THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS FACTS: In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J.

Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list

organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo
warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the
House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. It was Aangat
Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her
eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo. In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is
the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of
Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list
nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims
of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Petitioner Palparan
countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to
and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any
question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before
that party-list group, not before the HRET. ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan. HELD:
although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a
member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied) Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out
above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the
HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party
or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of
the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s
own jurisdiction begins.The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for
quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima

G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

FACTS:

1. This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act
of 2005). RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status

2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards.
Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation
of powers, for it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

ISSUE:
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional

HELD:

No. It is unconstitutional.

In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to
enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-
enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine
whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of
legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. The power of
oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government.

With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes
an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of
powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch. However, to forestall the danger of congressional
encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not
vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power,
it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution including the
procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited
to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1)

scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to
ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and
its power of confirmation and

(2)

investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in
this class. Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or
"power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional
oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the
design or structure

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND
SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL
REFORMS G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008 VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x G.R. No.
179275 December 23, 2008 SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners, vs. THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - x MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.,
BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
 Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During the 2007 election the conversation of President
Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire of the president to have a
favourable outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was played during the house of
representative investigation. Because of such turn of events, a petition was filed before the court praying that such playing of the
illegally seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping law. Also such petition for injunction prays that
the Senate committee be prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic reason that there was no proper
publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make such investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.

Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to further proceed with their
investigation?

Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following: The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The
requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.Publication is indeed imperative, for
it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. The Court does not agree. The absence
of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI
of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules
have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or
tradition followed by the Senate. The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792
considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for
evidentiary purposes.In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of
electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations. Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the
Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure." Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for the
reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such
inquiry if allowed without observance of the required publication will put a person’s life, liberty and property at stake without due
process of law. Also, the further assertion of the senate that they already published such rules through their web page, in
observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the court as matter of evidence and still does not
conforme with what the constitution propounded. In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the
senate to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Petition for Certiorari assailing the Show Cause Letter (Nov. 22, 2007) and Contempt Order (Jan. 30, 2008) issued by respondent
Senate Committee against petitioner Neri (formerDirector General of NEDA)April 21, 2007 – DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE
for the supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project amounting to P16 Billion. The project was to be financed by the
People’s Republic of China Petitioner was summoned by respondents to appear and testify in the investigation on the NBN Project
on a number of dates, however, he attended only on the Sept. 26 hearing. Sept. 18, 2007 – businessman Jose de Venecia III testified
that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the Project initially
approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer project, but on March 29, 2007, NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-
government project to be financed through a loan from the Chinese government. Sept. 26, 2007 – petitioner testified before
respondent Committees for 11 hours. He disclosed that COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange
for his approval of the project, and he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt. When probed further on what they
discussed, petitioner refused to answer 3 questions, invoking “executive privilege”:

- WON President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project

- WON she directed him to prioritize it

- WON she directed him to approve Respondents issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum, requiring petitioner to appear and testify on
Nov. 20, 2007. However, a Letter (Nov. 15, 2007) by Executive Secretary Ermita requested respondents to dispense with petitioner’s
testimony on the ground of “executive privilege” that covers above questions, maintaining that the confidentiality of conversations
of the President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and policy decision making process and for the protection of the public
interest – disclosure of information might impair our diplomatic and economic relations with China. Nov. 22, 2007 – respondents
issued the Show Cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. On Nov. 29, petitioner replied that it
was not his intention to ignore the hearing and he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by
executive privilege. He further requested to be furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarify. In a letter by his counsel, it
was stated that it was upon the order of the President that he did not appear, and that the conversation with the president dealt
with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal. Jan. 30, 2008 –
respondents found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory, and without responding to his reply, issued the Order citing him in
contempt and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At- Arms until he gives his testimony. The
parties were directed to manifest to the Court if they were amenable to the Court’s proposal of allowing petitioner to immediately
resume his testimony before the respondents to answer other questions without prejudice to the decisions on the merits of this
petition Senate disagreed. OSG – Motion for Leave to Intervene: - Communications between petitioner and President are covered
by the executive privilege. - Petitioner was not summoned by respondent in accordance with the power to inquiries in aid of
legislation as laid down in Sec. 21, Art. 6, Constitution and Senate v. Ermita March 6, 2008 – President Arroyo issued Memorandum
Ciruclar No. 151, revoking EO 464 and Memorandum Circular N. 108, advising officials and employees to abide by the Consitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence (Senate v. Ermita) when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation. *Sec. 21, Art. 6 of
Constitution – Legislative powers of Congress – relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation – aim is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation – can compel the appearance of executive officials *Sec. 22, Art. 6 of Constitution –
Oversight powers of Congress – relates to the power to conduct a question hour – to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
oversight function – cannot compel the appearance of executive officials *Principle of Separation of Powers - executive branch
cannot frustrate power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands of information - power of judicial review is
available – right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is susceptible to abuse subject to certiorari (Sec. 1, Art. 8,
Constitution)

