CRITIQUE OF SPINOZA’S DETERMINISM

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2017.

Spinoza’s Determinism or Negation of Human Free Will. One major consequence of

Baruch Spinoza’s (1632-1677) monistic pantheism of the One Divine Substance is his negation
of human free will.1 For him, people are but finite modes, modifications, of the one sole
Substance, which is God identical with Nature (Deus sive Natura). Human free will is illusory;
we live and breathe in a monistic world of strict determinism, he teaches. Human beings are
insignificant accidents, modes, modifications, of a larger whole, which is Nature identified with
the One Divine Substance. Since human beings are finite modes, accidents, modifications which
have need to exist in another, namely, in the One Divine Substance, they are necessarily
determined in their actions by the One Substantial Causa Sui. Spinoza states in definition 7 of
part I of his 1677 Ethics Demonstrated According to the Geometrical Order (Ethica ordine
geometrico demonstrata): “That thing is said to be free (liber) which exists solely from the
necessity of its own nature, and is determined to action by itself alone. A thing is said to be
necessary (necessarius) or rather, constrained (coactus), if it is determined by another thing to
exist and to act in a definite and determinate way.”2

Spinoza teaches that people only think they are free because they are in fact simply
ignorant of the real causes which determine or necessitate their actions. Spinoza writes in his
Ethics: “Men are deceived in thinking themselves free, a belief that consists only in this, that
they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined.
Therefore, the idea of their freedom is simply the ignorance of the cause of their actions. As to
their saying that human actions depend on the will, these are mere words without any
corresponding idea. For none of them knows what the will is and how it moves the body, and
those who boast otherwise and make up stories of dwelling places and habitations of the soul
provoke either ridicule or disgust.”3 Our feeling that we have free will, that we are the authors of
our free acts, is only an illusion, he says. “Mental decision…and the appetite…are one and the
same thing... The mental decision that is believed to be free…is nothing but the affirmation
which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, necessarily involves. So these mental decisions arise in the
mind from the same necessity as the ideas of things existing in actuality, and those who believe

1
Describing the difference between free will (affirmed and defended by thinkers like St. Augustine and St. Thomas
Aquinas) and determinism (espoused by thinkers like Epicurus, Hobbes, Spinoza and Stuart Mill) Celestine N. Bittle
writes: “Free will is defined as the ability of the will, all conditions for action being present, to decide whether to act
or not to act and whether to act in this manner or in that manner…The essence of the freedom of the will, as just
defined, consists in indetermination, so that the will, no matter what the strength of the conflicting motives or the
nature of the antecedent external and internal conditions for action may be, is not determined to act by necessity.
This doctrine is therefore designated as indeterminism. This indeterminism, however, is not absolute, because in the
pursuit of ‘happiness’ the will is, as stated before, determined. We advocate, then a moderate indeterminism…The
doctrine opposed to free will is styled determinism. According to this doctrine, the will is not intrinsically free, but is
determined by the antecedent psychical and physical conditions and causes to act as it does; it is necessitated in its
volition.”(C. BITTLE, The Whole Man, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1956, pp. 380-381).
2
B. SPINOZA, Ethics Demonstrated According to the Geometrical Order (Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata),
I, def. 7.
3
B. SPINOZA, op. cit., 2p35s.

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that they speak, or keep silent, or do anything from free mental decision are dreaming with their
eyes open.”4

For Spinoza, the will is not a faculty or operative power distinct from the intellect but is
rather a function of the intellect; it is a modality of thought and as such has thought for its cause.
Therefore, the human will cannot be free. Mascia writes that “there is no place in the
metaphysics of Spinoza for an ethics in which the end of man is attained through human actions
proceeding from free will. Free will is denied by Spinoza as impossible. ‘Non datur imperium in
imperio.’ Acts of the will can be reduced to cognitive acts, because by virtue of the psycho-
physical law every act of knowledge has its corresponding act in the practical sphere.”5 James
Collins observes that Spinoza’s “position of freedom is dictated by metaphysical considerations.
Because of man’s location within the modal world of natura naturata, he is, by definition,
subject to a rigorous determinism in all his actions. The divine causality imposes compulsion or
necessity-from-another upon all the modes, mental as well as bodily, thus preventing any modal
entity from conforming with the definition of freedom. It does no good to distinguish mind from
body: mind is not only modally determined in itself but is correlated, in all its acts, with the
determined series of physical events. One finite mode of thought causes another in an infinite
series of necessitated mental actions, each of which has its physical counterpart in the similarly
compelled series of modes of extension. Even the last refuge of libertarian doctrine – free will –
is scuttled by Spinoza. For if by free will is meant a faculty, it falls beneath the general criticism
of faculties of the mind. And if it means the act of free choice, there is no special class of acts to
sustain the general name. There is no real distinction between acts of knowing and willing. To
will is nothing more than to affirm or deny that which is true or false in our ideas. This is a
cognitive function and offers no ground of distinction for another class of powers or acts.
Descartes had defended freedom by making judgment an act of will. Spinoza reduces the will to
the cognitive function of judgment, making it subject to the same determinism governing all our
cognitive operations.”6

