
This sharp reduction of Sino-Soviet trade cannot
be explained only by the fact that after 1960,
following the failure of the "big leap" and the "
people's communes" policies, China's foreign trade
took a downward turn which continued up to
1963. The sharp reduction of Soviet-Chinese trade
relations did not stem from the economic
situation but from the anti-Soviet political line of Mao
Tse-tung and his group.
 This group regarded China's external economic

policy as part of its foreign policy and as its tool.
Therefore the changes taking place in the foreign
policy of the leadership of the Communist Party
of China were immediately reflected in its
economic policy. The deterioration of relations
between the Soviet Communist Party and the Mao
Tse-tung group, caused by the hegemonic
aspirations and divisive activities of the latter, affected
the interstate economic relations between the
Soviet Union and China. At the end of 1959 the
Mao Tse-tung group took a course aimed at
terminating economic relations with the Soviet Union.
In 1960 trade was down 19 per cent on the 1959
level. In 1961 it was reduced by 46 per cent
compared with I960; in 1962 it declined by
another 22 per cent, and in 1963 by a further 20 per
cent. And whereas in 1959 the Soviet Union
accounted for 50 per cent of China's foreign trade,
in 1960 its share went down to 40 per cent, in
1961 to 31 per cent, in 1962 to 28 per cent and
in 1963 to 21 per cent, and continued to sharply
decline in subsequent years. In 1965 a mere 15 per
cent of China's foreign trade was with the Soviet
308
Union, and in 1966 this fell to 7 per cent and in

1967 to 2 per cent.~^^1^^
 Following the directions of the Mao Tse-tung

group, the representatives of the People's Republic
of China at the Soviet-Chinese talks cut down the
volume of goods negotiated for trade, rejecting
many items which had become traditional Soviet
exports to China. For example, in December 1961
the Chinese negotiators announced that the import
of Soviet complete sets of plant would be
reduced to about a fifth as compared with the
preceding year, and that in 1962--63 it would be
terminated.~^^2^^ The political implications of this move by
the Chinese leadership are quite obvious, since the
People's Republic of China was at the same time
importing industrial plant from the capitalist
countries. For example, China purchased industrial
plant for 20 factories from Britain, Italy, West
Germany, France and Japan.
 The anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese

leadership in the sphere of foreign trade led to a sharp
reduction of Soviet exports to China. In terms of
value Soviet exports to China fell from 859.1
million roubles in 1959 to 157.8 million roubles in
1966. The Soviet Union made every effort to check
the downward trend in trade turnover with China.
Soviet representatives at trade talks offered to
expand the volume of Soviet exports to China, but
they encountered opposition from the Chinese
side. At the same time the Chinese
representatives refused to increase the delivery to the Soviet
_-_-_
~^^1^^ See 0. Borisov, B. Koloskov, Op. cit., pp. 193, 200, 212,
240; M. Kapitsa, To the Left of Common Sense, M., 1968,
p. 66.
~^^2^^ See O. Borisov, B. Koloskov. Op. cit., p. 198.
309
Union of goods needed by the Soviet people,

including those goods which China was exporting
in large amounts to capitalist countries and which
had been traditional Chinese export items to the
USSR. As a result, the shipment of these
commodities to the Soviet Union was sharply reduced. Over
the 1959--65 period China reduced its export to the
Soviet Union-of tin to 2.5 per cent of its former
level, mercury to 3.1 per cent, molybdenic
concentrate to 4.2 per cent, tungsten concentrate to
23 per cent, raw silk to 2.8 per cent, tung oil to
8.3 per cent, wool to 15.4 per cent, bristle to 18
per cent.
 The Chinese representatives tried to camouflage

this policy, which was aimed at terminating
Soviet-Chinese economic relations, with talks about
China's desire to increase the volume of trade with
the Soviet Union. They offered in an increasing
volume the goods which China found difficult to
sell on the world market, and, at the same time,
reduced the volume of goods which had become
traditional Chinese exports to the Soviet Union.
This manoeuvre of the Chinese leadership
inevitably led to a sharp reduction in Sino-Soviet trade
in the years which preceded the so-called
cultural revolution in China. Between 1959 and 1966
the volume of trade between China and the
Soviet Union decreased by almost 85 per cent.
SinoSoviet currency relations are an important aspect
of the economic ties between the USSR and China.
In the early stages of Soviet-Chinese economic
relations, when China was still suffering from
inflation, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
of China agreed upon the rate of exchange of their
currencies. On June 1, 1951, the governments of
the USSR and China signed an agreement on the
310
exchange rate of the rouble in relation to the yuan

of the People's Bank of China. The agreement
stated that "the two sides unanimously agreed to
establish the parity of the rouble in relation to
the yuan of the People's Bank of China in line
with the official price of gold.'' On the day the
agreement was signed the rate of exchange was
established at 6,754 yuans to the rouble. The
agreement came into effect immediately and was
considered effective "until the accomplishment of
the currency reform in China and the
establishment of the amount of pure gold carried by the
currency of the People's Republic of China.'' On
September 22, 1953, on the initiative of the
Soviet Union, a protocol agreement was signed in
Peking establishing the exchange rate of the yuan
of the People's Bank of China in relation to the
rouble. According to this protocol, all monetary
operations between the USSR and China were to
be conducted on the basis of the agreed ratio of
5,000 yuans to the rouble (instead of 6,754 as was
stipulated in the agreement of June 1, 1951). The
new ratio between the rouble and the yuan was
intended to simplify the working of the
forthcoming currency reform in China and to strengthen
the yuan against the currencies of other countries.
After the monetary reform in March, 1955, in the
course of which 10,000 old yuans were exchanged
for one new yuan, the exchange ratio between the
yuan and the rouble remained the same: 0.5 yuan
to the rouble (two roubles to one yuan). Since
no fixed gold content of the yuan was specified by
the reform, this official exchange rate of the yuan in
relation to the rouble remained unaltered, by
agreement between the governments of the Soviet
Union and China. On December 30, 1957, the
311
governments of the USSR and China signed a

protocol agreement on an increase in the exchange
rate of the yuan for non-commercial payments.
Under this agreement, which came into effect on
January 1, 1958, the exchange rate of the yuan
in relation to the rouble in non-commercial
payments was raised by 200 per cent. This increase
in the value of the yuan in non-commercial
payments raised the Chinese currency to 16.67 yuans
to 100 roubles (600 roubles to 100 yuans). The
exchange rate of the rouble to the yuan for
noncommercial payments was established on the
basis of prices of manufactured sample goods and
foodstuffs, and prices of services, and was in line
with the prices for equivalent commodities and
services in the USSR.
 The protocol agreements of October 23, 1956,

and December 30, 1957, established the rate of
exchange between the rouble and the yuan for
non-commercial payments. This new exchange
rate was subject to review and verification by
agreement between the State Bank of the USSR
and the People's Bank of China in case the retail
prices on goods and services were changed
substantially either in one of the countries or in both
of them. After the Soviet Union increased the gold
backing of the rouble on January 1, 1961, the
buying power of the rouble was also increased. As a
result, the exchange rate of the rouble in relation
to other currencies, including the currency of the
People's Republic of China, was altered. The State
Bank of the USSR and the People's Bank of
China agreed upon a new exchange rate between
the rouble and the yuan: 45 roubles to 100 yuans
in commercial payments, and 77.52 roubles to
100 yuans in non-commercial payments.
312
 These facts show that the currency relations

between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
of China rested on an objective economic
foundation and on the basis of mutual agreement, and
that the Soviet Union did not seek to use its
currency transactions with China to its own
advantage.
 The credit relations between the USSR and

China were an important part of Sino-Soviet
economic relations. They facilitated the building of
socialism in the People's Republic of China, and
helped to strengthen its national economy and
defences. The credits the Soviet Union extended
to the People's Republic of China meant that part
of the surplus product which forms the
accumulation fund, was temporarily taken out of the
Soviet national economy and was transferred to
China in the form of credits, instead of being
used for the expansion of the productive capital or
for capital construction in the cultural and
service spheres which could have brought additional
benefits to the Soviet people. From the purely
commercial point of view the Soviet Union stood
to gain nothing from its credits to China. Under
the planned system of economic management, the
Soviet Union would have gained much more from
using them for its own domestic needs-for the
expansion of production, in order to export the
additional products in exchange for the necessary
commodities, instead of shipping equipment and
machinery (especially complete sets of plant) on
credit to China. The payment of interest on its
credits - which, by the way, was much lower than
on the capitalist market - serves as only a partial
compensation for the losses sustained by the
Soviet national economy through the temporary
313
withdrawal of a part of the national product from it.

This means that the Soviet Union, true to the
principles of proletarian internationalism,
extended credits to China at the expense of the
development of its own national economy and the
promotion of the living standards of its people.
 The Soviet credits were quite different from

the so-called assistance rendered by the
capitalist states to developing countries. Soviet credits
are not aimed at exploiting people. Nor is their
purpose the economic expansion of the Soviet
Union, the making of super-profits, or the
wresting of political or military concessions from
weaker states. The Soviet credits were aimed at helping
the Chinese people to build a socialist society in
their country. They were extended to the
People's Republic of China at the most difficult times
of its existence - during the first few years after
the revolution when the restoration and
development of the national economy was a question of
life and death for the young republic; during the
1950--53 period when the People's Republic of
China was participating in the Korean war; in
1961 when the adventuristic policy of Mao
Tsetung created an extremely difficult economic and
political situation in the country.
 As a rule these credits were provided in the

form of commodities. China also received
investment credits which went for the construction of
industrial projects designated by the Chinese
government. Gold and freely convertible currency
as credit means were used on a limited scale in
the economic relations between the USSR and
the People's Republic of China. One of the
features of the Soviet-Chinese credit relations, as well
314
as the interest on them, was the fact that the Soviet

investment and commodity credits were repaid in
traditional Chinese export goods. This provided
China with a stable guaranteed market for her
goods, enabled many of her industries to work
to capacity, provided employment for her
population and consolidated the fiscal situation in the
country.
 Most of the credits extended by the Soviet

Union to the People's Republic of China were in
roubles. The credit extended to China on
February 14, 1950, was in American dollars, while the
credits granted in 1951--55 were in roubles with
a gold backing of 0.222168 grams of gold. On
January 1, 1961, the gold backing of the rouble
was established at 0.987412 grams of gold which
accordingly raised the exchange rate of the rouble
in relation to the currencies of other countries. The
new exchange rate went a long way towards
eliminating the difference between the level of world
prices and the internal wholesale prices of
commodities offered for sale on the world market. The
increased gold backing of the rouble made it
necessary to recalculate the debts of the People's
Republic of China and other recipients of Soviet
credits. As a result, the total debt owed to the
Soviet Union was reduced by 77.5 per cent. At
the same time the prices of goods under the
existing agreements on commodity exchange and other
deliveries were reduced by exactly the same
percentage. Therefore the amount of goods
delivered against the Soviet credits, and the rate at which
the debts were to be repaid, did not change. The
upward revaluation of the rouble did not affect the
commodity and credit transaction concluded
earlier between the Soviet Union and China. In fact,
315
China lost nothing from the recalculation of the

funds specified in these agreements in terms of
new roubles.
 The Soviet credits to the People's Republic of

China went to pay for industrial equipment,
machinery, transport, technical assistance, military
deliveries. Soviet property handed over to China,
and to settle the debts of trading operations. The
Soviet credits were offered to the People's
Republic of China on advantageous terms-at an annual
interest of not more that two per cent-some of
the credits were interest-free. The credits were
extended, used and repaid with due consideration
for the national economic plans of the two
countries, and this helped both China and the USSR
to fulfill their mutual commitments.
 It is important to stress here that the Soviet

Union did not claim to provide China with all
the means necessary for the industrialisation
programme of the whole country, with its collossal
population and territory. The aim of Soviet
financial assistance to China was to help the People's
Republic of China and the Chinese people to make
the best use of their domestic resources and
internal possibilities in order to create the primary
basis of socialist industrialisation, to build a
complex of industrial establishments, which the
People's Republic of China could use in order to
advance at the fastest possible rate, and to
eliminate backwardness and grow from a poor
agrarian country into a powerful socialist nation. Such
an industrial base was created in China with the
help of the Soviet Union and other socialist states.
According to Li Hsien-nien, China's Minister
of Finance, Soviet loans provided 2 per cent of
316
China's total revenue over ten years.~^^1^^ This figure

does not mean that the Soviet loans played a small
part in the industrialisation process of the
People's Republic of China and in the promotion of
its defence capability. The money offered by the
Soviet Union was spent very concentratedly, and
not within the framework of the national
economy as a whole. It went into the building of
large, modern industrial establishments-the basis
of China's industrialisation. The Soviet military
credits were used for modernising the People's
Liberation Army of China, for making it a
modern army. The very fact that the People's
Liberation Army of China was fully equipped with
modern materiel, equipment and weapons (
including jet planes, modern tanks, artillery, submarines,
and surface war ships) received from the Soviet
Union or manufactured according to Soviet
blueprints at Chinese factories, and with Soviet aid,
speak for the scope, effectiveness and significance
of the Soviet credits for the People's Republic of
China. Soviet military credits were also used for
the building of barracks and for providing the
soldiers and officers of the People's Liberation
Army of China with foodstuffs and equipment.
Soviet credits were provided in sufficient quantities
to have a decisive effect on the progress of China's
economy and on the building of her defences.
 The unceasing political, ideological and

military provocations, numerous hostile acts and
intrigues of the Maoists against the Soviet Union
and the Soviet Communist Party might raise the
question whether the aid the Soviet Union
_-_-_
 ^^1^^ The Glorious Decade, Collection of articles, Peking,

Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960, p. 196.
317
extended to China between 1950--66 strengthened the

positions of the Maoist group pursuing a
nationalistic and anti-Soviet line? The answer is "no,''
because by doing so the Soviet Communist Party
and the Soviet people did their internationalist
duty to the world revolutionary movement. The
aim of the Soviet Union was to help the Chinese
people to transform their country into an advanced
socialist state and to make China its powerful ally
in the struggle against imperialism. This was
largely achieved. In the years when the People's
Republic of China was cooperating with the
Soviet Union, and when the Communist Party of
China was making wide use of the experience of the
Soviet Communist Party, socialism put down deep
roots in China. The events which are now taking
place in China show that the efforts of the Maoists
over the years to loosen these roots have run into
opposition from the Chinese Communists and
from wide sections of the Chinese population.
 In the early 1950's the Mao Tse-tung group

obviously regarded the Soviet assistance and
experience as a means of realising its chauvinistic
and hegemonic designs. However, as the Chinese
people built the foundations of socialism,
drawing on Soviet experience and aid, this process
became increasingly at variance with the anti--
Marxist adventuristic and great-power aspirations of
the Mao Tse-tung group. The building of
socialism in China necessitated the observance of
certain objective laws of socio-economic development
and an internationalist attitude towards the USSR
and other socialist countries, whereas Mao
Tsetung and his supporters deliberately ignored these
facts. It was precisely for this reason that Mao
Tse-tung, in the last few years of the first five--
318
year plan, followed a political line aimed at

discrediting the assistance and experience of the
USSR, at undermining the confidence of the
Chinese people in the CPSU and in the Soviet Union.
This was in preparation for carrying out his
adventuristic and chauvinistic designs.
 The divisive, anti-Soviet policies of the Mao

Tsetung group are not only sapping the unity of the
socialist community and weakening the world
revolutionary movement, but are also hindering
the process of building socialism in China, and
are detrimental to the interests of the Chinese
people themselves. Therefore, the working people of
our country continue to believe, in spite of the
difficulties in Sino-Soviet relations, that the
present situation in China is transitory by its very
nature, and that friendship and cooperation
between the Soviet Union and China will ultimately
triumph.
 Voprosy Islurii, No. 6, 1969
[319]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
Peking Against
 the Socialist Community
 A. Nadezhdin
 In the confrontation of the two world systems

the Maoists have in effect assumed the role of an
instrument serving imperialism in its efforts to
``soften'' and break up the socialist community,
that decisive factor in the development of the
world revolutionary process. Indeed, the
nationalistic Chinese-Albanian estrangement from the
socialist community is welcomed by the
imperialist policy-makers as the best possible contribution
to the attainment of this strategic objective at a
time when direct military pressure on the
socialist states is clearly not only ineffective but also
dangerous. Imperialism today hopes to achieve
with Peking's assistance what it failed to
accomplish through years of reliance on its own forces
alone.
 The present Chinese leadership sees the main

obstacle to its hegemonistic great-power ambitions
in the solid, science-based revolutionary unity of
the socialist countries and the entire international
communist movement. This unity is also the main
barrier to the realization by world anti--
communism of its hopes of being able to destroy the
socialist system and halt the forward march of
history. Although the aims of the imperialists and
the Peking leaders are not identical, the course
they are steering to achieve them is virtually the
same. It lies through struggle primarily against
320
the most powerful citadel of the world's

socialist forces-the Soviet Union. This is why
antiSovietism, long the core of the ideology and
policy of anti-communism, has become basic also to
the ideology and policies of the present Chinese
leadership. In concentrating on attacking the
USSR, both the imperialists and the Peking
leaders are prompted by the hope that world
socialism can be defeated by hammering at its
leading detachment. By underscoring their hostility
towards the Soviet Union they count on dulling
the vigilance of the other socialist countries and
forces and persuading them that anti-Soviet
actions do not jeopardise the interests of the rest
of the socialist community. In other words, both
anti-communists of every hue and the Chinese
leaders employ anti-Sovietism as an instrument for
dividing and weakening the world socialist system.
Though both of these reactionary forces claim to
be irreconcilably opposed to one another, the
fact remains that they have in effect joined in a
united front against world socialism, against the
international communist movement.
 The hostility of the present Peking leaders to

the interests of the international proletariat is
patent in the Maoist slogans, and Peking's practical
policies have given it tangible form. Every
action taken by the USSR and other socialist
countries towards strengthening world socialism,
lessening international tension and organising broad
resistance to the stepped-up activity of the
forces of imperialism and reaction
invariably evokes a flood of invective and slander
from Peking. This was the case during
the Caribbean crisis in the autumn of 1962
when the Soviet Union took a number of
21--193
321
steps essential to help the Cuban people defend

their revolutionary achievements. The same
happened in 1967, when the USSR and other
fraternal countries came out against the Israeli
aggression in the Middle East, and in 1968, when they
barred the way to counter-revolution in
Czechoslovakia. As a matter of fact, there is not an area
of international relations in which Peking over
the past ten years has not in one way or another,
directly or indirectly, fallen in line with the
imperialist reaction and served its interests. And
nothing accords with these interests more than
the divisive policy pursued by the Chinese
leaders towards the world socialist system. Peking has
helped to animate diverse ``Leftist'' trends in the
international working-class movement, given
encouragement to proponents of bourgeois
nationalist ideology and both ``Leftist'' and Rightist
splinter groups, all of which see in Maoist China
a backer of their anti-socialist machinations.
Indeed Peking has repeatedly promised them every
assistance.
 In its efforts to divide the socialist community

Peking is not only working to undermine the
world revolutionary movement, but impeding the
building of socialism primarily in China, and
also in Albania. For these countries, which
inherited an onerous legacy of social and economic
backwardness from the old order, close unity with
world socialism is a decisive condition of successful
socialist development. As long as they stood
together with the other socialist countries, they
registered successes. The Soviet Union and other
developed socialist countries rendered them extensive
assistance in resolving the key problems of
socialist construction.
322
 In 1950--59 the USSR pledged the Chinese
People's Republic help in the building, expansion and
reconstruction of more than 400 major
enterprises, separate factory departments, and other
projects. Of these over 250 were completed or
partly put into operation. In 1952--61 other European
socialist countries built or helped in the building
in China of more than 260 enterprises, factory
departments, technological installations and other
economic projects. Already by 1960 enterprises
built with Soviet help produced 8.7 million tons
of pig iron and 8.4 million tons of steel, and
accounted for 80 per cent of the motor trucks, over
90 per cent of the tractors, 55 per cent of the
steam and hydraulic turbines, 25 per cent of the
electric power and 25 per cent of the aluminium
turned out in China.
 Had China not rejected close cooperation with

the socialist camp and the Chinese leadership
not substituted all-out build-up of military
potential for the creation of the material and
technological base of socialism, the Chinese People's
Republic would undoubtedly have scored further
successes in industrialisation and the development of
socialist society in general. For the USSR and other
socialist countries, in step with the development
of their own economies, would naturally have
expanded industrialisation aid through the sixties.
As a result, a solid material foundation would
have been laid by now for socialist production
relations in China. As it is, however, the material
base remains weak, and this, especially with the
policies pursued by the Chinese leaders, facilitates
the deformation and emasculation of the very
essence of socialist production relations. (The
break with the socialist community has greatly
21*
323
retarded economic development of Albania too,

even though it received substantial material and
financial aid from China in the sixties. Whereas
the average annual industrial growth rate in
Albania was 17 per cent in 1956--60, in 1961--65 it
was only 6.8 per cent as against the 8.7 per cent
planned.)
 The anti-socialist orientation of Maoism is

manifest not only in the parallelism of the policies
pursued by Peking and the imperialist world, both
of which are aimed against the socialist camp,
but also in the basic concurrence of the stance
and policy of the Peking leaders and those of the
Chinese bourgeoisie, which exists to this day in
the Chinese People's Republic. In 1957 the Maoists
gave this bourgeoisie every opportunity publicly
to propound its anti-socialist views.
 When in mid-1957 a campaign was at last

launched against the offensive of the "bourgeois
Right-wing elements,'' the Chinese press carried
articles critical of their anti-Soviet sallies and
fabrications. In one of these articles the then General
Secretary of the Sino-Soviet Friendship
Association Tsien Chun-jui (in the sixties he became a
victim of the Maoist repressions), assessing the
stand of the "bourgeois Right-wing elements,''
stressed that their objective was the restoration
of capitalism. "The Right regarded struggle
against the Communist Party within the country
and against the Soviet Union on the international
arena of utmost importance for the achievement
of this objective,'' he said. "Unless the Communist
Party is overthrown and friendly relations with
the Soviet Union severed, the positions of
socialism are bound to remain strong.''~^^1^^ The article
__FIX__ f2-f7 ...

<f2> <f7> runs the command tx-editing-insert-page-break-mid-paragraph ...
does not delete "" at end of above block due
to -2 after control M.
_-_-_
 ~^^1^^ Hsuehhsi, No. 16, 1957.
324
declared that the "ideology of bourgeois nationalism

manifested in relation to the Soviet Union will
become ultra-reactionary anti-Soviet nationalism.''
Today many of the aims the bourgeois forces in
China fought for in the fifties have been realized
by the present Peking leaders: the internationalist,
Marxist-Leninist forces in the Communist Party
of China were smashed during the "cultural
revolution,'' struggle against the USSR has become
Peking's No. 1 objective, and anti-Sovietism has
been made official policy.
 The above-mentioned article also noted that the

bourgeois Right was "beginning to develop a sense
of superiority over other nations,'' that they
had gone so far as to forget the foreign policy
principles recorded in the Constitution and were out
to "practise reactionary great-power chauvinism.''
"The foreign policy programme of the bourgeois
Right-wing elements is pivoted on anti-socialism
and pro-Americanism,'' Tsien Chun-jui said.
 It is perfectly obvious that the foreign policy

programme of the bourgeois Right-wing elements
as set forth in 1957, its nationalistic class essence,
has been fully espoused by the Maoists. It is not by
chance that the most active anti-Sovieteers from
the Right-wing camp were rehabilitated soon
after 1957.
 Peking's foreign policy line in many respects

echoes the policies of Chiang Kai-shek, who
represents the class interests of diehard Chinese
bourgeois-landlord reaction. Although Mao Tse-tung
once called Chiang a man from whom one could
learn only what should not be done, in practice
he is a zealous follower of his "teacher in
reverse.'' If, after seizing power in China in 1927,
325
Chiang Kai-shek and his followers overtly and

covertly engaged in anti-Soviet machinations on the
international arena, circulating slanderous
allegations concerning some mythical "Red
imperialism,'' and today, entrenched in Taiwan, make no
secret of their anti-Soviet credo, the Maoists have
openly pivoted their foreign policy on anti--
Sovietism and are talking about Soviet "social
imperialism.'' And if Chiang Kai-shek and his
followers are active participants in the notorious
Asian People's Anti-Communist League, the
Maoists are fighting the international communist
movement both in Asia and outside its bounds. It is not
surprising that entry visas to China were refused
the communist members of a French
parliamentary delegation.
 Like the Chiang Kai-shek crowd, the present

Chinese leaders are not at all happy about the
independence of the Mongolian People's
Republic. Although Peking bosses have not ventured to
publish maps showing the Mongolian People's
Republic as a part of China, as has been done in
Taiwan, they continue to cherish as they did
decades ago hopes of annexing Mongolia to China.
 As far back as 1936, during an interview gran- [

ted to the then obscure US journalist Edgar Snow, '
Mao Tse-tung categorically declared that after the
victory of the revolution in China the MPR would
"automatically,'' "of its own free will,'' once again
become part of China. In April 1945 Chou
Enlai's private secretary told some American
officials that the Chinese leaders would like to "join
Outer Mongolia (meaning the MPR to China).''
And in 1954 Mao with unadulterated great-power
arrogance took up with the Soviet Government
326
the question of annexing Mongolia to the

Chinese People's Republic, but was told that this was
a question that should have been raised with the
Mongolian people and government, and not with
the Soviet Union.
 Both Chiang Kai-shek and the present Chinese

leaders present territorial claims to the USSR and
other neighbouring countries. Both have taken
a chauvinistic, great-power stance as regards
China's role and place in the world. Even during
the difficult period of the war against Japan, when
China was in extreme straits, the
Kuomintangcontrolled press made no secret of the hegemonic
ambitions of Chiang Kai-shek and his followers.
The newspaper Yihshihpao, for instance, wrote on
December 16, 1943: "In the future the vast
territory in East Asia from the Indian Ocean in the
west to Japan in the east and from Australia in
the south to Alaska in the north will wholly
belong to China, and she shall have to bear the
responsibility for the integrity and prosperity of all
this territory.'' Mao Tse-tung repeated the same
claims in June 1958: "The present Pacific Ocean
is in reality not too pacific. In the future, when it
comes under our control, it can become such.''
 Indicative too is the identity of the Maoist and

Chiang Kai-shek tactics of struggle against
progressives at home and on the international arena.
It will be recalled that in 1927, when the
communist movement in China had gained substantial
strength, Chiang Kai-shek struck hard at it, and
at the same time brought relations with the USSR
to the breaking point, to armed clashes on the
Soviet-Chinese frontier. The strengthening of the
forces of socialism registered in China by 1956--57
327
similarly prompted the Maoists to launch an

offensive against them and to accompany the drive with
a worsening of relations with the USSR and other
socialist countries which eventually developed into
open enmity towards them.
 There is also another noteworthy coincidence.

When Japanese imperialism presented a deadly
danger to the Chinese state in the late twenties and
early thirties, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers
sought to ward off the threat by doing their
utmost to provoke a clash between Japan and the
Soviet Union by demonstrating their anti--
Sovietism and their readiness to yield to Japanese
imperialism. In the past decade the Maoists have
repeatedly displayed pliancy under pressure from
US imperialism, confining themselves to endless
"serious warnings.'' At the same time, in order to
curry favour with it, they have escalated
antiSovietism as no imperialist state has ventured to
do. Besides, in the sixties Peking seized upon
every opportunity to provoke a sharp
aggravation of relations and even a clash between the US
and the USSR, intending to remain in the
sidelines itself.
 A comparison of Peking's foreign policy with ,

the course steered by world anti-communism and
the foreign policy programme of the Chinese
bourgeois-landlord reaction shows that although there
are definite and at times extremely sharp
contradictions among these three political forces, their
positions in relation to world socialism are very
much alike.
 However, as distinct from the latter two,

Peking prefers to conduct its subversive work under
a smokescreen fo "ultra-Left,'' "ultra--
revolutionary" slogans and professed aims. For this reason the
328
Peking leaders are anxious to have at least some

of the socialist countries and communist parties,
as well as organisations representing the
nationalliberation movement, concede that Peking too
stands on ``revolutionary'' positions if they
cannot be induced to recognize it as the "only true
revolutionary.'' This was one of the reasons why
Peking returned in 1968 to its notorious "
differentiated policy" towards the socialist countries.
The underlying idea, formulated in the early
sixties, is to concentrate on assailing the USSR, while
taking a flexible attitude towards other socialist
countries in order to induce them to be at least
``neutral'' in the fight waged by the Marxist--
Leninists against Peking's reactionary ideological
and political platform and great-power
hegemonism.
 The Marxist-Leninists are not taken in by this

tactic. "We,'' the Polish Trybuna Ludu said in an
article on the fiftieth anniversary of the
Communist Party of China, "seek normalisation of
interstate relations with the Chinese People's Republic.
But we resolutely reject every attempt to make
use of our readiness to normalise relations to
promote ends preventing the strengthening of the
unity of the entire socialist community. Under no
circumstances can an anti-Soviet policy and
orientation on splitting the socialist community and the
international communist movement serve as a
platform for genuine normalisation.''
 Our epoch is a crucial one in human history.

The broadest unity of all progressive forces, and
primarily of the socialist countries and the
organised international working class, is of
decisive importance for the success of the struggle
against the threat of a devastating thermo-nuclear
329
war, for peace, democracy, socialism and

communism. Hence the magnitude of the harm done to
the interests of the revolutionary forces by the
divisive activities of the ``Left'' and Right-wing
revisionists operating in the ranks of these
forces, in camouflage garb, seeking to speak and act
in their name and to subordinate them to their
influence. Especially pernicious and unprincipled
is revisionism combined with and nurtured by
nationalism. This combination, if transformed into
official ideology governing the policies of one or
another country that has embarked on the
socialist road, presents a danger proportional to
the size of the country that has fallen under
nationalist sway.
 The ``bridge-building'' policies of world

imperialism and Peking's "differentiated policy" pursue
at this stage one and the same goal-they both
are designed to prevent the development of world
socialism as a united political and economic
system and thereby to undermine its might and
influence on the world revolutionary process.
 The socialist countries give a resolute rebuff to

the divisive activities of Peking, which has
opened a new front against world socialism, a front
that is particularly dangerous because it runs
through the socialist system itself. Hence utmost
clarity is essential in assessing its place and role
in the global confrontation of the forces of
progress and reaction.
 The future of socialism, its sound, successful

development in the various countries, and the
prospects of the struggle for socialism in the
capitalist countries depend to a great extent, as the
experience of the past two and a half decades has
convincingly shown, on the unity of the
330
socialist world system as a whole, on the consistent

utilisation of the countless advantages inherent in
it. On this depends the success also of the
worldwide anti-imperialist movement. Consequently, the
socialist countries, while resolutely combating
Peking's splitting activities and rejecting the
ideological and political platform of the present
Chinese leaders, are working untiringly to bring
about a normalisation of inter-state relations with
the Chinese People's Republic. This principled line
was once again clearly reflected in the decisions
of the recent congresses of the communist parties
of Hungary, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, the Mongolian People's Republic, and
the German Democratic Republic.
 New Times, No. 33, 1971
[331]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
New Strategy for the Same Ends
 AN ANALYSIS OF MAOIST INTERNATIONAL
 POLICY
 O. Ivanov
 The great-power, disruptive policy of the

Peking leaders is causing serious damage to the
interests of the world socialist system and the entire
communist movement, impeding the anti--
imperialist struggle of the progressive forces and
exercising an adverse influence on the
international situation. What is happening in China is being
exploited by anti-communist propaganda in order
to discredit scientific socialism and Marxism--
Leninism as a whole.
 The practical activity, political principles and

pronouncements of the Chinese leadership in the
current period have clearly shown that Mao
Tsetung and his group are intent on following the
basic political course endorsed by the Ninth
Congress of the Communist Party of China. This
means a rejection of the proletarian, class
approach in assessing social phenomena,
undermining the socialist community and the anti--
imperialist front, frenzied anti-Sovietism and the
endeavour to establish world hegemony.
 But instead of bringing the Maoists the

desired results, the attempts at a frontal and
forceful implementation of this policy have deepened
China's internal crisis and its isolation on the
international arena. That is why the Maoists have
recently been compelled, while keeping up their
332
far-going hegemonic aims, to resort to

manoeuvring. They are trying hard to make their policy
look more respectable and less aggressive.
 Ever since the Ninth Congress of the CPC,

Mao Tse-tung and his supporters have been
trying to complete the legalisation of the political
upheaval brought about during the "cultural
revolution,'' to bolster up their regime in China
and gradually put into action their foreign policy
aimed at achieving hegemonic aims.
 In the sphere of the country's internal

development, the chief task of the Maoists has been
to overcome socio-economic instability and
restore the prestige of the central government, which
was shaken by the "cultural revolution.'' This has
demanded that attention be confined to the
problems of economic, Party and state construction.
To a certain extent regulation of socio-political
and economic activity is achieved by means of
all-round militarisation and by maintaining a
"besieged fortress" atmosphere. The personality
cult of Mao Tse-tung is being further boosted
and there are endless demagogic claims that the
Maoist "cultural revolution" was "absolutely
necessary in order to strengthen the dictatorship of
the proletariat,'' and that it gave "a powerful
impetus to the economic, political, ideological
and cultural development of the country.'' The
outrages committed by the hungweipings, and
the vicious mockery of hundreds of thousands of
Communists are said to have been caused by the
"intrigues and provocations of Chairman Mao's
enemies,'' meaning Liu Shao-chi and his
adherents. This is all part of the Maoists' broad
political manoeuvre aimed at stabilising the internal
situation.
333
 However, the process of relative stabilisation

is uneven and painful. The agitations of the "
cultural revolution,'' particularly those connected
with the major reshuffle in the Party and
government, had not yet subsided when a new political
crisis broke out in the ruling Maoist elite. More
than one half of the 25 Members and Candidate
Members of the Politbureau of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China (the
Politbureau formed at the Ninth Congress in 1969)
have disappeared from the political arena; and
only two of the five Members of the Politbureau
Permanent Committee (known as "the Five'') are
politically active.
 Quite recently, Lin Piao, CC CPC Vice--

Chairman and Member of the Politbureau Permanent
Committee, was mentioned in the Party Rules as
a "close associate" and the ``continuer'' of the
cause of Mao Tse-tung. But the ink had hardly
dried when, according to foreign agencies, Lin
Piao was declared, following Liu Shao-chi, "a po- I
litical swindler and a great careerist.'' The coun- '
try is still dominated by tension, which, as
before, the Maoists are trying to blunt by
accelerating their anti-Soviet campaign and whipping up
war hysteria.~^^1^^
 All this cannot be accounted for merely by the

struggle for power in the Chinese leadership.
Everything seems to indicate that the new crisis was
_-_-_
~^^1^^ One can get an idea of the scope of China's anti-Soviet

campaign if one notes, among other things, the fact that
in less than 11 months in 1971, the Maoist government
mouthpiece, Jenmin jihpao, carried about 400 items
containing crude attacks on the Soviet Union, and 12 issues
of Hungchi magazine carried similar material. China's book
market is full of anti-Soviet literature; Radio Peking daily
broadcasts anti-Soviet slander.
334
caused by a dispute among the Maoist rulers on

questions of domestic and foreign policy.
 Being well aware of the dangerous
consequences of the Maoist course, Marxist-Leninist
parties are seriously concerned with the Chinese
problem. They voiced their principled position at the
International Meeting of Communist and
Workers' Parties held in Moscow in June, 1969. In
this respect the Meeting marked an important
stage in the efforts of Marxist-Leninists to
strengthen the unity of their revolutionary ranks,
to preserve the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory,
and to counteract the anti-Leninist and subversive
activity of the Maoists.
 The 24th Congress of the CPSU, the recent

congresses of other Marxist-Leninist parties, the
constructive foreign policy of the USSR and the
general offensive launched by the forces of
socialism against imperialism and reaction-these
have once again demonstrated most strikingly
the subversive character of the foreign policy
course followed by the Maoists, whose aim is to
split the world revolutionary movement.
 The Chinese splitters and their agents abroad

have suffered serious set-backs, and this has
compelled them to revise their strategy. Add to this
the collapse of the imperialist sabotage against
socialism in Czechoslovakia (the intrigues of the
anti-socialist forces in that country were
approved by the Maoists) and the firm rebuff given
to the provocations of the Chinese authorities on
the Soviet-Chinese frontier, and it will become
clear what forced the Maoists to alter the strategy
of conducting subversive activity in the
international arena.
335
 The CPSU and other fraternal parties contrast

Peking's disruptive policy with the efforts to
cement the unity of the socialist countries, the
world communist movement and the anti--
imperialist forces, and also with their policy of
normalising interstate relations with the Chinese People's
Republic. This policy was clearly set forth in the
Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the
24th Congress delivered by Comrade Leonid
Brezhnev, in the speeches of delegates, in the
Congress's Resolution on the Report, and in the
addresses delivered by the leaders of the fraternal
Marxist-Leninist parties to the Congress. The
CPSU and the fraternal parties of the socialist
countries are ready to promote the all-round
development of interstate relations with the PRC
without going against their principles and
national interests. At the same time the Marxist--
Leninist parties are continuing to repel the attacks
and expose the ideological platform of the
Maoists, a platform which is incompatible with
Marxism-Leninism.
 Based on a consideration of long-term

prospects, this policy of the Marxist-Leninists serves
to cement the unity of the international
communist movement and the entire anti-imperialist
movement, and furthers the cause of socialism in
China itself.
 Owing to the internationalist stand of the

socialist countries in regard to China, to their strong
defence of the principles of Marxism-Leninism
and to their firm counteraction of the efforts to
subvert the socialist states, the world
revolutionary movement and the anti-imperialist forces, it
became possible to frustrate the plans of the
Maoists to set up their own centre for countering
336
the world communist and working-class

movement, and in large measure to neutralise the
adverse consequences of Peking's policy~
 The Maoists have met with serious internal

and international obstacles to the achievement of
their aims. The adventurism characteristic of
Maoism has come sharply into conflict with
reality, and this has created the ground for fresh
political crisis in China. The policy of Mao
Tsetung and his group is facing growing resistance
from the working people and members of the
Chinese Communist Party. No wonder Mao
Tsetung declared that "it needs another three or four
cultural revolutions" to get rid of opposition to
the policy of the ruling elite and to strengthen the
government, or rather - the military-bureaucratic
dictatorship.
 The Maoists have failed in their attempts to

attain their chauvinistic and hegemonic aims
through frontal attacks on the forces which they
regard as their chief opponents. Nor did their
fabrications about a Soviet military threat
produce the hoped-for results.
 The fact that the Soviet Union and other

fraternal countries are consistently pursuing a
policy of promoting genuine normalisation of
relations with China causes difficulty for the Maoists
and their anti-Soviet propaganda both at home
and on the international scene.
 What, then, ate the distinctive features of the

new Maoist strategy? The most conspicuous of
Peking's new strategems is the change in its
foreign-policy slogans. The slogan "Revolution
through war or prevention of war through
revolution,'' advanced in the course of the Ninth
Congress of the CPC, was replaced in the spring of
22---193
337
1970 by another slogan which says, "The danger

of a new world war still exists, and all nations
must be prepared for it. But revolution is now
the chief trend in the world.'' While retaining the
slogan of a world war as the most expedient
means of resolving the contradictions of today,
the Maoists now more frequently speak about
their readiness to build relations with all
countries, including the socialist ones, on the basis of
the "five principles of peaceful coexistence.'' But
although Peking is less bellicose in its statements
on international issues, it is keeping to its
antiSoviet, anti-socialist direction in its foreign
policy activity.
 It is noteworthy that among the many capitalist

countries that have recently recognized the PRC,
those connected with the USA through various
military alliances and blocs are displaying
particular activeness.
 The logical consequence of Peking's new

strategy in the international arena is its open
rapprochement with the ruling circles of the biggest
imperialist states. In 1970 the capitalist market
accounted for 82 per cent of the PRC's foreign
trade turnover, as compared to only 32 per cent
in 1958. These figures speak for themselves. They
reveal the reorientation of the PRC's economic
ties from the socialist to the capitalist market.
 The USA is experiencing great difficulties in

connection with the continuing war in Vietnam.
It is intensifying its aggression against the
peoples of Indochina and accelerating the
implementation of its ``Vietnamisation'' policy. In doing so
Washington is trying to use the "Peking card,''
and the Maoists are again helping the American
imperialists to find a way out of the Indochina
338
impasse. What is more, Mao Tse-tung and his

group are starting a new wave of anti-Sovietism
to reassure the US rulers about Peking's loyalty.
 The Soviet Union has always opposed the

isolation of PRC and welcomes the establishment of
normal diplomatic relations between China and
other countries as well as the restoration of
China's rights in the UN. It seems that this could
lead to international detente and could make
possible the solution of many major problems and
the safeguarding of world peace.
 Throughout the years the Soviet Union and

other socialist countries have steadfastly
defended the true interests of China as a socialist
country. They have consistently exposed the
imperialist policy of isolating and blockading the
PRC, and have supported the legitimate demands
to restore its rights in the UN by opposing the
"two Chinas" policy.
 Unfortunately, the very first steps of the

Chinese delegation in the UN General Assembly
have shown that the Chinese leadership intends
to continue in the United Nations anti-Sovietism
and its efforts to split the progressive forces. The
two speeches made by the leader of the Chinese
delegation at the General Assembly bear this
out. Peking's obstructive stand on the question
of calling a World Disarmament Conference and
a conference of the five nuclear powers plays right
into the hands of the enemies of peace, says the
Bulgarian newspaper Rabotnichesko Delo. They
are hoping that Peking's cheap demagogy will
influence some Third World countries and that the
imperialists will thus be able to wreck the
Soviet initiatives aimed at establishing peace and
security.
22*
339
 The CPSU and the Soviet Government

consistently support the normalisation of relations
between all countries because this promotes a
general improvement of the international climate. At
the same time, they have always considered that
the development of bilateral relations between
states must not interfere with the interests of
other countries or proceed at their expense. The
policy of improving the entire international
situation is the pivot of the peace programme put
forward by Comrade Leonid Brezhnev in the Report
of the CC CPSU to the 24th Congress, and
endorsed by the Congress. The policy of the CPSU
and the Soviet Government towards China is
inseparably linked with this general programme.
Their objective is to defend the basic interests of
the Soviet people, the purity of Marxist-Leninist
principles, and the ideals of peace, democracy
and communism. The CPSU will never go against
its own principles, against the state interests of
the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries,
or against the world revolutionary process and
the anti-imperialist struggle.
 Recently the Peking leadership has also

changed its strategy in its relations with the socialist
countries. On the one hand, readiness is
expressed to promote interstate relations with the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the
basis of the "five principles of peaceful
coexistence.'' But at the same time, a sixth principle is
added, and this provides for interference into the
internal affairs of the socialist countries and for
"prolonged, irreconcilable, principled struggle.''

