Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Is service of summons thru the DFA upon persons outside the country valid?
E. On whom served
a. On Corporations
i. Public (Section 13)
ii. Private
1. Domestic (Section 11)
2. Foreign (Section 12)
b. On Natural Persons
i. Prisoners (Section 9)
ii. Minor and Incompetent (Section 10)
iii. Unknown Identity and Whereabouts (Section 14)
c. On Entities without Judicial Personality (Section 8)
Cases:
1. Valmonte vs. CA, G.R. No. 108538
SECOND DIVISION
SYLLABUS
DECISION
MENDOZA, J : p
In its Order dated July 3, 1992, the trial court, denied private respondent's motion
to declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. A motion for reconsideration
was similarly denied on September 23, 1992. Whereupon, private respondent
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals.
On December 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the
petition and declaring Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. A copy of the appellate
court's decision was received by petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte on January 15,
1993 at his Manila office and on January 21, 1993 in Seattle, Washington.
Hence, this petition.
The issue at bar is whether in light of the facts set forth above, petitioner Lourdes
A. Valmonte was validly served with summons. In holding that she had been, the
Court of Appeals stated: 1 cdt
§ 17. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside and
is not found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal status
of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual
or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part,
in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of
the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by
leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as
under Section 7; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation
in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a
copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered
mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner
the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days
after notice, within which the defendant must answer.
In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in
rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff
who is domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated or attached.
Service of summons in the manner provided in § 17 is not for the purpose of
vesting it with jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair play or
due process, so that he will be informed of the pendency of the action against
him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in
which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. 6 cdtai
Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar, private respondent's action, which
is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of an action quasi in
rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant's
interest in a specific property and not to render a judgment against him. As
explained in the leading case of Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca: 7
[An action quasi in rem is] an action which while not strictly speaking an
action in rem partakes of that nature and is substantially such. . . . The
action quasi in remdiffers from the true action in rem in the circumstance
that in the former an individual is named as defendant and the purpose
of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien
burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the
sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by
attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way
thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is
conclusive only between the parties.
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the
Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14,
§17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either
(1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in
such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of
the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may
deem sufficient. cdtai
Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes, the question is
whether the service on her attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be
justified under the third mode, namely, "in any . . . manner the court may deem
sufficient."
We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside
the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country
where the defendant resides. 8 Moreover, there are several reasons why the
service of summons on Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte cannot be considered a valid
service of summons on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the first place, service
of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of
the court as required by Rule 14, § 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed
sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid and
on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to
file an answer.
In the second place, service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made
upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, § 17. As provided
in § 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by
affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds
for the application.cdt
Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave,
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not given ample time to file her Answer
which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice. It
must be noted that the period to file an Answer in an action against a resident
defendant differs from the period given in an action filed against a nonresident
defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In the former, the period is fifteen
(15) days from service of summons, while in the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days
from notice.
Strict compliance with these requirements alone can assure observance of due
process. That is why in one case, 9 although the Court considered publication in
the Philippines of the summons (against the contention that it should be made in
the foreign state where defendant was residing) sufficient, nonetheless the
service was considered insufficient because no copy of the summons was sent to
the last known correct address in the Philippines.
Private respondent cites the ruling in De Leon v. Hontanosas, 67 SCRA 458,
462-463 (1975), in which it was held that service of summons upon the
defendant's husband was binding on her. But the ruling in that case is justified
because summons were served upon defendant's husband in their conjugal
home in Cebu City and the wife was only temporarily absent, having gone to
Dumaguete City for a vacation. The action was for collection of a sum of money.
In accordance with Rule 14, § 8, substituted service could be made on any
person of sufficient discretion in the dwelling place of the defendant, and certainly
defendant's husband, who was there, was competent to receive the summons on
her behalf. In any event, it appears that defendant in that case submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court by instructing her husband to move for the dissolution of
the writ of attachment issued in that case. aisadc
On the other hand, in the case of Gemperle v. Schenker, 10 it was held that
service on the wife of a nonresident defendant was found sufficient because the
defendant had appointed his wife as his attorney-in-fact. It was held that although
defendant Paul Schenker was a Swiss citizen and resident of Switzerland,
service of summons upon his wife Helen Schenker who was in the Philippines
was sufficient because she was her husband's representative and attorney-in-
fact in a civil case, which he had earlier filed against William Gemperle. In fact
Gemperle's action was for damages arising from allegedly derogatory statements
contained in the complaint filed in the first case. As this Court said, "[i]n other
words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued, on behalf of
her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed
against him, particularly in a case, like the one at bar, which is a consequence of
the action brought by her on his behalf." 11 Indeed, if instead of filing an
independent action Gemperle filed a counterclaim in the action brought by Mr.
Schenker against him, there would have been no doubt that the trial court could
have acquired jurisdiction over Mr. Schenker through his agent and attorney-in-
fact, Mrs. Schenker.
In contrast, in the case at bar, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint her
husband as her attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote private respondent's
attorney that "all communications" intended for her should be addressed to her
husband who is also her lawyer at the latter's address in Manila, no power of
attorney to receive summons for her can be inferred therefrom. In fact the letter
was written seven months before the filing of this case below, and it appears that
it was written in connection with the negotiations between her and her sister,
respondent Rosita Dimalanta, concerning the partition of the property in question.
As is usual in negotiations of this kind, the exchange of correspondence was
carried on by counsel for the parties. But the authority given to petitioner's
husband in these negotiations certainly cannot be construed as also including an
authority to represent her in any litigation.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was no valid service on petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte in this case. cdta
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the orders dated
July 3, 1992 and September 23, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 48 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
(Spouses Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108538, [January 22,
|||
SECOND DIVISION
SYNOPSIS
DECISION
MENDOZA, J : p
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its notion was denied by the
trial court in its order, dated January 16, 1996, for failure of petitioner to raise
any new ground. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals, assailing the aforesaid orders of the trial court.
On September 18, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. 7 The appellate court ruled that although petitioner denied Lynverd
Cinches' authority to receive summons for it, its actual receipt of the summons
could be inferred from its filing of a motion to dismiss, hence, the purpose for
issuing summons had been substantially achieved. Moreover, it was held, by
including the affirmative defense that it had already paid its obligation and
praying for other reliefs in its Motion to Dismiss, petitioner voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 8
Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON A MERE
DRAFTSMAN WHO IS NOT OF THOSE UPON WHOM
SUMMONS MAY BE SERVED IN CASE OF A DEFENDANT
CORPORATION AS MENTIONED IN THE RULES IS VALID.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE INCLUSION OF ANOTHER AFFIRMATIVE
RELIEF IN A MOTION TO DISMISS ABANDONS AND WAIVES
THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT THEREIN ALSO PLEADED
UNDER PREVAILING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. cda
THIRD DIVISION
SYNOPSIS
In this instant petition, E.B. Villarosa and Partner Co., Ltd. contended that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person because the summons intended
for it was improperly served on its Branch Manager.
The Court agreed with petitioner. Designation of persons or officers who are
authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now
limited and more clearly specified in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule
must be strictly observed, service must be made to one named in the statute.
