The Unsustainable Presidency Clinton Bush Obama and Beyond PDF

The Evolving American Presidency Series
Series Foreword:
The American presidency touches virtually every aspect of American and world
politics. And the presidency has become, for better or worse, the vital center of the
American and global political systems. The framers of the American government
would be dismayed at such a result. As invented at the Philadelphia Constitutional
Convention in 1787, the presidency was to have been a part of the government with
shared and overlapping powers, embedded within a separation-of-powers system. If
there was a vital center, it was the Congress; the presidency was to be a part, but by
no means, the centerpiece of that system.
Over time, the presidency has evolved and grown in power, expectations, responsibili-
ties, and authority. Wars, crises, depressions, industrialization, all served to add to the
power of the presidency. And as the United States grew into a world power, presiden-
tial power also grew. As the United States became the world’s leading superpower, the
presidency rose in prominence and power, not only in the United States, but on the
world stage as well.
It is the clash between the presidency as created and the presidency as it has developed
that inspired this series. And it is the importance and power of the modern American
presidency that makes understanding the office so vital. Like it or not, the American
presidency stands at the vortex of power both within the United States and across the
globe.
This Palgrave series recognizes that the presidency is and has been an evolving institu-
tion, going from the original constitutional design as a chief clerk, to today where the
president is the center of the American political constellation. This has caused several
key dilemmas in our political system, not the least of which is that presidents face
high expectations with limited constitutional resources. This causes presidents to find
extraconstitutional means of governing. Thus, presidents must find ways to bridge
the expectations/power gap while operating within the confines of a separation-of-
powers system designed to limit presidential authority. How presidents resolve these
challenges and paradoxes is the central issue in modern governance. It is also the
central theme of this book series.
Michael A. Genovese
Loyola Chair of Leadership
Loyola Marymount University
Palgrave’s The Evolving American Presidency, Series Editor
The Second Term of George W. Bush

edited by Robert Maranto, Douglas M. Brattebo, and Tom Lansford
The Presidency and the Challenge of Democracy

edited by Michael A. Genovese and Lori Cox Han
Religion and the American Presidency

edited by Mark J. Rozell and Gleaves Whitney
Religion and the Bush Presidency

edited by Mark J. Rozell and Gleaves Whitney
Test by Fire: The War Presidency of George W. Bush
by Robert Swansbrough
American Royalty: The Bush and Clinton Families and the Danger to the American
Presidency
by Matthew T. Corrigan
Accidental Presidents: Death, Assassination, Resignation, and Democratic

Succession
by Philip Abbott
Presidential Power in Action: Implementing Supreme Court Detainee Decisions

by Darren A. Wheeler
President George W. Bush’s Influence over Bureaucracy and Policy: Extraordinary

Times, Extraordinary Powers
edited by Colin Provost and Paul Teske
Assessing George W. Bush’s Legacy: The Right Man?

edited by Iwan Morgan and Philip John Davies
Acting Presidents: 100 Years of Plays about the Presidency

by Bruce E. Altschuler
America Responds to Terrorism: Conflict Resolution Strategies of Clinton, Bush,

and Obama
by Karen A. Feste
Presidents in the Movies: American History and Politics on Screen

edited by Iwan W. Morgan
Watergate Remembered: The Legacy for American Politics

edited by Michael A. Genovese and Iwan W. Morgan
Clinton/Gore: Victory from a Shadow Box

by Jeffrey J. Volle
Bad Presidents: Failure in the White House

by Philip Abbott
The Unilateral Presidency and the News Media: The Politics of Framing Executive
Power
by Mark Major
Maligned Presidents of the Late 19th Century

by Max J. Skidmore
Pitiful Giants: Presidents in Their Final Terms

by Daniel P. Franklin
The Unsustainable Presidency: Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Beyond

by William F. Grover and Joseph G. Peschek
The Unsustainable Presidency
Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Beyond
William F. Grover and

Joseph G. Peschek
THE UNSUSTAINABLE PRESIDENCY
Copyright © William F. Grover and Joseph G. Peschek, 2014.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014 978-1-137-37181-2
All rights reserved.
Grover, William F.; Peschek, Joseph G., Voices of Dissent: Critical Readings in
American Politics, 3rd Edition, Copyright 1999, Pp. 164–169. Reprinted by
permission of Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ.
Grover, William F.; Peschek, Joseph G., Voices of Dissent: Critical Readings in
American Politics, 7th Edition, Copyright 2008, Pp. 244–245, 246–252.
Reprinted by permission of Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ.
First published in 2014 by
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Grover, William F., 1956–
The unsustainable presidency : Clinton, Bush, Obama, and
beyond / by William F. Grover, Joseph G. Peschek.
pages cm.—(The evolving American presidency series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Presidents—United States. 2. Executive power—United States.

3. Political leadership—United States. 4. United States—Economic policy.
5. National security—United States. 6. Clinton, Bill, 1946–
7. Bush, George W. (George Walker), 1946– 8. Obama, Barack.
9. United States—Politics and government—1993–2001.
10. United States—Politics and government—2001–2009.
11. United States—Politics and government—2009–
I. Peschek, Joseph G. II. Title.
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Contents
Preface vii
One Theories of the American Presidency 1
Two Beyond Institutions-as-Structure: A Deeper

Structural Perspective 15
Three Bill Clinton and the Neoliberal Presidency 35
Four The Conservative Mirage: George W. Bush and

Empire Waning 71
Five Change You Can Believe In? The Barack Obama

Presidency 105
Six Toward a Deep Presidency: Coming to Terms with

Our Constitutional Catastrophe-in-Chief 141
Notes 155
Index 197
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Preface
I think we are fortunate at the moment that we do not face a crisis of

the scale and scope that Lincoln or FDR faced.
—Barack Obama, 2014
Americans presidents seek to offer reassurance to citizens, and it

is not surprising that Barack Obama, in a conversation with New
Yorker editor David Remnick, would deny that we are living in a time
of deep crisis. We contend, in contrast, that the United States and the
larger world really are facing a set of interrelated crises, including
a seemingly endless commitment to a “war against terrorism” and
a prolonged economic slump accompanied by substantial material
hardship and deepening inequality. Global climate change, brought
about by accelerating emission levels of carbon dioxide and methane,
threatens life on Earth as we know it. We argue that the political,
economic, and ideological underpinnings of the modern American
presidency render the institution incapable of addressing these crises
in creative, hopeful, and progressive ways. We write with some sense
of urgency because we seek to avoid having to add “catastrophe-in-
chief” to the list of presidential duties laid out in Article II, Section 2
of the Constitution.
In his interview with the New Yorker President Obama stated, “I
just wanted to add one thing to that business about the great-man
theory of history. The President of the United States cannot remake
our society, and that’s probably a good thing . . . . Not ‘probably.’ It’s
definitely a good thing.” If democracy rests on popular sovereignty,
then who could disagree? But in The Unsustainable Presidency we
examine the relationship between “society” and “the president” in
different ways. We situate the modern presidency in the context of
the structure of American society as a whole, emphasizing its defin-
ing features as a capitalist democracy with an accompanying class
and power structure and as a global political and military hege-
monic superpower. To understand the presidency and presidents, it is
essential to analyze how the two state imperatives of securing private
economic growth and maintaining US global dominance—which
stem from the nature of modern American society and the politi-
cal economy—shape the office and its occupants. In our view, these
viii Preface
factors are at least as important as the impact of public opinion, elec-

tion outcomes, and relations with Congress, crucial though these are,
and probably more so.
The Unsustainable Presidency both builds on and criticizes as
overly narrow the field of presidency studies in Political Science. In
chapter one, we characterize and critique dominant theories of the
presidency for operating with a restrictively narrow understanding of
structural context. In chapter two, we offer an alternative structural
theory that draws on several types of critical social theories, particu-
larly theories of the state, to develop an expanded structural frame-
work—grounded in political economy—to better contextualize the
presidency. In effect we seek to explore the contours of what might be
called the “deep presidency.” Chapters three, four, and five are inter-
pretations of the presidencies of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and
Barack Obama. Our case studies focus on core political, economic,
and national security issues and are by no means comprehensive in
nature. We hope readers will approach these chapters looking to see
to what extent our analytical framework helps them better under-
stand the three most recent presidencies than do more conventional
approaches. In chapter six, we discuss the normative and political
implications of our argument in terms of future possibilities for the
presidency and American democracy. And we suggest nothing less
than a fundamental rethinking of how we define “economic growth”
and “national security” if the modern presidency is to be sustain-
able. Toward that end, in our view, citizens should be less concerned
with the important but relatively comfortable question of what kind
of president our society needs, and more attuned to the unsettling yet
urgent question of what kind of society we want to be.
In completing this book we received insightful comments and
suggestions from Josh Hoxie, Dillon Klepetar, Elizabeth Sanders,
Michael Schwartz, and Patricia Siplon. We take responsibility for
any remaining errors of fact or interpretation. Finally, we would like
to thank Brian O’Connor, our editor at Palgrave Macmillan, for his
encouragement and support. As in all we do professionally, this book
is dedicated to our students at Hamline University and Saint Michael’s
College.
Chapter One
Theories of the American Presidency
Did you plug the hole yet, Daddy?

—President Obama, repeating a question asked by his
11-year-old daughter, Malia
At a press conference on May 27, 2010, President Obama addressed

the ongoing crisis of the BP/Deepwater Horizon oil spill. More than
a month earlier the rig in the Gulf of Mexico exploded, killing 11
workers and injuring 17. The resulting hole in the well head gushed
some 53,000 barrels of oil per day into the Gulf, creating the largest
marine oil spill in US history. By the time the well was capped 87 days
later, more than 210 million gallons of oil, and about 500,000 tons
of natural gas, had been released—amounting to, as one analyst put,
“one Exxon-Valdez-sized oil spill every three to four days.”1 The
world held its breath—and millions watched with intense interest
the online oil spill live cam—as the Obama administration, industry
officials, and environmentalists worked furiously to stop the rampag-
ing oil. Years after the disaster, the Gulf ecosystem remained deeply
impacted, and BP continues to fight in court to have its settlement
payments reduced. 2 The quote above was part of President Obama’s
effort to show his concern for the ongoing damage being inflicted
on the environment, recalling his daughter Malia’s concern that he
“plug the hole” through which the ecosystem of the Gulf coast was
being ravaged. Even his children, we were assured, were keeping the
President’s feet to the fire on this disaster.
Beyond this particular ecological crisis, President Obama had
to respond to the larger environmental challenge of global climate
change, which threatens our existence on Earth at its most basic
level. In his June 2013 speech on climate change at Georgetown
University, the president surveyed the state of the debate over the
environment:
Nobody has a monopoly on what is a very hard problem, but I don’t have
much patience for anyone who denies that this challenge is real. We don’t
2 The Unsustainable Presidency
have time for a meeting of the Flat Earth Society. Sticking your head in
the sand might make you feel safer, but it’s not going to protect you from
the coming storm. And ultimately, we will be judged as a people, and
as a society, and as a country on where we go from here. Our founders
believed that those of us in positions of power are elected not just to serve
as custodians of the present, but as caretakers of the future.3
He went on to announce what he called his “new national climate

action plan.” With this assortment of bipartisan market-based poli-
cies, Obama sought to emphasize his desire to take climate change
seriously, while assuring his audience that there was no tension
between the traditional pursuit of economic growth and the massive
challenge posed by global climate change. “The old rules may say we
can’t protect our environment and promote economic growth at the
same time,” he contended, “but in America, we’ve always used new
technologies—we’ve used science; we’ve used research and develop-
ment and discovery to make the old rules obsolete.”4 He went on to
assert the need to keep the United States a global leader in the fight
against the “ravages of climate change.” But he reiterated that our
leadership role—“the world still looks to America to lead”—must be
carefully crafted with the reassurance that our role as “caretakers
of the future” involves “no contradiction between a sound environ-
ment and strong economic growth.” This echoed a theme he raised
at his post-reelection press conference in 2012, where he spoke of the
“tough political choices” accompanying the nation’s approach to cli-
mate change. “[I]f the message is somehow we’re going to ignore jobs
and growth simply to address climate change, I don’t think anybody
is going to go for that. I won’t go for that.”5
President Obama’s overarching challenge, reinforced by his
daughter’s more specific concern, reflects one of the great dilemmas
of the modern American presidency. How did we get to a point as
a nation whereby the president is expected to plug the hole caused
by the explosion of an oil rig? More dauntingly, how did we get to
a point as a nation wherein the president is expected to formulate
plans for confronting a problem as new and monumentally threaten-
ing to life on the planet as global climate change, while maintaining
our traditional commitments to the prosperity of business? On its
face, the questions seem absurd. Of course the president is expected
to respond to myriad crises—domestic, foreign, and, increasingly
global. But as obvious as that may seem, it has not always been that
way. To understand why, we need to explore the shifting terrain of
theories of the American presidency.
Theories of the American Presidency 3
Theories of the Presidency

In 1941 publisher Henry Luce famously announced the dawn of the
“American Century.” With Political Science in mind, he might have her-
alded the “Presidential Century.”6 With an eye toward the presidency
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the post-FDR, post–World War II period
saw studies of the presidency become something of a growth industry
within Political Science. Conventional approaches to the office have
their origins in Alexander Hamilton’s observation in an oft-cited pas-
sage from Federalist 70: “Energy in the executive is a leading character
in the definition of good government.”7 True, the president would still
have to operate within the republican confines of Madisonian separa-
tion of powers, institutional check and balances, and federalism. And
on paper the Constitution surely does give Congress far more enumer-
ated powers in Article I than the president receives in the vague grant of
“executive power” found in Article II. But over time Hamilton was pre-
scient that energy and vigor would be sparked by the chief executive,
spread by the flames of crises. As William Grover has put it elsewhere,
Alexander Hamilton was ahead of his time. The twentieth century has
seen his conception of the presidency become a celebrated maxim of polit-
ical science. Yet his late eighteenth century advocacy of broad executive
power...did not fit the theory and practice of the next hundred years.8
If citizens in the nineteenth century were confronted with problems,

their political instincts led them to seek redress in their state govern-
ments or in the US Congress, not in the occupant of the White House.
The elevation in the power and importance of the presidency can be
captured in the work of Woodrow Wilson, as a young political scien-
tist at Princeton. His 1885 classic Congressional Governmentt argues
that “the actual form of our present government is simply a scheme of
congressional supremacy.” “Congress [is] the dominant, nay, the irre-
sistible, power of the federal system.”9 Wilson’s thinking had changed
considerably, though, by the time his 1908 book Constitutional
Government in the United States was published. Reflecting on the
presidency of Theodore Roosevelt and the rise of both the regula-
tory state and the stature of the United States in international affairs,
Wilson now saw the presidency as “at liberty, both in law and con-
science, to be as big a man as he can.”10 He continued:
The President can never again be the mere domestic figure he has been
throughout so large a part of our history. The nation has risen to first
rank in power and resources. The other nations of the world look
askance upon her, half in envy, half in fear, and wonder with a deep
anxiety what she will do with her vast strength . . . Our President must
always, henceforth, be one of the great powers of the world, whether
he act greatly and wisely or not . . . We can never hide our President
as a mere domestic office . . . He must stand always at the front of our
affairs.11
At the operational and philosophical level among presidents, this

shift is mirrored by the approach of Theodore Roosevelt’s energized
view of the office in his “stewardship theory” (1913) when viewed
alongside William Howard Taft’s much more confined constitutional
interpretation (1916). Roosevelt’s robust orientation merits lengthy
quotation from his autobiography:
The most important factor in getting the right spirit in my

Administration, next to the insistence upon courage, honesty, and a
genuine democracy of desire to serve the plain people, was my insis-
tence upon the theory that the executive power was limited only by
specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or
imposed by the Congress under its Constitutional powers. My view
was that every executive officer . . . was a steward of the people bound
actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people, and not to
content himself with the negative merit of keeping his talents undam-
aged in a napkin. I declined to adopt the view that what was imper-
atively necessary for the nation could not be done by the President
unless he could find some specific authorization to do it. My belief
was that it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the
needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by
the Constitution or by the laws. Under this interpretation of executive
power I did and caused to be done many things not previously done by
the President and the heads of the departments. I did not usurp power,
but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power.12
Roosevelt’s expansive reading of the office gave the president wide

latitude to pursue the public good as he saw fit, subject only to spe-
cific legal obstacles. To Taft, by contrast, such barriers offered neces-
sary protection from the potential abuses of executive domination
implicit in Roosevelt’s “bully pulpit.” Narrowly legalistic in scope,
the Taft outlook found safety in a more restrictive conception:
The true view of the Executive function is, as I conceive it, that the
President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably
traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included
within such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise. Such
specific grant must be either in the Federal Constitution or in an act of
Congress passed in pursuance thereof. There is no undefined residuum
of power which he can exercise because it seems to him to be in the
public interest . . . The grants of Executive power are necessarily in gen-
eral terms in order not to embarrass the Executive within the field of
action plainly marked for him, but his jurisdiction must be justified
and vindicated by affirmative constitutional or statutory provision, or
it does not exist.13
The president’s talent and power were not destined to remain

“undamaged in a napkin” as Roosevelt feared; nor was presiden-
tial power going to be granted only insofar as it protected the chief
executive from embarrassment when acting within his limited pur-
view, as Taft had wanted. Rather the activist Hamiltonian concep-
tion of the office—with the Framers’ sparse assertion of “executive
power” in Article II now broadly defined—would carry the day.14 It
was Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency that ensured the triumph of the
earlier Roosevelt’s conception of the office. With the coming of the
twin crises of the Great Depression and World War II, the presidency
became the focal point of public political expectations. The powers
of the national government were broadened considerably to encom-
pass the modern welfare state (redistributive policies), the regulatory
state (regulation of the economy), and the warfare state (expansion
of US military and geopolitical power). Political scientist Theodore
Lowi characterized the resulting public expectations for presidential
efficacy in ensuring these agencies deliver the political and economic
goods as amounting to a “Republic of Service Delivery”:
[S]ince the president has become the embodiment of government, it

seems perfectly normal for millions upon millions of Americans to con-
centrate their hopes and fears directly and personally upon him. It is no
wonder that the United States has developed such a tremendous stake in
the “personal president” and his personal capacity to govern.15
The electoral primary system—relentlessly hyped by the 24-hour news

cycle—only accentuates this presidency-centered process, turning the
presidential personality into “a combination of Jesus Christ and the
Statue of Liberty: Bring me your burdens. Bring me your hopes and
fears. Bring me your search for salvation.”16 An energetic, visionary,
Christ-like Statue of Liberty—the soaring expectations of post-New
Deal, post–World War II America called for an office whose scope
was enormously expanded.
Expansivist Theories
Within Political Science the range of thinking about the presidency
became demarcated by two schools of thought that vied for preem-
inence—the broad vision of Theodore Roosevelt, etched into our
political landscape by FDR, and the narrower view of Taft. Political
scientists typically situated the office, analytically and normatively,
between these two poles. Expansivist theories of the office conse-
crated in theory what the office had become in practice.17 They sought
to justify and extend the expansion of presidential initiative to achieve
widely shared programmatic goals. One of the earliest champions of
the activist modern presidency was British political scientist and Labor
Party leader Harold Laski. His 1940 book The American Presidency
focused on the unique character of the office. Laski offered no sim-
ple comparison between European parliamentary systems and their
American counterparts, arguing that “the president of the United
States is both more and less than a king; he is, also, both more and
less than a prime minister.”18 With FDR as his model, Laski made the
case for presidents to harness the vigor of social movements to pro-
mote the reforms needed for the challenging times ahead. Expanded
presidential power would be the vehicle for fulfilling the concerns of
the common person; a weak presidency would be insufficient:
A weak president, in a word, is a gift to the forces of reaction in the

United States. It enables them to manipulate and maneuver between
every difference that is provoked by the absence of a strong hand at the
helm . . . A weak presidency prevents that transcendence of the limita-
tions of 1787 which the compulsions of our generation demand.19
Only a president can rise above the obstacles to progressive reform.

The Framers of the Constitution wove those obstacles into the fabric
of the new nation, particularly the institutionalized fragmentation of
power and authority that leaves Congress with “its own instinctive
and inherent tendency . . . under all circumstances to be anti-presiden-
tial,” constantly “seeking its own essence” and “exalting its own pres-
tige.”20 Beyond Congress as a limitation on presidential power, Laski
also was deeply troubled by the power of big business to shape the
agenda and policies of presidents and Congress, a theme that echoes
for us in the twenty-first century as well. While repeatedly referring
to the maintenance of business confidence as imperative to the realiza-
tion of reform, he also wanted activist presidents, emboldened by crisis
conditions and popular support, to overcome the interests of privilege
and the propertied classes in order to extend the scope of the positive
state. Yet he offered no insight into how to resolve this tension, pre-
ferring to assert the president’s historic transcendent ability to “sus-
pend the normal assumptions of the American system.” He famously
observed that the beauty of the American political system—with an
eye toward Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, Wilson, and FDR—is that
“so far, it is clear, the hour has brought forth the man.” His faith in a
popular president’s ability (even assuming the desire) to transcend the
dual limitations of 1787 and Wall Street seems overstated.
Despite not being fully explored, Laski’s misgivings about how
the political economy limits presidential initiative were nowhere in
sight as historian and political scientist Clinton Rossiter embraced
the spirit of this ascendant attitude toward expansive chief execu-
tives in 1956 with his book The American Presidency. In it Rossiter
welcomed the rise of presidential power and the expansion of roles he
must play, capturing the expanded job with his imagery of “hats” the
modern president must wear. He continued, in near worshipful tones:
“I would be less than candid were I not to make clear at the outset my
own feeling of veneration, if not exactly reverence, for the authority
and dignity of the Presidency.”21 With portraits of influential chief
executives that border on hagiography, Rossiter extolled the virtues of
executive leadership, shifting appreciative metaphors from “a kind of
magnificent lion” to “a chamber orchestra of ten pieces,” each piece
corresponding to a presidential role. He explores ten roles in all, five
strictly of constitutional design (such as commander-in-chief) and five
additional roles that have arisen out of historic necessity (such as man-
ager of prosperity). His presidential “hats” metaphor grew so popular
that, as one analyst contended, it constituted “the most prevalent and
academically respectable way of viewing the presidency . . . [I]t may be
dubbed the received view of the office.”22 Offering brief portraits of
the great presidents, Rossiter offers tribute to their legendary achieve-
ments, which he glorifies with reverential prose:
Each is an authentic folk hero, each a symbol of some virtue or dream

especially dear to Americans. Together they make up almost half of the
company of American giants, for who except Christopher Columbus,
Benjamin Franklin, Daniel Boone, Robert E. Lee, and Thomas A.
Edison in real life, Deerslayer and Ragged Dick in fiction, and Paul
Bunyon and the Lonesome Cowboy in myth can challenge them for
immortality? Washington the spotless patriot, Jefferson the democrat,
Jackson the man of the frontier, Lincoln the emancipator and preserver
of the Union, Theodore Roosevelt the All-American Boy, Wilson the
peacemaker—these men are symbols of huge interest and value to the

American people. 23
Even chief executives routinely rated the worst by historians and

political scientists—Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Ulysses
S. Grant, and Warren Harding—receive consoling words from
Rossiter, confirming his belief in what he terms a “cardinal fact” of
historiography: “American history is written, if not always made,
by men of moderate views, broad interests, and merciful judg-
ments.”24 Questions about the impact of creating a mythical aura
around earthly presidents—indeed, critical judgments of any type—
seem utterly unpatriotic under Rossiter’s post–World War II gaze.
The presidency is ascribed totemic qualities, and to tamper with this
“peculiar treasure” is to court disaster. Thus Rossiter’s final advice:
“Leave Your Presidency Alone.”
Rossiter’s cheerleading for the office was followed in 1960 by
the book that blended theory with practice, revolutionizing the way
Political Science viewed the office. In his seminal text Presidential
Power,r Richard Neustadt liberated presidential studies from the
constraints of strict constitutional interpretations of the office that
focused on the president’s formall powers—formal roles carried out
within a matrix of competing institutions. Since ours is a govern-
ment of separate institutions sharing power, formal constitutional
powers are no guarantee of actual power in day-to-days affairs.
Drawing on his years of experience in the Truman administration,
Neustadt compared and contrasted Truman and Eisenhower’s presi-
dencies, underscoring the centrality of a president’s informall powers
of persuasion and bargaining, personal skills that presidents bring
to the office in varying degrees. Neustadt thus sought to view the
office as a more unified whole animated by the behavior of a chief
executive with one major purpose—to wield power. In perhaps the
most famous words ever written in presidency scholarship, Neustadt
contended that “presidential power is the power to persuade.”25
Rather than issuing commands, persuasion involved a president
bargaining with various constituencies—including executive offi-
cials, Congress, party leaders, citizens at home and abroad—with
an eye toward maximizing his personal power in the service of his
political ends. Presidential power in the pursuit of noble (and for
Neustadt, liberal) ends helped fuel rising public expectations of the
office, expectations that somewhat ironically helped undermine
future presidents that Neustadt analyzed in his “Later Reflections”
that appeared in several subsequent editions of his classic. But
throughout he steadfastly maintained his original belief that served

as the expansivist clarion call:
In a relative but real sense one can say of a President what Eisenhower’s
first Seretary of Defense once said of General Motors: what is good for
the country is good for the President, and vice versa. 26
This thought, particularly the “vice versa” captures the expansivist

spirit in Neustadt. And his book has retained its place in the pantheon
of political science literature to a great extent because it articulated
that spirit so effectively. Striding beyond constitutional constraints
on presidential leadership, “[f]or better or worse, the United States is
today a presidential nation.”27 As Lori Cox Han put it, “The modern
presidency, with all its power and bureaucratic machinery, laid waste
to the modestly crafted, humble office erected by the framers.”28
Restrictivist Theories
Yet a funny thing happened on the way to the blissful world of the
activist presidency. The seeds of presidential demise were sewn by
some decidedly active occupants of the White House. The conjunc-
tion of the Vietnam War, economic decline, and the Watergate scan-
dal laid waste to some actual presidencies as well, notably the tenures
of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. The reaction within Political
Science was to highlight the emergent “crisis” of the American pres-
idency—the office of gilded hopes had suddenly become “imperial,”
“a puzzle,” “an illusion,” “rhetorical,” “impossible,” and “plebisci-
tary.”29 To be sure, in addition to Taft’s constrained view of the office,
there were warnings of this crisis prior to the strife of the 1960s and
70s. Championing the constitutional approach to presidential stud-
ies that Neustadt’s work would eventually supplant, in 1940 Edward
S. Corwin voiced grave concern that the office had become danger-
ously personalized, growing to resemble a “primitive monarchy.” As
he observed, “Taken by and large, the history of the presidency is
a history of aggrandizement.”30 The “aggrandizement” of the office
troubled him, for if the Framers had designed separation of powers to
create “an invitation to struggle,” Corwin worried that the president
had the upper hand, due in large part to the elasticity of the presi-
dent’s underdefined grant of “executive power” and the history of
“executive prerogative” rooted in seventeenth-century Lockean liber-
alism and the law of national self-preservation in times of emergency.
Precedent and tradition ensure that the fruits of aggrandizement are

passed along from strong leaders to weaker ones, encouraging the
weakening of the most cherished constitutional principle for Corwin,
and for all restrictivists—the separation of powers.
As the Nixon presidency was collapsing, there was an explosion
of restrictivist theories, led by historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in his
1973 classic The Imperial Presidency. While his term “imperial presi-
dency” passed forever into the lexicon of American politics, the irony
of Schlesinger leading the charge for a more cautious approach to
presidential power is hard to miss: at best, he was a born-again restric-
tivist. For his approval of both FDR and John F. Kennedy as paragons
of liberal virtue was legendary. Still, he grew wary of assertions of
presidential power during the Vietnam War, and his call for the resto-
ration of a constitutional balance of power between the president and
Congress, and a plea to hold down public expectations of the office,
resonated with the times. And he continued his battle against presi-
dential unilateralism right through his critique of the congressional
response to 9/11 in the Patriot Act, President George W. Bush’s han-
dling of the War in Iraq, and the Bush Doctrine.31 Commenting on
what he termed “the perennial threat to the constitutional balance,”
Schlesinger summed up his thesis with a sharpened eye toward the
Bush presidency: “When the constitutional balance is upset in favor
of presidential power and at the expense of presidential accountabil-
ity, the presidency can be said to become imperial.”32
At the heart of all restrictivist analyses was the belief that the
power imbalance between the executive and legislative branches
threatens the quality of democracy, particularly in matters of national
security, where accountability often is so thin. This imbalance can
affect all policy areas. Domestically, for example, some political
scientists focused on rising public expectations of the office and
how they pressured presidents into paradoxical no-win situations. 33
Inflated public expectations, an exaggerated view of the office—
what Thomas Cronin once dubbed “the textbook presidency,” born
of reverence for the romantic FDR model and the explosion of New
Deal domestic programs—can lead the public to place certain chief
executive “on a pedestal rather than under a microscope.” Lowi saw
a similar dynamic at work. He viewed the job demands and expec-
tations shouldered by the president as “pathological, paranoid, and
perverse.” He added:
The president is the Wizard of Oz. Appearances become every-

thing . . . The more the president holds the initiative and keeps it
personal, the more he reinforces the mythology that there actually

exists in the White House a “capacity to govern.”34
But it is in foreign policy where the wizardly threat to institutional