 On October 7, 1969, a Chinese Government

statement advanced the following formula:
''. . .Between China and the USSR there are
340
irreconcilable, fundamental differences, and a

principled struggle between them will continue for a
long time. But that should not prevent the
maintenance of normal state relations between China
and the Soviet Union on the basis of the five
principles of peaceful coexistence.'' This formula
was then extended to the PRC's relations with
other socialist countries.
 By proposing this basis for relations with

the USSR and other socialist countries, the
Chinese leadership is not only completely ignoring
the class approach in international affairs, but
also trying to create an international legal ``
basis'' for considering them as non-socialist.
Peking maintains that, apart from China itself, only
Albania is a genuinely socialist state. And what
is more, the Maoists want to exploit
normalisation of state relations with the socialist countries
(which have not adopted the doctrine of Maoism
or approved the "cultural revolution'') in order
to destroy or undermine their system. So although
the Maoists pay lip-service to the five principles
of peaceful coexistence, which include non--
interference in one another's affairs, in actual fact
they are trying to legalise their subversive
activity against the socialist countries and
interference in their internal affairs under the pretext of
waging a "principled struggle.''
 The aims and programme of this struggle are

openly expounded in the directive article, "
Leninism or Social-Imperialism?" It is an attempt
to give "theoretical backing" to the subversion
against the USSR and other socialist countries,
against the Marxist-Leninist parties and the
international collective organisations of the socialist
states-the Council for Mutual Economic
341
Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

Similar aims were expressed by the Chinese
leadership in its publications on the occasion of the
events that took place in Poland in December
1970, in the article of March 18, 1971, marking
the centenary of the Paris Commune, and in the
article of July 1, 1971, on the occasion of the
50th anniversary of the CPC.
 Why is Peking resorting to new stratagems'? It

is aware of its inability to oppose all the socialist
countries at the same time, and to wage a frontal
attack against the socialist community combined
with the international communist movement. So
it decided to employ the strategy expounded in the
articles dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the
CPC and to Mao Tse-tung's speech "On Our
Policy.'' The essence of such strategy is summed up
in what they call "dual tactics.'' In their jargon
this means "fighting spear with spear,'' "
marshalling the forces of active supporters, winning over
the intermediate forces and isolating the chief
adversaries,'' "crushing the enemies singly,'' and
"hitting on the head so that the rest crumbles
down.'' In brief, as the Peking social chauvinists
step up their subversive activity against the
socialist countries, they are trying to take an
individual approach to these countries, carefully
studying the specific situation in each of them and
the state of their relations with the Soviet Union.
Nor is Peking niggardly with its promises of
economic benefits and credits for separate socialist
countries provided they are ``neutral'' in the
major dispute between the international communist
movement and the CPC leaders, and provided
they loosen their ties with the Soviet Union. That
is how the Peking leaders are trying to expand
342
the channels for their ideological penetration of

the socialist countries. They aim to turn them
into an instrument of its policy, and ultimately
to undermine or weaken the unity and might of
the socialist system and isolate the USSR as much
as possible. This line is reminiscent of the "bridge
building" stratagem by means of which
imperialism has long been trying to weaken the unity
of the socialist community and `èrode'' it from
within.
 Besides, there are other benefits which the

Chinese leadership hopes to get by means of its new
strategy. For example, it wants the normalisation
of interstate relations between the PRC and the
socialist countries to be presented as a victory
for the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung" and a
justification of the course charted by the Ninth Congress
of the CPC.
 But something else betrays the treachery of

the Maoist "dual tactics.'' This is that, despite
all the efforts of the fraternal parties, the
Chinese leadership (while proclaiming fictitious
antiimperialist slogans) vigorously opposes unity of
action in the struggle against imperialism. This,
in effect, helps the imperialists in their attempts
to mount a counter-offensive against the
revolutionary movement in one area or another. An
example of this is provided by the events in
Indochina and also by the increasing efforts of
the reactionary forces to undermine the
progressive regimes in a number of Asian, African and
Latin American countries.
 Peking has not only kept its global strategy

against the Soviet Union unchanged, but is
constantly deepening and "theoretically
343
substantiating" it. Having rejected the Marxist assessment

of the major contradictions of today, and the
class conception of the balance of forces in the
world, the Maoist politicians now contend that
the chief contradiction is the one between the
two ``superpowers'' (the USSR and the USA) on
the one hand, and the rest of the world on the
other. The slogan of combating "the hegemony
of the two superpowers" has become the banner
under which the Chinese leadership is trying once
again to build up a bloc consisting of the "small
and medium-sized" states, irrespective of their
socio-economic systems. This slogan is an
extension of the Maoists' anti-Marxist schemes about
the "intermediate zones" and the divisions of all
states into ``rich'' and "poor,'' and is obviously
devised to justify their anti-Soviet policy. Under
the pretext of fighting "the two superpowers,'' the
Maoists are discarding the idea of the
confrontation of the two systems. Instead they equate
socialism and capitalism, and in this way try to
attain hegemony.
 Peking's present foreign policy doctrine

consists, on the one hand, in manoeuvring within
the USSR-USA-Japan-China ``quadrangle''-in
increasing the contradictions between the USSR,
the USA and Japan for the sake of its own
selfish, great-power chauvinist aims; and, on the
other hand, in urging various states (including
developing, capitalist and some socialist ones) to
fight what it calls the "hegemony of the two
superpowers,'' directing their attack mainly
against the Soviet Union-the bulwark of
socialism, world peace and security. Chinese
representatives emphasise that this platform is the basis
for a rapprochement with the PRC, that it is on
344
this basis that China is ready to improve relations

with any country, regardless of its system.
 The Maoist leadership is trying hard to find

allies in the developing countries of Asia,
Africa and Latin America, counting on the nationalist
sentiments and extremist groupings in some of
them. It has begun to step up diplomatic and
economic relations with the developing countries,
using more flexible methods and avoiding blatant
intervention in their internal affairs or open
imposition of Maoist ideas.
 A new feature of Chinese tactics designed to

win the sympathy of the Third World was the
revision in 1970 of the formerly hostile attitude
towards the "movement of the non-aligned
countries" .and the endeavour to subject their interests
to China's hegemonic policy. It is these aims that
prompted the Chinese leadership to capitalise on
the slogan of struggle against "the two
superpowers" and to attempt to separate the Third
World countries from their reliable support in
the anti-imperialist struggle-to separate them
from the Soviet Union and the other socialist
countries.
 Hegemonic aspirations are also the factor that

determines the attitude of the Peking leadership
towards the problem of Indochina. Recent events
are increasingly exposing its strategic goals in
Indochina and its double-dealing policy.
Everything seems to indicate that the Maoists are
intent on strengthening their position in this
region. If we were to uncover the real motive
behind their monoeuvres, it would be plain that
they are meant to show the US rulers that "the
key to the solution of the Indochina problem lies
in Peking,'' and to belittle the importance of the
345
initiatives of the Vietnamese patriots for a

political settlement. This gives the US Administration
the opportunity to ignore the constructive
proposals put forward by the delegation of the South
Vietnam Provisional Revolutionary Government
and fully supported by the Government of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and by the
progressive and peace forces of the world.
 In order to win the confidence of the Arabs

and to strengthen its position in the Middle East,
Peking now prefers not to voice open objections
against a political settlement of the crisis there.
Yet it continues to give active support to the
extremist elements there which oppose any
political settlement.
 The PRC leadership is dead against all the

initiatives of the socialist states for a detente in
Europe. It sharply opposed the Soviet and Polish
agreements with the Federal Republic of
Germany, and the West Berlin talks. Its propaganda
discredits the idea of strengthening European
security and does everything possible to interfere
with efforts to attain this end.
 By opposing the Soviet proposals to hold a

conference of the five nuclear powers and a World
Disarmament Conference, the Chinese
Government has proved itself to be an opponent of
detente.
 Peking is now trying to bring its attitude to

the international communist movement in line
with its new foreign policy strategy. It wants to
counterpose the various anti-Soviet political
forces and revisionist elements of all hues, both Right
and "Left,'' to the tendency towards growing
unity among the communist forces. That is why
the pursuance of the ideals of the working class
346
and of scientific socialism today requires firm

action against all these enemies of Marxism--
Leninism.
 The Moscow Meeting of Communist and

Workers' Parties held in 1969 has crippled the
hegemonic plans of the CPC leaders. Having
completely failed to turn the pro-Chinese groups in
other countries into influential political parties or
to unite them into something resembling an
international trend, the Chinese leadership have
made another attempt to win over individual
communist parties or at least to persuade them
not to make any public criticism of its
ideology and policy. With this aim in view, Chinese
propaganda and official CPC representatives have
concentrated on slandering the CPSU's home and
foreign policies and the situation in the USSR
and the socialist community in front of foreign
Communists. At the same time any pretext is
used to kindle nationalism and anti-Sovietism
among the ranks of the communist movement and
the national-liberation movement.
 In its efforts to subject the revolutionary

movement and the national-liberation drive to its
hegemonic aims. Maoism is managing to confuse
some revolutionaries and trying to direct
struggle, not against the real enemies, but against the
Soviet Union and the communist parties which
are actively defending Marxism-Leninism and the
unity of all revolutionary forces.
 The Maoist strategy can be summed up as

follows: Wherever there is hope of influencing the
leadership of communist parties, the Maoists
readily abandon their own direct supporters,- in
countries where they come up against strong
resistance, they increase their support for the pro--
347
Maoist, break-away groups and "parties,'' spend

large sums on maintaining their network of
political agents, and engage in direct political attacks
on the communist parties in those countries.
 As for the patently pro-Maoist parties, they

have recently been considerably weakened.
Having taken the political course dictated by Peking,
they found themselves in a most awkward
situation. For example, there were some communist
parties whose leadership blindly followed Maoist
dogmas. This led to the serious defeat of the
revolutionary forces in the countries concerned,
while the parties themselves lost contact with the
masses, forfeited worker and peasant support, and
degenerated into conspiratorial sects maintained
by Peking.
 It is characteristic that in fighting the

communist parties of capitalist countries, Peking
even makes use of its contacts with the ruling
bourgeois parties. For example, the Chinese
leaders demanded that representatives of the
Japanese Communist Party should be excluded from
the Parliamentary Association which is trying to
establish diplomatic relations between China and
Japan, and that communist parliamentarians
should not be included in parliamentary
delegations sent to China. That is how the Peking
leadership is taking revenge on the Communist Party
of Japan for its criticism of Maoist adventurism
in the international arena and for its principled
stand towards the notorious "cultural revolution.''
The international policy of the Chinese
leadership has demonstrated that Maoism sharply
conflicts with the anti-imperialist platform
formulated at the International Meeting of June 1969.

 Maoism is one of the most dangerous
348
adversaries of Marxism in the history of the

revolutionary movement. The danger stems largely from the
fact that Maoism is a political practice which
exploits the aspirations of the masses for
socialism and which relies for ideological support on
the eclecticism of "Mao Tse-tung ideas,'' the
political prestige of the Chinese revolution and the
CPC, the state machinery, and the economic,
military and other resources of the world's most
populous country.
 Maoist slogans sometimes find some response

among certain quarters in the Third World and
among young extremists in the capitalist
countries, and are taken up and spread by
opportunists. This is due largely to the fact that the public
in these countries, not knowing the true nature of
Maoism, mistakes the revolutionary rhetoric of
Maoism for a genuine revolutionary spirit and
concern for the interests of the fighting peoples.
But deeper knowledge of Maoism dispels these
illusions and proves it to be basically
incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and scientific
socialism, and with the interests of the struggle for
national liberation.
 The International Meeting of Communist and

Workers' Parties held in 1969 emphasised that
combating the theory and practice of Maoism is
one of the most important internationalist tasks
of all the Marxist-Leninist parties and the world
revolutionary movement.
 In order to expose the anti-Marxist, anti--

Leninist nature of Maoism, it is essential to consider
some of its specific features:
 - Maoism disguises its real essence with

Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary phraseology in order
to deceive the Chinese people, who, because of
349
the existing conditions in the PRC, are unable to

learn about the works and views of the founders
of Marxism-Leninism and so accept Mao's `ìdeas''
as the "pinnacle of Marxist thought;"
 - the Maoists take a purely pragmatical

approach to the question of theory, regarding it as
an instrument for furthering their great-power
policy. The Maoists unscrupulously change their
political declarations and stratagems, according to
the dictates of practical needs and the concrete
situation, but always spearhead the attack against
Marxism-Leninism, the communist movement and
the socialist community, particularly the Soviet
Union. The ideological and political platform of
Maoism is designed to realise the hegemonic
aspirations of the CPC's nationalistic leadership;
 - Maoism's eclecticism makes it manifold. It
is a hotchpotch of `ìdeas'' that can be adapted
to the most diverse needs. That is why "Mao
Tsetung's ideas" suit the ultra-Left "revolutionaries,''
the extremists and Trotskyites, and the Right
opportunists alike. Maoist ideas are utilised by
outright anti-communists and anti-Sovietists such as
Klaus Mehnert, Benjamin Schwartz and Edgar
Snow. Maoism makes active use of the various
anti-communist trends and of revisionism of all
hues to attack scientific socialism.
 The anti-Leninist ideological and political

platform of the Maoists appeared in the late 1950's
and took concrete shape after Peking's extensive
political and ideological campaign against the
CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties.
 Criticism of Maoism should take account of

the great gap existing between Mao's published
articles, which foster the myth that he is an "
outstanding Marxist-Leninist,'' and his actual views.
350
These latter betray themselves in the actual

policy and activity of the present Chinese leadership,
Mao Tse-tung's articles and speeches are
reportedly published after thorough revision, after
"they have been flavoured with Marxism--
Leninism,'' as he himself says. The Maoists
deliberately exploit for their selfish aims the authoritative
ideas of scientific socialism, using them to
conceal the unscientific, anti-Marxist character of the
ideas of the "great helmsman.'' On the other
hand, Mao Tse-tung has adopted many true
postulates regarding the strategy, tactics and
driving forces of the Chinese revolution, having
borrowed them from the documents of the
Communist International and from works by veterans of
the fraternal parties (including some Chinese). It
is the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties,
not Mao Tse-tung, that are to be credited with
the verified conclusions and appraisals
concerning such basic issues as the anti-imperialist and
anti-feudal nature of the Chinese revolution, the
important role in it of the peasantry, the
significance of the revolutionary army and armed
struggle in China, and the tactics of a unified national
front.
 In order to keep "Mao Tse-tung's ideas" "

unrivalled,'' all the works of the well-known
Chinese propagandists of Marxism-Li Ta-chao, Chu
Chiu-po, Teng Chung-hsia, Wang Ming, Chang
Wen-t'ien and others-have been destroyed; some
of these authors are being constantly discredited,
while others are intentionally buried in oblivion.
This enables the Maoists to portray Mao Tse-tung
as the great "theorist, strategist and tactician"
of the Chinese revolution.

 The Maoists are thus giving Mao Tse-tung
351
undeserved credit for elaborating the fundamental

principles regarding the strategy and tactics of
the Chinese revolution, completely ignoring the
decisive role in it of the advice and
recommendation of the Communist International and of the
CPSU's experience. It is essential to distinguish
the `ìdeas'' which really belong to Mao Tse-tung
from the correct precepts on which Maoism is
merely capitalising in order to conceal its own
anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist essence.
 The importance of the struggle against the

theory and practice of Maoism is becoming more
and more obvious today because of the
emergence of a kind of "unified ideological front"
extending from ``Left'' and Right opportunism to
diehard anti-communism. Today the most varied
political forces-the imperialists, Maoists,
nationalists, revisionists of all shades, and bellicose
Zionists-are acting together in a single camp
against Marxist-Leninist teachings, the communist
movement and the socialist community. Mao
Tse-tung and his group, who pose as ultra-"
revolutionaries,'' are actually in alliance with Right
revisionists and undisguised anti-Communists such
as Herbert Marcuse, Milovan Djilas, Klaus
Mehnert, Ernst Fischer and Zbigniew Brzezinsky.
 We often see Western ideologists, disguised as

``defenders'' of humanism and democracy,
systematically accusing the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries of mythical "violations
of democracy and the principles of humanism,''
whitewashing the criminal acts committed by the
Maoists during the "cultural revolution.'' They
depict the cultural revolution as an "outburst of
indignation against bureaucracy,'' as an attempt
to "renovate socialism,'' and as a "search for
352
Asian democracy.'' These ``democrats'' said
nothing when Mao Tse-tung and his adherents dealt
with well-known Chinese writers, actors and
artists and with thousands of Communists and
revolutionaries. They say nothing when the Maoists
exile hundreds of thousands of people to
concentration camps called "labour reformatories" and
persecute intellectuals. Nor have they reacted to
Mao Tse-tung's policy of genocide in Tibet,
Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and South China.
 To strengthen ties with the above-mentioned

anti-Marxist "united front" and slacken the
effectiveness of the principled criticism of the Maoist
order by Marxist-Leninist parties, the Peking
leaders are increasingly issuing invitations to
Western literary men, correspondents and numerous
delegations. For instance, in the autumn of 1970,
the PRC was visited by Edgar Snow, the ``
chronicler'' of Maoism. Peking insistently invites
bourgeois journalists to China and works on them
diligently so they would depict the situation in China
in a way favourable to the Maoists. Chinese
officials have suddenly become very talkative and
great lovers of heart-to-heart discussions over a
cup of tea with American, West German and
Japanese bourgeois journalists, hoping to be
favoured with wide publicity of their views and
their numerous verbal attacks against the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries. It is not
surprising that on returning home these visitors
whitewash the "cultural revolution,'' portraying
it as the "purposeful struggle of the masses.''
 Motivated by time-serving considerations and

a desire to enter into contact with Peking, even
some progressive papers have recently carried
publications playing down the disastrous effect
23--193
353
of the "cultural revolution,'' and describing the

present situation in China as a socialist "
countrywide experiment.'' The authors of these
publications want to create the impression that Chinese
society is undergoing "all-round development"
and that the standard of living of the Chinese
peasant and worker is rising; they compare the
"people's communes" to the agricultural co--
operatives existing in the socialist countries and so
on. But what they call "objective information" is
often just mere repetition of official Maoist
propaganda meant to mislead readers.
 Right opportunists are also trying to form an

alliance with the Maoists in the onslaught against
Marxism-Leninism by making up to Peking and
embellishing its policy and the "cultural
revolution.'' One of the originators of this trend is Roger
Garaudy, expelled from the French Communist
Party for his anti-party activities. In his writings
he presents the theory and practice of Maoism
as a "model of backward socialism" which he
says is the logical product of the development
of Chinese society.
 The ideological battle being waged by the

CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties forces
the Maoists to assume a defensive position,
change their tactics, and adapt themselves to the
new situation. This principled struggle offers
effective moral and political support to the
genuine Communists of China and to those Chinese
people, who are striving to redirect their country
along the socialist path.
 While consistently combating the chauvinist

course of the Maoists, the CPSU is constantly
educating the Soviet people in the spirit of
proletarian internationalism and patriotism. Soviet
354
people have the greatest respect for the Chinese

people and their culture. Despite the anti-Soviet
hysteria in China, the Soviet-Chinese Friendship
Society in the USSR is still functioning actively.
It is in the USSR, and not in China, that the
classics of Chinese literature are being studied and
the works of Lu Hsin, Lao She, Mao Tun, T'an
Han and many other leading Chinese novelists,
playwrights and poets are being widely
published. It was not present-day China, but Moscow,
that celebrated the anniversary of Sun Yat-sen
and held exhibitions of paintings by Hsu Pei-hung,
Chi Pai-shin and other Chinese artists. These facts
serve to expose the Maoist claims that the Soviet
Union conducts "anti-Chinese propaganda.''
 In his address to the International Meeting of

Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow
in 1969, CC CPSU General Secretary Leonid
Brezhnev said: "We do not identify the declarations and
actions of the present Chinese leadership with the
aspirations, wishes and true interests of the
Communist Party of China and the Chinese people.
We are deeply convinced that China's genuine
national renaissance, and its socialist
development, will be best served not by struggle against
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries,
against the whole communist movement, but by
alliance and fraternal cooperation with them.''
 The Soviet stand towards the Chinese People's

Republic was reaffirmed at the 24th Congress of
the CPSU. While consistently following the course
mapped out by the Congress, the Party
continues to be steadfast in exposing the anti-Soviet
policy of the Maoists and their anti-Leninist,
nationalist ideology, and to stave off Peking's
encroachments upon the national interests of the
23*
355
Soviet Union, and upon the unity and cohesion

of the socialist community and the world
revolutionary movement. The CPSU is pursuing a stable
policy of normalising interstate relations between
the USSR and the PRC.
 In its resolution "On the International

Activity of the CC CPSU After the 24th Congress of
the CPSU,'' the November (1971) Plenum of the
CC CPSU affirmed that the "Politbureau is
consistently pursuing the policy of the 24th Congress
in relations with the Chinese People's Republic.''
The Plenum expressed "complete agreement with
the Politbureau's position in resolving the
relevant practical questions,'' and noted with
satisfaction that "the foreign policy course of the CC
CPSU enjoys the full understanding and
unanimous support of all Communists and the entire
Soviet people. Therein lies the main strength of the
CPSU's international policy.''
 The situation today and the present onslaught

of the Chinese leadership against Marxism--
Leninism, and against the unity of the Marxist--
Leninist parties and of the socialist countries, urgently
demand still greater efforts in all areas of the
ideological struggle against Maoism, so that
peace, democracy and socialism may triumph.
 Kommnnist, No. 7, 1971
[356]
__ALPHA_LVL2__
The Foreign Policy
 of the People's
 Republic of China Since
 the 9th Congress
 of the Communist Party of China
 D. Vostokov
 Since the 9th CPC Congress (April 1969) the

PRC's foreign policy has not only retained its
nationalistic character, but its great-power,
chauvinistic essence and its break with the principles
of socialist internationalism are making
themselves more deeply and clearly felt.
 This has been shown in the decisions of the

September 1970 2nd Plenary Meeting of the
CPC CC as well as in the PRC's 1970--71 foreign
policy activity. The 2nd Plenary Meeting called
on the Party and the army resolutely to
implement Mao Tse-tung's line and directives and to
accomplish the tasks set by the 9th Congress.
Thus, anti-Sovietism and subversive actions
within the socialist community and the international
communist movement as well as the striving for
a rapprochement with imperialist states were
confirmed as the PRC's long-term official foreign
policy. By pursuing an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist
policy Peking wants to compensate the Western
states for their aid in the development of China's
economy, as well as for helping it to carry out
its great-power designs of turning China into a
357
state capable of realising its territorial claims on

the Soviet Union, and of bringing under its
influence the neighbouring states in East and
SouthEast Asia.
 The striving to reach an agreement with

imperialism on an anti-Soviet basis and to exti'icate
China from the international isolation in which
the country found itself in the course of the "
cultural revolution,'' has forced Peking to make
certain changes in its foreign policy tactics, and to
exercise some flexibility in attaining its
greatpower aspirations. The Chinese leaders have now
dampened down the propaganda of ultra-``Leftist''
slogans of a "people's war" and the utmost
aggravation of international tension which they had
earlier passed for effective means of stimulating
the revolutionary situation in the world. Now
they pose as proponents of a detente and
peaceful coexistence. At the same time, they are hastily
establishing diplomatic relations with other
countries.
 The changes in Peking's tactics are due to a

number of setbacks in its foreign and home
policy. These include:
 -- the futile attempts to split the socialist

community and international communist movement.
The Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers'
Parties (1969) showed that the communist parties
condemned the "special course" and splitting
tactics of the Peking leaders; 
 -- the abortive plans to use the liberation

movement of the developing countries and the
progressive democratic movement in the capitalist
countries for its own great-power, chauvinistic
purposes by means of pseudo-revolutionary
demagogy;
358
 -- Peking's international isolation resulting

from its subversive activity and interference in
other countries' affairs as well as its attempts to
provoke armed clashes and local wars, with
China herself taking no part in them. This isolation
has become especially pronounced during the
"cultural revolution" since the Chinese leaders
introduced methods of hungweipings' violence
and armed pressures into diplomatic practice and
international relations ;
 -- the poor state of Chinese economy and low

rates of its development caused by the recent
events of the "cultural revolution" and
militarisation, unavailing attempts to rely on small
industries and primitive means of production, and the
politically motivated curtailment of economic
relations with the USSR and the other socialist
countries.
 At the same time, despite the defeat of the

opposition and establishment of a military--
bureaucratic dictatorship, the political situation in China
is characterised by political instability which
forces the Peking leaders to stabilise the regime at
any cost, in order to consolidate it and
implement their strategic great-power, chauvinistic
schemes.
 The concentration of power in the hands of a
small group of leaders, the reliance on special
army units, the suppression of the opposition, and
the liquidation of the democratic institutions in
the state and the Party offer favourable
conditions for arbitrariness in foreign policy, for a
collusion with imperialism on the basis of
deepening and strengthening the anti-Soviet line and
the tactical renunciation of the ultra-``Leftist''
slogans, as well as curtailing or, at least,
359
camouflaging their ties with the ``Left'' extremist

pettybourgeois elements in capitalist countries.
 Peking's new tactics show that it has become

the Trojan horse of imperialism in the
international revolutionary movement, this forming the
essence of the intensified diplomatic flirting now
taking place between China and the imperialist
countries headed by the USA.
 In the new situation, the diplomacy of the

People's Republic of China seeks to ensure a
favourable attitude to the Peking regime on the
part of a maximum number of states, the
capitalist states, in the first place, without affecting
the Maoist great-power, chauvinistic course.
 The following are some of the concrete features

which characterise the new stage in Peking's
policy:
 -- an active struggle for wide international

recognition;
 -- restoration of the PRC's rights in the United

Nations including its permanent membership in
the Security Council;
 -- ensuring aid from imperialist states aimed

at an accelerated economic, scientific,
technological and military development of China.
 These trends of the PRC's foreign policy have

manifested themselves in numerous acts by the
Chinese Government in the international arena.
Peking is increasingly seeking to conceal its
participation in the activity of the pro-Maoist groups
in the revolutionary and liberation movement. In
the "Third World" Peking has begun to establish
contacts with pro-Western regimes.
 The resumption of contacts with the United
States in the beginning of 1971 and the attempts
to enter into relations with it on the basis of
360
renouncing the struggle against imperialism are

directly linked with what has now become an
important component part of Peking's foreign
policy and a new stage in the PRC's foreign policy.
The Maoists have been playing on the
contradictions between the two world systems in order
to gain time, accumulate strength and prepare the
internal and external conditions for establishing
the People's Republic of China as the "third
global" power. To accomplish this task the Chinese
leaders have elaborated and used the "two
superpowers" concept which they have made the core
of their foreign policy since the 9th CPC
Congress. Today the Peking regime is striving to win
world-wide support for its hegemonistic aims by
resorting to the slogan of uniting the "medium
and small" countries and by manipulating with
anti-Soviet and anti-American catchwords.
 At the same time, the Peking regime is

continuing to build up its nuclear-missile potential,
although this task is far from being completed.
However, the very possibility of such a
development is already of some political significance since
it enables the Chinese leaders to pursue a
geopolitical course in international relations.
 Although Peking has formally retained the two

main interconnected components-anti-Sovietism,
as the major course of the foreign policy, and
anti-Americanism-in its ideological, political and
propaganda arsenal the latter component has
finally degenerated into nationalistic doctrine which,
owing to the objective historical conditions,
sometimes coincides with the struggle waged by
progressive forces against imperialism. Anti--
Americanism has been assigned the role of bringing
pressure to bear in the bargaining which Mao
361
Tse-tung and his followers are carrying on with

US imperialism for a recognition of their
chauvinistic global claims, especially in East and
SouthEast Asia.
 The flirtation with imperialism and

simultaneous pursuit of an anti-Soviet policy compel the
Chinese leaders to cooperate with imperialist
governments in some world affairs, as a result
of which the PRC may be drawn into the orbit
of imperialism's international relations and
therefore China is in danger of becoming politically
and economically dependent upon the developed
capitalist countries.
 At the same time, the foreign policy of the

Peking regime, particularly in the "Third World"
countries, continues to retain its petty-bourgeois
radical component. In their struggle for
hegemony in the world revolutionary and liberation
movement the Chinese leaders, orienting
themselves on the nationalistic elements prevailing in
some sections of the anti-imperialist front, are
seeking, by means of the "two superpowers"
concept, to place nationalism at the service of
their anti-Soviet policies.
 In the beginning of 1971, the Chinese

leadership for the first time responded positively to the
initiative of the US Government which since 1963
had repeatedly proposed to normalise US-Chinese
relations. Although the Chinese leadership
retained and even developed some forms of relations
with the United States on various levels and,
according to some sources, was even willing in
1964 to receive President Johnson in the People's
Republic of China despite its anti-American
propaganda, all the proposals made by the USA on
extending contacts and establishing them
362
officially were ostentatiously and categorically rejected.
 This attitude of the PRC Government towards

the US proposals was determined by a number of
factors, primarily the absence of internal
political conditions in China for a serious
modification of its foreign policy. Of some significance
also was the inconsistency of the Johnson
Administration which, while improving its relations
with the Mao regime and trying to apply the
``bridge-building'' concept to the PRC, heeded the
ultra-Right opposition and adhered to its military
and political commitments to the Chiang Kai-shek
regime. The subsequent events showed that the
US-Chinese rapprochement was hindered by the
fact that the new Administration which followed
that of President Johnson continued the
escalation of war in Indochina and committed
aggressive acts against the DRV and Laos in the
immediate proximity to the Chinese borders.
 Taking into account the fresh elements in

international affairs-armed provocations by the
Peking regime on the Soviet-Chinese borders, the
shift of the PRC Government to a new diplomacy
after the "cultural revolution,'' the futility of the
US Government's attempts to prevent the
diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of
China by the US allies in NATO-and the change
in the mood of the American voters with respect
to the war in Vietnam, the US Republican
Administration, nevertheless, went much further in its
relations with the PRC than its predecessors.
 The new Administration took some unilateral

measures aimed at normalising the US-Chinese
relations. To begin with, it relaxed the embargo
on trade with the PRC. This resulted in the
restoration of the US-Chinese trade relations (in
363
1970---3.5 million dollars' worth), the US

Government granting licences to overseas branches of
US companies to sell to the PRC such
commodities as the General Motors Corporation lorry
engines, excavating machines, pharmaceutical goods,
rubber, etc. Subsequently, in striving to stimulate
the restoration of relations, the US Government
lifted all restrictions on exports of non-strategic
goods to the PRC, while retaining the embargo
on the trade with the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, the Korean People's Democratic
Republic, and Cuba.
 Moreover, the US 7th Fleet ceased patrolling

the Taiwan Strait and the US reconnaissance planes
discontinued their flights over the PRC territory.
The USA changed its position regarding China's
entry to the UN.
 On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung and his

followers, who since 1964--65 have tried covertly to
improve the Chinese-American relations, could
overtly meet the US ``bridge-building'' policy
halfway only under certain conditions, i.e., when
the establishment of a military-bureaucratic
dictatorship as a result of the "cultural revolution"
dispelled their apprehensions that the anti--
popular policy of rapprochement with the US
imperialism would consolidate the anti-Maoist opposition
and undermine the already unstable status of the
Mao Tse-tung group inside China.
 Under these conditions, the unilateral measures
taken by the US Government served their
purpose. They made it possible to conduct secret
negotiations with representatives of the Peking
regime with the result that the State Department
abrogated the need for special entry permits for
US citizens wishing to visit the People's Republic
364
of China, these permits formerly being regarded

by the Chinese Government as discriminatory.
An agreement was also reached to invite on this
basis US public and press representatives as the
first step in developing bilateral contacts. Soon
after this restriction had been annulled, the US
pingpong team which had participated in the world
championship games in Japan was invited to
China and the first US newsmen were granted
permission to enter the country. In April 1971,
the American athletes and journalists arrived in
China thus inaugurating a new stage in the
USChinese relations.
 In addition to public contacts, secret

negotiations were held on a governmental level. H.
Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, during his official visit to
Pakistan, secretly flew to Peking where he stayed
from July 9 to 11, 1971, and had talks with
Premier of the State Council of the PRC Chou En-lai.
On July 16, it was declared in Washington and
Peking that US President R. Nixon had been
invited to visit the People's Republic of China at
his convenience before May 1972; the invitation
was accepted. In his TV address Nixon,
explaining the reasons for his future visit, stated that the
new relations which the US Administration was
establishing with the PRC were not directed
against any other country.
 World progressive opinion, however, expressed

doubt as to the selfless character of the
normalisation that had begun in the relations between
the United States and the People's Republic of
China. These relations can become an important
factor of peace only if they reflect positive changes
in the policy pursued by the two powers, such
365
as taking realistic positions on peaceful

coexistence with other countries, and their renunciation
of political manoeuvring directed against other
states. There are quite a few facts, however, which
warrant no such conclusion.
 US imperialism has not as yet ceased its

aggressive war in Indochina. The US Government
has given no answer to the peaceful initiative of
the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of South Vietnam-the seven-point
proposal. As for the PRC's stand on the Vietnam
issue, Chou En-lai who, in his lenghty interview
with James Reston, The New York Times observer,
made public the principles of the PRC's foreign
policy, did not support the demand of the DRV
Government to fix the date of the US troops
withdrawal from Vietnam and did not even mention
the date the PRC wishes the US troops to be
withdrawn from Taiwan.
 The PRC's policy on other international issues

coincides with the aggressive course of US
imperialism. The Peking regime sought to utilise
the Middle East situation resulting from the
Israeli aggression against the Arab countries to
discredit Soviet foreign policy, and tried to
intensify the Soviet-American contradictions in that
area. At the same time the Chinese leaders and
US imperialism came out in support of the
counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and
attempted to profit from the difficulties which arose
in the Polish People's Republic in 1970. The
Chinese leaders played into the hands of NATO's
global strategists by creating a hotbed of tension
on the Chinese-Soviet borders.
 Far from being peaceful are also the policy of

building up the nuclear-missile potential, the
366
constant opposition to a detente, and the negative

attitude towards collective security measures,
while the urge to replace a genuine detente by
foreign policy stratagems makes the policy
pursued by Peking leaders similar to that of US
imperialism.
 These facts have led progressive people

throughout the world to the conclusion that the
true reasons for the rapprochement between the
Chinese leadership and US imperialism are to be
found in the homogeneity of their present foreign
policy interests. On the one hand, US imperialism
is clearly striving to weaken the influence of
socialism and to gain control over the vast zone of
the "Third World" in the face of the growing
tendency towards complete national and social
emancipation; on the other hand, the Peking regime
is making no less overt the attempt to secure the
position of the "world's third superpower" and
to use it for the purpose of attaining its territorial
claims and hegemonistic designs.
 The policy of the US-Chinese rapprochement

recently manifested itself in new facts. At the end
of October H. Kissinger made his second voyage
to Peking and had lengthy talks with Chou
Enlai. The foreign press reported that these talks
covered not only the protocol and the programme
of the US President's forthcoming visit, but also
some specific problems that are to be discussed
during the negotiations.
 It was no accident that Kissinger made his visit

to Peking at the time when the General Assembly
of the United Nations was considering the
question of restoring the PRC's rights in this
international organisation. The resolution to admit the
367
PRC to the UN and to expel the Chiang Kai-shek

representatives was passed by a majority vote.
 The progressive forces all over the world are

hoping that the normalisation of relations
between the PRC and the USA will not result in
increased tension and deterioration in
international affairs. As A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the
USSR Council of Ministers, said to the newsmen
in Canada in an interview on October 20, 1971,
concerning the Chinese-American negotiations, it
is important that they should lead to a peaceful
settlement of issues, to a relaxation of world
tension. This undoubtedly also pertains to all spheres
of the PRC's activity in the international arena
in connection with the possibilities of its
extension after the admittance of the PRC to the UN.
 Without modifying their major strategic aims,

the Chinese leaders in 1970--71 were vigorously
changing their tactics with regard to the
national liberation movement as well as the interstate
relations with the developing Asian, African and
Latin American countries. Their entire
international activity at that period was aimed at
restoring and increasing the Third World countries'
confidence in China as a force independent of the
"two superpowers.''
 In their foreign policy activity in the Third

World countries, the Chinese leaders have again
resorted to the principles and formulas of the
Bandung Conference and the methods of the "
popular diplomacy" for the extension of all-round
contacts with many countries regardless of their
political orientation. China has been restoring her
membership in international bodies and becoming
more active in local branches of various societies.
The PRC has not only returned its ambassadors
368
to a number of Afro-Asian countries but has also

considerably moderated its own terms for
establishing diplomatic relations in the last two
years, so that today it suffices for a developing
country to recognise the PRC Government as "the
only legitimate government of China,'' without
completely disrupting relations with Taiwan. The
PRC has recently established official diplomatic
relations with a number of countries, including
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the
Cameroons, Sierra Leone, Kuwait, Iran, Chile, Peru, the
Lebanon and Rwanda.
 China's diplomatic penetration into Latin

America also betrays the PRC's new tactics. Peking
is continuing to intensify its efforts to extend its
official relations with countries in Asia, Africa
and Latin America.
 Of late, Chinese propaganda has been

changing its accents in the "Third World.'' There now
appear fresh catchwords and concepts designed
to camouflage the opportunism of the Peking
leaders and their departure from the anti--
imperialist struggle as well as, consequently, to retain the
possibility of struggling for the hegemony of the
PRC as the sole uniting and guiding force in the
Third World. As a matter of fact, Chinese ``
antiimperialism'' has become idle talk which, as was
recently emphasised by the Arab press, serves
only as a "serious warning" to Washington. 
AlAhbar wrote: "The revolutionary phrase--
mongering cannot conceal the bargaining of the Peking
leaders with US imperialism.''
 In keeping with this position, the Maoists'

tactics in the national-liberation movement of the
three continents substantially changed in 1970--
71. While actually continuing to sabotage the
24--193
369
cause of the peoples' anti-imperialist struggle,

Peking has endeavoured to normalise its
relations with pro-imperialist forces. True, in 1971
the Chinese press continued to extol the ``
successes'' of the small and uncoordinated Peking--
directed groups which exert no influence on the
course of the real anti-imperialist struggle waged
by the peoples of that region. But that was only
lip-service to Peking's ostentatious "anti--
imperialism.''
 Moreover, in order to attain its nationalistic

aspirations and, for this purpose, to dispel the
mistrust with which the governments of a number
of Third World countries regarded Peking in
1966--68, the Chinese leaders, under the guise of
so-called double revolutionary tactics, simply
betray the forces which they supported before. For
instance, in 1971, China abandoned the Ceylon
``Left'' putchist forces which she herself had
inspired. The Maoists also acted improperly in
relation to East Pakistan.
 Seeking to use Pakistan as its major "strong

point" in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean
area, and playing on the contradictions between
Pakistan and India, Peking also made some
peaceable gestures to India in 1971, although its true
aims are in no way concerned with the interests
of the two countries.
 Peking uses a similar tactic in the Middle East.

According to Arab public opinion, the Chinese
leaders instigated the September 1970 events in
Jordan which led to the defeat of the Palestine
organisations. In 1971 the Peking leaders were
still interested in keeping this conflict unsettled,
although they no longer talked about it openly.
The Maoists continued to propagate their bellicose
370
principles and to declare their support for the

liberation struggle of the people of Palestine, but,
at the same time, ceased their sharp attacks
against the peaceful settlement plan, thus
playing a double game with the Palestine resistance
movement and the fighting Arab countries. The
Chinese leaders unhesitatingly declared that they
"had lost their confidence in the Palestine
guerrillas and do not intend to support them in the
future.'' All this hardly agrees with the
statement made by Chou En-lai in September 1971, to
the effect that "China does not sell her principles
and does not betray her comrades-in-arms.''~^^1^^
 Peking's course aimed at consolidating China's

positions to the full in countries of socialist
orientation (Burma, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Tanzania,
Zambia, Guinea, the Congo-Brazzaville) is a new
feature of her foreign policy tactics in the Third
World. While widely spreading in these
countries their version about the two "superpowers,''
the Maoists hope to undermine these progressive
nations' confidence in the USSR, to discredit the
Soviet Union's foreign policy and even its
efficient economic assistance. Thus, the Chinese
leaders mean not only to weaken the ties between the
Third World and the socialist countries but
also to completely disunite them and become a
leading force there.
 To attain this goal, Peking has changed its

formerly negative attitude to the idea of
nonalignment. Today the Chinese leaders seek to turn
it against the USSR as one of the "superpowers"
_-_-_
~^^1^^ Chou En-lai's interview to the Director of the Mexican

Excelsior newspaper, September 5, 1971.
24*
371
and hope to utilise the non-aligned countries in

their great-power designs.
 The PRC's economic policy in the Third

World has also suffered some changes. There is
a clear tendency to increase the number of states
receiving Chinese aid, as well as the amount of
this aid. The countries of socialist orientation have
always been China's chief contractors in the
development of her economic cooperation with the
Third World countries (Tanzania, Zambia,
Guinea, the Congo-Brazzaville, and Mali were
receiving Chinese aid even during the "cultural
revolution''). In 1970--71, the People's Republic of China
concluded a number of new agreements on
economic and technical cooperation with the Arab
Republic of Egypt, the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen, Sudan, Mali, Somalia, Ceylon,
and Mauritania. By the beginning of 1971, the
countries of socialist orientation accounted for
about 60 per cent of the total Chinese aid to the
Third World and for most of the enterprises
actually built.
 The changes in Peking's tactics in Africa since

the 9th CPC Congress have been directly
connected with the fact that the genuine
nationalliberation movements had rejected China's claims
to the leadership of the revolutionary forces and
had consolidated their ties with the socialist
countries, the Soviet Union in particular. At the
same time, the pro-Maoist groups and
organisations have discredited themselves, lost their links
with the people, and have become overt enemies
of the African revolutionary-democratic forces.
 In an attempt to restore their positions in the

African national-liberation movement, the Chinese
leaders have of late attached special importance
372
to the struggle of the peoples of Southern Africa

and the Portuguese colonies, and ceased the gross
imposition of their views and concepts on the
revolutionary forces.
 Striving to restore the contacts with the

revolutionary-democratic organisations in the South
of Africa, the Chinese leaders are very reluctant
to curtail their relations with the Pan-African
Congress, the South-West Africa National Union and
other pro-Maoist groups on the dependent
territories, obviously hoping to retain and continue
to use them in their hegemonistic policy. Peking
maintains particularly close ties with the National
Union for the Complete Independence of Angola
the leadership of which at its 2nd Congress (1970)
openly supported China on all issues.
 In the national-liberation movement of Africa,

as also in other areas, Peking has been employing
the "double revolutionary tactics.'' This also
applies to the pro-Maoist organisations and groups
which have become an obstacle to the Peking
broad diplomatic offensive in Africa. Thus, the
Chinese leaders ceased supporting the pro-Maoist
groups in the Cameroons and the Zaire Republic.
Since the end of 1969, the CPC's leadership has
discontinued its support of the opposition
organisations in Botswana (the Botswana People's
Party), Swaziland (the Swaziland Progressive
Party), and Lesotho (the Lesotho Congress Party).
 The unscrupulous but more flexible policy of

the Chinese leaders is directed towards the same
old goal, i.e., achieving hegemony in the national
liberation movement, and weakening its union
with the socialist countries, and the international
communist and working-class movement.
 The major task of the Chinese leadership in
373
Latin America today is the development of

interstate relations. Peking has vigorously striven for
recognition by Latin American governments. Here
the Chinese leaders stand on overtly anti-Soviet
positions and endeavour to activate the Maoist
groups. At the same time, they are trying to
undermine the revolutionary movement from
within and to impose upon it their ideological
and organisational leadership. Thus, Peking is
striving to neutralise the crisis consequences and
the discontent in Latin American pro-Chinese
groups that resulted from the changes in the
foreign policy tactics of the Chinese leadership,
in particular its flirting with US imperialism.
 The CPC's leadership attaches special

importance to the development of economic and trade
relations with Latin American countries. In
AprilMay 1971, the PRC government trade delegation
visited Chile and Peru and, for the first time in
the history of Chinese-Latin American relations
(except Cuba), signed trade agreements and a
protocol. In mid-June 1971, a Peruvian trade
delegation, as well as Gavier Tantalean Vanini, Peru
Minister of Fishing, visited Peking. A trade
protocol was signed, the People's Republic of China
committing itself to purchase 150,000--200,000
tons of fish flour, 20,000 tons of fish oil, 35,000--
40,000 tons of copper, 10,000 tons of lead and
10,000 tons of zinc before the end of 1972. The
two countries decided to exchange trade
representations.
 Trade relations are also developing between

the PRC and Ecuador. The press reported talks
on China's purchases of bauxites and aluminium
in Guyana. Eliseo Berruato, Mexican
DeputySecretary for Industry and Commerce, expressed
374
himself in favour of extending trade ties with the

PRC.
 The change in the attitude of a number of

proAmerican governments in Latin America towards
China is also closely connected with the increased
US-Chinese contacts in 1971. The representatives
of these Latin American countries' big capital will
obviously attempt to make large profits in the
Chinese market.
 Since the "cultural revolution" the PRC's

diplomatic activity has extended, first and foremost,
to the Western capitalist countries which Peking
regards as a global force that has common
political interests with China. The Chinese leadership
attaches great importance to establishing ties with
European capitalist countries on the basis of
"consolidating all forces against the hegemony of
the two ``superpowers'' and thus seeks partly to
solve the PRC's political and economic problems
through cooperation with the West; it also wants
to use Europe as a means of pressure on the USA
and the USSR.
 Having advanced the theory of "small and

medium" countries, the Peking leaders regard
Great Britain, France, the FRG and other Western
countries as victims of the pressure exerted by
the ``superpowers'' and, ignoring the class essence
of capitalism, they are actually willing to regard
them as not belonging to the imperialist system.
 By advocating the slogan of a Europe

competing with the ``superpowers'' the Chinese leaders
share the common `ìdeological'' principles of
bourgeois nationalism and endeavour to use them
for a rapprochement with the capitalist countries.
On the basis of this, the PRC won its recognition
by some European states and established
375
diplomatic relations with Italy, San Marino, Austria,

Turkey and Belgium in 1970--71. It is
characteristic that the NATO leaders do not object to
recognition of the PRC. Nearly half the members
of this aggressive organisation have established
diplomatic relations with the PRC and are
developing economic contacts. The Chinese press, in
its turn, has practically ceased criticising the
NATO aggressive bloc.
 In extending their relations with developed

capitalist states, the PRC's leaders seek to utilise
the Western economic, scientific and technical
potential for the purpose of obtaining strategic
goods and technical assistance in building
military objects.
 Thus, in the PRC's foreign contacts imperialist

powers have actually replaced the socialist
countries with whom the Chinese leaders have
curtailed their economic relations. The capitalist
world has become China's major supplier of plant
equipment (including military equipment). In the
last seven years, British, West German, French,
Italian and other companies have signed
contracts with the PRC's foreign trade bodies for the
delivery of 300 million dollars' worth of
equipment for 43 industrial enterprises, including 18
chemical, four oil-refining, ten engineering and
five steel manufacturing plants.
 The trip of the PRC's economic delegation

headed by the Foreign Trade Minister, Bai
Sianko, to the West European countries in
SeptemberNovember 1971 attests the PRC's intentions to
strengthen its ties with the capitalist world.
 Considering the interest displayed by the

Peking regime in establishing all-round contacts
with the West, the governments and the
376
reactionary circles in some NATO countries hope to use