Petitioner's filing of a motion to dismiss, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the defendant, can by no means be deemed a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J : p
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated August 5, 1998 and November
20, 1998 of the public respondent Judge Herminio I. Benito of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 132 and praying that the public respondent court be
ordered to desist from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 98-824. LLjur
Petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with principal
office address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branch offices at 2492
Bay View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale
with Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain
parcels of land located at Barrio Carmen, Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter
into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They
further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom,
the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati.
On April 3, 1998, private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of
Contract and Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati allegedly for failure of the latter to comply with its
contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there
were no substantial developments therein. 1
Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through
its Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City 2 but the Sheriff's Return of Service 3 stated that
the summons was duly served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.
thru its Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL SABULBERO on May 5, 1998 at their
new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the
signature on the face of the original copy of the summons."
On June 9, 1998, defendant filed a Special Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss 4 alleging that on May 6, 1998, "summons intended for defendant" was
served upon Engr. Wendell Sabulbero, an employee of defendant at its branch
office at Cagayan de Oro City. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Defendant contends that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was
improperly served upon its employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City
who is not one of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure upon whom service of summons may be made.
Meanwhile, on June 10, 1998, plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default 5 alleging that defendant has failed to file an Answer despite its receipt
allegedly on May 5, 1998 of the summons and the complaint, as shown in the
Sheriff's Return.
On June 22, 1998, plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss 6 alleging that the records show that defendant, through its branch
manager, Engr. Wendell Sabulbero actually received the summons and the
complaint on May 8, 1998 as evidenced by the signature appearing on the copy
of the summons and not on May 5, 1998 as stated in the Sheriff's Return nor on
May 6, 1998 as stated in the motion to dismiss; that defendant has transferred its
office from Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro to its new office address at
Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro; and that the purpose of the rule is to
bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.
On August 5, 1998, the trial court issued an Order 7 denying defendant's Motion
to Dismiss as well as plaintiff's Motion to Declare Defendant in Default.
Defendant was given ten (10) days within which to file a responsive pleading.
The trial court stated that since the summons and copy of the complaint were in
fact received by the corporation through its branch manager Wendell Sabulbero,
there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons and
consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. cdasia
Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of
petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general
manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss did not operate to confer
jurisdiction upon its person. There is no question that the defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. 29 Before, the rule
was that a party may challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his person by
making a special appearance through a motion to dismiss and if in the same
motion, the movant raised other grounds or invoked affirmative relief which
necessarily involves the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, the party is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. 30 This doctrine
has been abandoned in the case of La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 31 which became the basis of the adoption of a new provision in
the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules. Section 20 now provides that "the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not
be deemed a voluntary appearance." The emplacement of this rule clearly
underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on summons.
Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the
defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper service of
summons, the trial court cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court
will consequently be null and void. 32
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
CORONA, J : p
This is a petition for review 1 of the September 22, 2005 decision 2 and
December 29, 2005 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
82482. HDCTAc
SECOND DIVISION
SYNOPSIS
The Supreme Court ruled that service of summons upon private respondent
through its filing clerk cannot be considered valid. Consequently, all the
subsequent proceedings held before it, including the order of default was null and
void because the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent.
According to the Court, notice to enable the other party to be heard and to
present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any
administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and
indispensable ingredient of due process. The Court will deprive private
respondent of its right to present its defense in this multi-million peso suit, if it
disregards compliance with the rules on service of summons. Thus, the petition
was denied. AaSTIH
SYLLABUS
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J : p
This petition for review assails the decision, 1 dated May 12, 2000, of the Court of
Appeals and its resolution 2 dated August 25, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54649
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The decision set aside the
decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, in Civil Case
No. 98-1567 and directed said court to conduct further proceedings on the
complaint for rescission of lease contract.
The antecedent facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
Petitioners spouses Efren and Digna Mason owned two parcels of land located
along Epifanio delos Santos Avenue in Pasay City. On March 30, 1993,
petitioners and private respondent Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation
(hereafter Columbus) entered into a lease contract, under which Columbus
undertook to construct a building worth ten million pesos (P10,000,000) at the
end of the third year of the lease. Because private respondent failed to comply
with this stipulation, the petitioners on November 13, 1998, filed a complaint for
rescission of contract with damages against private respondent before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-1567.
Summons was served upon private respondent through a certain Ayreen
Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons described Rejalde as a
secretary of Columbus, the sheriff's return described Rejalde as a secretary to
the corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal processes.
Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading, hence
petitioners filed a motion to declare private respondent in default. The motion
was granted and petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision.
On April 22, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision whose dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs and against defendant declaring the contract of
lease rescinded, terminated and cancelled, and ordering defendant:
1. To pay plaintiffs the amount of P10 Million which is the value of the
building which defendant failed to construct on the leased properties, as
and by way [of] actual damages;
2. To pay plaintiffs the amount of P63,862.57 beginning November 1998
until defendant and the sub-lessee vacate the leased property by way of
reasonable compensation for the use of the properties;
3. and all other persons and entities claiming rights under it, to surrender
possession to plaintiffs and to vacate the leased premises;
4. to pay plaintiffs the amount of P300,000.00 as and by way of moral
damages;
5. to pay plaintiffs the amount of P100,000.00 as and by way of
exemplary damages;
6. to pay plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount of P100,000.00; and
7. to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. 4
That decision became final on May 12, 1999. The following day, private
respondent filed a motion to lift order of default, which was opposed by
petitioners. The trial court ordered the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. However, without waiting for the same, the trial court on May 26,
1999, denied the motion to lift order of default, thus:
It appearing that the decision rendered by this Court on April 27, 1999
became final and executory on May 12, 1999, defendant's Motion to Lift
Order of Default is hereby DENIED. Concomitant thereto, plaintiffs'
Motion for Execution is hereby GRANTED.
The Order of this Court on May 21, 1999 allowing the parties to file their
respective memoranda within ten (10) days from May 21, 1999 is hereby
revoked and set aside, since the incidents can be resolved based on the
records.
WHEREFORE, let a writ of execution issue to enforce and implement
the final and executory decision rendered by this Court on April 7, 1999.
SO ORDERED. 5
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
Undaunted, private respondent filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ of
execution. It suffered the same fate as the motion for reconsideration for being
dilatory. The branch sheriff was directed to proceed with the enforcement of the
decision.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which ruled in its favor,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision in Civil Case No.
98-1567 and all the proceedings therein, including the order of default
and writ of execution, are SET ASIDE. The court a quo is ORDERED to
require petitioner to file its answer and thereafter to conduct further
appropriate proceedings with reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED. 6
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred when it denied private
respondent's motion to lift order of default. The appellate court pointed out that
private respondent was not properly served with summons, thus it cannot be
faulted if it failed to file an Answer. Section 11, 7 Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that service of summons upon domestic private juridical
entity shall be made through its president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. Since service upon private
respondent was made through a certain Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk in
private respondent's office, as evidenced by the latter's employment record, such
service cannot be considered valid. Consequently, the subsequent proceedings,
including the order of default, judgment by default and its execution, were also
invalid because the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent.