In the proof of proposition 35 of part II of his Ethics, Spinoza writes: “The mind is a
definite and determinate mode of thinking (Pr. II, II), and thus (Cor. 2, Pro 17, I) it cannot be the
free cause of its actions: that is, it cannot possess an absolute faculty of willing and nonwilling. It
must be determined to will this or that (Pr. 28, I) by a cause, which likewise is determined by
another cause, and this again by another, etc.”7 For Spinoza, the will is reduced to the intellect in
its function of affirmation or negation. Will and intellect are, for him, one and the same thing.
“By the will I mean the faculty of affirming and denying, and not desire. I mean, I repeat, the
faculty whereby the mind affirms or denies what is true or what is false, not the desire whereby
the mind seeks things or shuns them.”8 “Proposition 49: There is in the mind no volition, that is,
affirmation and negation, except that which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves. Proof:
There is in the mind (preceding Pr.) no absolute faculty of willing and non-willing, but only
particular volitions, namely, this or that affirmation, and this or that negation. Let us therefore
conceive a particular volition, namely, a mode of thinking whereby the mind affirms that the

4
B. SPINOZA, op. cit., 3p2s.
5
C. MASCIA, A History of Philosophy, St. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson, N.J., 1957, p. 305.
6
J. D. COLLINS, The Continental Rationalists: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1967, pp. 97-98.
7
B. SPINOZA, op. cit., 2p35dem.
8
B. SPINOZA, op. cit., 2p48s.

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three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation involves the conception,
or idea, of a triangle; that is, it cannot be conceived without the idea of a triangle. For to say that
A must involve the conception of B is the same as to say that A cannot be conceived without B.
Again, this affirmation (Ax. 3, II) cannot even be without the idea of a triangle. Therefore, this
idea can neither be nor be conceived without the idea of a triangle. Furthermore, this idea of a
triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its three angles are equal to two right
angles. Therefore, vice versa, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived without this
affirmation, and so (Def. 2, II) this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle,
and is nothing more than the essence itself. And what I have said of this volition (for it was
arbitrarily selected) must also be said of every volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea.
Corollary: Will and intellect are one and the same thing.”9 Battista Mondin observes the
following: “Come si vede, Spinoza sovverte totalmente la posizione di Cartesio. Non solo egli
nega la tesi cartesiana della superiorità della volontà rispetto all’intelletto stesso, ma subordina
totalmente la volontà all’intelletto stesso, facendo della volontà una sua funzione. In tal modo
egli taglia alla radice la teoria del libero arbitrio, perché la conoscenza non può scegliere di
rappresentare oppure di non rappresentare i propri oggetti, ma lo fa necessariamente sia che lo
compia in modo adequato oppure inadequato, chiaro oppure confuso.”10

To illustrate how human free will is illusory, Spinoza gives the example that if a stone
were thrown up in the air and while falling were to become conscious it would imagine that it
was flying of its own free will, but this would all be an illusion for other causes that determine
the stone’s descent are at work. In his description of Spinoza’s position, and critique of Spinoza
on this issue, Guido Berghin-Rosè writes: Obiezione: La coscienza che abbiamo della libertà del
nostro volere è dovuta soltanto all’ignoranza delle cause che ci determinano a volere e non esige
nulla di più.

“Questa spiegazione fa capo principalmente a Spinoza e fu frequentemente ripetuta dopo

di lui. Una causa che ignoriamo non ci è riferita dalla coscienza, la quale può quindi credere che
non ci sia e pensarci libera. Analogamente, l’ago calamitato che il magnetismo orienta
(Leibniz),11 la banderuola mossa dal vento (Bayle), la trottola fatta girare dai ragazzi (Hobbes),
ignorando ciò che le muove potrebbero pensare di determinarsi da sè. Questo avviene per
l’uomo, il quale, se conoscesse i fattori profondi delle proprie decisioni le vedrebbe determinate
come ogni altro evento fisico.