China as an anti-Soviet force. Great Britain and
the FRG's reactionary elements in particular
being obviously eager to create a military complex
in China directed against the USSR.
 Their common stand also makes itself felt in

the questions pertaining to the relaxation of
tension and the creation of a collective security
system in Europe. The struggle waged by the USSR
and other socialist countries for a detente,
establishment of a European security system based
on recognition of the territorial status quo in
Europe, and for convocation of an all-European
conference meets with stubborn resistance of the
Chinese leadership and the reactionary forces in
the NATO countries, primarily the revanchists
in the FRG. Striving to provoke conflict situations
between the USSR and the USA, the Chinese
leadership attempts to hinder a detente in Europe
and to retain possibilities for bringing pressure to
bear on the USSR from the West. The Chinese
leaders regard a detente in Europe as dangerous
to their strategic plans.
 The Peking regime sharply condemned the

Soviet-West German treaty of August 12, 1970.
Peking alleged that the treaty was a "betrayal of
the interests of the German people, the Soviet
people and the peoples of the whole of Europe"
and declared that the Soviet Union had given to
West Germany "tacit consent to annex the GDR.''
Thus, the Chinese leaders' stand with respect to
the Soviet-West German treaty objectively
merged with that of the most reactionary forces of
West German imperialism who, in their turn,
described the treaty as a "provocation against
China.''
377
 The rather frank statement of Huang Chen, the

Chinese Ambassador to Paris, is typical of the
Chinese leaders' attitude to the problems of
European security. On November 5, 1970, speaking
in Paris on the occasion of the Italy-PRC mutual
diplomatic recognition, he said: "We Chinese are
against the Soviet proposal to convene an
allEuropean security conference. By this, the Soviet
Union wants to oust the Americans from Europe
so that it may bring greater pressure to bear on
China and to fetter its satellites more than ever
before. The agreement between Bonn and Moscow
helps the USSR to implement its plans.''
 The present-day foreign policy of the Chinese

leadership is characterised by a "flexible line"
aimed at a rapprochement not only with the USA
but also with Japan, the sharp criticism of the
Sato Government by the Peking leaders
notwithstanding. After the November 1969 Japanese-US
talks which had demonstrated a consolidation of
their imperialist efforts in Asia, as well as their
anti-Chinese stance, Chinese propaganda brought
to the forefront the theme of struggle against
Japanese militarism.
 In the propaganda speeches of Chinese leaders,

Japanese militarism is increasingly mentioned as
the chief enemy of the people alongside the two
"superpowers.'' However, the Chinese leaders are
developing contacts with Japan in practically all
spheres, and their relations with the Japanese
ruling Liberal-Democratic Party have become
very active. Despite the fact that the Sato
Government has not responded to Peking's far-reaching
proposals made in the 1960s, the Chinese leaders
have not abandoned their hopes and efforts of
striking a bargain with the Japanese ruling
378
quartcrs on the nationalistic, anti-Soviet basis which

they had proclaimed earlier.
 It is but natural that in their relations with the

Mao Tse-tung group, Japanese imperialists take
into account its anti-Sovietism and subversive
activities against the democratic forces of Japan,
as well as the opportunity to utilise
JapaneseChinese contacts to bring pressure to bear on the
USA. At the same time, the Japanese Government
continues to consolidate its imperialist efforts in
Asia and to extend its economic and political
penetration into Taiwan. Under the conditions of
the escalation of the US aggression in Vietnam,
the Japanese Government stopped using the
funds of the Export-Import Bank of Japan for
financing deliveries of complete sets of equipment
to China. It also exercises stricter control over
the exports and even the exposition in the PRC
(at the Japanese industrial fairs) of non--
commercial samples of goods regarded as strategic.
 While further consolidating and extending its

military-political alliance with the USA, the
Japanese Government has agreed overtly to include
Taiwan, Vietnam, and South Korea in the sphere
of the "security treaty.'' Moreover, it has
demonstrated its readiness to see to it that the
status quo in the Taiwan problem be preserved.
Thus, Japan is increasingly more frankly
claiming leadership in Asia in union with and aided
by the United States.
 Having failed, by means of nationalistic and

anti-Soviet flirting with Japan's ruling quarters,
to mitigate the anti-Chinese stance of her
militarypolitical alliance with the USA and to gain access
to Japanese investments and technology, the
Chinese leadership increased its pressure on Japan
379
and started severely criticising the Sato

Government, at the same time activating its relations
with the opposition, the so-called pro-Chinese
elements of the Liberal-Democratic Party. The
Chinese leaders are blackmailing Japan's ruling
circles with the possibly anti-Japanese trend of
the newly-emerging Chinese-US rapprochement.
They demonstrate to the Japanese ruling circles
their blatant anti-Sovietism and solidarity on
the "Northern territories" issue, the solidarity on
which Japan may allegedly rely in bringing
pressure to bear on the Soviet Union.
 At the same time, a very specific feature may

be traced in Peking's growing criticism of the
Japanese reactionaries and militarists. This
criticism increasingly' boils down to attacks against
the activity of the present government making it
possible to use it as a kind of a smoke-screen for
the purpose of hiding the actually growing
political ties with the Japanese ruling quarters as a
whole. The so-called pro-Chinese opposition
within the Liberal-Democratic Party, the opposition
whose mood, alongside the racial-nationalistic
"flexibility,'' is characterised by overt anti--
Sovietism and revanchism, speaks on behalf of these
quarters. The Chinese leaders persistently seek to
present it as a progressive, anti-imperialist force
with which a mutual understanding would be
tantamount to a unification of the Asian peoples'
efforts in their struggle against the US-Japanese
reactionaries.
 In the joint communiques with the above--

mentioned LDP representatives (at the annual
negotiations in Peking on the trade with the big
Japanese capitalists), the Chinese leadership shows its
full accord with them on a number of key
380
international issues which do not only relate to the

Chinese-Japanese relations. Although the
Japanese side represents the upper stratum of the
Japanese monopoly bourgeoisie's ruling party, at
the trade talks it makes vigorous attempts to
dissociate itself from the Sato Government foreign
policy. It expresses an `ùnderstanding'' of China's
stand on a number of world issues, for instance,
that the new interpretation of the Japanese--
American "security treaty" has turned it into a more
harmful military alliance directed against the
Chinese and other Asian peoples; that the
Japanese reactionaries have become a major supporter
of US imperialism and the vanguard in the
struggle against the peoples of Asia; that the
USJapanese reactionaries seek to perpetuate the
occupation of Taiwan and South Korea and the split
of Vietnam; and that in Japan, the revival of
militarism has become a reality.
 Moreover, the placemen of the Japanese

monopoly circles, who reflect the interests of the
monopoly section which, pursuing its own
imperialist aims with respect to Asia, including China,
are inclined to be less dependent on the USA,
even declare their resolve to oppose the revival
of Japanese militarism.
 The Chinese leaders also seek to build their

relations with the democratic forces of Japan on
an anti-Soviet basis. It is well-known that the
``revolutionary'' activity of the Peking leaders in
Japan during the "cultural revolution" resulted
in increased dissociation of the country's
democratic forces and weakening of some of its
contingents. This service rendered to the Japanese
ruling quarters can hardly be overestimated. The
Japanese-American "security treaty" was to
381
expire in June 1970, and a fierce struggle was waged

between the US-Japanese reactionaries, on the
one hand, and the progressive forces, on the
other, to determine the country's further course.
The cherished hope of the US and Japanese
imperialist circles was to weaken the stand of the
progressive forces and their pressure, and to
attain this aim these imperialists had exerted a
great deal of effort.
 Objectively, Peking was acting in the same

vein. The obviousness of this fact forced the
Peking leaders somewhat to modify the wording of
the thesis of struggle against the "four enemies"
which they had been imposing on the Japanese
democratic forces, although the essence of this
thesis remained unaffected. Anti-Sovietism and
subversive actions against the Communist Party
of Japan remain the core of the Chinese leaders'
activity in the democratic movement of Japan.
 All this goes to show that, despite the changes

in their tactical principles, and peaceable
verbiage, the foreign policy of the Maoists has not
altered its essence and remains nationalistic and
adventurist. The Chinese leaders continue acting
on the strength of their anti-socialist propositions
aimed at winning a leading status in the world
by pursuing an anti-Soviet policy, carrying on
subversive activity in the socialist community
and the world communist and democratic
movement; they are increasingly developing contacts
with imperialist states, particularly with the USA,
and are endeavouring to use the Third World
countries as an instrument of achieving their
great-power chauvinistic aims.
 Meanwhile the restoration of the PRC's rights

in the United Nations that was advocated by the
382
USSR, which has always defended, as a matter

of principle, the interests of the Chinese people
and China as a great power, offers the PRC fresh
opportunities in international relations. Today it
is becoming increasingly evident that only a
policy based on socialist principles can really
protect China's national interests and give the
Chinese people a chance to concentrate their efforts
on socialist construction as well as to restore the
genuine prestige of the PRC in the international
arena.
 Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, No. 12, 1971
[383]
__ALPHA_LVL0__
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<•> Questions Requiring an Answer 242
CONCERNING THE US-CHINA TOP-LEVEL

TOC MEETING

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G. Arbatov p
Text
HTML The news of the forthcoming visit of the US President to Peking has lost its p
PS novelty. At first a sensation, it is now a matter for businesslike discussion of a
PDF question of considerable public interest. People would like to know what effect the
change in US-Chinese relations, which is in the air, will have on the world situation.
T* Will it lead to a lessening of tension and normalisation of international relations, or
19* will it merely further sharpen the conflicts that are tearing the world, and cause new
ones?
###
President Nixon’s projected visit to Peking, as far as it goes, does not give grounds
for definite conclusions about the future of US-Chinese relations and their effect on
world developments. Nevertheless some ideas are already suggesting themselves.
To begin with, it would be interesting to take a look at the forces in the USA that p
are behind the tendency for a change in that country’s policy towards China, a
tendency which became apparent some time ago.
At first glance, this all seems quite straightforward. US policy vis-a-vis China began p
to change when the unfriendliness of China’s leaders towards the Soviet Union, and
their attempts to split the revolutionary and liberation movements, revealed
themselves. This, however, does not mean that all Americans are in favour of 243
improving US-Chinese relations solely for the reason that such a course is counter to
the interests of the other socialist countries.
The matter is not as simple as it might seem. Without doubt, the factor just p
mentioned is largely responsible for the shifts in official US policy and in the views
of some of those US statesmen who, only a short while ago, were ready to call a
traitor anyone advocating recognition of the Chinese People’s Republic and an end
to US enmity towards China and the Chinese people. Today many of these statesmen
have turned into ardent advocates of detente with China. And this, naturally, gives
some food for thought. It also cannot be ignored that detente with China is being
welcomed in many countries by bitter adversaries of the Soviet Union, including
counter-revolutionary emigrants from socialist countries and Zionist militants.
At the same time, there are also people of a different kind in the USA who stand p
for better relations with China. Progressive people in America have long objected to
the cold-war policy of their government. Supporting efforts directed towards peace,
they have been demanding an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/3.3-Concerning.the.US-China.Top-Level.Meeting[2012-12-18 3:22:40]
other socialist states, China included.
Progressive Americans have been really alarmed and disappointed by what has taken p
place in China in recent years, notably the slide of the Chinese leadership into
nationalistic and chauvinistic positions in foreign policy. While expressing doubts as
to the motives behind the projected changes in their country’s official policy at the
present time, they nevertheless believe that changes are necessary. They consider that 244
the United States must change its attitude to China and recognise the country’s right
to be installed in the United Nations, and that it must put an end to its cold-war
policies directed against the USSR, China, the German Democratic Republic, Cuba,
etc. Moreover, progressive circles in the United States fully realise that the hard trials
which have fallen to the lot of the Chinese people, and for which the Peking
leadership must bear the main responsibility, are partly the result of the imperialist
policy of isolating China and putting obstacles in the way of her peaceful
construction.
Such are the two extreme poles of the rather motley collection of trends and p
attitudes which support the change in US policy towards China.
But it is not only a change in the attitudes which can be discerned at the poles of p
the USA’s political life that is concerned. A change is also to be seen in the
attitudes of the US public at large. This is due, to a certain extent, to the active
campaign for better relations with China which all progressive people have been
waging for many years. Furthermore, confronted with troubles of both an
international and a domestic nature, the US public is growing increasingly aware of
the need to put an end to the cold-war policy and achieve a detente. This fact
cannot be ignored by the US ruling circles.
But this is not the whole story. There is also the matter of the changes which are p
taking place in bourgeois public opinion which is generally shaped by official
propaganda. After its hatred campaign against China, which had gone on for many
years, this propaganda changed its tone and direction. It is impossible not to
associate this change with China’s switch-over to anti-Sovietism and with its policies 245
aimed at splitting the revolutionary liberation movement.
It might have been expected that bourgeois elements in the US would be shocked p
by the " cultural revolution" with its excesses, by Peking’s support of all leftist
adventuristic forces and extremist groupings in different countries, including the USA
itself, by its propaganda moves against peaceful coexistence, and, finally, by its
fierce verbal attacks on the United States. Yet nothing of the kind happened. The
bourgeois element judged China’s policy by her deeds and not by her words. And
her deeds convinced the practical American bourgeoisie that China, despite the
vehemence of her denunciations, posed no real danger to US policy, and that in any
event China could be dealt with, no matter what the Peking leaders might say or the
Chinese press write. Name-calling, after all, never hurts anyone.
Among bourgeois and petty-bourgeois circles, which as a rule go on supporting p

Washington’s official policy until it gets them into trouble, the belief that China had
ceased to be too " revolutionary,” too "communistic,” engendered hopes that, with
Peking’s help, the United States would be able to finish the war in Vietnam to their
own satisfaction. These hopes were greatly encouraged by the news of Nixon’s
forthcoming visit to Peking. Agreement on this visit was most opportune indeed.
Washington’s imperialist policy had long been running into tremendous difficulties p
created by the heroic resistance put up by the Vietnamese people and the support
given them by the socialist countries and by progressive people throughout the world. 246
Even in the United States, this war was regarded as the most unpopular of all the
wars which that country had ever waged. The shock publication of the secret
Pentagon documents deepened the rift caused by the war. The mounting public
protest in the USA and the new peace initiatives of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South
Vietnam gave the Nixon Administration the alternative of either stopping the war or
exposing itself to the danger of political defeat. The news of the forthcoming Peking
summit was used to stave off a decision on ending the war in Vietnam. The US
ignored the Vietnamese peace proposals and there was talk in certain US circles
about the possibility of reaching agreement on this issue behind the backs of the
Vietnamese people.
Although discussion of China’s attitude to the Vietnam question deserves a special p

article, it is necessary to say a few words about it. The projected visit of the US
President to Peking could have been presented as a sensation only to credulous
people who implicitly believed the earlier propaganda about Peking’s irreconcilability
with US imperialism. Yet, the timing of the invitation impressed many, both in the
USA and outside it, as a move obviously prejudicing the cause of the Vietnamese
patriots. The New York Post was genuinely puzzled and suggested that it was up to
the Sinologists and Maoists to explain why the Chinese Communists had decided to
make things easier for the President.
But as far as the United States is concerned, an analysis of the attitudes prevailing p
in that country leads one to the conclusion that the recent Washington-Peking 247
contacts and Nixon’s projected trip to China enjoy wide approval, albeit for different,
often mutually exclusive, reasons.
Hopes for much support were evidently no small factor in prompting the decision on
the Peking summit. On the eve of the presidential elections, the US Government is
concentrating on anything which may help the ruling Republican Party to defeat its
political rivals.
II
An understanding of the different motives that prompt the various political groups p
and social strata in the USA to support the idea of improving relations with China is
important, not only to explain the reasons for the recent developments, but also to
forecast the possible consequences of those developments. With the emphasis in US-
Chinese relations being shifted to the sphere of political decisions, the different
motives, initially obscure though they were, are bound to become increasingly clear.
This can already be sensed in press comments and in speeches by US political and p
public leaders. And it is becoming increasingly clear that many Americans feel some
anxiety about the possible long-term results of the political move made by the US
Administration.
Some of these comments assert that, by deciding on Nixon’s visit to Peking, the US p
Administration is evading outstanding political issues such as the necessity to put an
end to the war in Vietnam or the need for changes in the existing practice of
adopting political decisions by which the President could plunge the country into war
without the knowledge of the public or even the Congress. Others are concerned 248
about the effect the trip may have on Soviet-American relations and the prospects
for reducing the arms race and achieving a detente. And many among the US ruling
circles are beginning to feel uneasy about the possible impact of the Peking
rendezvous on the USA’s relations with its West European allies, with Japan and
other countries. In fact, the news of the planned visit was received by many of them
with unconcealed alarm, to say nothing of the confusion it caused in the camp of the
US puppets in Taiwan, Seoul and Saigon.
These and other problems are making themselves felt with increasing sharpness in p
the discussion, now under way in the USA, on President Nixon’s projected visit to
Peking. Even those who unreservedly approve of this step fully realise that a meeting
as such, even a summit one, cannot automatically solve the problems facing the
country. Moreover, some US leaders fear possible disillusionment in the very near
future which, after the great expectations that have been raised, may have the effect
of a political boomerang. What will be the outcome of Nixon’s visit? What will be
its overall effect on the presidential elections to be held in the fall of 1972? How
well has the President "figured it out"? These are the questions that some of the
leaders of the ruling party are asking themselves.
They realise that US policy is up against a multitude of complicated problems p

which cannot be disposed of by a sweeping diplomatic gesture but which need
radical political solutions, at times painful for Washington. The US President himself
was forced to throw cold water on the overly optimistic at a recent press conference 249
by advising against entertaining “illusions” about the Peking trip.
Many questions connected with the President’s projected visit to Peking, notably p
those pertaining to the future of US-Chinese relations and US policy in general,
remain basically unanswered. Neither Washington nor Peking is in a great hurry to
answer them, their obvious desire being to build up an atmosphere of secrecy around
many things concerning their relations. According to the US press, the American
public is particularly anxious about the possible effect of the move undertaken by the
US Administration on US relations with the socialist countries, particularly with the
Soviet Union. This is understandable, if one takes into account the political,
economic and military prestige of the Soviet Union on the world scene– prestige
which it has gained as a result of its might and its peaceful constructive policy-and
if one takes into account the role of the Soviet Union in world developments. There
are many people in the United States who clearly see that much of what is important
for both countries and for the world at large depends on US-Soviet relations.
It is already evident that Americans are very divided on the subject. Some put p
forward proposals to combine efforts to normalise relations with China with equally
vigorous efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the overall
international situation. Others try to figure out how best to use every step towards
detente with China for stepping up pressure on the Soviet Union, for blackmailing it,
and for forcing concessions from it. Still others are advocating a long-term policy of
pitting the governments of "Red China" and “Red Russia" against one another, as the 250
reactionary New York Daily News put it.
As regards US official policy, it has so far confined itself to giving assurances that p
the Peking summit, and normalisation of US-Chinese relations, will not interfere in
any way with the interests of other countries.
The Soviet people cannot ignore the fact that the US press itself gives a very p
ambiguous interpretation of such assurances. The Washington Post, for instance,
writes that, despite all formal refutations issued by the US Government, officials in
the Nixon Administration privately express views to the effect that it is not in the
interests of the United States to dispel the Soviet Union’s suspicions about some
details of US-Chinese relations which may give reason for dissatisfaction or concern
in Moscow.
It is worth noting that US press comments on the recent hearings in the Senate p
commission for foreign affairs have a definite orientation. Among the commentators
one finds former officials of the State Department who were victimised in
McCarthy’s time for their advocacy of US-Chinese detente. Explaining their attitude
of those days, they emphasise that they understood detente as a means of alienating
China from the socialist camp. By taking advantage of Mao’s readiness to seek ways
for improving relations with Washington, which had been in evidence since the
forties, they hoped to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and China. By such
comments, the US press is openly persuading the reader of the benefits of detente
with China for stepping up anti-Soviet intrigues.
This line reveals, to say the least, the extreme political shortsightedness of its p
initiators. A dialogue, as difficult as it is important, has long been going on between 251
the United States and the Soviet Union. Covering a wide range of serious problems,
it requires confidence more than anything else for successful completion. But what
can be less conducive to confidence than underhand diplomatic proceedings,
backstage intrigues and duplicity? But let us proceed to the question of how
Washington’s official assurances concerning its intentions should be treated.
For over twenty years now the Soviet Union has pressed for the international p
recognition of the legitimate rights of the Chinese People’s Republic. It can only be
regretted that the United States has taken so long to acknowledge realities and make
its first steps toward renunciation of its cold-war policy towards China. It is also to
be regretted that this step has been taken under the circumstances which cast doubts
upon the motives.
As to the question of what is actually behind these changes in the American policy, p
what will be the outcome of the struggle of various forces shaping this policy, the
answer will be found in the actions of Washington, and not in the words about its
intentions.
President Nixon has called his intended visit to Peking a "peace trip" and p
Washington wants to present it as a practical step in pursuance of the policy of
transition "from the era of confrontation to the era of negotiation" which it
proclaimed several years ago.
The sincerity of statements is tested only by practice. And this is true of the case in p
question, all the more so since the world public knows that the speeches and
assurances of US politicians have often been at variance with their deeds.
There are many problems in the tackling of which the United States could p 252
demonstrate whether its policies are motivated by a desire for peace, detente and
normalisation of the international situation, or by new imperialist designs which fit
into the traditional scheme of the positions– ofstrength policy. These are the problems
of Vietnam, the Middle East, European security, curtailment of the arms race, US
relations with the socialist countries, etc. If the steps toward improvement of
relations with China are accompanied by a change to a more constructive US attitude
to these and other questions, then we shall have good reason to take Washington’s
protestations about its good will and peaceful intentions seriously. Such a change
would undoubtedly be viewed favourably in the Soviet Union. A sincere policy
aimed at lessening tension has always met with understanding and enjoyed support in
the Soviet Union. And it is from this position that we must appraise the intentions of
Peking.
The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is aimed at effecting a change in the course p
of world affairs, at implementing measures intended to normalise the situation, and at
consolidating peace and security throughout the world. This is the sum and substance
of the foreign policy course charted by the 24th CPSU Congress-its proclaimed
peace programme. As was reaffirmed at the 24th Congress, the Soviet Union is in
favour of improving relations with China and the USA, developing relations with
other countries, and promoting bilateral, regional and international cooperation aimed
at consolidating peace and the security of nations.
Among the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union there are some which require p
the consideration of all the major powers, including China. In this context, China’s 253
participation in the discussion and solution of problems such as a curtailment of the
arms race, the complete banning of all weapons of mass destruction and the
replacement of exclusive military blocs by continental systems of collective security,
is very important.
Such a development would be to the benefit of all nations, including the USSR, p
China and the USA, and Soviet policy supports it.
At the present time, however, there are many reasons to expect a different
development of events, as US policy remains unchanged, except in relation to China,
and presents the main obstacle to eliminating sharp world conflicts and normalising
the world situation. This being so, Washington’s steps toward detente with China can
have only one meaning. Definite conclusions suggest themselves accordingly. But the
Soviet Union and world socialism are strong enough to meet any possible tide of
events.
***
The answer to the major questions arising in connection with the US President’s p
visit to Peking and changes in US-Chinese relations will be provided, not by the
words or diplomatic manoeuvres of the states in question, but by their actions in the
coming months.
The Soviet Union and other countries will be keeping a watchful eye on these p
actions and on developments in general, for the problems involved are of great
importance for the Soviet Union, for world socialism, for the entire world situation
and for the cause of world peace.
Pravda, August 10, 1971
***

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<•> The Preaching and Practice 254
of the Chinese Leaders

TOC
Card I. Alexandrov p
The present epoch is characterised by gigantic revolutionary transformations radically p

Text
changing the face of our planet. The forces of world socialism, of the communist
HTML
and workers’ movement, and of national liberation are developing their offensive
PS
PDF
against the positions of imperialism. This historic confrontation encompasses all sides
of public life-economy, politics, ideology and culture.
T*
19*
Experience has convincingly confirmed the correctness of the conclusion drawn by p
the International Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties in 1969 that "the
### world system oi socialism is the decisive force in the anti-imperialist struggle." It has
become a powerful accelerator of the historical progress that was started by the Great
October Revolution, a mighty bulwark of peace and the security of the peoples.
In the countries of socialism, pursuing a Leninist course of domestic and foreign p

policy, the working people of the whole world see a reliable bulwark of peace,
freedom and social progress. The stronger the fraternal alliance of socialist countries,
the stronger become the forces of peace and progress in the whole world, and the
more resolute becomes the rebuff to any aggressive designs of imperialism. The
support and aid given to heroic Vietnam, and to the peoples of Laos and Cambodia
by the USSR, the other socialist countries and by all progressive forces are a vivid 255
example of this.
At the same time, the members of the anti– imperialist front of struggle cannot but
be alarmed by the anti-Leninist, great-power chauvinistic course of the present
leadership of China directed towards undermining the unity of revolutionary, anti-
imperialist forces and inflicting serious damage on their common cause.
I
More than ten years have passed since the Chinese leadership, for the first time, p
openly proclaimed a special ideological-political platform on the main issues of our
time, the development of world socialism, and of the communist and workers’
movement.
They revised the Marxist-Leninist principles of socialist construction and foreign p

policy that were implemented in the first ten years of the PRC’s existence and
recorded in the decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC (1956). Some time later,
contrary to the Marxist-Leninist line of the international communist movement jointly
worked out by the communist and workers’ parties, including the CPC, the Chinese
leaders advanced their own “Left” theses that allegedly were to facilitate the
speediest destruction of imperialism and an acceleration of the world revolution by
any means, not ruling out a world thermo-nuclear war. They tried to impose this
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/3.4-Preaching.and.Practice.of.Chinese.Leaders[2012-12-18 3:22:47]
platform on the international communist and workers’ movement. Actually Maoism’s

“Leftism” only camouflaged the conceited hegemonistic designs of the Maoists to
which Peking’s entire domestic and foreign policy was subordinated.
In the field of domestic policy, Mao Tse-tung and his entourage decided to put the p 256
economic basis, the foundations of socialism that were laid in the country during the
first decade after the victory of the revolution, at the service of their aims. Having
discarded the decisions of the 8th Congress of the CPC aimed at the systematic
building of socialism and ensuring the people’s well-being, Mao Tse-tung and his
group plunged China into the voluntarist adventure of the "big leap,” of building the
"people’s communes,” proclaiming their intention to effect a transition to communism
in 3-5 years, and declaring that "three years of hard work would bring ten thousand
years of happiness.” Apart from other things, the course of the "big leap" pursued
the ambitious aim of assuming a vanguard position among the socialist countries.
This appealed to the Maoists’ hegemonistic aspirations.
Built on an anti-scientific, subjectivist– voluntarist conception, contradicting the p

objective laws of socialist construction, the "big leap" has turned for the Chinese
people into a tragedy of vainly wasted efforts, has led to a serious economic crisis,
and to a still further lowering of the already low living standards of the people.
In order to protect themselves from the discontent of the popular masses, the Mao p
group blamed the Party and state cadres, who had allegedly "poorly followed Mao’s
instructions,” for the failure of the "big leap.”
Then followed a sharp zigzag in the tactics of the Chinese leadership, when it stated p
that it was impossible to build socialism in China in the lifetime of the present
generation, that this would take many decades if not centuries. It proclaimed poverty 257
to be the “basis” of revolutionism, and the desire to improve the life of the people-"
revisionism,” "bourgeois economism.” They galvanised the old Trotskyite anti-
Leninist thesis of the “ impossibility” of successfully building socialism before the
triumph of the world revolution.
In the sphere of foreign policy the Maoists took the line of sharpening international p
tension, pushing other countries and peoples towards armed conflicts. They rejected
any proposals aimed at a relaxation of international tension. Peking met with hostility
the treaties on banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and
under water, and on the non-proliferation of such weapons, on banning the
emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor, rejected the idea put
forward by the Soviet Union of creating a system of collective security in Asia and
opposed many other constructive proposals of the socialist countries.
This course was covered up by noisy “Leftist” slogans about the need to p
immediately destroy imperialism. Calls for a "people’s war" in all countries, on all
continents, were issued. The thesis "the world can be changed only with the rifle"
was proclaimed as a universal truth.
No matter what ultra-revolutionary phraseology was used to cover up this course, its p
essence remained unchanged: the striving for hegemony in a war-devastated world. In
this connection even a nuclear-missile war in which, as estimated by Mao Tse-tung,
half of mankind might perish, was declared a sort of boon. Speaking with the
American journalist Strong in 1965, Mao called on the peoples of the world not to
fear nuclear war because "China will survive it.” On the ruins left by this war the 258
Maoists intended to build "a civilisation a thousand times more wonderful,” naturally,
according to their own recipes. Mao Tse-tung spoke in detail about this in his
conversation with Jawaharlal Nehru and in his speech at the 1957 Moscow
Conference. These ideas were developed in a number of Chinese articles printed in
April 1960 in connection with the 90th anniversary of Lenin’s birth and also in a
later period, for instance, in an article in the May 14, 1969 issue of the Chiehfang
jihpao.
But the Chinese leadership was not and is not at all eager to rush into battle against p
imperialism. It would like to use for the attainment of its plans the military and
economic might of the socialist countries, the strength of the international working
class, the possibilities of the national-liberation movement, trying to turn them into a
tool of their great-power hegemonism. Although the Maoists declare that they are
"prepared for the greatest national sacrifices" their deeds show differently. They
prefer the position of "sitting on the mountain and observing the tigers fight.”
Marxist-Leninist Parties throughout the world resolutely rejected the ideology, p

policy, strategy and tactics of Maoism, subjecting them to a thorough principled
criticism as alien to Marxism– Leninism, objectively untenable and harmful from the
point of view of the international and national tasks of the communist, workers’ and
national– liberation movement. The Maoist justification of war evoked indignation
and protests from the broadest segments of the international public.
Together with the other fraternal Parties the CPSU consistently upheld the principles p
of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, pressing for a strengthening of 259
the position and the unity of world socialism, the cohesion of the world communist
movement and the national– liberation, democratic and peace-loving forces in the
struggle against imperialism, reaction and war. So the CPC leaders took the line of
splitting the communist movement, of creating in other countries Maoist groups and
trends opposing the fraternal Parties, and of eroding the socialist community.
The Chinese leaders spearheaded their struggle against our Motherland, against our p
Party and its consistent Leninist course.
The Maoists demanded of Soviet Communists that they renounce the decisions of p
the 20th Congress and the CPSU Programme, started intensive anti-Soviet
propaganda and from the middle of 1960 began systematically to organise
provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border, developing them into armed clashes in the
spring and summer of 1969. In an atmosphere of anti-Soviet psychosis and
militaristic frenzy that was simultaneously generated in China, the course hostile to
the Soviet Union was proclaimed an official doctrine at the 9th CPC Congress.
Mao and his entourage are steadily scaling down economic and other ties with the p
USSR and other socialist countries, while simultaneously expanding in every way the
ties with leading imperialist powers, first of all with the United States.
Suffice it to say that the share of socialist countries in the PRC’s foreign trade p
dropped to 25 per cent in 1966, as against 68 per cent in 1959. The volume of
Soviet-Chinese trade in 1969 was about one sixth of that in 1966.
It is indicative that Peking develops its relations with imperialist countries on the p 260
basis of undisguised anti-Sovietism, to the detriment of the interests of world
socialism and the revolutionary, national-liberation movement.
But all the efforts of the Chinese leadership to split the international communist p
movement, to create in Peking a centre opposed to it, to gain ground in the
attainment of its great-power hegemonistic ambitions by asserting on the international

scene a sort of exclusiveness for China and for its role as leader of the Third World-
"the world village"-against the "world town"-and thereby to establish an anti-
socialist, anti-Soviet front, proved futile. The untenability of the strategy and tactics
of the Maoists was proved by the course of historical development, and their
adventuristic aims turned out to be unattainable.
The Maoist subversive groups and factions in various countries, based actually on p
an anti– communist, anti-Soviet platform, began to fall apart. In pursuing their plans
to assume leadership of the Third World on the basis of their extremist platform, the
Chinese leaders encountered the resistance of peace-loving, developing states,
especially neighbouring ones against which they made territorial and other claims.
Serious failures in domestic and foreign policies led to a socio-political crisis in p

China and to widespread dissatisfaction in the ranks of the CPC and among the
working people. A split developed in the CPC leadership. The Maoists faced the real
danger of having to bear grave responsibility to ’ the party and the country.
’ p
Precisely these reasons prompted Mao and his grouping to carry out what actually p
amounted to a political coup in the country, implemented in the form of a "cultural 261
revolution" and which, as admitted by the Chinese leaders themselves, was a
"struggle for power.” A military-bureaucratic system began to be implanted in the
country.
Party, trade union, and youth organisations and unions of creative workers were p
demolished in the course of the "cultural revolution" and the constitutional bodies of
people’s power were paralysed. Large masses of Communists, workers, peasants and
especially intellectuals were subjected to repressions. The ideal of “democracy” as
proclaimed in China was to turn the entire people into "loyal soldiers" and "obedient
buffaloes of the great helmsman.”
The blow was dealt first of all at those Communists who saw the perniciousness of p
the voluntaristic ideas of the "big leap" and the anti-popular foreign political course
for the cause of socialism in China, at those who in the period of the escalation of
the American aggression in Vietnam proposed to settle differences with the CPSU, to
achieve unity of action of the socialist countries in the struggle against imperialism’s
aggressive intrigues.
At the same time the organisers of the "cultural revolution" continued the campaign p
of hatred and slander against the Soviet Union and other socialist states, trying to
ascribe to them plans of creating a “circle” around China in collusion with
imperialism. Under this pretext the Maoists started the militarisation of the country,
calling upon it "to prepare for hunger, to prepare for war.” It is monstrous, though it
is a fact, that the Maoists began to call for a "cultural revolution" in other socialist
countries, alleging that without such a revolution "capitalism will be restored.”
Peking went so far as to call for an "assertion of the banner of Chairman Mao’s 262
ideas over the entire globe.”
The 9th CPC Congress, held in 1969, was called upon to legalise the military- p
bureaucratic system in China. Mao Tse-tung and his group actually started to build
the Communist Party anew, throwing aside the political, ideological and
organisational principles of the Marxist-Leninist Party. Mao’s ideas were presented at
the congress as "the Marxism-Leninism of the present epoch.” Declaring a "ruthless
struggle" against "modern revisionism,” by which Peking has in view the leadership
of most socialist countries and Communist Parties, the 9th CPC Congress thus
signified a new stage in the evolution of the ideological and political theses of
Maoism as an anti-Leninist, petty-bourgeois, chauvinistic ideology.
But the Maoists did not derive the results they wanted either from the "cultural p
revolution" or from the "line of the 9th Congress of the CPC.” On the contrary, in
the period from 1966 to 1969 they aggravated the state of crisis and the country’s
even greater international isolation. Although by methods of violence, terror and
demagogy the Chinese leadership succeeded in suppressing open resistance to its
course and in imposing this course on the country, it could not help seeing that it
would not be able to overcome by these means either the domestic crisis or the
international isolation.
The Chinese leaders could not but realise the full extent of their defeat and the
collapse of their plans when the 1969 International Conference of Communist and
Workers’ Parties in Moscow reaffirmed the unshakable loyalty of the world army of
Communists to the principles of Marxism– Leninism and proletarian internationalism, 263
and demonstrated the growing unity of the communist ranks on this principled basis.
The Conference strengthened the position of the international communist, workers’
movement as the most influential political movement of our time, the vanguard of
anti– imperialist forces in the struggle for the triumph of the cause of peace, national
liberation and socialism. The Conference highly assessed the role of the Soviet Union
and the CPSU in the liberation struggle and the USSR’s peaceful foreign policy.
II
The development of the present international situation is characterised primarily by p

the growth of the forces of world socialism, the consolidation of the unity of the
world communist movement and the cohesion of the forces of the anti– imperialist
front. The historic offensive by revolutionary forces against imperialism’s positions,
their growing activity in the struggle for peace and security of nations compel the
Peking leaders to review their tactics, to use methods often contrary to those they
had only recently proclaimed.
The time came when the Chinese leaders had to mothball some ultra-“Left” slogans p
and even to remove from the front of the stage the persons who had compromised
themselves most by excessive zeal in promoting the "Mao line" during the "cultural
revolution.” The Maoists are making a new zigzag in their policy. And once again
Mao and his group are trying-for the umpteenth time -to blame the barbaric nature
of the "cultural revolution" with its mass repressions and excesses on those whom
they themselves had set against the CPC, and used to clear the way to the 264
establishment of their domination. A “respectable” appearance is being hastily given
to Peking’s policy which is now being pursued by more ingenious methods.
Facts show, however, that if any changes have been made in Peking’s tactics they p
amount only to a giving up of the attempts to accelerate implementation of the old
line, and not renunciation of its aims, to the use of subtler methods of manoeuvering
intended to deceive the Chinese people and also to confuse the international
revolutionary liberation forces.
Whereas previously the policy of peaceful coexistence of countries with different p

social systems, consistently promoted by the USSR and other fraternal countries, was
labelled in Peking as a “ betrayal” and "collusion with imperialism,” now the

Chinese leadership even teaches others how to pursue a policy of peaceful
coexistence. The Chinese Government has officially proposed the "five principles of
peaceful coexistence" as the basis of relations between the PRC and the United
States. At the same time it has enlivened its contacts with many Western countries,
having established diplomatic relations with a number of them. Peking has tuned
down outright propaganda of the thesis of the inevitability of a world thermonuclear
war and, more than that, now tries to feign love of peacefulness.
The tone of Chinese propaganda statements in respect of the United Nations p

Organisation has also changed. China has started expressing its obvious desire to
restore its rights in that organisation, although only recently Peking maintained that it
wanted to have nothing to do with it. As is known, the Soviet Union and the other 265
socialist countries have invariably come out and continue to come out for the
restoration of the lawful rights of the PRC in the United Nations.
In reviewing their foreign policy tactics, the Peking leaders evidently arrived at the p
conclusion that the hungweipings damage first of all China’s prestige not only in the
socialist and developing countries, but also in the West. Outwardly the anti-Soviet
campaign carried on in official statements by Chinese leaders was somewhat altered.
In 1969 the Chinese leaders agreed to a meeting of heads of the governments of the
USSR and the PRC proposed by the Soviet side and also to the holding of Soviet-
Chinese talks on border and other questions of intergovernmental relations.
Striving for a lessening of international tension, for consolidation of peace and the p
security of nations, people of goodwill would like to see a manifestation of elements
of realism in China’s foreign policy behind the changes in the method of action of
the Chinese leadership, elements that would serve the aims of strengthening the anti–
imperialist front and the cause of peace and friendship among the peoples. The
Soviet people, too, sincerely want this.
The question that naturally arises is: what, in deed, is the essence of the changes in p
the foreign policy of the Chinese leadership at the present stage, and in what
measure do they accord with the aspirations of the peoples, including the people of
China? In fact, this is a question of the correlation and interconnection of the
Chinese leadership’s strategy and tactics in the present conditions. Only facts, their
thorough and objective analysis can produce the answer.
The facts are such that neither in its statements nor in its practical deeds, has the p 266
Chinese leadership yet renounced a single provision of its special, incompatible with
Leninism, ideological-political platform on the main questions of international life
and the world communist movement. The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China held in the autumn of 1970 reaffirmed the
"militant tasks of the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of China" and the
advancement to the fore of "intensification of preparations for war.” The Chinese
leadership opposes collective security in Europe and Asia, and the USSR’s and
Poland’s treaties with the FRG. Peking spares no effort to transfer the situation of
military psychosis to Albania in the hope of sowing the seeds of tension in the
Balkans by this or other methods. Under cover of bombastic declarations, the
Chinese leadership as before opposes concrete steps directed at the attainment of
agreements on questions of disarmament and prohibition of nuclear weapons. The
Government of the People’s Republic of China turned down the Soviet proposal to
convene a conference of five nuclear powers, stating that "China’s nuclear weapons
are still in the testing stage...”
The Chinese leadership continues to engage in intensive hostile propaganda against p

our Party and country. It is in the Soviet Union, in the policy of the CPSU, in the
successes of the working people of our country and the fraternal countries of
socialism that it sees the main obstacle to the attainment of its hegemonistic
ambitions in the international arena. The Maoists are trying to keep from the Chinese
people the facts which shed light on the life of the Soviet people, which show the
real course of the historic struggle between the forces of socialism and imperialism. 267
All the good that is connected with the Soviet Union, which supported the Chinese
people’s revolutionary struggle in the course of many decades and gave it fraternal
assistance in its advance along the road of socialism, is deliberately erased from the
minds of the Chinese working people.
The Chinese leaders continue to declare that they will conduct an "implacable p
struggle" against the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and Marxist-Leninist
Parties. At the close of 1970, speaking with his old acquaintance, US journalist E.
Snow, Mao Tse-tung said that the ideological differences between the CPSU and the
CPC are "irreconcilable.”
The Chinese leaders continue to conduct subversive activities against the world p
socialist community, they oppose the collective international organisations of socialist
countries, the Warsaw Treaty and the CMEA. In its time Peking deemed it possible
to express its solidarity with the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia and their
imperialist patrons and then to bemoan the failure of their counter-revolutionary plot.
Vicious attacks against socialist Poland sounded from Peking in unison with the anti-
Communists.
The policy of the Chinese leadership toward socialist countries clearly shows a p
striving, which coincides with the machinations of imperialist reaction, to set the
socialist states at loggerheads, to set one against the other and to prevent the
implementation of the joint political line of fraternal countries in the international
arena.
Whereas previously Peking waged a broad propaganda offensive against all socialist p
countries, at present it is trying to "narrow the field" of struggle, and applies a 268
“differentiated” approach to socialist countries in an effort to draw some of them into
the orbit of its policy. In so doing it makes alluring gestures and promises. For the
time being Peking does not ask much from those it flirts with. The Chinese leaders
would be pleased with any step which, in their opinion, might cause a crack, if only
a small one, in relations between socialist countries.
Lenin wrote: "Capital is an international force. To vanquish it, an international

workers’ alliance, an international workers’ brotherhood is needed. We are opposed
to national enmity and discord, to national exclusiveness. We are
internationalists.” [ 268•1 Contrary to Leninism, contrary to the communist logic of
class struggle Peking rejects the idea of united action of socialist countries, of all the
revolutionary forces in the struggle against imperialism. Thus the Chinese leadership
assumes a grave responsibility for creating an opportunity for the imperialists to step
up their actions and attempts, on a number of sectors, to mount a counter– offensive
against the world revolutionary movement, suppress the liberation movement in
South-East Asia and support the Israeli aggression in the Middle East.
III
Persistent propaganda advancing the demagogic thesis of struggle against "two p

superpowers,” a thesis absolutely alien to Marxism-Leninism, has become for the
Chinese leadership a means of continuing its hostile course against the Soviet Union.
The Chinese leadership tries to place US imperialism, which strives to play the role 269
of a guarantor and custodian of the international system of exploitation and
oppression, which brings destruction, death and suffering to many peoples of the
world, side by side with the Soviet Union-the homeland of Leninism, the first
socialist country, the bulwark of the anti-imperialist struggle of all the revolutionary
forces.
The Peking leaders need "the theory of two superpowers" for the same purpose as p
they did their old "theory of struggle of the world village against the world town.”
In both of these theories, nationalistic, great-power motives take the place of a class
approach. Having failed in their attempts to divide the world into the economically
developed “town” and the “village” fighting for its liberation or the developing
"village,” the Peking leaders decided to narrow "the front of attack" and direct it,
first of all, against the Soviet Union. Now they urge all countries-capitalist,
developing, and socialist-to fight against the "two superpowers.” Meanwhile, the
Chinese press emphasises that China will never be a “superpower” and during
personal contacts between Chinese leaders and representatives of different countries it
is stressed that China is the best defender of countries fighting against the "two
superpowers.”
The term “superpower” was borrowed by the Chinese leaders from the imperialist p
ideologists of the USA. The latter invented it in order to defend capitalist principles,
to mislead the American people, in the first place, and the world public and
somehow to camouflage the imperialist, aggressive nature of US foreign policy.
Characteristically, the expression "one or two superpowers" has been heard in Peking
during the efforts to establish Sino-American contacts. Apparently it was decided in 270
expectation of Nixon’s visit to tone down the propaganda hullabaloo: "It is not you
we have in mind.”
The putting forward of the patently false thesis of "two superpowers,” allegedly p
opposed to all the other states, is in fact an act of class betrayal. Peking is trying
thus to play down the confrontation between the two world systems-socialism and
capitalism-trying to evade (and it does evade in practice) real struggle against
imperialism. It even goes so far as to advise West European states and monopolies
on how they should pool their efforts in order best to oppose the "one or two
superpowers.” Meanwhile the Chinese leaders have legalised their own political
flirting with US ruling circles.
In an attempt to theoretically “corroborate” the rupture with world socialism, the p

actual betrayal of the class interests of the working people, to justify their line
towards a collusion with imperialism, Mao Tse-tung and his associates deliberately
confuse questions related to the contradictions of the contemporary world, substituting
the Pekingfabricated formula of "four big contradictions" for the true contradictions,
and especially the main one-the contradiction between imperialism and socialism. If
this formula is cleared of rhetoric, its essence boils down to uniting the world in the
interests of the achievement of Peking’s hegemonistic goals under the pretext of
resolving these contradictions and of struggling against "the two superpowers.” Not
long ago, in an article in the magazine Hungchi this formula, proclaimed at the 9th
Congress of the Communist Party of China, was directly adapted to the demagogic
conception of "the two superpowers.” And following the usual ultra-revolutionary 271
phraseology about "colossal upheavals" and “re-grouping” of forces taking place in
the world, the above article upholds China’s tactics of forming blocs with any,
including imperialist, forces for achieving Peking’s foreign policy aims. It would not
be amiss to recall that the thesis of the “re-grouping” of forces had been repeatedly
applied by Mao Tse-tung before for political intrigues.
The article openly justifies the tactics of political double-dealing, under the name of p
"revolutionary dual tactics.” One of the latest Peking’s " revolutionary dual tactics" in
regard to the Soviet Union, was the recent interview by the Prime Minister of the
PRC Chou En-lai to The New York Times observer Reston. Chou En-lai drew
attention to the anti-Soviet essence of Peking’s platform and of its steps aimed at a
rapprochement with Washington. He palmed off to Reston, who was glad to take up
the provocative thesis of a Soviet military threat to China. In another interview, with
a correspondent of a Yugoslav newspaper, Chou En-lai discoursed at length about
"one or two superpowers,” and again spoke of the mythical threat to China from the
North, from the USSR, using the opportunity to stress some special, “liberating”
mission of China in Asia.
As to the threat to China "from the North,” it is well known that the Soviet Union p
has never presented and does not do so now any territorial claims to China and
believes that the Soviet and Chinese peoples have no cause for conflicts.
The CPSU and the working people of the Soviet Union, like the fraternal Parties p
and the working people of the other socialist states, regarded and still regard the 272
development of relations of friendship and cooperation with the Chinese people, with
the Chinese Communists, as one of the important conditions for strengthening the
position of world socialism, and consolidating the unity of the international
communist movement and the entire anti-imperialist front.
It is this that determines the principled and consistent line of the CPSU and the p
Soviet state in regard to China, a line that has again been authoritatively confirmed
in the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 24th Congress of the
Party and in the Resolution of the Congress, in the Decisions of the Plenary
Meetings of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the speeches of the General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Comrade L. I. Brezhnev.
Our Party and people unanimously approve the policy of the Central Committee of p
the CPSU and the Soviet Government of maintaining restraint and not yielding to
provocations, and of doing everything the USSR can to achieve the normalisation of
relations with the PRC and the restoration and development of mutual friendship and
cooperation of the Soviet and the Chinese peoples on the basis of the principles of
MarxismLeninism and proletarian internationalism.
The constructive line of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in relation to the p
PRC meets with the understanding and approval of the fraternal socialist countries,
of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, and of all the progressive, peaceloving
forces. It evokes the sympathy of all who cherish the true national interests of China,
unbreakably bound with the interests of world socialism, of friendship of the PRC 273
with the Soviet Union.
This line is an inalienable part of the Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet Union, of p
the allembracing programme of activities of our Party and the Soviet state in the
international arena-a programme of struggle for the further consolidation and
development of the forces of socialism, for a relaxation of international tension and
for strengthening peace, for rallying the ranks of the world communist and working-
class movement, for the consolidation of all the forces coming out against
imperialism and colonialism, reaction and aggression. The peace programme set forth
by the 24th Congress of the CPSU, answering the vital interests of the peoples of
the entire planet, has already become a most important factor of contemporary
international life.
People in the Soviet Union regard with due appreciation the development of normal p
relations between states, and on this plane, the normalisation of relations between the
PRC and the USA is no exception. But the Soviet people cannot help giving
attention to the fact that in its overtures to Washington, the Chinese leadership again
frankly stresses its hostility towards the Soviet Union.
In so doing, it certainly realises that the ruling imperialist circles, first of all in the p
USA, draw appropriate conclusions from this kind of “ respectable” manoeuvres of
the Chinese leaders, of their anti-Soviet direction. And it is no accident, apparently,
that allusions to Peking’s present “obligingness” and the possibility of imperialism
cashing in on it, slip into the pages of the bourgeois American press.
Of course, while waging a resolute ideologicalpolitical struggle against the great- p 274
power chauvinistic theses of Peking in its foreign policy course, we are doing
everything to protect the interests of the Soviet people, who are building
communism, the interests of our friends and allies, against any encroachments.
Seeing the unprincipledness, the nationalistic pragmatism of the Chinese leadership, p

the public in many countries of the world is asking the question: is not a deal being
hatched against socialism behind the scenes in Peking and Washington, a deal at the
expense of the interests of the peoples fighting for national independence and
freedom?
An examination of the Maoist slogans and the Maoist practice both at home and in p
the international arena gives good reason to pose such a question.
The ideological-political essence of the Maoist platform, its strategic aims, despite p
all the tactical manoeuvres of the Chinese leadership, remain unchanged. The
conceptions of the Chinese leadership and its actions have been and are based on the
anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist ideology of Maoism.
Maoism has exposed itself in deeds as a pettybourgeois ideological-political p

movement basically alien to Marxism-Leninism, parasitising on the principles of
scientific socialism, on the striving of the popular masses of China for socialism. The
goals and practice of Maoism are incompatible with the tasks of the world
communist, liberation movement. Here one should fully take into account that
Maoism, in its present struggle against the Marxist-Leninist teaching, the communist
movement, the socialist community, objectively links up with the most diverse 275
political forces hostile to socialism-the imperialists and racialists, Trotskyites and
reformists, forming a kind of "united front" with them.
Experience shows that if certain progress has been made in some spheres of the p
Chinese economy in recent years, this was not due to but despite Maoist concepts.
None of the concepts of Maoism, none of Mao’s ideas has stood the practical test of
socialist construction in China and development of international life. Maoism lacks
any constructive content. The more dangerous therefore is the striving of the Peking
leaders for hegemony in the world communist movement, and for leadership in the
Third World. The aim and practice of Maoism are causing tremendous damage to the
international communist and workingclass movement, to the national liberation and
anti-imperialist struggle. The recipes of the Maoists are doing irreparable harm to
those who give them credence (we all remember the tragic fate of the Communist
Party of Indonesia and of some other Communist Parties whose leadership listened to
advice from Peking).
The Communists are confronted with the task of enhancing in every way their p
political vigilance in the face of the hostile ideology and subversive actions of
Maoism, with the task of further thoroughly exposing the real essence of Maoist
ideology and policy. The Communists are fighting resolutely and on a principled
basis against the theory and practice of Maoism, against Maoists’ machinations in the
world communist movement, in the ranks of the anti-imperialist front. They are
waging a consistent ideological and political struggle against the anti-socialist, anti- 276
Leninist platform of Maoism so that the Chinese people can again take the path of
alliance and fraternal cooperation with socialist countries, with all revolutionary,
progressive forces of the time, forces fighting tor peace, national independence,
democracy and socialism.
Pravda, September 4, 1971
***

normal
TEXT SIZE
Notes
[ 268•1] "Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 30, p. 293.
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<•> Peking Foreign Policy 277
Doctrines and Practice