Besides judgments by default are not favored, especially so when there is
a prima facie showing that the defaulting party has a meritorious defense, which
in this case was grounded on the contract of lease sued upon, said the Court of
Appeals.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition
for review averring that the Court of Appeals erred in:
I. . . . HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO VALID SERVICE OF
SUMMONS UPON PRIVATE RESPONDENT COLUMBUS
PHILIPPINES BUS CORPORATION
II. . . . NOT HOLDING THAT THERE WAS VALID SERVICE OF
SUMMONS CONFORMABLY WITH THE SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE RULE.
SO ORDERED.
(Spouses Mason v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144662, [October 13, 2003],
|||
THIRD DIVISION
SYNOPSIS
In the complaint for specific performance filed by petitioners Spouses Patrick and
Rafaela Jose against respondents Spouses Helen and Romeo Boyon, the
summons was effected through substituted service and by publication because
the process server alleged that he cannot serve it personally. Consequently,
respondents failed to file their answer, were declared in default by the trial court,
and after the ex parte presentation of evidence, a resolution in favor of petitioners
was issued. Upon learning of the resolution, respondent Helen Boyon, who was
then residing in the United States, filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning the
validity of service of summons. However, the motion was denied by the trial court
on the ground that by respondents' default they loss their standing in court. Thus,
she filed a petition forcertiorari with the Court of Appeals which ruled that the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over respondents because of the invalid service
of summons. Hence, this petition.
In denying the petition, the Court ruled that the Return of Summons showed that
no effort was actually exerted and no positive step was taken by either the
process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on
respondents. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant
circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general
statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying
with the rules of substituted service of summons.
It must also be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by
publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. In the instant
case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance
directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land,
the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not
assert any interest or right over it. Moreover, this Court has consistently declared
that an action for specific performance is an action in personam. Having failed to
serve the summons on respondents properly, the RTC did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process demands that all the
proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be deemed null and void.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J : p
In general, substituted service can be availed of only after a clear showing that
personal service of summons was not legally possible. Also, service by
publication is applicable in actions in rem and quasi in rem, but not in personal
suits such as the present one which is for specific performance.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the February 26, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 60888. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision is worded as follows:
"WHEREFORE, on the basis of what prescinds, the assailed resolution
and orders issued by the public respondent are perforce ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. This pronouncement is nonetheless rendered without
prejudice to the refiling of the same case by the private respondents with
the court a quo." 3
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are narrated by the CA in this wise:
"On July 2, 1998, [petitioners] Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a
complaint for specific performance against [respondents] Helen and
Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a
parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The action was lodged
before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa which is presided by
herein public respondent Judge N.C. Perello. On July 21, 1998,
respondent judge, through the acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch
276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, issued summons to the
[respondents]. As per return of the summons, substituted service was
resorted to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the
summons personally to the [respondents] failed. On December 9, 1998,
[petitioners] filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of
Court to Effect Summons by Publication. On December 28, 1998, public
respondent issued an Order granting the Ex-parte Motion for Leave of
Court to Effect Summons by Publication. On July 30, 1999, the
respondent judge, sans a written motion, issued an Order declaring
herein [respondent] in default for failure to file their respective answers.
As a consequence of the declaration of default, [petitioners] were
allowed to submit their evidence ex-parte. Ultimately, on December 7,
1999, respondent judge issued the assailed resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
"A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the
assailed Resolution dated December 7, 1999 was already final and
executory
"B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the
Petition for Certiorari of private respondents despite the pendency of an
appeal earlier filed
"C. The Honorable Court erred in not holding that the Petition for
Certiorari was time barred
"D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
proceedings in the lower court are null and void due to invalid and
defective service of summons and the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the respondents." 6
In sum, the main issue revolves around the validity of the service of summons on
respondents.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Service of Summons
Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling that the service of summons on
respondents was invalid. They submit that although the case filed before the trial
court was denominated as an action for specific performance, it was actually an
action quasi in rem, because it involved a piece of real property located in the
Philippines. They further argue that in actions quasi in rem involving ownership of
a parcel of land, it is sufficient that the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the res.
Thus, the summons by publication, which they effected subsequent to the
substituted service of summons, was allegedly sufficient.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the proceedings in the trial court
were null and void because of the invalid and defective service of summons.
According to them, the Return of Summons issued by the process server of the
RTC failed to state that he had exerted earnest efforts to effect the service of
summons. He allegedly tried to serve it personally on them on July 22, 1998 at
No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang. He, however, resorted to
substituted service on that same day, supposedly because he could not find
respondents in the above address. They further allege that the person to whom
he gave the summons was not even a resident of that address.
Respondents contend that when summons is served by substituted service, the
return must show that it was impossible to serve the summons personally, and
that efforts had been exerted toward that end. They add that noncompliance with
the rule on substituted service renders invalid all proceedings relative thereto.
As to the summons by publication subsequently effected by petitioners,
respondents argue that the case filed before the trial court was an action for
specific performance and, therefore, an action in personam. As such, the
summons by publication was insufficient to enable the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of respondents.
Respondents conclude that even granting that the service of summons by
publication was permissible under the circumstances, it would still be defective
and invalid because of the failure of petitioners to observe the requirements of
law, like an Affidavit attesting that the latter deposited in the post office a copy of
the summons and of the order of publication, paid the postage, and sent the
documents by registered mail to the former's last known address.
We agree with respondents. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where the action is in
personamand the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by
personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6
and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:
"Section 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable,
the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him.
"Section 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof."
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service of
summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made
promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of
service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons
within a reasonably time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant;
and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and
discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or
regular place of business, of the defendant. 7 It is likewise required that the
pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in
the officer's return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the
foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons
ineffective. 8
Defective Personal Service of Summons
In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously
resorted to substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine
effort to locate respondents. A review of the records 9 reveals that the only effort
he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22,
1998, to try to serve the summons personally on respondents. While the Return
of Summons states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because
Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not
mention exactly what efforts — if any — were undertaken to find respondents.
Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process server obtained
the information on their whereabouts. The pertinent portion of the Return of
Summons is reproduced as follows:
"That efforts to serve the said Summons personally upon defendants
Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon were made but the same were ineffectual
and unavailing for the reason that defendant Helen Boyon is somewhere
in the United States of America and defendant Romeo Boyon is in Bicol
thus substituted service was made in accordance with Section 7, Rule
14, of the Revised Rules of Court." 10
The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no
positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve
the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the
alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was
verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying
the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the
summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for
purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.