“Risposta: L’esperienza è contraria a questa affermazione. Un mio atto lo sento tanto più
libero quanto più ne conosco i fattori e so positivamente che deriva dalla mia volontà, e tanto
meno libero quando più me lo trovo fatto senza sapere come. Se fosse vero quanto afferma
l’obiezione, dovrebbe accadere il contrario: dovrei sentirmi tanto più libero quanto più ignaro,
inconscio, sorpreso. La coscienza della libertà dunque, non si spiega con l’ignoranza delle cause
(tanto è vero che essa diminuisce col crescere di quella).

9
B. SPINOZA, op. cit., 2p49dem. and cor.
10
B. MONDIN, L’uomo libero, Dino Editore, Rome, 1989, p. 141.
11
Cf. G. W. LEIBNIZ, Essai de Théodicée, n. 50.

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 “Quanto agli aghi magnetici e simili, essi si sentirebbero liberi come ci sentiamo liberi
noi, quando cadiamo a terra per effetto della gravità.”12

Similarly, Celestine Bittle critiques Spinoza’s position as follows: “Determinists

frequently assert that our convictions of the freedom of the will is but an illusion based upon an
ignorance of the causes which produce the acts of the will. Since we are not conscious of the
underlying causes which determine the will to act, we have the feeling of freedom in our acts; in
reality, however, all acts of the will are determined.

“This assertion of the determinists contradicts the experience of consciousness…Our

experience tells us that the ignorance of the cause of actions occurring within us does not
necessarily induce in us the conviction that this cause is free. On the contrary, when we act on a
momentary impulse and without reflection, not knowing why we act, when we are convinced
that our act was involuntary, unfree, and irresponsible. On the other hand, when we reflect upon
a project with careful deliberation, consider all its advantages and disadvantages, investigate the
various means at our disposal, lay out a plan in all its details, weigh all the motives for and
against a course of action – in a word, when our knowledge is at its best – then it is that the
conviction of the freedom of the will and of its choice is greatest. It is, therefore, the
incontrovertible testimony of our consciousness that our conviction of freedom is not based on
the illusion of ignorance but on the certainty of knowledge…”13

Though Spinoza states that human free will is an illusion, one can be “free,” he teaches,
in the detached acknowledgement that everything in the end is determined or necessitated by the
One Divine Substance: “La libertà dell’uomo, scopo supremo dell’etica spinoziana, viene così a
coincidere con la compiuta accettazione e identificazione con la necessità della natura divina.”14
“Spinoza’s answer is that we shall be free by understanding and acceptance – understanding that
we are part of a bigger whole and seeing that, as such, nothing that happens to any one of us
could have fallen otherwise, given the state of the whole from which it arises. Once we see this
clearly we shall stop fretting and we shall come free from the cycle of ego-centric, reactive
transactions in which we are puppets on a string.”15 “Spinoza holds that it is not by fighting what
constitutes such determinism that human beings can find freedom, move from a state of bondage
to one of freedom, but, paradoxical as it may sound, by accepting it. Such acceptance is achieved
through detachment and self-knowledge…Given that the situation that faces him cannot be
changed, how can he come out of such a state of bondage, emerge into a state of freedom?
Spinoza’s answer is: by accepting his situation, by stopping to fight it. This involves detachment,
which is not the same as indifference. The detachment in question is from the ego…if in my
feelings I am at one with Nature then everything that happens will be what I am in agreement
with, not because of what it is, but regardless of what it is. Paradoxically in yielding myself, in
the sense of giving up my ego and becoming part of Nature, I stop yielding to something external
to myself…the will of Nature, as it were, is imposed on one because one separates oneself from

12
G. BERGHIN-ROSÈ, Elementi di filosofia, vol. 4 (Psicologia), Marietti, Turin, 1960, p. 292.
13
C. BITTLE, op. cit., p. 393.
14
B. MONDIN, op. cit., p. 144.
15
I. DILMAN, Free Will, Routledge, London, 1999, p. 129.

4
it by rooting oneself in one’s ego. If one embraces it, makes the will of Nature one’s command,
one will be set free.”16

Régis Jolivet’s Critique of Spinoza (and Herbart’s Modification of Spinoza’s Theory) on

Human Will: “1. La volontà ridotta all’intelligenza. - Le teorie intellettualistiche che riducono la
volontà all’intelligenza, si presentano in due diverse forme che prendono il nome da Spinoza e da
Herbart.

“a) La volontà intesa come facoltà di affermare e di negare. Spinoza distingue tre generi
di conoscenza: l’immaginazione, che coglie soltanto i fenomeni e i modi fuggitivi e ci fornisce
solo idee confuse, l’intellezione, che si eleva attraverso il ragionamento fino alla conoscenza
delle cause e ci offre idee chiare, la scienza intuitiva, che è conoscenza perfetta, adeguata,
assoluta, in quanto ci fa afferrare il reale sub specie aeterni.