integrity was viewed as the greatest—the place where Hamilton’s
much touted “energy in the executive” could do the most damage.
Schlesinger lamented soaring presidential ambition in foreign affairs,
so far as to contend that “the American presidency has come to see
itself in messianic terms as the appointed savior of a world whose
unpredictable dangers call for rapid and incessant deployment of
men, arms, and decisions behind a wall of secrecy.”35 Surveying the
historic landscape of executive excess in foreign affairs (dozens of
cases), from the eighteenth century onward, he finds in all instances
that the reassertion of a congressional voice would have addressed
the dangerous institutional imbalance. From Franklin Pierce’s 1854
leveling of San Juan del Norte in Nicaragua, to the Civil War, to
the Spanish-American War, to Theodore Roosevelt’s and Wilson’s
strong tenures, to FDR pre and post Pearl Harbor—his analysis in
The Imperial Presidency viewed the president and Congress vying for
preeminence, as if on a see-saw of power.
The larger point, however, is that for restrictivists the key issue
is procedural—the legal need to go to Congress before leading a
nation into war. Schlesinger insisted Congress be at the table, playing
its role. It is an old argument over “the location of the war-making
power.” But since he offered no evidence that Congress could have
responded to a different set of imperatives, or would have offered a
different definition of “national security” during the cold war conflict
with the former Soviet Union, Schlesinger’s unwillingness to ques-
tion “the motives and merits of American foreign policy” enfeebles
his case. He consciously sidestepped questions about the values and
interests that underlie foreign policy decisions of all administrations.
For Schlesinger, indeed for restrictivists generally, the office of the
presidency was imperial, not the particular policy in a given situa-
tion or the overall national security approach of the United States.
And when he moves beyond warfare into a domestic crisis such as
Watergate—what he calls “the glory of Watergate”—he finds glory
in the conclusion that the nation’s democratic institutions work. Bad
guys eventually get caught. Like the expansivist Laski, Schlesinger
ultimately has faith in the integrity of the political system: “The great
strength of democracy is its capacity for self-correction,” he argues. 36
Even when buffeted by the “destabilizing force of capitalism,” strong
democratic leadership will supply the “intelligent diagnosis and
guidance” essential to restoring systemic balance. The system will self-

correct. Mainstream politicians and political analysts seem unable to
question the supposed need for American global dominance and the
mission of the United States to spread “freedom” and “democracy”
around the world. As Andrew J. Bacevich observed, “When it comes
to foreign policy, the fundamental divide in American politics today
is not between left and right but between those who subscribe to the
myth of the ‘American Century,’ and those who do not.”37 Whatever
misgivings restrictivists might have about the impact of presidential
overreach on the institutional balance of power, they are decidedly in
the former category, firmly encamped on the “myth of the American
Century” side of the divide.
Toward a Deeper Structural Critique of

the Expansivist-Restrictivist Debate
These two major schools of thought are not without merit. Growth
in presidential responsibilities and stature is important, and to ignore
it makes little sense. One need only explore debates over the Bush
administration’s Iraq War invocation of the “unitary executive”
theory, or President Obama’s get-tough stance toward government
whistle-blowers (Edward Snowden and others), to get a feel for what
is at stake when presidents, regardless of party, gain too much power.
Surely concentration of power in any one branch of government can
threaten the quality of representative government.38 Nevertheless,
there are three major interrelated deficiencies that mark the conven-
tional expansivist-restrictivist debate.
First, mainstream theories are fixated on institutionalism. They
focus primarily on the institutional balance of power, making their
difference one of degree, not one of kind. The internal composition
of government institutions is studied, their political-constitutional
dynamic assessed, leading to analyses that are mainly descriptive
in nature. 39 Second, the expansivist-restrictivist spectrum offers a
narrow range of debate within which presidents are located some-
where between these poles of activity and relative restraint. This
cramped intellectual space does not allow room for orientations
that question the assumptions upon which previous theories have
rested, or that critically question the normative assumptions and
settled understandings beneath presidential power, such as defini-
tions of economic growth and national security, as we will see later.
With regard to the Kennedy presidency, for example, Bruce Miroff

pointed to the limited confines of what he termed “revisionist”
theories when he contended that this literature “is soft at the core;
despite their disillusionment, most presidential scholars cannot con-
ceal the fact that they are still in love with the Presidency.”40 When
in office, the promising, personally energetic, dynamic chief execu-
tive (JFK or any other) primarily serves as the “chief stabilizer” of
democratic institutions and corporate capitalism. Overly personal-
ized accounts of individual presidents add their own contribution to
this shortcoming, a warning demonstrated in a recent study of the
Obama presidency.41
Finally, this narrow range of debate is intoxicated with process,
emphasizing means over ends. The office becomes a management
issue, sometimes contending that the complexities of the world sim-
ply have made the job of the president too big to handle. The goals
of the office thus are taken for granted; seldom are the ends of presi-
dential power critically assessed or seen as major contributing fac-
tors themselves to policy dilemmas. This rules out the structural
possibility that there may be a self-defeating logic to the pursuit of
goals deemed beyond reconsideration. As Ira Katznelson and Mark
Kesselman have pointed out with reference to Neustadt’s embrace
of presidential power—a comment applicable to the expansivist-
restrictivist debate:
In our view, Neustadt is correct in stressing the need to understand the

overall coherence of presidential activity. Yet he does not specify what
ends are served by the successful exercise of presidential power. Unless
one can supply an answer, the exercise of presidential power appears
meaningless, like a dog chasing its tail. 42
A structural theory of the presidency seeks to move beyond the

limitations of this debate, to probe the ends of the presidency and
the way the goals and interests of the nation are framed. These are
ends shared by both major parties and pursued by presidents and
Congress alike. Conventional theories of the presidency place great
weight on such differences of party, personality, and policy. A struc-
tural theory, by contrast, focuses on basic continuities that transcend
such differences, thus allowing us to view the office in a deep con-
text, a context that illuminates more fully a response to the question
posed by Malia Obama at the outset of the chapter. Her daddy did
indeed need to “plug the hole” created by BP and Transocean in
the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. More accurately, public expectations
demand that a president respond to such crises. But beyond that, he

also must address the much larger hole, what environmental author
Naomi Klein has called the “hole in the world”—a hole that results
from the accumulated hubris and arrogance of how we treat the natu-
ral world.43 Structural impediments to plugging that gaping environ-
mental hole are woven into the very fabric of the modern presidency.
We need a structural theory—a deep presidency analysis—to unravel
those threads.
Chapter Two
Beyond Institutions-as-Structure:
A Deeper Structural Perspective
The life of the nation has grown infinitely varied. It does not centre
now upon questions of governmental structure or of the distribution
of governmental powers. It centres upon questions of the very struc-
ture and operation of society itself, of which government is only the
instrument.
—Woodrow Wilson, 1912
Structure Muddled
Woodrow Wilson had it right, up to a point. There is a structure of
power—“the very structure and operation of society itself”—that lies
beneath the distribution of governmental powers. His 1912 obser-
vation points to a flaw in the conventional structure-as-institutions
approach adopted by mainstream political science.1 That approach
privileges the institutional balance of power among the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government, often ignoring (or
accepting as a “given”) the deeper structure of power within which
institutions operate. Then, as now, serious analysis of the presidency
would benefit from examining and questioning that power structure
underlying the operation of governmental institutions. Wilson’s presi-
dential campaign rhetoric above introduced a critique of the rise of
giant corporations within the American political economy, monopoly
power that came under attack in the Progressive Era with often harsh
indictment:
The masters of the government of the United States are the combined
capitalists and manufacturers of the United States. It is written over
every intimate page of the records of Congress, it is written all through
the history of conferences at the White House, that the suggestions of
economic policy in this country have come from one source, not from
many sources. The benevolent guardians, the kindhearted trustees who
have taken the troubles of government off our hands, have become so
conspicuous that almost anybody can write out a list of them. 2
However, the venom Wilson reserved for big manufacturers, bank-

ers, the great railroad combinations, and other trusts should not,
of course, be mistaken for a general rejection of the business ethos
or the basic structural arrangements of the political economy. He
sought to preserve all of that. What he opposed—what progressives
opposed, in word if not deed, as a movement—was the pernicious
effect of monopoly on market competition and business opportuni-
ties for smaller enterprises. “I am for big business, and I am against
the trusts,” he added, drawing a distinction that reveals the limits
of his examination of “the very structure and operation of society
itself.” He elaborated on this distinction in a passage that celebrated
big business:
Big business is no doubt to a large extent necessary and natural. The

development of business upon a great scale of cooperation, is inevi-
table, and, is probably desirable. But that is a very different matter
from the development of trusts, because the trusts have not grown.
They have been artificially created; they have been put together, not by
natural processes, but by the will, the deliberate planning will, of men
who were more powerful than their neighbors in the business world. 3
Large corporations were viewed as “natural,” even organic, whereas

trusts were a contrived impediment to the “natural processes” of the
market—standard fare for the progressive critique of the day.
Wilson’s focus on the structure of society beneath the mere gov-
ernmental structure entailed a conservative reading of the political
economy, as he acknowledged when he explained that “if I did not
believe that to be a progressive was to preserve the essentials of our
institutions, I for one could not be a progressive.”4 His perspective
was echoed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt while running for his first
reelection in 1936. In a succinct summary of the limits of progressive
reformism, he argued that “the most serious threat to our institutions
comes from those who refuse to face the need for change.” As he went
on to explain: “Liberalism becomes the protection for the far-sighted
conservative . . . ‘Reform if you would preserve.’ I am that kind of con-
servative because I am that kind of liberal.”5 These two Democratic
presidents embraced a relatively thin notion of “structure.” Were
trusts the lone cause of the class bias of economic policy in the halls
of Congress and conferences in the White House? Or must politics in
a capitalist democracy necessarily favor the interests of wealthy own-
ers of capital over the interest of the common person? Would restrain-
ing or eliminating monopoly while preserving big business cure “the
Beyond Institutions-as-Structure 17
problem,” or would this simply leave different, somewhat less large,

somewhat less self-conscious elites as “the masters of government?”
Was there some pristine past, as Wilson seemed to imply, when mar-
kets, and the government, were free of manipulation from mammoth
combinations of capital? Was Congress less susceptible to such eco-
nomic forces than the president, or vice versa?
Many other questions could be posed, based on the implications
of thinking about the term “structure” in relation to political insti-
tutions. The point, though, is to highlight that the term “structure”
itself is quite muddled, or at least subject to differing uses. Mainstream
theories of the presidency use the word in a shallow sense, when refer-
ring to the constitutional separation of powers, or institutional grid-
lock. This common use of a structure-as-institutions approach can be
illustrated in the work of James MacGregor Burns, whose well-known
books on presidential leadership often rest on an analysis of institu-
tional disarray, government stalemate and ineptitude. Burns found the
American presidency in “crisis” due to such “structural” factors—di-
vided government inherited from the Framers renders programmatic
government a rarity in the United States, particularly in comparison
to parliamentary-style systems. Presidential leadership for this expan-
sivist political scientist is a casualty of such “deadlock.”6 Certainly
there is nothing wrong with assessing the institutional machinery
of government. Burns made a lifetime of valuable contributions pin-
pointing the flaws of divided government, the high price we pay for
fragmentation of power when it comes to fashioning coherent public
policy. Yet equating structure merely with political institutions leaves
unexamined myriad issues and pressures of fundamental importance
to making sense of the office. A structural theory of the presidency,
by contrast, broadens the scope of inquiry beyond the structure-as-
institutions approach. Structural theories situate the office within the
deeper structure of the political economy. Moving this deeper context
to the foreground brings the constraints of capitalist market forces
and the imperatives of the state into sharper relief. Appreciating these
constraints helps explain the continuities among presidencies that are
in play regardless of whether any particular president operates with
greater or lesser cooperation with the legislative branch.
Analyzing the presidency through the lens of a deeper notion of
structure is not a new phenomenon, although recent calls for such an
approach within Political Science in order to assess the Obama presi-
dency create that misimpression through what amounts to “analytical
amnesia.”7 Conventional scholars of the presidency conveniently for-
get or fail to acknowledge critical/radical perspectives that challenge
expansivist and restrictivist assumptions, a point made more broadly

in 1981 with regard to all fields of Political Science by then-president
of the American Political Science Association Charles Lindblom.
Elsewhere Lindblom critiqued mainstream neglect of more radi-
cal, uncomfortable insights as amounting to an intellectual prison:
“Our thought is imprisoned. We cannot venture intellectually—a few
exceptions aside—beyond what seem normal and natural”—a prob-
lem he saw plaguing popular thought and academic thinking within
the social sciences.8 As a result of this intellectual prison, Lindblom
showed how mainstream Political Science too often ignored outright
the extent to which public policy is locked into market assumptions
that reinforce corporate power at the expense of wider democracy.
As it applies to the conventional structure-as-institutions approach,
there is an implicit assumption that Congress would be less beholden
to corporate interests, or less enamored with US geopolitical power or
“American exceptionalism,” than the president. It would assume that
Congress plays by a different set of rules of political economy and
national security, which it does not. It would assume, in short, the
dubious notion that restoring the balance of power between Congress
and the President would change the structural calculations of these
two institutions. President Obama reminded us of the shortcomings
of such an assumption in his 2014 commencement address at the
United States Military Academy at West Point. “So the United States
is and remains the one indispensable nation,” he asserted to his appre-
ciative audience of cadets. “That has been true for the century passed
and it will be true for the century to come.” He added, “I believe in
American exceptionalism with every fiber of my being.”9 What mem-
ber of the House or Senate, in either political party, what Republican
president past or future, would take issue with President Obama’s
formulation? This structural reality—a unity of overarching purposes
and outlooks, with only tactical variations framed in patriotic ver-
biage about defending “freedom” and “democracy”—undermines the
balance of power institutional focus, a point to which we will return
in our case studies.
But even such conventional perspectives occasionally make contact
with aspects of a deeper structural view, albeit briefly. The afore-
mentioned insights of Harold Laski in his 1940 book The American
Presidency serve as one example of recognition of the obstacles to
the expansion of presidential leadership.10 Laski lamented the tradi-
tional structure-as-institutions explanations—federalism, separation
of powers, and checks and balances—as inherent constitutional con-
straints, giving rise to his observations that “the day of a successful
election is the day on which the president ceases to be a free man.”

But beyond the divisive role of Congress as “anti-presidential,” he
also cited the power of big business, how parties and presidents must
defer to business in order to pursue “business confidence,” becoming
“essentially agents of the property interests.” This deeper structural
insight is ultimately trumped, though, by the sheer power of presi-
dential leadership and will, as seen again in his faith that historically
“The hour has brought forth the man.” He simply does not ponder
the limits of reformism, rather suggesting (without exploring) that the
basic structure of the political economy can be thwarted despite its
having “economic and psychological authority unexampled . . . in any
country in the world.”
An opening to move beyond Laski’s embrace of transcendent lead-
ership can be found in another political scientist working within the
conventional range of debate, Stephen Skowronek and his influen-
tial work Presidential Leadership in Political Time.11 On one level,
Skowronek’s approach does move beyond the bounds of the expan-
sivist-restrictivist debate. He notes that both of these poles embrace
essentially the same progressive reading of the people gravitating
toward the President as the driving force of change. The more expan-
sive modern reading (Neustadt et al.) viewed the rise of presidential
power as good for a healthy democracy, whereas the more restricted
traditional view (the later Schlesinger, et al.) saw the growth of the
office as problematic: “In one view, the rise of the presidency was
good for democracy; in the other, it was damaging; in one, presi-
dential empowerment was the solution; in the other, it was the prob-
lem.”12 Skowronek poses a novel “third look,” situating the office
in terms of paired presidencies across “political time” (as opposed
to more sequential “secular time”). These paired comparisons of
presidencies—Jackson and FDR, Polk and Kennedy, Pierce and
Carter—correspond to leaders who assumed office in similar politi-
cal situations, and they allow for interesting atypical leadership cou-
plings. Jackson and FDR engaged in “regime construction,” Polk and
Kennedy were “regime managers,” and Pierce and Carter confronted
“enervated regimes,” in periods of degeneration or disjunction.13 The
presidents routinely deemed “great” all had the advantage of com-
ing to power when their situations warranted bold leadership due to
political upheaval.
The rise and fall of dominant political coalitions, the need to con-
struct new “political-institutional regimes,” afford regime-building
chief executives the luxury of starting from the ground up in terms of
experimentation with new ideas, new policies, and new groupings of
political interests. Skowronek expands on the virtue of his conception

of political time:
Analytically speaking, presidents located in different historical peri-

ods at parallel moments in these interactive sequences of political time
are likely to be more similar to one another in the leadership chal-
lenges they face and the political effects they register than they are
to the presidents located within their own period of secular political
development.14
On a more structural level, though, Skowronek’s dominant political

coalitions are closely linked to a standard conception of a political-
institutional framework. Regimes that evolve over time remain wed-
ded to a systemic “structure” wherein politics is narrowly construed,
and political parties and interest groups are the basis for differences
which are rarely about core principles. Bipartisan elite consensus about
the ends of the political economy and the interests of the state offers a
continuity that dwarfs differences over means. When Skowronek con-
tends that regime construction involves “an infusion of new political
interests into control of the federal government,” he is surely right.15
However it is also true that for Skowronek corporate priorities are
just another interest among many within a governing coalition, as
in classic pluralist theory. Perry Anderson captures this absence of
a deeper, more enduring notion of structure well in his analysis of
how corporate power and rates of economic growth evident in the
dissolution of “regimes of accumulation” impact the American politi-
cal economy: “It is striking how blind even the most accomplished
American political science or sociology is to the economic history
structuring shifts in the political system,” most of which “proceed as
if their subject could be discussed without so much as a glance at the
fortunes of American capitalism.”16
In his wide-ranging book The Personal President, Theodore Lowi’s
“institutionalist approach” to the presidency takes us one important
step further in pressing the limits of structure-as-institutions, beyond
regime segments and governing coalitions.17 Recall Lowi’s restrictiv-
ist reservations about executive power stem from his belief that the
New Deal expansion of regulatory power and redistributive programs
solidified the connection between an activist government and a strong
presidency. Our vision of democracy, he contended, has been changed
fundamentally—a change that amounts to a “redefinition of demo-
cratic theory with the presidency at its core.” The resulting “personal
presidency” engenders inflated public expectations and concomitant
unrealistic pressures on the office. The president has, in essence,

become “the state personified.” If, as Lowi argued, the presidency
serves as the personification of the state, it follows that questions
about the imperatives of the capitalist state—how it shapes and con-
strains what presidents can do—are in order. By exploring theories
of the state, a structural theory of the presidency eclipses whatever
differences various administrations may have over party, policy or
personality to focus on the deeper structural continuities.
Deep Presidency: Structure, the

President, and the State
Whether acknowledged or not, conventional debate on the presidency
assumes a pluralist model of politics that dominates contemporary
political science. Within the pluralist framework the state is viewed
as a neutral arbiter of conflicting group interests, detecting no under-
lying pattern of class bias to state behavior.18 Society is viewed as a
collection of groups that compete over various policy areas. Through
these groups, or acting as individuals through other democratic
freedoms such as voting rights, representative institutions, and civil
liberties, people can negotiate and compromise in an open political
process. Group conflict is considered fair as long as the government
serves as an unbiased umpire, maintaining a level-playing field for all
groups. Power is said to be diffuse so that no one group has unfair
advantages. Yet if state officials succumb to bias toward one particu-
lar set of interests—if your point of view appears to continually be
ignored or defeated in the policy arena—you can change the umpires
via regular elections. When necessary, reforms occur as groups suc-
ceed (or fail) in having their ideas triumph over competing ideas. And
the end result of this pluralist interaction is understood to reasonably
approximate “the public interest.” On a pluralist reading of politics,
the system may have its flaws, but none is so fatal that the system
itself is called into question. The pluralist understanding of American
politics is a relatively comfortable one, for it allows analysts to retain
the belief that the political process is sufficiently open and fluid to
adapt to virtually any contingency without changing the basic power
relations of the political economy. When reform is necessary it usually
is in the form of piecemeal problem-solving and incremental change.
Moreover, pluralists define politics narrowly—as what government
does—so that the model overlooks other arenas of power, among
them the role of corporate and finance capital.
The deficiencies of the pluralist theory of politics and the state were
highlighted by Lindblom, who actually began his career as one of the
leading architects of pluralism within political science. Lindblom had
the intellectual courage to question the assumptions of his earlier work
as he further scrutinized the relationship been public policy and mar-
kets, democracy and capitalism. He delivered a serious blow to plural-
ist theory with his groundbreaking work on how market mechanisms
“imprison” public policy via the threat of “capital strike,” the “auto-
matic punishing recoil” of the market economy when dominated by
business power pursuing its normal capitalist logic.19 This ability to
punish government policymakers almost instantly (via disinvestment,
unemployment, stock market fluctuations, etc.) amounts to a veto
power over public policy decisions, repressing change. Policymakers—
presidents and legislators—are publicly accountable for the performance
of a private economy over which they have little control. The health of
the economy is dependent on the perceptions and decisions of largely
unaccountable private individuals. “When a decline in prosperity and
employment is brought about by decisions of corporate and other busi-
ness executives,” Lindblom commented, “it is not they but government
officials who consequently are retired from their offices.”20
For an application of this principle, one need only think of the
extent to which the very corporations, banks and Wall Street firms
that ushered in the great recession of 2008 were offered generous
government bailouts by both the Bush and Obama administrations.
Businesses occupy a “privileged position” within capitalist democ-
racies—a luxury afforded no other interest group—imprisoning not
only governmental policy but the thought process of the public and
social scientists, as mentioned earlier. This privileged position led
Lindblom to what is perhaps his most oft-quoted, sobering conclusion
about the contradictions between democracy and capitalism: “The
large private corporation fits oddly into democratic theory. Indeed,
it does not fit.”21 Dominated by corporate power, the market thus
can be viewed as a metaphorical prison, and by extension presidents
are prisoners too—albeit “voluntary captives,” given the strictures of
ideology and the legitimacy of a corporate worldview. 22
Because power is supposedly diffuse within the pluralist model,
the interests of the state are generally assumed to be parallel with the
pursuit of public interest. Erik Olin Wright and Joel Rogers express
these interlocking interests well:
One consequence of this deep dependence of the state on the private

capitalist economy is that the interests of business appear to be in the
“general interests” of society rather than merely the “special interests”

of a particular class of people. 23
This conflation of private business interests with the public interest

absolves pluralists of the need for sustained analysis of the nature of
the state; they see no need to dwell on any tension between democracy
and capitalism. The group competition at the heart of their model is
deemed to be open, fair, and unbiased. The resulting society, though
sometimes chaotic, is seen as stable and orderly overall. By contrast,
nonpluralist theories of the state—mostly critical/radical scholarship
of the left, whose absence Lindblom lamented earlier—draw on a
framework of political economy to locate political institutions within
the inherently unbalanced environment of capitalist democracy. This
is the environment that the state defends and extends through the
exercise of public authority and power. 24 As the state personified, the
president leads this effort. Understanding the relationship between
the democratic state and the capitalist economy thus is central to
structural analysis, serving as the broader context within which presi-
dents operate. Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers deploy structural analy-
sis draw our attention to two connected constraints that undermine
democratic political institutions: demand constraints and resource
constraints. 25
As Cohen and Rogers point out, in a democracy people are sup-
posed to get what they want. Demand constraints operate to limit
what people want—what they demand politically—to what is compat-
ible with the system of capitalist democracy and the interests of corpo-
rations and a sound business climate. People are socialized, culturally
encouraged, to apply calculations of economic rationality, the satis-
faction of short-term material gain, to their decisions and demands.
This “normal” way of thinking privileges the interests of corporate
capital before the interests of all other groups in society. People’s liveli-
hoods are tethered to support for a “good business climate,” even if
corporate interests in health care, the environment, tax policy—any
policy area—actually work directly against the interests of ordinary
citizens. Under such a constraint, it appears “irrational” for citizens to
demand, via longer-term struggle, that presidents and other public offi-
cials enact policies that challenge business priorities. This constraint
on the national level is in play on the global level as well through the
national security state, where the impetus of corporate profitability
and markets overseas drives foreign policy decisions.
Resource constraints add to this skewing of peoples’ demands by
amplifying corporate advantages in the outcomes of policy decisions.
Wealthy individuals and corporations have tremendous resource

advantages—income, wealth, staff, lobbying, information-gathering,
coordination of their interests—over average citizens when it comes
to translating their desires into policy outcomes. This resource con-
straint “fundamentally undermines the ability of citizens to act collec-
tively,” a troubling circumstance when you consider that “the essence
of politics is collective action—different people acting together for
the achievement of common aims.”26 Martin Gilens and Benjamin
Page empirically verify this disconcerting lack of citizen efficacy
in their recent testing of several theories of American government,
including pluralism. Weighing elites’ interests and business interest
groups against the interests of average citizens, they find that “the
preferences of the average American appear to have only a miniscule,
near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy.”
Echoing Lindblom’s earlier concern for the weakening of democracy,
Gilens and Page conclude that while citizens do have access to regu-
lar elections and many formal rights, “majorities of the American
public actually have little influence over the policies our government
adopts . . . [W]e believe that if policymaking is dominated by powerful
business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans,
then America’s claims to being a democratic society are seriously
threatened.”27 Taken together, demand constraints and resource con-
straints threaten the very health of democracy and tie governmental
institutions even more tightly to the agenda of corporate capital. The
institution of the presidency, therefore, can only be fully understood
within a deeper theory that brings to the foreground the role of the
state in a capitalist democracy—a structural perspective that moves
far beyond the institutional balance of power. Again, if we accept that
the president is “the state personified,” we need to examine theories
of the state to illuminate the dynamics of the office.
Three major approaches to theories of the state will help shed light
on the tensions between democratic politics and a capitalist econ-
omy, each with distinct emphases but with overlapping insights and
implications as well: class dominance, capital dominance, and social
struggle theories. All three approaches, in our usage, may be regarded
as “structural” theories of the state.
First, class dominance theories, often described as “instrumental-
ism,” are concerned chiefly with what types of people occupy posi-
tions of leadership in the state. Leading class dominance theorists
would include Ralph Miliband and G. William Domhoff, although
both are indebted to the path-breaking work of sociologist C. Wright
Mills on the American power structure, especially his analysis of
the “power elite.”28 On this reading, the role of policy elites (direct
inside participation), policy planning groups (outside influence on
agenda-shaping and issue-framing) and “revolving door” relation-
ships (recycled elites) ensure that the state is used as an “instrument”
for achieving elite interests. 29 If assessing the formation of the Obama
administration after the election of 2008, for example, a class domi-
nance theorist would be greatly concerned about Obama’s selection
of an Economic A-Team loaded with the likes of conventional eco-
nomic analysts and Wall Street insiders such as Robert Rubin, Larry
Summers, Tim Geithner, Jeffrey Immelt, and Austin Goolsbee. What
economist Robert Kuttner terms “the Wall Street colonization of the
Obama administration” would be viewed as the result of decisions
made in the President’s pursuit of a strategy for restoring the health of
the American economy with conventional, business-friendly person-
nel choices. Class dominance theory puts great pressure on the plural-
ist view of the state, as Domhoff demonstrates:
Contrary to the pluralist view of power . . . there is a social upper class

by virtue of its dominant role in the economy and government...[T]his
ruling class is socially cohesive, has its basis in the large corporations
and banks, plays a major role in shaping the social and political cli-
mate, and dominates the federal government through a variety of orga-
nizations and methods. 30
And while Domhoff and other class dominance theorists do not argue
that elite control of the national policy agenda is absolute, this elite
perspective sets the terms under which all group competition takes
place. And when intraclass conflict does happen, it is conflict within
an overall shared consensus. Thus for the class dominance view of
the state, social class background, personal relationships and other
subjective factors are of central importance.
By contrast, capital dominance theorists see a much more objec-
tive relationship at work. These theorists argue that the state pursues
the interests of the wealthy and business leaders most fundamentally
due to the need to promote capital accumulation and business confi-
dence. On this reading of the state, policymakers would pursue the
interests of capitalist firms and the wealthy regardless of whether or
not those policymakers themselves actually come from upper class
backgrounds or previously worked for corporations or banks. Nicos
Poulantzas was perhaps the most celebrated capital dominance theo-
rist of the state. He famously clashed with Miliband, arguing that
Miliband placed far too much emphasis on the social background of
state officials and their direct connections to the capitalist class. He

argued that the relationship of the state to capitalist class interests is
an objective one:
The relation between the bourgeois class and the State is an objective
relation. This means that if the function of the State in a determinate
social formation and the interests of the dominant class in this forma-
tion coincide, it is by reason of the system itself.31
From the capital dominance vantage point, who serves as Treasury

secretary or secretary of commerce, for example, matters much
less than the need to maintain “business confidence” and a healthy
economy—imperatives that structure the decisions of state actors.
The structure of the system—the function of the state—therefore
demands that business leaders largely get what they want. The threat
of “capital strike” gives corporate leaders a virtual veto over public
policy, and this threat in no way depends upon a “conspiracy” or even
much in the way of class consciousness. Normal attention to business
principles and the bottom line of private profit are enough. 32 Market
forces and corporate interests—not close personal ties or any per-
sonal agenda—thus are the glue that holds the system together.
Finally, while recognizing the importance of fostering capital accu-
mulation, social struggle theories point to another imperative of the
state that can conflict with the functional need for accumulation—
the need for state polices to be legitimate in the eyes of the public.
As Fred Block has argued, the will of the people, particularly social
movements putting pressure on state managers from below, can force
the state to take actions that run counter to the interests of corpo-
rations. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis agree, criticizing capital
dominance theorists for assuming that the state always makes deci-
sion optimal to the needs of corporate capital. They contend that the
relationship between the state and the capitalist economy is “contra-
dictory rather that a functional totality,” and within those contradic-
tions lie the possibility of significant concessions being won by social
movements.33 The state thus must walk a fine line. It must favor the
interests of one particular group, while appearing to show no such
favoritism, even when the favors given to corporations actually serve
to undermine the economic health of average Americans. Lawrence
Jacobs and Desmond King refer to this dilemma as “the contradiction
of help that hurts.”34 Yet democratic accountability and legitimacy
demand that the state be at least somewhat responsive to the will
of the people or allegiance to the system, the rules of the game, will
weaken. Class dominance and capital dominance theories of the state

sometimes understate or ignore the fact that the rules can change.
If the game of politics seems hopelessly rigged and routinely unfair,
a legitimation crisis would follow, as citizens will no longer play by
the rules and may agitate for major reforms or even revolutionary
change.35 FDR’s experience with mass social movements during the
Great Depression speaks to this need to respond to the will of the
people, whether for the rights of workers to unionize, Social Security
protections, or other New Deal programs. This balance between
accumulation and legitimation opens up a space for struggle over
the decisions of state actors—decisions that may be inimical to the
accumulation of capital and business confidence. Such contestation
has led to the success social movements at various points throughout
US history, opening spaces for ordinary citizens to make a difference
in a manner that reflects the best ideals of democracy.
Obviously these three variations of theories of the state overlap,
and they also have some important differences in emphasis and par-
ticulars. We are making no attempt at a full comparative analysis
here, and we disagree with those who would argue that it is crucial
to pick one of these three as the best determinant of state action.
We are suggesting, though, that all nonpluralist theories of the state
recognize the tension between democracy and capitalism. They share
a common premise that the basic dynamics of capitalism profoundly
affect political life. The class background of state actors, the role
of the policy planning network, the structural imperative of capital
accumulation, social struggle, and the tension between democracy
and capitalism—all of these factors are vital to structural analysis.
Yet, while the literature of theories of the state is large, there has
been comparatively little interest in applying any of it to scrutiny
of the presidency, as conventional accounts of the office remain so
heavily attentive to the institutional balance of power. 36 Figure 2.1
presents the main contours of a structural approach as applied to
the presidency and its connections to theories of the state. Two such
efforts to move these structural factors to the forefront bear notice,
though. Bruce Miroff laid the groundwork for a connection between
theories of the state and theories of the presidency with his study of
the Kennedy presidency. In his 1976 book Pragmatic Illusions, Miroff
debunked the myth of John F. Kennedy as a progressive reformer.
Exploring foreign and domestic policy (the Berlin crisis, the Cuban
missile crisis, the Alliance for Progress, Vietnam, the New Economics
and civil rights), Miroff found a wide gulf between myth and real-
ity in the Kennedy years. “Behind the image of the popular hero,”
Congress
President
Power: Power: Art. I, Sec 8

