Emmanuel Pelaez vs Auditor General

15 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require…
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general
from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which
provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of
Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the
President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He
further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to
the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of
the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate
has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would mean that
the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace the
standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may
require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only
the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of
municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative (not executive).
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Executive Secretary
Bills Must Originate EXCLUSIVELY from the House of Representatives; Undue Delegation of Legislative Power; Equal Protection
Clause
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
CESAR PURISIMA; and HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., Respondent.
Facts:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9337: AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS 27, 28, 34, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 119,
121, 148, 151, 236, 237 AND 288 OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions
contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate
to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of
value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix
the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied
on the sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption
delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually
imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the
conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made
by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation
of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such
that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
Issues:
Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the
Constitution.
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the
Constitution.
Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Discussions:
Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to
“originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but Senate has the power not only to propose amendments, but also
to propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House. the
Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public
debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as
they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems.
On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the
judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.”
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PDEA, G.R. NO. 157870
FACTS:
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses. In December
2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a
senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it,
he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the
1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486. According to Pimentel, the
Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of
the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial
aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or
COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is
the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. The provision “ [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test ” is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications.
COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified
voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines
for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.
SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
SECTION 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
SECTION 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
SECTION 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to
fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
SECTION 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a
full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict
of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any
office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
SECTION 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session,
unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine
until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
The President may call a special session at any time.
SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority
vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to
day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may
provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts
as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-
fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than
three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in
the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission
shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
SECTION 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days
after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the
Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its
Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
SECTION 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in
accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an
itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall
not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately,
shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments.
SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation
of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be
prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to
some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving
appropriations for other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds
actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be
supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the
ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall
remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If
he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with
the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas
or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system
of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries,
and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress.
SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any,
shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
SECTION 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.
SECTION 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or
part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at
least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.

People's Initiative (or "PI") is a common appellative in the Philippines that refers to either a mode for constitutional
amendment provided by the 1987 Philippine Constitution or to the act of pushing an initiative (national or local)
allowed by the Philippine Initiative and Referendum Act of 1987.

Republic Act No. 6735 August 4, 1989

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

I. — General Provisions

Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."

Section 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose.
 There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;

a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local
legislative body for action.

(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the
purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof,
passed by Congress; and

c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance
enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.

(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.

(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the
people.

(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of signatories. It shall be
in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the
Commission.

(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.

(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang
Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.

(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the
case may be.

Section 4. Who may exercise. — The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the
country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.

Section 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the
total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total
number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5)
years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;

c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition.

(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of an
autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per
centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is
 composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a
city should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.

(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the
petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which
every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.

(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed by at least
ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.

Section 6. Special Registration. — The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at least three (3)
weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.

Section 7. Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list
of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

II. — National Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of
initiative or referendum.

Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of
the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set
the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days
from the determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.

Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. — (a) The Proposition of the enactment, approval,
amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the
registered voters of the Philippines.

If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the national law
proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of
its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by
the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said
national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the
completion of publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full
force and effect.

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the
purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission.

Section 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and

(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the
Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.

Section 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for
indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of
the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.

The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative measure before the
House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative measures
on the committee.

Section 12. Appeal. — The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for
initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.

III. — Local Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. — (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters in case of
autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities,
and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively,
proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.

(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its presentation, the
proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving
notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned.

(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local Government or his
designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition.

(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.

(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case
of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from
notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures.

(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative, in the presence of a
representative of the proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies
concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case may be. Signature
stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted.

(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its office in the local
government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained.
Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition.

(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for the initiative at
which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their
approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g)
hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in
case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set,
after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.

Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. — If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, it shall
take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the
local legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered
defeated.

Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. — (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a
year.

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies
to enact.

(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented,
the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the
manner herein provided.

Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. — Any proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through
the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local
legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by
the local legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided,
however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.

Section 17. Local Referendum. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local legislative body may
submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval or
rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved.

Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days in case of
provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.

The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.

Section 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and
void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local
legislative body to enact the said measure.

IV. — Final Provisions

SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. — The Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.
Section 20. Rules and Regulations. — The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

Section 21. Appropriations. — The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of this Act shall be
charged against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may
be necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 22. Separability Clause. — If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or
provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.

Section 23. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.

Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board

NOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R. No. 158633) and Pimentel vs COMELEC (G.R.
No. 161658)

In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.

In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated
December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to
those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No.
6486.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for,
elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision
in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.

HELD: No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution
is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of
their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test” is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in
the Constitution.