“La teoria dell’attività corrisponde a quella della conoscenza. La legge fondamentale di

ogni attività finita viene enunciata così: ogni cosa si sforza, per quanto è in suo potere, di
perseverare nel proprio essere, e questo sforzo non è che l’essenza in atto di quella cosa
medesima (Ethica, III, th. 6 e 7). Tale sforzo si chiama volontà quando si riferisce alla sola
anima, e si chiama appetito e desiderio quando si riferisce sia all’anima che al corpo.17 Il
desiderio è il principio di tutte le passioni. La volontà corrisponde alle idee chiare della ragione,
come la passione corrisponde alle idee confuse dell’immaginazione. Essa è la facoltà di
affermare e di negare e non il desiderio, cioè si confonde col determinismo che è proprio
dell'idea. La volontà e l’intelligenza sono dunque una sola, identica cosa (Ethica, II, th. 49).

“b) La volontà come risultato del dinamismo delle rappresentazioni. Nel sistema di
Spinoza, la volontà si trova tanto identificata col determinismo dell’idea chiara (la quale si
afferma da se stessa solo a causa della sua chiarezza), che la nozione di forza e di dinamismo
riprende il suo significato solo al di fuori della volontà, cioè nel desiderio e nell’appetito. Proprio
su questo punto Herbart modifica la teoria di Spinoza. Per lui, la realtà psicologica è formata
soltanto dalle rappresentazioni e dai loro rapporti. Ma queste rappresentazioni, in quanto tendono
a perseverare nell’essere, sono dotate di dinamismo interno: si fortificano a vicenda, si fondono
le une nelle altre o si respingono sotto la soglia della coscienza. Le rappresentazioni così represse
continuano a sussistere sotto forma di tendenze. Proprio questo conflitto fra le rappresentazioni e
le tendenze viene manifestato dagli stati affettivi e volontari, i quali non hanno dunque nessuna
realtà specifica distinta da quella delle rappresentazioni. Quali semplici modi di essere di queste
ultime, l’affettività e la volontà sono soltanto un aspetto del contenuto rappresentativo della
coscienza: l’affettività rivela il conflitto delle rappresentazioni, mentre la volontà rivela il
desiderio congiunto all’idea della sua attuazione.

“2. Discussione. Com’è concepito in queste due forme, il punto di vista intellettualistico è
ugualmente inaccettabile. Infatti Spinoza, col suo ridurre la volontà a un semplice modo di essere
dell’idea chiara, urta contro il fatto psicologicamente accertato che le idee non agiscono in forza
del loro contenuto rappresentativo, ma delle tendenze e dei sentimenti che vengono da esse

16
I. DILMAN, op. cit., pp. 134, 138.
17
Appetito e desiderio sono sinonimi, tranne nel fatto che il desiderio include l’idea di coscienza: «Il desiderio è un
appetito di cui abbiamo coscienza». (Ethica III, scholion del th. IX).

5
attuati. Herbart fino a un certo punto lo riconosce, perché considera la rappresentazione come
dotata di una forza propria. Ma siccome tale forza viene concepita come risultante della
rappresentazione in quanto tale, egli finisce col fare del soggetto un semplice spettatore dei
conflitti delle rappresentazioni: infatti non si può immaginare che il soggetto intervenga in
questo conflitto, perché tale intervento richiederebbe 1’esistenza di una forza diversa da quella
delle rappresentazioni; per la stessa ragione non è possibile neppure pensare che il soggetto abbia
qualche potere sul movimento delle rappresentazioni. In tal modo, la volizione è un fenomeno in
cui il soggetto non svolge nessuna parte attiva.

“D’altronde, in queste due teorie è impossibile capire il disaccordo esistente fra la

rappresentazione e l’azione, anche se tale disaccordo è frequente: infatti si può avere
un’intelligenza perspicace e un cuore perverso, una scienza molto vasta e una virtù mediocre, e si
può avere un valore morale maggiore o minore di quanto non valgano le nostre idee. Parimenti,
la conoscenza può essere imperfetta e dare origine ad una passione fortissima: viceversa, la
passione può essere debole anche con una conoscenza perfetta. Concludendo: se è fuori
discussione che una volontà è una realtà psicologica che non può esistere senza il presupposto
dell’intelligenza, il volere non si può ridurre né ad un’idea, né ad un conflitto di idee, né ad un
giudizio speculativo. Esso significa, come osserva Ribot, una «affermazione pratica», cioè un
giudizio che impone un atto od un movimento.”18

Henri Grenier’s Defense of of Free Will: “Man is endowed with free will. 1. Internal
experience. – At three different moments, we perceive from our internal experience that we have
free will: before an action, when we deliberate; during the action, when we perceive that we can
cease to act; after the action, when we know that we were able not to have performed it.