* formal: Art. II, Sec 2 * purse
* informal: Persuasion * oversight
Personality * strong domestically
Institutional
Party
Balance of
Mgt. Style
Power
Capitalism Theories of the State

Accumulation Democracy
Economic Growth Legitimization
National Security Social Movements
Figure 2.1 Deep Structure: The Presidency and the State

Conventional theories of the presidency focus on the institutional balance
of power between the president and Congress, depicted above as a see-saw.
The action is mostly inside the big circle. The “imperial presidency” thesis
assumes that balance is weighted far too much toward the White House, par-
ticularly in times of military conflict when the president’s power is strongest
relative to Congress, whose power is greatest in domestic policy. By contrast,
a structural theory—a deep presidency approach—emphasizes the context
within which this balance of power operates—the playing field, if you will—
on which the two institutions compete for power. This context is depicted
above as the large circle. The contradictions between democratic political
institutions and capitalist economic institutions, the dual state imperatives
of accumulation of capital for large corporations and democratic legitimacy,
and how economic growth and national security are defined are all key com-
ponents of the structural view, rooted as it is in theories of the state. If the
president is the “state personified,” then all presidents will strive to enact
economic and national security policies with shared ends, differing only
over tactical means within this larger shared consensus. Social movements
historically can play a role in challenging this elite consensus—a hopeful
sign in the face of climate change and the decline of US military power, both
of which directly threaten the foundations of the modern presidency.
Miroff contended, “lies the reality of service to established power

and established values.”37 Rather than agents of change, most presi-
dents play the role of the “central figures in the maintenance of estab-
lished socioeconomic arrangements.” On the domestic front this role
includes the primary function of the Kennedy presidency—and by
implication, all presidencies—the “stabilization of corporate capital-
ism.” As the “chief stabilizer” of political and economic order in the
United States, the president also acts on the foreign policy front to
facilitate the goals of, and accommodate the operation of, interna-
tional capital. Miroff concluded:
It has not mattered greatly that recent Chief Executives have been
relatively unlearned in economics; the imperatives of giant corpora-
tions who dominate the American economy impose themselves on the
Presidency with a force that cannot be misunderstood . . . The complex
partnership between the White House and the corporate community
thus transcends personalities and party lines. 38
While Miroff focused on one administration, in 1981 Alan Wolfe

surveyed this “complex partnership” from FDR onward. He began
by tracing the relationship of the presidency to the historical develop-
ment of American democracy, beginning with the contrasting visions
of Jefferson’s republicanism and Hamilton’s modernist commercial
expansionism. The triumph of Hamilton’s political-economic vision
meant at that by the time of FDR, modernizing elites had come to
expect a strengthened chief executive to lead the way toward ensuring
the vitality of American capitalism. Thus, “there are only two issues
at work in American politics most of the time: economic growth and
military strength.”39 The Rooseveltian bargain between the people
and the president centered on two conditions, “continuous economic
growth at home and persistent US hegemony abroad.”40 Thus emerged
the indissoluble nexus between economic security and national secu-
rity—the welfare-warfare state. But the factors that allowed for the
long wave of postwar economic growth that gave rise to this nexus all
were subject to eventual diminishing returns—hence America’s vex-
ing “impasse.”41 In particular, as the long wave of economic expan-
sion underlying post–World War II US hegemony came to an end in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, the presidency faced mounting pres-
sures. Presidents accustomed to being a “cheerleader for economic
growth” domestically, and a “cheerleader for American power” inter-
nationally suddenly had very little to cheer about. As Wolfe wrote,
“The American presidency requires economic growth to work; when

economic growth cannot be generated, the presidency cannot work.42
State crisis and the crisis of the American presidency are inextricably
linked.
Given the “impasse” that faces the nation and the presidency, how
might a deep presidency approach—a structural theory of the office—
help us view the modern presidency with greater clarity? A brief look
at the Obama presidency might steer us toward some answers. Barack
Obama came to power at a time when America faced an “impasse”
unrivaled by any President since the Great Depression in terms of
the depth of the recession he inherited coupled with the disastrous
war in Iraq and the prospect of an endless war on terror. One thing
seems fairly clear: if the market can be viewed as a “prison,” President
Obama certainly was a “voluntary captive.” While Jacobs and King
recently contended that as both a candidate and an office-holder,
Obama sought the “overhaul of American political economy,” such
an assessment seems like an overstatement of vast proportions, or
at least a misreading of the word “overhaul.” Despite his uplifting
campaign 2008 rhetoric of hope and change, Obama assumed office
as, in the words of one of his advisors, “a visionary minimalist.”43
He seemed captive of the same business and financial mindset of
George W. Bush. As Joseph Peschek has argued: “Under Obama, the
country has moved in directions, in both domestic and foreign policy,
that reveal at least as much continuity with, as departures from, the
record of his predecessor.”44 Robert Kuttner documented a “startling
continuity” with the interests and personnel of Wall Street bankers
and financiers, with the new president responding to the political
moment of his time with an endorsement of the old order his election
was intended to rectify with his much-promised audacity. As another
analyst summed it up, “Obama had taken office at a true populist
moment that demanded more than this.”45
President Obama’s centrist approach to governing came as more
of a surprise to liberals and progressives than it should have. Well
before the election of 2008, many observers had pointed out that in
both his personal character and his policy inclinations Obama was
not the transformative figure he was often made out to be in most of
the mainstream media. As Larissa MacFarquhar described him in her
in-depth account in The New Yorker some 18 months before the elec-
tion, “In his view of history, in his respect for tradition, in his skepti-
cism that the world can be changed any way but very, very slowly,
Obama is deeply conservative.”46 Others saw clear signs of his conven-
tional approach to economic and foreign affairs in those pre-election
months as well.47 Obama can be viewed as what Burns once termed a

“transactional leader,” not a “transforming leader.”48 A transactional
leader thrives on bargaining and accommodating within the given
system, whereas a transforming leader seeks to respond to human
needs by transcending or even reconstructing the political system.
Months prior to the 2008 election, economist and columnist Paul
Krugman put it this way with reference to progressive activists dur-
ing the presidential primary season: “They convinced themselves that
he was a transformational figure behind a centrist facade. They may
have had it backward.”49 In light of the President’s continued strides
toward bipartisanship and accommodation on a range of issues in
the face of an intransigent Republican Party—even after such efforts
were doomed to be met with rebuff—Krugman appears prescient.
Obama’s adoption of the conservative framing of the budget deficit as
the number one issue facing the nation, and his relative silence of the
issue of climate change during his first term and the early years of his
second are but two examples among many.
The climate Obama inherited, though, was dominated by the ide-
ology of “neoliberalism”—a way of looking at politics and economics
that arose in the late 1970s as a profoundly conservative response
to the structural challenges to economic growth worldwide. Indeed,
neoliberalism has been the dominant global elite strategy in response
to the slowdown in postwar economic expansion. The “impasse”
that surfaced during the Nixon presidency had a profound impact on
subsequent presidents. The rise of neoliberalism generally is demar-
cated by the beginning of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s
Conservative Party leadership 1979 and the election of Reagan in
1980. The shift in the United States, though, really began in the final
two years of the Carter administration, lurching even more sharply
rightward during the Reagan Revolution from 1981–1989, and con-
solidated during Bill Clinton’s “New Democrat” policies. And today,
neoliberalism is the reigning capitalist orthodoxy worldwide, the man-
tra of corporate-led globalization. At the heart of roughly 35 years
of neoliberalism is a worship of the “free market” and a rejection—
disdain, really—of government, especially any attempt on the part
of government to help the less fortunate or promote social justice.
Political economist and geographer David Harvey, one of the leading
chroniclers of neoliberal thought, describes it as a theory of political
economy that “proposes that human well-being can best be advanced
by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within
an institutional framework characterized by strong private property
rights, free markets, and free trade.” He continues, “The role of the
state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropri-

ate to such practices,” practices that rest on a thin notion of freedom
that “degenerates into a mere advocacy of free enterprise. 50 Beyond
solidifying these conditions, the states’ role is minimal, at best, for
neoliberals. Elsewhere Harvey has explained that neoliberal ideology
adheres to one fundamental universal principle:
There shall be no serious challenge to the absolute power of money

to rule absolutely. And that power is to be exercised with one objec-
tive. Those possessed of money power shall not only be privileged to
accumulate wealth endlessly at will, but they shall have the right to
inherit the earth, taking either direct or indirect dominion not only
of the land and all the resources and productive capacities that reside
therein, but also assume absolute command, directly or indirectly, over
the labor and creative potentialities of all those others it needs. The
rest of humanity shall be deemed disposable. 51
Neoliberalism brings to fruition the worst fears of Karl Polanyi who,

in his 1944 masterpiece The Great Transformation, warned that “to
allow the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of
human beings and their natural environment . . . would result in the
demolition of society.”52 Such demolition could not come soon enough
for many neoliberals, beholden as they are to Thatcher’s famous dec-
laration, “There’s no such thing as society; there are only individual
men and women, and there are families.” The neoliberal principles
reject Keynesian economic philosophy—taxation, spending, govern-
ment regulation of the economy—in favor of strict laissez-faire beliefs.
Again, Thatcher justified her harsh approach to welfare with a blunt
acronym—TINA—which stood for There Is No Alternative.
In the context of the United States, neoliberalism has meant an
attack on the New Deal, welfare state policies of FDR—the founda-
tion on which the modern theory of the presidency was built. In place
of FDR’s role for an active state, Reagan proposed to lead the United
States into the twenty-first century by recreating the conditions of the
latter part of the nineteenth, prompting some observers to deem this
the arrival of a “new Gilded Age.” Although there is certainly nothing
natural or inevitable about the core ideas of neoliberalism, they have
come to define much of the terrain of political debate in the United
States, appearing as “common sense.” Included in these ideas are
severe cutbacks in government-funded programs, particularly provi-
sions for social welfare; deregulation of the economy; lax enforcement
of remaining rules and regulations; open hostility to labor unions;
privatization of anything possible, particularly public services, along

with the demonization of everything public; and public-private part-
nerships in the delivery of other services. As a cluster of interrelated
practices, these policies constitute “a retreat of democracy and an
enlargement of privatized ways of organizing social life.”53 They
also undermine some of the premises of the modern presidency, con-
structed as it was on a Rooseveltian foundation. This is the deeper
structure—the draconian environment of neoliberal political economy
and a reassertive national security strategy—inherited by Presidents
Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. We now turn our
attention to a detailed analysis of their presidencies, as seen through
the lens of a structural theory of the presidency—a deep presidency
view—which takes more seriously than did Woodrow Wilson, “the
very structure and operation of society itself, of which government is
only the instrument.”
Chapter Three
Bill Clinton and the

Neoliberal Presidency
I used to think if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the

president or the pope or a .400 baseball hitter. But now I want to come
back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody.
—Clinton adviser James Carville
The Political Context of the Clinton

Presidency
Bill Clinton’s election in 1992 brought an end to a period in which
the Republican Party had controlled the White House for 12 consecu-
tive years, and for 20 of the previous 24 years. Clinton won 32 states
and the District of Columbia for 370 electoral votes, compared to
18 states and 168 electoral votes for President George H. W. Bush.
Clinton was able to capture four of the 11 states of the southern
Confederacy (Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Georgia), though
he garnered only a plurality of the nationwide popular vote (43 per-
cent). In an unusually strong showing for an independent candidate,
Texas businessman H. Ross Perot received nearly 19 percent of the
popular vote. With his reelection in 1996, Clinton became the first
Democratic President since Franklin D. Roosevelt to serve two full
terms as president.
As Bill Clinton campaigned for president in 1992, how had the ter-
rain of politics been shaped by the structural factors we foreground
in our analysis, especially by changes in the character and direction
of the American political economy? The dominant characteristic was
a “Right-turn” in American politics that accompanied and responded
to the economic downturn, stagflation, and crisis of profitability in
the 1970s. This turn was not a response to any upsurge of conserva-
tism in public opinion. Rather, working through a network of think
tanks, policy organizations, and media outlets, business elites and
conservative political actors mobilized to discredit post–World War
II economic and social liberalism and to some extent the New Deal
itself. Economist Thomas I. Palley distinguishes between the domi-

nant pre-1980 and post-1980 growth models. Before 1980, economic
policy, building on Keynesian insights, aimed at full employment and
linked wage and productivity gains in a “virtuous circle of growth.”
After 1980 a commitment to full employment was abandoned and the
link between productivity and wage growth was severed. “Adherents
of the neo-liberal orthodoxy made controlling inflation their primary
policy concern, and set about attacking unions, the minimum wage,
and other worker protections. Meanwhile, globalization brought
increased foreign competition from lower-wage economies and the
prospect of off-shoring of employment,” Palley notes.1 Over time this
set of macroeconomic policies would come to be known as neoliberal-
ism.2 The new emphasis was on business-oriented tax cuts, economic
deregulation, reductions in social safety net programs, and attacks on
the power of labor unions.
While the Right-turn is most strongly associated with President
Ronald Reagan (1981–1989), it is important to note the administra-
tion of the last Democratic president, Jimmy Carter (1977–1981), was
also marked by, and in several ways originated, a shift to the Right.
Especially from late 1978 onward Carter embraced fiscal conserva-
tism, balanced budgets, a version of supply-side economics and the
deregulation of the airline, railroad, and trucking industries. He also
appointed Paul Volcker as chair of the Federal Reserve System in 1979.
Volcker, aiming to curb inflation, adopted a restrictive monetary
policy that reduced economic growth and led to a severe recession.
Finally, in national security policy, Carter reversed the post-Vietnam
decline in defense spending and in reaction to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan identified the Middle East as a strategic area of US inter-
ests, laying the groundwork for repeated US military interventions in
that region in the decades since. This led some observers to call Carter
the most conservative Democratic president since Grover Cleveland
(1885–1889, 1893–1897).3
During the Reagan years some Democratic Party leaders moved to
adapt themselves to the conservative environment by courting busi-
ness interests and countering the progressive presidential campaigns
of Jesse Jackson in 1984 and 1988. Part of this dynamic was evident
in the 1984 presidential campaign, as related by economics writer
Jeff Faux:
Former vice-president Walter Mondale, the Democratic nominee, orig-

inally wanted to run on a plan to save American manufacturing jobs.
But after a few dinners with Wall Street contributors (organized by
Bill Clinton and the Neoliberal Presidency 37
Robert Rubin of Goldman Sachs, later Bill Clinton’s Treasury secre-

tary), who were more worried about keeping bond prices up than the
unemployment rate down, he switched to a pledge to reduce the federal
deficit, even if it meant raising taxes.4
After Mondale’s drubbing by Reagan, Democratic National Committee

chair Paul Kirk established the Democratic Policy Commission. An
early statement of principles was an effort, according to a Democratic
insider, “to get out from under the false image that Democrats are
weak on defense, have weird life styles and are big taxers and spend-
ers.”5 Democratic leaders stepped up their bids for corporate con-
tributions. California Congressman Tony Coelho became head of
the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). He
described his role this way,
What I wanted was to make the DCCC like a business. What I have now
is a business that is successful. My business had no assets, and today has
five million dollars in assets. My business had no income, and today we
open up our doors every month and get three hundred thousand dollars
in direct mail. The business of politics is what I’m all about.6
Perhaps the most significant indicator of the new direction among

Democratic elites was the formation in 1985 of the Democratic
Leadership Council (DLC) and its think tank the Progressive Policy
Institute. The DLC had a political base among Southern and Western
office-holders and enjoyed considerable corporate funding. It advo-
cated free trade, free markets, and fiscal discipline. The DLC had
been formed by Democrats who wanted to “move the party—both
in substance and in perception—back to the mainstream of American
political life,” in the words of Senator Sam Nunn, an early Clinton
supporter.7
In April 1989 DLC director Al From flew to Little Rock where he
reportedly told then-Governor Clinton, “Have I got a deal for you.
If you take the DLC chairmanship, we will give you a national plat-
form, and I think you will be president of the United States.”8 Clinton
served as DLC chair in 1990–1991. According to Jon F. Hale,
As DLC chair, Clinton worked the DLC network assiduously, with

his extensive travel paid for by the DLC. In return, he received key
early money, campaign workers, and endorsements from among those
associated with the DLC. Perhaps most important, the DLC’s policy
development efforts provided Clinton with the ready-made message
and agenda of the New Democrats to use in his campaign.9
According to Kenneth Baer’s sympathetic history of the DLC, the

group provided Clinton “entrée into the Washington and New York
fundraising communities.” In the early 1992 primaries, Baer writes,
“financially, Clinton’s key Wall Street support was almost exclusively
DLC-based.”10
When he announced his candidacy for president in October 1991,
Clinton said: “The change I seek and the change that we all must
seek, isn’t liberal or conservative. It’s different and it’s both.”11 In
1992 Clinton declared: “I got into this race for president because I
was tired of Republican neglect and Democratic allegiance to pro-
grams that were outmoded. I thought we ought to have a third way.”12
The 1992 Democratic Party platform reflected DLC New Democrat
themes. Hale explains that of the 51 specific agenda-item subheadings
in the platform, 37 were in agreement with items in the DLC’s New
Choice agenda, and nothing in the platform was in disagreement with
DLC priorities.13
Clinton’s record as Arkansas governor and his campaign funding
sources raised doubts about commitment to fundamental change in
economic policy. Clinton governed Arkansas as a business-friendly
Democrat, who forged close ties with large corporations like
International Paper, Tyson Foods, Wal Mart, and the Stephens invest-
ment banking firm. Some critics noted the cost of such policies in pol-
luted waterways and toxic waste sites, a regressive state tax structure,
and strained relations with organized labor.14 Bill Becker, head of the
Arkansas AFL-CIO, said of Clinton, “This guy will pat you on the
back and piss down your leg.”15
Bill Clinton enjoyed an exceptionally well-financed campaign in
1992.16 In addition to support from industries in his native Arkansas,
Clinton was backed by many figures from investment banking, com-
puters, and capital-intensive exporters. Barrie A. Wigmore, a limited
partner at Goldman Sachs & Co. Wall Street securities firm, said of
Clinton, “He’s pro-markets. At last we have a president who has a
sense of the importance of entrepreneurship, and a Democrat who
won’t be a Luddite.”17 These business Democrats were unlikely to
support major challenges to economic orthodoxy.
During the presidential campaign, Bill Clinton branded himself as
a “different kind of Democrat” attuned to the values and concerns
of the white middle class. His themes of opportunity, responsibility,
and community were influenced by his association with the DLC and
were intended to differentiate him from both Reagan-Bush conserva-
tism and the liberal wing of the Democratic Party.18 Political Scientist
Walter Dean Burnham states flatly that “in 1992 Clinton ran explicitly
as a ‘New Democrat,’ in no way identified with the liberal core of the

national party or its unsuccessful presidential nominees.”19
That may be going too far. While sounding New Democrat themes,
Clinton also championed populist change in economic policy and con-
tended that under Republican presidents, “The rich get the gold mine
and the middle class gets the shaft.” A slogan at his campaign head-
quarters (“It’s the economy, stupid. And don’t forget health care”)
announced Clinton’s intention to focus on the economy “like a laser
beam.” Putting People First, the platform of the Clinton-Gore ticket,
proposed large public investments in defense conversion, education,
environmental technology, and infrastructure. This ambitious agenda
also contained a national service program for young people, a national
health insurance plan, a proposal to increase the minimum wage, and
support for a bill to prohibit the hiring of permanent replacements for
striking workers. Journalist John Judis wrote that “these measures
amounted to the most ambitious legislative agenda since Lyndon
Johnson’s Great Society.”20 Clinton proposed to cut the federal deficit
in half by 1996, while finding $200 billion in new revenues, roughly
half of which would go into cleaning up the environment and renovat-
ing US transportation and communications systems. 21
Clinton’s economic strategy was supported by over three hundred
economists, including six Nobel Prize winners, who applauded his
call for increased public investment to overcome the “silent depres-
sion” of the Reagan-Bush years. 22 Robert Reich, who would become
Clinton’s secretary of labor, supported his old friend’s economic pol-
icy: “The centerpiece of the Clinton plan is a major increase in public
investment in education, training, and infrastructure.” He went on to
claim that the Clinton economic strategy
recognizes that the best way to spur productivity is by investing in

people directly: ensuring that infants get adequate nutrition and health
care, preschoolers have adequate day care and Head Start, kids have
good schools, teenagers who don’t go on to college get a chance to
develop productive skills, those who are eligible for college can afford
to go, workers can get good on-the-job training, and all who wish
can upgrade their skills. It also recognizes the importance of roads,
airports, toxic waste facilities, fiber-optic information networks, and
high-speed trains—the infrastructure that supports human capital. 23
Our point is that the Clinton campaign of 1992 blended New Democrat
and progressive, even social democratic, themes that appealed to a
wide variety of constituents and interests. 24
Many observers thought that Clinton would bring a fundamentally

different model of political economy than neoliberalism. During the
campaign the New York Times reported that “Mr. Clinton wants to
pull the American economy in the direction of the managed capital-
ism found in Japan and Western Europe, where governments play a
larger role than Washington in shaping industries and markets.”25
British journalist Martin Walker supported this view, reporting that
Clinton was very knowledgeable about European social democracy
and admired Germany’s combination of export-led economic growth
and a generous welfare state with advanced industrial job training.26
These readings of Clinton pertained to the debate on his candidacy
on the political Left. Several writers associated with the democratic
socialist magazine Dissentt argued that Clinton was a European-style
social democrat, albeit in “stealth” form. Harold Meyerson, execu-
tive editor of the LA Weekly, contended that more than any viable
presidential contender in 1992, “Clinton looks to the socio-economic
arrangements of continental capitalism for ways to fix the U.S. econ-
omy.” Meyerson downplayed Clinton’s affiliation with the DLC and
noted the congruence of Clinton’s ideas with the views of liberal intel-
lectuals such as William Julius Wilson and E. J. Dionne on the need
for broad-based social programs. 27Other progressive political ana-
lysts were much more skeptical of Clinton. The Nation ran a number
of articles that were highly critical of the Arkansas governor for sup-
porting the Gulf War, capital punishment, and a punitive approach
to welfare reform. Matthew Rothschild, publisher and later editor of
the Progressive, wrote,
How could I vote for someone who left the primary campaign trail to
see a convict executed in his home state of Arkansas? How could I vote
for someone who supported the Gulf War and places himself to the
right of George Bush on foreign policy? How could I vote for someone
who blames welfare mothers for being poor?28
Assessing Clintonomics
As Bill Clinton campaigned for the presidency in 1992, the nation was
recovering from a recession that lasted eight months, from July 1990
to March 1991. While not an especially long downturn, the econ-
omy recovered slowly in the early 1990s, with the unemployment rate
reaching nearly 8 percent as late as June 1992. When Clinton took
office as president on January 20, 1993, any number of indicators
pointed to profound challenges to the ability of Americans to enjoy a

secure and prosperous quality of life. In 1992 an estimated 36.9 mil-
lion Americans, or 14.5 percent of the population, lived in poverty,
according to the Census Bureau. The government defined a person
in poverty as anyone living in a family of four that made less than
$14,335, a line many experts believe at least 50 percent too low. Even
using official definitions, 21.9 percent of children lived in poverty, and
rates were higher for African Americans and Hispanic Americans.
More than 40 percent of poor people worked in 1992, and many
worked full time. 29 Since 1973 real family income had remained flat,
despite the growing number of two-income families. Real wages of
private, non-supervisory workers had declined by about 10 percent,
calling into question the American dream of upward mobility and
a better life for one’s children. From 1991 to 1993 new jobs were
created at a much slower rate than in previous rebounds from reces-
sion, leading to talk of a “jobless recovery.”30 In 1993 the number of
Americans below the poverty line increased by over a million and the
median family income fell, an unprecedented development for the sec-
ond year of an economic recovery. 31
Low-wage employment grew faster than any other kind. The
Washington Postt described this sector as “a risky and often cruel
world where good workers bounce from employment to unemploy-
ment, to welfare and back, accumulating long resumes of low-pay,
low-skill, dead-end jobs, worrying about health insurance, child care
and the employee pension they may never get.”32 Economic insecurity
also gripped the educated middle class, whose incomes had failed to
keep pace with inflation and who were increasingly subject to corpo-
rate downsizing. Robert Reich coined the termed the “anxious class”
to refer to millions of middle-class Americans “who no longer can
count on having their jobs next year, or next month, and whose wages
have stagnated or lost ground to inflation.”33
Record levels of income and wealth inequality revealed that at least
a few Americans had done very well indeed in the 1980s. In 1989
the top 4 percent of America’s workforce earned as much in wages
and salaries as the bottom 51 percent, compared to 1970 when the
top 4 percent earned as much as the bottom 38 percent. Between
1977 and 1989, 60 percent of the total growth in after-tax income of
all Americans went to the richest 1 percent of US families, reported
the Congressional Budget Office. The bottom 80 percent of families
received just 6 percent of total income growth in the same period. 34
Thus the evidence pointed to a long-term reversal in the economic
advances many Americans had made in the post–World War II
decades, a situation ripe for a presidential candidate espousing pro-

grams of fundamental economic change. To what extent was Clinton
able to change the terms of economic policy? We argue that while there
were important differences between Clinton’s approach and those of
his Republican predecessors, the principal effect of Clintonomics was
to lock-in the Right-turn in public policy and to champion a corpo-
rate-oriented and Wall Street-friendly neoliberal growth model whose
defects would come home to roost in the following decade.
A centerpiece of Clinton’s first year in office was the struggle over
a four-year plan for stimulating the economy and lowering the bud-
get deficit, presented in February 1993. The $493 billion plan was
divided between tax increases and spending cuts, with two thirds of
the funds going to deficit reduction. About $160 billion was to go for
the public investments that Clinton had championed in the campaign,
such as programs aimed at children and families, the nation’s infra-
structure, high technology, and worker training. Clinton also called
for an immediate $30 billion stimulus program to create 500,000
new jobs, not all fulltime, in the short term. New tax revenues were
to come from an increase in the top income tax rate from 31 percent
to 36 percent and a new energy tax, among other sources. 35 Clinton’s
plan did not include the middle-class tax cut he had promoted during
the campaign. His proposals took account of a new set of higher defi-
cit projections by the outgoing Bush administration and reflected the
views of a subset of his advisers who were committed to fiscal auster-
ity. As a New York Times analysis at the time put it, “The new figures
handed a powerful weapon to a group of advisers who came to be
known as the ‘deficit hawks’ and, behind their backs, as the ‘pain-is-
good’ crowd because of their belief that spending cuts or higher taxes
were needed to bring the Federal deficit under control.”36
Democrats enjoyed a solid majority in both chambers of Congress.
However Clinton’s short-term economic stimulus package, down
to $16 billion from $30 billion by March of 1993, was killed by a
Republican filibuster. In comparison the Japanese announced a
$117 billion government stimulus package at about the same time
for an economy much smaller than America’s. 37 Clinton’s call for a
tax on the heat content of fuel (the “BTU” or British thermal units
tax) passed the House but died in the Senate amidst intense opposi-
tion from the manufacturing, coal, and transportation industries. It
was replaced with a modest increase in the federal gasoline tax. In
early August a watered-down version of Clinton’s proposals passed
Congress with no Republican votes and with Vice President Al Gore
casting a tie-breaking vote in the Senate. The legislation, known as
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, contained progressive ele-