Issues and Ratio:

1. WON the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered by Executive Privilege. (YES. 2 reasons) *Power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation – broad – legislative cannot legislate wisely/effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect/change compulsory process to enforce it – limitations – validity: done in
accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and the rights of persons appearing/affected be respected.
Such power extends to executive officials and exemption can only be through a valid claim of executive privilege. a. There is a
recognized claim of executive privilege despite revocation of EO 464. Concept of executive privilege has constitutional
underpinnings. US v. Nixon – public interest: preserve confidentiality of conversations that take place in the President’s performance
of his official duties (presidential communications privilege) – President’s generalized interest in confidentiality – provide him and
those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions. In Re: Sealed Case
– 2 kinds of executive privilege: (1) Presidential communications privilege – communications, documents or other materials that
reflect presidential decisionmaking and deliberations which President believes should remain confidential – decision making of the
President (separation of powers) (2) Deliberative process privilege – advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated – decision-making of the Executive
Officials (common law privilege). The officials covered by the former are those functions that form the core of presidential authority
that are “quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power” (commander in chief power, appointment/removal power, power to
grant pardons/reprieves, etc) Courts ruled that Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal military/state secrets,
identity of government informers, information related to pending information and foreign relations. Chavez v. PCGG – secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters. Chavez v. PEA – Presidential conversations, correspondences in closed-
door Cabinet meetings SC: Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the 3 questions fall under the conversation and correspondence between the President and public
officials necessary in her executive and policy decisionmaking process – disclosure might impair diplomatic & economic relations
with People’s Republic of China (Presidential Communications Privilege and Executive Privilege on matters r elating to Diplomacy or
Foreign Relations) - communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power (enter into an executive agreement w/
other countries w/o concurrence w/ Legislature) - communications are received by a close advisor of the President (operational
proximity test – petitioner is a member of the cabinet) - no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation
of the privilege. No categorical explanation from respondents to show a compelling need for the answers to the questions, and veer
more towards exercise of legislative oversight function (Sec. 22, Art. 6) Respondents: a claim of executive privilege does not guard
against a possible disclosure of a crime/wrongdoing (US v Nixon – specific need for evidence in pending criminal tr ial outweighs
President’s interest in confidentiality) SC: information in this case is elicited not in a criminal proceeding but a legislative inquiry. The
validity of exectuve privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but also on the procedural setting/context which the claim is
made. Respondent: the grant of executive privilege violates constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern (Sec. 7, Art. 3, Constitution) SC: Petitioner made himself available to them during the Sept. 26 hearing,
questioned for 11 hours, and expressly manifested willingness to answer more questions except the 3 covered by executive
privilege. People’s right to information is limited by law (RA 6713, Sec. 7; RPC, Art. 229; RA 3019, Sec. 3(k); and Rules of Court, Rule
130, Sec. 24 (e)). The information in this case is classified as confidential wherein there is public interest in its confidentiality. Not
every legislative inquiry is an exercise of people’s right to information. b. The claim of executive privilege is properly invoked. The
letter (Nov. 17, 2007) of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement for a formal claim of executive privilege (a precise and
certain reason for preserving confidentiality). It serves as the formal claim of privilege: “this Office is constrained to invoke the
settled doctrine of executive privilege (Secretary v. Ermita), and the Office of the President has advised Sec. Neri accordingly… The
information if disclosed might impair diplomatic and economic relations with People’s Republic of China.” The grounds were specific
enough so as not to leave respondent in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. Congress must
not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of information which the
privilege sought to protect – respect to a co-equal department.