“2. Testimony of all peoples. – All peoples testify that man is free. But this testimony is
true. Therefore…

“Major. – Among all peoples, man is considered as master of his own acts: laws are made
which man is bound to observe, counsels are formulated for the direction of man’s conduct,
penalties are imposed for the violation of justice, etc.

“Minor. – The testimony of all peoples is true, because it concerns a matter which is
easily known by conscience.

“3. A priori. – An agent whose appetite follows a judgment which of its nature is
indifferent is endowed with free will. But man is an agent whose appetite or will follows a
judgment which of its nature remains indifferent in regard to particular goods. Therefore man is
endowed with free will in regard to particular goods.19

“Major. – If an appetite follows a judgment which of its nature is indifferent, it is not

determined by that judgment, but has dominative power over it, in as much as it can accept or not
accept it, and therefore it remains free.

18
R. JOLIVET, Trattato di filosofia, vol. 3 (Psicologia), Morcelliana, Brescia, 1958, nos. 505-506.
19
De Veritate, q. 24, a. 2 ; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 83, a. 1 ; De Malo, q. 6, a. 1.

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 “Minor. Man passes judgment on particular goods by his intellect which, as a spiritual
faculty, can reflect upon its own judgment, and can compare particular goods with the notion of
universal good. But such a judgment is of its nature indifferent, because particular goods, in as
much as they are compared with universal good, can be considered as non-goods or evils, if they
fail to fulfill the conditions of universal good. Therefore…20”21

H. D. Gardeil, O.P.’s Defense of Free Will: “a) The Requirements of Morality. – No free
will, no morality! It would be easy to elaborate on this theme, which, so far as it goes, does
constitute a most valuable argument. But whatever else may be said on this score, St. Thomas
has given us the wholesum and substance of it in the following terse rejoinder: ‘I answer that
man has free will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and
punishments would be in vain.’22 To this, nothing material could be added.

“b) The Nature of the Free Act. – The pivotal argument for free will, however, the one
that stays all others, is based on the nature of the free act itself. Admittedly, it is conscious
experience that reveals this act to us, but only when this experience is put through the crucible of
metaphysical analysis does the testimony of consciousness become a decisive argument. Hence,
also, the custom of referring to the present argument as the metaphysical proof, or the proof from
the nature of the will.

“For the basic explanation of the free act St. Thomas always appeals to the rational nature
of man, particularly and more directly to his faculty of judgment. Some beings act without the
power of judgment; others, through the intervention of a judgment. If the judgment is instinctive,
not resulting from rational insight, as in the case of brute animals, then there can be no freedom
in the act. But if, as in the case of man, the judgment derives from deliberation and comparison
instituted by reason, then the ensuing act is a product of free will. This power of free
determination is possible because in contingent matters, in judgments that are not intrinsically
necessary, reason may take any of several opposite courses. Since human actions have to do with
particular matters, and since these matters as performable are contingent realities, man’s reason
can form various practical judgments concerning them, none of the judgments being determined
or necessary. In short, the freedom of man’s will is a necessary consequence of his rational
nature. St. Thomas presents the argument as follows: ‘Man acts from judgment, because by his
apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But, because this
judgment in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of
comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being
inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses…Now
particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may
follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it
necessary that man have free will.23

20
The argument from reason in regard to particular goods may stated thus: I wish good. But this particular good is
here and now good (in as much as it is a participation of good), and not good (in as much as it fails to fulfill to
conditions of universal good). Therefore I can choose this good or not choose it, in as much as I consider it as a
good, or as a non-good.
21
H. GRENIER, Thomistic Philosophy, vol. 2 (Philosophy of Nature), St. Dunstan’s University, Charlottetown,
1950, pp. 258-260.
22
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 83, a. 1, c.
23
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 83, a. 1.

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 “With respect to the subject or agent, therefore, freedom has its source in reason; with
respect to the object, it lies in the contingent or particular nature of the goods confronting the
agent. In terms of the object we may, as St. Thomas often does, state the argument of free will as
follows: In face of contingent or particular goods the will remains free; only the absolute or
universal good necessarily moves it. These two proofs, moreover, the one from the object and the
other from the rational nature of man, are complementary, since the human or free act is the
product of the reciprocal application of intellect and will.