ments, such as an increase in the top tax rate for 1.2 million high-
income Americans and an expansion of the earned income tax credit
for about 15 million low-income people, many of whom were “work-
ing poor.” But in order to win support, Clinton delayed asking for
labor law reform and a hike in the minimum wage and dropped his
proposal to require employers to pay 1.5 percent of their payroll tax
for worker training.38
After seven months in office, the priorities of Bill Clinton’s economic
policies had shifted. During his presidential campaign, Clinton identi-
fied “twin deficits” confronting the nation: the federal budget deficit
and a public investment deficit.39 Once in office Clinton focused more
on the budget deficit while his long-term public investment policy was
dramatically scaled back. According to one analysis, whereas President
Bush’s last budget increased spending on infrastructure, education,
and training by more than 8 percent, Clinton’s first budget cut public
investment in the same categories by nearly 1 percent.40 Policy debates
were framed by the argument that deficit reduction, austerity policies,
and business confidence were the keys to attaining economic growth.
According to this theory, a lower budget deficit means less government
borrowing, which makes more money available for private sector bor-
rowing, which leads to lower interest rates, more private investment,
and greater economic growth. There were strong reasons to question
the logic of this theory at the time.41 Nonetheless the prioritization of
deficit reduction became more and more dominant politically. This
Right turn in the discourse of economic policymaking was noted by
several observers, who found that “President Clinton is proclaim-
ing the same hard-nosed economic propositions that George Bush
and Ronald Reagan proclaimed as their guiding principle.” Another
report noted that “Mr. Clinton has failed to overcome the inertia
of the established political system. The bill Congress will vote on
later this week bears a striking resemblance to the budget agreement
that President George Bush and Congress struck in 1990.”42 In his
book The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House, Bob Woodward
reported that the president was himself dismayed by the conservative
trajectory of his own policies: “We’re Eisenhower Republicans here,
and we are fighting the Reagan Republicans.”43 Woodward’s book
makes clear that the Clinton administration’s concern about business
confidence from Wall Street reinforced an emphasis on budget deficit
reduction, while trends in the bond market functioned as a structural
constraint on policy.44 On economic issues Clinton was governing
more like a New Democrat than the Social Democrat some on the
Left had hoped for.
Why did this happen? Republican intransigence, and defections by
conservative Democrats, helps to explain the trajectory of policy. Inside
the executive branch an important role in shaping policy decisions was
played by economic officials with strong ties to corporate and financial
interests. Lloyd Bentsen, a conservative Democratic Senator from Texas
with substantial real-estate holdings and past board positions with
banks and insurance companies, was tapped for Treasury secretary.
Roger Altman, vice-chair of the Blackstone Group investment bank-
ing firm, became Bentsen’s deputy at the Treasury Department. Robert
Rubin, a co-chair of Wall Street’s Goldman Sachs & Co, headed the
National Economic Council and succeeded Bentsen as Treasury sec-
retary. Bentsen, Altman, and Rubin allied with “deficit hawks” Leon
Panetta and Alice Rivlin of the Office of Management and Budget and
with Federal Reserve chair Alan Greenspan to thwart more progressive
fiscal policies and to reinforce an emphasis on deficit reduction. Clinton’s
political appointments drew as heavily from the corporate community
and from elite policy networks as did those of his predecessors.45
These factors should be placed in the context of other ways in
which business interests exercised influence. Political scientist Thomas
Ferguson argued that Clinton “captured the White House by relying
on a powerful but very thin wedge of support within big business.”
According to Ferguson, “Clinton never succeeded in expanding that
base. Instead, most of American business opposed him from his earli-
est days in office, when he proposed a modest increase in taxes on
Americans in the highest income brackets.”46 Opposition from busi-
ness helps to explain why, during his first year in office, Clinton
moved away from the “comprehensive national strategy” on the econ-
omy he had touted during the campaign. Despite some initial busi-
ness support, most business interests came out in opposition to key
elements of Clinton’s program. They played the inside game and the
outside game in lobbying members of the administration and mem-
bers of Congress. Representing small business, the 600,000-member
National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), was especially
active in opposing Clinton’s budget plan. The NFIB joined with the
American Energy Alliance (AEA) to fight successfully Clinton’s pro-
posed BTU energy tax. Financed and organized by the United States
Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers,
and the American Petroleum Institute, the AEA paid for local televi-
sion advertisements, staged news events, and patch-through phone
networks to create the appearance of grassroots opposition to the
BTU tax.47 The anti-energy tax coalition also used more traditional
forms of lobbying. Speaking to a trade group of oil wildcatters while
the House was considering the energy bill, Treasury Secretary Lloyd
Bentsen stated, “We’ve had over 8,000 business and interest groups
who have come to the Treasury wanting changes. We’ve made many
of them. We wanted to listen and we wanted to hear.”48
In 1994 Clinton suffered a major setback in the midterm elections,
in which Republicans, under the leadership of Newt Gingrich, took
control of the House of Representatives, as well as the Senate. This
was the first time Republicans controlled both chambers of Congress
since the early 1950s. While the effect of the election was to shift
the center of gravity of American politics to the Right, we contend
that the conservative shift in economic policy preceded the election,
while Democrats still enjoyed united party control of government. In
the run-up to the 1996 presidential election Clinton practiced “trian-
gulation.” Influenced by conservative adviser Dick Morris, Clinton
distanced himself from congressional Democrats.49 In his January
1996 State of the Union Address Clinton stated, “The era of big gov-
ernment is over.” He went on to add, “But we cannot go back to the
time when our citizens were left to fend for themselves.” By this time,
under pressure from Republicans, Clinton had agreed to a plan to bal-
ance the federal budget by 2002. In August 1997 Clinton signed the
Balanced Budget Act, proclaiming, “After decades of deficits, we have
put America’s fiscal house in order again.” Even without the legisla-
tion, deficits were coming down, due to the combined effects of the
1993 tax legislation and steady economic growth. The budget came
into surplus in 1998 and remained so through 2001. Defending his
fiscal conservatism Clinton claimed, “The liberal left parties in the
rich countries should be the parties of fiscal discipline. It is a liberal,
progressive thing to balance the budget and run surpluses if you’re in
a rich country today.”50 In contrast we think that the prioritization
of balanced budgets established a structural constraint on democratic
politics and affirmed the Right-turn in American politics since the
1970s. As economist Michael Meeropol explains in his 1998 book
Surrender,r the attachment to balanced budgets rests on the theoreti-
cal claim that “individuals pursuing their self-interest and constrained
only by competition will interact in such a way as to produce the best
of all possible (economic) results.” Hence “government should stay
out of the way as much as possible.” Practically, Meeropol notes, “the
requirement of a balanced budget provides significant support for
policymakers who do not wish to expand government spending on
programs that might be popular.”51
Another problematic feature of Clinton’s second term was the pas-

sage of several pieces of legislation that contributed to the deregulation
of the financial sector and the growth of economic inequality. In 2011
Clinton penned an article for Newsweek on 14 ways to put America
back to work. In a section on “Deals to Make Things” Clinton wrote,
“The real thing that has killed us in the last 10 years is that too much
of our dealmaking creativity has been devoted to expanding the
financial sector in ways that don’t create new businesses and more
jobs and to persuading people to take on excessive debt loads to make
up for the fact that their incomes are stagnant.”52 Clinton could have
been talking about the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, the Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999, and the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000, all of which he abetted and signed.
First, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 lowered the long-term cap-
ital gains tax rate from 28 percent to 20 percent. When President
Clinton signed the legislation, with Speaker Gingrich at his side, he
stressed the benefits of the legislation for the middle class, such as
education and child credits. By tax filing day in 1998 the cut in the
capital gains rate meant that the wealthiest 1 percent of taxpayers
received $1,189 of tax benefits in 1997 for each dollar of tax relief
received by the bottom 80 percent of Americans—the 97.6 million
tax-paying households that earned less than $59,000 in 1997. An
analysis by the Citizens for Tax Justice that was not disputed by the
government claimed that over its first five years the capital gains tax
cuts would amount to an estimated $87 billion, of which 81 percent
would go to the top 5 percent, while less than 2 percent of the capital
gains tax cut would benefit the bottom 60 percent. 53 It also contained
a tax exemption for home sales that arguably contributed to the hous-
ing bubble of over-inflated home values that would burst in the fol-
lowing decade. 54
Second, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, also known as the Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999, repealed part of the New Deal-
era Glass-Steagall Act, removing barriers in the market among finan-
cial institutions. Commercial banks, investment banks, insurance
companies, and other financial services companies were allowed to
consolidate in new ways. The law consolidated an ongoing revolution
in American banking in which many financial rules and regulations
had already been relaxed. But the effect was to encourage high-risk
speculation on Wall Street. As Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph
Stiglitz put it, “When repeal of Glass-Steagall brought investment and
commercial banks together, the investment-bank culture came out on
top. There was a demand for the kind of high returns that could be
obtained only through high leverage and big risk-taking.”55 Among the
eight Senators who voted against the bill was Democrat Paul Wellstone
of Minnesota. He warned that, “‘Glass-Steagall was intended to pro-
tect our financial system by insulating commercial banking from
other forms of risk. It was one of several stabilizers designed to keep a
similar tragedy from recurring. Now Congress is about to repeal that
economic stabilizer without putting any comparable safeguard in its
place.”56 Documents released in 2014 show that Clinton’s advisers
downplayed the risks of financial deregulation. According to a care-
ful analysis by Dan Roberts of the UK-based Guardian, “Clinton’s
advisers repeatedly reassured him that the decision to let Wall Street
dismantle regulatory barriers designed to protect the public after the
Great Depression simply represented inevitable modernization.” The
Financial Services Modernization Act gave a retrospective clearance
for the merger of Citigroup and Travelers Group and portended a
wave of financial consolidation. According to Roberts,
The White House papers show only limited discussion of the risks of
such deregulation, but include a private note which reveals that details
of a deal with Citigroup to clear its merger in advance of the legislation
were deleted from official documents, for fear of it leaking out. ‘Please
eat this paper after you have read this,’ jokes the hand-written 1998
note addressed to Gene Sperling, then director of Clinton’s National
Economic Council. 57
Third, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 passed

Congress in late 2000 as a 262-page deregulatory bill inserted as a rider
into an 11,000-page conference report. The bill limited the ability of
the government to regulate financial instruments such as derivatives
and credit default swaps. The market value of these high-risk instru-
ments mushroomed in the following decade, rising in value from $106
trillion in 2001 to $531 trillion in 2008. 58 When the credit crisis and
mortgage downturn of 2008 occurred, major financial institutions
found themselves at risk of collapse due to problems stemming from
deregulated financial markets. The passage of the legislation in 2000
came after a debate over financial regulation in which Brooksley Born,
the chair of the Commodities Futures Trade Commission (CFTC),
warned that unregulated derivatives could “pose grave dangers to
our economy.” According to several accounts, her concerns were
opposed and even ridiculed by Fed Chair Alan Greenspan, Treasury
Secretary Robert Rubin, Securities and Exchange Commission chair
Arthur Levitt, and later Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers. In
1999 Born asked to be replaced as CFTC chair. The following year

the President’s Working Group on Financial Legislation worked with
legislators such as Texas Republican senator Phil Gramm, chair of
the Banking Committee, to push the legislation through Congress.
Gramm worked with lobbyists from Enron to create an exemption
from regulation for energy trading, dubbed the “Enron loophole.”
Clinton signed the legislation into law on December 21, 2000. Years
later many observers concluded that the effects of the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act had been detrimental for the economy
in ways that vindicated Brooksley Born’s warnings. In 2010, CFTC
chair Gary Gensler stated that the derivatives marketplace “adds up
to higher costs to all Americans.”59
Positive assessments of Clinton’s economic record claim that his
administration “transformed a weak economy into a fundamentally
sound one, turned deficits into surpluses, and created the conditions
for strong future growth.”60 In 2014, as concerns about economic
inequality resurfaced in anticipation of a presidential bid by his wife
in 2016, Clinton defended his legacy. “My commitment was to restore
broad-based prosperity to the economy and to give Americans a
chance,” he said. “You know the rest. It worked out pretty well.”61 In
Clinton’s second term, the economy grew at an annual rate of nearly
4.5 percent and the unemployment rate averaged 4.0 percent in 2000.
In February of 2000 the economic expansion of the 1990s turned 107
weeks old, the longest ever. No recession occurred during Clinton’s
presidency, though one broke out shortly after he left office. In the
late 1990s real wages grew modestly and pay inequality declined
due to such factors as a raise in the minimum wage, strengthening of
the Earned Income Tax Credit, and restraint on interest rates by the
Federal Reserve.
While we acknowledge these positive indicators, we believe that on
balance Clinton’s record on economic policy reveals an administra-
tion straitjacketed by the conventional growth model that we see as
a principal structural constraint operative in the modern presidency.
First, the economic boom of the late 1990s was extremely precarious,
since it had been driven in part by soaring consumer debt, made pos-
sible by rising stock market and real estate values.62 By 2000 Federal
Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan had grown concerned about the
stock market’s “wealth effect” in stimulating inflationary spending
by affluent Americans.63 As economist Dean Baker explains, “The
immediate cause of the prosperity was the demand created by a $10
trillion stock bubble.” In addition the balanced budget under Clinton
was itself a result of the stock bubble. According to the Congressional
Budget Office, “Even with the Clinton administration’s tax increase

and spending cuts we still would have been looking at a substantial
deficit in 2000 had it not been for the stock bubble.”64 Baker also
notes that the reduction in the budget deficit was supposed to lead to
an increase in investment and a fall in the trade deficit. Yet investment
rose only modestly, while the trade deficit widened rapidly as a result
of a high dollar policy begun by Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin in
1995. He concludes, “In short, the Clinton-era policies sent the U.S.
economy on a seriously wrong path. They created an absurd obsession
with budget deficits, a pattern of bubble-driven growth, an incredibly
bloated financial sector and an unsustainable trade deficit.”65
Second, Clinton’s economic policies were in many ways shaped
and constrained by perceptions of how they would be received by
the financial community. Joseph Stiglitz served on Clinton’s Council
of Economic Advisers and then as the chief economist of the World
Bank. He described the 1990s as the decade in which finance reigned
supreme and policymakers deferred to its judgment. Stiglitz charac-
terized this outlook as one in which “Longstanding wisdom, that
there were alternative policies, that different policies affected differ-
ent groups differently, that there were trade-offs, that politics pro-
vided the arena in which the trade-offs were evaluated and choices
were made, was shunted aside.” While he and other advisers thought
this view was wrong, the dominant outlook was one in which “finan-
cial markets, it seemed, represented America’s best interests as well
as their own.”66 We agree with the conclusion of economist Robert
Pollin’s careful analysis of Clintonomics that it was “down-the-line
neoliberalism.” Pollin writes,
Gestures to the least well-off were slight and back-handed, while wages
for the majority remained below their level of the previous generation,
even after three years of raises that accompanied the stock market
boom and productivity surge. Wealth at the top exploded of course.
But the stratospheric rise in stock prices and the debt-financed con-
sumption and investment booms produced a mortgaged legacy. The
financial unraveling had begun even as Clinton was basking in praise
for his economic stewardship.67
Finally, while income inequality was no longer widening as Clinton’s

term came to and end, there was no real reversal of a trend since the
early 1970s of dramatic income gains for the top 20 percent of house-
holds, modest income gains for the middle of the income spectrum,
and declining incomes for those in the bottom 20 percent. By 1999
the richest 2.7 million Americans—the top one percent—had as many

after-tax dollars as the bottom 100 million.68 During Clinton’s last
year in office, the poverty rate fell to 11.3 percent, the lowest rate
since 1974. Still the median household income in 2000 was slightly
lower than in 1999, reflecting sluggish wage growth. Income inequal-
ity was unchanged in 2000, whereas it usually narrows in a recovery.
The biggest gains by far were at the top of the income scale.69 In June
2001, five months after Clinton left office, a Pew Research Center
poll asked respondents if they agreed that the country is divided into
“haves” and “have-nots”: 44 percent agreed, up from 26 percent who
held this view in 1988, when that decade’s boom was coming to a
close. When asked to name the biggest problem facing themselves
and their families, 62 percent cited a financial concern, including not
being able to make ends meet (26 percent), the high cost of housing
(10 percent), and gas and fuel prices (9 percent). A third of those with
family incomes under $50,000 a year reported occasions when they
could not pay their utility bills. The Pew report stated, “Aside from
their income, there is one characteristic which unifies these finan-
cially strapped Americans, and that is their recognition of the precari-
ousness of their position.”70 Developments in the next decade would
continue to feed perceptions of vulnerability.
Social Policy and the Welfare State

“Don’t forget health care” was the second key mantra of Bill
Clinton’s 1992 campaign. After taking office, Clinton named First
Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton to head a White House Task Force on
National Health Care Reform whose purpose was to propose reforms
for a system in which 37 million Americans were uninsured and costs
were skyrocketing. When the reform package, known as the Health
Security Act, was unveiled in the fall of 1993 Americans were asked to
consider a complicated proposal over 1,300 pages in length that rec-
ommended a system of universal coverage through private insurance
companies. At the center of the plan was a mandate for employers to
provide health insurance coverage to their employees through com-
petitive, regionally-based health maintenance organizations. Among
the interest groups with a stake in the plan were big businesses, small
businesses, doctors, hospitals, health insurers, drug companies, labor
unions, the elderly, consumer groups, and state governments. Many
of these interests were to participate in a fierce and well-funded oppo-
sition campaign.
While a complex set of economic interests clearly affected the

health care debate after Clinton’s legislation was introduced, busi-
ness interests played an important role at earlier stages of the policy
formation process.71 Clinton drew on a market-based, managed com-
petition model of cost control and efficiency that was associated with
the Jackson Hole Group, which scholar Theda Skocpol describes as
“a seminar of policy experts and health-industry people” who “hoped
to head off stronger doses of government financing and regulation
that would be a threat to big private insurers and private health care
delivery systems.”72 Financial sponsors of the Jackson Hole Group
included Aetna Life and Casualty, Metropolitan Life, and Prudential
Insurance. As sociologist Beth Mintz points out, the interests and
preferences of the big business community were reflected in the policy
development and legislative drafting processes by the market-based
nature of the reform effort, the relationship between the Clinton plan
and the Jackson Hole Group, and the absence of any serious consid-
eration of a Canadian-style single-payer plan by the Clinton team.73
As historian Colin Gordon points out, with single payer ruled out of
bounds, the Clinton health plan,
at best a muddled creature of the Democratic right, occupied the left

of a very narrow legislative spectrum. On the pretense of compromise
or bipartisanship, the Administration’s plan was inexorably dragged
further to the right, conceding in fits and starts substantial ground to
Republican critics, ‘moderate’ Democrats, and a carefully-manufac-
tured (but false) sense of public doubt.74
The Clinton health care bill was called the most heavily lobbied
piece of legislation in American history. According to a detailed study
by the Center for Public Integrity, special interest groups spent over
$100 million and hired at least 97 law, lobbying, or public relations
firms to influence the outcome of the health care debate. From 1993
through the first quarter of 1994, over $25 million was contributed
to members of Congress by organizations with health-care related
interests, according to Federal Election Commission records. In the
same period members of the five key congressional committees that
worked on health care legislation received over $8 million in Political
Action Committee contributions from health-care related interests.
The Center for Public Integrity found that at least 80 former govern-
ment officials, including 12 former members of Congress, had gone
through the revolving door to work for health-care interests, with 23
of these former officials leaving government in 1993 or 1994.75
During the 1980s and early 1990s, some business interests sup-
ported health care reform, including employer mandates, as a way of
containing and equalizing costs among competing firms. But politi-
cal scientist Cathie Jo Martin concludes that “big business was the
big no-show in the [Clinton] health care reform saga.”76 One reason
for the relative absence of large employers from the political debate,
Martin believes, was the failure of business organizations—under
pressure from vocal minorities, such as insurers and pharmaceuti-
cal companies—to rise above least-common-denominator politics.77
In the early months of the Clinton administration, groups such as
the American Medical Association, the National Association of
Manufacturers, and the United States Chamber of Commerce indi-
cated support for, or at least neutrality about, employer mandates. By
early 1994 these groups, facing pressure from members who feared
rising costs and from conservative politicians opposed to a greater
government role, were disavowing support for mandates. Helping
to crystallize big business opposition was the Business Roundtable’s
withdrawal of support from the Clinton plan in February of 1994 in
favor of the rival Cooper-Breaux plan, a “defining event” in the esti-
mation of Representative John Dingell.78 In April the small-business
oriented NFIB released a study claiming that the Clinton proposal
could cost 1.3 million jobs and result in reduced wages for 23 million
workers. Around the same time the National Restaurant Association
announced a grassroots campaign, including TV advertisements,
against employer mandates. Leading the latter effort was PepsiCo
Inc., owner of nine fast-food chains, including Kentucky Fried
Chicken, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell, then the nation’s second-largest
employer after General Motors.79 Perhaps the best-known products of
the opposition campaign—the “Harry and Louise” advertisements—
were sponsored by the Health Insurance Association of America
(HIAA). HIAA represented midsized and small insurance companies
that were threatened by the cost controls built into Clinton’s health
security plan. By 1993 America’s “big five” insurance companies—
Aetna Life and Casualty, Cigna Corporation, Metropolitan Life,
Prudential Insurance, and Travelers Corporation—had withdrawn
from HIAA, expecting their stakes to expand under new legislation.
HIAA spent up to $15 million on TV advertisements, targeting key
states and districts and helping to increase public uneasiness about
the Clinton plan.80
By the fall of 1994 Clinton’s health care reform plan, perhaps the
major social policy initiative at the national level since the 1960s, had
been gutted by Congress and never received a vote. In addition to the
loss of business support, several other factors help explain this out-
come. Republicans were united in opposition to this bill as they had
been to the 1993 budget package. The political and ideological effects
of a successful health care reform victory for Clinton were revealingly
described by the GOP strategist and neoconservative activist William
Kristol. In a memorandum to Republican leaders, he maintained,
It will relegitimize middle-class dependence for “security” on govern-

ment spending and regulation. It will revive the reputation of the party
that spends and regulates, the Democrats, as the generous protector of
middle-class interests. And it will at the same time strike a punishing
blow against Republican claims to defend the middle class by restrain-
ing government . . . Its success would signal a rebirth of centralized wel-
fare-state policy at the very moment we have begun rolling back that
idea in other areas.81
Organized labor might have been expected to be at the center of a

progressive health-care reform coalition with public interest groups,
but its position in the debate was more complicated. Labor was divided
on which approach to universal coverage it would support. Early
in Clinton’s presidency a number of key unions backed away from
urging Clinton to support a single-payer option.82 Political scientist
Marie Gottschalk demonstrates that legislation passed over several
decades had created deep commitments within the labor movement to
the private, employer-based welfare state and to working in alliance
with business interests on health care policy. She concludes that this
institutional context led labor to misread the business sector:
Business support for a comprehensive health-care reform plan that

unions could live with, even if they could not love it, was ephemeral.
The decision to seek a close alliance with business and support an
employer-mandate solution was a costly one for unions. It yielded few
political gains, but exacerbated cleavages between organized labor and
important public interest groups.83
To what extent did public preferences determine the defeat of

health care reform? According to careful studies of public opinion
by Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, there was solid public sup-
port for key features of Clinton’s plan through early 1994, reflecting
a long-term shift in attitudes from “strong laissez-faire anti-statism
toward a more ambivalent position based on pragmatism—a desire
for protection against the unwanted consequences of the current
or future health system.”84 During 1994 the public became more
uncertain and cautious about the Clinton plan, but Jacobs and
Shapiro contend that “it is simply not the case that public opinion has
dictated policy . . . The public’s attitudinal shift toward conservatism
or caution is the result or echo of deeply divisive political strategies
and policy discussions among political leaders and interest groups.”85
Like the study of Clinton’s 1993 economic policies, the case of health
care reform reveals a conservative dominance in public policy that
was driven in part by the political mobilization of business interests.
As Colin Gordon argues, “In its deference to medical interests and
employment-based provision of care, the CHP [Clinton Health Plan]
underscored the privileged status of private interests in both the health
system and in the broader logic of American politics.”86 These early
policy battles shaped the scope of political discourse within which
later Clinton initiatives were debated. While Clinton was largely suc-
cessful in protecting Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid from
cuts, his major social policy accomplishment turned out to be the
dismantling of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program
(AFDC), which originated as part of the New Deal-era Social Security
Act of 1935.
As a “New Democrat,” Clinton campaigned in 1992 with a vow
to “end welfare as we know it.” While many federal programs pro-
vide “welfare” in some form, the term had become negatively associ-
ated with AFDC, which provided a federal entitlement to assistance
to mainly female-headed low-income families. Many Democrats
thought that support for the racially stereotyped program had
become an electoral liability, especially among white working-class
voters. The attack on welfare reflected a decades-long campaign by
the political Right, joined by conservative Democrats, and underwrit-
ten by corporate-funded think tanks, such as the American Enterprise
Institute, the Cato Institute, and the Heritage Foundation. Clinton
gave many states waivers to experiment with changes to AFDC, but
after the Republican gains in the 1994 elections, he was pressured to
agree to more far-reaching changes to welfare. Clinton vetoed two
bills to dismantle welfare passed by the Republican-led Congress, but
he signaled that he was open to sharp changes in the federal welfare
system. In a remarkable statement in January 1995 Clinton described
the failure of the welfare system as “perhaps the most pressing social
problem we face in our country.”87 Douglas Besharov, a welfare spe-
cialist at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, pointed out
that “the president’s rhetoric has moved the welfare debate sharply
to the right, freeing conservatives to go further than Ronald Reagan
ever dreamed, and undercutting liberal and moderate support for the
status quo.”88 The following year Congress passed and Clinton signed
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, which eliminated AFDC altogether. It was replaced with
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), a new program
that provided block grants to the states to run their own programs.
In order to receive federal funds, states had to impose work require-
ments and a five-year limit on receiving welfare, and were encouraged
to set even more stringent time limits.89
The political economy of the welfare reform legislation was con-
sistent with the broader neoliberal approach to public policy that per-
vaded the Clinton presidency. Ending “entitlements” was said to be
necessary to end “dependency” on government. The transition from
welfare to work was seen as the key to “personal responsibility” even if
it meant entering a precarious, low-wage labor market. The new legis-
lation contained very little support for ensuring that paid work would
provide a path out of poverty. In this context Robert Reich’s description
of Clinton’s approach to welfare reform is worth quoting at length:
When, during his 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton vowed

to “end welfare as we know it” by moving people “from welfare to
work,” he presumably did not have in mind the legislation which he
signed into law in August 1996. The original idea had been to smooth
the passage from welfare to work with guaranteed health care, child
care, job training and a job paying enough to live on. As a result,
former welfare recipients would gain dignity and independence, and
society as a whole would have the benefit of their labors. The 1996
legislation contained none of these supports—no health care or child
care for people coming off welfare, no job training, no assurance of a
job paying a living wage, nor, for that matter, of a job at any wage. In
effect, what was dubbed welfare “reform” merely ended the promise
of help to the indigent and their children which Franklin D. Roosevelt
had initiated more than sixty years before.90
President Clinton touted welfare reform as a major achievement. At

the level of political strategy he and his advisers hoped welfare reform
would make it easier to gain public support for progressive social pol-
icy expansions in the future, an outcome not borne out by the evidence
of public opinion.91 As for the policy effects of the new law, much
early media coverage of the effects of welfare reform focused selec-
tively on reduced caseloads and overlooked standards of evaluation
that might suggest failure.92 Evidence suggested that most welfare-
leavers were working in low-wage service jobs, often without health
insurance. By 1999 one-third to one-half of leavers reported serious
economic struggles in providing food and almost 20 percent reported

problems paying rent.93 The real test of welfare reform would come
with an economic downturn. The recession of 2007–2008 and its
aftermath revealed the existence of large holes in the social safety net,
which led to many vulnerabilities and much hardship. A 2012 report
by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) on the effects of
TANF found, “Over the years, TANF has become less effective both
in assisting working families affected by economic downturns and in
helping very-low-income families in crisis. The result is a weakening
safety net that is falling short of its promise to help families become
self-sufficient and to protect families with children who are unable to
work, often because of health problems.”94
In his speech to the 2012 Democratic National Convention,
Clinton defended Barack Obama against charges of “gutting” wel-
fare reform and defended his own legacy: “So this is personal to me.
We moved millions of people off welfare. It was one of the reasons
that in the eight years I was president, we had a hundred times as
many people move out of poverty into the middle class than hap-
pened under the previous 12 years, a hundred times as many. It’s a
big deal.” In contrast the CBPP report noted, “Over the last 16 years,
the national TANF caseload has declined by 60 percent, even as pov-
erty and deep poverty have worsened. While the official poverty rate
among families declined in the early years of welfare reform, when
the economy was booming and unemployment was extremely low,
it started increasing in 2000 and now exceeds its 1996 level.95 At
the state level the economic downturn created budget pressures to
“keep the needy away,” observed New York Times welfare expert
Jason DeParle. Writing in 2012 DeParle cited studies finding that as
many as one fourth of low-income single mothers were jobless and
without cash aid. He found that in Arizona, “The poor people who
were dropped from cash assistance here, mostly single mothers, talk
with surprising openness about the desperate, and sometimes illegal,
ways they make ends meet. They have sold food stamps, sold blood,
skipped meals, shoplifted, doubled up with friends, scavenged trash
bins for bottles and cans and returned to relationships with violent
partners—all with children in tow.”96 Peter Edelman, who resigned
as assistant secretary of Health and Human Services in 1996 in pro-
test of Clinton signing the welfare bill, points out that in 2014 TANF
was virtually defunct in many states and that six million people had
incomes consisting only of food stamps. According to Edelman, “the
percentage of children in poor families receiving cash assistance
nationally has dropped from 68 percent to 27 percent. In more than
half the states, fewer than 20 percent of children living in poor fami-
lies are receiving TANF.97 Conditions such as these call into ques-
tion the claim that Clinton’s legacy involves inclusive and meaningful
opportunity, responsibility, and community.
Political Conflict and