The necessity of stating in the process server's Return or Proof of Service the
material facts and circumstances sustaining the validity of substituted service
was explained by this Court in Hamilton v. Levy, 11 from which we quote:
PHIL 354-366)
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J : p
We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a
valid substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that
defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service. 22 Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a
"reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no
specific time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time
as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent
man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done,
having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other
party." 23 Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However,
when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of
the summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of
the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the
service of summons has failed. 24 What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff
to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt
service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days
since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the
sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month,
it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return
of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff's Return provides
data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to
be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days
of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can
be considered "reasonable time" with regard to personal service on the
defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons
with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not
to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try
their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other
hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of
summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in
serving the process on the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be
available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in
failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least
three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff
must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of
service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. 25 The efforts made
to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated
in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the
inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the
alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to
serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify
substituted service. The form on Sheriff's Return of Summons on Substituted
Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine
Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant
personally and the fact of failure.26 Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5
dated November 9, 1989 requires that "impossibility of prompt service should be
shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure
of such efforts," which should be made in the proof of service. TIEHSA
In the case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 33 it may be true that the Court held that
a Sheriff's Return, which states that "despite efforts exerted to serve said process
personally upon the defendant on several occasions the same proved futile,"
conforms to the requirements of valid substituted service. However, in view of the
numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the
filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and
appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal
expenses, the Court rules in the case at bar that the narration of the efforts made
to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise words
will not suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more
particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal service,
dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of
occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be
included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such
efforts were made to personally serve summons on defendant, and those
resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal service.
Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in
inexact terms would encourage routine performance of their precise duties
relating to substituted service — for it would be quite easy to shroud or conceal
carelessness or laxity in such broad terms. Lastly, considering that monies and
properties worth millions may be lost by a defendant because of an irregular or
void substituted service, it is but only fair that the Sheriff's Return should clearly
and convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness of personal service.
Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is
still a serious nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be left
with a "person of suitable age and discretion" residing in defendant's house or
residence. Thus, there are two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient
must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in
the house or residence of defendant. Both requirements were not met. In this
case, the Sheriff's Return lacks information as to residence, age, and discretion
of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriff's general assertion that de la Cruz
is the "resident caretaker" of petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn
Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is
doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the condominium
unit considering that a married woman of her stature in society would unlikely
hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioner's allegation that
Macky de la Cruz is not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary
to have additional information in the Return of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de
la Cruz's refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong indication that
he did not have the necessary "relation of confidence" with petitioner. To protect
petitioner's right to due process by being accorded proper notice of a case
against her, the substituted service of summons must be shown to clearly comply
with the rules.
It has been stated and restated that substituted service of summons must
faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and in the
circumstances authorized by the rules. 34
Even American case law likewise stresses the principle of strict
compliance with statute or rule on substituted service, thus:
The procedure prescribed by a statute or rule for substituted or
constructive service must be strictly pursued. 35 There must be strict
compliance with the requirements of statutes authorizing substituted or
constructive service. 36
Where, by the local law, substituted or constructive service is in
certain situations authorized in the place of personal service when the
latter is inconvenient or impossible, a strict and literal compliance with
the provisions of the law must be shown in order to support the judgment
based on such substituted or constructive service. 37 Jurisdiction is not
to be assumed and exercised on the general ground that the subject
matter of the suit is within the power of the court. The inquiry must be as
to whether the requisites of the statute have been complied with, and
such compliance must appear on the record. 38 The fact that the
defendant had actual knowledge of attempted service does not render
the service effectual if in fact the process was not served in accordance
with the requirements of the statute. 39
Based on the above principles, respondent Trajano failed to demonstrate
that there was strict compliance with the requirements of the then Section 8, Rule
14 (now Section 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). cSCTEH
PHIL 454-477)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
MENDOZA, J : p
In court proceedings, there is no right more cherished than the right of every
litigant to be given an opportunity to be heard. This right begins at the very
moment that summons is served on the defendant. The Rules of Court places
utmost importance in ensuring that the defendant personally grasp the weight of
responsibility that will befall him. Thus, it is only in exceptional circumstances that
constructive notification, or substituted service of summons, is allowed. If the
server falls short of the rigorous requirements for substituted service of
summons, then the Court has no other option but to strike down a void judgment,
regardless of the consequences.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
June 27, 2012 Decision 1 and the March 26, 2013 Resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA)in CA-G.R. SP No. 106271, which denied the petition for annulment
of judgment.
The Facts
Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong national, and
respondent Benjamin Co (respondent), a Filipino citizen, were married on
October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood-Malate Church. 3
Sometime in November 2008, petitioner received a subpoena from the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) directing her to appear before the said agency
because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation
proceedings. Reportedly, her marriage with respondent was nullified by the court.
When petitioner appeared before the BID, she was furnished with the copies of
the following documents: (1) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed as
Civil Case No. CV-01-0177; (2) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0306; (3) Decision, 4 dated December 11, 2002, in
Civil Case No. 02-0306 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260 (RTC),
Parañaque City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent as
void ab initio; and (4) their marriage contract 5 with the subject decision
annotated thereon. Petitioner was perplexed that her marriage with respondent
had been declared void ab initio.
The above documents showed that on April 26, 2001, respondent filed a petition
for declaration of nullity 6 on the ground of psychological incapacity before the
RTC, which was docketed as Civil Case No. CV-01-0177. Respondent stated
that petitioner's address was 600 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila. There was no
showing of its status, whether pending, withdrawn or terminated.
On July 19, 2002, respondent filed another petition for declaration of nullity 7 on
the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case
No. 02-0306. Respondent indicated that petitioner's address was 23 Sta. Rosa
Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the
RTC issued summons. 8 In his Server's Return, 9 process server Rodolfo Torres,
Jr. stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with the copy
of the petition was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same
personally on petitioner. The said documents were received by Mr. Roly
Espinosa, a security officer.
On December 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision 10 in Civil Case No. 02-
0306 finding respondent's marriage with petitioner as void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that
summons was served on petitioner on August 1, 2002, but she failed to file her
responsive pleading within the reglementary period. The public prosecutor also
stated that there were no indicative facts to manifest collusion. Thus, the RTC
concluded that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment 11 under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court before the CA on November 24, 2008, claiming that she
was never notified of the cases filed against her. She prayed that the RTC
decision, dated December 11, 2002, in Civil Case No. 02-0306, be nullified on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner alleged that first, respondent committed extrinsic fraud because, as
seen in Civil Case No. CV-01-0177, he deliberately indicated a wrong address to
prevent her from participating in the trial; second, jurisdiction over her person
was not acquired in Civil Case No. 02-0306 because of an invalid substituted
service of summons as no sufficient explanation, showing impossibility of
personal service, was stated before resorting to substituted service of
summons; third, the alleged substituted service was made on a security guard of
their townhouse and not on a member of her household; and fourth, she was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations. 12
acITSD
Although the decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was promulgated as early as
December 11, 2002, the Court must strike it down for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner. The favorable judgment enjoyed by respondent cannot be
categorized as a genuine victory because it was fought against an adversary,
who was ignorant of the existing dispute. Whatever prize bestowed upon the
victor in such a void decision must also be undone. Respondent, if he wishes to
pursue, must start from scratch and institute his action for declaration of nullity
again; this time with petitioner fully aware and ready for litigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 27, 2012 Decision and the
March 26, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106271
are herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2002 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City is hereby declared VOID.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Yuk Ling Ong v. Co, G.R. No. 206653, [February 25, 2015])
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J : p
The petitioner appended the following to her answer: (a) a copy 13 of the
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Jose Layno in her favor, dated August 26,
1992, showing that the respondent was a resident of Barangay Buenlag,
Calasiao, Pangasinan; (b) a Real Estate Mortgage 14 executed by the
respondent, dated February 9, 1999 showing that she was a resident of
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan; (c) the Joint Affidavit 15 of Vicenta
Peralta and Orlando Macalanda, both residents of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan, declaring that the respondent and her brother Oscar Layno were
their neighbors; that the respondent and her brother had been residents of
Barangay Buenlag since their childhood; that although the respondent left the
country on several occasions, she returned to the Philippines and resided in her
house at No. 572 located in the said barangay; and (d) the Voter's Registration
Record 16 of Oscar Layno, approved on June 15, 1997.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff Vivian
Layno Jensen and against defendant Filomena Domagas, as follows:
1. The Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Calasiao, Pangasinan in
Civil Case No. 879, entitled Filomena Domagas versus Vivian
Layno Jensen is declared null and void, for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the plaintiff and the subject matter.