TOC
Card L. Kirichenko p
Observers of the world scene never stop wondering at the zigzags of Chinese p
Text
foreign policy. One might almost think Peking had been following entirely different
HTML
policies at different times.
PS
PDF
But although there have been several distinct periods in China’s foreign policy of p
the past twenty years, the changes might be likened to the insulation of electric wire,
T*
19*
which may be of different colours though the wire is the same. The methods and
tactics have changed, but the essential policy, the objectives have not.
###
Though they protested time and again in former days that they wanted friendly, p
equal relations with other nations, though they vowed and swore fidelity to
proletarian internationalism, Mao Tsetung and his entourage have in fact always
proceeded from the Sinocentrist doctrines cultivated by the Chinese emperors. They
have always thought in terms of China as a superpower able to impose its will upon
others and ordain the pattern of international relations; in all periods their actions
have been geared to the object of restoring the "Celestial Empire" and making China
the “central” power of the world.
The first period covered the years 1949–58. The Chinese People’s Republic was p
weak, it strove to make maximum use of other coutries’ experience and support to
consolidate its position and build up its economy. Close cooperation was practised
with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. But even at this period the 278
Chinese leaders made plans to swallow up the Mongolian People’s Republic and
complained about China’s having “lost” large areas of Southeast Asia which the
armies of the Chinese emperors had reached once upon a time. At the Asia and
Oceania trade union conference at the end of 1949 the Chinese representatives
declared that all peoples fighting for national liberation must follow "the path of Mao
Tse-tung.” In 1950–51 the Maoists tried to impose their own programme on the
Communist Parties of India and Indonesia: in these predominantly peasant countries
the revolution had, they claimed, to follow the same lines as in China. Later on they
put out the famous formula about "the wind from the East beating the wind from the
West,” which was certainly rather equivocal.
After China successfully completed the first five-year plan, laying the foundations of p
an industrial structure, they decided they could proceed differently. At home the
Chinese leaders launched the "big leap forward" and started setting up the
communes; the purpose was to make a big spurt in building Chinese economic and
military power, through maximum restriction of the people’s living standards and all-
out mobilization of effort. Abroad, they tried to get the socialist community under
their thumb and use it for their chauvinist ends.
The attempt to gain control of the socialist community did not succeed; the p
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/3.5-Peking.Foreign.Policy.Doctrines.and.Practice[2012-12-18 3:23:01]
communist parties found the doctrine Peking advanced to be adventurist. Thereupon

Peking changed its tactics.
On June 14, 1963, the leaders of the Communist Party of China published a p
document entitled “Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International 279
Communist Movement" (the "25 points”). In it they denied the decisive influence of
the socialist system on the course of world development, belittled the struggle of the
working class in the capitalist countries, contraposed the national-liberation
movement to the socialist world system and the working-class movement, advocated
adventurism in foreign policy and continuance of the cold war, preached sectarianism
and putschism in questions of revolution, and sought to justify factionalism in the
communist movement. Anyone who refused to accept the Maoist "general line" was
labelled a "revisionist,” a "traitor to Marxism.”
Mao also injected a new meaning into his "intermediate zones" conception. The way p
it now came out was that the two poles in the worldwide struggle were China, on
the one hand, and US imperialism and the Soviet Union, on the other, and that
between these poles lay all the other states-socialist, developing, and imperialist. The
countries of this intermediate zone were treated as reserves and potential allies not
only against US imperialism but against the Soviet Union. In Lin Piao’s 1965 article
"Hail the Victory of the People’s War!" was formulated the "people’s war" strategy,
the gist of which was that Asia, Africa and Latin America were the "world village,”
that it was here the revolution would develop, and do so on the Chinese model and
hence under China’s leadership, and that the world-wide victory of the socialist
revolution would come through the revolutionary "world village" closing in on the
"world city"-Western Europe and North America.
On the practical level, the Chinese leaders attempted at this time to break up the p 280
socialist community and then unite what they could around Peking. In the Third
World they tried to persuade the Asian, African and Latin American peoples that
China was the staunchest and most consistent fighter against imperialism -and
colonialism, sought to isolate the national liberation movement from the socialist
countries and the world communist movement, and impelled the freedom– fighters
towards adventurist action. They set their face against any move to lessen
international tension, campaigned for armament-building, and tried to provoke
international conflict wherever possible. In doing so they declared that war would
speed up the world revolutionary process, that "power grows out of the barrel of a
gun.” In talking like this, Mao was not original. He was echoing almost word for
word the conception of the ancient philosopher Shang Yang (4th century B. C.), who
declared that "if a country is poor but bends its efforts to war... it will certainly
become powerful. If a country is rich but fights no wars... it is certainly enfeebled.”
To be sure, Mao somewhat modified that conception: he preferred the fighting to be
done by others, and pinned his chief hopes on a nuclear clash between the USSR
and the USA.
By 1966 it was apparent that Peking had lost out. The socialist countries, with just p
one exception, had declined to support its policy. The Third World nations had
perceived that it was an adventurist and irresponsible policy, and only two or three
of them had remained on friendly terms with China. As may be seen from the secret
Pentagon papers now published in the United States, the US Government had taken 281
advantage of Peking’s divisive line to launch its aggressive war in Indochina. The
Chinese leadership and Mao personally were responsible for having exposed to attack
the Communist Party and other progressive forces of Indonesia.
A bitter struggle developed within the Chinese leadership as a result. Some members p
of it criticised Mao’s adventurist line, proposed more realistic policies, objected to
the personality cult, recommended ending Mao’s incompetent interference in the
economy.
Leaning on the army and using the youth whom they made their dupes, Mao and p
his group smashed their opponents. A military-bureaucratic regime was instituted in
the country.
During the "cultural revolution" the Maoists attempted to provoke "people’s wars" in p
other countries, and to start a hungweiping movement on a world scale. They
engaged in hostile actions against all socialist countries except Albania. They
interfered grossly in the affairs of India and Burma, Nepal and Ceylon, Laos and
Cambodia, Malaysia and Indonesia and various African nations.
In the heat of conflict the Maoists revealed their true intentions to an extent which p
they now seem to regret. They threatened to make short work of other peoples, laid
claim to territories belonging to neighbouring countries, declared that China must
lead the world, vowed to "plant the banner of Mao Tse-tung" in other countries’
capitals.
The "cultural revolution" further discredited Peking. China found herself in p

oppressive international isolation. Many of the splinter groups which Maoist agents 282
had formed with so much difficulty in some countries fell to pieces.
Starting with the latter half of 1969, as the "cultural revolution" was back-pedalled, p
the methods and tactics of Chinese foreign policy again began to change. Peking has
been trying to make its policy look respectable. Interference has been less crude, it
has been covered up carefully with smiling yuan diplomacy. But underneath all this
camouflage the long-term objectives remain the same.
By means of a differentiated approach to the socialist countries the Chinese leaders p

are trying to erode the socialist community, to oppose some countries to others, to
get at least some to adopt an anti-Soviet platform. With some countries Peking flirts,
forgetting that only a short time ago it was calling them insulting names; against
others it keeps up the hostile campaign. Chinese propaganda spreads false tales about
Soviet policy and misrepresents the purposes of the Warsaw Treaty and the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance. The Chinese leaders gloat no less than the
imperialists over any temporary difficulties in this or that country.
Peking is wooing many Asian and African countries, endeavouring to make them p
bases of its activity. Exploiting the difficulties in Pakistan and the complications
between that country and India, it is trying to catch the Pakistani leaders in its net.
Chinese emissaries are hard at work in Africa, seen as a convenient field to apply
the Maoist conceptions and an area where it is relatively easy to create seats of
international conflict. The aid given some Asian and African nations is meant to
break their links with the socialist states, make them dependent on Peking and turn 283
them into instruments of its policy.
Peking is extending relations with the imperialist states; it is anxious to lay hands p
on their technological achievements and be able to influence their policy.
While posing as "staunch,” “firm” allies of the national liberation movement and p
accusing others of “collusion” with imperialism, the Chinese leaders forget all about
their duty to that movement as soon as they see a chance to make a deal with the
imperialists that will serve their nationalistic ambitions. That is the light in which the
progressive forces see a number of recent moves by Peking.
The main theme in Chinese foreign policy at the present time is a clamour against p
"the monopoly of the two superpowers.” Ignoring the class approach and attempting
to equate the imperialist United States and the socialist Soviet Union, the masters of
the "Celestial Empire" have produced the idea of a united front of the "small and
medium countries.” This new doctrine is of much the same order as the "intermediate
zones" conception. Its chief purpose is to prove that it is for China to be leader of
the "small and medium countries.” In an interview given a French journalist last
September, the Peking leaders declared that China was "the only country in the
world capable of ending the world supremacy of the two superpowers.” And in
statements repeated recently, China’s Premier has offered China as protector to the
“small” and “weak” countries.
Referring to the Chinese Premier’s remarks about "the hegemony of the two p
superpowers,” General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USA Gus Hall 284
observes (Daily World, June 12): "Is the role of the Soviet Union and US
imperialism the same in the Mid-East, in Africa, in Latin America? They are at the
opposite dialectical poles. One is the main force of oppression and exploitation, the
other the main outside force of support to the forces of liberation and freedom. To
speak about them in general terms as ’ superpowers’ is a service to US
imperialism.”
We see that whereas formerly Peking laid claim to leadership of the revolutionary p
forces of the contemporary world, now it is calling for a bloc that would alike
embrace socialist countries, developing nations and imperialist powers. In so doing it
betrays its secret aim-to become, on the pretence of opposing "the two superpowers,”
the greatest superpower of all. Isn’t it like the fairytale Wolf trying to imitate Mother
Goat’s voice so as to eat up the goat’s little ones?
However the Chinese leaders may disguise their true ambitions, their policy was and p
is a chauvinist, great-power policy fraught with danger to the peoples and to the
cause of peace. That will come home in time even to those who today have illusions
about it and even repeat the Maoist rubbish about a "monopoly of the two
superpowers.”
Only abandonment of chauvinist ambitions and unprincipled adventurist policies, a p

return to the path of normal relations with other countries, based on generally
accepted standards of intercourse, can bring China the standing and prestige in the
world that the great Chinese people is entitled to enjoy.
New Times, No. 30, 1971
***

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<•> Concerning the Economic Relations 285
Between the
TOC Soviet Union
Card and China (1950–66)

Text Yu. Vladimirov p

HTML
PS The events which have taken place in China in recent years make it quite clear that p
PDF the Maoist group which usurped power in the country with the help of the armed
forces, is following a policy that is directly opposed to Marxism-Leninism and
T* proletarian internationalism. Defying all the revolutionary forces of our time, the
19* Maoists have launched China on a path of economic, political, ideological and
military adventurism that has not only harmed the cause of socialism in that country
###
and jeopardised the socialist gains of the Chinese people, but has weakened the
socialist community of nations and precipitated serious differences in the international
communist movement, thereby greatly harming the cause of socialism throughout the
world.
Being well aware of the fact that the main barrier to the accomplishment of their p
adventuristic, great-power ambitions is the Soviet Union and its Communist Party,
the Maoists have declared the Party of Lenin and the world’s first state of working
people to be their main enemy. Besides their continuous slandering of our country
the Maoists are attempting to whip up hatred for the Soviet Union which has always 286
stood as the symbol of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
As part of this campaign the Maoists are presenting Soviet-Chinese economic
relations in such a way as to belittle the importance of Soviet economic aid to
China, and are accusing the USSR of wanting to subjugate China to its economic
and political interests. In their efforts to keep the world national-liberation movement
apart from the Soviet Union, the socialist community and the international communist
movement, with the aim of turning it into a tool of their great-power policy, the
Maoists are misrepresenting the nature of Soviet economic assistance to the Chinese
People’s Republic by describing China as a “victim” of Soviet foreign economic
policy, and are “warning” the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America against
having any economic or other contacts with the USSR.
Imperialist propaganda seizes upon such Maoist pronouncements in order to defame p

the socialist community and impugn the cause of communism as a whole. However,
no slander or fabrications by the enemies of the Soviet Union and communism can
conceal the fact that while China was marching together with the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries it scored major successes in overcoming the economic,
social, ideological and political effects of the country’s long period under the
domination of foreign imperialists and its own feudal bureaucracy, and great
successes in the subsequent construction of the foundations of socialism. Conversely,
when China, under the pressure of the Maoists, isolated itself from the Soviet Union
and other socialist states by its policy of hostility, it ran into a blind alley and was 287
thrown back more than ten years in its development. The Maoists have been unable
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/3.6-Economic.Relations.Between.USSR.and.China[2012-12-18 3:23:11]
to blot out the memory of the internationalist aid, unprecedented in scale and
effectiveness, which the Soviet Union rendered to China in its economic
development. Neither the Chinese people nor the rest of the world have forgotten it.
The economic ties between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China, dealt p
with in this article, are an important aspect of Soviet-Chinese relations. A study of
these ties affords a good idea of the state of Soviet-Chinese relations in the period
between 1950 and 1966. [287•1
At the beginning of the 1950’s China was an economically and technically p

backward country. The war in Korea in which the People’s Republic of China took
part, and the economic blockade organised by the imperialist states delayed the
overcoming of this backwardness and the building of the foundations of socialism in
China. In those conditions the People’s Republic of China found it very difficult to
rebuild its national economy, to effect deep-going socio-economic changes, and to
build the foundations of socialism. The People’s Republic of China was in need of 288
all-round assistance. The only country whose assistance could, in its scale and
technical level, meet the requirements of the PRC was the Soviet Union, and this
assistance the Soviet Union was ready to provide in line with the principles of
proletarian internationalism.
China required massive investments, large quantities of modern industrial equipment, p

and experienced engineers, technicians, and skilled workers in order to restore its
national economy and eliminate its economic backwardness and its dependence on
the imperialist states, and to build the material and technical basis of socialism. In
the first years after the formation of the People’s Republic of China the country had
none of these things. The magnitude of the economic and technical assistance
rendered by the Soviet Union to China was unprecedented in its scale and
effectiveness. The USSR provided this assistance at the most critical period for the
People’s Republic of China, when the restoration and development of the national
economy was a question of life and death for new China. In that complicated
domestic and international situation Soviet economic and technical assistance
provided the means for solving extremely difficult political, social, economic and
other problems. This assistance enabled the People’s Republic of China to restore
and reconstruct its national economy in record time and lay the foundations of a
modern industry which made it possible for China to eliminate the economic
backwardness of the country and build the material and technical basis of socialism.
Soviet assistance to China was not in the form of surplus goods it could find no use p 289
for. The Soviet Union shared with the People’s Republic of China what it often
needed itself. In this the Soviet Union was motivated by a desire to help the Chinese
Communist Party and the Chinese people to turn China into an industrial socialist
state and an ally in the common struggle for the triumph of communism. The Soviet
Union was also guided by its desire to strengthen the socialist community as a
whole-this powerful factor of the world revolutionary process.
Helped by the Soviet Union, the Chinese people restored the war-ravaged economy p
over the short period between 1950 and 1959, and built more than 250 large
industrial enterprises, factories and various industrial projects, all of them complete
with the latest machinery and equipment. [289•1 Besides expanding and
modernising the old industries, such as the production of iron and steel, non– ferrous
metals, and power industry, China now had brand-new industries for the manufacture
of aircraft, cars, tractors, power and heavy machinery, instrument-making, electro-
technical and radio-technical industries, and some important branches of the chemical
industry. The factories and plants built in the People’s Republic of China with Soviet
assistance, helped to raise the country’s annual output to the following: cast iron–8.7
million tons, steel–8.4 million tons, rolled metal–6.5 million tons, coal–17.2 million
tons, aluminium–38 thousand tons, ammonia–150 thousand tons, sulphuric acid-250 290
thousand tons, heavy machinery-60 thousand tons, mining equipment-20 thousand
tons, oil processing and chemical equipment-40 thousand tons, steam and hydraulic
turbines (capacity)-1.7 million kw., power generators (capaoity)-0.6 million kw.,
tractors (in conventional units)-42 thousand, lorries-30 thousand, metal-cutting
machines-3.7 thousand, and steam boilers for thermal power stations-total capacity of
7 thousand tons of steam an hour. At the power stations built and reconstructed with
Soviet assistance, turbo-generators with an aggregate capacity of 4 million kw. were
put into operation. [290•1 In 1960 the factories and plants built with Soviet
assistance turned out 30 per cent of the total production of cast iron in the country,
about 40 per cent of the steel, more than 50 per cent of the rolled metal, 80 per cent
of the lorries, more than 90 per cent of the tractors, 30 per cent of the synthetic
amonia, 25 per cent of power, 55 per cent of the steam and hydraulic turbines, about
20 per cent of the power generators, 25 per cent of the aluminium, over 10 per cent
of the heavy machinery, etc. [ 290•2
The 250 large industrial projects built with Soviet technical assistance are only a p
part of the sweeping fifteen-year programme of Soviet technical assistance to the
People’s Republic of China providing for the construction, reconstruction and
expansion of more than 400 large industrial enterprises, factories and individual 291
projects. The scale of this programme is evident from the fact that the USSR
undertook to help the People’s Republic of China to build 12 metal-smelting plants
and factories with a designed annual capacity of 28 million tons of cast iron, 30
million tons of steel and 25 million tons of rolled metal; three plants for the
production of aluminium with a total capacity of 738 thousand tons a year; factories
for the production of tin with a total capacity of 25 thousand tons a year; seven
plants for the manufacture of metallurgical, mining, oilrefining and chemical
equipment with a total capacity of 240 thousand tons of goods a year; seventeen
plants for the production of steam, gas and hydraulic turbines and generators for
them, with a total annual capacity of 11.2 million kw; 100 factories and plants
working for national defence. [291•1 This programme would have been
implemented had it not been for the Maoist group which began, in 1961, to scale
down the scientific and technical and other ties with the Soviet Union.
When work began in China on the restoration of its national economy .and on the p
implementation of the extensive programme for economic rehabilitation, it had very
few skilled engineers, technicians or scientists. That is why China found it extremely
difficult to build a socialist economy unaided, especially its industry. Because of this,
the Soviet Union, between 1950 and 1960, sent over ten thousand highly skilled
specialists to China, and organised the training of Chinese scientific and technical
personnel and workers at Soviet industrial establishments, at colleges, and at design 292
and research organisations. In the period between 1951 and 1962, more than eight
thousand Chinese citizens received their industrial and technical training in the Soviet
Union. In the same period more than 11 thousand Chinese students and postgraduates
studied at Soviet educational establishments. About one thousand scientific workers
from the Academy of Sciences of China underwent training at research institutes of
the USSR Academy of Science. In addition to this, over 1,500 Chinese engineers,
technicians and scientists visited the Soviet Union to study the scientific and
technological achievements and experience of this country.
The assistance the USSR rendered to China in the scientific and technical sphere p
was of tremendous significance for socialist construction in the People’s Republic of

China. Over the 1954– 59 period alone, the USSR handed over more than 24
thousand sets of scientific and technical papers to China. The scope and effectiveness
of Soviet assistance in this sphere is evident from the fact that in China at present
all industries without exception turn out certain types of products which have been
developed according to Soviet blueprints, technical specifications and technological
papers handed over to China. All those papers which foreign experts valued at
thousands of millions of dollars, were turned over to China free of charge. However,
the value of Soviet assistance lay, not so much in its monetary value, as in the fact
that China would not have been able to get from elsewhere the up-to-date technical
and engineering information she needed in order to undertake extensive economic
reconstruction. None of the advanced capitalist countries wanted to help China to 293
overcome her economic backwardness. But even if any of them had agreed to do so,
the People’s Republic of China would either have had to pay large sums in foreign
currency (which China did not have at that time) for this assistance, or would have
had to sacrifice its political and economic independence. Moreover, the Soviet Union,
in 1950–61, extended to China long-term credits on easy terms, totalling 1,816
million foreign exchange (convertible) roubles. [293•1
Besides economic, scientific and technical aid to China for the development of her p
national economy, the Soviet Union played an important role in building up China’s
modern defence industry. In addition to technical assistance in building factories and
plants for defence and equipping them with modern machinery, the Soviet Union
furnished China with a great deal in the way of blueprints and technological
specifications for the production of modern armaments and military equipment. China
also received large amounts of modern military materiel, armaments, and other
equipment for the People’s Liberation Army of China.
Trade played an important part in the system of Soviet-Chinese economic relations p

over the period under review. The People’s Republic of China received from the
Soviet Union all that was necessary for the restoration and development of her
national economy, and exported her own goods to the Soviet Union in return for the
financial and other forms of assistance. The following figures illustrate the 294
importance of SovietChinese trade for the People’s Republic of China. Before the
creation of the People’s Republic of China a mere five per cent of China’s foreign
trade was with the USSR, [ 294•1 but in 1950 this was increased to 23 per cent,
and in 1958 to 50 per cent. [ 294•2 During the first five-year plan period (1953–
57) in China, 57.1 per cent of China’s foreign trade was with the USSR.
Because of the bad economic situation in the People’s Republic of China in the p
first few years of its existence (a backward economy crippled by war, and rather
poor export possibilities), and in view of its need for rapid economic rehabilitation
and development, as well as for increased defence capability, the Soviet Union made
sizeable economic and military credits available to China. These enabled China to
import from the USSR large amounts of goods, which were of vital importance for
the restoration and development of China’s economy, for the strengthening of her
national defence and for ensuring the vital needs of the Chinese people. Between
1949 and 1955 the Soviet exports to China exceeded its imports from it. Over a
period of six years this excess of export over import ran into 947.3 million roubles.
The active balance in Soviet-Chinese trade meant therefore that the Soviet Union p
allocated from its national income and extended to China long-term credits for the 295
urgent economic needs of the People’s Republic of China. As the People’s Republic
of China used up the Soviet credits in the restoration and development of its national
economy, its resources increased and export possibilities grew accordingly. Beginning
in 1956, when the national economy of China had been completely restored and
developed, and when many of its branches met the targets of the first five-year plan
ahead of schedule, it began to pay off its debts to the Soviet Union. It was from
1956 on that China’s exports to the USSR exceeded her imports from this country.
Over nine years (1956–64) the People’s Republic of China overcame the imbalance
in its trade with the Soviet Union by additional deliveries of commodities and by
making some payments in foreign currency.
The structure and character of Soviet export to China were determined primarily by p
our country’s desire to render the greatest possible assistance to a fraternal country in
the restoration of its national economy, in the satisfaction of the vital needs of the
Chinese people, in the creation of a firm basis for socialist industrialisation and for
the development of the People’s Republic of China on socialist lines. During the
restoration period in China, the main Soviet export items to China were machines
and equipment, ferrous metals, oil products, etc. Between 1950 and 1952, the Soviet
Union delivered to China 276.93 million roubles worth of machinery and equipment,
or 21.6 per cent of the total cost of Soviet exports to China in that period.
Moreover, while in the first several years of the restoration period the Soviet Union
delivered mostly separate types of machinery and equipment necessary for the 296
restoration and reconstruction of industrial projects built before the establisment of
the PRC, in later years, after 1951, the Soviet export to China consisted to an
increasing extent of complete sets of plant. The reason for this was that the USSR
began providing equipment for 50 industrial establishments, which had been
completed or were being built with its help. These included the Anshan metal-
manufacturing combine, the Fengman hydro-power station, and the thermal power
stations in the cities of Penhsihu, Taiyuan, Chungching, and Sian. During the first
five-pear plan period when the People’s Republic of China was launching an
extensive programme of industrialisation and the country needed machinery and
equipment, the Soviet Union supplied 639 million roubles’ worth of industrial
plant. [ 296•1 Machinery and equipment made up almost half of Soviet exports to
China. In 1957 the share of complete sets of plant in Soviet exports to China was 77
per cent. At a time when the steel industry of the People’s Republic of China was
just being restored and the country was producing no more than 1.3 million tons a
year, the Soviet Union shipped 943 thousand tons of iron and steel to China between
1950 and 1952, or ’ 40 per cent of Chinese production for that period. During the
first five-year plan period when China was suffering from a metal shortage the !
Soviet Union shipped 300,825 million roubles’ worth of rolled steel and tubing
which were in I short supply in China (almost two million tons).
In old China the highest output of petroleum products ever reached (mainly obtained p 297
from shale) was 320 thousand tons. Local oil refineries operated exclusively on
imported oil. It was because of this that Soviet shipments of petroleum products were
of such great importance to the People’s Republic of China. In the years of
reconstruction China produced 943 thousand tons of petroleum products (including
216,000 tons of benzine and 71,500 tons of kerosine). Over the same period the
Soviet Union delivered to China 1.5 million tons of petroleum products (including
506,000 tons of benzine, 477,000 tons of kerosine, 160,000 tons of diesel fuel, and
154,000 tons of lubricants). As a result of Soviet assistance the output of petroleum
products in the People’s Republic of China rose from 436,000 tons in 1952 to
1,460,000 tons in 1957. But in spite of this increase the Soviet Union remained
China’s main supplier of petroleum products. In the course of the first five-year plan
period the Soviet Union delivered about seven million tons of petroleum products to
the People’s Republic of China. In 1957 alone the USSR exported 1,803 thousand
tons of petroleum products to the People’s Republic of China. [297•1
In the first few years after the formation of the People’s Republic of China the p
Soviet Union exported to it large quantities of cotton fabrics and other consumer
goods, such as sugar, shoes, clothing, and tobacco. However, as the national
economy of China was being restored and as it became more and more capable of 298
supplying its population with consumer goods, their import from the USSR was
sharply reduced and stopped altogether at the end of the first five-year plan period.
The People’s Republic of China greatly benefited from the import of goods from p
the Soviet Union. The economic blockade and embargo on trade with China imposed
by the United States and other imperialist states made the socialist countries, and
especially the Soviet Union, the only supply source of modern means of production
for the People’s Republic of China. "Over a number of years means of production
dominated our import. It helped greatly to restore and develop industrial and farm
production, and speeded up the successful socialist industrialisation of the country,”
wrote Yeh Chi-Chuang, PRC Minister of Foreign Trade. "We would like to
emphasise the fact that the fraternal socialist countries, and especially the Soviet
Union, rendered us tremendous disinterested aid which helped to expedite socialist
construction in our country and create the mainstay of socialist
industrialisation.” [ 298•1
China also imported Soviet goods which it used for the strengthening of its p
defences. The delivery of goods for military purposes was particularly intensive in
1950–53 when the People’s Republic of China and the Korean People’s Democratic
Republic were fighting against American imperialism and China was defending its 299
frontiers. But even after the war the shipment of Soviet weapons rated high in
China’s import, while the country was modernising its armed forces. As the
modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army of China came to an end, and
defence industry enterprises built with Soviet assistance were completed, the import
of military equipment from the Soviet Union was sharply reduced. The large military
deliveries from the Soviet Union between 1950 and 1957 were of tremendous
importance for the People’s Republic of China. On the one hand they helped to
quickly re-equip the People’s Liberation Army of China with modern weapons. On
the other hand, the Soviet deliveries of weapons, munitions and equipment enabled
China to use considerable manpower and material resources to speed up the process
of restoration and peaceful development of China’s national economy.
Soviet deliveries to China not only helped to satisfy China’s economic demands, to p
strengthen its defence potential and meet the vital needs of the Chinese people, but
also helped to develop China’s export capacity. China needed greatly to increase
exports to meet the bill for its growing import of industrial goods which it needed
for the restoration and reconstruction of its national economy and later for launching
an extensive programme of economic development. At the same time China wanted
to export the goods which were in fairly large supply on the home market.
Considering the economic situation in China and its export possibilities, the Soviet
Union imported from China, between 1950 and 1960, raw materials for the
production of foodstuffs, rare and Emacs-File-stamp: 300
"/home/ysverdlov/leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/20071228/383.tx" alloying metals (tin,
mercury, tungsten, molybdenic concentrates, spodumen, beryllium, etc.), textile fibre
(raw silk, wool, jute, hemp, etc.), textiles (silks and woollens, linen table cloths, and
other articles), such raw materials as tung oil, ethereal oils, bristle, hides, etc., some
chemicals, hand– crafted articles, haberdashery, rugs, etc.
At the same time, having rehabilitated the national economy destroyed by the nazi p
invaders, the Soviet Union was speeding up socialist construction. Beginning with
1953, a large number of measures were taken in the USSR to ensure the growth of
all the branches of the national economy, especially agriculture. The economic
advance in the Soviet Union led to a marked improvement in living standards. In an
effort to satisfy the needs of th’e Soviet people as far as possible and to promote the
further progress of the Soviet economy, the Soviet Communist Party concentrated on
the development of our country’s internal reserves and resources. However, the
import of goods from abroad was welcome at this time and this favoured the export
of Chinese goods to the Soviet Union.
Right from the first years of its existence the People’s Republic of China exported p
most of its goods to the Soviet Union and it is not possible to overestimate the
importance of the capacious and stable Soviet market for China, especially at the
time when she was boycotted by the United States and many other capitalist
countries. Even in 1957 when the imperialist policy of economic blockade and trade
embargo had failed, [300•1 and more than 70 countries and areas of the world 301
had established economic relations with the Chinese Peopled Republic, [301•1 its
export to the Soviet Union was as follows: 100 per cent of its export of jute sacking,
96 per cent of coconut oil, 87.1 per cent of apples, 76.6 per cent of wool, 69.5 per
cent of tin preserves, 66.8 per cent of tobacco, 64.8 per cent of frozen pork, 59.1 per
cent of peanuts in the shell, 58.1 per cent of citrus fruit, 50.8 per cent of frozen veal
and mutton, 50.1 per cent of soya beans, 41.3 per cent of resins, 37.6 per cent of
shelled peanuts, 36.9 per cent of bristle, 31.6 per cent of rice, 28.7 per cent of tea,
91 per cent of tungsten concentrate, 85.2 per cent of tin, 82.9 per cent of
molybdenum concentrate, 80 per cent of cement, 53.4 per cent of cast iron, 28.4 per
cent of caustic soda, 95.3 per cent of woollen textile, 62.5 per cent of manufactured
silk.
It should also be borne in mind that the People’s Republic of China, as a newly p
developing country, with its poor choice and quality of goods, found it difficult to
get into the world market, and to withstand the competition of other developing
countries, as well as of the economically advanced capitalist states. It was only 302
China’s close economic ties with the socialist countries, and especially with the
USSR, that enabled her to export large quantities of industrial and
agricultural [ 302•1 raw material and other commodities at fixed prices.
Trade between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China in 1950–67 p
was carried out under the inter-governmental trade agreement signed on April 19,
1950. The goods from the USSR to China and from China to the USSR were
delivered in accordance with inventories which were reviewed and agreed upon by
both sides -every year. The trade agreement of April 19, 1950, was pronounced
effective from January 1 to December 31, 1950, that is, for a term of one year.
However, the governments of the USSR and the People’s Republic of China
regularly extended the term of this agreement by a further year. This means that, in
effect, Soviet-Chinese trade was carried on without a long-term trade
agreement. [ 302•2 Nevertheless it is wrong to say, as some bourgeois authorities 303
do, that Soviet-Chinese trade had no long-term legal basis, and that it was the Soviet
Union which did not want to commit itself to any long-term trade agreement with
the People’s Republic of China. The fact is that, in the first place, in the period
between 1950 and 1964 Soviet-Chinese trade meant more than a mere commercial
operation. Soviet exports to the People’s Republic of China included, besides purely
commercial deliveries, deliveries under an economic aid programme and under a
military aid programme. Chinese exports to the USSR included trade deliveries and
payment for Soviet economic and military credits to China and interest on them. As
for economic aid, military aid and credits, they were extended to the People’s
Republic of China on the basis of long-term agreements. In the second place, the
Soviet Union repeatedly suggested that both sides review the question of signing a
long-term agreement in order to provide for stable commercial ties between the
USSR and China. The Chinese side, however, permanently declined to discuss this
question.
All practical questions concerning Soviet– Chinese trade relations were regulated at p
first by "The General Terms of Delivery of Goods by Soviet and Chinese Foreign
Trade Organisations,” signed on March 29, 1952, and later by "The General Terms of
Delivery of Goods from the Soviet Union to the People’s Republic of China and
from the People’s Republic of China to the Soviet Union" which were discussed and 304
signed by both sides twice-on February 12, 1955, and on April 10, 1957. "The
General Terms" included a large number of questions concerning Soviet-Chinese
trade, including "terms of delivery, dates of delivery, quantity and quality of goods,
containers and markings, consignment notifications, payment procedure, sanctions,
complaints, arbitration, and general matters.”
The question of prices is of tremendous importance for the Soviet-Chinese trade p

relations. In its letter to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party of
February 29, 1964, the Mao Tsetung group said that prices on many goods and
equipment imported from the Soviet Union were much higher than those on the
world market. [ 304•1 That is not true. The Soviet-Chinese trade agreement of
April 19, 1950, stipulated that prices in Soviet-Chinese trade would be determined
"on the basis of world market prices in roubles.” In the course of the Soviet-Chinese
trade talks in 1950 all sale and purchase prices were based on the world capitalist
market prices of equivalent commodities for the preceding year. This system of price
setting was largely in use until 1958. The principle of stability of prices used in
trade between the USSR and China, as well as in trade between the USSR and other
socialist countries, was aimed at protecting the prices established in trade between
socialist countries from the harmful effects of the unstable capitalist market. This
inevitably led to situations when the USSR and China sold each other goods at 305
prices either higher or lower than those on the world capitalist market. According to
some Chinese sources, the prices of various machines imported by China from the
USSR during, and immediately after, the Korean war were some 20–30 per cent
lower, and on some types of equipment for heavy industry 30–60 per cent lower than
the prices of the equivalent types of equipment on the British and American
markets. [ 305•1 Somewhat later, as a result of a change in prices on the world
capitalist market, the Soviet Union, in turn, could buy wool, rice, jute, tung oil, black
tea, raw silk, tin, tungsten concentrate, etc., at prices which were lower than those on
the world market. [ 305•2
Following this change in prices on the world market which affected the prices of p
certain goods in Soviet-Chinese trade, some price readjustments were made in the
course of 1950–58, by agreement between the two trading partners. In 1958 prices
were again reviewed by mutual consent. The new prices were set by both sides in
line with average annual prices on the major world markets for 1957 and have since
remained unchanged by agreement between the two sides.
The principle of price setting was worked out in two letters (April 23, 1958, and p
February 26, 1959) exchanged between the sides, and was reaffirmed in annual trade
protocols on the Soviet– Chinese trade at the suggestion of the Chinese side and with 306
the consent of the Soviet side. Thus the Chinese statements made after 1960 that the
prices on many types of Soviet goods and equipment were much higher than the
prices which existed on the world market, and that for this reason trade with the
Soviet Union brought no returns to China are at variance with the facts. The prices
adopted in 1958 by both sides still operate in Soviet-Chinese trade.
Another question raised in connection with Soviet-Chinese trade is that of the p