“As for the experience or consciousness of freedom which is often invoked as an

argument for free will, this refers specifically to the awareness of the nonnecessary character of
the judgments on which my eventual decision rests. I may judge that a given means would be
effective for the attainment of an end in view, and so I decide upon it; but at the same time I am
aware that the reason or motive which prompts me to act is not irresistible, or compulsive. The
good with which I am confronted is a contingent or particular good; therefore my choice cannot
but be free. In a word, my consciousness of being a free agent is the consciousness of having a
reason which judges and evaluates; it is not the feeling of an instinctive impulse coming, so to
speak, from nowhere, as it is so often imagined.

“c) Exercise and Specification. The indetermination of the will may be approached from
yet another point of view. We say that an act is free when it is not caused by a good that
necessarily moves the will. But this absence of predetermination in the will may result from two
sources, from the order of exercise and from the order of specification.

“For example, there may be two or more different means of arriving at a given end, say
two different roads leading to a town I want to visit. Since there is nothing in the nature of things
that compels me to take one road to the exclusion of the other, I am free to choose between them.
This freedom to choose one thing over another means that my act is free in the order of
specification. But even if we suppose there is only one road, I am still free, since my visiting the
town, which necessarily requires taking the only road, is a particular good, and so does not
present itself as absolutely necessary. Consequently my will remains free to decide to go or not
to go. And this power to will or not to will is called freedom of exercise.

“It scarcely needs mentioning, moreover, that both the freedom of exercise and
specification rest on the contingent or particular character of the goods in question. From the
standpoint of the agent, however, freedom of exercise is more basic, as even without the other it
is enough to guarantee freedom. But when freedom of exercise is lacking, no free will is possible
at all; whereas when specification is not free but self-imposed and necessary, as in the case of
only one means being available, the will is still free, not to choose between means, but to act or
not to act.

“d) Election (Choice) and the Practical Judgment. – As was noted earlier in examining
the various steps of the free act, intellect and will work conjointly in producing it. This reciprocal
movement or determination reaches a decisive stage at the last practical judgment. Suppose that
having experienced a wish for something, I decide to pursue it (intentio finis). Several means
being available, I deliberate about them. Sooner or later I must decide upon one. How is this final
decision made? It is made by the will, but only after the intellect has judged that this particular

8
means should be chosen. Through the last practical judgment (judicium practicum) of the
intellect, I determine the means to be adopted, and through an act of the will I choose it (electio).
In this process the judgment of the intellect and the choice of the will are applied concurrently.
Which of the two, it may be asked, is the determining factor? The answer is that both are
determining but from different points of view. In the order of specification, I have chosen
because I have judged; in the order of exercise, I have judged because I have chosen. These two
steps, choice and practical judgment, are distinct; yet it is important to bear in mind that one
determines the other, each in its own order. The free act, therefore, proceeds from intellect and
will together. Since in the last analysis, however, the final decision is made by the will through
the act of choice, we say that freedom has the will as its subject, but reason as its cause: radix
libertatis sicut subjectum est voluntas, sed sicut causa est ratio.24”25

Raymond J. Anable, S.J.’s Defense of Free Will: “Metaphysical Proof for the Freedom of
Deliberate Acts of Will. If intellectual deliberation has any purpose (ratio essendi), the will must
have freedom of choice in its deliberate acts ; But, intellectual deliberation has supreme purpose ;
Therefore, the will has freedom of choice in its deliberate acts.

“Proof of the Minor: It is unquestioned and unquestionable that man acts as man –
reasonably – only subsequent to deliberation. Hence, deliberation has supreme purpose or
significance in human life.

“Proof of the Major: In every act of deliberation I become aware of the objective
indifference, or simultaneous aspects of good and non-good, in this particular object. But the
will, as a faculty whose formal object is rational good, cannot be forced to choose what is
presented to it as non-good. This would involve a contradiction in the nature or being of the will
itself.26 Yet, subsequent to deliberation, in this life, every good presented to the will (either
because of its contingent, finite nature, or because of our imperfect cognition of it), is
simultaneously presented as non-good. Therefore, the only purpose of deliberation must be to
present to the will a good which, as simultaneously non-good, cannot compel a faculty whose
formal object is rational good.

“Hence, in a particular will act, subsequent to deliberation, the ‘determinatio ad unum’

(the determination to do A rather than not to do A), cannot have been made by the object as
presented by the intellect, nor by the nature of the will as such.