2. WON respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Contempt Order. YES. 5 reasons: - There was a
legitimate claim of executive privilege therefore the Order suffers from constitutional infirmity - Committees did not comply with
the requirement (Senate v. Ermita) that the invitations should contain the “possible needed statute which prompted the inquiry”,
“the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof”. Compliance is imperative,
both under Sec. 21 and 22 of Art. 6 of Constitution, to ensure rights of persons appearing and affected by the inquiry are respected. -
It is revealed in the transcript that the proceeding on Jan. 30, 2008 had only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee present during the deliberation (7 only). Sec. 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
provides that a vote of majority of its members may punish any witness for contempt. Members who did not actually participate in
the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order, and its validity is doubted. Sen. Pimentel insisted that the quorum of the
committee was only 2 and that the will of the lead committee prevails over all the other. - The Court finds merit in the argument of
the OSG that respondent violated Sec. 21, Art. 6 of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the “duly
published rules of procedure”, which the respondents failed to meet therefore its hearings were procedurally infirm. - Respondents’
issuance of the contempt Order were arbitrary and precipitate because it did not pass upon the claim of executive privilege and
inform the petitioner of their ruling, curtly dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order.
Petitioner was not an unwilling witness and manifested his willingness to testify. Respondents denied him due process of law. Court
was also accused of attempting to abandon its constitutional duty when it required parties to consider a proposal that would lead to
a possible compromise it was only to test a tool that other jurisdictions find to be effective in settling similar cases to avoid a
piecemeal consideration of the questions for review. Much of this spirit of compromise is reflected in the generality of language
foundi n the Constitution (US v. American Tel. & Tel Co.). Judgment: Petition Granted. Contempt Order Nullified. Dissent: Puno, J. -
The principle of separation of powers is not absolute –a hermetic sealing off of the 3 branches of government from one another
would preclude the establishment of a nation capable of governing itself effectively. - System of checks and balances – the power of
congressional oversight – to enhance its understanding of and influence over implementation of legislation it has enacted
review/investigation of executive branch action by legislature’s corollary power of investigation. Standard justification: presumed
need for new/remedial legislation (investigations in aid of legislation) - Legislative power of investigation includes power of
contempt or process to enforce (Arnault v. Nazareno) – incidental to/implied in legislative function –cannot legislate
wisely/effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect/change - 2
requirements for the valid exercise of power of investigation and contempt of witness for contumacy: existence of a le gislative
purpose (in aid of legislation) and pertinency of the question propounded. - Validity of the claim of executive privilege depends on
the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. - Presidential communications are presumptively privileged. To
overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient showing/demonstration of specific need for the withheld information. 2
standards: evidentiary and constitutional. - Function Impairment Test – the Court weighs how the disclosure of the withheld
information would impair the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duties more than nondisclosure would impair other
branch’s ability to perform its constitutional functions. - The SC cannot assess the validity of the claim of the Executive Secretary
because paucity of explanation on on how diplomatic secrets will be exposed at the expense of our national interest if petitioner
answers disputed questions. SC cannot determine whether there is reasonable danger if petitioner answers – C ourt cannot engage
in guesswork. - It is self-evident that the assailed questions are pertinent to the subject matter of legislative investigation and have
direct relation to the subject and pending Senate bills. - Petitioner: respondents were seeking to establish the culpability of the
President or the anomalies in the NBN-ZTE Contract. SC: motive of the Senate Committees in conducting their investigation is
beyond the purview of the Court’s power of judicial review – questions are pertinent and there is no effective substitute for the
information sought. - Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation is assailed as invalid for failure to be
republished – not a continuing body – membership changes every 3 years (election) Senators have traditionally considered the
Senate as a continuing body despite the change of part of its membership after an election – does not cease its labor, Committees
continue their work. By tradition, custom and practice, the Senate does not republish its rules especially when the same has not
undergone any material change. Existing rules which have already undergone publication should be deemed adopted and continued
regardless of election of new members. Internal rules – respect for co-equal branch. - Respondent Senate Committees have good
reasons in citing Neri for contempt for failing to appear on Nov. 20 hearing. There is no basis for petitioner and Executive Secretary
to assume that petitioner’s further testimony will be limitedonly ton the 3 disputed questions.

In Re: Saturnino Bermudez (G.R. No. 76180 )

Immunity from Suits

Facts:

This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by the petitioner Bermudez seeking for the clarification of Sec. 5, Art. 18 of the proposed
1986 Constitution, as quoted:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1992.

Petitioner sought the aid of the Court to determine as to whom between the incumbent Pres. Aquino and VP Laurel and elected
Pres. Marcos and VP Tolentino the said provision refers to.

Issue: Whether the Court should entertain the petition for declaratory relief?

Held: It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.(Note: ROC provides that the
jurisdiction for petitions for declaratory relief is with the RTC )

More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C.
Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the
period of their incumbency and tenure.
It being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent
President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their
term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of election

Soliven v Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988) FACTS: Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged
for libel by the president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a
complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president
cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction
and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be
able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not the President, under
the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit? HELD: The
rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to
the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s
behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege
and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

WHEREFORE finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents,
the court resolved to DISMISS the petitions

Almonte vs Vasquez G.R. No. 93567, May 23 1995 Petitioners: Nerio Rogado, Chief Accountant; Elisa Rivera, Chief of the Records;
Jose T. Almonte, EIIB Commissioner; Villamor Perez, Budget and Fiscal Management Division Chief; Respondent: Honorable Conrado
M. Vasquez FACTS: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to
produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The
subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the
EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They
moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government. ISSUE: Whether or not an
Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide documents relating to personal service and
salary vouchers of EIIB employers. RULING: Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in
and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot
enforce his legal rights. In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of
records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering and

evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not
limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state secrets it may
be sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on other considerations.