quality of goods exchanged between the two countries. Some bourgeois propagandists
who are concerned not so much with the economic interests of the People’s Republic
of China as with the fast growth of Soviet trade with many countries and who
regard the Soviet Union as a serious competitor on the world market, are trying to
convince the trading partners of the USSR (especially the developing countries) that
Soviet goods are of an inferior quality and they refer to "China’s experience" in this
matter. But as no direct statements about poor quality of Soviet goods have been
made by Chinese officials, these propagandists resort to dubious methods. One
American authority on Sino-Soviet economic relations, Chy-yuan Cheng, [ 306•1
cited some Chinese official figures on breakage of imported Soviet equipment, which
had actually been caused by the lack of experience of Chinese workers and
technicians. This was in order to cause doubts about the quality of Soviet-made
goods.
It is possible, of course, that the flood of machinery, equipment and other goods p 307
which was sent to China from the USSR over many years, contained some
substandard samples. For example, the People’s Republic of China often imported
large quantities of first models of the latest Soviet equipment. This fact was hailed
with great satisfaction in China. The Chinese press repeatedly pointed out that the
Soviet Union had helped China install equipment which factories and plants in the
USSR did not have themselves. It stands to reason that some of this equipment,
which had not passed the test of time, must have had faults which called for
readjustment of design. In every case such faulty equipment was either replaced or
brought up to the required standards by Soviet specialists and at the expense of the
Soviet side, in accordance with established international commercial practice. The
Chinese goods imported to the Soviet Union were treated in a similar way: when a
commodity from China did not meet the required standards the responsibility for it
was borne by the Chinese side. On the whole the quality of Soviet goods delivered
to China was high. The 250 industrial enterprises, factories and projects built with
Soviet assistance and equipped with Soviet-made machinery, tens of thousands of
machine tools and instruments manufactured from Soviet blueprints and with the help
of Soviet equipment and now working at Chinese factories are evidence of this.
The volume of trade turnover between China and the USSR rose in the 1950–59 p
period (in 1953 it doubled over the 1950 figure and in 1959 was 43 per cent higher
than in 1953), and fell beginning with 1960. This is a specific feature of Soviet-
Chinese economic relations. In 1966 the volume of trade exchange between the 308
USSR and China was only 15.5 per cent of its 1959 volume and was 50 per cent
less than the 1950 volume. This sharp reduction of Sino-Soviet trade cannot be
explained only by the fact that after 1960, following the failure of the "big leap" and
the " people’s communes" policies, China’s foreign trade took a downward turn
which continued up to 1963. The sharp reduction of Soviet-Chinese trade relations
did not stem from the economic situation but from the anti-Soviet political line of
Mao Tse-tung and his group.
This group regarded China’s external economic policy as part of its foreign policy p
and as its tool. Therefore the changes taking place in the foreign policy of the
leadership of the Communist Party of China were immediately reflected in its
economic policy. The deterioration of relations between the Soviet Communist Party
and the Mao Tse-tung group, caused by the hegemonic aspirations and divisive
activities of the latter, affected the interstate economic relations between the Soviet
Union and China. At the end of 1959 the Mao Tse-tung group took a course aimed
at terminating economic relations with the Soviet Union. In 1960 trade was down 19
per cent on the 1959 level. In 1961 it was reduced by 46 per cent compared with
I960; in 1962 it declined by another 22 per cent, and in 1963 by a further 20 per
cent. And whereas in 1959 the Soviet Union accounted for 50 per cent of China’s
foreign trade, in 1960 its share went down to 40 per cent, in 1961 to 31 per cent, in
1962 to 28 per cent and in 1963 to 21 per cent, and continued to sharply decline in
subsequent years. In 1965 a mere 15 per cent of China’s foreign trade was with the
Soviet Union, and in 1966 this fell to 7 per cent and in 1967 to 2 per 309
cent. [ 309•1
Following the directions of the Mao Tse-tung group, the representatives of the p
People’s Republic of China at the Soviet-Chinese talks cut down the volume of
goods negotiated for trade, rejecting many items which had become traditional Soviet
exports to China. For example, in December 1961 the Chinese negotiators announced
that the import of Soviet complete sets of plant would be reduced to about a fifth as
compared with the preceding year, and that in 1962–63 it would be
terminated. [ 309•2 The political implications of this move by the Chinese
leadership are quite obvious, since the People’s Republic of China was at the same
time importing industrial plant from the capitalist countries. For example, China
purchased industrial plant for 20 factories from Britain, Italy, West Germany, France
and Japan.
The anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese leadership in the sphere of foreign trade led to p
a sharp reduction of Soviet exports to China. In terms of value Soviet exports to
China fell from 859.1 million roubles in 1959 to 157.8 million roubles in 1966. The
Soviet Union made every effort to check the downward trend in trade turnover with
China. Soviet representatives at trade talks offered to expand the volume of Soviet
exports to China, but they encountered opposition from the Chinese side. At the
same time the Chinese representatives refused to increase the delivery to the Soviet
Union of goods needed by the Soviet people, including those goods which China was 310
exporting in large amounts to capitalist countries and which had been traditional
Chinese export items to the USSR. As a result, the shipment of these commodities to
the Soviet Union was sharply reduced. Over the 1959–65 period China reduced its
export to the Soviet Union-of tin to 2.5 per cent of its former level, mercury to 3.1
per cent, molybdenic concentrate to 4.2 per cent, tungsten concentrate to 23 per cent,
raw silk to 2.8 per cent, tung oil to 8.3 per cent, wool to 15.4 per cent, bristle to 18
per cent.
The Chinese representatives tried to camouflage this policy, which was aimed at p
terminating Soviet-Chinese economic relations, with talks about China’s desire to
increase the volume of trade with the Soviet Union. They offered in an increasing
volume the goods which China found difficult to sell on the world market, and, at
the same time, reduced the volume of goods which had become traditional Chinese
exports to the Soviet Union. This manoeuvre of the Chinese leadership inevitably led
to a sharp reduction in Sino-Soviet trade in the years which preceded the so-called
cultural revolution in China. Between 1959 and 1966 the volume of trade between
China and the Soviet Union decreased by almost 85 per cent. SinoSoviet currency
relations are an important aspect of the economic ties between the USSR and China.
In the early stages of Soviet-Chinese economic relations, when China was still
suffering from inflation, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China agreed
upon the rate of exchange of their currencies. On June 1, 1951, the governments of
the USSR and China signed an agreement on the exchange rate of the rouble in 311
relation to the yuan of the People’s Bank of China. The agreement stated that "the
two sides unanimously agreed to establish the parity of the rouble in relation to the
yuan of the People’s Bank of China in line with the official price of gold.” On the
day the agreement was signed the rate of exchange was established at 6,754 yuans to
the rouble. The agreement came into effect immediately and was considered effective
"until the accomplishment of the currency reform in China and the establishment of
the amount of pure gold carried by the currency of the People’s Republic of China.”
On September 22, 1953, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, a protocol agreement
was signed in Peking establishing the exchange rate of the yuan of the People’s
Bank of China in relation to the rouble. According to this protocol, all monetary
operations between the USSR and China were to be conducted on the basis of the
agreed ratio of 5,000 yuans to the rouble (instead of 6,754 as was stipulated in the
agreement of June 1, 1951). The new ratio between the rouble and the yuan was
intended to simplify the working of the forthcoming currency reform in China and to
strengthen the yuan against the currencies of other countries. After the monetary
reform in March, 1955, in the course of which 10,000 old yuans were exchanged for
one new yuan, the exchange ratio between the yuan and the rouble remained the
same: 0.5 yuan to the rouble (two roubles to one yuan). Since no fixed gold content
of the yuan was specified by the reform, this official exchange rate of the yuan in
relation to the rouble remained unaltered, by agreement between the governments of
the Soviet Union and China. On December 30, 1957, the governments of the USSR 312
and China signed a protocol agreement on an increase in the exchange rate of the
yuan for non-commercial payments. Under this agreement, which came into effect on
January 1, 1958, the exchange rate of the yuan in relation to the rouble in non-
commercial payments was raised by 200 per cent. This increase in the value of the
yuan in non-commercial payments raised the Chinese currency to 16.67 yuans to 100
roubles (600 roubles to 100 yuans). The exchange rate of the rouble to the yuan for
noncommercial payments was established on the basis of prices of manufactured
sample goods and foodstuffs, and prices of services, and was in line with the prices
for equivalent commodities and services in the USSR.
The protocol agreements of October 23, 1956, and December 30, 1957, established p
the rate of exchange between the rouble and the yuan for non-commercial payments.
This new exchange rate was subject to review and verification by agreement between
the State Bank of the USSR and the People’s Bank of China in case the retail prices
on goods and services were changed substantially either in one of the countries or in
both of them. After the Soviet Union increased the gold backing of the rouble on
January 1, 1961, the buying power of the rouble was also increased. As a result, the
exchange rate of the rouble in relation to other currencies, including the currency of
the People’s Republic of China, was altered. The State Bank of the USSR and the
People’s Bank of China agreed upon a new exchange rate between the rouble and
the yuan: 45 roubles to 100 yuans in commercial payments, and 77.52 roubles to 100
yuans in non-commercial payments.
These facts show that the currency relations between the Soviet Union and the p 313
People’s Republic of China rested on an objective economic foundation and on the
basis of mutual agreement, and that the Soviet Union did not seek to use its currency
transactions with China to its own advantage.
The credit relations between the USSR and China were an important part of Sino- p
Soviet economic relations. They facilitated the building of socialism in the People’s
Republic of China, and helped to strengthen its national economy and defences. The
credits the Soviet Union extended to the People’s Republic of China meant that part
of the surplus product which forms the accumulation fund, was temporarily taken out
of the Soviet national economy and was transferred to China in the form of credits,
instead of being used for the expansion of the productive capital or for capital
construction in the cultural and service spheres which could have brought additional
benefits to the Soviet people. From the purely commercial point of view the Soviet
Union stood to gain nothing from its credits to China. Under the planned system of
economic management, the Soviet Union would have gained much more from using
them for its own domestic needs-for the expansion of production, in order to export
the additional products in exchange for the necessary commodities, instead of
shipping equipment and machinery (especially complete sets of plant) on credit to
China. The payment of interest on its credits - which, by the way, was much lower
than on the capitalist market - serves as only a partial compensation for the losses
sustained by the Soviet national economy through the temporary withdrawal of a part 314
of the national product from it. This means that the Soviet Union, true to the
principles of proletarian internationalism, extended credits to China at the expense of
the development of its own national economy and the promotion of the living
standards of its people.
The Soviet credits were quite different from the so-called assistance rendered by the p
capitalist states to developing countries. Soviet credits are not aimed at exploiting
people. Nor is their purpose the economic expansion of the Soviet Union, the making
of super-profits, or the wresting of political or military concessions from weaker
states. The Soviet credits were aimed at helping the Chinese people to build a
socialist society in their country. They were extended to the People’s Republic of
China at the most difficult times of its existence - during the first few years after the
revolution when the restoration and development of the national economy was a
question of life and death for the young republic; during the 1950–53 period when
the People’s Republic of China was participating in the Korean war; in 1961 when
the adventuristic policy of Mao Tsetung created an extremely difficult economic and
political situation in the country.
As a rule these credits were provided in the form of commodities. China also p
received investment credits which went for the construction of industrial projects
designated by the Chinese government. Gold and freely convertible currency as credit
means were used on a limited scale in the economic relations between the USSR
and the People’s Republic of China. One of the features of the Soviet-Chinese credit
relations, as well as the interest on them, was the fact that the Soviet investment and 315
commodity credits were repaid in traditional Chinese export goods. This provided
China with a stable guaranteed market for her goods, enabled many of her industries
to work to capacity, provided employment for her population and consolidated the
fiscal situation in the country.
Most of the credits extended by the Soviet Union to the People’s Republic of China p
were in roubles. The credit extended to China on February 14, 1950, was in
American dollars, while the credits granted in 1951–55 were in roubles with a gold
backing of 0.222168 grams of gold. On January 1, 1961, the gold backing of the
rouble was established at 0.987412 grams of gold which accordingly raised the
exchange rate of the rouble in relation to the currencies of other countries. The new
exchange rate went a long way towards eliminating the difference between the level
of world prices and the internal wholesale prices of commodities offered for sale on
the world market. The increased gold backing of the rouble made it necessary to
recalculate the debts of the People’s Republic of China and other recipients of Soviet
credits. As a result, the total debt owed to the Soviet Union was reduced by 77.5 per
cent. At the same time the prices of goods under the existing agreements on
commodity exchange and other deliveries were reduced by exactly the same
percentage. Therefore the amount of goods delivered against the Soviet credits, and
the rate at which the debts were to be repaid, did not change. The upward
revaluation of the rouble did not affect the commodity and credit transaction
concluded earlier between the Soviet Union and China. In fact, China lost nothing 316
from the recalculation of the funds specified in these agreements in terms of new
roubles.
The Soviet credits to the People’s Republic of China went to pay for industrial p
equipment, machinery, transport, technical assistance, military deliveries. Soviet
property handed over to China, and to settle the debts of trading operations. The
Soviet credits were offered to the People’s Republic of China on advantageous
terms-at an annual interest of not more that two per cent-some of the credits were
interest-free. The credits were extended, used and repaid with due consideration for
the national economic plans of the two countries, and this helped both China and the
USSR to fulfill their mutual commitments.
It is important to stress here that the Soviet Union did not claim to provide China p
with all the means necessary for the industrialisation programme of the whole
country, with its collossal population and territory. The aim of Soviet financial
assistance to China was to help the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese
people to make the best use of their domestic resources and internal possibilities in
order to create the primary basis of socialist industrialisation, to build a complex of
industrial establishments, which the People’s Republic of China could use in order to
advance at the fastest possible rate, and to eliminate backwardness and grow from a
poor agrarian country into a powerful socialist nation. Such an industrial base was
created in China with the help of the Soviet Union and other socialist states.
According to Li Hsien-nien, China’s Minister of Finance, Soviet loans provided 2 per
cent of China’s total revenue over ten years. [317•1 This figure does not mean 317
that the Soviet loans played a small part in the industrialisation process of the
People’s Republic of China and in the promotion of its defence capability. The
money offered by the Soviet Union was spent very concentratedly, and not within the
framework of the national economy as a whole. It went into the building of large,
modern industrial establishments-the basis of China’s industrialisation. The Soviet
military credits were used for modernising the People’s Liberation Army of China,
for making it a modern army. The very fact that the People’s Liberation Army of
China was fully equipped with modern materiel, equipment and weapons ( including
jet planes, modern tanks, artillery, submarines, and surface war ships) received from
the Soviet Union or manufactured according to Soviet blueprints at Chinese factories,
and with Soviet aid, speak for the scope, effectiveness and significance of the Soviet
credits for the People’s Republic of China. Soviet military credits were also used for
the building of barracks and for providing the soldiers and officers of the People’s
Liberation Army of China with foodstuffs and equipment. Soviet credits were
provided in sufficient quantities to have a decisive effect on the progress of China’s
economy and on the building of her defences.
The unceasing political, ideological and military provocations, numerous hostile acts p
and intrigues of the Maoists against the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist
Party might raise the question whether the aid the Soviet Union extended to China 318
between 1950–66 strengthened the positions of the Maoist group pursuing a
nationalistic and anti-Soviet line? The answer is "no,” because by doing so the
Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet people did their internationalist duty to the
world revolutionary movement. The aim of the Soviet Union was to help the Chinese
people to transform their country into an advanced socialist state and to make China
its powerful ally in the struggle against imperialism. This was largely achieved. In
the years when the People’s Republic of China was cooperating with the Soviet
Union, and when the Communist Party of China was making wide use of the
experience of the Soviet Communist Party, socialism put down deep roots in China.
The events which are now taking place in China show that the efforts of the Maoists
over the years to loosen these roots have run into opposition from the Chinese
Communists and from wide sections of the Chinese population.
In the early 1950’s the Mao Tse-tung group obviously regarded the Soviet p
assistance and experience as a means of realising its chauvinistic and hegemonic
designs. However, as the Chinese people built the foundations of socialism, drawing
on Soviet experience and aid, this process became increasingly at variance with the
anti– Marxist adventuristic and great-power aspirations of the Mao Tse-tung group.
The building of socialism in China necessitated the observance of certain objective
laws of socio-economic development and an internationalist attitude towards the
USSR and other socialist countries, whereas Mao Tsetung and his supporters
deliberately ignored these facts. It was precisely for this reason that Mao Tse-tung, in
the last few years of the first five– year plan, followed a political line aimed at 319
discrediting the assistance and experience of the USSR, at undermining the
confidence of the Chinese people in the CPSU and in the Soviet Union. This was in
preparation for carrying out his adventuristic and chauvinistic designs.
The divisive, anti-Soviet policies of the Mao Tsetung group are not only sapping the p
unity of the socialist community and weakening the world revolutionary movement,
but are also hindering the process of building socialism in China, and are detrimental
to the interests of the Chinese people themselves. Therefore, the working people of
our country continue to believe, in spite of the difficulties in Sino-Soviet relations,
that the present situation in China is transitory by its very nature, and that friendship
and cooperation between the Soviet Union and China will ultimately triumph.
Voprosy Islurii, No. 6, 1969
***

TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 287•1] This period is marked, on one side, by the conclusion on February 14,
1950, of a Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance
which paved the way for comprehensive inter-state relations between the USSR and
the People’s Republic of China, and, on the other, by the llth Plenary Meeting of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (August, 1966) at which the
Maoists, contrary to the interests of the socialist countries, and especially against the
interests of the Chinese people, enunciated their anti-Soviet line as the official policy
of the People’s Republic of China, stretching Soviet-Chinese relations to breaking
point.
[ 289•1] See 0. Borisov, B. Koloskov, The Policy of the Soviet Union ’-Towards the
People’s Republic of China: Socialist Internationalism i?i Action; The Leninist Policy
of the USSR Toward.’: China, Collection of Articles, M.. 1968, p. 201.
[ 290•1] See O. Borisov, B. Koloskov. The Policy of the Soviet Union Towards the
People’s Republic of China: Socialist Internationalism in Action; The Leninist Policy
of the USSR Towards China, Collection of Articles, M., 1968, pp. 202–203.
[ 290•2] Ibid., p. 203.
[ 291•1] Op. cit, p. 201.
[ 293•1] M. A. Suslov, On the Struggle of the CPSU for the Unity of International
Communist Movement, M., 1964, p. 53.
[ 294•1] An Economic Profile of Mainland China, Studies prepared for the Joint
Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. US Government Printing
Office, Washington, 1967, p. 592.
[ 294•2] See Our Friend China, M., 1959, p. 371.
[ 296•1] See M. Sladkovsky. Development of Trade Between the Soviet Union and
the People’s Republic of China. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 1959, No. 10, p. 7.
[ 297•1] See M. Sladkovsky, Soviet-Chinese Economic Cooperation. Ten Years of

the People’s Republic of China, M., 1959, p. 186; M. Sladkovsky, Development of
Trade Between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, pp. 4, 7, 8.
[ 298•1] Yeh Chi-Chuang. The Foreign Trade of Our Country Over the Past
Decade, Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, 1959, No. 10, p. 14.
[ 300•1] In 1957 the capitalist countries of the West relaxed their restrictions on
trade with China. They were compelled to do so by the economic difficulties in the
capitalist world and by the adverse situation on the capitalist market. Besides they
saw that China was getting all that was necessary from her trade with the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries. On May 30, 1957, Britain announced that it
would sell to China goods open for sale to the USSR and the countries of people’s
democracy. Similar announcements were made later by Holland, Denmark, Norway,
Belgium, Portugal, France, West Germany, Japan and Italy. As a result, 33.9 per cent
of China’s foreign trade in 1957 was with the capitalist countries.
[ 301•1] Duivai Maoi (Foreign Trade), 1958, No. 1.
[ 302•1] Unprocessed and processed agricultural raw material and the produce from
farmers’ subsidiary plots of land made up 90.7 per cent (in 1950) and 71.6 per cent
(in 1957) of China’s exports. See Ten Great Years. Statistics of the Economic and
Cultural Achievements of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Languages Press,
Peking, 1960, p. 176.
[ 302•2] On April 23, 1958, the governments of the USSR and China signed a treaty
on trade and navigation. In this document the two sides expressed a desire to take all
the necessary measures to develop and consolidate commercial relations on the basis
of equality and mutual benefit. The treaty stipulated that the governments of the
USSR and China would conclude agreements, including long-term ones, for
promoting goods turnover to meet the needs of the national economy of each of the
signatory states. The USSR and the People’s Republic of China also announced that
they would accord each other favoured-nation treatment on all questions concerning
trade and other types of econoni’c relations.
[ 304•1] Correspondence between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of

China and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Peking, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964, p. 33.
[ 305•1] Sec Peng Ming, The History of Friendship Between the Soviet and Chinese
Peoples, in Chinese, Peking, 1955 p. 138.
[ 305•2] Yeh Chi-chuang, Speech at the 4th Session of the AllChina Assembly of
People’s Representatives, July 11, 1957, Jenmin Jihpao, July 12, 1957.
[ 306•1] Chy-yuan Cheng. Op. cit. 300
[ 309•1] See 0. Borisov, B. Koloskov, Op. cit., pp. 193, 200, 212, 240; M. Kapitsa,
To the Left of Common Sense, M., 1968, p. 66.
[ 309•2] See O. Borisov, B. Koloskov. Op. cit., p. 198.
[ 317•1] The Glorious Decade, Collection of articles, Peking, Foreign Languages

Publishing House, 1960, p. 196.
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TOC
Card A. Nadezhdin p
In the confrontation of the two world systems the Maoists have in effect assumed p
Text
the role of an instrument serving imperialism in its efforts to “soften” and break up
HTML
the socialist community, that decisive factor in the development of the world
PS
PDF
revolutionary process. Indeed, the nationalistic Chinese-Albanian estrangement from
the socialist community is welcomed by the imperialist policy-makers as the best
T* possible contribution to the attainment of this strategic objective at a time when
19* direct military pressure on the socialist states is clearly not only ineffective but also
dangerous. Imperialism today hopes to achieve with Peking’s assistance what it failed
### to accomplish through years of reliance on its own forces alone.
The present Chinese leadership sees the main obstacle to its hegemonistic great- p
power ambitions in the solid, science-based revolutionary unity of the socialist
countries and the entire international communist movement. This unity is also the
main barrier to the realization by world anti– communism of its hopes of being able
to destroy the socialist system and halt the forward march of history. Although the
aims of the imperialists and the Peking leaders are not identical, the course they are
steering to achieve them is virtually the same. It lies through struggle primarily
against the most powerful citadel of the world’s socialist forces-the Soviet Union. 321
This is why antiSovietism, long the core of the ideology and policy of anti-
communism, has become basic also to the ideology and policies of the present
Chinese leadership. In concentrating on attacking the USSR, both the imperialists and
the Peking leaders are prompted by the hope that world socialism can be defeated by
hammering at its leading detachment. By underscoring their hostility towards the
Soviet Union they count on dulling the vigilance of the other socialist countries and
forces and persuading them that anti-Soviet actions do not jeopardise the interests of
the rest of the socialist community. In other words, both anti-communists of every
hue and the Chinese leaders employ anti-Sovietism as an instrument for dividing and
weakening the world socialist system. Though both of these reactionary forces claim
to be irreconcilably opposed to one another, the fact remains that they have in effect
joined in a united front against world socialism, against the international communist
movement.
The hostility of the present Peking leaders to the interests of the international p
proletariat is patent in the Maoist slogans, and Peking’s practical policies have given
it tangible form. Every action taken by the USSR and other socialist countries
towards strengthening world socialism, lessening international tension and organising
broad resistance to the stepped-up activity of the forces of imperialism and reaction
invariably evokes a flood of invective and slander from Peking. This was the case
during the Caribbean crisis in the autumn of 1962 when the Soviet Union took a
number of steps essential to help the Cuban people defend their revolutionary 322
achievements. The same happened in 1967, when the USSR and other fraternal
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/3.7-Peking.Against.the.Socialist.Community[2012-12-18 3:23:20]
countries came out against the Israeli aggression in the Middle East, and in 1968,
when they barred the way to counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia. As a matter of
fact, there is not an area of international relations in which Peking over the past ten
years has not in one way or another, directly or indirectly, fallen in line with the
imperialist reaction and served its interests. And nothing accords with these interests
more than the divisive policy pursued by the Chinese leaders towards the world
socialist system. Peking has helped to animate diverse “Leftist” trends in the
international working-class movement, given encouragement to proponents of
bourgeois nationalist ideology and both “Leftist” and Rightist splinter groups, all of
which see in Maoist China a backer of their anti-socialist machinations. Indeed
Peking has repeatedly promised them every assistance.
In its efforts to divide the socialist community Peking is not only working to p
undermine the world revolutionary movement, but impeding the building of socialism
primarily in China, and also in Albania. For these countries, which inherited an
onerous legacy of social and economic backwardness from the old order, close unity
with world socialism is a decisive condition of successful socialist development. As
long as they stood together with the other socialist countries, they registered
successes. The Soviet Union and other developed socialist countries rendered them
extensive assistance in resolving the key problems of socialist construction.
In 1950–59 the USSR pledged the Chinese People’s Republic help in the building, p 323
expansion and reconstruction of more than 400 major enterprises, separate factory
departments, and other projects. Of these over 250 were completed or partly put into
operation. In 1952–61 other European socialist countries built or helped in the
building in China of more than 260 enterprises, factory departments, technological
installations and other economic projects. Already by 1960 enterprises built with
Soviet help produced 8.7 million tons of pig iron and 8.4 million tons of steel, and
accounted for 80 per cent of the motor trucks, over 90 per cent of the tractors, 55
per cent of the steam and hydraulic turbines, 25 per cent of the electric power and
25 per cent of the aluminium turned out in China.
Had China not rejected close cooperation with the socialist camp and the Chinese p
leadership not substituted all-out build-up of military potential for the creation of the
material and technological base of socialism, the Chinese People’s Republic would
undoubtedly have scored further successes in industrialisation and the development of
socialist society in general. For the USSR and other socialist countries, in step with
the development of their own economies, would naturally have expanded
industrialisation aid through the sixties. As a result, a solid material foundation
would have been laid by now for socialist production relations in China. As it is,
however, the material base remains weak, and this, especially with the policies
pursued by the Chinese leaders, facilitates the deformation and emasculation of the
very essence of socialist production relations. (The break with the socialist
community has greatly retarded economic development of Albania too, even though 324
it received substantial material and financial aid from China in the sixties. Whereas
the average annual industrial growth rate in Albania was 17 per cent in 1956–60, in
1961–65 it was only 6.8 per cent as against the 8.7 per cent planned.)
The anti-socialist orientation of Maoism is manifest not only in the parallelism of p

the policies pursued by Peking and the imperialist world, both of which are aimed
against the socialist camp, but also in the basic concurrence of the stance and policy
of the Peking leaders and those of the Chinese bourgeoisie, which exists to this day
in the Chinese People’s Republic. In 1957 the Maoists gave this bourgeoisie every
opportunity publicly to propound its anti-socialist views.
When in mid-1957 a campaign was at last launched against the offensive of the p
"bourgeois Right-wing elements,” the Chinese press carried articles critical of their
anti-Soviet sallies and fabrications. In one of these articles the then General Secretary
of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association Tsien Chun-jui (in the sixties he became a
victim of the Maoist repressions), assessing the stand of the "bourgeois Right-wing
elements,” stressed that their objective was the restoration of capitalism. "The Right
regarded struggle against the Communist Party within the country and against the
Soviet Union on the international arena of utmost importance for the achievement of
this objective,” he said. "Unless the Communist Party is overthrown and friendly
relations with the Soviet Union severed, the positions of socialism are bound to
remain strong.” [ 324•1 The article declared that the "ideology of bourgeois 325
nationalism manifested in relation to the Soviet Union will become ultra-reactionary
anti-Soviet nationalism.” Today many of the aims the bourgeois forces in China
fought for in the fifties have been realized by the present Peking leaders: the
internationalist, Marxist-Leninist forces in the Communist Party of China were
smashed during the "cultural revolution,” struggle against the USSR has become
Peking’s No. 1 objective, and anti-Sovietism has been made official policy.
The above-mentioned article also noted that the bourgeois Right was "beginning to p
develop a sense of superiority over other nations,” that they had gone so far as to
forget the foreign policy principles recorded in the Constitution and were out to
"practise reactionary great-power chauvinism.” "The foreign policy programme of the
bourgeois Right-wing elements is pivoted on anti-socialism and pro-Americanism,”
Tsien Chun-jui said.
It is perfectly obvious that the foreign policy programme of the bourgeois Right- p
wing elements as set forth in 1957, its nationalistic class essence, has been fully
espoused by the Maoists. It is not by chance that the most active anti-Sovieteers
from the Right-wing camp were rehabilitated soon after 1957.
Peking’s foreign policy line in many respects echoes the policies of Chiang Kai- p
shek, who represents the class interests of diehard Chinese bourgeois-landlord
reaction. Although Mao Tse-tung once called Chiang a man from whom one could
learn only what should not be done, in practice he is a zealous follower of his
"teacher in reverse.” If, after seizing power in China in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek and 326
his followers overtly and covertly engaged in anti-Soviet machinations on the
international arena, circulating slanderous allegations concerning some mythical "Red
imperialism,” and today, entrenched in Taiwan, make no secret of their anti-Soviet
credo, the Maoists have openly pivoted their foreign policy on anti– Sovietism and
are talking about Soviet "social imperialism.” And if Chiang Kai-shek and his
followers are active participants in the notorious Asian People’s Anti-Communist
League, the Maoists are fighting the international communist movement both in Asia
and outside its bounds. It is not surprising that entry visas to China were refused the
communist members of a French parliamentary delegation.
Like the Chiang Kai-shek crowd, the present Chinese leaders are not at all happy p
about the independence of the Mongolian People’s Republic. Although Peking bosses
have not ventured to publish maps showing the Mongolian People’s Republic as a
part of China, as has been done in Taiwan, they continue to cherish as they did
decades ago hopes of annexing Mongolia to China.
As far back as 1936, during an interview gran- [ ted to the then obscure US p
journalist Edgar Snow, ’ Mao Tse-tung categorically declared that after the victory
of the revolution in China the MPR would "automatically,” "of its own free will,”
once again become part of China. In April 1945 Chou Enlai’s private secretary told
some American officials that the Chinese leaders would like to "join Outer Mongolia
(meaning the MPR to China).” And in 1954 Mao with unadulterated great-power
arrogance took up with the Soviet Government the question of annexing Mongolia to 327
the Chinese People’s Republic, but was told that this was a question that should have
been raised with the Mongolian people and government, and not with the Soviet
Union.
Both Chiang Kai-shek and the present Chinese leaders present territorial claims to p
the USSR and other neighbouring countries. Both have taken a chauvinistic, great-
power stance as regards China’s role and place in the world. Even during the
difficult period of the war against Japan, when China was in extreme straits, the
Kuomintangcontrolled press made no secret of the hegemonic ambitions of Chiang
Kai-shek and his followers. The newspaper Yihshihpao, for instance, wrote on
December 16, 1943: "In the future the vast territory in East Asia from the Indian
Ocean in the west to Japan in the east and from Australia in the south to Alaska in
the north will wholly belong to China, and she shall have to bear the responsibility
for the integrity and prosperity of all this territory.” Mao Tse-tung repeated the same
claims in June 1958: "The present Pacific Ocean is in reality not too pacific. In the
future, when it comes under our control, it can become such.”
Indicative too is the identity of the Maoist and Chiang Kai-shek tactics of struggle p
against progressives at home and on the international arena. It will be recalled that in
1927, when the communist movement in China had gained substantial strength,
Chiang Kai-shek struck hard at it, and at the same time brought relations with the
USSR to the breaking point, to armed clashes on the Soviet-Chinese frontier. The
strengthening of the forces of socialism registered in China by 1956–57 similarly 328
prompted the Maoists to launch an offensive against them and to accompany the
drive with a worsening of relations with the USSR and other socialist countries
which eventually developed into open enmity towards them.
There is also another noteworthy coincidence. When Japanese imperialism presented p

a deadly danger to the Chinese state in the late twenties and early thirties, Chiang
Kai-shek and his followers sought to ward off the threat by doing their utmost to
provoke a clash between Japan and the Soviet Union by demonstrating their anti–
Sovietism and their readiness to yield to Japanese imperialism. In the past decade the
Maoists have repeatedly displayed pliancy under pressure from US imperialism,
confining themselves to endless "serious warnings.” At the same time, in order to
curry favour with it, they have escalated antiSovietism as no imperialist state has
ventured to do. Besides, in the sixties Peking seized upon every opportunity to
provoke a sharp aggravation of relations and even a clash between the US and the
USSR, intending to remain in the sidelines itself.
A comparison of Peking’s foreign policy with , the course steered by world anti- p
communism and the foreign policy programme of the Chinese bourgeois-landlord
reaction shows that although there are definite and at times extremely sharp
contradictions among these three political forces, their positions in relation to world
socialism are very much alike.
However, as distinct from the latter two, Peking prefers to conduct its subversive p
work under a smokescreen fo "ultra-Left,” "ultra– revolutionary" slogans and
professed aims. For this reason the Peking leaders are anxious to have at least some 329
of the socialist countries and communist parties, as well as organisations representing
the nationalliberation movement, concede that Peking too stands on “revolutionary”
positions if they cannot be induced to recognize it as the "only true revolutionary.”

This was one of the reasons why Peking returned in 1968 to its notorious "
differentiated policy" towards the socialist countries. The underlying idea, formulated
in the early sixties, is to concentrate on assailing the USSR, while taking a flexible
attitude towards other socialist countries in order to induce them to be at least
“neutral” in the fight waged by the Marxist– Leninists against Peking’s reactionary
ideological and political platform and great-power hegemonism.
The Marxist-Leninists are not taken in by this tactic. "We,” the Polish Trybuna p
Ludu said in an article on the fiftieth anniversary of the Communist Party of China,
"seek normalisation of interstate relations with the Chinese People’s Republic. But
we resolutely reject every attempt to make use of our readiness to normalise
relations to promote ends preventing the strengthening of the unity of the entire
socialist community. Under no circumstances can an anti-Soviet policy and
orientation on splitting the socialist community and the international communist
movement serve as a platform for genuine normalisation.”
Our epoch is a crucial one in human history. The broadest unity of all progressive p
forces, and primarily of the socialist countries and the organised international
working class, is of decisive importance for the success of the struggle against the
threat of a devastating thermo-nuclear war, for peace, democracy, socialism and 330
communism. Hence the magnitude of the harm done to the interests of the
revolutionary forces by the divisive activities of the “Left” and Right-wing
revisionists operating in the ranks of these forces, in camouflage garb, seeking to
speak and act in their name and to subordinate them to their influence. Especially
pernicious and unprincipled is revisionism combined with and nurtured by
nationalism. This combination, if transformed into official ideology governing the
policies of one or another country that has embarked on the socialist road, presents a
danger proportional to the size of the country that has fallen under nationalist sway.
The “bridge-building” policies of world imperialism and Peking’s "differentiated p

policy" pursue at this stage one and the same goal-they both are designed to prevent
the development of world socialism as a united political and economic system and
thereby to undermine its might and influence on the world revolutionary process.
The socialist countries give a resolute rebuff to the divisive activities of Peking, p
which has opened a new front against world socialism, a front that is particularly
dangerous because it runs through the socialist system itself. Hence utmost clarity is
essential in assessing its place and role in the global confrontation of the forces of
progress and reaction.
The future of socialism, its sound, successful development in the various countries, p
and the prospects of the struggle for socialism in the capitalist countries depend to a
great extent, as the experience of the past two and a half decades has convincingly
shown, on the unity of the socialist world system as a whole, on the consistent 331
utilisation of the countless advantages inherent in it. On this depends the success also
of the worldwide anti-imperialist movement. Consequently, the socialist countries,
while resolutely combating Peking’s splitting activities and rejecting the ideological
and political platform of the present Chinese leaders, are working untiringly to bring
about a normalisation of inter-state relations with the Chinese People’s Republic.
This principled line was once again clearly reflected in the decisions of the recent
congresses of the communist parties of Hungary, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, the Mongolian People’s Republic, and the German Democratic
Republic.
New Times, No. 33, 1971
***

TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 324•1] Hsuehhsi, No. 16, 1957.
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<•> New Strategy for the Same Ends 332
AN ANALYSIS OF MAOIST INTERNATIONAL

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Text
HTML The great-power, disruptive policy of the Peking leaders is causing serious damage p
PS to the interests of the world socialist system and the entire communist movement,
PDF impeding the anti– imperialist struggle of the progressive forces and exercising an
adverse influence on the international situation. What is happening in China is being
T* exploited by anti-communist propaganda in order to discredit scientific socialism and
19* Marxism– Leninism as a whole.
### The practical activity, political principles and pronouncements of the Chinese p
leadership in the current period have clearly shown that Mao Tsetung and his group
are intent on following the basic political course endorsed by the Ninth Congress of
the Communist Party of China. This means a rejection of the proletarian, class
approach in assessing social phenomena, undermining the socialist community and
the anti– imperialist front, frenzied anti-Sovietism and the endeavour to establish
world hegemony.
But instead of bringing the Maoists the desired results, the attempts at a frontal and p
forceful implementation of this policy have deepened China’s internal crisis and its
isolation on the international arena. That is why the Maoists have recently been
compelled, while keeping up their far-going hegemonic aims, to resort to 333
manoeuvring. They are trying hard to make their policy look more respectable and
less aggressive.
Ever since the Ninth Congress of the CPC, Mao Tse-tung and his supporters have p
been trying to complete the legalisation of the political upheaval brought about
during the "cultural revolution,” to bolster up their regime in China and gradually put
into action their foreign policy aimed at achieving hegemonic aims.
In the sphere of the country’s internal development, the chief task of the Maoists p
has been to overcome socio-economic instability and restore the prestige of the
central government, which was shaken by the "cultural revolution.” This has
demanded that attention be confined to the problems of economic, Party and state
construction. To a certain extent regulation of socio-political and economic activity is
achieved by means of all-round militarisation and by maintaining a "besieged
fortress" atmosphere. The personality cult of Mao Tse-tung is being further boosted
and there are endless demagogic claims that the Maoist "cultural revolution" was
"absolutely necessary in order to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat,” and
that it gave "a powerful impetus to the economic, political, ideological and cultural
development of the country.” The outrages committed by the hungweipings, and the
vicious mockery of hundreds of thousands of Communists are said to have been
caused by the "intrigues and provocations of Chairman Mao’s enemies,” meaning Liu
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/3.8-Analysis.of.Maoist.International.Policy[2012-12-18 3:23:27]
Shao-chi and his adherents. This is all part of the Maoists’ broad political manoeuvre
aimed at stabilising the internal situation.
However, the process of relative stabilisation is uneven and painful. The agitations p 334
of the " cultural revolution,” particularly those connected with the major reshuffle in
the Party and government, had not yet subsided when a new political crisis broke out
in the ruling Maoist elite. More than one half of the 25 Members and Candidate
Members of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China (the Politbureau formed at the Ninth Congress in 1969) have disappeared from
the political arena; and only two of the five Members of the Politbureau Permanent
Committee (known as "the Five”) are politically active.
Quite recently, Lin Piao, CC CPC Vice– Chairman and Member of the Politbureau p
Permanent Committee, was mentioned in the Party Rules as a "close associate" and
the “continuer” of the cause of Mao Tse-tung. But the ink had hardly dried when,
according to foreign agencies, Lin Piao was declared, following Liu Shao-chi, "a po-
I litical swindler and a great careerist.” The coun- ’ try is still dominated by tension,
which, as before, the Maoists are trying to blunt by accelerating their anti-Soviet
campaign and whipping up war hysteria. [334•1
All this cannot be accounted for merely by the struggle for power in the Chinese p
leadership. Everything seems to indicate that the new crisis was caused by a dispute 335
among the Maoist rulers on questions of domestic and foreign policy.
Being well aware of the dangerous consequences of the Maoist course, Marxist- p
Leninist parties are seriously concerned with the Chinese problem. They voiced their
principled position at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties
held in Moscow in June, 1969. In this respect the Meeting marked an important
stage in the efforts of Marxist-Leninists to strengthen the unity of their revolutionary
ranks, to preserve the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory, and to counteract the anti-
Leninist and subversive activity of the Maoists.
The 24th Congress of the CPSU, the recent congresses of other Marxist-Leninist p
parties, the constructive foreign policy of the USSR and the general offensive
launched by the forces of socialism against imperialism and reaction-these have once
again demonstrated most strikingly the subversive character of the foreign policy
course followed by the Maoists, whose aim is to split the world revolutionary
movement.
The Chinese splitters and their agents abroad have suffered serious set-backs, and p
this has compelled them to revise their strategy. Add to this the collapse of the
imperialist sabotage against socialism in Czechoslovakia (the intrigues of the anti-
socialist forces in that country were approved by the Maoists) and the firm rebuff
given to the provocations of the Chinese authorities on the Soviet-Chinese frontier,
and it will become clear what forced the Maoists to alter the strategy of conducting
subversive activity in the international arena.
The CPSU and other fraternal parties contrast Peking’s disruptive policy with the p 336
efforts to cement the unity of the socialist countries, the world communist movement
and the anti– imperialist forces, and also with their policy of normalising interstate
relations with the Chinese People’s Republic. This policy was clearly set forth in the
Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress delivered by Comrade
Leonid Brezhnev, in the speeches of delegates, in the Congress’s Resolution on the
Report, and in the addresses delivered by the leaders of the fraternal Marxist-Leninist
parties to the Congress. The CPSU and the fraternal parties of the socialist countries
are ready to promote the all-round development of interstate relations with the PRC
without going against their principles and national interests. At the same time the
Marxist– Leninist parties are continuing to repel the attacks and expose the
ideological platform of the Maoists, a platform which is incompatible with Marxism-
Leninism.
Based on a consideration of long-term prospects, this policy of the Marxist- p

Leninists serves to cement the unity of the international communist movement and
the entire anti-imperialist movement, and furthers the cause of socialism in China
itself.
Owing to the internationalist stand of the socialist countries in regard to China, to p

their strong defence of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and to their firm
counteraction of the efforts to subvert the socialist states, the world revolutionary
movement and the anti-imperialist forces, it became possible to frustrate the plans of
the Maoists to set up their own centre for countering the world communist and 337
working-class movement, and in large measure to neutralise the adverse
consequences of Peking’s policy
The Maoists have met with serious internal and international obstacles to the p
achievement of their aims. The adventurism characteristic of Maoism has come
sharply into conflict with reality, and this has created the ground for fresh political
crisis in China. The policy of Mao Tsetung and his group is facing growing
resistance from the working people and members of the Chinese Communist Party.
No wonder Mao Tsetung declared that "it needs another three or four cultural
revolutions" to get rid of opposition to the policy of the ruling elite and to
strengthen the government, or rather - the military-bureaucratic dictatorship.
The Maoists have failed in their attempts to attain their chauvinistic and hegemonic p
aims through frontal attacks on the forces which they regard as their chief opponents.
Nor did their fabrications about a Soviet military threat produce the hoped-for
results.
The fact that the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries are consistently pursuing p
a policy of promoting genuine normalisation of relations with China causes difficulty
for the Maoists and their anti-Soviet propaganda both at home and on the
international scene.
What, then, ate the distinctive features of the new Maoist strategy? The most p
conspicuous of Peking’s new strategems is the change in its foreign-policy slogans.
The slogan "Revolution through war or prevention of war through revolution,”
advanced in the course of the Ninth Congress of the CPC, was replaced in the spring
of 1970 by another slogan which says, "The danger of a new world war still exists, 338
and all nations must be prepared for it. But revolution is now the chief trend in the
world.” While retaining the slogan of a world war as the most expedient means of
resolving the contradictions of today, the Maoists now more frequently speak about
their readiness to build relations with all countries, including the socialist ones, on
the basis of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence.” But although Peking is less
bellicose in its statements on international issues, it is keeping to its antiSoviet, anti-
socialist direction in its foreign policy activity.
It is noteworthy that among the many capitalist countries that have recently p
recognized the PRC, those connected with the USA through various military alliances
and blocs are displaying particular activeness.
The logical consequence of Peking’s new strategy in the international arena is its p
open rapprochement with the ruling circles of the biggest imperialist states. In 1970
the capitalist market accounted for 82 per cent of the PRC’s foreign trade turnover,
as compared to only 32 per cent in 1958. These figures speak for themselves. They
reveal the reorientation of the PRC’s economic ties from the socialist to the capitalist
market.
The USA is experiencing great difficulties in connection with the continuing war in p
Vietnam. It is intensifying its aggression against the peoples of Indochina and
accelerating the implementation of its “Vietnamisation” policy. In doing so
Washington is trying to use the "Peking card,” and the Maoists are again helping the
American imperialists to find a way out of the Indochina impasse. What is more, 339
Mao Tse-tung and his group are starting a new wave of anti-Sovietism to reassure
the US rulers about Peking’s loyalty.
The Soviet Union has always opposed the isolation of PRC and welcomes the p
establishment of normal diplomatic relations between China and other countries as
well as the restoration of China’s rights in the UN. It seems that this could lead to
international detente and could make possible the solution of many major problems
and the safeguarding of world peace.
Throughout the years the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have steadfastly p
defended the true interests of China as a socialist country. They have consistently
exposed the imperialist policy of isolating and blockading the PRC, and have
supported the legitimate demands to restore its rights in the UN by opposing the
"two Chinas" policy.
Unfortunately, the very first steps of the Chinese delegation in the UN General p
Assembly have shown that the Chinese leadership intends to continue in the United
Nations anti-Sovietism and its efforts to split the progressive forces. The two
speeches made by the leader of the Chinese delegation at the General Assembly bear
this out. Peking’s obstructive stand on the question of calling a World Disarmament
Conference and a conference of the five nuclear powers plays right into the hands of
the enemies of peace, says the Bulgarian newspaper Rabotnichesko Delo. They are
hoping that Peking’s cheap demagogy will influence some Third World countries and
that the imperialists will thus be able to wreck the Soviet initiatives aimed at
establishing peace and security.
The CPSU and the Soviet Government consistently support the normalisation of p 340
relations between all countries because this promotes a general improvement of the
international climate. At the same time, they have always considered that the
development of bilateral relations between states must not interfere with the interests
of other countries or proceed at their expense. The policy of improving the entire
international situation is the pivot of the peace programme put forward by Comrade
Leonid Brezhnev in the Report of the CC CPSU to the 24th Congress, and endorsed
by the Congress. The policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government towards China
is inseparably linked with this general programme. Their objective is to defend the
basic interests of the Soviet people, the purity of Marxist-Leninist principles, and the
ideals of peace, democracy and communism. The CPSU will never go against its
own principles, against the state interests of the Soviet Union and the other socialist
countries, or against the world revolutionary process and the anti-imperialist struggle.
Recently the Peking leadership has also changed its strategy in its relations with the
socialist countries. On the one hand, readiness is expressed to promote interstate
relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the basis of the "five
principles of peaceful coexistence.” But at the same time, a sixth principle is added,
and this provides for interference into the internal affairs of the socialist countries
and for "prolonged, irreconcilable, principled struggle.”
On October 7, 1969, a Chinese Government statement advanced the following p

formula: ”. . .Between China and the USSR there are irreconcilable, fundamental 341
differences, and a principled struggle between them will continue for a long time.
But that should not prevent the maintenance of normal state relations between China
and the Soviet Union on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.”
This formula was then extended to the PRC’s relations with other socialist countries.
By proposing this basis for relations with the USSR and other socialist countries, p
the Chinese leadership is not only completely ignoring the class approach in
international affairs, but also trying to create an international legal “ basis” for
considering them as non-socialist. Peking maintains that, apart from China itself, only
Albania is a genuinely socialist state. And what is more, the Maoists want to exploit
normalisation of state relations with the socialist countries (which have not adopted
the doctrine of Maoism or approved the "cultural revolution”) in order to destroy or
undermine their system. So although the Maoists pay lip-service to the five principles
of peaceful coexistence, which include non– interference in one another’s affairs, in
actual fact they are trying to legalise their subversive activity against the socialist
countries and interference in their internal affairs under the pretext of waging a
"principled struggle.”
The aims and programme of this struggle are openly expounded in the directive p
article, " Leninism or Social-Imperialism?" It is an attempt to give "theoretical
backing" to the subversion against the USSR and other socialist countries, against the
Marxist-Leninist parties and the international collective organisations of the socialist
states-the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty 342
Organisation. Similar aims were expressed by the Chinese leadership in its
publications on the occasion of the events that took place in Poland in December
1970, in the article of March 18, 1971, marking the centenary of the Paris Commune,
and in the article of July 1, 1971, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the
CPC.
Why is Peking resorting to new stratagems’? It is aware of its inability to oppose p