2. Defendant Filomena Domagas is ordered to pay plaintiff, the following:
a.) Actual damages, representing litigation expenses in the
amount of P50,000.00;
b.) Attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00;
c.) Moral Damages in the amount of P50,000.00;
d.) Exemplary Damages in the amount of P50,000.00; and
e.) Costs of suit. HTacDS
SO ORDERED. 17
The trial court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint
and summons on the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879,
considering that she left the Philippines on February 17, 1999 for Oslo, Norway,
and her brother Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the said complaint
and summons for and in her behalf.
The ruling of the CA that the petitioner's complaint for forcible entry of the
petitioner against the respondent in Civil Case No. 879 is an action quasi in rem,
is erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and
one in personam.
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its
character. 18 Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for
that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. 19 A
proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and
obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of,
specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance
with the mandate of the court. 20 The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to
impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly
upon the person of the defendant. 21 Of this character are suits to compel a
defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary
liability on him. 22 An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object
a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the
propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought
against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-
settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. 23 In Combs v. Combs, 24 the
appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations
and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and
obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of
real property are in personam. 25
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against
persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the
claims assailed. 26 In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant
and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. 27 Actions quasi in rem deal with the
status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to
operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible
claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in
the action. 28
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject
to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of
the possession of any land or building in force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of
any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns
of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time
within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against
the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession,
or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.
Under Section 15, Rule 70 of the said Rule, the plaintiff may be granted a
writ of preliminary prohibition or mandatory injunction:
Sec. 15. Preliminary Injunction. — The court may grant
preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58
hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of
dispossession against the plaintiff.
CIHTac
In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after
his marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. This can be gleaned from the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 26, 1992 in which she declared that she was a
resident of said barangay. Moreover, in the Real Estate Mortgage Contract dated
February 9, 1999, ten days before the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed,
the petitioner categorically stated that she was a Filipino and a resident of
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was
in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons
and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served on her through
substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.
Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the
court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. 34 The statutory
requirement of substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and any
substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered
ineffective.35 As the Court held in Hamilton v. Levy: 36
. . . The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service
of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer's Return;
otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service
cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in
derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in
character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was
made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements
of substituted service renders said service ineffective. 37
In Keister v. Narcereo, 38 the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or
"residence" are generally held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is not
sufficient to leave the summons at the former's dwelling house, residence or
place of abode, as the case may be. Dwelling house or residence refers to the
place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the
service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the
time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must
be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the
defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as
much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction. 39
The Return of Service filed by Sheriff Eduardo J. Abulencia on the service
of summons reads: ECISAD
648)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J : p
This petition for review assails the Decision 1 dated May 20, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87723 and its Resolution 2 dated June
28, 2005, denying the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court had
affirmed the Order 3 dated February 6, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 150, in Civil Case No. 03-093 and its Order 4 dated
September 16, 2004 denying the motion for partial reconsideration. acCETD
On May 20, 2003, Dole filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
following grounds: (a) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the person of Dole due
to improper service of summons; (b) the complaint failed to state a cause of
action; (c) All Season was not the real party in interest; and (d) the officers of
Dole cannot be sued in their personal capacities for alleged acts performed in
their official capacities as corporate officers of Dole. 5 In its Order dated
February 6, 2004, the RTC denied said motion. Dole moved for partial
reconsideration raising the same issues but its motion was denied.
Thereafter, Dole filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
contending that the alias summons was not properly served. The appellate
court, however, ruled otherwise. It reasoned that Dole's president had known
of the service of the alias summons although he did not personally receive
and sign it. It also held that in today's corporate setup, documents addressed
to corporate officers are received in their behalf by their staff. 6 Dole sought
reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied.
Hence, this petition where petitioner raises the lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT ALLOWED SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON A
PRIVATE CORPORATION WHEN IT HELD THAT DOLE WAS
VALIDLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT
SUMMONS WAS NOT SERVED ON ITS PRESIDENT, MANAGING
PARTNER, GENERAL MANAGER, CORPORATE SECRETARY,
TREASURER OR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL THEREBY IGNORING THE
RULE ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON PRIVATE DOMESTIC
CORPORATIONS. 7 cTCEIS
Simply stated, the issue in this case is whether there was a valid
service of summons on petitioner for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the corporate defendant below, now the petitioner herein.
Petitioner contends that for the court to validly acquire jurisdiction over
a domestic corporation, summons must be served only on the corporate
officers enumerated in Section 11, 8 Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Petitioner maintains that the alias summons was not validly served
on it since the alias summons was served on Marifa Dela Cruz, an employee
of Dole Pacific General Services, Ltd., which is an entity separate and distinct
from petitioner. It further avers that even if she were an employee of the
petitioner, she is not one of the officers enumerated under Section 11, Rule
14. Thus, the RTC, without proper service of summons, lacks jurisdiction over
petitioner as defendant below. IDATCE
Private respondent All Season, for its part, contends that the trial court
had acquired jurisdiction over petitioner, since petitioner received the alias
summons through its president on April 23, 2003. According to private
respondent, there was full compliance with Section 11, Rule 14, when Marifa
Dela Cruz received the summons upon instruction of petitioner's president as
indicated in the Officer's Return. 9 More so, petitioner had admitted that it
received the alias summons in its Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Time 10 filed on May 5, 2003.
Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic
corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule in
statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. 11 Service
must therefore be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. IcAaEH
In this case, it appears that on April 23, 2003, Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal
assistant, received the alias summons. 12 Contrary to private respondent's
claim that it was received upon instruction of the president of the corporation
as indicated in the Officer's Return, such fact does not appear in the receiving
copy of the alias summons which Marifa Dela Cruz signed. There was no
evidence that she was authorized to receive court processes in behalf of the
president. Considering that the service of summons was made on a legal
assistant, not employed by herein petitioner and who is not one of the
designated persons under Section 11, Rule 14, the trial court did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.
However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. 13 As held
previously by this Court, the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such
as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration,
are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 14 aTAEHc
700-706)
11. Green Star Express v Nissin Universal Robina Corp. 761 SCRA
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, ** J : p
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
MENDOZA, J : p
SO ORDERED.