24
Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2,
25
H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 3 (Psychology), B. Herder, St.
Louis, 1956, pp. 212-216.
26
The contradiction in the nature of the will, if the will were not free in its deliberate acts, may be stated thus: a) the
will would be necessitated by a “good” which (as deliberation makes clear) is presented to it as non-necessitating.
Thus, if forced by its nature, v.g., to take the “good,” it would be forced by its nature to take what by its very nature
it must avert from: or, putting the same contradiction in still another way, b) the result of intellectual deliberation is
that the will is moved or pulled by its very nature in two ways
< ---------- and ---------- >
and this is as far as its nature itself takes it. Therefore, its nature cannot at the same time take it only one way
< ---------------
or
-------------- >

9
 “Then, ‘I,’ de-facto freely choose or make this determination rather than that one. And
since ‘I’ do this through my faculty which seeks rational good, we refer this freedom to the will
itself.”27

James E. Royce, S.J.’s Defense of Free Will: “Proofs of Freedom: Freedom from
External Necessity. That the will is not subjected to coercion by an external efficient cause
hardly needs proof. The act of the will is by its very nature an inclination, and coercion means
that one is made to act contrary to his inclination. A forced act of will is a contradiction. The
only thing which can move the will to act is a motive, and motive is not an efficient cause. The
will cannot be forced to elicit its own act (Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, a. 82, a. 1).

“Freedom from Internal Necessity. The real problem is the elimination of psychological
determinism, or necessitation by the very motives which the intellect presents to the will.
Ordinarily three proofs are given. The first is by far the most important, for it flows from an
analysis of the relation of intellect and will, and the role of the indifferent judgment in the act of
choice. Properly understood, it automatically answers most objections against moderate
indeterminism.

“1. From Indifferent Judgments.28 Will is determined only to the extent that intellect
determines it ; But intellect does not determine will with regard to the finite goods seen as finite ;
Therefore will is not determined with regard to finite goods seen as such.

“The major premise of this proof flows from the fact that will follows intellect: appetition
follows cognition, and the inclination of the will must correspond to the intellectual judgments
which elicit it.

“The minor premise simply examines the nature of the intellectual judgments which the
will follows. Finite goods are seen as not good in every respect, and therefore rejectable. Since
the intellect is capable of knowing the universal good, it recognizes any particular good as
contingent or non-necessitating. I can have adequate reason (even God himself as now known)
for doing something, but the reason does not tell me that I cannot do otherwise. Therefore I am
free to determine whether or not I shall act because of this motive.

“This indifferent or undetermined judgment regarding eligible goods is sometimes called

changeable, but this is misleading. It suggests that the judgment is a determining motive right
now, but that upon further information the judgment might change. This theory does not escape
psychological determinism, for it could be argued that the further information then determines.
Rather, right here and now with the information available I know that this good is nonnecessary,
and that another alternative is possible. Again, the judgment is not free (active), since the
intellect cannot help but know what it knows. But what is known in this instance is that this act is
choosable but rejectable; therefore the ultimate practical judgment to choose or reject it is
determinable (passive) by the will.

27
R. J. ANABLE, Philosophical Psychology, Fordham University Press, New York, 1947, pp. 203-204.
28
Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 83, a. 1 ; De Veritate, q. 24, a. 1.

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 “2. From Direct Experience. …the act of choice seems to be as much a matter of
phenomenological observation as any other psychological fact. Choices and decisions are as
much a part of everyday experience as perceptions, images, or thinking. The capacity for
freedom may be a matter of inference, but the experience of choice is an empirical datum to be
observed and analyzed; the only alternative is the theory that this experience is a universal mass
illusion, which in turn becomes a fact which must be explained. Whatever metaphysical
implications are involved in its explanation, the fact seems inescapable.

“Before choice, I am conscious of the alternatives before me, and that I see them as non-
necessitating. The whole process of deliberation is nonsense if the decision is already
determined.

“During choice, I am conscious that I actively determine the course to be taken. This
experience of the actual domination we exercise over the act of choice has been called by
psychologists ‘the active interposition of the ego.’ Although not open to quantitative
measurement,29 what we experience here is not a mere lack of necessitation or an ignorance of
motivating factors, but a positive exertion of influence on the part of the self…

“After choice, we experience remorse, self-approval, and other evidences of a sense of

responsibility. We are oftern clearly aware of the difference between hitting a person
accidentally and deliberately. No matter how sorry we feel over the former, we do not feel
responsible or guilty, as we would in the latter instance. We are quite conscious of whether or
not the act flowed from a deliberate choice on our part, and this is reflected in such expressions
as ‘I decided,’ ‘I made up my mind,’ ‘I made a choice,’ or ‘I yielded.’