Dual Citizenship or Dual Allegiance [ Cordora vs. COMELEC, et al. (G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009)]
Jus sanguinis is a principle of nationality law by which citizenship is not determined by place of birth but by having one or both
parents who are citizens of the state.
Jus soli meaning "right of the soil", commonly referred to as birthright citizenship, is the right of anyone born in the territory of
a state to nationality or citizenship.
Since it is election time, we are hearing a lot of cases being filed to seek the disqualification of certain candidates from seeking
elective posts. Most notable is the case for disqualification of Vivien Tan, daughter of Lucio Tan, from seeking the
congressional seat for a Quezon City district.
But what is really the basis for disqualification? Is it dual citizenship or dual allegiance?
In Cordora vs. COMELEC, et al. (G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009) , the Supreme Court explained -
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis* is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli.** Such a person, automatically and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states.
Given the provisions on citizenship under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of
the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are
citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of
another state.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty
to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition – his active
participation in the naturalization process.
Under Republic Act No. 9225,*** a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his
Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of
allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship.
Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for elective position. Like any other natural-born Filipino, it is
enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the Oath of
Allegiance contained therein. On the other hand, a person with dual allegiance who seeks public office must (apart from
meeting the qualifications under Philippine law) swear to an Oath of Allegiance and execute a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225.
* A child’s citizenship is determined by its parents’ citizenship, as in the Philippines.
** A child’s citizenship is determined by its place of birth, as in the United States of America.
*** The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.

Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary

Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary

December 8, 1994

Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the constitution. First, it violates
the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of
congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of
the Constitution, which provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts
increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI
also provides that within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to
any census showing that the minimum population requirement was attained.

Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?

Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regard to the first contention of one subject
one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its
conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject"
rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the provision of the section
itself shows that the 250T limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and
San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative
districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed
through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum
requirements for the establishment of separate legislative district. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010 Perez, J.

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing
first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law
by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative
district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando
were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards that
requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in
a province.

HELD:
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a
province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the
population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

Mariano vs COMELEC GR No 118577 07 March 1995

Facts: Juanito Mariano, resident of Makati filed a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, assailing unconstitutional
sections in RA 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati”). Petitioners contend that (1) Section 2 Article I of RA 7854 failed to delineate the land areas of Makati by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions, (2) Section 51 Article X of RA 7854 collides with Section 8 Article X and Section 7 Article VI
of the Constitution, that the new corporate existence of the new city will restart the term of the present municipal elective
making it favourable to incumbent Mayor Jejomar Binay, and (3) Section 52 Article X of RA 7854 for adding a legislative district
is unconstitutional and cannot be made by special law.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional.

Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously
covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In
language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city’s land area “shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality.”

The Court cannot entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 51. The requirements before a litigant can
challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet
to ripen to an actual case or controversy.

In Tobias vs Abalos, Court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city.

Abayon V. HRET, Palparan V. HRET

FACTS:

In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat
in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent
HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative.

It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All
questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
In G.R.
189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007
elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in
the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs),
former rebels, and security guards.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not
he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s
nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question
must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

HELD:

although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a
member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that
House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other
things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are
“elected members” of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to
hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of
the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House
of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins.10

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

Case Digest: Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 203766 : April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse
various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The
Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these
party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not
come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly
representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.

Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations; andsecond, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down inAng Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections(BANAT) should be applied by
the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the
Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases.

Political Law- Party-list system

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list system is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-
list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to
constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political
parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized
sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-list system prescribed in the
Constitution.

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a sectoral partyor a coalition of parties." Clearly, a
political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a"political partyrefers to
anorganized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government."On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral partyrefers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereofwhose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector."R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously,
they are separate and distinct from each other.

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A
political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement
in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance
principles and policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens.

Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria:
(1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may
have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and
do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."

Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may
have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified
because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees
failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee.

In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere
to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The
sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those
who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic
or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-
write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

BANAT vs COMELEC GR No 179271 21 April 2009

Facts: The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900
votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. BANAT filed petition as quoting the COMELEC of using the Panganiban
formula used in Veterans case in allocating party-list seats. BANAT contend that Article 6 Section 5 should be followed and that
20%of party-list representatives shall be proclaimed. COMELEC denied said petition. BANAT filed mandamus for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Article 6 Section 5 (2) of the Constitution
mandatory?

Decision: Petition has partial merit. The party-list election has four inviolable parameters stated in Veterans. First, the twenty
percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list; Second, the two percent threshold
only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to
have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats; Fourth,
proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their
total number of votes.
Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
Agapito A. Aquino, Petitioner

Commission on Elections, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon and JuanitoIcaro, Respondents

Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.:

The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved. In any challenge
having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding
solutions which would give effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by
those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a winning candidate's
qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the
apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions.

FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati
City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less
than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI
of the Constitution.
HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove
that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that
time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion,
Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record
up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying
one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City, it does notengender the kind of
permanency required to prove abandonment of one’soriginal domicile.
Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makatiis a bare assertion which is hardly supported by
the facts. To successfully effecta change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actualchange of domicile; a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond withthe purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of originshould be deemed to continue.
Pundaodaya –versus- Comelec & Noble, G.R.179313, Sept.

17, 2009 Facts: Petitioner ran against Noble for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.
Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification against Noble alleging that the latter lacks the residency qualification.
Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Noble averred that he is a registered voter and
resident of Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. In a resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled and
disqualified Noble from running as mayor. Noble filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. In the meantime, he
garnered the highest number of votes and was proclaimed the winning candidate. Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent Motion to
Annul Proclamation. The COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision of the Second Division and declared Noble qualified to run
for the mayoralty position. Pundaodaya filed the instant petition for certiorari. Issue: Should “residence” and “domicile” be
construed as referring to “dwelling”? Did Noble effectively change his domicile? Held: The Court found that Noble failed to
convince that he successfully effected a change of domicile. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the
place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also
a declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode. In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it
was held that the term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or
“habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi).” De Guzman –versus- Comelec, G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009 Facts: Petitioner and private respondent
Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the 2007 elections. Private respondent filed
a petition for disqualification alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner admitted that he was a
naturalized American. However, he applied for dual citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003) and subsequently took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. As such, he is qualified to run as
vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Private respondent won as vice-mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest on grounds of
irregularities and massive cheating. The COMELEC First Division rendered its resolution disqualifying petitioner. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration but it was dismissed on by the COMELEC En Banc. Petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Does the filing of a certificate of candidacy ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No.
9225?
Held: The court ruled that the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements. Thus, in Japzon v. COMELEC, the Court
held that Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 requires the twin requirements, “he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.” Cordova –versus- Comelec, G.R. No. 176947,
Feb. 12, 2009 Facts: Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked
the required citizenship and residency requirements. Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any
misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. Cordora claimed that he is not a natural-born Filipino, that he was born of a
Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. He also took an
oath of allegiance pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003). Cordora claims that the
number of years of residency stated in Tambunting’s certificates of candidacy is false because he lost his residency because of
his naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting contended that the residency requirement is not the same as citizenship.
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Tambunting and the COMELEC En Banc
affirmed the findings and the resolution. Issue: Did Tambunting fulfill the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by
law? Held: The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc. Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed
to meet the residency requirement because of Tambunting’s naturalization as an American. Cordora’s reasoning fails because
Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of
election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently,
and is not dependent upon citizenship.
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a
motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions
and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of
popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and
rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of
the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is
not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to
his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
POBRE vs.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
(A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009)
PETITIONER
Petitioner Antero Pobre made aware to the court the contents of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the
senate floor. The following excerpts are the ones in question: x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts
in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would
rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. According to Pobre, the words of the lady
senator were disrespectful and requested that the latter be disbarred or be subjected to disciplinary action. RESPONDENT
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago argued that the statements she made were covered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its
committee. She claims to have made those comments to expose anomalies with regard to the selection process of the Judicial
Bar Council for the next Chief Justice.
The argument of the respondent is based on Article VI Section 11 which states that: "A Senator or Member of the
House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof."
ISSUE : WON Miriam Defensor-Santiago can be charged for her comments on the Judiciary
SUPREME COURT: NO. The court ruled in favor of Defensor-Santiago in this case. The plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal
of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or
in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. Despite this, the court feels that the lady senator has gone beyond the
limits of decency and good conduct for the statements made which were intemperate and highly improper in substance. The
court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on her, but the factual and legal circumstances of this case,
however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Petition is DISMISSED
Vinzons-Chato v.

Comelec

Facts: Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the HOR, hence, Comelec ruled
that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato’s election protest against Unico regarding canvassing of returns and
alleged invalidity of Unico’s proclamation. He then filed a special civil action for certiorari in the SC.
Issue: WON the court should take cognizance of Chato’s election protest. If not, to who is this issue best addressed to?
WON his civil action for certiorari will prosper.
Held: The court should not take cognizance of Chato’s election protest for it would amount to usurpation of the
constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET. Civil action for certiorari will not prosper. Ratio: - In an electoral contest
where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as
Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. Reason: it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of
jurisdiction between constitutional bodies with due regard to the people’s mandate. - Special civil action for certiorari shall
prosper if the following requisites concur: o Tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction o There is no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul or modify the proceeding. - In this case,
COMELEC did not commit rave abuse of discretion when it issued a resolution holding that it had lost jurisdiction upon Unico’s
proclamation. It demonstrated fealty to the constitutional fiat regarding HRET.