G.R.

No. 201061 July 3, 2013 The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal
vs. actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin,
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent. using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed
a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of
D E C I S I O N nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to
CARPIO, J.: Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
The Case marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the
1
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 17 August 2011 properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the
2 3
Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during
G.R. CV No. 94226. the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as
The Antecedent Facts illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her
marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). answer.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence
10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which
They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III. the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then
by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States refused to present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency
of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several
and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4
order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008,
Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court,
Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to
be registered. consider the case submitted for decision.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and The Decision of the Trial Court
4
Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following In a Decision dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin.
real properties: The trial court gave weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only
the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses; Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not
5
Benjamin, married to Sally; issued to Benjamin and Sally. The trial court ruled that the marriage was
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office
8783 registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name with Azucena.
of Sally as a single individual.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37)
bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480,
because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035,
particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627,
committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635,
legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211,
the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners,
was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B.
Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are
37 properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven
with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to (37) titles.
Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and
Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their children, including 8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s money without contribution
Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his
Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of
descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were her collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30)
bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is
actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and
trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by surrender control and possession of these properties including the
TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium documents of title to the petitioner.
units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties
lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased are under co-ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the
from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan
properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his
and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and
without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant
Azucena in a separate proceeding. to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to
that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the
Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena. parties’ children.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads: No other relief granted.
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial
on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila,
and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT. Quezon City and Caloocan.
 6
SO ORDERED. shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s share
7
Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009, the trial court denied shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad
the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of faith.
Appeals. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and
The Decision of the Court of Appeals convincing evidence that would show bias and prejudice on the part of the
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.
appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED.
six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial The assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009,
reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case
on the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos.
However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while
insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos.
subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and to be
his action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the
that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of respondent-
was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
8
Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals SO ORDERED.
ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its
marriage to Sally null and void. 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally Hence, the petition before this Court.
was governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled The Issues
that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in (1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to (2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
Benjamin and his siblings. the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 (3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he with modification the trial court’s decision regarding the property relations
was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of of Benjamin and Sally.
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and The Ruling of this Court
under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the The petition has no merit.
absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s
the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be ruling that she waived her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in
not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by
the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in their
institution. children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In
9
is not a matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property registered in the names
this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the
2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly
They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their
November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed to marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported
present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena
of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, was valid and subsisting.
Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros
day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City,
priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and
warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to
complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No.
because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further
the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage
to present her evidence on 28 November 2008. License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license
evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right to present them. As and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
11
evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Clearly, if indeed
of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void
12
delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.
Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage
to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar
temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta
trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
13
the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the the Municipality of Pasig; Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division
10
deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties. of the Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for
14
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally Culture and the Arts; and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration
15
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized Department of the National Statistics Office. The documentary and
her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin
at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin
16
allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to and Sally "was made only in jest" and "a simulated marriage, at the
Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation
coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if
17
seen as Chinese conservatives." In short, it was a fictitious marriage. the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy
and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that
This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of
certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code.
18
1982 while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because
19
stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982. Benjamin there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent
and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained.
the dates reflected on the birth certificates. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a
23
null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.
of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior
24
beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was marriage. In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage
license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil
match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between
Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented
20
Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab initio. The themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin
Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
21
and void from the beginning." Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only
sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent. contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled that "the proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
22
rest of the decision stands." While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the deposits of money and evidences of credit.
decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion that the marriage between ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership
Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated: existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are
marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is in bad faith.
valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith
the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of in deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March
proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by SO ORDERED.
Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance ANTONIO T. CARPIO
inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even Associate Justice
admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of WE CONCUR:
properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally ARTURO D. BRION
25
x x x." Associate Justice
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Court of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the Associate Justice Associate Justice
property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
26
and Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 Associate Justice
27
were in the name of Benjamin with the descriptive title "married to Sally." A T T E S T A T I O N
The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
28
name of Sally with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the Court’s Division.
name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married ANTONIO T. CARPIO
to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status Associate Justice
29
of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without Chairperson
proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no C E R T I F I C A T I O N
30
co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Inhibition of the Trial Judge Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, Chief Justice
showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
31
conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. To justify the call Footnotes
for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, * Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 October 2012.
malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be 1
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
32
inferred from the decision or order itself. In this case, we have sufficiently 2
Rollo, pp. 29-40. Penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme Court
explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision Associate Justice) Estela M. PerlasBernabe with Associate Justices
because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence. Bienvenido L. Reyes (now also a Supreme Court Associate Justice) and
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may Samuel H. Gaerlan, concurring.
have used uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not
3 22
Id. at 52. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan with Associate Rollo, p. 40.
23
Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring. Id. at 112-113.
4 24
Id. at 107-123. Penned by Presiding Judge Roy G. Gironella. See Nollora, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 191425, 7 September 2011, 657 SCRA
5
Records, Vol. 2, p. 461. 330.
6 25
Id. at 122-123. Records, Vol. 1, p. 50.
7 26
Id. at 124-128. Id. at 23.
8 27
Id. at 40. Id. at 24-26.
9 28
See Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA Id. at 27-28.
29
353. Acre v. Yuttikki, 560 Phil. 495 (2007).
10 30
Id. Id.
11 31
Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001). Kilosbayan Foundation v. Janolo, Jr., G.R. No. 180543, 27 July 2010, 625
12
Article 35 of the Family Code states: SCRA 684.
32
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 173057-74, 27 September 2010, 631
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the SCRA 312.
consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform ROMERO, J.:p
marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa,
believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation
do so; to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct
preceding Chapter; as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41; First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that
identity of the other; and the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between
13
Records, Vol. 2, p. 458. Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's
14
Id. at 459. jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has
15
Id. at 460. jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
16
Rollo, p. 112. Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's
17
Id. residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
18
Records, Vol. 1, p. 65. jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located
19
Id. at 66. some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
20
Supra note 12. Norte.
21
Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent
beginning: judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have
x x x x been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious; concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The
x x x x same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which
was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
Domagtoy," which is still pending. marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of
Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
1
each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death
states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)
applies to the case in question. There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-
pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
2
case. proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been
complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
malfeasance. accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding
and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or
He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or
3
Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. The affidavit was not ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void,
issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall
acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling
knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in under Article 41."
September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside
five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead. (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
is sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge
for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree. or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of
parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage the basic principles of civil law.
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of
statement to that effect. the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that
for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the
Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted law.
provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at
courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and
parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
6
that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not too much to expect
7
place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the them to know and apply the law intelligently. Otherwise, the system of
4
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times
authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar
does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to
marriage. the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that
faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore
allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may the law.
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to more severely.
5
administrative liability. Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Footnotes
Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a 1 Rollo, pp. 7-8.
2 Uy v. Dizon-Capulong, A.M. No. RTJ-91-766, April 7, 1993; Montemayor v.
Collado, A.M. No. 2519-MTJ, September 10, 1981; Ubongon v. Mayo, A.M.
No. 1255-CTJ, August 6, 1980, 99 SCRA 30.
3 Rollo, p. 12.
4 Rollo, pp. 10-11.
5 Article 4, Family Code.
6 Lim v. Domogas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-899, October 15, 1993, 227 SCRA 258,
263 citing Ubongan v. Mayor, 99 SCRA 30 and Ajeno v. Inserto, 71 SCRA 166.
7 . . . . Realty Co. v. Arranz, A.M. No. MTJ-93-978 October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA
771.