Estrada v. Desierto; Arroyo Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001 [Immunity
from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy] FACTS: It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings
involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun
in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on
January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As
a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President
Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada. On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and
joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was
vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with
prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him
not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of
the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office. ISSUE(S): 1. WoN the petition presents a
justiciable controversy. 2. WoN Estrada resigned as President. 3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President. 4. WoN the President
enjoys immunity from suit.

5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity. RULING: 1. Political questions- "to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People
Power II:

EDSA I

EDSA II

exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.

exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which
only affected the office of the President.

extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review

intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President
are subject to judicial review.

presented a political question;

involves legal questions. The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental
powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve
the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left
the Palace. Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant issues—
President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation. SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could
not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement: 1. He
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President; 2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and
in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to
reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears); 3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity); 4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come in the same service of the country; 5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission
before, during and after January 20, 2001. 3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has
been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is
the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability. The Court
therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In
fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground
that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de
jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court. 4. The cases filed against Estrada are
criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death

penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing
the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
trespasser. 5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system
does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere
publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced
the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing
preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor
should be more concerned with justice and less with prose

118 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS

DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z.
OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT.
COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT
CALLAGAN,Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 193160

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR.
GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1ST LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE
E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN, Petitioners,

vs.

NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent. [G.R. No. 191805; April 16, 2013]

TOPIC: PONENTE: SERENO, CJ. AUTHOR: NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated
with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan
Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

2. Noriel was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership in the NPA.

3. After his released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection
Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres.
Arroyo, et al.

4. The CA granted the writs but dropped Pres. Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of
office or actual incumbency.

5. After a careful examination of the records, the SC was convinced that the Court of Appeals correctly found sufficient evidence
proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military abducted petitioner Rodriguez, and
detained and tortured him. Hence, the SC affirmed with modification the CA’s decision. The case was dismissed with respect to
respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George
Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vincent Callagan for lack of merit.

6. The SC directed the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to take the appropriate action
with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal competence, that may have been incur red by
respondents Gen. Victor lbrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st
Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ were ordered to submit to the Court the results of their
action within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.

7. Pursuant to the Decision ordering the Office of the Ombudsman to take further action, Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales sent
this Court a letter requesting an additional two-month period within which to submit a report. The Ombudsman stated that Noriel
Rodriguez and his family refused to cooperate with the investigation for security reasons.

8. Respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the soldiers belonging to the 17 th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry
Division of the military cannot be held accountable for authoring the abduction and torture of petitioner. Their arguments revolve
solely on the claim that respondents were never specifically mentioned by name as having performed, permitted, condoned,
authorized, or allowed the commission of any act or incurrence omission which would violate or threaten with violation the rights to
life, liberty, and security of petitioner-respondent and his family.

9. The Ombudsman submitted the Investigation Report, which detailed the steps taken by the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the
Office of the Ombudsman, concluding that no criminal, civil, or administrative liabilities may be imputed to the respondents. It was
reflected therein that the lawyers for the Rodriguezes had manifested to the FIO that the latter are hesitant to appear before them
for security reasons.

10. Karapatan (a non-governmental organization that provides legal assistance to victims of human rights violations and their
families) could not locate Noriel and Rodel. As of this writing, the Rodriguezes refused to participate in the present fact-finding
investigation ‘for security reasons.’ Recent information revealed that Noriel and his family are no longer interested in participating in
the present case.

11. Instead of appearing before the FIO for a conference under oath, SPO1 Robert B. Molina submitted an Affidavit stating that
Wilma H. Rodriguez appeared before the Gonzaga Police Station and requested to enter into the blotter that her son, Noriel, was
allegedly missing in Sitio Comunal, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Thereupon, he gathered information relative to Wilma’s report "but the
community residence failed to reveal anything".

12. The other accounts – specifically that of respondent Antonino C. Cruz, Special Investigator II of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR), as well as the claims of respondents Mina and De Vera that they had disclosed to the CHR that Noriel had become an agent
("asset") of the 17th Infantry Battalion – have been thoroughly evaluated and ruled upon in our Decision. The OMB further laments,
"If only he (Noriel) could be asked to verify the circumstances under which he executed these subsequent affidavits, his inconsistent
claims will finally be settled," and that "(I)f there is one person who can attest on whether detention and torture were indeed
committed by any of the Subjects herein, it is Noriel Rodriguez himself, the supposed victim."