all the socialist countries at the same time, and to wage a frontal attack against the
socialist community combined with the international communist movement. So it
decided to employ the strategy expounded in the articles dedicated to the 50th
anniversary of the CPC and to Mao Tse-tung’s speech "On Our Policy.” The essence
of such strategy is summed up in what they call "dual tactics.” In their jargon this
means "fighting spear with spear,” " marshalling the forces of active supporters,
winning over the intermediate forces and isolating the chief adversaries,” "crushing
the enemies singly,” and "hitting on the head so that the rest crumbles down.” In
brief, as the Peking social chauvinists step up their subversive activity against the
socialist countries, they are trying to take an individual approach to these countries,
carefully studying the specific situation in each of them and the state of their
relations with the Soviet Union. Nor is Peking niggardly with its promises of
economic benefits and credits for separate socialist countries provided they are
“neutral” in the major dispute between the international communist movement and
the CPC leaders, and provided they loosen their ties with the Soviet Union. That is
how the Peking leaders are trying to expand the channels for their ideological 343
penetration of the socialist countries. They aim to turn them into an instrument of its
policy, and ultimately to undermine or weaken the unity and might of the socialist
system and isolate the USSR as much as possible. This line is reminiscent of the
"bridge building" stratagem by means of which imperialism has long been trying to
weaken the unity of the socialist community and “erode” it from within.
Besides, there are other benefits which the Chinese leadership hopes to get by p
means of its new strategy. For example, it wants the normalisation of interstate
relations between the PRC and the socialist countries to be presented as a victory for
the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung" and a justification of the course charted by the Ninth
Congress of the CPC.
But something else betrays the treachery of the Maoist "dual tactics.” This is that, p
despite all the efforts of the fraternal parties, the Chinese leadership (while
proclaiming fictitious antiimperialist slogans) vigorously opposes unity of action in
the struggle against imperialism. This, in effect, helps the imperialists in their
attempts to mount a counter-offensive against the revolutionary movement in one
area or another. An example of this is provided by the events in Indochina and also
by the increasing efforts of the reactionary forces to undermine the progressive
regimes in a number of Asian, African and Latin American countries.
Peking has not only kept its global strategy against the Soviet Union unchanged, but p
is constantly deepening and "theoretically substantiating" it. Having rejected the 344
Marxist assessment of the major contradictions of today, and the class conception of
the balance of forces in the world, the Maoist politicians now contend that the chief
contradiction is the one between the two “superpowers” (the USSR and the USA) on
the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other. The slogan of combating "the
hegemony of the two superpowers" has become the banner under which the Chinese
leadership is trying once again to build up a bloc consisting of the "small and
medium-sized" states, irrespective of their socio-economic systems. This slogan is an
extension of the Maoists’ anti-Marxist schemes about the "intermediate zones" and
the divisions of all states into “rich” and "poor,” and is obviously devised to justify
their anti-Soviet policy. Under the pretext of fighting "the two superpowers,” the
Maoists are discarding the idea of the confrontation of the two systems. Instead they
equate socialism and capitalism, and in this way try to attain hegemony.
Peking’s present foreign policy doctrine consists, on the one hand, in manoeuvring p
within the USSR-USA-Japan-China “quadrangle”-in increasing the contradictions
between the USSR, the USA and Japan for the sake of its own selfish, great-power
chauvinist aims; and, on the other hand, in urging various states (including
developing, capitalist and some socialist ones) to fight what it calls the "hegemony
of the two superpowers,” directing their attack mainly against the Soviet Union-the
bulwark of socialism, world peace and security. Chinese representatives emphasise
that this platform is the basis for a rapprochement with the PRC, that it is on this 345
basis that China is ready to improve relations with any country, regardless of its
system.
The Maoist leadership is trying hard to find allies in the developing countries of p
Asia, Africa and Latin America, counting on the nationalist sentiments and extremist
groupings in some of them. It has begun to step up diplomatic and economic
relations with the developing countries, using more flexible methods and avoiding
blatant intervention in their internal affairs or open imposition of Maoist ideas.
A new feature of Chinese tactics designed to win the sympathy of the Third World p
was the revision in 1970 of the formerly hostile attitude towards the "movement of
the non-aligned countries" .and the endeavour to subject their interests to China’s
hegemonic policy. It is these aims that prompted the Chinese leadership to capitalise
on the slogan of struggle against "the two superpowers" and to attempt to separate
the Third World countries from their reliable support in the anti-imperialist struggle-
to separate them from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.
Hegemonic aspirations are also the factor that determines the attitude of the Peking p
leadership towards the problem of Indochina. Recent events are increasingly exposing
its strategic goals in Indochina and its double-dealing policy. Everything seems to
indicate that the Maoists are intent on strengthening their position in this region. If
we were to uncover the real motive behind their monoeuvres, it would be plain that
they are meant to show the US rulers that "the key to the solution of the Indochina
problem lies in Peking,” and to belittle the importance of the initiatives of the 346
Vietnamese patriots for a political settlement. This gives the US Administration the
opportunity to ignore the constructive proposals put forward by the delegation of the
South Vietnam Provisional Revolutionary Government and fully supported by the
Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and by the progressive and
peace forces of the world.
In order to win the confidence of the Arabs and to strengthen its position in the p
Middle East, Peking now prefers not to voice open objections against a political
settlement of the crisis there. Yet it continues to give active support to the extremist
elements there which oppose any political settlement.
The PRC leadership is dead against all the initiatives of the socialist states for a p
detente in Europe. It sharply opposed the Soviet and Polish agreements with the
Federal Republic of Germany, and the West Berlin talks. Its propaganda discredits
the idea of strengthening European security and does everything possible to interfere
with efforts to attain this end.
By opposing the Soviet proposals to hold a conference of the five nuclear powers p
and a World Disarmament Conference, the Chinese Government has proved itself to
be an opponent of detente.
Peking is now trying to bring its attitude to the international communist movement p
in line with its new foreign policy strategy. It wants to counterpose the various anti-
Soviet political forces and revisionist elements of all hues, both Right and "Left,” to
the tendency towards growing unity among the communist forces. That is why the
pursuance of the ideals of the working class and of scientific socialism today 347
requires firm action against all these enemies of Marxism– Leninism.
The Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties held in 1969 has crippled p
the hegemonic plans of the CPC leaders. Having completely failed to turn the pro-
Chinese groups in other countries into influential political parties or to unite them
into something resembling an international trend, the Chinese leadership have made
another attempt to win over individual communist parties or at least to persuade them
not to make any public criticism of its ideology and policy. With this aim in view,
Chinese propaganda and official CPC representatives have concentrated on slandering
the CPSU’s home and foreign policies and the situation in the USSR and the
socialist community in front of foreign Communists. At the same time any pretext is
used to kindle nationalism and anti-Sovietism among the ranks of the communist
movement and the national-liberation movement.
In its efforts to subject the revolutionary movement and the national-liberation drive p
to its hegemonic aims. Maoism is managing to confuse some revolutionaries and
trying to direct struggle, not against the real enemies, but against the Soviet Union
and the communist parties which are actively defending Marxism-Leninism and the
unity of all revolutionary forces.
The Maoist strategy can be summed up as follows: Wherever there is hope of p

influencing the leadership of communist parties, the Maoists readily abandon their
own direct supporters,- in countries where they come up against strong resistance,
they increase their support for the pro– Maoist, break-away groups and "parties,” 348
spend large sums on maintaining their network of political agents, and engage in
direct political attacks on the communist parties in those countries.
As for the patently pro-Maoist parties, they have recently been considerably p
weakened. Having taken the political course dictated by Peking, they found
themselves in a most awkward situation. For example, there were some communist
parties whose leadership blindly followed Maoist dogmas. This led to the serious
defeat of the revolutionary forces in the countries concerned, while the parties
themselves lost contact with the masses, forfeited worker and peasant support, and
degenerated into conspiratorial sects maintained by Peking.
It is characteristic that in fighting the communist parties of capitalist countries, p

Peking even makes use of its contacts with the ruling bourgeois parties. For
example, the Chinese leaders demanded that representatives of the Japanese
Communist Party should be excluded from the Parliamentary Association which is
trying to establish diplomatic relations between China and Japan, and that communist
parliamentarians should not be included in parliamentary delegations sent to China.
That is how the Peking leadership is taking revenge on the Communist Party of
Japan for its criticism of Maoist adventurism in the international arena and for its
principled stand towards the notorious "cultural revolution.” The international policy
of the Chinese leadership has demonstrated that Maoism sharply conflicts with the
anti-imperialist platform formulated at the International Meeting of June 1969.
Maoism is one of the most dangerous adversaries of Marxism in the history of the p 349
revolutionary movement. The danger stems largely from the fact that Maoism is a
political practice which exploits the aspirations of the masses for socialism and
which relies for ideological support on the eclecticism of "Mao Tse-tung ideas,” the
political prestige of the Chinese revolution and the CPC, the state machinery, and the
economic, military and other resources of the world’s most populous country.
Maoist slogans sometimes find some response among certain quarters in the Third p
World and among young extremists in the capitalist countries, and are taken up and
spread by opportunists. This is due largely to the fact that the public in these
countries, not knowing the true nature of Maoism, mistakes the revolutionary rhetoric
of Maoism for a genuine revolutionary spirit and concern for the interests of the
fighting peoples. But deeper knowledge of Maoism dispels these illusions and proves
it to be basically incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and scientific socialism, and
with the interests of the struggle for national liberation.
The International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties held in 1969 p

emphasised that combating the theory and practice of Maoism is one of the most
important internationalist tasks of all the Marxist-Leninist parties and the world
revolutionary movement.
In order to expose the anti-Marxist, anti– Leninist nature of Maoism, it is essential p

to consider some of its specific features:
- Maoism disguises its real essence with Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary phraseology p

in order to deceive the Chinese people, who, because of the existing conditions in 350
the PRC, are unable to learn about the works and views of the founders of Marxism-
Leninism and so accept Mao’s “ideas” as the "pinnacle of Marxist thought;"
- the Maoists take a purely pragmatical approach to the question of theory, p

regarding it as an instrument for furthering their great-power policy. The Maoists
unscrupulously change their political declarations and stratagems, according to the
dictates of practical needs and the concrete situation, but always spearhead the attack
against Marxism-Leninism, the communist movement and the socialist community,
particularly the Soviet Union. The ideological and political platform of Maoism is
designed to realise the hegemonic aspirations of the CPC’s nationalistic leadership;
- Maoism’s eclecticism makes it manifold. It is a hotchpotch of “ideas” that can be p

adapted to the most diverse needs. That is why "Mao Tsetung’s ideas" suit the ultra-
Left "revolutionaries,” the extremists and Trotskyites, and the Right opportunists
alike. Maoist ideas are utilised by outright anti-communists and anti-Sovietists such
as Klaus Mehnert, Benjamin Schwartz and Edgar Snow. Maoism makes active use of
the various anti-communist trends and of revisionism of all hues to attack scientific
socialism.
The anti-Leninist ideological and political platform of the Maoists appeared in the p
late 1950’s and took concrete shape after Peking’s extensive political and ideological
campaign against the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties.
Criticism of Maoism should take account of the great gap existing between Mao’s p
published articles, which foster the myth that he is an " outstanding Marxist-
Leninist,” and his actual views. These latter betray themselves in the actual policy 351
and activity of the present Chinese leadership, Mao Tse-tung’s articles and speeches
are reportedly published after thorough revision, after "they have been flavoured with
Marxism– Leninism,” as he himself says. The Maoists deliberately exploit for their
selfish aims the authoritative ideas of scientific socialism, using them to conceal the
unscientific, anti-Marxist character of the ideas of the "great helmsman.” On the
other hand, Mao Tse-tung has adopted many true postulates regarding the strategy,
tactics and driving forces of the Chinese revolution, having borrowed them from the
documents of the Communist International and from works by veterans of the
fraternal parties (including some Chinese). It is the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist
parties, not Mao Tse-tung, that are to be credited with the verified conclusions and
appraisals concerning such basic issues as the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal nature
of the Chinese revolution, the important role in it of the peasantry, the significance
of the revolutionary army and armed struggle in China, and the tactics of a unified
national front.
In order to keep "Mao Tse-tung’s ideas" " unrivalled,” all the works of the well- p
known Chinese propagandists of Marxism-Li Ta-chao, Chu Chiu-po, Teng Chung-
hsia, Wang Ming, Chang Wen-t’ien and others-have been destroyed; some of these
authors are being constantly discredited, while others are intentionally buried in
oblivion. This enables the Maoists to portray Mao Tse-tung as the great "theorist,
strategist and tactician" of the Chinese revolution.
The Maoists are thus giving Mao Tse-tung undeserved credit for elaborating the p 352
fundamental principles regarding the strategy and tactics of the Chinese revolution,
completely ignoring the decisive role in it of the advice and recommendation of the
Communist International and of the CPSU’s experience. It is essential to distinguish
the “ideas” which really belong to Mao Tse-tung from the correct precepts on which
Maoism is merely capitalising in order to conceal its own anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist
essence.
The importance of the struggle against the theory and practice of Maoism is p
becoming more and more obvious today because of the emergence of a kind of
"unified ideological front" extending from “Left” and Right opportunism to diehard
anti-communism. Today the most varied political forces-the imperialists, Maoists,
nationalists, revisionists of all shades, and bellicose Zionists-are acting together in a
single camp against Marxist-Leninist teachings, the communist movement and the
socialist community. Mao Tse-tung and his group, who pose as ultra-"
revolutionaries,” are actually in alliance with Right revisionists and undisguised anti-
Communists such as Herbert Marcuse, Milovan Djilas, Klaus Mehnert, Ernst Fischer
and Zbigniew Brzezinsky.
We often see Western ideologists, disguised as “defenders” of humanism and p

democracy, systematically accusing the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of
mythical "violations of democracy and the principles of humanism,” whitewashing
the criminal acts committed by the Maoists during the "cultural revolution.” They
depict the cultural revolution as an "outburst of indignation against bureaucracy,” as
an attempt to "renovate socialism,” and as a "search for Asian democracy.” These 353
“democrats” said nothing when Mao Tse-tung and his adherents dealt with well-
known Chinese writers, actors and artists and with thousands of Communists and
revolutionaries. They say nothing when the Maoists exile hundreds of thousands of
people to concentration camps called "labour reformatories" and persecute
intellectuals. Nor have they reacted to Mao Tse-tung’s policy of genocide in Tibet,
Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and South China.
To strengthen ties with the above-mentioned anti-Marxist "united front" and slacken p
the effectiveness of the principled criticism of the Maoist order by Marxist-Leninist
parties, the Peking leaders are increasingly issuing invitations to Western literary
men, correspondents and numerous delegations. For instance, in the autumn of 1970,
the PRC was visited by Edgar Snow, the “ chronicler” of Maoism. Peking insistently
invites bourgeois journalists to China and works on them diligently so they would
depict the situation in China in a way favourable to the Maoists. Chinese officials
have suddenly become very talkative and great lovers of heart-to-heart discussions
over a cup of tea with American, West German and Japanese bourgeois journalists,
hoping to be favoured with wide publicity of their views and their numerous verbal
attacks against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It is not surprising that
on returning home these visitors whitewash the "cultural revolution,” portraying it as
the "purposeful struggle of the masses.”
Motivated by time-serving considerations and a desire to enter into contact with p

Peking, even some progressive papers have recently carried publications playing
down the disastrous effect of the "cultural revolution,” and describing the present 354
situation in China as a socialist " countrywide experiment.” The authors of these
publications want to create the impression that Chinese society is undergoing "all-
round development" and that the standard of living of the Chinese peasant and
worker is rising; they compare the "people’s communes" to the agricultural co–
operatives existing in the socialist countries and so on. But what they call "objective
information" is often just mere repetition of official Maoist propaganda meant to
mislead readers.
Right opportunists are also trying to form an alliance with the Maoists in the p
onslaught against Marxism-Leninism by making up to Peking and embellishing its
policy and the "cultural revolution.” One of the originators of this trend is Roger
Garaudy, expelled from the French Communist Party for his anti-party activities. In
his writings he presents the theory and practice of Maoism as a "model of backward
socialism" which he says is the logical product of the development of Chinese
society.
The ideological battle being waged by the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties p
forces the Maoists to assume a defensive position, change their tactics, and adapt
themselves to the new situation. This principled struggle offers effective moral and
political support to the genuine Communists of China and to those Chinese people,
who are striving to redirect their country along the socialist path.
While consistently combating the chauvinist course of the Maoists, the CPSU is p
constantly educating the Soviet people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and
patriotism. Soviet people have the greatest respect for the Chinese people and their 355
culture. Despite the anti-Soviet hysteria in China, the Soviet-Chinese Friendship
Society in the USSR is still functioning actively. It is in the USSR, and not in
China, that the classics of Chinese literature are being studied and the works of Lu
Hsin, Lao She, Mao Tun, T’an Han and many other leading Chinese novelists,
playwrights and poets are being widely published. It was not present-day China, but
Moscow, that celebrated the anniversary of Sun Yat-sen and held exhibitions of
paintings by Hsu Pei-hung, Chi Pai-shin and other Chinese artists. These facts serve
to expose the Maoist claims that the Soviet Union conducts "anti-Chinese
propaganda.”
In his address to the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties held p
in Moscow in 1969, CC CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev said: "We do not
identify the declarations and actions of the present Chinese leadership with the
aspirations, wishes and true interests of the Communist Party of China and the
Chinese people. We are deeply convinced that China’s genuine national renaissance,
and its socialist development, will be best served not by struggle against the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries, against the whole communist movement, but by
alliance and fraternal cooperation with them.”
The Soviet stand towards the Chinese People’s Republic was reaffirmed at the 24th p
Congress of the CPSU. While consistently following the course mapped out by the
Congress, the Party continues to be steadfast in exposing the anti-Soviet policy of the
Maoists and their anti-Leninist, nationalist ideology, and to stave off Peking’s
encroachments upon the national interests of the Soviet Union, and upon the unity 356
and cohesion of the socialist community and the world revolutionary movement. The
CPSU is pursuing a stable policy of normalising interstate relations between the
USSR and the PRC.
In its resolution "On the International Activity of the CC CPSU After the 24th p
Congress of the CPSU,” the November (1971) Plenum of the CC CPSU affirmed
that the "Politbureau is consistently pursuing the policy of the 24th Congress in
relations with the Chinese People’s Republic.” The Plenum expressed "complete
agreement with the Politbureau’s position in resolving the relevant practical
questions,” and noted with satisfaction that "the foreign policy course of the CC
CPSU enjoys the full understanding and unanimous support of all Communists and
the entire Soviet people. Therein lies the main strength of the CPSU’s international
policy.”
The situation today and the present onslaught of the Chinese leadership against p
Marxism– Leninism, and against the unity of the Marxist– Leninist parties and of the
socialist countries, urgently demand still greater efforts in all areas of the ideological
struggle against Maoism, so that peace, democracy and socialism may triumph.
Kommnnist, No. 7, 1971
***

TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 334•1] One can get an idea of the scope of China’s anti-Soviet campaign if one
notes, among other things, the fact that in less than 11 months in 1971, the Maoist
government mouthpiece, Jenmin jihpao, carried about 400 items containing crude
attacks on the Soviet Union, and 12 issues of Hungchi magazine carried similar
material. China’s book market is full of anti-Soviet literature; Radio Peking daily
broadcasts anti-Soviet slander.
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<•> The Foreign Policy 357
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Since the 9th CPC Congress (April 1969) the PRC’s foreign policy has not only p
retained its nationalistic character, but its great-power, chauvinistic essence and its
T*
break with the principles of socialist internationalism are making themselves more
19*
deeply and clearly felt.
###
This has been shown in the decisions of the September 1970 2nd Plenary Meeting p
of the CPC CC as well as in the PRC’s 1970–71 foreign policy activity. The 2nd
Plenary Meeting called on the Party and the army resolutely to implement Mao Tse-
tung’s line and directives and to accomplish the tasks set by the 9th Congress. Thus,
anti-Sovietism and subversive actions within the socialist community and the
international communist movement as well as the striving for a rapprochement with
imperialist states were confirmed as the PRC’s long-term official foreign policy. By
pursuing an anti-Soviet, anti-socialist policy Peking wants to compensate the Western
states for their aid in the development of China’s economy, as well as for helping it
to carry out its great-power designs of turning China into a state capable of realising 358
its territorial claims on the Soviet Union, and of bringing under its influence the
neighbouring states in East and SouthEast Asia.
The striving to reach an agreement with imperialism on an anti-Soviet basis and to p

exti’icate China from the international isolation in which the country found itself in
the course of the " cultural revolution,” has forced Peking to make certain changes in
its foreign policy tactics, and to exercise some flexibility in attaining its greatpower
aspirations. The Chinese leaders have now dampened down the propaganda of ultra-
“Leftist” slogans of a "people’s war" and the utmost aggravation of international
tension which they had earlier passed for effective means of stimulating the
revolutionary situation in the world. Now they pose as proponents of a detente and
peaceful coexistence. At the same time, they are hastily establishing diplomatic
relations with other countries.
The changes in Peking’s tactics are due to a number of setbacks in its foreign and p
home policy. These include:
– the futile attempts to split the socialist community and international communist p
movement. The Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties (1969) showed
that the communist parties condemned the "special course" and splitting tactics of the
Peking leaders;
– the abortive plans to use the liberation movement of the developing countries and p
http://www.leninist.biz/en/1972/DP382/3.9-Foreign.Policy.of.China.Since.the.9th.Congress[2012-12-18 3:23:37]
the progressive democratic movement in the capitalist countries for its own great-
power, chauvinistic purposes by means of pseudo-revolutionary demagogy;
– Peking’s international isolation resulting from its subversive activity and p 359
interference in other countries’ affairs as well as its attempts to provoke armed
clashes and local wars, with China herself taking no part in them. This isolation has
become especially pronounced during the "cultural revolution" since the Chinese
leaders introduced methods of hungweipings’ violence and armed pressures into
diplomatic practice and international relations ;
– the poor state of Chinese economy and low rates of its development caused by p
the recent events of the "cultural revolution" and militarisation, unavailing attempts
to rely on small industries and primitive means of production, and the politically
motivated curtailment of economic relations with the USSR and the other socialist
countries.
At the same time, despite the defeat of the opposition and establishment of a p
military– bureaucratic dictatorship, the political situation in China is characterised by
political instability which forces the Peking leaders to stabilise the regime at any
cost, in order to consolidate it and implement their strategic great-power, chauvinistic
schemes.
The concentration of power in the hands of a small group of leaders, the reliance p
on special army units, the suppression of the opposition, and the liquidation of the
democratic institutions in the state and the Party offer favourable conditions for
arbitrariness in foreign policy, for a collusion with imperialism on the basis of
deepening and strengthening the anti-Soviet line and the tactical renunciation of the
ultra-“Leftist” slogans, as well as curtailing or, at least, camouflaging their ties with 360
the “Left” extremist pettybourgeois elements in capitalist countries.
Peking’s new tactics show that it has become the Trojan horse of imperialism in the p
international revolutionary movement, this forming the essence of the intensified
diplomatic flirting now taking place between China and the imperialist countries
headed by the USA.
In the new situation, the diplomacy of the People’s Republic of China seeks to p
ensure a favourable attitude to the Peking regime on the part of a maximum number
of states, the capitalist states, in the first place, without affecting the Maoist great-
power, chauvinistic course.
The following are some of the concrete features which characterise the new stage in p
Peking’s policy:
– an active struggle for wide international recognition; p
– restoration of the PRC’s rights in the United Nations including its permanent p
membership in the Security Council;
– ensuring aid from imperialist states aimed at an accelerated economic, scientific, p

technological and military development of China.
These trends of the PRC’s foreign policy have manifested themselves in numerous p
acts by the Chinese Government in the international arena. Peking is increasingly
seeking to conceal its participation in the activity of the pro-Maoist groups in the
revolutionary and liberation movement. In the "Third World" Peking has begun to
establish contacts with pro-Western regimes.
The resumption of contacts with the United States in the beginning of 1971 and the p
attempts to enter into relations with it on the basis of renouncing the struggle against 361
imperialism are directly linked with what has now become an important component
part of Peking’s foreign policy and a new stage in the PRC’s foreign policy. The
Maoists have been playing on the contradictions between the two world systems in
order to gain time, accumulate strength and prepare the internal and external
conditions for establishing the People’s Republic of China as the "third global"
power. To accomplish this task the Chinese leaders have elaborated and used the
"two superpowers" concept which they have made the core of their foreign policy
since the 9th CPC Congress. Today the Peking regime is striving to win world-wide
support for its hegemonistic aims by resorting to the slogan of uniting the "medium
and small" countries and by manipulating with anti-Soviet and anti-American
catchwords.
At the same time, the Peking regime is continuing to build up its nuclear-missile p
potential, although this task is far from being completed. However, the very
possibility of such a development is already of some political significance since it
enables the Chinese leaders to pursue a geopolitical course in international relations.
Although Peking has formally retained the two main interconnected components- p
anti-Sovietism, as the major course of the foreign policy, and anti-Americanism-in
its ideological, political and propaganda arsenal the latter component has finally
degenerated into nationalistic doctrine which, owing to the objective historical
conditions, sometimes coincides with the struggle waged by progressive forces
against imperialism. Anti– Americanism has been assigned the role of bringing
pressure to bear in the bargaining which Mao Tse-tung and his followers are 362
carrying on with US imperialism for a recognition of their chauvinistic global claims,
especially in East and SouthEast Asia.
The flirtation with imperialism and simultaneous pursuit of an anti-Soviet policy p

compel the Chinese leaders to cooperate with imperialist governments in some world
affairs, as a result of which the PRC may be drawn into the orbit of imperialism’s
international relations and therefore China is in danger of becoming politically and
economically dependent upon the developed capitalist countries.
At the same time, the foreign policy of the Peking regime, particularly in the "Third p
World" countries, continues to retain its petty-bourgeois radical component. In their
struggle for hegemony in the world revolutionary and liberation movement the
Chinese leaders, orienting themselves on the nationalistic elements prevailing in some
sections of the anti-imperialist front, are seeking, by means of the "two superpowers"
concept, to place nationalism at the service of their anti-Soviet policies.
In the beginning of 1971, the Chinese leadership for the first time responded p
positively to the initiative of the US Government which since 1963 had repeatedly
proposed to normalise US-Chinese relations. Although the Chinese leadership
retained and even developed some forms of relations with the United States on
various levels and, according to some sources, was even willing in 1964 to receive
President Johnson in the People’s Republic of China despite its anti-American
propaganda, all the proposals made by the USA on extending contacts and
establishing them officially were ostentatiously and categorically rejected. 363
This attitude of the PRC Government towards the US proposals was determined by p
a number of factors, primarily the absence of internal political conditions in China

for a serious modification of its foreign policy. Of some significance also was the
inconsistency of the Johnson Administration which, while improving its relations
with the Mao regime and trying to apply the “bridge-building” concept to the PRC,
heeded the ultra-Right opposition and adhered to its military and political
commitments to the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The subsequent events showed that the
US-Chinese rapprochement was hindered by the fact that the new Administration
which followed that of President Johnson continued the escalation of war in
Indochina and committed aggressive acts against the DRV and Laos in the immediate
proximity to the Chinese borders.
Taking into account the fresh elements in international affairs-armed provocations by p

the Peking regime on the Soviet-Chinese borders, the shift of the PRC Government
to a new diplomacy after the "cultural revolution,” the futility of the US
Government’s attempts to prevent the diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic
of China by the US allies in NATO-and the change in the mood of the American
voters with respect to the war in Vietnam, the US Republican Administration,
nevertheless, went much further in its relations with the PRC than its predecessors.
The new Administration took some unilateral measures aimed at normalising the p
US-Chinese relations. To begin with, it relaxed the embargo on trade with the PRC.
This resulted in the restoration of the US-Chinese trade relations (in 1970—3.5 364
million dollars’ worth), the US Government granting licences to overseas branches of
US companies to sell to the PRC such commodities as the General Motors
Corporation lorry engines, excavating machines, pharmaceutical goods, rubber, etc.
Subsequently, in striving to stimulate the restoration of relations, the US Government
lifted all restrictions on exports of non-strategic goods to the PRC, while retaining
the embargo on the trade with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Korean
People’s Democratic Republic, and Cuba.
Moreover, the US 7th Fleet ceased patrolling the Taiwan Strait and the US p
reconnaissance planes discontinued their flights over the PRC territory. The USA
changed its position regarding China’s entry to the UN.
On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung and his followers, who since 1964–65 have tried p
covertly to improve the Chinese-American relations, could overtly meet the US
“bridge-building” policy halfway only under certain conditions, i.e., when the
establishment of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship as a result of the "cultural
revolution" dispelled their apprehensions that the anti– popular policy of
rapprochement with the US imperialism would consolidate the anti-Maoist opposition
and undermine the already unstable status of the Mao Tse-tung group inside China.
Under these conditions, the unilateral measures taken by the US Government served p
their purpose. They made it possible to conduct secret negotiations with
representatives of the Peking regime with the result that the State Department
abrogated the need for special entry permits for US citizens wishing to visit the
People’s Republic of China, these permits formerly being regarded by the Chinese 365
Government as discriminatory. An agreement was also reached to invite on this basis
US public and press representatives as the first step in developing bilateral contacts.
Soon after this restriction had been annulled, the US pingpong team which had
participated in the world championship games in Japan was invited to China and the
first US newsmen were granted permission to enter the country. In April 1971, the
American athletes and journalists arrived in China thus inaugurating a new stage in
the USChinese relations.
In addition to public contacts, secret negotiations were held on a governmental p

level. H. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
during his official visit to Pakistan, secretly flew to Peking where he stayed from
July 9 to 11, 1971, and had talks with Premier of the State Council of the PRC
Chou En-lai. On July 16, it was declared in Washington and Peking that US
President R. Nixon had been invited to visit the People’s Republic of China at his
convenience before May 1972; the invitation was accepted. In his TV address Nixon,
explaining the reasons for his future visit, stated that the new relations which the US
Administration was establishing with the PRC were not directed against any other
country.
World progressive opinion, however, expressed doubt as to the selfless character of p

the normalisation that had begun in the relations between the United States and the
People’s Republic of China. These relations can become an important factor of peace
only if they reflect positive changes in the policy pursued by the two powers, such
as taking realistic positions on peaceful coexistence with other countries, and their 366
renunciation of political manoeuvring directed against other states. There are quite a
few facts, however, which warrant no such conclusion.
US imperialism has not as yet ceased its aggressive war in Indochina. The US p
Government has given no answer to the peaceful initiative of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam-the seven-point
proposal. As for the PRC’s stand on the Vietnam issue, Chou En-lai who, in his
lenghty interview with James Reston, The New York Times observer, made public the
principles of the PRC’s foreign policy, did not support the demand of the DRV
Government to fix the date of the US troops withdrawal from Vietnam and did not
even mention the date the PRC wishes the US troops to be withdrawn from Taiwan.
The PRC’s policy on other international issues coincides with the aggressive course p
of US imperialism. The Peking regime sought to utilise the Middle East situation
resulting from the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries to discredit Soviet
foreign policy, and tried to intensify the Soviet-American contradictions in that area.
At the same time the Chinese leaders and US imperialism came out in support of the
counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and attempted to profit from the
difficulties which arose in the Polish People’s Republic in 1970. The Chinese leaders
played into the hands of NATO’s global strategists by creating a hotbed of tension
on the Chinese-Soviet borders.
Far from being peaceful are also the policy of building up the nuclear-missile p
potential, the constant opposition to a detente, and the negative attitude towards 367
collective security measures, while the urge to replace a genuine detente by foreign
policy stratagems makes the policy pursued by Peking leaders similar to that of US
imperialism.
These facts have led progressive people throughout the world to the conclusion that p
the true reasons for the rapprochement between the Chinese leadership and US
imperialism are to be found in the homogeneity of their present foreign policy
interests. On the one hand, US imperialism is clearly striving to weaken the
influence of socialism and to gain control over the vast zone of the "Third World"
in the face of the growing tendency towards complete national and social
emancipation; on the other hand, the Peking regime is making no less overt the
attempt to secure the position of the "world’s third superpower" and to use it for the
purpose of attaining its territorial claims and hegemonistic designs.
The policy of the US-Chinese rapprochement recently manifested itself in new facts. p
At the end of October H. Kissinger made his second voyage to Peking and had
lengthy talks with Chou Enlai. The foreign press reported that these talks covered not
only the protocol and the programme of the US President’s forthcoming visit, but
also some specific problems that are to be discussed during the negotiations.
It was no accident that Kissinger made his visit to Peking at the time when the p
General Assembly of the United Nations was considering the question of restoring
the PRC’s rights in this international organisation. The resolution to admit the PRC 368
to the UN and to expel the Chiang Kai-shek representatives was passed by a
majority vote.
The progressive forces all over the world are hoping that the normalisation of p
relations between the PRC and the USA will not result in increased tension and
deterioration in international affairs. As A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers, said to the newsmen in Canada in an interview on October 20,
1971, concerning the Chinese-American negotiations, it is important that they should
lead to a peaceful settlement of issues, to a relaxation of world tension. This
undoubtedly also pertains to all spheres of the PRC’s activity in the international
arena in connection with the possibilities of its extension after the admittance of the
PRC to the UN.
Without modifying their major strategic aims, the Chinese leaders in 1970–71 were p
vigorously changing their tactics with regard to the national liberation movement as
well as the interstate relations with the developing Asian, African and Latin
American countries. Their entire international activity at that period was aimed at
restoring and increasing the Third World countries’ confidence in China as a force
independent of the "two superpowers.”
In their foreign policy activity in the Third World countries, the Chinese leaders p
have again resorted to the principles and formulas of the Bandung Conference and
the methods of the " popular diplomacy" for the extension of all-round contacts with
many countries regardless of their political orientation. China has been restoring her
membership in international bodies and becoming more active in local branches of
various societies. The PRC has not only returned its ambassadors to a number of 369
Afro-Asian countries but has also considerably moderated its own terms for
establishing diplomatic relations in the last two years, so that today it suffices for a
developing country to recognise the PRC Government as "the only legitimate
government of China,” without completely disrupting relations with Taiwan. The
PRC has recently established official diplomatic relations with a number of countries,
including Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, the Cameroons, Sierra Leone, Kuwait,
Iran, Chile, Peru, the Lebanon and Rwanda.
China’s diplomatic penetration into Latin America also betrays the PRC’s new p
tactics. Peking is continuing to intensify its efforts to extend its official relations with
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Of late, Chinese propaganda has been changing its accents in the "Third World.” p
There now appear fresh catchwords and concepts designed to camouflage the
opportunism of the Peking leaders and their departure from the anti– imperialist
struggle as well as, consequently, to retain the possibility of struggling for the
hegemony of the PRC as the sole uniting and guiding force in the Third World. As
a matter of fact, Chinese “ antiimperialism” has become idle talk which, as was
recently emphasised by the Arab press, serves only as a "serious warning" to
Washington. AlAhbar wrote: "The revolutionary phrase– mongering cannot conceal

the bargaining of the Peking leaders with US imperialism.”
In keeping with this position, the Maoists’ tactics in the national-liberation p

movement of the three continents substantially changed in 1970– 71. While actually
continuing to sabotage the cause of the peoples’ anti-imperialist struggle, Peking has 370
endeavoured to normalise its relations with pro-imperialist forces. True, in 1971 the
Chinese press continued to extol the “ successes” of the small and uncoordinated
Peking– directed groups which exert no influence on the course of the real anti-
imperialist struggle waged by the peoples of that region. But that was only lip-
service to Peking’s ostentatious "anti– imperialism.”
Moreover, in order to attain its nationalistic aspirations and, for this purpose, to p
dispel the mistrust with which the governments of a number of Third World
countries regarded Peking in 1966–68, the Chinese leaders, under the guise of so-
called double revolutionary tactics, simply betray the forces which they supported
before. For instance, in 1971, China abandoned the Ceylon “Left” putchist forces
which she herself had inspired. The Maoists also acted improperly in relation to East
Pakistan.
Seeking to use Pakistan as its major "strong point" in the Middle East and the p
Indian Ocean area, and playing on the contradictions between Pakistan and India,
Peking also made some peaceable gestures to India in 1971, although its true aims
are in no way concerned with the interests of the two countries.
Peking uses a similar tactic in the Middle East. According to Arab public opinion, p
the Chinese leaders instigated the September 1970 events in Jordan which led to the
defeat of the Palestine organisations. In 1971 the Peking leaders were still interested
in keeping this conflict unsettled, although they no longer talked about it openly. The
Maoists continued to propagate their bellicose principles and to declare their support 371
for the liberation struggle of the people of Palestine, but, at the same time, ceased
their sharp attacks against the peaceful settlement plan, thus playing a double game
with the Palestine resistance movement and the fighting Arab countries. The Chinese
leaders unhesitatingly declared that they "had lost their confidence in the Palestine
guerrillas and do not intend to support them in the future.” All this hardly agrees
with the statement made by Chou En-lai in September 1971, to the effect that "China
does not sell her principles and does not betray her comrades-in-arms.” [371•1
Peking’s course aimed at consolidating China’s positions to the full in countries of p

socialist orientation (Burma, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Tanzania, Zambia, Guinea, the
Congo-Brazzaville) is a new feature of her foreign policy tactics in the Third World.
While widely spreading in these countries their version about the two "superpowers,”
the Maoists hope to undermine these progressive nations’ confidence in the USSR, to
discredit the Soviet Union’s foreign policy and even its efficient economic assistance.
Thus, the Chinese leaders mean not only to weaken the ties between the Third World
and the socialist countries but also to completely disunite them and become a leading
force there.
To attain this goal, Peking has changed its formerly negative attitude to the idea of p
nonalignment. Today the Chinese leaders seek to turn it against the USSR as one of
the "superpowers" and hope to utilise the non-aligned countries in their great-power 372
designs.
The PRC’s economic policy in the Third World has also suffered some changes. p
There is a clear tendency to increase the number of states receiving Chinese aid, as
well as the amount of this aid. The countries of socialist orientation have always
been China’s chief contractors in the development of her economic cooperation with
the Third World countries (Tanzania, Zambia, Guinea, the Congo-Brazzaville, and
Mali were receiving Chinese aid even during the "cultural revolution”). In 1970–71,
the People’s Republic of China concluded a number of new agreements on economic
and technical cooperation with the Arab Republic of Egypt, the People’s Democratic
Republic of Yemen, Sudan, Mali, Somalia, Ceylon, and Mauritania. By the beginning
of 1971, the countries of socialist orientation accounted for about 60 per cent of the
total Chinese aid to the Third World and for most of the enterprises actually built.
The changes in Peking’s tactics in Africa since the 9th CPC Congress have been p
directly connected with the fact that the genuine nationalliberation movements had
rejected China’s claims to the leadership of the revolutionary forces and had
consolidated their ties with the socialist countries, the Soviet Union in particular. At
the same time, the pro-Maoist groups and organisations have discredited themselves,
lost their links with the people, and have become overt enemies of the African
revolutionary-democratic forces.
In an attempt to restore their positions in the African national-liberation movement, p

the Chinese leaders have of late attached special importance to the struggle of the 373
peoples of Southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies, and ceased the gross
imposition of their views and concepts on the revolutionary forces.
Striving to restore the contacts with the revolutionary-democratic organisations in p

the South of Africa, the Chinese leaders are very reluctant to curtail their relations
with the Pan-African Congress, the South-West Africa National Union and other pro-
Maoist groups on the dependent territories, obviously hoping to retain and continue
to use them in their hegemonistic policy. Peking maintains particularly close ties with
the National Union for the Complete Independence of Angola the leadership of
which at its 2nd Congress (1970) openly supported China on all issues.
In the national-liberation movement of Africa, as also in other areas, Peking has p

been employing the "double revolutionary tactics.” This also applies to the pro-
Maoist organisations and groups which have become an obstacle to the Peking broad
diplomatic offensive in Africa. Thus, the Chinese leaders ceased supporting the pro-
Maoist groups in the Cameroons and the Zaire Republic. Since the end of 1969, the
CPC’s leadership has discontinued its support of the opposition organisations in
Botswana (the Botswana People’s Party), Swaziland (the Swaziland Progressive
Party), and Lesotho (the Lesotho Congress Party).
The unscrupulous but more flexible policy of the Chinese leaders is directed towards p
the same old goal, i.e., achieving hegemony in the national liberation movement, and
weakening its union with the socialist countries, and the international communist and
working-class movement.
The major task of the Chinese leadership in Latin America today is the development p 374
of interstate relations. Peking has vigorously striven for recognition by Latin
American governments. Here the Chinese leaders stand on overtly anti-Soviet
positions and endeavour to activate the Maoist groups. At the same time, they are
trying to undermine the revolutionary movement from within and to impose upon it
their ideological and organisational leadership. Thus, Peking is striving to neutralise
the crisis consequences and the discontent in Latin American pro-Chinese groups that
resulted from the changes in the foreign policy tactics of the Chinese leadership, in
particular its flirting with US imperialism.
The CPC’s leadership attaches special importance to the development of economic p

and trade relations with Latin American countries. In AprilMay 1971, the PRC
government trade delegation visited Chile and Peru and, for the first time in the
history of Chinese-Latin American relations (except Cuba), signed trade agreements
and a protocol. In mid-June 1971, a Peruvian trade delegation, as well as Gavier
Tantalean Vanini, Peru Minister of Fishing, visited Peking. A trade protocol was
signed, the People’s Republic of China committing itself to purchase 150,000–
200,000 tons of fish flour, 20,000 tons of fish oil, 35,000– 40,000 tons of copper,
10,000 tons of lead and 10,000 tons of zinc before the end of 1972. The two
countries decided to exchange trade representations.
Trade relations are also developing between the PRC and Ecuador. The press p
reported talks on China’s purchases of bauxites and aluminium in Guyana. Eliseo
Berruato, Mexican DeputySecretary for Industry and Commerce, expressed himself in 375
favour of extending trade ties with the PRC.
The change in the attitude of a number of proAmerican governments in Latin p

America towards China is also closely connected with the increased US-Chinese
contacts in 1971. The representatives of these Latin American countries’ big capital
will obviously attempt to make large profits in the Chinese market.
Since the "cultural revolution" the PRC’s diplomatic activity has extended, first and p
foremost, to the Western capitalist countries which Peking regards as a global force
that has common political interests with China. The Chinese leadership attaches great
importance to establishing ties with European capitalist countries on the basis of
"consolidating all forces against the hegemony of the two “superpowers” and thus
seeks partly to solve the PRC’s political and economic problems through cooperation
with the West; it also wants to use Europe as a means of pressure on the USA and
the USSR.
Having advanced the theory of "small and medium" countries, the Peking leaders p
regard Great Britain, France, the FRG and other Western countries as victims of the
pressure exerted by the “superpowers” and, ignoring the class essence of capitalism,
they are actually willing to regard them as not belonging to the imperialist system.
By advocating the slogan of a Europe competing with the “superpowers” the p

Chinese leaders share the common “ideological” principles of bourgeois nationalism
and endeavour to use them for a rapprochement with the capitalist countries. On the
basis of this, the PRC won its recognition by some European states and established
diplomatic relations with Italy, San Marino, Austria, Turkey and Belgium in 1970– 376
71. It is characteristic that the NATO leaders do not object to recognition of the
PRC. Nearly half the members of this aggressive organisation have established
diplomatic relations with the PRC and are developing economic contacts. The
Chinese press, in its turn, has practically ceased criticising the NATO aggressive
bloc.
In extending their relations with developed capitalist states, the PRC’s leaders seek p
to utilise the Western economic, scientific and technical potential for the purpose of
obtaining strategic goods and technical assistance in building military objects.
Thus, in the PRC’s foreign contacts imperialist powers have actually replaced the p
socialist countries with whom the Chinese leaders have curtailed their economic
relations. The capitalist world has become China’s major supplier of plant equipment
(including military equipment). In the last seven years, British, West German, French,
Italian and other companies have signed contracts with the PRC’s foreign trade
bodies for the delivery of 300 million dollars’ worth of equipment for 43 industrial
enterprises, including 18 chemical, four oil-refining, ten engineering and five steel
manufacturing plants.
The trip of the PRC’s economic delegation headed by the Foreign Trade Minister, p
Bai Sianko, to the West European countries in SeptemberNovember 1971 attests the
PRC’s intentions to strengthen its ties with the capitalist world.
Considering the interest displayed by the Peking regime in establishing all-round p

contacts with the West, the governments and the reactionary circles in some NATO 377
countries hope to use China as an anti-Soviet force. Great Britain and the FRG’s
reactionary elements in particular being obviously eager to create a military complex
in China directed against the USSR.
Their common stand also makes itself felt in the questions pertaining to the p
relaxation of tension and the creation of a collective security system in Europe. The
struggle waged by the USSR and other socialist countries for a detente, establishment
of a European security system based on recognition of the territorial status quo in
Europe, and for convocation of an all-European conference meets with stubborn
resistance of the Chinese leadership and the reactionary forces in the NATO
countries, primarily the revanchists in the FRG. Striving to provoke conflict situations
between the USSR and the USA, the Chinese leadership attempts to hinder a detente
in Europe and to retain possibilities for bringing pressure to bear on the USSR from
the West. The Chinese leaders regard a detente in Europe as dangerous to their
strategic plans.
The Peking regime sharply condemned the Soviet-West German treaty of August 12, p
1970. Peking alleged that the treaty was a "betrayal of the interests of the German
people, the Soviet people and the peoples of the whole of Europe" and declared that
the Soviet Union had given to West Germany "tacit consent to annex the GDR.”
Thus, the Chinese leaders’ stand with respect to the Soviet-West German treaty
objectively merged with that of the most reactionary forces of West German
imperialism who, in their turn, described the treaty as a "provocation against China.”
The rather frank statement of Huang Chen, the Chinese Ambassador to Paris, is p 378
typical of the Chinese leaders’ attitude to the problems of European security. On
November 5, 1970, speaking in Paris on the occasion of the Italy-PRC mutual
diplomatic recognition, he said: "We Chinese are against the Soviet proposal to
convene an allEuropean security conference. By this, the Soviet Union wants to oust
the Americans from Europe so that it may bring greater pressure to bear on China
and to fetter its satellites more than ever before. The agreement between Bonn and
Moscow helps the USSR to implement its plans.”
The present-day foreign policy of the Chinese leadership is characterised by a p