“3. From Moral and Legal Obligation. Those who admit moral obligation or legal
responsibility must logically admit that man is not completely the victim of determining forces.
If a person cannot do otherwise, it is absurd to hold him responsible for what happens.
Obligation involves both the possibility of my doing something and the fact that I am not forced
to do it. Our entire legal system and administration of justice rests on this foundation. There
would be no point in an elaborate trial to ascertain whether or not the alleged murderer were sane
unless there was a difference between the normal man who can exercise free choice and the
person in whom some abnormality prevents this. The same argument holds for the notion of
merit and reward. Why praise a man for doing something unless he could have done
otherwise?…”30

Paul J. Glenn’s Defense of Free Will. “The first, the direct, and the most evident proof of
this fact is found in consciousness. Man is aware that he is not the victim of a nature that forces
his actions in all things; he is aware that he is not the helpless prey of circumstances; he is aware
that he is not compelled to yield to the attractions of any object, however powerful these may be.
In a word, man is aware that he is master of his human conduct. Let us make no mistake; we do
not assert that man has control of every activity, even every conscious activity, or that he
exercises what control he has by continuous volitions or will-acts. What we do assert is that man
is master of his human acts, that is, of such acts as he deliberately and advertently performs, and

29
Cf. R. C. McCARTHY, S.J., The Measurement of Conation, Loyola University Press, Chicago, 1926.
30
J. E. ROYCE, S.J., Man and His Nature, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1961, pp. 204-207.

11
which he knows as the fruit of his own decisions. A good deal of man’s ordinary daily life runs
along on the wheels of habit and takes a course determined by the man’s character and the
attractions of the various objects and situations that he encounters. But the even current of man’s
life (colored by his character and by the motives found in the attractiveness or repulsiveness of
particular objects and situations) is willed in its cause, for the man is its cause; and now and
again, during a day or week or month, the man must avert more or less directly to the sort of life
he regularly leads, and, so adverting, must give practical approval to it, must will it in short. Only
occasionally, perhaps, in a person’s ordinary day, is there demand for a special, clearly realized,
and deliberate choice or volition. Such clearly realized will acts are most evident in the
judgments of conscience on the moral qualities of a situation to be faced and decided. It is
particularly in conscience-judgments that a man is reflectively aware that his decision, his
volition, his will-act, is the essential factor which makes his ‘doing’ or ‘avoiding’ his own
activity, of which he is cause, author, and responsible determinant. – Man is conscious of the
control he wields over his own acts. And he experiences this consciousness before, during, and
after his deliberate volitions. Before he acts, he may, and frequently does, take counsel with
himself or seek advice of others. He weighs reasons pro and con; he considers advantages or
disadvantages to follow. During the action, he is aware that he is doing what he might have left
undone, doing one thing while he might have chosen to omit it or to have done something else,
even something opposite. After acting, man is conscious of self-approval or remorse; he is glad
or sorry that he has acted as he did. Consciousness, is therefore, an evident proof of the existence
of free-will…

“…Another proof of the freedom of the will is found in the absurdities which follow
upon its denial. ‘By their fruits ye shall know them,’ is a reliable test of doctrines. Therefore if
the doctrine which denies freedom of the will is found to lead logically to impossibilities and
absurdities, it is not a true doctrine; consequently, its contradictory doctrine is true, viz., that the
will is free. Now, denial of free-will does, in fact, lead to impossibilities and absurdities. We
have seen some of these in the discussion of our argument from consciousness, to wit, that denial
of human freedom makes nonsense of human laws, educative methods, business practices, etc.
Further, we must declare that this denial is entirely destructive of morality. For it takes away
responsibility. And if a man has no free-will, and no choice in his conduct, no control of his acts,
it follows that there is no such thing as right and wrong, no such thing as merit and demerit. Saint
and sinner, the good man and the roué, the solid citizen and the gangster, are equally blameless
in the face of fated necessity. Prisons then are torture chambers, but, of course, men are fated to
build prisons and confine prisoners. Good conduct and evil conduct are equally valueless, but
men are forced by blind necessity to praise the one and condemn the other. No sense or reason is
to be found, therefore, in the common conduct of mankind; we are all blind fools together.
Morality comes to naught, and with morality all social sense and social security perish. Here is
the fruit of the denial of human free-will. But we cannot, without denying all value to human
knowledge, accept this fruit as true food of minds. We find it absurd; we find it impossible to
accept. Therefore, we find the denial of free-will impossible. We are driven to conclude that
human free-will is a fact.”31

St. Thomas Aquinas’s Defense of Free Will: “Man has free-will: otherwise counsels,
exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to
31
P. J. GLENN, Psychology, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1955, pp. 367-369, 372-373.

12
make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves
downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment,
but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be
shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from
natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts
from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided
or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural
instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and
retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may
follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now
particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may
follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it
necessary that man have a free-will.”32

32
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 83, a. 1, c.

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