Electoral Outcomes
Clinton faced strong opposition and sharp hostility from right-wing
political forces during his two terms as president. In our view, the
conflict between Clinton and the Right was a significant factor shap-
ing and constraining his presidency. This was obviously the case after
the Republicans took control of Congress as a result of the elections
of 1994 and during the impeachment crisis of 1998–1999, which was
driven by the most conservative forces within the GOP. Hillary Clinton
gave memorable expression to one view of the relationship between
Bill Clinton and conservatism. In a January 27, 1998, television inter-
view on NBC’s Today program, shortly after allegations about the
president’s affair with Monica Lewinsky surfaced, she referred to the
“vast right wing conspiracy” that was out to get her husband and
bring him down. Conspiracy theories have a bad reputation, for good
reason. Hillary Clinton’s remarks were self-serving. But right-wing
forces really were well-organized, constructing a formidable network
that targeted Clinton throughout his two terms in office.
One interpretation of the conflict between Clinton and the Right
is to see it as a reflection of the 1990s “culture war” between tradi-
tionalists or conservatives and modernists or progressives. Cultural
conservatives relentlessly promoted the view that Clinton was a closet
leftist or a counter-cultural “McGovernik,” as Newt Gingrich once
called him. For those on the traditionalist side of the culture wars,
such as Gingrich, Robert Bork, and William Bennett, Clinton was
the symbol of moral and cultural degeneracy associated with excesses
of the 1960s. Cultural traditionalists and religious evangelicals saw
in the Monica Lewinsky scandal confirmation of their fears about
Clinton. Many political observers have noted the rage and disgust
that Clinton elicited from conservatives. Jeffrey Toobin stated, “The
Republican Party had not just disagreed with Clinton’s policies dur-
ing his administration; it had regarded him with almost feral loath-
ing. From the day Clinton was elected, Republicans described him
as morally unfit and politically illegitimate”98 Similarly Lars-Erik
Nelson contended that the Republican impeachment drive was fueled
by a “deep-seated and almost irrational hatred of Clinton, the man,

that abides within a steady one third of the electorate.” Noting that
Clinton “gave his opponents ample ammunition for their attacks,”
Nelson suggested that Clinton was viewed by his right-wing oppo-
nents from the outset as a usurper. On election night of 1992, Senator
Bob Dole stated that he would represent the 57 percent of the elec-
torate who had voted against Clinton and would filibuster all major
Democratic legislation.99
In their book on right-wing populism, political researchers Chip
Berlet and Matthew Lyons analyze how the conservative anti-Clinton
drive brought together a coalition of social traditionalism, economic
libertarianism, and anti-collectivism. Anti-collectivism is associated
with what the authors call a “conspiracist” subculture replete with
themes of liberal media bias, government tyranny, treason, New
World Order globalism, and satanic One World Government.100 In
earlier periods mainstream conservatives held the Far Right at arm’s
length. But in the 1990s, as Berlet and Lyons explain, “conservative
groups with a more cautious and pragmatic track record appeared
more and more open to right-wing conspiracist allegations that
became the subtexts of the anti-Clinton campaign. The impeachment
struggle demonstrated the extent to which the Republican Party was
willing to enlist (or at least accommodate for political gain) sectors of
the Right that championed apocalyptic conspiracism—the Christian
Right, hard-right ultra-conservatives, and the Patriot and militia
movements.”101
While the culture war hypothesis helps to explain conservative
hostility to Clinton, it has limitations as an explanation of the rela-
tionship between Clinton and the right wing. First, in its emphasis
on cultural values and beliefs, the culture war explanation misses
the extent to which both economic interests and conservative ideol-
ogy within the business community formed the basis for opposition
to Clinton’s policy proposals. Second, the culture war explanation
underplays the role of conservative institutions and networks in con-
structing and mobilizing conservative opposition to Clinton. We will
briefly describe how these institutions and networks expanded and
operated in the 1990s.
During the 1990s, business elites and other conservative forces
poured tens of millions of dollars into national- and state-level policy
organizations and think tanks. These institutions affected the climate
of opinion in which public policy was discussed and formulated at
both national and statewide levels. Many of these policy organiza-
tions received funding from conservative foundations such as the
Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Koch Family Foundation,

the John M. Olin Foundation, the Scaife family foundations (Sarah
Scaife, Carthage, and Allegheny), and the Adolph Coors Foundation.
According to a report by People for the American Way, right-wing
foundations developed a comprehensive funding strategy, providing
grants to a broad range of groups, including national think tanks and
advocacy groups, regional and state-based think tanks, conservative
media sources, and conservative university programs and academic
associations.102 Foundations associated with Richard Mellon Scaife
were particularly active in promoting anti-Clinton campaigns.103
The American Spectator magazine published a series of articles on
Clinton, including a piece by David Brock that led to the Paula Jones
lawsuit. The American Spectator Educational Foundation received
$185,000 from the Bradley Foundation in 1994 and $395,000 from
the Scaife family foundations in the early 1990s.104
Between 1992 and 1994, 12 leading conservative foundations
awarded $210 million to support a wide array of conservative proj-
ects and institutions. Of this amount $79.2 million was awarded to
build and strengthen a national infrastructure of think tanks and
advocacy groups such as the Heritage Foundation, the American
Enterprise Institute, the Cato Institute, the Hudson Institute, the
Manhattan Institute, and the Ethics and Public Policy Center.
Another $16.3 million in grants was provided to help political con-
servatives shape public opinion by financing alternative media out-
lets, media watchdog groups, and the development of conservative
public television and radio programming. In a report by the National
Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, researcher Sally Covington
explains, “This money has supported three interlocking purposes:
the development of right-wing media outlets, the development of con-
servative public affairs programming on public television and radio
and the development of right-wing media critics to assert pressure on
the media mainstream into covering the right’s political and policy
agenda.”105 In a later study by the National Committee for Responsive
Philanthropy, Daniel Callahan showed that the top 20 conservative
think tanks spent $158.1 million in 1996, up sharply from the total
for 1992, and an amount exceeding the $138 million in soft money
contributions to the Republican Party in 1996. Callahan noted that
conservative policy groups “have shown increasing sophistication
in waging high-intensity battles over extended periods of time, bet-
ter coordinating their activities with lobbyists in the private sector,
political operatives in Washington and the states, and activists at the
grassroots.”106
Since the 1970s conservatives have entered into the debate over the
media and politics. On one hand, they tirelessly promoted the view
that the mainstream mass news media is shot through with liberal
bias. Conservative activist William Kristol’s admitted that “The lib-
eral media were never that powerful, and the whole thing was often
used as an excuse by conservatives for conservative failures.”107 On
the other hand, conservatives developed a media network of invective
and abuse of Clinton that involved, among others, talk radio’s Rush
Limbaugh, the American Spectatorr magazine, the Washington Times
newspaper, the Christian Broadcasting Network, and the Wall Street
Journal. They kept alive the Whitewater story, which one study found
gaining three times as much media space as did health care during the
first three months of 1994. The Paula Jones sex tale was also parlayed
by conservatives, including the Reverend Jerry Falwell, who distrib-
uted a video tape containing allegations that Clinton had ordered the
murder of several people in Arkansas who had damaging information
on the former governor.108 The new right-wing media worked closely
with both conservative think tanks and the congressional GOP. New
studies from the Heritage Foundation or the Cato Institute would be
mentioned on the radio by Rush Limbaugh, who would be deluged
with calls from the “dittoheads” requesting copies. The GOP kept
Limbaugh aware of their strategy. As Dan Balz and Ronald Brownstein
note, “As his audience grew, Limbaugh functioned like a trawling
ship for the Right, bringing home nets of new recruits.”109 In addi-
tion, conservative think tanks affected the media by serving as a major
source of both citations and “talking heads.” In 1997 three of the four
most cited think tanks in major media were conservative: the Heritage
Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Cato Institute
(the centrist Brookings Institution held the top spot). According to a
study by the progressive media group FAIR, 54 percent of major media
think tank citations in 1997 came from conservative or right-leaning
think tanks, compared to 30 percent from centrist think tanks and
15 percent from progressive or left-leaning think tanks.110
Conservative legal institutions and personnel played a significant
role in keeping Clinton off-balance in the 1990s. One of the best-
known institutions was the Federalist Society, a major source of
conservative legal talent.111 Founded in 1982, the Federalist Society
claims over 40,000 members, with chapters at 140 law schools. As
Julie Gerchik notes, the Federalist Society “complements the activities
of a number of sophisticated legal advocacy and litigation organiza-
tions on the right, such as the Institute for Justice, the Washington
Legal Foundation, the Center for Individual Rights, and the Pacific
Legal Foundation, among others.”112 These have been supplemented

by a growing number of litigation organizations of the religious Right,
such as Pat Robertson’s American Center for Law and Justice and the
Rutherford Institute. Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr had impor-
tant links to these conservative legal networks, as did attorneys who
assisted with the Paula Jones lawsuit against Clinton. The Federalist
Society received contributions from the John M. Olin, Lynde and
Harry Bradley, Sarah Scaife, and Charles G. Koch Foundations. In
1998 all four of these foundations contributed at least $100,000 to
the Federalist Society, placing them in a group of eight top Federalist
Society contributors.113
In December of 1998 Bill Clinton became only the second president
to be impeached by the House of Representatives. The process that
led to this juncture was a long one, in which conservative political
forces played a powerful role. Even before the Lewinsky saga, business
lobbies and corporate-backed think tanks worked overtime to create
a political climate that threw Clinton off-balance and moved him in
the direction of fiscal conservatism. With few exceptions the US busi-
ness community and the political Right were deeply opposed to even
modest challenges to the hegemony of free enterprise under corporate
auspices. With much exaggeration the Right saw in Clinton and his
electoral base possible challenges to its dominance, challenges that
needed to be deflected or defeated. In the ensuing struggle for ideologi-
cal dominance conservative think tanks played an important role.
Accompanying the growth of a right-wing institutional infrastruc-
ture was the shift of the Republican Party to a more consistent and
coherent conservatism. It is true that Clinton’s presidency suffered a
hammer blow in the fall of 1994, when the Republican opposition
took control of the Senate, last held by the GOP in 1986, and the
House of Representatives, which the Democrats had controlled for
40 years. While such Democratic stalwarts as House Speaker Tom
Foley, New York governor Mario Cuomo, and former House Ways
and Means Committee chair Dan Rostenkowski were voted out of
office, not one incumbent Republican governor, senator, or represen-
tative was defeated. As President Clinton’s approval ratings dipped
below 40 percent in late 1994, a number of media commentators
proclaimed Newt Gingrich, the new Speaker of the House, de facto
leader of the country.
In the wake of this Democratic debacle, supporters and critics of
Clinton cast blame and reached for explanation. Many political writ-
ers castigated Clinton for his indecision, lack of conviction, and over-
eagerness to please. Perhaps the dominant interpretation of Clinton’s
troubles was that he had moved to the Left after taking office, alienat-
ing middle-class voters who wanted him to govern as a moderate “New
Democrat.” Representative David McCurdy of Oklahoma, chairman
of the DLC, articulated this point of view: “The president’s problems
were created because he ran as a New Democrat and has failed to
govern as one.” For DLC president Al From, the 1994 vote proved that
New Deal liberalism had run its course. News analyst Cokie Roberts
had this advice for Clinton: “Move to the right. You can get out the
Democratic base if you need to.”114 Indications that Clinton was fol-
lowing this counsel soon emerged, as the president announced a $25
billion increase in defense spending, cold shouldered Labor secretary
Robert Reich’s proposal to end corporate subsidies, mused about the
positive benefits of school prayer, and forced the resignation of Surgeon
General Jocelyn Elders, a hate object of the Christian Right.115
By contrast we disagree with the claim that Clinton created an
opening for the Right by over-reaching and governing from the Left,
especially in his first two years in office. To explain the 1994 out-
come, we think it is necessary to look beyond elections and public
opinion and to consider broader economic and political factors that
stymied real change and frustrated voters. For example, consider the
analysis of the 1994 elections by Ruy Teixeira and Joel Rogers. They
found that the sharpest falloff in support for the Democrats between
1992 and 1994 was among non-college-educated white men and
women, the group who had suffered the largest wage declines over the
last two decades. Declining living standards hurt the Democrats more
than the Republicans because the dominant story about economic
and social change believed by the public casts wasteful government,
rather than irresponsible corporations and their political allies, as the
villain. They concluded that unless the Democratic Party showed “a
broader willingness to contest business interests and encourage mobi-
lization along class lines, Democrats will continue to be on the defen-
sive and Republicans will continue to have the high ground.”116 This
would involve a break with New Democrat strategy, which implicitly
accepted the dominant story line that big government is the problem.
In 1996 Bill Clinton became the first Democrat to be reelected
president since Franklin Roosevelt, a remarkable recovery from his
position after the 1994 elections. Once again observers disagreed
about the meaning of Clinton’s rebound for the future of American
politics. Some commentators found in Clinton’s reelection a vindi-
cation of a moderate “New Democrat” approach. “He’s buried the
daggers that were aimed at our heart,” said Clinton’s former adviser,
George Stephanopoulos, “weak on crime, weak on welfare, weak
on defense, and that’s a significant accomplishment.”117 Bill Curry,

a former counselor to the president, stated, “The New Democrats
have much of what is required, a belief in the devolution of power,
fiscal restraint, smallness of scale, public-private partnerships and
free markets.” But he added, “The question is, if that’s all there is to
it, then there’s also a really useful name for the people who believe
in it—Republicans.”118 Al From, president of the DLC, approved of
Clinton’s support for a balanced budget by 2002, an end to “welfare
as we know it,” the “V” chip, and school uniforms.119 In his introduc-
tion of Clinton at the DLC’s annual meeting in December of 1996,
From said the president had been re-elected because he “reconnected
the Democratic Party with its real tradition . . . of economic growth
and opportunity, not redistribution.”120 In his own remarks to the
DLC Clinton recognized “the truly stunning array of business lead-
ers who are here today.” The president proclaimed that “today the
clamor of political conflict has subsided. A new landscape is taking
place. The answer is clear: the center can hold, the center has held and
the American people are demanding that it continue to do so.”121
This interpretation of Clinton’s centrism is open to dispute. Stanley
Greenberg, Clinton’s former pollster, pointed out that Clinton made
important gains in 1996 among middle-income voters (those earn-
ing between $30,000 and $50,000 a year) and voters without col-
lege degrees. Greenberg acknowledged that these voters responded to
Clinton’s moderate message on crime and values, but he claimed they
were also interested in social and family support programs such as health
care and social security.122 This view is consistent with Ruy Teixeira’s
conclusion about the 1996 election that “the key issues motivating
Clinton voters were the economy/jobs, Medicare and Social Security,
and education. He did poorly among voters concerned about the deficit
and crime/drugs, two signature New Democrat issues.”123 In a follow-
up analysis of the 1996 vote, based on census data rather than Voter
News Service exit polls, Teixeira emphasized even more strongly that
non-union, non-college educated whites were crucial to the Democrats’
success and that these voters could be reached with a progressive popu-
list message, a message that would have been anathema to the neolib-
eral orthodoxy entrenched among Democratic elites.124
Foreign Policy and National Security

Clinton was the first president elected since the downfall of the Soviet
Union and the end of the cold war. While Clinton emphasized domestic
issues during the 1992 campaign, he saw domestic and international

institutions as interconnected, especially economically. Indeed the
1990s were the decade in which “globalization” became a buzzword.
Despite the changed international context of this decade, Clinton as
president was shaped by the national security imperative, with its
commitments to expansion and global dominance, as much as were
his predecessors. In this section we will briefly explore how Clinton
pursued global power and expansion in a post-cold war context.125
With the “geostrategic” landscape transformed by the end of the
cold war, the Clinton administration emphasized the importance of
economic statecraft or “geoeconomics.” As David Sanger of the New
York Times put it, “The man who came to office criticizing President
George Bush for putting commerce ahead of human rights ended up
arguing, quite passionately, that the spread of American-style capital-
ism would eventually help spread American-style democracy.”126 In
so doing Clinton was deepening what international relations scholar
Peter Gowan called the Dollar-Wall Street regime, which since the
1970s exerted three key pressures from Wall Street to penetrate
global financial systems: first, removal of barriers to the free flow
of funds between Wall Street and private operators within the target
state; second, granting full rights to Wall Street operators to do busi-
ness within the financial systems and economies of the target states;
third, redesigning the financial systems of target states to match the
business strategies of Wall Street and its clients, such as transnational
corporations and money market mutual funds.127
The political underpinnings of this approach were laid out in a
1993 speech “From Containment to Enlargement” by National
Security Adviser Anthony Lake. He stated that a key feature of the
current era
is that we are its dominant power. Those who say otherwise sell
America short . . . We are setting a global example in our efforts to rein-
vent our democratic and market institutions . . . The successor to a doc-
trine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement—enlargement
of the world’s free community of market democracies.
Lake went on to connect this political-economic model to US military

posture: “If NATO is to remain an anchor for European and Atlantic
stability, as the President believes it must, its members must commit
themselves to updating NATO’s role in this new era.”128 This point
should be borne in mind in our discussion of the Kosovo war below.
For his part Secretary of State Warren Christopher cabled all US
embassies in 1993 “making it clear that I expected each [Ambassador]

to take personal charge of promoting our commercial interests—and
to engage their embassies in a sustained effort to help the American
business community.”129
Clinton’s global political economy rested on the “Washington
Consensus.” Originally coined by the British economist John
Williamson, the term came to be used to refer to neoliberal or market-
oriented policy prescriptions promoted by Washington, DC-based
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World
Bank, and the US Treasury Department. Clinton’s support for unhin-
dered capital flows, deregulation, and opening of markets, in the
words of one observer, “has become the Administration’s answer
to virtually every problem in the world economy, as well as the key
to lifting American living standards: a one-size-fits-all solution.”130
Critics referred to these policies as “neoliberalism” or “market
fundamentalism.”
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between
the United States, Canada, and Mexico in many ways reflected these
assumptions about global economic governance. NAFTA had been
negotiated by the Bush administration, and it played a role in the
1992 election when Ross Perot predicted a gigantic job loss to Mexico
if the agreement was enacted. During the election campaign, Clinton
promised to improve NAFTA with supplemental labor and environ-
mental agreements. While seeking support for NAFTA as president,
he touted its potential job creation benefits, predicting a trade surplus
with Mexico and a reduction in immigration to the United States.
His task was to persuade Congress to approve it. The agreement was
supported by key leaders in both the Democratic and Republican par-
ties, by the corporate community, and by elite media. However it was
never popular with the general public and it was strongly opposed by
the labor movement, environmental groups, and many congressional
Democrats. At stake was the model of economic globalization that
would predominate in a new era. As Jeff Faux put it, “NAFTA was
not a response to a national crisis threatening the nation’s citizens, it
was an international opportunity for the nation’s elites to make rules
for the post-cold war global economy that would benefit them and
their corporate clients.”131 While labeled as a free trade agreement,
NAFTA also aimed to bolster Mexico as a source of low-wage labor,
secure US investments in Mexico, and extend US patent and copyright
protections into the Mexican market.132 Supporters of NAFTA saw
the payoff in broader hemispheric terms as well. They wanted to con-
solidate a continents-spanning neoliberal model of development and
block the emergence of left-wing challenges in Latin America. The

CEO of the Wall Street investment bank Salomon Brothers, Robert
Denham, said a defeat of NAFTA “would be a slap in the face to all
the leaders in the Western Hemisphere who have chosen the capitalist
road over government-controlled economies.” Lawrence Summers, at
the time the Undersecretary for International Affairs at the Treasury
Department, later said that NAFTA “resulted in a profound change
in the internal political dynamics of Mexico in favor of the progres-
sive forces that believed in the market and friendship with the United
States as opposed to the forces that believed in more socialism and
opposition to the United States.”133
Clinton pulled out all the stops to win passage of NAFTA. A “war
room” was established in the White House to pressure Congress,
and former presidents were invited to a signing ceremony. The
White House strategy was described as a “coordinated, computer-
generated, all hands on deck plan to pry votes loose for the North
American Free Trade Agreement that consumed nearly all of the time
of the president and his lieutenants for 56 days.”134 Business interests
mobilized and worked closely with the Clinton administration and
with pro-NAFTA Democrats and Republicans in Congress. About
100 corporate and trade association officials met weekly at the
Washington office of the US Chamber of Congress, while other com-
pany representatives, led by a former lobbyist for General Electric,
coordinated with Rep. Robert Matsui, a pro-NAFTA Democrat.
Republican lobbyists met with House Minority leader Robert
Michael to plan strategy. Mexican government and business interests
spent tens of millions to lobby Congress and hired several dozen for-
mer US government officials to support the effort.135 In November of
1993 Congress ratified NAFTA, which passed in the House by a 234
to 200 margin, with 132 Republicans in support and 42 opposed.
House Democrats opposed NAFTA by a margin of 156 to 102. In the
Senate the vote was 61–38, with 34 Republicans and 27 Democrat
voting to approve.
Were the claims made to the American public about the benefits
of the agreement borne out by later developments? First, while there
were job gains along the border, estimates are that up to one million
jobs in the United States were lost as companies relocated to Mexico
to take advantage of cheaper wages. Second, NAFTA strengthened
the hand of US companies in bargaining with workers, as the threat
of relocation was used to hold down wages and benefits. Third, the
United States experienced a trade deficit with Mexico, and immigra-
tion from Mexico to the United States accelerated. Fourth, NAFTA
served as a model for later neoliberal multilateral and bilateral trade

agreements.136
In late 1994 Clinton pushed for NAFTA on a global scale through
the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an expansion
of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, originally created in
1947. The same corporate networks that lobbied for NAFTA now pres-
sured Congress to support the WTO. An administration official told
the New York Times, “You have to imagine the Alice in Wonderland
quality of this. Here we are, trying to figure out how to get business
leaders to pressure Republicans to vote for something Reagan cham-
pioned and Bush almost implemented.”137 Clinton also supported nor-
malized trade relations with China and China’s entry into the WTO.
China was to be become a source of cheap labor for US manufacturers
as well as a source of investment in US financial markets to keep alive
the bubble economy of the end of the decade. The 1997–1998 East
Asia financial crisis and its global reverberations led to some reconsid-
eration of Washington Consensus policies, but the Clinton administra-
tion was able to weather the storm. Indeed Robert Rubin, Lawrence
Summers, and Alan Greenspan appeared on the cover of Time maga-
zine, described as “The Committee to Save the World.” The accompa-
nying article noted, “By fighting off one collapse after another—and
defending their economic policy from political meddling—the three
men have so far protected American growth, making investors deliri-
ously, perhaps delusionally, happy in the process.”138 Nicholas Guyatt
nicely characterizes the Clinton administration’s approach to global
political economy: “Although Clinton was reluctant to slash public
spending and to privatise many government programmes, his stance
on international trade was avowedly neoliberal: economies around the
world should open to capital investment; any remaining restrictions
on capital flows should be lifted; and American goods and financial
services should be sold freely around the world.”139
Turning to national security issues, when Clinton ran for office
in 1992, he campaigned in some ways to the right of George H. W.
Bush, calling for tougher US action toward China, Cuba, Iraq, and
Serbia. He was endorsed by a number of foreign policy hawks and
neoconservatives who were disenchanted with Bush’s foreign policy
and who were actively courted by the Clinton campaign.140 While
Clinton’s approach to globalization centered on the spread of mar-
kets, there was no lessening in the use of US military power in the
1990s. American military force was directed toward Somalia (1993),
Haiti (1993–1994), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), the Sudan (1998),
Afghanistan (1998), and Iraq (1993–1998). Clinton also supported
the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which attained
membership in 1999.141 In a post-cold war setting in which European
states were tempted to engage in independent action, NATO expan-
sion was a way of asserting American hegemony in Europe. It was also
connected to Clinton’s goals of economic expansion and the spread
of “market democracies.” In 1998 Defense Secretary William Cohen
defended NATO expansion as a way of “spreading the kind of secu-
rity and stability that Western Europe has enjoyed since World War
II to Central and Eastern Europe . . . And with that spread of stability,
there is a prospect to attract investment.”142
Historian Andrew J. Bacevich contends, “The two terms of
President Bill Clinton produced an unprecedented level of military
activism.”143 Iraq, which will feature prominently in our analysis of
Clinton’s successor, was subject to crippling sanctions, the enforce-
ment of no-fly zones, the buildup of US forces in the Gulf, and air
and missile attacks. In June 1993 Clinton ordered the launching of 23
Tomahawk cruise missiles from US warships into Baghdad in retali-
ation for an alleged assassination plot against former President Bush
during a trip to Kuwait. The target was the headquarters of the Iraqi
Intelligence Service. In February of 1998 Clinton was prepared to
order heavy air strikes against Iraq to force Saddam Hussein to allow
United Nations inspectors greater access to search sites for weapons
of mass destruction. The crisis eased when UN general secretary Kofi
Annan brokered a deal to allow increased inspections. In the mean-
time the administration was embarrassed by an outpouring of anti-
war sentiment at a public meeting at Ohio State University featuring
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Defense Secretary William
Cohen, and National Security Adviser Samuel Berger. Shortly there-
after Albright justified the contemplated military action by stating,
“We are talking about using military force, but we are not talking
about a war. This is an important distinction.”144 If so, it is a distinc-
tion with a questionable legal or Constitutional basis.
On October 31, 1998, Clinton signed into law the Iraq Liberation
Act, which appropriated funds for Iraqi opposition groups and codi-
fied regime change into law. In December 1998 the United States,
joined by British forces, conducted a four-day bombing campaign,
code-named Operation Desert Fox, against Iraqi targets. Unlike pre-
vious attacks that focused on weapons facilities, these raids targeted
command and control installations such as barracks, airfields, and
communications centers. As with the earlier attacks, there was no
Congressional authorization for the use of force. Clinton invoked the
national security doctrine of “credibility” to justify the US assault:

“If Saddam can cripple the weapons inspection system and get away
with it, he would conclude that the international community, led by
the United States, has simply lost its will . . . If we turn our backs on
his defiance, the credibility of U.S. power as a check against Saddam
will be destroyed.”145
In March of 1999 Clinton ordered air and missile attacks against
Serbian targets in Yugoslavia, purportedly to defend ethnic Albanians
in the Serbian province of Kosovo. After three months of the most
protracted American military campaign since the Vietnam War, con-
ducted under the auspices of NATO, Serbian troops withdrew from
Kosovo. As war powers scholar David Gray Adler notes, this was the
first time in US history that a president waged war in the face of a
direct congressional refusal to authorize the war.146 Adviser Sidney
Blumenthal states, “Clinton had never been hesitant about the use
of force, but by his second term he felt thoroughly comfortable using
it, having ordered the U.S. military into action many times.”147 In
that sense Clinton continued the extra-Constitutional use of the war
power that is an integral component of the modern American presi-
dency, regardless of party.
While a full analysis of the Kosovo conflict is beyond our scope here,
we would challenge the official rationale that the United States initi-
ated the war as a humanitarian intervention on behalf of the Kosovo
Albanians. Clinton himself stated on March 23, the day before the
bombing began, “And if we’re going to have a strong economic relation-
ship that includes our ability to sell around the world, Europe has got to
be a key . . . That’s what this Kosovo thing is all about.”148 More impor-
tant to the Clinton administration than human rights, in our view, was
securing broader political goals in Europe and beyond, including main-
taining US hegemony in Europe, transforming NATO to assert its sov-
ereignty with respect to the United Nations and to enable it to conduct
“out-of-area” strikes, blocking the emergence of an alternative French-
German European Union leadership model, and demonstrating the use
of a high-technology military strategy of precision targeting and bomb-
ing.149 The war helped to bring about the humanitarian disaster that it
was supposed to stop and empowered the Kosovo Liberation Army to
conduct an ethnic cleansing campaign against Serbs in the province.150
Many of the claims made by the Clinton administration to justify the
Kosovo war would be adapted and intensified by the Bush administra-
tion to attack Iraq four years later.
* * *
Clinton was hailed as a pioneer of a “Third Way” approach between

the Left and Right that offered hope for progressive politics and that
became influential in Western Europe and elsewhere in the late 1990s.
Clinton argued that the positive economic and social outcomes of
his presidency resulted from the Third Way/New Democrat policies
he had pursued. Speaking at the annual conference of the DLC on
December 2, 1998, Clinton stated:
We said we were New Democrats, and we called our approach the

Third Way . . . Our ideas have passed the most important test: They
work in the real world . . . These same ideas are reviving center-left
political parties throughout the industrialized world as people struggle
to put a human face on the global economy.151
The terms of this revival may be questioned. Perry Anderson charac-

terizes Third Way Center Left governments as “regimes of consolida-
tion: they have accepted and extended the legacy of their predecessors,
without substantially modifying it.” He argues that the ideological
supplement on which they depend “is a soothing emulsion whose
themes are the interdependence of responsibility and community, and
the compatibility of economic competition with social cohesion . . . As
a discourse without enemies, its popular appeal is virtually guar-
anteed. By the same token, its capacity for independent initiative is
very limited.”152 In this chapter we have argued that Clinton, while
supplementing his core goals with themes of community, inclusion,
and racial reconciliation, largely was shaped by and adapted to the
neoliberal growth model and to a national security model based on
US global dominance. In that sense the structural foundations of the
modern American presidency as we know them went unchanged in
the Clinton years.
Chapter Four
The Conservative Mirage: George W. Bush

and Empire Waning
I’m the commander—see, I don’t need to explain—I do not need to

explain why I say things. That’s the interesting thing about being
president.
—George W. Bush
The Political Context of the