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the CA erred when it granted the writ of amparo in favor of petitioner Noriel.

HELD: NO.RATIO:SC denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration. The purported unwillingness of the petitioner to appear or
participate at this stage of the proceedings due to security reasons does not affect the rationale of the writ granted by the CA, as
affirmed by this Court. In any case , the issue of the existence of criminal, civil, or administrative liability which may be imputed to
the respondents is not the province of amparo proceedings -- rather, the writ serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of
impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by
inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action. In this case then, the thrust of ensuring that investigations are conducted
and the rights to life, liberty, and security of the petitioner, remains. The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. It is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or even administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence. The totality of evidence as a standard for the grant of
the writ was correctly applied by the Court. No reversible error may be attributed to the grant of the privilege of the writ by the CA,
and the present motion for reconsideration raises no new issues that would convince us otherwise. Respondents’ claim that they
were not competently identified as the soldiers who abducted and detained the petitioner, or that there was no mention of their
names in the documentary evidence, is baseless. The CA rightly considered Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay as a meticulous and
straightforward account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and maltreated on
account of his suspected membership in the NPA. Petitioner narrated that at dawn on 9 September 2009, he noticed a soldier with
the name tag "Matutina," who appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as "sir." He saw Matutina again
at 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, when his abductors took him to a military operation in the mountains. His narration of his
suffering included an exhaustive description of his physical surroundings, personal circumstances, and perceived observations. He
likewise positively identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his abduction, detention and
torture. These facts were further corroborated by Hermie Antonio Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he recounted in detail
the circumstances surrounding the victim’s capture. Respondents’ main contention in their Return of the Writ was correctly deemed
illogical and contradictory by the CA. They claim that Rodriguez had complained of physical ailments due to activities in the CPP-NPA
yet nevertheless signified his desire to become a double-agent for the military. If petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and
desired to become an ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that he would agree to become an undercover agent and work alongside
soldiers in the mountains – or the wilderness he dreads – to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA comrades. Respondents
conveniently neglect to address the findings of both the CA and this Court that aside from the abduction of Rodriguez, respondents,
specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the former’s right to security when they made a visual recording of his
house, as well as the photos of his relatives. The CA found that the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the photos of
petitioner’s relatives hung on the wall of the house, and the innermost portions of the house. There is no reasonable justification for
this violation of the right to privacy and security of petitioner’s abode, which strikes at the very heart and rationale of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo. More importantly, respondents also neglect to address our ruling that the failure to conduct a fair and effective
investigation similarly amounted to a violation of, or threat to Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty, and security. The writ’s curative role
is an acknowledgment that the violation of the right to life, liberty, and security may be caused not only by a public official’s act, but
also by his omission. Accountability may attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and
not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. The CA found that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG Verzosa, LT. Gen. Bangit,
Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera, and Lt. Col. Mina conducted a perfunctory investigation which relied solely on the accounts of the
military. Thus, the CA correctly held that the investigation was superficial, one-sided, and depended entirely on the report prepared
by 1st Lt. Johnny Calub. No efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioner’s version of the incident, and no witnesses were qu estioned
regarding it. The CA also took into account the palpable lack of effort from respondent Versoza, as the chief of the Philippine
National Police. CASE LAW/

Neri vs Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers G.R.No. 180643, March 25 2008 [Executive Privilege] FACTS: The
Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos
offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by
executive privilege. RULING: The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege. It pertains
to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It
is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by
the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The information relating to these powers may
enjoy greater confidentiality than others. Elements of presidential communications privilege: 1) The protected communication must
relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. 2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

ARTICLE VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.

Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the
same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President.

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.

Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such
for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city,
shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the
Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest
number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the
following oath or affirmation:

“I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President [or Vice-President or Acting
President] of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself
to the service of the Nation. So help me God.” [In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted].
Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by law
and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument
from the Government or any other source.

Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.

If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and
qualified.

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the
Vice President-elect shall become President.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act
as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a
Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph.

Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting
President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same
restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.

Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President
shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office
upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and
Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a
special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the
time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this
Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall
be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of
this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall
be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.

Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all
the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress
shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance
with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the
powers and duties of his office.

Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The members of the
Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be
denied access to the President during such illness.

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within
ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress.

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing
to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within
thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on
applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which
would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.

Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.

Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of
the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed
revenue measures.

Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other
time.