"flexible line" aimed at a rapprochement not only with the USA but also with Japan,
the sharp criticism of the Sato Government by the Peking leaders notwithstanding.
After the November 1969 Japanese-US talks which had demonstrated a consolidation
of their imperialist efforts in Asia, as well as their anti-Chinese stance, Chinese
propaganda brought to the forefront the theme of struggle against Japanese
militarism.
In the propaganda speeches of Chinese leaders, Japanese militarism is increasingly p
mentioned as the chief enemy of the people alongside the two "superpowers.”
However, the Chinese leaders are developing contacts with Japan in practically all
spheres, and their relations with the Japanese ruling Liberal-Democratic Party have
become very active. Despite the fact that the Sato Government has not responded to
Peking’s far-reaching proposals made in the 1960s, the Chinese leaders have not
abandoned their hopes and efforts of striking a bargain with the Japanese ruling
quartcrs on the nationalistic, anti-Soviet basis which they had proclaimed earlier. 379
It is but natural that in their relations with the Mao Tse-tung group, Japanese p
imperialists take into account its anti-Sovietism and subversive activities against the
democratic forces of Japan, as well as the opportunity to utilise JapaneseChinese
contacts to bring pressure to bear on the USA. At the same time, the Japanese
Government continues to consolidate its imperialist efforts in Asia and to extend its
economic and political penetration into Taiwan. Under the conditions of the
escalation of the US aggression in Vietnam, the Japanese Government stopped using
the funds of the Export-Import Bank of Japan for financing deliveries of complete
sets of equipment to China. It also exercises stricter control over the exports and
even the exposition in the PRC (at the Japanese industrial fairs) of non– commercial
samples of goods regarded as strategic.
While further consolidating and extending its military-political alliance with the p
USA, the Japanese Government has agreed overtly to include Taiwan, Vietnam, and
South Korea in the sphere of the "security treaty.” Moreover, it has demonstrated its
readiness to see to it that the status quo in the Taiwan problem be preserved. Thus,
Japan is increasingly more frankly claiming leadership in Asia in union with and
aided by the United States.
Having failed, by means of nationalistic and anti-Soviet flirting with Japan’s ruling p
quarters, to mitigate the anti-Chinese stance of her militarypolitical alliance with the
USA and to gain access to Japanese investments and technology, the Chinese
leadership increased its pressure on Japan and started severely criticising the Sato 380
Government, at the same time activating its relations with the opposition, the so-
called pro-Chinese elements of the Liberal-Democratic Party. The Chinese leaders are
blackmailing Japan’s ruling circles with the possibly anti-Japanese trend of the
newly-emerging Chinese-US rapprochement. They demonstrate to the Japanese ruling
circles their blatant anti-Sovietism and solidarity on the "Northern territories" issue,
the solidarity on which Japan may allegedly rely in bringing pressure to bear on the
Soviet Union.
At the same time, a very specific feature may be traced in Peking’s growing p
criticism of the Japanese reactionaries and militarists. This criticism increasingly’
boils down to attacks against the activity of the present government making it
possible to use it as a kind of a smoke-screen for the purpose of hiding the actually
growing political ties with the Japanese ruling quarters as a whole. The so-called
pro-Chinese opposition within the Liberal-Democratic Party, the opposition whose
mood, alongside the racial-nationalistic "flexibility,” is characterised by overt anti–
Sovietism and revanchism, speaks on behalf of these quarters. The Chinese leaders
persistently seek to present it as a progressive, anti-imperialist force with which a
mutual understanding would be tantamount to a unification of the Asian peoples’
efforts in their struggle against the US-Japanese reactionaries.
In the joint communiques with the above– mentioned LDP representatives (at the p
annual negotiations in Peking on the trade with the big Japanese capitalists), the
Chinese leadership shows its full accord with them on a number of key international 381
issues which do not only relate to the Chinese-Japanese relations. Although the
Japanese side represents the upper stratum of the Japanese monopoly bourgeoisie’s
ruling party, at the trade talks it makes vigorous attempts to dissociate itself from the
Sato Government foreign policy. It expresses an “understanding” of China’s stand on
a number of world issues, for instance, that the new interpretation of the Japanese–
American "security treaty" has turned it into a more harmful military alliance directed
against the Chinese and other Asian peoples; that the Japanese reactionaries have
become a major supporter of US imperialism and the vanguard in the struggle
against the peoples of Asia; that the USJapanese reactionaries seek to perpetuate the
occupation of Taiwan and South Korea and the split of Vietnam; and that in Japan,
the revival of militarism has become a reality.
Moreover, the placemen of the Japanese monopoly circles, who reflect the interests p
of the monopoly section which, pursuing its own imperialist aims with respect to
Asia, including China, are inclined to be less dependent on the USA, even declare
their resolve to oppose the revival of Japanese militarism.
The Chinese leaders also seek to build their relations with the democratic forces of p
Japan on an anti-Soviet basis. It is well-known that the “revolutionary” activity of
the Peking leaders in Japan during the "cultural revolution" resulted in increased
dissociation of the country’s democratic forces and weakening of some of its
contingents. This service rendered to the Japanese ruling quarters can hardly be
overestimated. The Japanese-American "security treaty" was to expire in June 1970, 382
and a fierce struggle was waged between the US-Japanese reactionaries, on the one
hand, and the progressive forces, on the other, to determine the country’s further
course. The cherished hope of the US and Japanese imperialist circles was to weaken
the stand of the progressive forces and their pressure, and to attain this aim these
imperialists had exerted a great deal of effort.
Objectively, Peking was acting in the same vein. The obviousness of this fact forced p
the Peking leaders somewhat to modify the wording of the thesis of struggle against
the "four enemies" which they had been imposing on the Japanese democratic forces,
although the essence of this thesis remained unaffected. Anti-Sovietism and
subversive actions against the Communist Party of Japan remain the core of the
Chinese leaders’ activity in the democratic movement of Japan.
All this goes to show that, despite the changes in their tactical principles, and p
peaceable verbiage, the foreign policy of the Maoists has not altered its essence and
remains nationalistic and adventurist. The Chinese leaders continue acting on the
strength of their anti-socialist propositions aimed at winning a leading status in the
world by pursuing an anti-Soviet policy, carrying on subversive activity in the
socialist community and the world communist and democratic movement; they are
increasingly developing contacts with imperialist states, particularly with the USA,
and are endeavouring to use the Third World countries as an instrument of achieving
their great-power chauvinistic aims.
Meanwhile the restoration of the PRC’s rights in the United Nations that was p
advocated by the USSR, which has always defended, as a matter of principle, the 383
interests of the Chinese people and China as a great power, offers the PRC fresh
opportunities in international relations. Today it is becoming increasingly evident that
only a policy based on socialist principles can really protect China’s national
interests and give the Chinese people a chance to concentrate their efforts on
socialist construction as well as to restore the genuine prestige of the PRC in the
international arena.
Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, No. 12, 1971
***

TEXT SIZE
normal
Notes
[ 371•1] Chou En-lai’s interview to the Director of the Mexican Excelsior

newspaper, September 5, 1971.
< >

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Y. Sverdlov
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A Abc of Dialectical and Historical Materialism

A Abc of Dialectical and Historical Materialism
Contents
A Abc of Planning: Fundamentals of the theory and methodology of economic planning, An
A About Andrei Tarkovsky
Index A About Lenin: Lenin in Soviet Literature
Card A Account to the Party and the People:, An
A Across the Soviet Union: Impressions of the USSR
Formats: A Activeness and Self-Education
Text A Actors Without Makeup
PS A Advocates of Colonialism
PDF A Aesthetics and Poetics
A Aesthetics, Art, Life: A collection of articles
A Aesthetics: A Textbook
Other
A Afghanistan Weighs Heavy on My Heart: The reminiscences of soldiers who fought in Afghanistan
Titles:
T*
A Afghanistan, the Revolution Continues
A Afghanistan: Between the past and future
Years: A Afghanistan: Past and present
19* A Africa Today: Progress, difficulties, perspectives
A Africa: Politics Economy Ideology
A Africa: Progress, problems, prospects:
### A African Communists Speak: Articles and documents from "The African Communist"
MAP A African Countries’ Foreign Policy.
A After 14,000 Wars
A Against Dogmatism and Sectarianism in the Working-Class Movement
A Against Liquidationism
A Against Right-Wing and Left-Wing Opportunism, Against Trotskyism
A Against Trotskyism: The struggle of Lenin and the CPSU against Trotskyism
A Against U.S. Aggression for National Salvation
A Against the Threat of Another World War
A Age-Group and Pedagogical Psychology
A Aggressive Broadcasting, Evidence Facts Documents: Psychological Warfare
A Agony of a Dictatorship: Nicaraguan Chronicle, The
A Agostinho Neto
A Agrarian India Betwen the World Wars
A Agrarian Reforms and Hired Labour in Africa
A Agrarian Relations in the USSR
A Agricultural Co-operatives: Their role in the development of socialist agriculture in the Soviet Union
A Agriculture in the U.S.S.R
A Aim of A Lifetime:, The
A Albert Einstein’s Philosophical Views and the Theory of Relativity
A Albert Einstein: Creator and rebel
A Alexei Tolstoy Collected Works In Six Volumes:
A All About The Telescope
A Along the Path Blazed in Helsinki
A Alternatives to Positivism.
A Always a Journalist
A Ambient Conflicts: Chapters from the history of relations between countries with different social system
A American Age of Reason: Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, The
A American Literary Criticism: An anthology
A American Model on the Scales of History, The
A American Utopia, The
A American Youth Today
A Americans: As seen by a Soviet writer, The
A Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism
A Anatomy of Lies [Amnesty International], The
A Anatomy of the Middle East Conflict
A Ancient Civilisations of East and West
A Andromeda: A Space Age Tale
A Anglo-Bulgarian Relations During the Second World War
A Anthology of Soviet Short Stories: In Two Volumes: Volume One.
A Anthology of Soviet Short Stories: In Two Volumes: Volume Two.
http://www.leninist.biz/en/TAZ[2012-12-18 3:23:51]
A Anthony Eden
A Anti-Communism Today
A Anti- Communism, the Main Line of Zionism
A Anti-Hitler Coalition:, The
A Antitank Warfare
A Anton Chekhov and His Times
A Anton Makarenko: His life and his work in education
A Arab Struggle For Economic Independence
A Arduous Beginning, The
A Are Our Moscow Reporters Giving Us the Facts About the USSR?
A Aristotle
A Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, The
A Arms Trade: A new level of danger, The
A Arms and Dollars: Roots of U.S. foreign policy
A Army and Social Progress, The
A Army and the Revolutionary Transformation of Society, The
A Art Festivals, USSR
A Art and Social Life
A Art and Society: Collection of articles
A Artistic Creativity, Reality and Man.
A Artistic Truth and Dialectics of Creative Work
A As Military Adviser in China
A As the People Willed: A documented account of how the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was founded (1917–1922)
A Ascent: Careers in the USSR, The
A Asian Dilemma: A Soviet view and Myrdal’s concept
A Asian Dilemma: The essence of social progress in the transitional period
A Astronomy for Entertainment
A At the Bidding of the Heart:
A At the Centr\ve of Political Storms: The memoirs of a Soviet diplomat
A At the Turning Points of History: Some lessons of the struggle against revisionism within the Marxist-Leninist movement
A Atlantis
A Atomic Nucleus
A Authoritarianism and Democracy
A Avengers:
A Awakening to Life: Forming behaviour and the mind in deaf-blind children
A Azerbaijanian Poetry, Classic Modern, Traditional:
B Badges and Trophies in Soviet Sports
B Basic Economic Law of Modern Capitalism, The
B Basic Principles of Dialectical and Historical Materialism, The
B Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics: A Soviet view, The
B Basic Principles of the Organisation of Soviet Agriculture, The
B Basic Problems of the Marxist-Leninst Theory: Symposium of Lectures
B Basics of Marxist-Leninist Theory
B Battle for the Caucasus
B Battle of Ideas in the Modern World., The
B Battle of Kursk, The
B Before the Nazi Invasion: Soviet Diplomacy in September 1939–June 1941
B Beginning: Lenin’s Childhood and Youth, The
B Behind the Facade of the Masonic Temple:
B Behind the Scenes of Third Reich Diplomacy.
B Benefactors of Peace
B Big Business and the Economic Cycle:
B Big Changes in the USSR: Leafing through the Soviet Journal Kommunist
B Biosphere and Politics, The
B Birth of Nations, The
B Birth of a Genius: The Development of the Personality and World Outlook of Karl Marx
B Black Book and Schwambrania:, The
B Blacks in United States History
B Bolshevik Party’s Struggle Against Trotskyism (1903–February 1917), The
B Bolshevik Party’s Struggle Against Trotskyism in the Post-October Period., The
B Bolshevik-led Socialist Revolution, March–October 1917, The
B Bolsheviks and the Armed Forces in Three Revolutions:, The
B Book About Artists
B Book About Bringing Up Children, A
B Book About Russia: In the union of equals:, A
B Books in the Service of Peace, Humanism, and Progress
B Books in the USSR
B Boris Kustodiev: The Artist and His Work
B Boris Pasternak: Selected writings and letters.
B Bourgeois Economic Thought 1930s–1970s
B Bourgeois Nations and Socialist Nations
B Breadwinners, The
B Brief Course of Dialectical Materialism: Popular outline, A
B British Foreign Policy During World War II 1939–1945
B Broad-Casting Pirates or Abuse of the Microphone:
B Builder of Socialism and Figher Against Fascism, The
B Bureaucracy in India
B Bureaucracy, Triumph and Crisis: New thinking
B Bureaucrats in Power–Ecological Collapse
B By: ANNA LOUISE STRONG
B By: JASON W. SMITH
C Camp of Socialism and the Camp of Capitalism, The
C Can Man Change the Climate?
C Can Socialists & Communists Co-Operate?
C Canada–USA: Problems and contradictions in North American economic integration
C Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth in Developing Africa
C Capitalism and the Ecological Crisis
C Capitalism at the End of the Century
C Capitalism, Socialism and Scientific and Technical Revolution
C Capitalism, the Technological Revolution, and the Working Class
C Capitalist Economy
C Case for Perestroika: Articles from the monthly Kommunist , The
C Categories and Laws of the Political Economy of Communism
C Caught in the Act
C Causality and the Relation of States in Physics
C Cause of My Life., The
C Caution: Zionism!:
C Cecil Rhodes and His Time
C Central Asia and Kazakhstan Before and After the October Revolution
C Central Asia and Kazakstan[d] Before and After the October Revolution: Reply to falsifiers of history
C Central Asia in Modern Times:
C Central V.I. Lenin Museum
C Centralised Planning of the Economy
C Ch’ing Empire and the Russian State in the 17th Century, The
C Challenges of Our Time: Disarmament and social progress, The
C Champions of Peace
C Changing Face of the Earth:, The
C Chapters from the History of Russo-Chinese Relations 17th–19th Centuries
C Child Development and Education
C Child, Adults, Peers: Patterns of communication
C Children and Sport in the USSR
C Children and Sport in the USSR
C Chile, Corvalan, Struggle.
C Chile: CIA Big Business
C China Theatre in World War II: 1939–1945., The
C China and Her Neighbours from Ancient Times to the Middle Ages:
C Choice Facing Europe, The
C Choice for Children, A
C Christ–Myth or Reality?
C Christian Ecumenism
C Christianity and Marxism
C Cia Target: The USSR
C Cia in Asia: Covert operations against India and Afghanistan., The
C Cia in Latin America, The
C Cia in the Dock., The
C Citizenship of the USSR: A legal study.
C City Invincible
C City of the Yellow Devil: Pamphlets, articles and letters about America, The
C Civil Codes of the Soviet Republics., The
C Civil Law and the Protection of Personal Rights in the USSR
C Civil War in Russia: Its causes and significance, The
C Civil War in the United States, The
C Civilisation and Global Problems
C Civilisation and the Historical Process
C Civilisation, Science, Philosophy:
C Civilisation, science, philosophy : theme of the 17th World Congress of Philosophy
C Classes and Nations
C Classes and the Class Struggle in the USSR, 1920s–1930s
C Classic Soviet Plays
C Classical Islamic Philosophy
C Cmea Countries and Developing States: Economic cooperation
C Cmea Today: From economic co-operation to economic integration
C Cmea and Third Countries: Legal aspects of co-operation

C Cmea and the Strategy of Acceleration
C Cmea: International Significance of Socialist Integration
C Co-operative Movement in Asia and Africa:, The
C Collapse of the Russian Empire 1917, The
C Comet in the Night: The story of Alexander Ulyanov’s heroic life and tragic death as told by his contemporaries
C Coming World Order, The
C Comintern and the East: A critique of the critique, The
C Comintern and the East: The struggle for the Leninist strategy and tactics in national liberation movements, The
C Comintern and the East: strategy and tactics in national liberation movements, The
C Communism IN THE UNITED STATES— A BIBLIOGRAPHY
C Communism and Cultural Heritage
C Communism and Freedom
C Communism as a Social Formation
C Communism: Questions and Answers: 1
C Communism: Questions and Answers: 7
C Communism: Questions and answers: 4
C Communist :: 1938 (VOL. XVII), The
C Communist Morality
C Communist Party (Cuba): (Collection of documents)
C Communist Party in Socialist Society: A critique of bourgeois concepts , The
C Communist Response to the Challenge of Our Time, The
C Communists and the Youth: Study of revolutionary education
C Comprehensive Programme for the Further Extension and Improvement of Co-Operation and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration by the CMEA Member Countries
C Comprehensive Science of Man: Studies and solutions, A
C Comrade Stalin—the Continuer of Lenin’s Great Work
C Concept of Common Heritage of Mankind: From new thinking to new practice.
C Concepts of Regional Development
C Concise Psychological Dictionary, A
C Confrontation or Compromise?: The meaning of worker participation in the management of capitalist enterprises
C Conjugation of Russian Verbs
C Conservation of Nature
C Conservatism in U.S. Ideology and Politics
C Consolidation of the Socialist Countries Unity
C Conspiracy Against Delgado: A History of One Operation by the CIA and the PIDE
C Conspiracy Against the Tsar: A Portrait of the Decembrists
C Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
C Constitutional Law and Political Institutions.
C Contemporary Anti-Communism: Policy and ideology.
C Contemporary Bourgeois Legal Thought: A Marxist evaluation of the basic concepts
C Contemporary Capitalism and the Middle Classes
C Contemporary Capitalism: New developments and contradictions
C Contemporary International Law: Collection of articles.
C Contemporary Political Science in the USA and Western Europe
C Contemporary Revolutionary Process: Theoretical Essays, The
C Contemporary Trotskyism: Its anti-revolutionary nature
C Contemporary World History 1917–1945, A
C Contemporary World Situation and Validity of Marxism
C Contradictions of Agrarian Integration in the Common Market
C Correction of the Convicted: Law, theory, practice
C Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945:
VOLUME 1:
C Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945:
VOLUME 2:
C Cpsu and the Soviet State in Developed Socialist Society, The
C Cpsu in the Struggle for Unity of All Revolutionary and Peace Forces, The
C Cpsu’s Nationalities Policy: Truth and lies, The
C Cpsu: Ideological, political and organisational principles., The
C Cpsu: Party of Proletarian Internationalism
C Cpsu: Topical Aspects of History and Policy, The
C Criminalistics
C Crisis of Capitalism and the Conditions of the Working People., The
C Crisis of World Capitalism
C Critique of Anti-Marxist Theories
C Critique of Mao Tse-Tung’s Theoretical Conceptions., A
C Critique of Masarykism, A
C Cultural Changes in Developing Countries
C Cultural Exchange: 10 years after Helsinki
C Cultural Life of the Soviet Worker: A Sociological Study, The
C Culture and Perestroika
C Culture for the Millions
C Current Problems of Contemporary Capitalism

D Danger: NATO
D De Gaulle: His Life and Work
D Death Can Wait
D Decisions of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.) on Literature and Art (1946-1948)
D Dedication: Stories about Soviet men and women
D Definition (Logico-Methodological Problems)
D Demography in the Mirror of History
D Denis Diderot
D Destiny of Capitalism in the Orient
D Destiny of the World: The socialist shape of things to come, The
D Destruction of Reason, The
D Destructive POLICY [Policy of Chinese leadership], A
D Destructive Policy, A
D Detente and Anti-communism
D Detente and the World Today: 26th CPSU Congress:
D Developed Socialism: Theory and practice
D Developed Socialist Society: Basic features and place in history.
D Developing Countries from the Standpoint of Marxist Political Economy
D Developing Countries’ Social Structure, The
D Developing Nations At the Turn of Millennium.
D Development by J.V. Stalin of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of the National Question, The
D Development of Revolutionary Theory by the CPSU.
D Development of Rights and Freedoms in the Soviet State, The
D Development of Soviet Law and Jurisprudence:, The
D Development of the Monist View of History., The
D Dialectical Logic: Essays on its history and theory
D Dialectical Materialism and the History of Philosophy
D Dialectical Materialism.
D Dialectical Materialism: Popular lectures
D Dialectics in Modern Physics
D Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx’s Capital, The
D Dialogue For Peace
D Dialogue of Cultures or Cultural Expansion?
D Dictionary for Believers and Nonbelievers., A
D Dictionary of Ethics., A
D Dictionary of International Law, A
D Dictionary of Philosophy (1967)
D Dictionary of Philosophy (1984)
D Dictionary of Political Economy., A
D Dictionary of Scientific Communism., A
D Difficult Mission: War Memoirs: Soviet Admiral in Great Britain during the Second World War.
D Dilemma of Balanced Regional Development in India
D Diplomacy of Aggression: Berlin–Rome–Tokyo Axis, its rise and fall.
D Diplomatic Battles Before World War II
D Disarmament and the Economy
D Disarmament: the Command of the Times
D Discovering the Soviet Union
D Discovery of the Century
D Distribution of the Productive Forces: General schemes, theory and practice
D Dmitry Shostakovich: About himself and his times
D Do The Russians Want War?
D Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War:
D Documents and Resolutions: the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, February 23–March 3, 1981
D Domination in 2,545 Endgame Studies.
D Dramas of the Revolution.
D Drawings by Soviet Children
D Dynamic Stability: The Soviet economy today
D Dynamic Twentieth Century, The
E Early Centuries of Russian History
E Early Russian Architecture
E Early Stories
E East After the Collapse of the Colonial System, The
E Eastern Societies: Revolution, Power, Progress:
E Echoes of the A-Blast
E Ecology and Development
E Ecology: Political Institutions and Legislation: environmental law in the USSR
E Economic “Theories” of Maoism., The
E Economic Aspects of Capitalist Integration
E Economic Aspects of Social Security in the USSR, The
E Economic Cycle: Postwar Development, The
E Economic Development and Perspective Planning

E Economic Geography of the Ocean
E Economic Geography of the Socialist Countries of Europe:
E Economic Geography of the World
E Economic Geography of the World
E Economic Geography: Theory and methods
E Economic Growth and the Market in the Developing Countries
E Economic History: The Age of Imperialism (1870–1917), An
E Economic Inequality of Nations
E Economic Integration: Two approaches
E Economic Law
E Economic Neocolonialism: Problems of South-East Asian Countries’ Struggle for Economic Independence
E Economic Policy During the Construction of Socialism in the USSR
E Economic Substantiation of the Theory of Socialism, The
E Economic System of Socialism, The
E Economic Theories and Reality
E Economic Zone: An International Legal Aspect, The
E Economics, Politics, the Class Struggle, International Relations
E Economies of Rich and Poor Countries, The
E Economies of the Countries of Latin America
E Economy of the Soviet Union Today: Socialism Today, The
E Education in the U.S.S.R.
E Education of the Soviet Soldier: Party-political work in the Soviet armed forces.
E Einstein and the Philosophical Problems of 20th-Century Physics
E Einstein
E Elements of Political Knowledge.
E Elitist Revolution or Revolution of the Masses?
E Elyuchin
E Emotions, Myths and Theories.
E End of Ideology Theory: Illusions and reality:, The
E End of the Third Reich., The
E Engels: A short biography
E English Revolution of the 17th Century through Portraits of Its Leading Figures, The
E Enigma of Capital: A Marxist viewpoint., The
E Environment: International Aspects
E Envoy of the Stars: Academician Victor Ambartsumyan
E Epoch of the Collapse of Capitalism and the Development of Socialism
E Era of Man or Robot?
E Ernesto Che Guevara
E Essays in Contemporary History, 1917–1945
E Essays in Contemporary History, 1946–1990
E Essays in Political Economy: Imperialism and the developing countries
E Essays in Political Economy: Socialism and the socialist orientation
E Essays on Linguistics: Language systems and structures
E Estonia, One of the United Family.
E Eternal Man: Reflections, dialogues, portraits
E Ethics of Science: Issues and controversies, The
E Ethics.
E Ethiopia: Population, resources, economy
E Ethnic Problems of the Tropical Africa: Can they be solved?
E Ethnocultural Development of African Countries
E Ethnocultural Processes and National Problems in the Modern World.
E Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere
E Europe 1939:
E Europe and Detente
E Europe and the Communists
E European Security and Co-Operation:
E European Security: Social aspects
E Evgeny Vakhtangov
E Exercises in Russian syntax with explanatory notes: [no date [ca. 1960]].
E Experience of Industrial Management in the Soviet Union, The
E Experience of the CPSU: Its World Significance.
E Export of Counter-Revolution: Past and present, The
F Face to Face With America: The story of N.S. Khrushchov’s [Khrushchev’s] visit to U.S.A., September 15–27, 1959
F Facts About the USSR
F Failure of Three Missions: British diplomacy and intelligence in the efforts to overthrow Soviet government in Central Asia and Transcaucasia...
F Fate of Man, The
F Faust versus Mephistopheles?
F Felix Dzerzhinsky: A biography.
F Female Labour Under Socialism: The Socio-Economic Aspects
F Feudal Society and Its Culture
F Few Salient Points or Things That Agitate Us: A collection of articles, A

F Fifty Fighting Years: The Communist Party of South Africa, 1921–1971
F Fifty Soviet Poets
F Fifty Years of a New Era:
F Fighters for National Liberation: Political profiles
F Fighting Red Tape in the USSR
F Figures for Fun:
F Film Trilogy About Lenin, A
F Final Reckoning, Nuremburg Diaries, The
F Finale: A Retrospective Review of Imperialist Japan’s Defeat in 1945
F Finance and Credit in the USSR
F First Breath of Freedom, The
F First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba:
F First Days of the October [sic. ABEBOOKS], The
F First Man in Space:
F Firsthand News
F Five Years’ Progress in Agricultural Production and the Tasks for the Future: Report
F Following Lenin’s Course: Speeches and articles
F Following the Course of All-round Perfection of Socialism
F For All Time and All Men [Karl Marx]
F For Man’s Happiness: The forum of Soviet Communists
F For a Nuclear-Free World
F For a Restructuring of International Economic Relations: 20th anniversary of UNCTAD
F Foreign Comrades in the October Revolution: Reminiscences
F Formation of the Socialist Economic System
F Foundations of Marxist Aesthetics
F Founding Fathers of the United States: Historical portraits
F Fourth Congress of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party:, The
F Fraternal Family of Nations:, A
F Frederick Engels: A Biography
F Frederick Engels: His Life and Work
F Freedom and the Artist
F Freedom of Conscience in the USSR
F From Anti-Imperialism to Anti-Socialism: The evolution of Peking’s foreign policy
F From Childhood to Centenarian
F From Geneva to Reykjavik
F From Helsinki to Belgrade:
F From Keynes to Neoclassical Synthesis:
F From Literacy Classes to Higher Education
F From Madrid to Vienna: Follow-up report of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation on the Helsinki Final Act
F From Revisionism to Betrayal: A criticism of Ota Sik’s economic views
F From Socialism to Communism
F From Tsarist General to Red Army Commander
F From Wooden Plough to Atomic Power: The Story of Soviet Industrialisation.
F From the History of Soviet-Chinese Relations in the 1950’s: Concerning the discussion of Mao Zedong’s role
F From the Missionary Days to Reagan: US China Policy
F Fundamental Law of the U.S.S.R., The
F Fundamental Problems of Marxism
F Fundamentals of Corrective Labour Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics: Statute on remand in custody
F Fundamentals of Criminalistics
F Fundamentals of Dialectical Materialism
F Fundamentals of Dialectics
F Fundamentals of Ergonomics
F Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics
F Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism • Manual
F Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism • Manual
F Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy (1974), The
F Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy (1982), The
F Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Theory and Tactics of Revolutionary Parties
F Fundamentals of Philosophy
F Fundamentals of Political Economy (1980)
F Fundamentals of Political Economy (1983), The
F Fundamentals of Political Economy: Popular course
F Fundamentals of Political Science: Textbook for primary political education.
F Fundamentals of Scientific Communism
F Fundamentals of Scientific Management of Socialist Economy
F Fundamentals of Scientific Socialism
F Fundamentals of Soviet State Law
F Fundamentals of Sports Training
F Fundamentals of the Socialist Theory of the State and Law
F Future of Society:, The
F Future of the USSR’s Economic Regions, The

F Futurology Fiasco: A Critical Study of non-Marxist Concepts of How Society Develops
G General Chernyakhovsky
G General Council of The First International 1864–1866: The London conference 1865 minutes
G General Crisis of Capitalism
G General Theory of Law: Social and philosophical problems, The
G Generalisation and Cognition
G Genesis of the Soviet Federative State (1917–1925)
G Genocide
G Geographical Prognostication: Problems and prospects
G Geography and Ecology: A collection of articles, 1971–1981
G Geography of the Soviet Union: Physical background, population, economy
G Georgi Dimitrov Selected Works (Volume 1):
G Georgi Dimitrov Selected Works (Volume 2):
G Georgi Dimitrov Selected Works (Volume 3)
G Georgi Dimitrov: An eminent theoretician and revolutionary
G Georgi Plekhanov Selected Philosophical Works (Volume I):
G Georgi Plekhanov Selected Philosophical Works (Volume II):
G Georgi Plekhanov Selected Philosophical Works (Volume III):
G Georgi Plekhanov Selected Philosophical Works (Volume IV):
G Georgi Plekhanov Selected Philosophical Works (Volume V):
G German Imperialism: Its past and present
G Germany:
G Glance at Historical Materialism, A
G Global engineering.
G Global Ecology
G Global Problems and the Future of Mankind
G Global Problems of Our Age
G Global Problems of Our Age
G Glory Eternal: Defence of Odessa 1941
G Going Beyond the Square: Notes by an economist
G Gorky Collected Works in Ten Volumes:
G Gorky and His Contemporaries:
G Government Regulation of the Private Sector in the USSR
G Great Baikal Amur Railway, The
G Great Construction Works of Communism and the Remaking of Nature
G Great Heritage: The classical literature of Old Rus, The
G Great March of Liberation, The
G Great Mission of Literature and Art, The
G Great October Revolution and World Social Progress, The
G Great October Revolution and the Intelligentsia:, The
G Great October Revolution and the Working Class, National Liberation and General Democratic Movements, The
G Great October Socialist Revolution, The
G Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–1945:
G Grounds for Optimism
G Growing Up Human
G Growing Up in the Soviet Union from the Cradle to Coming of Age
G Guarantee of Peace
H Hague Congress of the First International, September 2–7, 1872:, The
H Handbook of Philosophy, A
H Hands Up! Or Public Enemy No. 1
H Hans Kohn Analyses the Russian Mind
H Hashar
H Hatredmongers: Anti-Soviet activity of the Lithuanian Clerical EmigrÃ©s
H Health Protection in the USSR.
H Heartbeat of Reform: Soviet jurists and political scientists discuss the progress of Perestroika:, The
H Henry Thoreau
H Henry Winston: Profile of a U.S. communist
H Higher Education and Computerisation
H Highlights of a Fighting History: 60 Years of the Communist Party, USA
H Historical Experience of the CPSU in Carrying Out Lenin’s Co-operative Plan
H Historical Knowledge: A Systems-Epistemological Approach.
H Historical Materialism ( by Cornforth )
H Historical Materialism (1969)
H Historical Materialism: An outline of Marxist theory of society.
H Historical Materialism: Basic problems.
H Historical Materialism: Theory, methodology, problems.
H Historical Science in Socialist Countries:
H Historical Science in the USSR: New research:
H History OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION / BOLSHEVIKS / SHORT COURSE
H History OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
H History Versus Anti-History: A critique of the bourgeois falsification of the postwar history of the CPSU.
H History and Politics: American historiography on Soviet society
H History in the Making: Memoirs of World War II Diplomacy
H History of Afganistan
H History of Ancient Philosophy: Greece and Rome
H History of Classical Sociology, A
H History of India (2 v.), A
H History of Old Russian Literature, A
H History of Psychology, A
H History of Realism, A
H History of Religion
H History of Science: Soviet research, The
H History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1945–1970
H History of the Ancient World.
H History of the Middle Ages
H History of the October Revolution
H History of the Three Internationals
H History of the USA Since World War I
H History of the USSR in three parts: PART I:
H History of the USSR in three parts: PART II:
H History of the USSR in three parts: PART III:
H History of the USSR: An outline of socialist construction
H History of the USSR: Elementary course
H History of the USSR: The era of socialism
H Ho Chi Minh Selected Writings, 1920–1969:
H Ho Chi Minh.
H Honour Eternal: Second World War Memorials
H How Many Will the Earth Feed?
H How Socialism Began: Russia Under Lenin’s Leadership 1917–1923
H How Soviet Economy Won Technical Independence
H How Wars End: Eye-witness accounts of the fall of Berlin
H How the National Question Was Solved in Soviet Central Asia
H How the Revolution Was Won:
H How the Soviet Economy Is Run:
H How to Study Historical Materialism
H How to Study the Theory of Scientific Communism:
H Human Relations Doctrine: Ideological weapon of the monopolies.
H Human Rights and Freedoms in the USSR
H Human Rights and International Relations
H Human Rights, What We Argue About
H Human Rights: Continuing the discussion
H Humanism of Art., The
H Humanism, Atheism: Principles and Practice
H Humanism: Its Philosophical, Ethical and Sociological Aspects.
I I Hereby Apply for an Apartment
I I Saw the New World Born: John Reed
I Icon Painting: State Museum of Palekh Art.
I Ideals and Spiritual Values of Socialist Society, The
I Ideological Struggle Today
I Ideological Struggle and Literature:, The
I Ideology and Social Progress
I Ideology and Tactics of Anti-Communism: Myths and Reality, The
I Illusion of Equal Rights: Legal Inequality in the Capitalist World, An
I Image of India: The Study of Ancient Indian Civilisation in the USSR, The
I Immortality: Verse By Soviet Poets Who Laid Down Their Lives in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945
I Imperial China: Foreign-policy conceptions and methods
I Imperialism and the Developing Countries
I Improvement of Soviet Economic Planning
I In Disregard of the Law
I In Pursuit of Social Justice
I In Search of Harmony
I In Search of Holy Mother Russia
I In Southern Africa
I In the Forecasters’ Maze
I In the Grip of Terror
I In the Name of Life: Reflections of a Soviet Surgeon
I In the Name of Peace
I In the World of Music
I India: Independence and oil
I India: Social and Economic Development (18th–20th Century)
I India: Spotlight on Population
I Indian Economy, The

I Indian Philosophy in Modern Times
I Individual and Society, The
I Individual and the Microenvironment, The
I Individual in Socialist Society, The
I Industrial Revolution in the East, The
I Industrialisation of Developing Countries
I Industrialisation of India
I Inflation Under Capitalism Today
I Information Abused: Critical essays
I Insane Squandering: The Social and Economic Consequences of the Arms Race
I Integration of Science., The
I Intensifying Production: Acceleration factors
I Inter-American Relations from Bolivar to the Present
I Interaction of Sciences in the Study of the Earth, The
I International Covenants on Human Rights and Soviet Legislation
I International Humanitarian Law
I International Law of the Sea, The
I International Law: A textbook
I International Law
I International MEETING OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS’ PARTIES – MOSCOW 1969
I International Monetary Law
I International Monopolies and Developing Countries
I International Solidarity with the Spanish Republic 1936–1939:
I International Space Law.
I International Terrorism and the CIA: Documents, Eyewitness Reports, Facts
I International Trade and the Improvement of the Standard of Living in the West
I International Working-Class Movement, Volume 1: The Origins of the Proletariat and Its Evolution as a Revolutionary Class, The
I International Working-Class Movement, Volume 2: The Working-Class Movement in the Period of Transition to Imperialism (1871–1904), The
I International Working-Class Movement, Volume 3: Revolutionary battles of the early 20th Century, The
I International Working-Class Movement, Volume 4: The Socialist Revolution in Russia and the International Working Class (1917–1923), The
I International Working-Class Movement, Volume 5: The Builder of Socialism and Fighter Against Fascism, The
I International Working-Class Movement, Volume 6: The Working-Class Movement in the Developed Capitalist Countries After the Second World War (1945–1979), The
I International Working-Class and Communist Movement: Historical Record (1830s to mid-1940s)
I Interpreting America: Russian and Soviet Studies of the History of American Thought
I Introduction to Physics
I Invitation to a Dialogue
I Islam and Muslims in the Land of the Soviets
J Jawaharlal Nehru and His Political Views
J Jawaharlal Nehru
J Joint Jubilee Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, Moscow November 3, 1967
J Jonestown Carnage: A CIA crime, The
K Kampuchea: From Tragedy to Rebirth
K Karl Marx and Modern Philosophy: Collection of Articles
K Karl Marx and Our Time: Articles and speeches
K Karl Marx and Our Time: The struggle for peace and social progress
K Karl Marx’s Great Discovery: The dual-nature-of-labour doctrine:
K Karl Marx: A Biography
K Karl Marx: Short biography.
K Keynesianism Today:
K Klement Gottwald Selected Writings 1944–1949
K Komsomol: Questions and Answers, The
K Konstantin Stanislavsky, 1863–1963: Man and Actor:
K Kwame Nkrumah
L Labour Protection at Soviet Industrial Enterprises
L Labour in the USSR: Problems and solutions
L Land of Soviets, The
L Landmarks in History: The Marxist Doctrine of Socio-Economic Formations
L Landmarks of Marxist Socio-Economic Foundations
L Last Nuclear Explosion: Forty years of struggle against nuclear tests, The
L Last of the Romans and European Culture, The
L Law and Force in the International System
L Law and Legal Culture in Soviet Society
L Law, Morality and Man:
L Law, Progress, and Peace: A journalist’s observations on the influence of Soviet law on the progressive development of international law
L Leap Through the Centuries, A
L Leftist Terrorism: Are the Leftist Terrorists Really Left?
L Legal Regulation of Soviet Foreign Economic Relations, The
L Legislation in the USSR
L Legislative Acts of the USSR: Book 3
L Lenin About the Press
L Lenin COLLECTED WORKS (International), V.I.