Bush Presidency
George W. Bush became president following one of the most unusual
and controversial election outcomes in US history. In December 2000,
after the Supreme Court halted the vote recount in Florida and deliv-
ered that state’s Electoral College votes to Bush, the president-elect
said in a victory speech before the Texas state legislature, “I was not
elected to serve one party, but to serve one nation . . . Whether you
voted for me or against me, I will do my best to serve your interests
and I will work to earn your respect.”1 However, as we show in this
chapter, Bush defied expectations of compromise and proceeded to
govern on the basis of intense partisanship, pursuing in unadulter-
ated ways corporate growth and profits and, especially after the 9/11
attacks, a militarized version of national security. As one political
scientist wrote of Bush, “He is, arguably, the most radical president of
the past fifty years. Who would have expected this from a candidate
who came in second-best in the popular vote?”2
Bush secured the Republican nomination in 2000 with an over-
whelming fundraising advantage over his opponents. He opted out
of the system of partial public financing in the primary phase of the
campaign, the first major party nominee to do so, allowing him to
raise unlimited sums. The $94 million he amassed in the primary sea-
son was about $25 million more than was raised by his ten GOP con-
tenders combined. Bush drew on a fundraising base assembled from
his two campaigns for Texas governor as well as from an extensive
network of donors connected to his father, the former president. The
Bush campaign recruited about 2000 “Pioneers,” who each agreed to

be responsible for raising $100,000. Moreover the campaign’s finan-
cial dominance was established early on, long before the candidate
debates, let alone the primaries and caucuses. Newsweek noted that
“starting in 1999, small groups of bankers and corporate tycoons
started flying to Austin for private lunches at the governor’s man-
sion. The financial base of the Republican Party—computing entre-
preneurs from Silicon Valley, chemical company CEOs, Wall Street
bankers—was getting locked up, even though Bush had yet to declare.
When he finally did on June 12, 1999, he already had $15 million
in the kitty.”3 There were good reasons for the financiers to climb
aboard the Bush bandwagon. As governor of Texas, Bush was highly
responsive to business agendas on issues ranging from tort reform and
environmental regulation to trade and immigration. Journalist John
Judis concluded that Bush was “a politician who knows that he must
occasionally compromise in order to maintain a position from which
he can advance most, if not all, of his agenda. Still, when it comes to
business issues, that agenda puts him solidly to the right of most other
Republican governors.”4
George W. Bush presented a “kinder and gentler” Republican
face in the presidential campaign of 2000. While his core policy pro-
posal was a massive tax cut that would overwhelmingly advantage
the affluent, Bush also supported a sketchy patients’ bill of rights,
“choice-based” prescription drug benefits, and various education
spending proposals. Bush, then in his second term as Texas governor,
touted his “compassionate conservatism.” While Bush flirted with
the Religious Right in early GOP primaries in order to vanquish his
main rival John McCain, he quickly moved to the center, at least rhe-
torically, in the general election campaign. While Bush was vague on
controversial issues like abortion, gay rights, and the environment,
the Republican Convention was packaged for television as a multi-
cultural affair. Bush stated his belief that “the strength of our nation
rests on its incredible diversity, on the unique and special contribu-
tions of African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native
Americans.”5
Right-wing Republicanism had proven unpopular after Newt
Gingrich and his revolutionaries came to power in the midterm elec-
tions of 1994. In the midterm elections of 1998, weeks before the
House would vote to impeach President Clinton, the Republicans
lost seats in the House and Gingrich resigned from Congress. Bush’s
moderate postures led to grousing among conservatives. The Weekly
Standard d criticized Bush’s “lily-livered unwillingness to defend small-
George W. Bush and Empire Waning 73
government conservatism” while the National Review complained

that Bush “has not advocated any substantial retrenchment of federal
activity, and has made a lot of promises to spend money. He has been
weak in confronting racial preferences, blind to the dangers of uncon-
trolled immigration and the flaws of bilingual education, and silent
over the feminization of the military.”6
In US presidential elections, the incumbent party usually is returned
to the White House when voters perceive the economy as doing well.
Why, then, did Al Gore not win the presidential election of 2000?
There were a number of reasons. First, Gore was personally seen as
unlikable and phony by sizable numbers of voters. Second, the scan-
dals of the Clinton era led otherwise satisfied voters to look for a
change. Third, Gore faced a serious challenge on his left from Green
Party candidate Ralph Nader. Gore and Nader together got about
52 percent of the vote. Fourth, Gore lost because of the Electoral
College.
We disagree with the view that Gore lost because he ran a populist,
class-warfare campaign that swung too far to the Left. Democratic
Leadership Council chairman Al From asserted that “Gore chose a
populist rather than a New Democrat message. As a result, voters
saw him as a liberal.”7 The problem for Gore was that Bush was very
successful at blurring important policy differences in late September
and October. Polls showed that voters preferred Gore’s policy pro-
posals when his views were clearly explained. But voters were under-
standably confused when Bush offered a prescription drug plan and
increased spending on education. Bush vowed to save Medicare and
Social Security while portraying Al Gore as a big government lib-
eral. In response Gore began to emphasize his commitment to fiscal
discipline and began to use the term “middle-class families” instead
of “working families.”8 With policy differences obscured, personal
factors became more important, and Gore’s liabilities as a candidate
became more of a disadvantage. In addition the blurring of policy
differences increased the salience of cultural conservatism in such
areas as abortion rights, gay marriage, and gun control. This was
Republican territory. As a result of these factors, Bush was able to
make inroads into the working-class vote, receiving 63 percent sup-
port among white men without a four-year college degree, a 29 point
margin over Gore.9
On Election Day about 51 percent of the eligible electorate cast
ballots. Even more than in the past voters were drawn from the ranks
of the most affluent Americans. Exit polls showed that 15 percent of
voters had family incomes of more than $100,000, up from 9 percent
in 1996. This increase cannot be explained only by inflation. Bush led

Gore among the increasing number of upper-income voters. The policy
agenda of the class-skewed electorate differs from that of the general
public. As David Broder of the Washington Postt reported, nearly four
in ten voters with household incomes greater than $100,000 a year
wanted to spend the budget surplus to reduce the national debt—dou-
ble the proportion among the least affluent. Less-affluent voters were
far more likely to favor making prescription drugs part of Medicare,
rather than relying on private insurers to provide them.10
George W. Bush lost the popular vote to Vice President Al Gore by
540,000 votes, nearly five times the margin by which John F. Kennedy
led Richard Nixon in the election of 1960 and more than Richard
Nixon’s margin over Hubert Humphrey in 1968. As political analyst
Kevin Phillips pointed out, the total vote for the center-left—Gore and
Nader—was 52 percent, its highest share since Lyndon B. Johnson
in 1964.11 Gore held advantages among women, African Americans,
and voters from union households. He also did well among some new
economy professionals, winning 53 percent of voters with postgradu-
ate degrees. Gore won the cities and split the suburbs, while Bush
did best in rural areas.12 While the popular vote is politically signifi-
cant, the president is selected by the Electoral College. Two hundred
and seventy electoral votes are needed to win election. Arguably the
Electoral College is the product of pre-democratic thinking in which
the masses were seen as a turbulent source of instability. It also reflects
a segmented view of the American identity that was overturned by the
Civil War of 1861–1865.
As the votes were tallied on November 7, all eyes turned to Florida.
Florida’s 25 electoral votes for Bush made the difference. Bush’s vic-
tory was secured after a bitter, five-week long contest over the Florida
vote count. It was sealed only after a five-to-four ruling of the United
States Supreme Court which halted the recount and let stand Florida
secretary of state Katherine Harris’s certification of a 537 vote lead
for Bush. This decision effectively handed the presidency to Bush.
George W. Bush won 271 electoral votes, while Al Gore received 266
electoral votes (one pro-Gore elector abstained).
Americans learned much during the recount about the crazy-quilt
of election systems used in counties and states around the country.
These differences can have discriminatory effects that undermine
the principle of political equality that is at the heart of democracy.
Thousands of Florida votes were not counted because of improper
marks or machine malfunctions. “Undervotes”—where no vote was
recorded—were about four times as likely to occur in precincts using
punch-card ballots compared to precincts using more modern optical

scan ballots. The former are far more likely to be used in low income
areas with high numbers of minority voters. In addition the state of
Florida retained a Republican-linked database firm to scan voter-lists
for felons. Due to inaccuracies, thousands of Florida voters may have
been prevented from casting their ballots. Nearly all were Democrats
and nearly half were African Americans. “Overvotes”—where more
than one presidential candidate’s name was punched—were three
times as likely to have included Gore as one of their choices as Bush.
Palm Beach County’s “butterfly ballot” affected Democratic votes
disproportionately. A study found that the 8,000 voters whose bal-
lots were thrown out because they chose Gore and one of the two
other presidential candidates listed near him voted more than 10 to 1
Democratic in the US Senate race in Florida.13
On December 8 the Florida Supreme Court asserted its legal and
constitutional rights in interpreting state election law and ordered a
manual recount of some 43,000 undervote ballots. The following day
the US Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, halted the recount
and agreed to hear the case. Justice Antonin Scalia defended the
decision on the grounds that allowing the vote to continue would
do “irreparable harm” to Bush by undermining the legitimacy of his
presidency.14 Three days later the court, in another five-to-four deci-
sion, formally overturned the decision of the Florida Supreme Court
and brought the recount to an end. In a dissenting opinion, Justice
John Paul Stevens wrote: “In the interests of finality, however, the
majority effectively orders the disenfranchisement of an unknown
number of voters whose ballots reveal their intent—and are therefore
legal votes under state law—but were for some reason rejected by the
ballot-counting machines.”15
After the Supreme Court decision, most Americans appeared ready
to support George W. Bush as president, even though a plurality
believed that Al Gore would have won Florida and the presidency if
the court had allowed the vote recount to continue. However 84 per-
cent of African Americans said their confidence in the voting process
had been shaken, nearly twice the national average. According to a
Los Angeles Times poll, most Americans believed that Bush should
compromise with congressional Democrats rather than push his cam-
paign proposals to cut income tax rates, restructure Social Security,
and reconfigure federal education programs.16
During the campaign Bush stated “I’m a uniter, not a divider.”
Moreover Republicans lost seats in both the House and Senate, though
they retained majorities in both. However, even as the votes in Florida
were being contested, Bush’s political advisers saw the logic of govern-
ing through polarization rather than compromise. His chief pollster,
Matthew Dowd, wrote a memo for strategist Karl Rove arguing that
the proportion of actual independent or swing voters had shrunk to
a small part of the electorate in the previous two decades. Most self-
described independent voters had clear partisan leanings. According
to journalist Thomas Edsall’s characterization of Dowd’s memo, it
set the stage for President-elect Bush to abandon the themes that had
guided him as Texas governor and as candidate for the president.
Dowd’s analysis destroyed the rationale for Bush to govern as ‘a uniter,
not a divider.’ The memo freed Bush to discard centrist strategies and
to promote instead polarizing policies designed explicitly to appeal to
the conservative Republican core.17
Bush’s early cabinet nominations and policy proposals revealed

a determination to pursue a conservative agenda, albeit one with a
“compassionate” face. At the core of Bush’s base of support were the
wealthy and business interests from the old economy. Bush’s chief
of staff Andrew Card was the auto industry’s lead lobbyist against
fuel efficiency standards and global warming reforms. Bush’s choice
to head the Environmental Protection Agency—Christine Todd
Whitman—embraced “voluntary enforcement” of environmental reg-
ulations by corporations. Bush’s first choice for labor secretary, Linda
Chavez, opposed the minimum wage. Gale Norton, his interior sec-
retary, had been a supporter of the business-backed “property rights”
movement in western states. Many of Bush’s cabinet members had ties
to the defense, steel, and oil industries, and at least three befriended
the embattled tobacco industry.18 Bush’s secretary of defense, Donald
Rumsfeld, chaired a committee appointed by Congress on National
Missile Defense (NMD) and had close ties with the Center for Security
Policy, a pro-NMD lobby, which awarded Rumsfeld its 1998 “Keeper
of the Flame” award.19
Bush’s choice for attorney general, former Senator John Ashcroft,
served as a lightning-rod for a revival of the culture wars. A favorite
of the Christian Right, Ashcroft represented the cultural traditional-
ists who oppose abortion rights and the aspirations of gays and les-
bians. “The journey from [Janet] Reno to Ashcroft is a journey from
utter darkness to brilliant light,” said Jerry Falwell, the founder of the
Moral Majority. 20 Indeed Bush’s strongest base of support as presi-
dent was among white evangelical Protestants. Since his “recommit-
ment to faith” and abandonment of alcohol in the mid-1980s, Bush
had developed strong connections with evangelicals. When asked to

name a favorite philosopher in a December 1999 Republican debate,
Bush replied “Jesus Christ.” Near the end of his first year in office,
the Washington Postt observed of Bush,
For the first time since religious conservatives became a modern politi-
cal movement, the president of the United States has become the move-
ment’s de facto leader—a status even Ronald Reagan, though admired
by religious conservatives, never earned. Christian publications, radio
and television shower Bush with praise, while preachers from the pul-
pit treat his leadership as an act of providence. A procession of reli-
gious leaders who have met with him testify to his faith, while Web
sites encourage people to fast and pray for the president.”21
As an ideological supplement to his policies consolidating corpo-

rate domination Bush invoked faith and militarized American excep-
tionalism. He often used religiously coded language and supported
measures dear to religious conservatives, such as a ban on aid to inter-
national groups performing or counseling on abortion, creation of the
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, and restrictions on
federal support for stem cell research. But we argue that Bush’s main
agenda was more material, often in its crudest senses, than spiritual
and very much of this world. 22
Economic and Domestic Policy:

Taking Care of Business
The most significant changes in economic and domestic policies of
George W. Bush’s presidency took place in his first term. As was to
be expected, Bush pursued policies closely connected to the business
community, with few concessions to contending interests. While this
approach reflected Bush’s ideological orientation, it also pointed to
the political power of the business community and its resource advan-
tages. Business savored an early victory on workplace ergonomic
safety rules and progress on a bankruptcy reform bill that Clinton
had vetoed in 2000. Bush took early action to lift regulations of fed-
erally funded projects that had given preference to contractors using
union labor, lifted rules making mining companies pay for clean-up
costs of contaminated public water, removed safety limits on arse-
nic levels in drinking water, and moved to open up national forests
to increased logging and road building. 23 A Washington Postt article
explained, “Buoyed by their headiest week in recent memory, busi-

ness lobbyists are dusting off dozens of long-stalled legislative pro-
posals in hopes of cashing in on a new pro-business climate fostered
by Republican control of the White House.” The article also noted,
“Although Republicans clearly are the driving force, many congressio-
nal Democrats are also on board the business bandwagon, reflecting
both the party’s dependence on corporate money and a more cen-
trist ideological shift.”24 Bush’s identification with the business agen-
das was a constant in his presidency. As journalist Thomas Edsall
explained in 2004,
For three years, President Bush has been willing to anger environ-
mentalists, civil libertarians of the right and left, unions, trial law-
yers and conservative advocates of free markets. But one group that
almost always comes out a winner when Bush sets policy is the busi-
ness community, from Fortune 500 corporations to small, family-run
companies. 25
Bush’s domestic policies rested on the federal government providing

substantial subsidies and incentives to profit-based, private industry
and a policymaking process in which these same interests assumed
privileged positions of influence. Brief examples in the areas of energy
policy and the Medicare drug benefit, and in an unsuccessful attempt
to change Social Security accounts, serve to illustrate.
Bush’s Energy Development Task Force was presided over by Vice
President Cheney with much secrecy and in close consultation with
energy industry officials. In Cheney’s view, “Conservation may be a
sign of personal virtue, but it is not a sufficient basis for a sound, com-
prehensive energy policy.” In an attempt at clarification a few days
later, Bush stated. “I think conservation has got to be part of making
sure we have got a reasonable energy policy, but what the vice presi-
dent was saying was we can’t conserve our way to energy indepen-
dence,” Bush said. “We have got to do both. We’ve got to conserve,
but we also have to find new sources of energy.”26 The task force
recommendations, released in May 2001, were to massively increase
US energy supplies, and to support modest conservation and renew-
able energy efforts. 27 As proposed legislation entered into protracted
debate President Bush used executive orders to speed up new energy
construction projects and directed the Bureau of Land Management
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to open up public
lands for oil and gas exploration and ease water pollution rules affect-
ing coal companies. An official of Peabody Energy, the world’s largest
coal company said of Bush’s team, “The people running the United
States government are from the energy industry. They understand it
and they believe in energy supply.”28 After four years of debate driven
by regional and industrial conflicts, an Energy Policy Act passed in
2005 that provided tax breaks and other subsidies to oil, gas, coal
and nuclear power companies and reduced environmental legisla-
tion. The bill also contained an incentive for hydraulic fracturing
or “fracking.”29 As for global warming, the New York Times noted
that Vice President Cheney encouraged White House officials to force
the Environmental Protection Agency to remove sections on climate
change from separate reports in 2002 and 2003. “The administration
also sought to control or censor Congressional testimony by federal
employees and tampered with other reports in order to inject uncer-
tainty into the climate debate and minimize threats to the environ-
ment,” the Times found.30
In 2003 a $400 billion Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act was passed in the largest expansion of the
program since its creation in 1965. Bush claimed that the legislation
would bring prescription drug coverage to millions of senior citizens
in the form of Medicare Part D, starting in 2006. The law also pro-
vided billions of dollars in subsidies to insurance companies and health
maintenance organizations, and took the first step toward allowing
private plans to compete with Medicare. The final bill barred the gov-
ernment from negotiating lower drug prices. It also banned importa-
tion of cheaper drugs from Canada and gave drug companies stronger
protections against their generic competitors. According to a Public
Citizen study, the pharmaceutical industry, HMOs and related inter-
ests spent nearly $141 million on Washington lobbying in 2003. Drug
companies, HMOs, and their trade associations and industry-funded
advocacy groups deployed at least 952 lobbyists to do their bidding on
Capitol Hill and at the White House. 31 A ProPublica study describes
the final vote:
Congressional leaders pulled no punches in making sure the bill passed.

In violation of House rules, members were given less than 24 hours to
read the 850-page document, and the final vote was called about 3 a.m.
Instead of closing the vote 15 minutes after voting began, as required by
House rules, leaders kept the vote open for almost three hours, the longest
roll call vote in the history of the House of Representatives, while they
worked the floor. Today, at least 25 of those key players are back, but
this time they’re lobbyists, trying to persuade their former colleagues to
protect the lucrative system during the health care reform negotiations.
Among them was Billy Tauzin, a Republican representative from

Louisiana who played a key role in ensuring securing passage of the
bill. He went on to become president of PhRMA, the drug industry’s
lobbying group.32
In 2005 Bush pursued the goal of partial privatization of Social
Security. His plan would have given younger workers the option of
redirecting some payroll taxes into personal investment accounts.
Social Security privatization had long been promoted by right-wing
think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute. It
promised considerable business for the financial interests that would
manage personal accounts and more broadly reconfigure in impor-
tant ways the contours of the American political economy. As a Los
Angeles Times report put it, “For these free-market devotees, win-
ning the Social Security battle would be more than just the capstone
of Bush’s second-term agenda. It would also be the culmination of a
generation-long drive to chip away at the New Deal’s cornerstone and
transform the role of the federal government.”33 However the pro-
posal was not popular with the public and led to a grassroots mobi-
lization of opposition by labor, civil rights, and other groups. Some
Republican lawmakers grew uneasy and the legislation never came to
a vote in Congress.
Turning to budgetary and macroeconomic policies, when Bush
took office the federal budget was in the black, with a projected sur-
plus for Fiscal Year 2001 of about $125 billion. Bush claimed the
surplus reflected over-taxation, and in his first address to Congress
stated, “You see, the growing surplus exists because taxes are too
high and government is charging more than it needs. The people of
America have been overcharged and on their behalf, I’m here asking
for a refund.”34 Shortly thereafter the economy went into a recession,
which lasted from March to November 2001 and was caused by the
partial deflation of the stock market “bubble” that had underwritten
growth and closed the budget deficit in Clinton’s second term. After
contracting in the first three quarters of 2001, GDP began growing
again in the fourth quarter of 2001. The unemployment rate contin-
ued to rise after the formal end of the recession, reaching 6.3 percent
in the summer of 2003. Bush and his supporters contended that the
economy had begun to falter under Clinton. Deploying a new ratio-
nale they argued that the passage of large-scale tax cuts was necessary
to spur growth. The effect of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was to reframe
political discourse around national security and counter-terrorism
issues. This enabled Bush and the Republicans to deflect criticism of
their domestic policy agenda and escape punishment by nationalizing
the 2002 congressional elections on a national security basis. Polls

showed dramatic increases in voter concerns with terrorism and
national security, a trend that prevailed for much of the decade and
that mostly worked to the advantage of Republicans, contributing to
Bush’s reelection in 2004.
The term “Bush Tax Cuts” refers primarily to the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and to the Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. The 2001 proposal was for a
ten-year, $1.6 trillion tax cut, of which about 40 percent would go to
the richest one percent of taxpayers, with an average annual income
of $1.1 million. The share of the tax cuts going to the top one per-
cent, in the original proposal, would have significantly exceeded the
share that would have been received by the bottom 80 percent of the
population combined. 35 The legislation that passed Congress and that
Bush signed in June was a $1.35 trillion package of tax cuts set to
expire on December 31, 2010. The bill included a reduction in income
taxes, lowering of estate taxes, an increase in the child tax credit, and
tax rebate of $300 per single filer that Democrats had pushed for.
Bush got a boost shortly after he unveiled his proposal when Federal
Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan said that the federal budget surplus
was big enough to both pay off the national debt and to cut taxes.
In a strikingly ideological statement, Greenspan stated that without
tax cuts, budget surpluses would lead the government to buy private
financial assets such as stocks and bonds and in that way interfere
with the “free market.” He told the Senate Budget Committee, “At
zero debt, the continuing unified budget surpluses currently projected
imply a major accumulation of private assets by the federal govern-
ment. This development should factor materially into the policies you
and the Administration choose to pursue.”36 By late 2001, with reve-
nue declining due to the tax cuts and the recession, the federal budget
began to move into the red.37 Justifying his departure from campaign
vows of fiscal responsibility and balanced budgets, Bush claimed that
his promises did not apply in the event of war, recession, or national
emergency. “Lucky me, I hit the trifecta,” quipped the president. 38
In January 2003, Bush unveiled a new economic stimulus plan with
a ten-year price tag of $674 billion. Because of increased debt payments
due to rising federal deficits, the true cost might have been closer to
$900 billion. The chief feature of the Bush plan, comprising over half
the cost, was an end to the taxation of corporate dividends. While
about half of all households hold stock, stock ownership is highly con-
centrated among the wealthy.39 According to political analyst Kevin
Phillips, the top 1 percent of investors took 42 percent of stock market
gains between 1989 and 1997, while the top 10 percent of the pop-
ulation took 86 percent. Many ordinary Americans hold stock only
through 401K and other retirement accounts, but under Bush’s plan
income from this source would remain subject to taxation when with-
drawn. Some 40 percent of the benefits of Bush’s proposal would go
to the top one percent of wealthy Americans. Less than 10 percent of
this stimulant would go to the 80 percent of households earning less
than $73,000 a year. As Phillips put it, though touted as an economic
stimulant, “What this complicated proposal would stimulate is not the
workaday economy but the already huge gap between the wealthiest
Americans and everyone else.”40 Supporters of the Bush administra-
tion’s policies accused critics of playing “class warfare” politics. Bush’s
plan had a number of other features, including an increase in the child
tax credit, an increase in equipment tax write offs for small business,
and funds to establish $3,000 accounts to help unemployed workers
find new jobs. More important was his proposal to accelerate the tax
cuts passed in 2001. This measure, like the proposed end to dividend
taxation, would have directed the bulk of benefits towards the wealthy.
“Ninety-two million Americans will keep an average of $1,083 more
of their own money,” stated President Bush.41 As journalist Nicholas
Lemann commented, this claim is true “only in the sense that it is also
true that if Bill Gates happened to drop by a homeless shelter where a
couple of nuns were serving soup to sixty down-and-outers dressed in
rags, the average person in the room would have a net worth of a bil-
lion dollars. Average, yes; typical, no.”42
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 was
the second major tax cut legislation signed into law by President
George W. Bush. Vice President Dick Cheney cast a tie-breaking vote.
The official cost of the bill went to $350 billion, less than half the
original proposal through 2013. However, as the Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities (CBPP) found,
Every provision in the bill but one expires between the end of 2004 and
the end of 2008, and most or all of these provisions are nearly certain
to be extended. If the provisions are extended, the cost of the legislation
through 2013 will be $807 billion to $1.06 trillion. In addition, the bill
is heavily tilted toward the upper end of the income scale, with house-
holds that make over $1 million a year receiving an average tax cut or
$93,500 in 2003, while households in the middle of the income spec-
trum receive an average tax cut of $217. Some 36 percent of households
will receive no tax cut at all; 53 percent will receive $100 or less.43
Despite a modest recovery in 2004, Bush’s record on the economy and

economic policy in his first term was unimpressive.44 As economist
and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman pointed out,
An unusually large number of people have given up looking for work,

so they are no longer counted as unemployed, and many of those who
say they have jobs seem to be marginally employed. Such measures as
the length of time it takes laid-off workers to get new jobs continue to
indicate the worst job market in 20 years.45
Consumer debt hit record levels, resulting in soaring rates of con-

sumer bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure, car repossession, and credit
card delinquency.46 Growing family financial instability left more and
more workers insecure in the face of the jobless recovery. By October
of 2004, Commerce Department data showed that the share of GDP
consisting of wage and salary income fell for the 14th straight quar-
ter, a decline unprecedented in the post–World War II era.47 Political
scientist Jacob Hacker observed that
even as wages have become more unstable, the financial effects of losing
a job have worsened, and the cost of things families need, from hous-
ing to education, has ballooned. Yet government and the private sector
aren’t just ignoring these problems, they are making them worse. Many
programs for the poor, for example, have been substantially cut. And
middle-class programs like Social Security have steadily eroded.48
Bush’s presidency saw the return of large federal budget deficits. In

fiscal year 2004, the deficit was $413 billion, a $36 billion increase
from fiscal year 2003, and a steep fall from the $236 billion budget
surplus in fiscal year 2000. The Bush administration offered assur-
ances that it would cut the deficit in half by 2009. A report by the
nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office disputed the claims of the
Bush budget, and predicted that accumulated deficits over the next
decade would total $1.9 trillion.49 Other analysts forecast deficits of
over $5 trillion from 2005 to 2014, assuming a continuation of cur-
rent policies. Tax cuts deprived government of funds for domestic
spending and thus served to “starve the beast.” At least three-fourths
of the swing from surpluses to deficits under Bush’s first term can be
attributed to a decline in revenues.50
Growing budget and trade deficits, combined with other forms of
external debt, led the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to issue a
report in January 2004 warning that US fiscal policies could destabilize
international financial markets. IMF economists were concerned that

within several years the United States would owe 40 percent of its
total economy. Growing deficits could lead to higher interest rates
within the United States and the rest of the world, choking growth,
while a diminishing willingness of foreign investors to purchase US
assets might lead to rapid movements in exchange rates. Economic
analyst Nick Beams noted, “The problem confronting central bankers
and policymakers in the leading capitalist countries is that, while on
the one hand world economic growth as a whole is more dependent
than ever on the expansion of the U.S. economy, on the other this
expansion itself generates ever-increasing levels of debt.”51
By early 2004 there were signs of declining public support for the
president’s agenda. A New York Times/CBS News poll in January
found Bush’s overall job approval rating at 50 percent. Fewer than
one in five respondents said Bush had eased their tax burden. Only
27 percent believed the tax cuts were good for the economy, while
17 percent said the tax cuts were bad and 51 percent said the tax
cuts had not made much of a difference. The traditional Republican
Achilles heel of perceived top-end bias was visible: 57 percent thought
Bush generally favored the rich as opposed to the middle class and
poor, and 64 percent said they thought big business had too much
influence on the Bush administration. 52 By March a majority of
Americans—57 percent—said they wanted the next president to
steer the country away from the course set by Bush, according to a
Washington Post/ABC News poll. Only 39 percent stated that they
supported Bush’s handling of the economy. Two-thirds of the poll
respondents said that Bush cared more about protecting the interests
of large business corporations than working people. 53 While 60 per-
cent of Americans supported Bush’s war on terrorism, doubts grew
about the president’s handling of Iraq.
Despite this weak support, which continued into the autumn, Bush
was able to capture 51 percent of the popular vote and 286 electoral
votes on November 2. The Bush campaign was able to portray John
Kerry as a culturally elitist “flip-flopper” and as a danger to national
security in such a way that Kerry’s advantage over Bush on economic
and other domestic issues was nullified. Bush combined strong sup-
port from those making over $200,000 with increased support from
downscale, white working class voters in small towns and rural areas.
According to political analysts John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira,
Bush recreated the Reagan-era coalition by combining Brooks Brothers

and Wal-Mart, the upper class and the lower middle class . . . He reached
these voters, who made up the bulk of his support, through opposi-
tion to gay marriage and abortion and through patriotic appeal as the
commander-in-chief in a war against terrorism that seamlessly unites
Osama bin Laden with Saddam Hussein. 54
Among Bush supporters, a pre-election poll found nearly three out

of four continued to believe that prewar Iraq had weapons of mass
destruction or active programs to produce them and that Saddam
Hussein had provided substantial support to al Qaeda, despite abun-
dant evidence to the contrary. 55
After the election President Bush declared that because of his vic-
tory, and GOP gains in Congress, he had earned political capital in the
election and that he intended to use it to pursue conservative, business-
oriented tax, health care, and Social Security policies. However both
the election results and post-election polls called into question Bush’s
claim of a mandate. According to journalist Ronald Brownstein, mea-
sured as a share of the popular vote, Bush’s 2.9 percent edge over
Kerry was the smallest margin of victory for a reelected president
since 1828.56 A post-election CBS News/New York Times poll found
Bush’s overall approval rating at just 51 percent, with 54 percent feel-
ing the country is going in the wrong direction. Fifty-seven percent
disapproved of Bush’s handling of the economy and 55 percent disap-
proved of his handling of Iraq. Less than a third thought that Bush’s
tax cuts since 2001 had been good for the economy and two-thirds
thought that large corporations had too much influence on the Bush
administration. By more than 2 to 1, the public thought that reduc-
ing the federal budget deficit should be a higher priority than cutting
taxes.57 In many ways the American public was at odds with much of
Bush’s agenda. Still Bush’s early post-election political appointments
and policy statements appeared to signal renewed determination to
consolidate conservative political power.
Despite the series of tax cuts promoted by President Bush and
Congressional Republicans as the best way to stimulate the economy,
income growth in the Bush years was sluggish and uneven, failing to
reach many households. Between 2000 and 2007 the poverty rate
grew from 11.3 percent to 12.5 percent, an unusual trend for a cycle
of economic recovery. While the median income of working-age
households (those headed by someone under 65) rose by 1.3 percent
in 2007, it was still well below its 2000 level (in inflation adjusted dol-
lars). This was the first time on record that poverty and the incomes
of working-age households had worsened despite six consecutive
years of economic growth. 58 Economic gains have been much more
unevenly distributed since the late 1970s than in the three decades
after World War II, when gains were more widely shared. From 1976
to 2006 the incomes of the bottom 90 percent of households rose only
slightly (about 10 percent) while the incomes of the top one percent
grew by 232 percent.59 According to Internal Revenue Service data,
the average income of the top 1 percent grew nearly 50 percent from
2002 to 2006, helping to push income concentration to the second
highest level on record since 1913, as the richest 1 percent of house-
holds had 23 percent of income in 2006. The only year of greater
income concentration was 1928 (24 percent), the year before the
stock market crash.60 Many employees saw sharp declines in health
care and pension benefits provided by employers. By the end of 2007,
45.7 million Americans lacked health insurance coverage, 7.2 million
more than in 2000, and the share of Americans with employment-
based coverage declined for the seventh year in a row.61 Filings for
personal bankruptcy rose sharply, even as the social safety net frayed,
due to long-term cuts in public assistance, job training, housing sub-
sidy, and other programs.62 Although President Bush insisted that the
fundamentals of the economy were sound, the 2001–2007 recovery
was weak. As one study of this period between recessions concluded,
“Measures of total output, investment, consumption, employment,
wage and income growth, all rank at or near the bottom when com-
pared with past business cycles. Worse, these anemic results have
been accompanied by rising inequality as well, meaning that the bulk
of the (historically weak) gains have accrued to a small sliver of the
population.”63
By November of 2008 any number of grim facts pointed to seri-
ous and impossible-to-ignore economic problems. Most economists
acknowledged that the US economy was in a recession that was
likely to get much worse, as GDP shrank at a 0.3 percent annual rate
in the third quarter of 2008. Consumer spending fell by 3.1 percent
in the same period, its first decline since 1991. 64 About 240,000
jobs were lost in the month before the election as massive layoffs
hit the workforce. By the end of October the total number of jobs
lost since the beginning of 2008 was 1.2 million. The unemploy-
ment rate rose to 6.5 percent, up from 6.1 percent in October, and
the highest level in 14 years. More than 22 percent of the unem-
ployed had been out of work for six months or longer, the highest
level in a quarter century. 65 The slide continued in November, as
533,000 more jobs were lost, the largest one-month loss since 1974,
and the unemployment rate rose to 6.7 percent. This figure does
not include “discouraged workers” no longer looking for work or
the underemployed—those working fewer hours than they would

like. If people in these categories were counted, the unemployment
rate would have been 12.5 percent.66 Journalist Ronald Brownstein
noted that George W. Bush was the only president in recent history
to preside over an income decline through two presidential terms.
While Bush was in office the median household income declined,
poverty increased, and the number of Americans without health
insurance reached a new high.67 By the end of 2008 economic fore-
casts were for the recession to continue and intensify as Barack
Obama assumed office. But President Bush remained sunny about
the economic system. “The crisis was not a failure of the free market
system . . . Free market capitalism is more than an economic theory.
It is the engine of social mobility—the highway to the American
Dream,” he insisted.68
A Bloomberg/Los Angeles Times poll reported in December 2006
found that three quarters of Americans believed that economic
inequality was a major issue. A majority of Republicans—55 per-
cent—agreed.69 Even Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke warned of
the “painful dislocations” associated with capitalism and stated that
if “we did not place some limits on the downside risks to individu-
als affected by economic change, the public at large might become
less willing to accept the dynamism that is so essential to economic
progress.”70 While Bernanke worried about disillusionment with
the “dynamism” of the economy, we would argue that developing a
critical perspective on all our major institutions—political and eco-
nomic—contributes more to a healthy democracy than worshipping
at the golden calf of the market. Seeing through the many costs asso-
ciated with the modern presidency’s economic growth paradigm is a
vital step in this process.
National Security and the Bush