The decision became final as QSC and Medestomas did not interpose
an appeal. Gacott then secured a Writ of Execution, 8 dated September 26,
2007.
During the execution stage, Gacott learned that QSC was not a
corporation, but was in fact a general partnership registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In the articles of
partnership, 9 Guy was appointed as General Manager of QSC.
To execute the judgment, Branch Sheriff Ronnie L. Felizarte (Sheriff
Felizarte) went to the main office of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, Land Transportation Office (DOTC-LTO), Quezon City, and
verified whether Medestomas, QSC and Guy had personal properties
registered therein.10 Upon learning that Guy had vehicles registered in his
name, Gacott instructed the sheriff to proceed with the attachment of one of
the motor vehicles of Guy based on the certification issued by the DOTC-
LTO. 11 CAIHTE
In this case, had he been properly impleaded, Guy's liability would only
arise after the properties of QSC would have been exhausted. The records,
however, miserably failed to show that the partnership's properties were
exhausted. The report 37 of the sheriff showed that the latter went to the main
office of the DOTC-LTO in Quezon City and verified whether Medestomas,
QSC and Guy had personal properties registered therein. Gacott then
instructed the sheriff to proceed with the attachment of one of the motor
vehicles of Guy. 38 The sheriff then served the Notice of Attachment/Levy
upon Personalty to the record custodian of the DOTC-LTO of Mandaluyong
City. A similar notice was served to Guy through his housemaid at his
residence.
Clearly, no genuine efforts were made to locate the properties of QSC
that could have been attached to satisfy the judgment — contrary to the clear
mandate of Article 1816. Being subsidiarily liable, Guy could only be held
personally liable if properly impleaded and after all partnership assets had
been exhausted.
Second, Article 1816 provides that the partners' obligation to third
persons with respect to the partnership liability is pro rata or joint. Liability
is joint when a debtor is liable only for the payment of only a proportionate
part of the debt. In contrast, a solidary liability makes a debtor liable for the
payment of the entire debt. In the same vein, Article 1207 does not presume
solidary liability unless: 1) the obligation expressly so states; or 2)
the law or nature requires solidarity. With regard to partnerships, ordinarily,
the liability of the partners is not solidary. 39 The joint liability of the partners is
a defense that can be raised by a partner impleaded in a complaint against
the partnership.
In other words, only in exceptional circumstances shall the partners'
liability be solidary in nature. Articles 1822, 1823 and 1824 of the Civil
Code provide for these exceptional conditions, to wit:
Article 1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any
partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership
or with the authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is caused to any
person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is
incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the
partner so acting or omitting to act.
Article 1823. The partnership is bound to make good the loss:
(1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent
authority receives money or property of a third person and misapplies
it; and
(2) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives
money or property of a third person and the money or property so
received is misapplied by any partner while it is in the custody of the
partnership.
Article 1824. All partners are liable solidarily with the
partnership for everything chargeable to the partnership under
Articles 1822 and 1823.
[Emphases Supplied]
In essence, these provisions articulate that it is the act of a
partner which caused loss or injury to a third person that makes all other
partners solidarily liable with the partnership because of the words "any
wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the
business," "one partner acting within the scope of his apparent
authority" and "misapplied by any partner while it is in the custody of the
partnership." The obligation is solidary because the law protects the third
person, who in good faith relied upon the authority of a partner, whether such
authority is real or apparent. 40
In the case at bench, it was not shown that Guy or the other partners
did a wrongful act or misapplied the money or property he or the partnership
received from Gacott. A third person who transacted with said partnership can
hold the partners solidarily liable for the whole obligation if the case of the
third person falls under Articles 1822 or 1823. 41 Gacott's claim stemmed
from the alleged defective transreceivers he bought from QSC, through the
latter's employee, Medestomas. It was for a breach of warranty in a
contractual obligation entered into in the name and for the account of QSC,
not due to the acts of any of the partners. For said reason, it is the general
rule under Article 1816 that governs the joint liability of such breach, and not
the exceptions under Articles 1822 to 1824. Thus, it was improper to hold Guy
solidarily liable for the obligation of the partnership.
Finally, Section 21 of the Corporation Code, 42 as invoked by the RTC,
cannot be applied to sustain Guy's liability. The said provision states that a
general partner shall be liable for all debts, liabilities and damages incurred by
an ostensible corporation. It must be read, however, in conjunction with Article
1816 of theCivil Code,which governs the liabilities of partners against third
persons. Accordingly, whether QSC was an alleged ostensible corporation or
a duly registered partnership, the liability of Guy, if any, would remain to be
joint and subsidiary because, as previously stated, all partners shall be
liable pro rata with all their property and after all the partnership assets have
been exhausted for the contracts which may be entered into in the name and
for the account of the partnership.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 25, 2012 Decision
and the March 5, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
94816 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City, is ORDERED TO
RELEASE Michael C. Guy's Suzuki Grand Vitara subject of the Notice of
Levy/Attachment upon Personalty.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Guy v. Gacott, G.R. No. 206147, [January 13, 2016])
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the
December 12, 2007 Decision 2 and June 17, 2008 Resolution 3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98787, which affirmed the March 29, 2007
Order 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66, Makati City, in Civil
Case No. 06-882, denying petitioners' Special Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss for alleged improper service of summons.
On October 16, 2006, respondent Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation filed against petitioner corporation and its directors/officers a
Complaint 5 for civil damages arising from estafa in relation to violations of the
Trust Receipts Law. On October 26, 2006, after an ex parte hearing was
conducted, respondent's prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment was
granted and the corresponding writ was issued. 6 Thereafter, Sheriff Leodel N.
Roxas served upon petitioners a copy of the summons, complaint, application
for attachment, respondent's affidavit and bond, and the order and writ of
attachment. The Sheriff's Report dated November 13, 2006 narrated:
The undersigned sheriff respectfully submits the following report
to wit:
On 26 October 2006, [a] copy of Writ of Attachment dated 26
October 2006, issued by the Court in the above-entitled case was
received by the undersigned for service and implementation.
On even date, the undersigned served the Summons, copy of
[the] Complaint, application for attachment, the plaintiffs affidavit and
bond, and the Order and Writ of Attachment, on the defendants Nation
Petroleum Gas et al., at BPI Building, Rizal Street, Candelaria,
Quezon. Said summons and all pertinent papers, upon telephone
instruction of defendant Melinda Ang, were received by Claudia
Abante, [defendants'] [Liaison] Officer, as evidenced by her signature
at the original copy of Summons and Writ. I also served copies to other
defendants at their given addresses, but they refused to acknowledge
receipt thereof. EATCcI
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION BY
SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON ITS MERE EMPLOYEE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS BY
RESORTING TO SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS DESPITE
ABSENCE OF EARNEST EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE
SERVING OFFICER TO SERVE SUMMONS PERSONALLY. 23
We deny.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action
brought against him or her. 24 Its purpose is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant that an action
has been commenced so that he may be given an opportunity to be heard on
the claim against him. 25 "[C]ompliance with the rules regarding the service of
summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence
of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary
that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should first be
informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is
premised." 26
Service of summons on domestic corporation, partnership or other
juridical entity is governed by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules, which states:
SECTION 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. —
When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association
organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,
service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
When the defendant is a domestic corporation like herein petitioner,
service of summons may be made only upon the persons enumerated in
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules. 27 The enumeration of persons to whom
summons may be served is restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule
on statutory constructionexpressio unios est exclusio alterius. 28 Substantial
compliance cannot be invoked. 29 Service of summons upon persons other
than those officers specifically mentioned in Section 11, Rule 14 is void,
defective and not binding to said corporation. 30
Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of
service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a
corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who
is named in the statute; otherwise, the service is insufficient. The
purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will
receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure
that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the
corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers
served on him. 31
As correctly argued by petitioners, Sps. Mason already resolved that
substantial compliance on service of summons upon a domestic corporation is
no longer an excuse. Thus:
The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still
applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure has been settled inVillarosa which applies squarely to the
instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.
Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address at 102 Juan Luna
St., Davao City and with branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo,
Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City, entered into a sale with development agreement with private
respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to
comply with its contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit
for breach of contract and damages at the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was served upon
Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan
de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons and lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that there was
substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over
Villarosa. The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition
for certiorari. We decided in Villarosa's favor and declared the trial
court without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. We held that
there was no valid service of summons on Villarosa as service was
made through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised the
Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We discarded the trial
court's basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private
respondent's substantial compliance with the rule on service of
summons, and fully agreed with petitioner's assertions that the
enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive,
following the rule in statutory construction thatexpressio unios est
exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended
to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it could have
easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent
to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millennium to
support their position for said case is not on all fours with the instant
case. We must stress that Millennium was decided when the
1964 Rules of Court were still in force and effect, unlike the instant
case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases cited by
petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial compliance
must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case. cEaSHC
The same conclusion, however, could not be said with respect to the
service of summons upon the individual petitioners.
Section 7, in relation to Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules, provides for
substituted service of summons:
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever
practicable, the summons shall be served by handling a copy thereof
to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it,
by tendering it to him.
Section 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in
the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules cannot be construed to apply
simultaneously and do not provide for alternative modes of service of
summons which can either be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience
to the parties for, under our procedural rules, service of summons in the
persons of the defendants is generally preferred over substituted
service. 37 Resort to the latter is permitted when the summons cannot be
promptly served on the defendant in person and after stringent formal and
substantive requirements have been complied with. 38 The failure to comply
faithfully, strictly and fully with all the requirements of substituted service
renders the service of summons ineffective. 39
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals 40 painstakingly elucidated the
requirements of the Rules as follows:
We can break down this section into the following requirements
to effect a valid substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show
that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of
prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the
sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the
defendant in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned.
"Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessary under
the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do,
conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done,
having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the
other party." Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set
period. However, when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the
sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter submits the
return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The
plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of summons
has failed. What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a
personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt
service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven
(7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a
plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days
because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of
court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned
to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff's Return provides data to the Clerk
of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be
submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten
(10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the
issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with regard
to personal service on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of
summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness
and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of
justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish
personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant
is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff
must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the
process on the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be
available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally
serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service.
"Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least
two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts
were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be
confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts
and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The
efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure
must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of
the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the
defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or
house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the
summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify
substituted service. The form on Sheriff's Return of Summons on
Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published
by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts
made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure. Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires
that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the
efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such
efforts," which should be made in the proof of service. SaCIDT
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
LEONEN, J : p
A person who is not a party in the main action cannot be the subject of
the ancillary writ of preliminary injunction. These consolidated petitions arose
out of a pending case between Sunrise Garden Corporation and Hardrock
Aggregates, Inc. First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was not a party
to that case. IDaEHC
Sunrise Garden Corporation points out that First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. still failed to attach a certified true copy of its alleged titles
to the properties affected by the city road project. 116 Sunrise Garden
Corporation also manifests that the alleged properties of First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc. will not be affected by the city road project based on
an alleged study conducted by the Antipolo City Planning and Development
Office. 117
Further, Sunrise Garden Corporation and Republic of the Philippines
argue that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it issued
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction because the Writ violated Presidential
Decree No. 1818. 118
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818 provides:
Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an
infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural
resource development project of the government, or any public utility
operated by the government, including among others public utilities for
the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre
contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or governmental
official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or
implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public
utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution,
implementation or operation.
Sunrise Garden Corporation and Republic of the Philippines 119 posit
that the term "infrastructure project" includes the construction of
roads. 120 Also, the construction of the city road is a capital investment on the
part of government because payment to Sunrise Garden Corporation shall be
through tax credits. 121
Republic of the Philippines adds that Presidential Decree No. 1818 is
applicable because it does not distinguish between local government projects
and national government projects. 122 Further, the city road project is intended
to benefit not only the residents of several barangay that it will traverse, but
also the students of the barangay school. 123 Once the city road project is
completed, the travel time of the students will be lessened from two hours to
just 30 minutes. 124
Sunrise Garden Corporation admits that the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was not issued against First Alliance Real Estate Development,
Inc. 125 Nevertheless, the nullification of the trial court's Orders effectively
hampered the city road project. 126 The argument of First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. that "its property is being taken without just
compensation" 127 proves that the injury to First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. is quantifiable.
Sunrise Garden Corporation and Republic of the Philippines argue that
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction did not state the law and facts on which it
was based.128 The Court of Appeals did not state what clear legal right was
being protected. 129 It merely stated that "private respondents are threatening
to bulldoze the property subject matter of [the] litigation." 130
As to the alleged "gentlemen's agreement" stated in the Order of the
Court of Appeals, Sunrise Garden Corporation points out that as per the
transcript of stenographic notes, the "gentlemen's agreement" was merely a
suggestion of the court, but the parties themselves never came to an
agreement. 131
Sunrise Garden Corporation and Republic of the Philippines argue that
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was not denied due process
when the trial court issued the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction
because it was afforded several opportunities to be heard. 132
Republic of the Philippines acknowledges that the complaint for
damages filed by Sunrise Garden Corporation was only against Hardrock
Aggregates, Inc. because it was the entity that initially blocked the movement
of the construction equipment of Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor.