L Lenin Collected Works
L Lenin In Our Life.
L Lenin In Profile: World writers and artists on Lenin
L Lenin On Participation of the People in Government
L Lenin Prize Winners: Soviet stars theatre, music, art
L Lenin Selected Works
L Lenin Talks to America.
L Lenin Through the Eyes of Lunacharsky
L Lenin Through the Eyes of the World:
L Lenin and Books
L Lenin and Gorky: Letters, reminiscences, articles.
L Lenin and Library Organisation.
L Lenin and Modern Natural Science.
L Lenin and National Liberation in the East
L Lenin and Problems of Literature.
L Lenin and USSR Foreign Politics
L Lenin and the Bourgeois Press
L Lenin and the Leagues of Struggle
L Lenin and the Soviet Peace Policy: Articles and Speeches 1944–80.
L Lenin and the World Revolutionary Process
L Lenin in London: Memorial places
L Lenin in Soviet Literature; A Remarkable Year, etc.
L Lenin in Soviet Poetry
L Lenin on Labour Under Socialism: The Great Legacy of Marxism-Leninism
L Lenin on Language
L Lenin on religion, V.I.
L Lenin on the Intelligentsia
L Lenin on the Unity of the International Communist Movement
L Lenin’s "What the ‘Friends of the People’ Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats"
L Lenin’s “Materialism and Empirio-Criticism”
L Lenin’s “The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky”
L Lenin’s Behests and the Making of Soviet Latvia
L Lenin’s Comrades-In-Arms:
L Lenin’s Doctrine of National Liberation Revolutions and Modern World
L Lenin’s Geneva Addresses
L Lenin’s Ideas and Modern International Relations
L Lenin’s Plan of Building Socialism in the USSR
L Lenin’s Political Testament
L Lenin’s Teaching on the World Economy and Its Relevance to Our Times
L Lenin’s Theory of Non-capitalist Development and the Experience of Mongolia:
L Lenin’s Theory of Revolution
L Lenin: A Biography
L Lenin: A Short Biography., V.I.
L Lenin: Comrade and man
L Lenin: Great and Human
L Lenin: His life and work: Documents and photographs, V.I.
L Lenin: Revolution and the World Today
L Lenin: The Founder of the Soviet Armed Forces
L Lenin: The Great Theoretician.
L Lenin: The Revolutionary.
L Lenin: The Story of His Life, V. I.
L Lenin: Youth and The Future
L Lenin: a Biography
L Leningrad Does Not Surrender
L Leninism and Contemporary Problems of the Transition from Capitalism to Socialism.
L Leninism and Modern China’s Problems
L Leninism and Revolution: Reply to Critics
L Leninism and Today’s Problems of the Transition to Socialism
L Leninism and the Agrarian Peasant Question in Two Volumes: Volume One:
L Leninism and the Agrarian Peasant Question in Two Volumes: Volume Two:
L Leninism and the Battle of Ideas.
L Leninism and the National Question
L Leninism and the Revolutionary Process
L Leninism and the World Revolutionary Working-Class Movement (1971):
L Leninism and the World Revolutionary Working-Class Movement (1976):
L Leninism: The Banner of Liberation and Progress of Nations
L Leninist Standards of Party Life.
L Leninist Theory of Reflection and the Present Day, The
L Leninist Theory of Revolution and Social Psychology
L Leninist Theory of Socialist Revolution and the Contemporary World.
L Let Us Live in Peace and Friendship

L Let the Blood of Man Not Flow
L Let the Living Remember: Soviet War Poetry
L Letters From the Dead:
L Lev Vygotsky.
L Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War
L Liberation of Europe, The
L Liberation
L Lie of a Soviet War Threat, The
L Life and Activities of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin: A lofty example of serving mankind, The
L Life and Death of Martin Luther King, The
L Life and Work of Walt Whitman: A Soviet view
L Life of Lenin
L Life, Art and America: Narratives and stories, articles
L Life, We’re All in It Together
L Lifelong Cause, A
L Literature and the New Thinking
L Living Ocean, The
L Living and Effective Teaching of Marxism-Leninism:, The
L Logic Made Simple: A dictionary
L Logic
L Lomonosov’s Philosophy
L Long Road: Sino-Russian economic contacts from ancient times to 1917, The
L Looking Into the Future
M Macro-Economic Models
M Mad Love
M Made in USSR
M Mahitahi = Work Together: Some peoples of the Soviet Union
M Main Trends in Philosophy: A theoretical analysis of the history of philosophy., The
M Major Ethnosocial Trends in the USSR
M Making of the Marxist Philosophy from Idealism and Revolutionary Democracy to Dialectical Materialism and Scientific Communism, The
M Man After Work: Social problems of daily life and leisure time.
M Man At Work: The Scientific and Technological Revolution, the Soviet Working Class and Intelligentsia
M Man and His Stages of Life
M Man and Man’s World: the categories of “man” and “world” in the system of scientific world outlooks
M Man and Nature: The ecological crisis and social progress
M Man and Sea Warfare
M Man and Society
M Man and the Scientific and Technological Revolution
M Man as the Object of Education: An Essay in Pedagogical Anthropology (Selected extracts)
M Man at the Limit: Eye-witness reports
M Man’s Dreams are Coming True.
M Man’s Potential: Sketches
M Man’s Road to Progress: Talks on political topics
M Man, Science and Society
M Man, Science, Humanism: A New Synthesis
M Man, Society and the Environment:
M Man: His Behaviour and Social Relations
M Management of Socialist Production
M Mankind and the Year 2000: Current problems
M Manoeuvre in Modern Land Wafare
M Manpower Resources and Population Under Socialism
M Manzhou Rule in China
M Mao Tse-Tung: A political portrait
M Mao Tse-Tung: An ideological and psychological portrait
M Mao’s Betrayal
M Maoism As It Really Is:
M Maoism Through the Eyes of Communists
M Maoism Unmasked: Collection of Soviet Press Articles
M Maoism and Its Policy of Splitting the National Liberation Movement
M Maoism and Mao’s Heirs
M Maoism: The Curse of China
M Market of Socialist Economic Integration: Selected conference papers, The
M Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov (Volume 2):
M Marx & Engles Collected Works
M Marx • Engels • Marxism [Lenin]
M Marx Engels On Religion
M Marx and Engels Through the Eyes of Their Contemporaries
M Marx’s “Critique of the Gotha Programme”
M Marx’s Theory of Commodity and Surplus-Value: Formalised exposition
M Marxism and the Renegade Garaudy
M Marxism-Leninism on Proletarian Internationalism

M Marxism-Leninism on War and Army
M Marxism-Leninism on War and Peace
M Marxism-Leninism on the Non-Capitalist Way
M Marxism-Leninism: A Flourishing Science
M Marxism-Leninism: The International teaching of the working class
M Marxist Conception of Law, The
M Marxist Philosophy at the Leninist Stage
M Marxist Philosophy: A Popular Outline.
M Marxist Philosophy
M Marxist-Leninist Aesthetics and Life:
M Marxist- Leninist Aesthetics and the Arts
M Marxist-Leninist Philosophy (1978)
M Marxist-Leninist Philosophy (1980)
M Marxist- Leninist Philosophy: Diagrams, tables, illustrations for students of Marxist-Leninist theory.
M Marxist- Leninist Teaching of Socialism and the World Today, The
M Marxist-Leninist Theory of Society:, The
M Mass Information in the Service of Peace and Progress
M Mass Media in the USSR
M Mass Organisations in the U.S.S.R.
M Materialism and the Dialectical Method ( by Cornforth 1971)
M Materialismus Militans: Reply to Mr. Bogdanov
M Maxim Gorky Letters
M Maxim Litvinov
M May Day Traditions
M Meaning and Conceptual Systems.
M Meaning of Life, The
M Mechanisation of Soviet Agriculture: The economic effect, The
M Meeting of European Communist and Workers’ Parties for Peace and Disarmament, Paris, 28–29 April, 1980
M Meeting of Representatives of the Parties and Movements participating in the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution
M Meeting the Challenge: Soviet youth in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945
M Meetings with Sholokhov
M Memoirs of Wartime Minister of Navy
M Men at War
M Methodology of History
M Methodology of Law
M Middle East: Oil and Policy, The
M Mikhail Bulgakov and His Times: Memoirs, Letters
M Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917–1967.
M Militant Solidarity, Fraternal Assistance:
M Militarism and Science
M Militarism in Peking’s Policies
M Military-Industrial Complex of the USA, The
M Millionaires and Managers
M Miracle of the Age
M Moby Dick, or the Whale
M Modern History of China., The
M Modern History of the Arab Countries
M Modern History, 1640–1870
M Modern State and Politics, The
M Modern Theories of International Economic Relations
M Moiseyev’s Dance Company
M Monetary Crisis Of Capitalism: Origin, Development
M Monism and Pluralism in Ideology and in Politics (Abridged).
M Monopoly Press: Or, How American journalism found itself in the vicious circle of the “crisis of credibility”, The
M Morality and Politics: Critical essays on contemporary views about the relationship between morality and politics in bourgeois sociology
M Moscow Diary, A
M Moscow Soviet, The
M Moscow, Stalingrad, 1941–1942: Recollections, stories, reports.
M Multilateral Economic Co-Operation of Socialist States:, The
M Music Education in the Modern World:
M Musical Journey Through the Soviet Union, A
M My Day and Age: selected poems
M Mysteries of the Deeps [i.E. Deep]:
M Mystery of Pearl Harbor: Facts and Theories, The
M Myth About Soviet Threat: cui bono?
M Myth, Philosophy, Avant-Gardism:
N N. Lobachevsky and His Contribution to Science
N Namibia, A Struggle for Independence:
N National Economic Planning
N National Folk Sports in the USSR
N National Languages in the USSR: Problems and Solutions

N National Liberation Movement in West Africa
N National Liberation Revolutions Today: Part I:
N National Liberation Revolutions Today: Part II
N National Liberation: Essays on Theory and Practice
N National Sovereignty and the Soviet State
N Nationalities Question: Lenin’s Approach:, The
N Nations and Internationalism
N Nations and Social Progress
N Nato: A Bleak Picture
N Nato: Threat to World Peace
N Nature Reserves in the USSR
N Nature of Science: An epistemological analysis., The
N Nearest Neighbour is 170 KM Away: A journey into the Soviet Union, The
N Neo-Colonialism on the Warpath
N Neo-Freudians In Search of “Truth”.
N Neocolonialism and Africa in the 1970s
N Neocolonialism: Methods and manoeuvres.
N Nep, a Modern View
N Never Say Die
N New Approach to Economic Integration, A
N New Constitution of the USSR, The
N New Information Order or Psychological Warfare?, A
N New International Economic Order
N New Life Begun: Prose, poetry and essays of the 1920s–1930s, A
N New Realities and the Struggle of Ideas
N New Scramble for Africa, The
N New Soviet Legislation on Marriage and the Family
N Newly Free Countries in the Seventies, The
N Nihilism Today.
N Nikolai Miklouho-Maclay: Traveller, scientist and humanist
N Nikolai Vavilov: The Great Sower:
N Nine Modern Soviet Plays
N Nineteenth Century American Short Stories
N Non-Capitalist Development: An Historical Outline
N Non-aligned Movement, The
N Noncapitalist Way: Soviet Experience and the Liberated Countries, The
N Normalization of World Trade and the Monetary Problem
N North Russian Architecture
N Not For War We Raise Our Sons: A collection of letters to the Soviet Peace Fund and the Soviet Women’s Committee
N Notes on Indian History (664–1858)
N Nuclear Disarmament
N Nuclear Engineering Before and After Chernobyl:
N Nuclear Space Age: The Soviet viewpoint, The
N Nuclear Strategy and Common Sense
N Nuclear WAR: THE MEDICAL AND BIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
N Nuremberg Epilogue, The
O Ocean and Its Resources
O October Revolution and Africa, The
O October Revolution and the Arts:, The
O October Revolution and the Working-Class, National Liberal, and General Democratic Movements, The
O October Storm and After:, The
O October Storm and After:, The
O Of Human Values: Soviet literature today
O Old, the New, the Eternal: Reflections on art, The
O On Communist Education
O On Education: Selected articles and speeches
O On Historical Materialism • A Collection [Marx-Engels-Lenin]
O On Just and Unjust Wars
O On Labour-Oriented Education and Instruction
O On Literature and Art
O On Proletarian Internationalism
O On Relations Between Socialist and Developing Countries
O On The Art and Craft of Writing
O On The Principle Of Mutual Advantage:
O On a Military Mission to Great Britain and the USA
O On the “Manifesto of the Communisty Party” of Marx and Engels
O On the Communist Programme
O On the Edge of an Abyss: From Truman to Reagan, the doctrines and realitites of the Nuclear Age
O On the Eve of World War II: A foreign policy study
O On the Intelligentsia
O On the International Working-Class and Communist Movement

O On the Paris Commune
O On the Path of Cultural Progress: Culture of the socialist world
O On the Side of a Just Cause: Soviet assistance to the heroic Vietnamese people
O On the Soviet State Apparatus
O On the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century: The technological revolution and literature
O On the Track of Discovery. [Series 1] [n.d. [1960’s]]:
O On the Unity of the International Communist Movement
O On the Upgrade: Living standards in the Soviet Union
O On the Way to Knowledge: Man, the Earth, outer space, acceleration
O One Is Not Born a Personality.
O One True Luxury: Research into communication pattern of Soviet schoolchildren, The
O One Way Ticket to Democracy:
O Optimal Functioning System for a Socialist Economy
O Orbits of the Global Economy, The
O Organisation and Management: A sociological analysis of Western theories
O Organisation of Domestic Trade in the USSR
O Organisation of Industry and Construction in the USSR
O Organisation of Statistics in the U.S.S.R.
O Organisation of Statistics in the USSR
O Organization of African Unity: 25 years of struggle
O Organizations: Communist Party, USA
O Origin and Principles of Scientific Socialism
O Origin of Man, The
O Origin of the Human Race., The
O Origins of the Proletariat and Its Evolution as a Revolutionary Class, The
O Our Course: Peace and Socialism
O Our Course: Peace and Socialism
O Our Lives, Our Dreams: Soviet women speak:
O Our Rights: Political and economic guarantees:
O Outer Space: Politics and law
O Outline History of Africa, An
O Outline History of the Communist International (1971)
O Outline History of the Soviet Working Class
O Outline Political History of the Americas
O Outline Theory of Population, An
O Outline of Soviet Labour Law, An
O Overseas Chinese Bourgeoisie: A Peking tool in southeast Asia.
O Overseas Expansion of Capital:, The
P Pacific Community: An Outlook, The
P Palekh: Village of Artists
P Palestine Problem: Aggression, resistance, ways of settlement, The
P Palestine Question: Document adopted by the United Nations and other international organisations and conferences, The
P Panorama of the Soviet Union
P Part Played By Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man, The
P Passing Age: The ideology and culture of the late bourgeois epoch, The
P Path of Valour., The
P Path to Peace: A view from Moscow, The
P Patrice Lumumba: Fighter for Africa’s freedom
P Peace Prospects From Three Worlds
P Peace Strategy in the Nuclear Age
P Peace and Disarmament. Academic Studies. 1980
P Peace and Disarmament: Academic Studies, special issue 1987:
P Peace and Disarmament
P Peaceful Coexistence: Contemporary international law of peaceful coexistence
P Peking Reaches Out: A Study of Chinese Expansionism
P People’s Army, The
P People’s Control in Socialist Society
P People’s Democracy, A New Form of Political Organization of Society
P People’s Theater: From the Box Office to the Stage
P Peoples of the North and Their Road to Socialism, The
P Perestroika In Action:
P Perestroika: The Crunch is Now
P Permanent Blush of Shame: A Trip to the East and West, A
P Personal Property in the USSR
P Personal Subsidiary Farming Under Socialism
P Petty-Bourgeois Revolutionism (Anarchism, Trotskyism and Maoism)
P Phenomenon of the Soviet Cinema
P Philosophical Conception of Man:, The
P Philosophical Concepts in Natural Science.

P Philosophical Foundations of Scientific Socialism
P Philosophical Problems of Elementary Particle Physics
P Philosophical Traditions Today.
P Philosophical Views of Mao Tse-Tung: A Critical Analysis, The
P Philosophy and Scientific Cognition
P Philosophy and Social Theory: An Introduction to Historical Materialism
P Philosophy and Sociology.
P Philosophy and the Ecological Problems of Civilisation
P Philosophy and the World-Views of Modern Sciences
P Philosophy in the USSR: Problems of dialectical materialism.
P Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism., The
P Philosophy of Optimism: Current problems
P Philosophy of Revolt: Criticism of left radical ideology., The
P Philosophy of Survival, The
P Philososphy in the USSR: Problems of historical materialism
P Physics of Interstellar Space: A popular-science outline
P Pioneers of Space
P Plain-Spoken Facts, The
P Planet of Reason: A Sociological Study of Man-Nature Relationship, The
P Planning a Socialist Economy
P Planning in Developing Countries: Theory and methodology
P Planning in the USSR: Problems of theory and organisation
P Planning of Manpower in the Soviet Union
P Plato
P Please Accept my Donation: Collection of Letters to the Soviet Peace Fund
P Pluto’s Chain: Explorations of the Kamchatka-Kuril volcanic belt
P Polar Diaries
P Policy Keeping the World on Edge, A
P Policy of Peaceful Coexistence in Action, The
P Policy of Provocation and Expansion: A collection of documents and articles, published in the Soviet press, dealing with China’s policy of annexation and its territorial claims to other countries, A
P Policy of the Soviet Union in the Arab World:, The
P Politcal Economy (1983)
P Political Consciousness in the U.S.A.: Traditions and evolutions.
P Political Economy (1989)
P Political Economy of Capitalism (1974), The
P Political Economy of Capitalism (1985)
P Political Economy of Revolution:, The
P Political Economy of Socialism (1967)
P Political Economy of Socialism (1985)
P Political Economy: A Condensed Course
P Political Economy: A beginner’s course
P Political Economy: A study aid
P Political Economy: Capitalism
P Political Economy: Socialism.
P Political Map of the World, The
P Political Reality and Political Consciousness.
P Political Systems, Development Trends: Theme of the 11th World Congress of political sciences
P Political Terms: A short guide
P Political Terrorism: An Indictment of Imperialism.
P Political Thought of Ancient Greece
P Political Work in the Soviet Army
P Politico-Economic Problems of Capitalism.
P Population Biology: Progress and problems of studies on natural populations
P Population and Socio-Economic Development
P Population of the USSR: A socio-economic survey, The
P Population, Economics, and Politics: The socio-economic development of the European members of the CMEA
P Populism: Its past, present and future.
P Present-Day China: Socio-economic problems, collected articles.
P Present- Day Ethnic Processes in the USSR
P Present- Day Problems in Asia and Africa: Theory - Politics - Personalities
P Present- day Non-Marxist Political Economy:
P Press Is a Great Force, The
P Prevent War, Safeguard Peace. [ca. 1962]
P Prevention of War: Doctrines, concepts, prospects
P Principles of Criminology, The
P Principles of Philosophy, The
P Principles of the Theory of Historical Process in Philosophy.
P Priorities of Soviet Foreign Policy Today, The
P Privileged Generation: Children in the Soviet Union, The

P Problem of the Ideal: The nature of mind and its relationship to the brain and social medium, The
P Problems of Africa Today
P Problems of Common Security
P Problems of Contemporary Aesthetics: A collection of articles
P Problems of Leninism
P Problems of Modern Aesthetics:
P Problems of Socialist Theory
P Problems of Soviet School Education
P Problems of War and Peace: A critical analysis of bourgeois theories.
P Problems of the Communist Movement: Some Questions of Theory and Method.
P Problems of the Development of Mind.
P Problems of the History of Philosophy.
P Proceedings of the First Congress of the Yemeni Socialist Party:
P Profession of the Stage-Director, The
P Profiles in Labour: Essays about heroes of socialist labour
P Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:, The
P Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism and Other Writings, The
P Psychiatry
P Psychological Research in USSR: Volume 1
P Psychological War, The
P Psychology (1989)
P Psychology As You May Like It
P Psychology in the Soviet Union: A Historical Outline.
P Psychology of Experiencing: An analysis of how critical situations are dealt with, The
P Psychology of Learning: Theories of learning and programmed instruction, The
P Psychology of Management of Labour Collectives, The
P Psychology of Phantasy:, The
P Psychology of Thinking, The
P Public Education in Soviet Azerbaijan: Appraisal of an achievement
P Public Education in the U.S.S.R.
P Public Enterprises in Developing Countries: Legal status
P Public Sector in Developing Countries:, The
P Publishing in the Soviet Union
P Pulse of Time, The
Q Questions of the Methodology of History:
R R&D in Social Reproduction.
R Races and Peoples: Contemporary ethnic and racial problems.
R Races of Mankind, The
R Racism: An ideological weapon of imperialism.
R Rational Utilization of Natural Resources and the Protection of the Environment, The
R Re-reading Dostoyevsky
R Reader on Social Sciences (ABC #1), A
R Reader on the History of the USSR (1917–1937)., A
R Real Socialism and Ideological Struggle
R Real Truth: Profiles of Soviet Jews, The
R Recent History of the Labor Movement in the United States 1918–1939
R Recreational Geography in the USSR
R Red Carnation., The
R Red Star and Green Crescent
R Reflections on Security in the Nuclear Age: A Dialogue Between Generals East and West
R Relativity and Man
R Religion and Social Conflicts in the U.S.A.
R Religion in the World Today
R Remarkable Year: The Blue Notebook: Retracing Lenin’s Steps., A
R Reminiscences of a Kremlin Commandant. [no date, ca. 1965.]
R Rendezvous in Space: Soyuz Apollo
R Renovation of Traditions: (traditions and innovations of Socialist realism in Ukrainian prose)
R Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy
R Report to the Nineteenth Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)
R Requirements of Developed Socialist Society
R Responsiblity for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity:
R Resumption and Development of International Economic Relations, The
R Retracing Lenin’s Steps
R Revolution in Laos: Practice and Prospects
R Revolutionaries of India in Soviet Russia: Mainspring of the Communist movement in the East
R Revolutionary Battles of the Early 20th Century
R Revolutionary COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
R Revolutionary Democracy and Communists in the East
R Revolutionary Democracy in Africa

R Revolutionary Movement of Our Time and Nationalism., The
R Revolutionary Process in the East:, The
R Revolutionary Vanguard:, The
R Riddle of the Origin of Consciousness., The
R Riddle of the Self, The
R Riddles of Three Oceans, The
R Right of the Accused to Defence in the USSR, The
R Right-Wing Revisionism Today
R Rights Accruing From Loss of Health
R Rights of Soviet Citizens: Collected normative acts
R Rights of the Individual in Socialist Society, The
R Rise and Fall of the Gunbatsu: A Study in Military History, The
R Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, The
R Rise of Socialist Economy: The experience of the USSR, other socialist, and socialist-oriented developing countries, The
R Road to Communism:, The
R Road to Great Victory: Soviet Diplomacy 1941–1945
R Road to Nirvana, The
R Road to Stable Peace in Asia, The
R Road to Victory: The Struggle For National Independence, Unity, Peace and Socialism in Vietnam, The
R Role of Advanced Ideas in Development of Society
R Role of Socialist Consciousness in the Development of Soviet Society, The
R Role of the State in Socio-Economic Reforms in Developing Countries, The
R Role of the State in the Socialist Transformation of the Economy of the U.S.S.R., The
R Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
R Russia and Her People: Recollections in Tranquillity
R Russia and the West: 19th Century
R Russian Discovery of America, A
R Russian History in Tales
R Russian Museum: A Guide, The
R Russian Orthodox Church (1982), The
R Russian Orthodox Church 10th to 20th Centuries, The
R Russian Revolution: The Comic Book Version, The
R Russian Revolution: What actually happened?, The
R Russian Revolutionary Tradition, The
R Russian Thinkers: Essays on Socio–Economic Thought in the 18th and 19th Centuries
R Russians Abroad
S Sacred Lyre: Essays on the life and work of Alexander Pushkin
S Safeguard of Peace: Soviet armed forces:, A
S Salyut Project, The
S Saturn Is Almost Invisible
S Scandinavian Social Democracy Today
S School of Classical Dance
S Science AT THE CROSS ROADS
S Science Fiction and Adventure Stories by Soviet Writers
S Science Fiction: English and American Short Stories
S Science In Its Youth: Pre-Marxian political economy, A
S Science Policy: Problems and trends
S Science Serves the Nation:
S Science and Morality
S Science and Philosophy
S Science and Society.
S Science and Soviet People’s Education
S Science and Technology, Humanism and Progress:
S Science in the USSR:
S Science, Technology and the Economy
S Scientific Communism (1986)
S Scientific Communism (A Popular Outline)
S Scientific Communism and Its Falsification by the Renegades
S Scientific Communism: A textbook
S Scientific Intelligentsia in the USSR: (structure and dynamics of personnel), The
S Scientific Management of Society (1971), The
S Scientific Management of Society
S Scientific and Technical Progress and Socialist Society
S Scientific and Technical Progress in the USA:
S Scientific and Technical Revolution: Economic aspects
S Scientific and Technological Progress and Social Advance
S Scientific and Technological Revolution and the Revolution in Education, The
S Scientific and Technological Revolution: Its impact on management and education, The
S Scientific and Technological Revolution: Its role in today’s world, The
S Scientific and Technological Revolution: Social Effects and Prospects, The
S Scientific-Technological Revolution and the Contradictions of Capitalism., The

S Sdi: Key to security or disaster
S Search in Pedagogics: Discussions of the 1920’s and Early 1930s, A
S Second International, 1889–1914: The History and heritage, The
S Second Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.:
S Second World War: A Politico-Military Survey, The
S Secret War Against Cuba
S Secret War Against Soviet Russia, The
S Secret Weapon in Africa
S Secrets from Whitehall and Downing Street
S Secrets of the Second World War.
S Seeking Rational Solutions: Discussions old and new
S Selected Pedagogical Works
S Selected Philosophical Works
S Selected Speeches and Articles
S Selected Works in Geography
S Selected Writings: Linguistics, poetics
S Selections from Shaw: A fearless champion of truth.
S Selections from Shaw: A fearless champion of truth
S Semantic Philosophy of Art
S Sentinels of Peace
S Sergei Prokofiev: Materials, Articles, Interviews
S Serving the People.
S Seven Days in May
S Seven Essays on Life and Literature
S Shakespeare in the Soviet Union: A collection of articles.
S Sholokhov: A critical appreciation
S Short Course on Political Economy, A
S Short Economic History of the USSR, A
S Short History of Geographical Science in the Soviet Union, A
S Short History of Soviet Society, A
S Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union., A
S Short History of the National-Liberation Movement in East Africa, A
S Short History of the USSR (1987), A
S Short History of the USSR: A popular outline, A
S Short History of the USSR: Part I., A
S Short History of the USSR: Part II., A
S Short History of the World in Two Volumes, A
S Short History of the World in Two Volumes, A
S Siberia, 60 Degrees East of Greenwich: Oil and people
S Siberia: Achievements, Problems, Solutions
S Siberia: Epic of the Century
S Silent Death (Chemical weapons/warfare), The
S Simon Bolivar
S Sino-Soviet Relations 1945-1973:
S Sketches of the Soviet Union
S Social Democracy and Southern Africa, 1960s–1980s
S Social Informaton and the Regulation of Social Development
S Social Insurance in the U.S.S.R.
S Social Organisations in the Soviet Union: Political and legal organisational aspects
S Social Partnership or Class Struggle?: Theory, Legislation & Practice
S Social Problems of Man’s Environment: Where We Live and Work
S Social Programme of the Ninth Five-Year Plan
S Social Psychology and History
S Social Psychology and Propaganda
S Social Psychology
S Social Science
S Social Sciences: Information system., The
S Social Security in the USSR
S Social Structure of Soviet Society, The
S Social and Economic Geography: An essay in conceptual terminological systematisation
S Social and State Structure of the U.S.S.R., The
S Socialism As a Social System
S Socialism Theory and Practice:
S Socialism and Capitalism: Score and Prospects
S Socialism and Communism: Selected passages, 1956–63
S Socialism and Communism
S Socialism and Culture: A collection of articles
S Socialism and Democracy: A Reply to opportunists
S Socialism and Energy Resources
S Socialism and Humanism
S Socialism and Law: Law in society

S Socialism and Optimism
S Socialism and State Administration
S Socialism and Wealth
S Socialism and the Individual
S Socialism and the Newly Independent Nations
S Socialism and the Rational Needs of the Individual
S Socialism and the State
S Socialism in the USSR: How it was built
S Socialism’s Historic Mission and the World Today
S Socialism: A new theoretical vision
S Socialism: Crisis or renewal?
S Socialism: Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice
S Socialism: Its Role in History.
S Socialism: One-party and multi-party system
S Socialism: Questions of Theory
S Socialist Community at a New Stage, The
S Socialist Community: A new type of relations among nations, The
S Socialist Countries’ Economy in the 1970s, The
S Socialist Countries: Important Changes, The
S Socialist Culture and Man
S Socialist Democracy: Aspects of theory
S Socialist Humanism, Culture, Personality:
S Socialist Ideal and Real Socialism, The
S Socialist Ideology
S Socialist Integration
S Socialist International, The
S Socialist Internationalism (1978)
S Socialist Internationalism: Theory and practice of international relations of a new type
S Socialist Life Style and the Family
S Socialist Literatures, Problems of Development
S Socialist Long-Term Economic Planning.
S Socialist Management: The Leninist concept.
S Socialist Nationalisation of Industry.
S Socialist Organisation of Labour
S Socialist Policy of Peace: Theory and practice
S Socialist Realism and the Modern Literary Process
S Socialist Realism in Literature and Art:
S Socialist Revolution [MarxEngels], The
S Socialist Revolution and Its Defense, The
S Socialist Revolution in Russia and the Intelligentsia, The
S Socialist Revolution in Russia and the International Working Class (1917–1923), The
S Socialist Self-Government
S Socialist Society In the Present Stage: Proceedings of a section meeting
S Socialist Society: Its social justice
S Socialist Society: Scientific principles of development
S Socialist Way of Development in Agriculture, The
S Socialist Way of Life: Problems and perspectives
S Socialist World System, The
S Socialist- Oriented State: Instrument of Revolutionary Change, A
S Society and Economic Relations
S Society and Individual: Give and take
S Society and Nature: Socio-ecological problems
S Society and Youth
S Society and the Environment: A Soviet view
S Society of the Future
S Sociological Theory and Social Practice:
S Sociology of Culture, The
S Sociology of Revolution: A Marxist view
S Sociology: Problems of theory and method.
S Soldier’s Duty, A
S Soldier’s Memoirs:, A
S Solving the National Question in the USSR
S Some Aspects of Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces
S Some Basic Rights of Soviet Citizens
S Some Questions Concerning the Struggle of Counter-Revolutionary Trotskyism Against Revolutionary Leninism
S South Africa Against Africa, 1966–1986
S Southeast Asia: History, economy, policy.
S Southern Africa: Apartheid, Colonialism, Aggression.
S Soviet Agriculture
S Soviet Ambassador Reports Back, The
S Soviet Armed Forces Yesterday and Today, The

S Soviet Army, The
S Soviet Banker’s Notes, A
S Soviet Circus: A Collection of articles, The
S Soviet Collective Farm (a sociological study), The
S Soviet Communist Forum: (World response to the 25th CPSU congress)
S Soviet Constitution and the Myths of Sovietologists, The
S Soviet Constitution: A dictionary, The
S Soviet Court, The
S Soviet Democracy and Bourgeois Sovietology
S Soviet Democracy in the Period of Developed Socialism
S Soviet Economic Reform: Progress and problems.
S Soviet Economy Forges Ahead: Ninth five-year plan 1971–1975.
S Soviet Economy: Results and prospects
S Soviet Employee’s Rights in Law
S Soviet Family Budgets
S Soviet Finance: Principles, Operation
S Soviet Financial System
S Soviet Fine Arts
S Soviet Foreign Policy Volume I:
S Soviet Foreign Policy Volume II:
S Soviet Foreign Policy: A brief review 1955–65.
S Soviet Foreign Policy: Objectives and principles
S Soviet Foreign Trade: Today and tomorrow
S Soviet Form of Popular Government, The
S Soviet Frontiers of Tomorrow
S Soviet General Staff at War 1941–1945: Book 1, The
S Soviet General Staff at War 1941–1945: Book 2, The
S Soviet Geographical Explorations and Discoveries
S Soviet Geography Today: Aspects of theory
S Soviet Geography Today: Physical Geography
S Soviet Historical Science: New research
S Soviet Industry
S Soviet Land Legislation.
S Soviet Legislation on Children’s Rights.
S Soviet Legislation on Women’s Rights:
S Soviet Literature–Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow
S Soviet Literature: Problems and People
S Soviet Lithuania on the Road to Prosperity
S Soviet Man: The making of a socialist type of personality
S Soviet Nationalities and Policy and Bourgeois Historians: The formation of the Soviet multinational state (1917–1922) in contemporary American historiography
S Soviet Navy in War and Peace, The
S Soviet North: In the Land of the Midnight Sun; the Arctic; News from High Latitudes
S Soviet North: Present Development and Prospects, The
S Soviet Officers
S Soviet Parliament: A reference book, The
S Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II
S Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II
S Soviet Peace Policy, 1917–1939
S Soviet Peasantry: An outline history (1917–1970), The
S Soviet People as I Knew Them
S Soviet People: A new historical community, The
S Soviet Planned Economy, The
S Soviet Policy for Asian Peace and Security
S Soviet Political System Under Developed Socialism, The
S Soviet Political System: Perceptions and perspectives
S Soviet Psychology
S Soviet Reality in the Seventies
S Soviet Rock: 25 Years in the Underground + 5 Years of Freedom
S Soviet Russia Opts for Peace
S Soviet Russian Literature 1917–1977: Poetry and Prose - Selected Reading
S Soviet Russian Stories of the 1960s and 1970s
S Soviet Scene 1987: A collection of press articles and interviews
S Soviet School of Courage and Warcraft, The
S Soviet Science and Technique in the Service of Building Communism in the U.S.S.R.
S Soviet Socialist Democracy
S Soviet Society: Philosophy of Development
S Soviet Stars in the World of Music
S Soviet State and Law., The
S Soviet State as a Subject of Civil Law, The
S Soviet State, The
S Soviet Trade Unions: A collection of background materials, The

S Soviet Trade Unions: Yesterday Today Tomorrow
S Soviet Ukraine
S Soviet Union 50 Years Statistical Returns
S Soviet Union Today, The
S Soviet Union and Africa, The
S Soviet Union and European Security, The
S Soviet Union and International Economic Cooperation, The
S Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base (1945–1949), The
S Soviet Union as Americans See It 1917–1977, The
S Soviet Union: Political and Economic Reference Book.
S Soviet Volunteers in China 1925–1945
S Soviet Way of Life, The
S Soviet Women (Some aspects of the status of women in the USSR)
S Soviet Women: A portrait.
S Soviet Worker, The
S Soviet Writers Look At America
S Soviet Youth and Socialism.
S Soviet Youth: A socio-political outline.
S Soviet–U.S. Relations, 1933–1942
S Soviets of People’s Deputies: Democracy and administration
S Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies on the Eve of the October Revolution, March–October 1917
S Soweto: Life and Struggles of a South African Township
S Space Age, The
S Space Flights Serve Life on Earth
S Specialisation and Co-Operation of the Socialist Economies
S Sport and Society
S Stanislavsky
S State Law of the Socialist Countries: Socialism Today, The
S State Monopoly Capitalism and Labour Law
S State Monopoly Incomes Policy: Conception and Practice (In the Context of Great Britain)
S State Property in the USSR: Legal aspects
S State Structure of the USSR
S State and Communism, The
S State and Nations in the USSR, The
S State of Israel: A Historical, Economic and Political Study , The
S State, Democracy and Legality in the USSR: Lenin’s ideas today, The
S State-Monopoly Capitalism and the Labour Theory of Value.
S Steeled in the Storm: Essays on the history of the Komsomol
S Steep Steps: A Journalist’s Notes, The
S Stories About Lenin and the Revolution
S Stories About the Party of Communists Under Whose Leadership the Peoples of Russia Overthrew...
S Straight from the Heart: The writer and the time series
S Strategy of Economic Development in the USSR, The
S Strategy of Transnational Corporations, The
S Stride Across a Thousand Years:, A
S Strong in Spirit, The
S Struggle for Socialism in the World
S Studies in Psychology: The collective and the individual.
S Study of Soviet Foreign Policy, A
S Subject, Object, Cognition.
S Submarines in Arctic Waters
S Sukhomlinsky on Education, V.
S Surrealism
S System of Physical Education in the USSR, The
S Systems Theory: Philosophical and Methodological Problems
C Cp of China :: THE POLEMIC ON THE GENERAL LINE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
T Tales of the Ancient World:
T Talking About the Future: Can We Develop Without Disaster
T Talking About the Future: Is Mankind Heading for a Raw Materials Crisis?
T Talks on Soviet Democracy.
T Teacher’s Experience: Stanislav Shatsky: A collection, A
T Teaching of Political Economy: A critique of non-Marxian theories, The
T Teaching: Calling and skills.
T Teaching
T Technological Neo-colonialism
T Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences., The
T Television In the West and Its Doctrines.
T Ten Years of the Ethiopian Revolution
T Territorial Industrial Complexes: Optimisation models and general aspects
T Territorial Organisation of Soviet Economy, The
T Terrorism and International Law

T That Curious World of Nature: Geography for entertainment
T The LAND OF SOCIALISM TODAY TOMORROW
T The POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT
T Theatre, Music, Art (1967–1970)
T Their Point of View: Young Americans in the USSR
T Theoretical Aspects of Linguistics
T Theoretical Physics
T Theories of Surplus Value:
T Theory and Practice of Proletarian Internationalism, The
T Theory and Tactics of the International Communist Movement
T Theory of Earth’s Origin: Four lectures
T Theory of Growth of a Socialist Economy, The
T Theory of Knowledge ( by Cornforth ), The
T Theory of Population: Essays in Marxist research., The
T Theory of the State and Law
T There Shall be Retribution: Nazi war criminals and their protectors
T They Came to Stay: North Americans in the USSR
T They Found Their Voice: Stories from Soviet Nationalities with No Written Language Before the 1917 October Revolution
T They Knew Lenin: Reminiscenses of Foreign Contemporaries
T They Sealed Their Own Doom
T Third Soviet Generation
T Third World War? Threats, real, and imaginary, A
T Third World: Problems and Prospects, current stage of the national-liberation struggle, The
T Thirty Years of Victory
T This Amazing Amazing Amazing But Knowable Universe
T This NATION AND SOCIALISM ARE ONE
T This Nation and Socialism Are One
T This Whole Human Rights Business
T This is My Native Land: A Soviet journalists travels
T Three Centuries of Russian Poetry
T Three Leaders: Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi
T Three Men in a Boat to Say Nothing of the Dog
T Through the Russian Revolution
T Time For a New Way of Thinking
T Time to Speak Out, The
T To Be an Individual–Is It the Lot of Only a Chosen Few?
T To Children I Give My Heart
T Tomorrow Will Be Too Late: Dialogue on the threshold of the third millennium
T Topsy-Turvy Planet, or, Paramon’s Incredible Tale of Travel and Adventure, A
T Towards Freedom and Progress: The triumph of Soviet power in Central Asia
T Towards Social Homogeneity
T Towards Technologies of the Future
T Towns for People
T Tracing Martin Bormann
T Trade Among Capitalist Countries
T Trade Unions in Socialist Society
T Trade Unions, Disarmament, Conversion
T Trade and Coexistence
T Transition from Capitalism to Socialism, The
T Transnational Corporations And Militarism
T Travel to Distant Worlds
T Travels to New Guinea: Diaries Letters Documents.
T Tretyakov Art Gallery: A Guide
T Triumph of Lenin’s Ideas: Proceedings of Plenary Session
T Triumph of the Leninist Ideas of Proletarian Internationalism:
T Truth About Afghanistan:, The
T Truth About Cultural Exchange: 10 Years After Helsinki, The
T Turning-Point of World War II:, The
T Twentieth Century Capitalism
T Two Directions of Socio-economic Development in Africa
T Two Hundred Days of Fire: Accounts by participants and witnesses of the battle of Stalingrad
T Two Worlds–Two Monetary Systems
U U.S. Budget and Economic Policy.
U U.S. Labour Unions Today: Basic problems and trends.
U U.S. Military Doctrine, The
U U.S. Monopolies and Developing Countries
U U.S. Negroes in Battle: From Little Rock to Watts
U U.S. Neocolonialism in Africa
U U.S. Policies in the Indian Ocean
U U.S. Policy in Latin America: Postwar to present.
U U.S. Two-Party System: Past and present:, The

U U.S. War Machine and Politics, The
U Ultras in the USA., The
U Ulyanov Family, The
U Unbreakable Union of Soviet Republics, The
U Undaunted Heroes: A Vietnam diary, The
U Undeclared War: Imperialism vs. Afghanistan:, The
U Union of Soviet Writers: Aims, Organisation, Activities, The
U United Soviet People, The
U Unity, Solidarity, Internationalism: International Communist Unity:
U Universe and Civilisation, The
U Universe, The
U Us Monopolies and Developing Countries
U Usa and Western Europe: Economic Relations After World War II, The
U Usa versus Western Europe: New Trends
U Usa, Western Europe, Japan: a triangle of rivalry, The
U Usa: Anatomy of the Arms Race
U Usa: Imperialists and Anti-Imperialists: The great foreign policy debate at the turn of the Century
U Usa: Militarism and the Economy
U Ussr - USA - Sports Encounters
U Ussr Builds for the Future, The
U Ussr Economy in 1976–1980, The
U Ussr Proposes Disarmament (1920s–1980s), The
U Ussr State Industry During the Transition Period
U Ussr Tenth Five-Year Plan Building Projects
U Ussr Through Indian Eyes
U Ussr and Countries of Africa
U Ussr and Developing Countries: Economic Cooperation, The
U Ussr and International Copyright Protection, The
U Ussr and International Economic Relations:, The
U Ussr in World Politics., The
U Ussr–FRG Relations: A new stage
U Ussr–USA Trade Unions Compared
U Ussr’s Activities in the UN for Peace, Security and Co-Operation, 1945–1985, The
U Ussr, Reorganisation and Renewal
U Ussr, the USA, and the People’s Revolution in China, The
U Ussr: A Dictatorship or a Democracy?, The
U Ussr: A Short History., The
U Ussr: A Time of Change: Scholars, Writers and Artists Speak
U Ussr: A genuine united nations, The
U Ussr: A guide for businessmen
U Ussr: Education, Science and Culture., The
U Ussr: For Peace Against Aggression:
U Ussr: Geography of the eleventh five-year plan period
U Ussr: Public Health and Social Security., The
U Ussr: Questions and Answers
U Ussr: Sixty Years of the Union: 1922–1982
U Ussr: Youth of the Eighties
V Vietnam Story, The
V Village Children: A Soviet experience
V Vladimir Favorsky
V Vladimir Ilyich Lenin: A biography
V Vladimir Ilyich Lenin: Life and works
V Vladimir Ilyich Lenin: Pages from his life with reminiscences of his associates
V Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
V Vladimir Mayakovsky: Innovator
V Vladimir Vysotsky: Hamlet with a guitar
W Wanted...
W War Is Their Business: The U.S. Military-Industrial Complex:
W War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations:, The
W War’s Unwomanly Face
W Wars and Population
W Washington Crusaders On the March
W Washington Silhouettes: A political round-up
W Washington Versus Havana
W Way Society Develops, The
W We Are From Friendship University [nd (mid 1960s)]
W We Choose Peace
W Weaponry in Space: The dilemma of security
W Welfare the Basic Task: Five Year Plan, 1971–1975
W West Berlin: In memory of those Soviet officers and men who fell in the battle to liberate Berlin
W West Berlin: Yesterday and Today

W West European Integration: Its policies and international relations
W Western Aid: Myth and Reality
W Western Europe Today: Economics, politics, the class struggle, international relations
W What Are Classes and the Class Struggle? (ABC #14)
W What Are They After in Peking?
W What Are Trade Unions? (ABC #21)
W What If Everything You Thought You Knew About AIDS Was Wrong?
W What Is Capitalism? (ABC #8)
W What Is Communism? (ABC #10)
W What Is Democratic Centralism?
W What Is Democratic Socialism?
W What Is Dialectical Materialism? (ABC #6)
W What Is Good and What is Bad
W What Is Historical Materialism? (ABC #7)
W What Is Labour? (ABC #11)
W What Is Marxism-Leninism? (ABC #2)
W What Is Personality? (ABC #23)
W What Is Philosophy? (ABC #4)
W What Is Political Economy? (ABC #3)
W What Is Property? (ABC #13)
W What Is Revolution? (ABC #17)
W What Is Scientific Communism? (ABC #5)
W What Is Socialism? (ABC #9)
W What Is Surplus Value? (ABC #12)
W What Is The Party? (ABC #15)
W What Is The Scientific and Technological Revolution? (ABC #22)
W What Is The State? (ABC #16)
W What Is The Transition Period? (ABC #18)
W What Is The Working People’s Power? (ABC #19)
W What Is The World Socialist System? (ABC #20)
W What Is What? (ABC #24)
W What Maoism is Really Like
W What Real Socialism Means to the People:
W What’s What in World Politics: A reference book
W Where All Roads Into Space Begin:
W Where Are Trotskyites Leading the Youth?
W Where Human Rights Are Real.
W Where It’s Coldest
W Where the Old Are Young: Long life in the Soviet Caucasus
W White Book:, The
W White House and the Black Continent, The
W Whither and With Whom? Essays from the ideological front
W Who’s Who in the Soviet Cinema: Seventy Different Portraits
W Why We Returned to the Soviet Union: Testimonies from Russian emigrÃ©s
W Wilfred Grenfell: His life and work
W Will We Survive?
W Winning for Peace: The great victory–its world impact
W Winston Churchill
W Witness to War:
W Women Today
W Women in Science
W Women in the USSR: On the UN Decade for Women
W Women of a New World
W Words of Friends: Greetings extended to the XXVIth Congress of the CPSU, The
W Work and Love
W Workers in Society: Polemical essays
W Workers’ Control Over Production: Past and present.
W Working Class Movement in the Period of Transition to Imperialism (1871–1904), The
W Working Class and Social Progress:, The
W Working Class and its Allies, The
W Working Class and the Contemporary World:, The
W Working Class and the Trade Unions in the USSR:, The
W Working Class in Socialist Society:, The
W Working Class—The Leading Force of the World Revolutionary Process:, The
W Working-Class Movement in the Developmed Capitalist Countries After the Second World War (1945–1979), The
W Working-Class Struggle for Peace and Social Progress:, The
W Working-Class and National-Liberation Movements:
W World Capitalist Economy: Structural changes:, The
W World Communist Movement: An outline of strategy and tactics, The
W World Energy Problem, The
W World MARXIST REVIEW

W World Market Today, The
W World Revolutionary Movement of the Working Class
W World Revolutionary Process, The
W World Socialist Movement & Anti-Communism., The
W World Socialist System and Anti-Communism, The
W World Socialist System:, The
W World War II: Myths and the Realities.
W World War II: The Decisive Battles of the Soviet Army
W World Without Arms?, A
W World of Man In the World of Nature, The
W Wormwood [Hitler-era anti-semitism & postwar Zionism]
W Writer’s Creative Individuality and the Development of Literature, The
Y Yakov Sverdlov
Y Year 2000: End of the human race?, The
Y Year of Victory
Y Yellow Devil: Gold and capitalism., The
Y Young Communist International and Its Origins, The
Y Young Teens Blaze Paths to Peace: The story of the first global children’s festival for peace, friendship co-operation
Y Young in the Revolution:, The
Y Your First Move: Chess for beginners.
Y Youth and Politics
Y Youth and the Party: Documents
Z Zionism Stands Accused
Z Zionism: Enemy of peace and social progress

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@LBiz: en/1972/DP382:

Concerning the 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of

99 Maoism: Its Ideological and Political Essence

Dialectics, Genuine and Spurious • CRITICISM OF THE MAOIST

Crisis in the Political Development of China

THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND THE POLITICAL

153 THE POLITICAL CHANGE: ITS CAUSES AND FORMS

PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE MAOIST POLITICAL

165 Maoism Preaches Poverty

185 Great-Power Chauvinism of Mao Tse-tung

The International Communist Movement and the Communist

232 Regarding Peking-Washington Contacts

Questions Requiring an Answer • CONCERNING THE US-

254 The Preaching and Practice of the Chinese Leaders

277 Peking Foreign Policy Doctrines and Practice

Concerning the Economic Relations Between the Soviet Union and

320 Peking Against the Socialist Community

New Strategy for the Same Ends AN ANALYSIS OF MAOIST

The Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of China Since the

Lenin Obras Completas, Akal Editor (Mexico).

Those in Peking stubbornly try to discredit the principles of socialist p

Barracks, ignorance, arbitrariness and servitude-such is the order of things in China p

According to Chinese statistics, the People’s Republic of China in 1959 produced p

The military-barrack regime in China, which is pictured by her propagandists as a p

The hardships of life in China are aggravated by the Peking authorities’ p

The Peking leaders have distorted the essence of socialist industrialisation. By p

The forcible assimilation of national minorities is one aspect of the anti-popular p

The anti-Leninist course of China’s present leadership is reflected in the field of

If the Chinese leaders wished to remain faithful to Marxism-Leninism and p

The escalation of the US imperialist aggression in Indochina, the continuation of p

Under these conditions the negative consequences of Peking’s adventurist and p

“thought” were regarded as mistakes and delusions owing to Mao’s lack of

Mao took the most conservative aspect of Confucianism-the preaching of p

Maoism is an anti-Leninist political trend based on “Sinoised” social-chauvinism, p

from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

While exposing the anti-Leninist, anti-popular essence of the political and p

Pravda, May 18, 1970

<< Concerning the 50th Anniversary of >>

the Communist Party of China • O.

Anniversary of the Communist Party

After adopting an ideological and political line which is incompatible with p

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, said at

The emergence and development of the Communist Party of China proceeded in p

The formation of the revolutionary vanguard of the Chinese proletariat was p

In his ‘Left-Wing’ Communism - an Infantile Disorder Lenin wrote the following p

The Chinese revolutionaries had had no such experience. p

Thus the formation of the Communist Party in China proceeded in extremely p

revolution: expulsion of the imperialists and unification of the country, complete

development of the communist movement in China. The revolutionary movement

This was used to advantage by the representatives of the petty-bourgeois trend. In p

The visits by Chinese delegations from the people’s democratic regions of p

Lenin characterised the vacillations of the pettyowner element as follows: "This p

In April 1956 the Maoists proclaimed a "course of prolonged coexistence of the p

The national bourgeoisie took advantage of these "new stipulations" to launch an p

We must not forget in this connection Lenin’s warning that ”. .. we constantly p

military-bureaucratic dictatorship came into being in China. The proletarian ideology–

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at

Maoism as an ideological and political trend is essentially hostile to Marxism- p

Kommunist, No. 10, 1971

[ 39•1 ] Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 31, pp. 25–26.

[ 48•1 ] Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 30, p. 151.

[ 50•1 ] Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 33, p. 21.

[ 52•1 ] Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 33, p. 254.