Doctrine
Since World War II, most presidents have developed foreign policy
“doctrines” that reveal their interpretations of the challenges facing
the United States and the strategies by which they should be met. For
example, the Truman Doctrine of 1947 shaped American Cold War
strategy by identifying the containment of communism as the chief
goal of foreign policy. During the campaign of 2000 George W. Bush’s
foreign policy views were unclear. In one of his debates with Al Gore
during the presidential election campaign of 2000, Bush stated, “If
we’re an arrogant nation, they’ll resent us. If we’re a humble nation,

but strong, they’ll welcome us.”71 In the first six months of his presi-
dency, Bush championed an unapologetic, unilateralist approach to
international issues that included repudiation of US support for the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the International Criminal Court, the
Kyoto environmental treaty on climate change and aggressive back-
ing for the development of a National Missile Defense system. In the
year after the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration put
together the elements of a far-from-humble foreign policy doctrine
based on unilateral action, preemptive military strikes, and preven-
tion of the emergence of any strategic rivals to US supremacy. Bush’s
grand strategy was formalized in a September 17, 2002, presiden-
tial report called The National Security Strategy of the United States
of America. Maintaining a skeptical view of multilateral action and
international treaties, the report argued for preemptive strikes against
rogue states and terrorists, even if faced with international opposi-
tion, and for the maintenance of American military supremacy. In
his introduction to the report, Bush contended that “America will act
against such emerging threats before they are fully formed . . . History
will judge harshly those who saw the coming danger but failed to act.
In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security
is the path of action.”72 While many commentators interpreted the
national security strategy document as endorsing preemptive military
action, it might more accurately be seen as attempting to legitimate
the radical concept of “preventive” war, or a decision to attack now
to prevent a real or potential adversary from becoming a substantial
threat in the future. As Rahul Mahajan commented, “Since such a
justification could easily be used by any country to attack any other,
it’s long been understood in international legal circles that preventive
war is completely illegitimate.”73
Such actions are described as “anticipatory” or “preemptive” in
the report. They are justified by the nature of new adversaries, who
cannot be deterred by conventional measures: “Given the goals of
rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer rely on a
reactive posture as we have in the past.” The United States must be
prepared to aggressively defend its interests on its own terms. If neces-
sary, it is legitimate for the United States to engage in a defensive first
strike against governments that aid or harbor terrorists or pursue the
development of weapons of mass destruction. “Traditional concepts
of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed
tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents,” the
report stated. “America will act against such emerging threats before
they are fully formed.” The report made clear that the United States
would act against its enemies even if it did not have international
support: “While the U.S. will constantly strive to enlist the support
of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone.”
Additionally the report placed the United States off-limits to interna-
tional law, asserting that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court “does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept.”
Underlying the Bush doctrine is the notion that the United States must
remain the unchallenged power in world affairs. “The United States
possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in
the world,” the report began. Supremacy involves maintaining forces
that “will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from
pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the
power of the United States.”
In the Bush Doctrine military strength is closely linked to an eco-
nomic model that might be called “market fundamentalism.” There is
“a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy,
and free enterprise,” the report contended. “The lessons of history are
clear: market economies, not command-and-control economies with
the heavy hand of government, are the best way to promote prosperity
and reduce poverty.” Seeking to “ignite a new era of global economic
growth through free markets and free trade,” the report advocated
specific neoliberal policies such as “pro-growth legal and regulatory
policies,” “lower marginal tax rates,” and “sound fiscal policies to
support business activity.”
Finally, the Bush report was based on the premise that the United
States is the ultimate guarantor of universal values. The report
declared that US national security policy “will be based on a dis-
tinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our val-
ues and our national interests.” Seeking to make the world “not just
safer, but better,” the report asserted that the values of freedom “are
right and true for every person, in every society—and the duty of
protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling
of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages . . . The
United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mis-
sion.” Hendrik Hertzberg of the New Yorker described the perspec-
tive of the Bush report as “a vision of what used to be called, when we
believed it to be the Soviet ambition, world domination.”74
This expansive doctrine of unilateral and preemptive military action
and the maintenance of American military and economic supremacy
was foreshadowed in several earlier presidential statements. On the
night of September 11, 2001, Bush declared on national television,
“We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed

these acts and those who harbor them.”75 Four days later, Bush made
clear that he did not want other countries setting conditions for the
new war on terrorism. “At some point we may be the only ones left.
That’s okay with me. We are America,” the president told his advi-
sors.76 Addressing a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001,
Bush stated, “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to
make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this
day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terror-
ism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”77
In his January 2002 state of the union address, Bush widened
the war on terrorism when he identified an “axis of evil” involving
Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Maintaining that “our war on terror-
ism is only beginning,” Bush warned the world that “America will
do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security. We’ll be deliber-
ate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events while dan-
gers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The
United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous
regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”78
In his speech at West Point in June 2002, the president bundled these
post-9/11 statements into a proclamation of strategy. Bush called for
preemptive attacks on countries that endanger the United States argu-
ing that American security required “a military ready to strike at a
moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world.” Rejecting as inad-
equate the cold war doctrines of containment and deterrence, Bush
said the United States must be “ready for preemptive action when
necessary to defend our liberty.” Speaking with self-described “moral
clarity,” Bush proclaimed that “America has no empire to extend or
utopia to establish. We wish for others only what we wish for our-
selves—safety from violence, the rewards of liberty, and the hope for
a better life.”79
President Bush and other members of his administration denied
that the United States had imperial ambitions. As a candidate in 2000,
George W. Bush argued, “America has never been an empire . . . We
may be the only great power in history that had the chance, and
refused.” In his “mission accomplished” remarks aboard the USS
Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003, Bush reiterated, “Other nations
in history have fought in foreign lands and remained to occupy and
exploit. Americans, following a battle, want nothing more than to
return home.” For his part, defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld main-
tained, “We’re not imperialistic. We never have been.”80
Several well-connected supporters of the administration were not

as shy. One of the most articulate supporters of the Bush Doctrine
was the neoconservative intellectual Robert Kagan. In 1996, he com-
mented on American dominance, contending that “hegemony must
be actively maintained, just as it was actively obtained . . . Any lessen-
ing of that influence will allow others to play a larger part in shaping
the world to suit their needs.”81 Four years later, Kagan and William
Kristol argued that American hegemony was no danger to the world,
“since the United States does not pursue a narrow, selfish definition of
its national interest . . . and infuses its foreign policy with an unusually
high degree of morality.”82 Targeting the “confusion about our role in
the world,” they called for stepped-up U.S. commitment to shape the
global order, for “Given the dangers we know, and given the certainty
that unknown perils await us over the horizon, there can be no respite
from our burden of benevolent global hegemony.”83
Four days after the start of the US attack on Afghanistan in 2001,
neoconservative author Max Boot made “The Case for American
Empire” in which he famously asserted that “Afghanistan and other
troubled lands today cry out for the sort of enlightened foreign admin-
istration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and
pith helmets.” He went on to recommend,
Once Afghanistan has been dealt with, America should turn its atten-
tion to Iraq . . . Once we have deposed Saddam, we can impose an
American-led, international regency on Baghdad, to go along with the
one in Kabul. With American credibility and seriousness thus restored,
we will enjoy fruitful cooperation from the region’s many opportun-
ists, who will show a newfound eagerness to be helpful in our larger
task of rolling up the international terror network that threatens us.84
In May 2003 Boot urged the United States to be prepared to occupy

Iraq with troops for years, “possibly decades” and to embrace the
practice, if not the term, of imperialism. After all, on the whole, “U.S.
imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during
the past century.”85
Was there anything significantly new in the foreign policy of
the Bush administration? After all, since the end of World War II,
American presidents have shared a consensus on maintaining a domi-
nant or “hegemonic” US international role in order to secure global
capitalism and defeat those who would challenge it. Thus there is
little new in attempts to reinforce American dominance, including
cloaking them in the rhetoric of morality and religion. What were the
elements of continuity and change in US empire and hegemony after

9/11 as they were impacted by patterns of militarism, nationalism,
and political economy?
As a strategy of imperial maintenance, the Bush Doctrine had ele-
ments of both continuity and change. Noam Chomsky notes, “The
basic principles of the imperial grand strategy of September 2002 go
back to the early days of World War II.” Chomsky points out, how-
ever, that the planners of the 1940s were describingg policy guidelines
within elite circles. In contrast, Chomsky argues, “Cheney-Rumsfeld-
Powell and their associates are officially declaringg an even more
extreme policy, one aimed at permanent global hegemony by reliance
on force where necessary. They intend to be heard, and took action
at once to put the world on notice that they meant what they say.
That is a significant difference.”86 For historian Andrew J. Bacevich,
the United States had pursued a grand strategy since the end of the
cold war that drew on principles and practices developed both dur-
ing and before the cold war itself. This “strategy of openness” aimed
to “expand an American imperium” that rests on a “commitment
to global openness—removing barriers that inhibit the movement of
goods, capital, ideas, and people. Its ultimate objective is the creation
of an open and integrated international order based on the principles
of democratic capitalism, with the United States as the ultimate guar-
antor of order and enforcer of norms.”87 After noting that the two
terms of Bill Clinton “produced an unprecedented level of military
activism,” Bacevich interprets Bush’s immediate post-9/11 statements
as “articulating something that had eluded policymakers since the
collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the United States of a readily
identifiable enemy: a compelling rationale for a sustained and proac-
tive use of American power on a global scale justified as a necessary
protective measure.”88 Elsewhere Bacevich explored the deep roots of
militarism in the American past, and explained its resurgence and res-
toration in recent decades in terms of the overlapping and reinforcing
projects of a bloc of military officers, neoconservative intellectuals,
nuclear strategists, and conservative Christians. Well before 9/11 “a
militaristic predisposition was already in place both in official circles
and among Americans more generally. In this regard, 9/11 deserves
to be seen as an event that gave added impetus to already existing
tendencies rather than as a turning point.”89
Underlying the rhetoric of the Bush administration and the self-
understanding of many Americans was a particular form of American
nationalism, one that has been explored most fully by Anatol Lieven in
America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism.90
For Lieven, American nationalism involves both a “creed” of democ-

racy and liberal individualism and an ethno-religious impulse to
make the world over in the American image. While the latter part
often takes “passive” or isolationist forms, “when the U.S. has been
attacked or threatened, or feels forced to make some massive overseas
commitment, this messianism can take an active form” that encour-
ages contempt for the opinions of the rest of humanity.91 Another
contribution to understanding American nationalism is made by Paul
T. McCartney, who studied closely President Bush’s framing of the ter-
rorist attacks, the development of the Bush doctrine, and the justifica-
tion for the war on Iraq, all of which were saturated with nationalist
themes. For McCartney, American national identity included both
“exemplarism”—the desire to stand apart and serve as a model—
and “vindicationism”—the urge to change the world to make it look
and act more like the United States. For McCartney, “Bush’s foreign
policy is vindicationism with a vengeance.”92
The relationship of the “war on terrorism” to the political economy
of neoliberal global capitalism is extremely complex. At one level the
Bush years saw a revitalization of what outgoing President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, in his 1961 farewell address, called the military-indus-
trial complex. Massive increases in military spending reward business
interests close to the administration in ways that have little to do with
the war on terrorism. According to one study, 32 high administration
officials were former arms company executives, consultants, or share-
holders. The Center for Public Integrity found that of the 30 members
of the Defense Policy Board, the government-appointed group that
advises the Pentagon, at least nine had ties to companies that won
more than $76 billion in defense contracts in 2001 and 2002. Four
members were registered lobbyists, one of whom represented two of
the three largest defense contractors.93 A second, more sectional eco-
nomic factor underlying the imperial thrust was the world economy’s
growing reliance on Gulf oil. This region has two-thirds of the world’s
known oil reserves. Gulf oil is of high quality and is relatively cheap
and easy to extract.94 In 1980 President Jimmy Carter declared Gulf
oil a “vital interest” that must be defended by the United States “by
any means necessary, including military force.” Michael Klare argued
that the Bush administration has globalized the Carter Doctrine to
take into account not only the Gulf region, but the Caspian Sea basin,
the Andean region of Latin America, and the west coast of Africa,
all of which are targeted for stepped up US military assistance and
bases. “Slowly but surely, the U.S. military is being converted into
a global oil-protection racket,” Klare contends. The Bush Doctrine
reflects a revival of “geopolitics”—the contest for control over terri-

tory, resources, and important geographical positions.95
In combination with structural and systemic factors, several inter-
nal political processes help to explain the resurgence of militarism
and the redefinition of empire during the Bush era. In part the Bush
Doctrine reflected the ascendancy of the worldview of a policy cur-
rent made up of neoconservative ideologues and traditional national
security hawks and unilateralists, reinforced by pro-Israel hardliners
and supplemented by elements of the Christian Right, who have long
sought to reorient US policy. Their assumptions about national secu-
rity were shaping US foreign policy early in the twenty-first century.
During the 1980s, this group supported the depiction of the Soviet
Union as an “evil empire,” the development of a national missile
defense system (“Star Wars”), and political and military aid to anti-
Communist rebels such as the Nicaraguan contras and the Islamic
mujahedeen in Afghanistan. After the Soviet Union imploded in 1991,
foreign policy hawks and neoconservatives refined their blueprints for
American hegemony in a post-cold war world. During the 1990s and
into the years of the George W. Bush administration, they developed
their goals and strategies through a network of groups, often funded
by conservative foundations, such as the Project for a New American
Century, the Center for Security Policy, the Jewish Institute for
National Security, and the American Enterprise Institute. They artic-
ulated their views in the pages of the Weekly Standard, Wall Street
Journal, National Review, Commentary, and the Washington Times,
as well as through syndicated columns by Charles Krauthammer,
William Safire, and others.96
Vice President Dick Cheney played a key role in supporting this
policy current when he was secretary of defense in the first Bush
administration. In 1992 a draft of a Defense Policy Guidance docu-
ment from Cheney’s Defense Department was leaked to the press.
Written by Pentagon analysts Paul Wolfowitz (deputy secretary of
defense under Donald Rumsfeld) and I. Lewis Libby (Vice President
Cheney’s chief of staff), the document laid out the rationale for an
American first strike against any country deemed to threaten the
security of the United States. It also established the goal of “deter-
ring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or
global role.”97 While the global implications of the draft caused an
uproar, leading to the document being rewritten and toned down,
neo-imperial aspirations for seizing the “unipolar moment” on the
post–cold war world had been made plain.
During the 1990s key activists within this policy network, includ-
ing columnist Robert Kagan and Weekly Standard d editor William
Kristol, formed the Project for a New American Century (PNAC),
which won the support of many defense hawks, neoconservative intel-
lectuals, and leaders of the Christian and Catholic Right. In its 1997
statement of principles, the PNAC stated that “a Reaganite policy
of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today.
But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of
the past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the
next.”98 In addition to Wolfowitz and Libby, the signatories of this
statement included such future Bush administration officials as Dick
Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Zalmay Khalilzad, a
former Unocal Corporation oil industry consultant who became spe-
cial envoy to Afghanistan, and Elliott Abrams, convicted for his part
in the Reagan-era Iran-contra affair, and Bush’s Middle East affairs
director for the National Security Council.
In 2000 PNAC published a 76-page document called Rebuilding
America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New
Century that became a blueprint for Bush’s foreign and defense poli-
cies. After noting that the PNAC plan “builds upon the defense strat-
egy outlined by the Cheney Defense Department in the waning days
of the Bush administration,” the report states, “At present the United
States faces no global rival. America’s grand strategy should aim to
preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future
as possible.” The PNAC report went on to urge such measures as large
increases in military spending, the development of missile defense sys-
tems, the deployment of a new family of nuclear weapons, and facing
up to “the realities of multiple constabulary missions that will require
a permanent allocation of U.S. forces.” These actions were necessary
to “preserve Pax Americana” (an American peace) and a “unipolar
21st century.”99
PNAC and its allies have been the main advocates of an aggressive
Bush Doctrine. Within the Bush administration their main opponent
during Bush’s first term was Secretary of State Colin Powell, who
often favored a more moderate, less unilateralist approach to foreign
policy. PNAC leaders expected the far-reaching changes in US military
policy they favored would have to come about slowly in the absence
of “a catastrophic and catalyzing event like a new Pearl Harbor.” As
foreign policy analyst Chalmers Johnson puts it, “On September 11,
2001, they got their Pearl Harbor.”100 Nine days later, on September
20, 2001, the PNAC sent a letter to President Bush advocating “a
determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq,” a
“large increase in defense spending,” and staunch support for Israel

and an end to US support for the Palestinian Authority.101 The war on
terrorism would be used to implement the pre-9/11 agenda of impor-
tant elements of the Bush administration and the political and busi-
ness interests that coalesced around them.102
Southern Christian conservatives, who were an important base of
support for the Bush administration, coloring its rhetoric and moral
preoccupations, played a supplemental role to the neoconservative
current. They helped to infuse Bush’s foreign policy rhetoric with
a strong sense of apocalyptic righteousness against the “evil ones”
that Bush has targeted. Scholars David Domke and Kevin Coe note,
“Bush also talks about God differently than most modern presi-
dents. Presidents since Roosevelt have commonly spoken as petition-
ers of God, seeking blessing, favor, and guidance. This president
positions himself as a prophet, issuing declarations of divine desires
for the nation and world.”103 As Kevin Phillips contended, “The
idea that the de facto head of the Religious Right and the president
of the United States can be the same person is a precedent-shatter-
ing circumstance that has barely crept into the national political
discussion.”104
Leaders of the Christian Right bolster near unconditional support
for Israel in its struggle with the Palestinians. Bush’s position on the
Middle East increasingly dovetailed with that of the hardline Israeli
leader Ariel Sharon.105 “Christian Zionists” have a biblically derived
belief in the coming showdown with the forces of the Antichrist.
Ironically, Protestant denominations that historically have been far
from friendly to Jews are now among the most ardently pro-Israel
forces in the United States. The Reverend Jerry Falwell said, “The
Bible Belt is Israel’s safety net in the United States.”106 Describing
the dispensationist theology of evangelical fundamentalists Anatol
Lieven stated, “The existence of the Israeli state is seen as a necessary
prelude to the arrival of the Antichrist, the Apocalypse, and the rule
of Christ and His Saints.”107 Christian conservatives play important
roles in many state Republican parties and provided George W. Bush
with needed support in several key primary contests in 2000. The
Christian Right also influenced US policy toward the United Nations,
including American withdrawal from any programs that deal with
family planning. The Christian Right has long hated the United
Nations, both on nationalist grounds and because of their fears of
world government by the Antichrist.108
What explains the Bush administration’s growing focus on
“regime change” in Iraq in the year-and-a-half after 9/11? The Bush
administration argued that war with Iraq was necessary to eliminate

Saddam Hussein’s arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, to dimin-
ish the threat of international terrorism, and to promote democracy
in Iraq and the region. Little hard evidence was offered in support of
the administration’s claims about the dangers of Iraq.109 Bush admin-
istration claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction
were deflated after the war when no such weapons were found by the
Iraq Survey Group, leading to resignation of chief weapons inspector
David Kay in January 2004. While officials spoke of an “intelligence
failure” and Kay stated “we were all wrong,” it was clear that the
buildup to the war had involved a massive propaganda campaign in
which the intelligence process was thoroughly politicized. As Sidney
Blumenthal contended,
The truth is that much of the intelligence community did not fail, but
presented correct assessments and warnings, that were overridden and
suppressed. On virtually every single important claim made by the
Bush administration in its case for war, there was serious dissension.
Discordant views—not from individual analysts but from several intel-
ligence agencies as a whole—were kept from the public as momentum
was built for a congressional vote on the war resolution.110
Blumenthal’s claim was supported by an early 2007 report of the

Defense Department’s inspector general, which focused on the pre-
war activities of the Office of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Douglas Feith, a major neoconservative war Hawk. Characterizing
the reports issued by Feith’s office as “of dubious quality and reli-
ability” the inspector general stated that Feith’s team “developed,
produced and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments
on the Iraq and Al Qaeda relationship, which included some con-
clusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence
Community, to senior decision-makers.”111
If the official reasons for the aggressive stance toward Iraq can
be refuted, what sort of alternative explanation makes sense? In our
view, Iraq represented an opportunity to implement the broad impe-
rial strategy underlying the Bush Doctrine. The administration dis-
missed options for the containment and deterrence of Iraq because
these measures would not allow for the expansion of American power
in the region. The conquest of Iraq, were it successful, would also pro-
vide an opportunity to realize two more specific US imperial goals:
the establishment of new US military bases in the Middle East and the
securing of more reliable control over Iraq’s vast oil supplies. Michael
T. Klare connects the logic of US military intervention to larger eco-

nomic and political goals in the Middle East:
The Bush-Cheney team could draw only one conclusion: that, on their
own, the Persian Gulf countries had neither the will nor the capacity
to increase their petroleum output and protect its outward flow. If the
administration’s energy plan was to succeed, the United States would
have to become the dominant power in the region, assuming responsi-
bility for overseeing the politics, the security, and the oil output of the
key producing countries.112
By 2006 it was apparent to many in the US foreign policy establishment

that Bush’s adventure in Iraq was a disaster of historic proportions
from the standpoint of the long-term interests of US global power. In
this context the Iraq Study Group (ISG), a bipartisan group authorized
by Congress, issued its report in December. The ISG was chaired by
former secretary of state James Baker and former Representative Lee
Hamilton. It was made up of five Democrats and five Republicans,
all of whom had held high-level political positions and none of whom
had ever expressed unorthodox views on US foreign policy. While
the ISG took a dire view of the situation in Iraq, calling it “grave and
deteriorating,” in many ways, its report represented a classic ruling-
class damage control operation in which in fundamental assumptions
of the policy were not questioned. Andrew Bacevich noted,
Their [the ISG] purpose is twofold: first, to minimize Iraq’s impact

on the prevailing foreign policy consensus with its vast ambitions and
penchant for armed intervention abroad; and second, to quell any
inclination of ordinary citizens to intrude into matters from which
they have long been excluded. The ISG is antidemocratic. Its implicit
message to Americans is this: We’ll handle things. Now go back to
holiday shopping.113
Disavowing any purely military solution, the ISG report’s 79 recom-

mendations included downscaling of the US military presence in Iraq
and US engagement with Syria and Iran. As such the ISG maintained
a more “realist” position in foreign policy debates with the overreach-
ing and messianic “neoconservatives.”114 But far from holding out an
actual exit strategy, the ISG report shared in several ways Bush’s impe-
rial strategy for dominating the Middle East and its resources, while
differing on the means. While the report recommended that US com-
bat brigades be largely withdrawn from Iraq by early 2008, combat
brigades represented less than half of all troops in Iraq. Moreover the
withdrawn troops could be redeployed to US military bases in neighbor-

ing countries, creating a “considerable military presence in the region,
with our still-significant force in Iraq, and with our air, ground, and
naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar,” in the words of the
report. After noting that Iraq “has the world’s second-largest known
oil reserves” the ISG report stated, “The United States should encour-
age investment in Iraq’s oil sector by the international community and
by international energy companies.” Furthermore Recommendation 63
advocated that the “United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorga-
nize the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to
enhance efficiency, transparency and accountability.”
After the ISG presented its report at the White House, President
Bush called it a “serious study” and “very instructive.” He then pro-
ceeded to disavow its very modest and realistic recommendations and
insisted that his goal remained “victory” in Iraq. For his part Vice
President Cheney dismissed the report as “not a strategy for winning
the war.”115 After a strategic review, Bush unveiled his plans for a surge
or escalation of US military forces in Iraq.116 Once again it appeared
that President Bush had sided with hardline, neoconservative foreign
policy advocates affiliated with the American Enterprise Institute
think tank and allied with hawkish politicians such as Senators John
McCain and Joseph Lieberman.117
The idea that the “surge” was a success became widely accepted
in mainstream political and media circles and was a mainstay of
John McCain’s 2008 presidential campaign. The notion of a success-
ful surge resurfaced in 2014 as President Obama considered options
amidst growing insecurity in Iraq. While levels of violence in Iraq
were down in 2008, this was due to many factors other than the
surge, some of which predated the US escalation in 2007. As Middle
East scholar Juan Cole pointed out,
The major reason for the fall in the death toll, however, was that the
Shiites won the war for Baghdad, ethnically cleansing hundreds of
thousands of Sunnis from the capital and turning it into a city with
a Shiite majority . . . The high death tolls in 2006 and 2007 were a by-
product of this massive ethnic cleansing campaign. Now, a Shiite mili-
tiaman in Baghdad would have to drive for a while to find a Sunni
Arab to kill.118
Iraqi society has been devastated by the war and its aftermath.
Hundreds of thousands of civilian Iraqis have been killed and over
four million have been displaced, either within Iraq or in Syria,
Jordan, and other countries. Access to electricity, sanitary water, and

food was precarious. According to Oxfam, 28 percent of Iraqi chil-
dren were malnourished in 2007, four years after the onset of the US
attack.
For those aware of such facts it should not be surprising that Iraqi
journalist Muntadhar al-Zaidi received broad support in the Middle
East after he denounced Bush and threw his shoes at the president
when Bush visited Iraq in December 2008. In a farewell address
at West Point in the same month, Bush defended his foreign policy
doctrine:
With all the actions we’ve taken these past eight years, we’ve laid a
solid foundation on which future Presidents and future military lead-
ers can build . . . In the years ahead, our nation must continue develop-
ing the capabilities to take the fight to our enemies across the world.
We must stay on the offensive.119
President Obama would have to decide to what extent he should build

on Bush’s “foundation.”
Executive Power Untethered

During the 1970s, scholars and political observers began to speak of
an “imperial presidency” in which “the constitutional balance between
executive power and presidential accountability is upset in favor of
executive power,” in the words of historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.120
This concern over unchecked executive authority was a response to
America’s war in Vietnam and to the brazen assertion of executive
power by President Richard M. Nixon, who after resigning from office
stated, “When the president does it, that means that it is not illegal.”121
In this context there were calls for limits on presidential power, partic-
ularly in the areas of war making, intelligence and covert operations,
and a return to a better constitutional balance between the executive
and legislative branches. Thirty years later many observers were struck
by the imperial nature of George W. Bush’s presidency.122
President Bush described himself as the “decider.” Indeed Bush’s
presidency involved extraordinary claims by the chief executive to
decide any number of important questions that in the past involved
the legislative and judicial branches.123 Perhaps Bush’s understanding
of executive power rested on the worldview of a presidential aide who
told writer Ron Suskind,
We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And
while you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll act
again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s
how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors . . . and you, all of you,
will be left to just study what we do.124
Expansive claims for presidential power during wartime are not

unprecedented in US history, as the actions of Abraham Lincoln dur-
ing the Civil War and Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II
make clear. In the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, passed
within days of the 9/11 attacks, Congress indeed granted Bush broad
powers in what became known as the war on terror. Congress autho-
rized President Bush to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organi-
zations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations or persons.
President Bush and his legal and political advisers interpreted this
authorization very broadly, as brooking no interference from the
other branches of government in the anti-terrorism campaign. They
attempted to develop a doctrine justifying the unleashing of presi-
dential power centering on the concept of the “unitary executive,”
which journalist Elizabeth Drew defines as holding that “the execu-
tive branch can overrule the courts and Congress on the basis of the
president’s own interpretations of the Constitution, in effect over-
turning Marbury v. Madison (1803), which established the principle
of judicial review, and the constitutional concept of checks and bal-
ances.”125 This theory of the presidency draws from the vesting clause
that opens Article II of the Constitution: “The executive power shall
be vested in a President of the United States of America.” As legal
scholar Garrett Ebbs explains the theory,
That idea says that because “the” executive power is vested in “a presi-
dent,” any attempt to limit the president’s control over the executive
branch is unconstitutional. It supposedly follows from the “the” and the
“a” that members of the executive branch are solely accountable to the
president alone, and the president, in turn, may order anyone who works
in the executive branch to exercise his or her discretion in fulfilling any
official function however the president personally thinks best.126
Two weeks after the September 11 attacks Deputy Assistant