However, First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was given several
opportunities to air its side. The first opportunity was the meeting scheduled
on October 8, 2002 between First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.,
and Sunrise Garden Corporation. However, First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. did not appear despite being the requesting party. 133 TaDCEc
Further, First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was duly notified
when it allegedly received a copy of Sunrise Garden Corporation's Motion to
cite for contempt and filed an Opposition to the Motion. 134 Sunrise Garden
Corporation points out that First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.
appeared in court to argue why it should not be cited in contempt. 135
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was given another chance
to be heard when it filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 6, 2003
before the trial court. 136 Thus, First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.
cannot claim that it was denied due process. 137
In any case, Republic of the Philippines argues that the issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction does not require a trial-type hearing under Rule
58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. 138
Sunrise Garden Corporation argues that the trial court had jurisdiction
to issue the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction and enforce it against
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. 139 Assuming that the trial court
did not have jurisdiction over the person of First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc., this was cured when the latter voluntarily appeared in
court. 140 First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. even filed pleadings
such as an Opposition and a Motion for Reconsideration. 141 Other than filing
pleadings, First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. argued that its
properties will be affected by the city road project. 142This issue was then
submitted for resolution before the trial court. 143
Sunrise Garden Corporation further argues that First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc. had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, which
was to present its title to the property. 144
On the other hand, First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.
counters that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person as it
was not impleaded as a party-litigant in the Complaint for damages filed by
Sunrise Garden Corporation against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. 145 Sunrise
Garden Corporation does not deny that First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. was not included in the Complaint. 146
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was not involved in the
Complaint for damages before the trial court. 147 Nonetheless, Sunrise
Garden Corporation sought to enforce the Amended Writ of Injunction against
it even though the Amended Writ was addressed to Hardrock Aggregates,
Inc. 148 First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. alleges that it has no
business relations with Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. 149 Thus, the Amended Writ
of Preliminary Injunction is not binding on First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc., and it cannot be held in contempt. 150
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. argues that the Amended
Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated May 22, 2002 was void as to First Alliance
Real Estate Development, Inc. since it was never notified of the
hearing. 151 Further, to implement the Amended Writ against First Alliance
Real Estate Development, Inc. was equivalent to deprivation of property
without due process. 152 First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., or its
properties, was not involved in Civil Case No. 02-6396 and yet Sunrise
Garden insists on including First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.'s
properties in the city road project. 153
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. argues that the Amended
Writ of Preliminary Injunction will allow Sunrise Garden Corporation to take
possession and control of First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.'s
property without due process of law. 154 First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. cites Buayan Cattle Co., Inc. v. Hon. Quintillan, etc., et
al. 155 where this court held that "[i]njunctions are not available to take
property out of the possession or control of one party and place it into that of
another whose title was not clearly, been [sic] established." 156
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. claims that the
construction of the city road has the effect of appropriating and taking First
Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.'s private property for public
use. 157 First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. questions the lack of
authority of Sunrise Garden Corporation to take the property considering that
the Office of the Solicitor General admitted before the Court of Appeals that
there was no expropriation ordinance, as follows: 158 cDEHIC
J. Sabio:
. . . could you show this Court an Ordinance authorizing the
expropriation of that property? . . .
Sol. Saludares:
There is no expropriation Ordinance.
J. Sabio:
How can you enter a property without any authority,[sic] it [sic] is basic
that you can enter the property only upon a Court Order.
xxx xxx xxx
Sol. Saludares:
We have here a copy of the Ordinance, your honor.
J. Sabio:
What does it say?
Sol. Saludares:
An Ordinance creating a technical committee to conduct . . .
J. Sabio:
That is not expropriation. I have read that. That is not
expropriation. 159 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Further, the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
issued by the Court of Appeals is not violative of Presidential Decree No.
1818. 160 First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. argues that the cases
relied upon by Sunrise Garden Corporation and Republic of the
Philippines, Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgos161 and Republic v. Silerio, 162 are not
applicable because in these cases, biddings were conducted. 163 No bidding
was conducted for the city road project as shown by Sunrise Garden
Corporation's admission that it had an agreement with the City Government of
Antipolo. 164 "There was no bidding conducted and the agreement between
the Petitioner [Sunrise Garden Corporation] and the City Government of
Antipolo City relative to [the] construction of the access road and payment by
way of tax credit can still be questioned, for being illegal." 165
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. also alleges that Sunrise
Garden Corporation disregarded the Court of Appeals' advice or their
"gentlemen's agreement" to maintain the status quo when Sunrise Garden
Corporation sought an Order from the trial court to enforce the Amended Writ
of Injunction. 166
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. also questions the
standing of Republic of the Philippines and the City Government of Antipolo
because they were not impleaded as parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 75758 and
Civil Case No. 02-6396. 167 Since they were not parties during the
proceedings in the lower courts, they were not affected by the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. 168
Also, the Petitions filed by Republic of the Philippines through the Office
of the Solicitor General and before this court do not indicate the authority of
the City Government of Antipolo to "represent the Republic" 169 and sign the
certification of non-forum shopping. 170
With regard to Republic of the Philippines' claim that a second Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was issued by the Court of Appeals on August 13,
2003, First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. explains that this alleged
second Writ of Preliminary Injunction was actually the Writ issued by the Court
of Appeals in its Resolution dated June 20, 2003. 171 It is not a second Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
On the arguments raised by First Alliance Real Estate Development,
Inc., Republic of the Philippines counters that First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. cannot claim denial of due process due to the lack of
expropriation proceeding. 172
Republic of the Philippines argues that expropriation and eminent
domain are different, citing Section 19 173 of Republic Act No.
7160. 174 Republic of the Philippines explained that if compensation for the
property is accepted, then there is no need for an expropriation
proceeding. 175 In addition, First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. is not
an affected landowner. 176 ISCDEA
J. SABIO:
That is not the issue where he has to defend his title. Because his title is
not the one, the subject matter of the case in the court below.
ATTY. GALIT:
Your Honor, guided by the Supreme Court decision, a mere photocopy,
a mere xerox copy of any public document, alleged public
documents cannot be said to be a basis of any right. This is a
mere xerox copy to be treated as a mere scrap of paper.
J. SABIO:
Then you challenge it in a proper forum[,] not this forum. That is not the
issue here. That is beyond us to decide. The issue is whether he
[sic] injunction issued by the lower court should be enforced
[against] petitioner who is not a party to the case.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. GALIT:
To be clear, Your Honor, and with all due respect to this Honorable
Court. We take a parallel stand and we absolutely submit to the
pronouncement of this Honorable Court that a party who is not a
party litigant in the case below will never be affected by any
issuance of an injunction. That is precisely correct and we do not
dispute that, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. SAAVEDRA [co-counsel for petitioner Sunrise Garden
Corporation]:
As a matter of fact insofar as we are concerned, Your Honor, whether
the lower court has jurisdiction over their person because they
were not impleaded is immaterial. Because they are in the nature
or category of strangers who refused to obey the writ of injunction
which was addressed to the squatters. Since they have no right to
be protected, they have not shown that they own any portion of
the land to be traversed what right do they have to be protected
for.
J. SABIO:
Again let us not go back to that issue so that we will not be misled, we
do not becloud the real issue. The issue here is basic and
fundamental. Whether petitioner [w]ho has not been a party to the
case because he has not been impleaded can be cited for
contempt for refusal to obey or comply with the amended writ of
preliminary injunction? That is all. 210
Petitioner Sunrise Garden Corporation additionally argues that the trial
court acquired jurisdiction because respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. voluntarily appeared in court to argue why it should not be
cited in contempt. 211
While Rule 14, Section 20 212 of the Rules of Court provides that
voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons, the same rule also
provides that "[t]he inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed
a voluntary appearance." 213
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy Hong Pi, et
al., 214 this court discussed that voluntary appearance in court may not always
result in submission to the jurisdiction of a court.
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is
acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over
his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general
proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that
we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit
answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to
challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot
be considered to have submitted to its authority. CaSAcH