Attorney General John Yoo laid out the rationale for sweeping presi-
dential power: “In the exercise of his plenary power to use military
force, the President’s decisions are for him alone and are unre-
viewable.” He went on to contend, “The historical record demon-
strates that the power to initiate military hostilities, particularly in
response to the threat of an armed attack, rests exclusively with the
President . . . Congress’s support for the President’s power suggests no
limits on the Executive’s judgment whether to use military force in
response to the national emergency.”127
In line with this doctrine Bush used “signing statements” to a
greater extent than all previous presidents combined. A signing state-
ment, issued when the president signs a bill into law, describes his
interpretation of the bill and declares that some of its provisions
may be unconstitutional and thus need not be enforced or obeyed as
written. According to the Boston Globe, among the laws that Bush
claimed the power to disobey are a torture ban and oversight provi-
sions of the USA Patriot Act. As reporter Charlie Savage explained,
when Bush signed the 2007 military budget bill, he issued a state-
ment challenging 16 of its provisions, one of which bars the Pentagon
from “using any intelligence that was collected illegally, including
information about Americans that was gathered in violation of the
Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable government
surveillance.” Bush’s signing statement instructed the military to view
the law in terms of the “president’s constitutional authority as com-
mander in chief, including the conduct of intelligence agencies, and to
supervise the unitary executive branch.”128
Many other policies of the Bush administration grew out of the
notion of inherent presidential power, including indefinite detention of
suspects, the legitimation of torture against detainees, and the use of
third country “renditions” in which foreign citizens are apprehended
and shipped to countries for “interrogation” on behalf of the US gov-
ernment.129 Domestically Bush claimed the right to engage in illegal
wiretapping in defiance of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA), which requires court ordered warrants for such monitor-
ing, despite being told by officials of the Justice Department that such
surveillance was clearly illegal. Between 2001 and 2004 key mem-
bers of Congress, including future House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, were
briefed on the program by Vice President Cheney and other White
House officials.130 In 2008 Speaker Pelosi supported a compromise
bill that granted retroactive immunity to telecommunications com-
panies that collaborated with the warrantless surveillance program, a
bill that Senator Obama voted for. As investigative journalist Robert

Parry noted, “Pelosi argued that one of the strengths of the 2008 bill
was that it reinstated the principle that the president must abide by the
FISA law, a paradoxical argument for legislation that ensured that the
previous violation of the law would go unpunished.”131
The White House approved of the use of torture against al-Qaeda
suspects, issuing secret memos to the Central Intelligence Agency in
2003 and 2004 that explicitly endorsed the agency’s use of interroga-
tion techniques such as waterboarding. Vice President Cheney was
directly involved in approving severe interrogation methods. “I was
aware of the program, certainly, and involved in helping get the pro-
cess cleared,” Cheney said in an interview with ABC News.132 The
Defense Department was also implicated in torture. In December
2008 the Senate Armed Services Committee released a report finding
that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and other high-level officials
were directly responsible for the abuse of detainees at Guantanamo
Bay, at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, and in Afghanistan through prac-
tices such as forced nudity, painful stress positions, sleep deprivation,
extreme temperatures, and use of dogs. Lawyers in every branch of
the armed forces warned that the use of these techniques was illegal,
as well as ineffective and counterproductive. “The abuse of detainees
in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed to the actions of ‘a few
bad apples’ acting on their own. The fact is that senior officials in the
United States government solicited information on how to use aggres-
sive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their
legality, and authorized their use against detainees,” the report con-
cluded. The origins of the decision to use coercive techniques can be
found in a February 7, 2002, memo signed by President Bush declar-
ing that the Geneva Convention’s standards for humane treatment did
not apply to captured al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees.133
Many accounts point to the office of Vice President Cheney, and
his legal counsel David Addington, as a forceful advocate of these
measures. Under President Ford in the 1970s, Cheney, as chief of staff,
resented the modest rollback of presidential power in the post-Water-
gate era. In 2002 Cheney stated that the presidency “was weaker today
as an institution because of the unwise compromises that have been
made over the last 30 to 35 years.”134 Shortly after the 9/11 attacks,
Cheney said in a Meet the Press interview, that America would have
to work “sort of the dark side . . . in the shadows of the intelligence
world.” For Cheney, “it’s going to be vital for us to use any means at
our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective.”135 Toward the end
of his tenure as vice president, Cheney laid out another version of
the unitary executive theory in an interview with Chris Wallace on

Fox News Sunday. Cheney said, “The president of the United States
now for 50 years is followed at all times, 24 hours a day, by a mili-
tary aide carrying a football that contains the nuclear codes that he
would use and be authorized to use in the event of a nuclear attack
on the United States. He could launch a kind of devastating attack
the world’s never seen. He doesn’t have to check with anybody. He
doesn’t have to call the Congress. He doesn’t have to check with the
courts. He has that authority because of the nature of the world we
live in.”136 Claims about the “nature of the world we live in” can eas-
ily buttress unchecked executive power.
Another very troubling development from the standpoint of democ-
racy was a systematic pattern of distortions and falsehoods on the part
of the Bush administration about the Iraq War. A detailed study by
the non-partisan Center for Public Integrity found that President Bush
and top administration officials made at least 935 false statements
in the two years following September 11, 2001, about the national
security threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The report contends,
“In short, the Bush administration led the nation to war on the basis
of erroneous information that it methodically propagated and that
culminated in military action against Iraq on March 19, 2003.”137
In our view this is a conclusion that should now be obvious to any
rational citizen. However as his presidency entered its final weeks,
President Bush continued to justify the invasion of Iraq by telling ABC
News anchor Charles Gibson that Saddam Hussein did not let United
Nations inspectors into Iraq prior to the war. That this is a falsehood
is not a matter of opinion. Saddam Hussein let UN inspectors into
Iraq in the fall of 2002 and they searched sites around the country,
finding no evidence of weapons of mass destruction. They were not
expelled by the Iraqis, but left the country under the threat of Bush’s
invasion in March 2003. Bush’s statement to Gibson in December
2008 merely restated a falsehood stated by Bush as early as July 14,
2003: “We gave him [Saddam Hussein] a chance to allow the inspec-
tors in, and he wouldn’t let them in. And, therefore, after a reasonable
request, we decided to remove him from power.”138 The failure of the
mainstream media to strongly challenge these and other falsehoods
helped allow them to be reasserted. In the next chapter we will look
at ways in which President Barack Obama both departed from and
carried on the Bush-Cheney model of executive authority.
Chapter Five
Change You Can Believe In? The Barack

Obama Presidency
The truth of the matter is that my policies are so mainstream that if

I had set the same policies that I had back in the 1980s, I would be
considered a moderate Republican.
—Barack Obama
The Political Context of the

Obama Presidency
On the evening of November 4, 2008, Illinois senator Barack Obama
addressed a crowd of 125,000 supporters in Chicago’s Grant Park.
“A new dawn of American leadership is at hand,” Obama told the
gathering, shortly after the formal concession of his opponent for
the presidency, Senator John McCain of Arizona. “You understand the
enormity of the challenges we face—two wars, a planet in peril, the
worst financial crisis in a century,” he said. “The road ahead will be
long. Our climb will be steep. We may not get there in one year or
even one term, but America—I have never been more hopeful than
I am tonight that we will get there. I promise you—we as a people will
get there. Because of what we did on this day, at this moment, change
has come to America. This victory belongs to you,” he stated, adding
that “This victory alone is not the change we seek. It’s just a chance
to make that change.”
Obama’s victory indeed represented a remarkable climb to the top
of American politics. Born in 1961 to a Kenyan father and a Kansan
mother, Obama came to national attention in 2004 with his address
to the Democratic National Convention. The same year he was elected
to the US Senate. When he announced his presidential bid in early
2007, he was rated a long shot by most political analysts. But Obama
was able to capitalize on deep discontent about the direction of the
country and a strong desire for change among voters. Running an
exceptionally disciplined campaign, Obama managed to beat Senator
Hillary Rodham Clinton in the contest for the Democratic nomination
and achieve a decisive victory over Republican John McCain in the

general election, as the Democrats solidified their control of Congress
by making significant gains in the House and Senate.
What sort of change did the election of Barack Obama as the 44th
president of the United States bring about? To answer this question
we emphasize the need to understand political leaders and govern-
ment institutions, including the presidency, in the context of a broader
structure of power—ideological, political, and economic—that
shapes the American political system. When this is understood, we
will be able to better understand how much change, and what kind of
change, President Obama has and has not brought about. We begin
by examining the dynamics of the 2008 election contest.
Barack Obama faced a formidable opponent for the Democratic
nomination in Hillary Clinton. Contending with Clinton for the sup-
port of working-class voters, he stated in February 2008, “A coun-
try in which only a few prosper is antithetical to our ideals and our
democracy.” In the Democratic primaries, Obama battled not only
with Senator Clinton, but also with former senator and vice presiden-
tial candidate John Edwards, who ran on a message of economic pop-
ulism perhaps stronger than any major Democratic candidate since
Jesse Jackson in 1988. But Obama’s economic and domestic policy
positions at this stage were unclear and not to the Left of Clinton’s,
let alone Edwards’s.1 During the nomination fight, the liberal econo-
mist and New York Times columnist, Paul Krugman, on several occa-
sions described Obama’s economic policies as less progressive than
those of Edwards or Clinton. After Obama wrapped up the nomina-
tion, Krugman continued to argue that, “Progressive activists, in par-
ticular, overwhelmingly supported Mr. Obama during the Democratic
primary even though his policy positions, particularly on health care,
were often to the right of his rivals’.”2 Shortly after Hillary Clinton
ended her campaign, Obama told CNBC, “Look. I am a pro-growth,
free-market guy. I love the market.”3
In the summer of 2008, after clinching the nomination, Obama
raised concern among progressives by supporting the reauthorization
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, approving of controver-
sial Supreme Court decisions on gun ownership and the death penalty,
and opting out of public financing for the general election campaign.
Did these positions represent a flip-flop? Not really. Obama’s back-
ground as a community organizer and his mixed-race heritage, along
with much wishful thinking among liberals, led many progressives
to believe Obama was further to the Left than he actually was. In
truth, as journalist David Moberg noted, “Disappointed as some
The Barack Obama Presidency 107
progressives may be, Obama has not made a dramatic shift to the
center: He’s always been more centrist, cautious, and compromising
than many of his supporters—and critics—have wanted to admit.”4
On foreign policy, there is no doubt that Obama’s publicly stated
opposition to the Iraq war in 2002, before he was a US senator, was a
major asset with Democratic primary voters and caucus participants,
for whom the war was deeply unpopular. However his choice for a
running mate was Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware, who voted to
authorize the Iraq War in October 2002, as did Senator Clinton.
In the view of foreign policy scholar Stephen Zunes, “Biden, who
chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the lead-up
to the Iraq War during the latter half of 2002, was perhaps the
single most important congressional backer of the Bush adminis-
tration’s decision to invade that oil-rich country.”5Nevertheless the
Biden choice seemed to go down well with Democratic activists, and
Obama kicked off the fall campaign by accepting his party’s nomi-
nation before a crowd of more than 80,000 at Mile High football
stadium in Denver on August 28.
John McCain’s road to the Republican nomination was far from
smooth. Late in 2007, his campaign seemed to be on life support.
However he was able to bounce back and win the New Hampshire
primary early in 2008 and sew up the nomination by spring, capi-
talizing on reservations Republican voters had about such rivals as
Mitt Romney, Rudy Giuliani, Mike Huckabee, and Fred Thompson.
Despite a generally conservative voting record, McCain was still
viewed with suspicion, and even hostility, by some ideological and
social conservatives in the Republican base, because of his past posi-
tions on campaign finance, immigration, and other issues. In recent
years McCain had sought to mend fences with social conservatives,
reconciling with the Rev. Jerry Falwell in 2006, for example. He had
previously called Falwell an “agent of intolerance.”6 In late August,
shortly before the opening of the Republican National Convention
in St. Paul, Minnesota, McCain announced the surprising choice of
Alaska governor Sarah Palin as his running mate in a bid to further
mollify and energize Republican social conservatives.
McCain indeed got a “bounce” from the convention and pulled even
with Obama in national polls in the first half of September. McCain
had long been a foreign policy hardliner, forging deep associations
with hawkish neoconservative policy activists. Hammering Obama
for failing to support President Bush’s “surge” in Iraq, McCain pre-
sented himself as the candidate best prepared for the national secu-
rity challenges of a seemingly endless “war on terrorism.” After his
nomination, he managed to reduce Obama’s advantage on economic

issues.7 Both candidates brought out new and differing proposals to
deal with the worsening economic slump and the turmoil in financial
markets. McCain proposed tax cuts on capital gains and on with-
drawals from retirement accounts by people 59 and older, bigger
write-offs for stock losses, and a tax waiver for unemployment bene-
fits. Obama’s stimulus package was intended to create millions of new
jobs by investing in renewable-energy industries and infrastructure
projects, while providing near-universal health care and reducing the
federal budget deficit. As reporter Jackie Calmes explained, McCain’s
program “hews to the Republican playbook: tax cuts geared espe-
cially to individuals and businesses at the top of the income scale, in
the belief that they will stimulate the economy and create jobs that
benefit everyone.” Obama’s plans “reflect Democratic emphasis on
tax cuts intended for middle-class and low-wage workers and for the
smallest businesses, as well as spending increases for public works
to create jobs.”8 McCain admitted that economic policy was not his
strong suit, and he did not help his case by stating on September 15
that “the fundamentals of our economy are strong.” This came on the
same day as the McCain campaign released a television advertisement
that began “Our economy is in crisis” and at a time when just 9 per-
cent of the public rated the economy as good or excellent and only
14 percent said the country was moving in the right direction. These
developments, combined with Sarah Palin’s growing unfavorability
ratings, helped to reopen Obama’s lead by late September.9
Given McCain’s inability to gain traction on the economic issue,
his campaign and its supporters increasingly targeted Obama’s
“character” as revealed by his “associations” with controversial fig-
ures like his former minister Rev. Jeremiah Wright, former Weather
Underground leader and University of Illinois professor William Ayers,
and Columbia University professor and Middle East scholar Rashid
Khalidi.10 Sarah Palin characterized the significance of Obama’s con-
nection to Ayers this way: “This is not a man who sees America as
you see it, and how I see America. We see America as the greatest
force for good in this world . . . Our opponent though, is someone who
sees America, it seems, as being so imperfect that he’s palling around
with terrorists who would target their own country.”11 These attacks
had little effect. As reporters John Harris and Jim VandeHei noted,
Republicans lost one of their most effective political tactics. Portraying

Al Gore or John F. Kerry as exotic and untrustworthy characters with
culturally elitist values proved brutally effective for the GOP in 2000
and 2004, as it had in numerous other races for years. In 2008, such
tactics barely dented Obama—who because of his race and background
looked at first like a more vulnerable target.12
Another desperate and bizarre opposition tactic was to taint

Obama with the prospect of voter fraud and attempting to steal
the election. Republicans pointed to Obama’s alleged ties with
ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now), a 30-year-old non-profit organization that worked on behalf
of low- and moderate-income people and that was a regular target
of Republicans during election campaigns. In the last presidential
debate Senator McCain stated, fantastically, “We need to know the
full extent of Sen. Obama’s relationship with ACORN, who is now
on the verge of maybe perpetrating one of the greatest frauds in voter
history in this country, maybe destroying the fabric of democracy.”
For her part Governor Palin contended that “we can’t allow leftist
groups like ACORN to steal this election.”13 ACORN engaged in
extensive voter registration campaigns around the country, claiming
to have signed up 1.3 million new voters, and acknowledged some
errors on the registration cards that it collected. However there is no
connection between problems in voter registration and voter fraud on
Election Day. In fact voter fraud is virtually nonexistent. One study
of vote fraud by Professor Lorraine C. Minnite of Barnard College
found that nationwide “between 2002 and 2005 only one person
was found guilty of registration fraud. Twenty others were found
guilty of voting while ineligible and five were guilty of voting more
than once. That’s 26 criminal voters.”14 By contrast voter suppres-
sion and intimidation of eligible voters by public officials and private
groups, often aimed at minority and low-income communities, is a
far larger problem than voter fraud, affecting tens if not hundreds of
thousands of potential voters.15
Conservatives sought to gain additional mileage out of ACORN by
linking the organization’s advocacy of home ownership for people of
modest means to the subprime mortgage crisis and the larger crisis in
financial markets. A McCain-approved advertisement contended that
“ACORN forced banks to issue risky home loans—the same type of
loans that caused the financial crisis we’re in today.”16 This was part
of a broader effort by the political Right to pin the blame for the sub-
prime mortgage crisis on liberal policies aimed at providing afford-
able housing for minority and low-income communities, such as the
1977 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), and on risky lending by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. But this was an extremely shallow
and ideologically driven claim. Many of the largest subprime lenders

were not even covered by the CRA, directing their loans instead to
exurban development rather than to inner city areas. Business colum-
nist Daniel Gross had a better explanation: “Lending money to poor
people doesn’t make you poor. Lending money poorly to rich peo-
ple does.”17 Closely related to these claims were McCain and Palin’s
accusations that Obama had a closeted socialist agenda, as revealed
in his campaign comment to Mr. Samuel Joseph Wurzelbacher—later
known as “Joe the Plumber”—that it was a good idea to “spread
the wealth around.” Speaking of Obama’s tax proposals, Sarah Palin
stated, “Friends, now is no time to experiment with socialism.” John
McCain agreed that Obama’s tax proposals sounded a “lot like social-
ism.” Journalist Hendrik Hertzberg of the New Yorker quipped,
Back when the polls were nip and tuck and the leaves had not yet
begun to turn, Barack Obama had already been accused of betraying
the troops, wanting to teach kindergartners all about sex, favoring
infanticide, and being a friend of terrorists and terrorism. What was
left? The anticlimactic answer came as the long Presidential march of
2008 staggered toward its final week: Senator Obama is a socialist.18
Ironically John McCain had opposed some of President Bush’s tax

cut proposals several years before, explaining, “I cannot in good con-
science support a tax cut in which so many of the benefits go to the
more fortunate among us at the expense of middle-class Americans
who need tax relief.”19 Perhaps McCain had been a socialist as well.
During the general election campaign, Obama combined occa-
sional populist attacks on Wall Street, the Bush administration, and
John McCain with statements that reassured business leaders and
mainstream economists that he was not a radical. Thus he stated at a
campaign stop in Colorado,
I certainly don’t fault Senator McCain for these problems. But I do

fault the economic philosophy he subscribes to. It’s the same philoso-
phy we’ve had for the last eight years—one that says we should give
more and more to those with the most and hope that prosperity trickles
down to everyone else. 20
On the other hand, in an interview on NBC’s Today show Obama

said that the cost of the bailout plan might limit his plans for spend-
ing on health care, energy, education, and other domestic goals.
“Does that mean that I can do everything that I’ve called for in this
campaign right away?” he asked. “Probably not. I think we’re going

to have to phase it in. And a lot of it’s going to depend on what our
tax revenues look like.”21 At a rally in Green Bay Obama said, “I
am not a Democrat who believes that we can or should defend every
government program just because it’s there.” He told the crowd, “We
will fire government managers who aren’t getting results, we will cut
funding for programs that are wasting your money and we will use
technology and lessons from the private sector to improve efficiency
across every level of government.” Sounding notes of fiscal prudence
Obama stated, “We cannot give a blank check to Washington with no
oversight and accountability, when no oversight and accountability
is what got us into this mess in the first place.”22 By early October a
survey of applied academic economists by The Economistt magazine
found that a majority thought Obama had a better economic plan, a
firmer grasp of economics, and would appoint better economic advis-
ers than McCain. Obama scored better than McCain with the econo-
mists on nearly every issue: promoting fiscal discipline, energy policy,
reducing the number of people without health insurance, reforming
financial regulation, and boosting long-term economic growth. 23 Exit
polls on Election Day showed that the economy dominated voters’
concerns more than in any election since 1980, with 63 percent say-
ing it was the most important issue, up from 20 percent in 2004.
Three-quarters of those polled said the country was on the wrong
track, more than nine in ten rated the economy in bad shape and
at least seven in ten disapproved of President Bush’s handling of the
economy.24 As one analysis noted, “For McCain, who maintained his
edge in the public’s view as the stronger candidate on national secu-
rity issues, the utter dominance of economic issues overwhelmed his
campaign.”25 As we will see, while Obama’s campaign of reassurance
on economics may have been electorally shrewd, it also portended
fateful choices that Obama, as president-elect, made on appointments
to key economic policy positions.
Barack Obama won a popular majority in 28 states plus the District
of Columbia and the second congressional district in Nebraska for
a solid 365 votes in the Electoral College. McCain won 22 states
with 173 electoral votes. Over 131 million Americans voted in 2008,
the most ever, and turnout among eligible voters was estimated at
61.6 percent, representing the third straight presidential election in
which turnout rose and the highest turnout rate since 1968. 26 Obama
won nearly 53 percent of the popular vote compared to 46 percent
for McCain. He was the first Democratic candidate to win more
than 50 percent of the popular vote since Jimmy Carter in 1976,
and his percentage was the largest for a Democrat since Lyndon’s
Johnson victory over Barry Goldwater in 1964. Obama was able to
win the big three battleground states of Florida, Pennsylvania, and
Ohio and to win several states in strongly Republican regions includ-
ing the South (Virginia and North Carolina as well as Florida) and
Rocky Mountains/Great Plains region (New Mexico, Colorado, and
Nevada).
In some ways the presidential election of 2008 was a referendum
on the Bush presidency, unfortunately for John McCain. Exit polls
conducted among voters on Election Day revealed an atmosphere of
intense negativity in the country. Bush had the lowest sustained popu-
larity of any modern president. His approval rating last hit 50 percent
early in his second term. In a December 2008 Pew Research Center
survey, just 11 percent said Bush will be remembered as an outstand-
ing or above average president—by far the lowest positive end-of-term
rating for any of the past four presidents. Sixty-eight percent said
they disapproved of Bush’s performance, with 53 percent saying they
disapprove “strongly.”27
Obama won in part because of an electoral shift toward the
Democrats in party identification. Analysis by the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press found that 39 percent of vot-
ers were Democrats while 32 percent were Republicans, a significant
shift from 2004 when the electorate was evenly divided. Obama also
did well among moderates, picking up the support of more voters in
the ideological “middle” than did either John Kerry in 2004 or Al
Gore in 2000. The Illinois Democrat won at least half the votes of
independents, suburban voters, and Catholics, in all cases improving
on Kerry’s record among these groups in 2004. Younger voters were
very important to Obama, as he drew two-thirds of the vote among
those younger than age 30.28
Obama captured two-thirds of the Hispanic vote, a 13-point
improvement over Kerry in 2004, while gaining seven points among
African Americans compared to Kerry (95 percent for Obama, 88 per-
cent for Kerry), and managed to slightly improve on Kerry’s share of
the white vote (43 percent for Obama, 41 percent for Kerry). 29 While
Obama performed slightly worse among white women compared
to Al Gore in 2000, he won 41 percent of the white male vote. No
Democrat since Jimmy Carter in 1976 had won more than 38 percent
of the white male vote. 30 Obama’s coalition included majorities of
women, independent voters, political moderates, Hispanics, African
Americans, people of most income groups and educational levels, and
voters under age 45, according to a New York Times analysis.31
What did the election results and the nature of Obama’s coalition
tell us about the changing political nature of the country? After the
election a number of political leaders and pundits urged Obama to
“go slow” in promoting change, denying that the election results man-
dated progressive policies and asserting, as if a mantra, that America
remained a “center-right” nation. Thus former Republican official
and author William Bennett stated on CNN that “America is still a
center-right nation, no matter what anyone says.” House Minority
leader John Boehner of Ohio insisted that “Democrats should not
make the mistake of viewing Tuesday’s results as a repudiation of
conservatism.”32 And in a pre-election cover story titled “America
the Conservative,” Newsweek editor John Meachem said that should
Obama win, “he will have to govern a nation that is instinctively more
conservative than it is liberal.”33While it is true that self-described
conservatives have outnumbered self-identified liberals for some time,
such ideological labeling is misleading in a country where such terms
are notoriously unclear to average citizens. Looking at voter prefer-
ences on substantive policy issues is more meaningful. Polls in recent
years find consistent support for such progressive measures as increas-
ing the minimum wage, stricter environmental regulation, govern-
ment support to make health care more available and affordable, tax
cuts aimed at the middle-class and not the wealthy, and maintaining
Social Security as a public program. However, election outcomes and
public opinion influence but are not necessarily predictive of presi-
dential action. After the election, the structural and political factors
we emphasize were working to shape and limit the kind of changes
that Obama would reach for and attain.
The Politics of Economic and

Domestic Policy
The economic crisis that confronted Barack Obama as he assumed
office was rooted in the “neoliberal” capitalist model that had been
embraced by both Democrats and Republicans for many years. It was
not an invention of George W. Bush. Timothy Canova identified con-
tinuities between the Clinton and Bush administrations, noting that
both “embraced the so-called Washington Consensus, a policy agenda
of fiscal austerity, central-bank autonomy, deregulated markets, lib-
eralized capital flows, free trade and privatization.”34 Moreover the
turn to neoliberalism, globalization, and financialization appears to
be evidence of deeply rooted weaknesses in the US capitalist economy
itself. Seeming to offer plausible “escape routes” from the stagnation

and overcapacity that marked the economic crisis of the 1970s, it
proved to be unsustainable.35 As the economy tanked in 2008, a num-
ber of approaches to crisis management were possible, including an
attempted resolution through a rebranded New Deal, as advocated by
a number of progressive, Keynesian, and social democratic thinkers.
What sort of approach to political economy did Barack Obama bring
as he sought the presidency?36
Making Connections
When Barack Obama returned to Chicago in the early 1990s after
graduating from Harvard Law School, he began to form connections
with influential law firms, political leaders, and business interests that
went well beyond the circles in which he had moved as a community
organizer in the mid-1980s.37 Several detailed profiles in the main-
stream media demonstrate that a centrist, business-friendly dimension
of Obama’s political orientation had been well-formed even before he
announced his bid for the presidency. In the November 2006 issue of
Harper’s, journalist Ken Silverstein showed that Obama had built a
strong network of business supporters, including contributors from
corporate law and lobbying firms, Wall Street financial firms, and
large Chicago business interests. Silverstein acknowledged Obama’s
responsiveness to both his social activist and business constituents,
noting that Obama “quickly established a political machine funded
and run by a standard Beltway group of lobbyists.”38 As we noted in
chapter two, New Yorker staff writer Larissa MacFarquhar main-
tained that Obama held a “Burkean” and “deeply conservative” view
of history marked by a distrust of abstractions and an affirmation
of continuity and stability.39 Focusing on Obama’s economic policies
for an August 2008 New York Times Magazine feature, economics
columnist David Leonhardt described Obama as a “University of
Chicago Democrat” who advocated policies that “often involve set-
ting up a government program to address a market failure but then
trying to harness the power of the market within that program. This,
at times, makes him look like a conservative Democrat.”40
During the presidential campaign, Obama touted his base of small
contributors, but he also received considerable support from the larg-
est Wall Street firms and major corporate lobbyists. As G. William
Domhoff noted, “A relative handful of large donors in the Chicago
growth coalition and the national corporate community were essential
to his political career.”41 An August 2008 New York Times analysis

showed that Obama received more donations of $1,000 or more than
Hillary Clinton or John McCain. The article noted the role of more
than five-hundred Obama “bundlers” who each collected contribu-
tions of $50,000 or more. “Many of the bundlers came from industries
with critical interests in Washington. Nearly three dozen of the bun-
dlers have raised more than $500,000 each, including more than a half-
dozen who have passed the $1 million mark and one or two who have
exceeded $2 million,” reported Michael Luo and Christopher Drew.
An analysis of campaign finance records shows that about two-thirds

of his bundlers are concentrated in four major industries: law, securi-
ties and investments, real estate and entertainment. Lawyers make up
the largest group, numbering roughly 130, with many of them working
for firms that also have lobbying arms. At least 100 Obama bundlers
are top executives or brokers from investment businesses: nearly two
dozen work for financial titans like Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs
or Citigroup. About 40 others come from the real estate industry.42
A post-election study by the Campaign Finance Institute found that

while nearly 50 percent of Obama’s donations came in individual con-
tributions of $200 or less, only 26 percent of the money he collected
through August 31 during the primary and 24 percent of his money
through October 15 came from contributors whose total donations
added up to $200 or less. This is because many donors contributed
$200 or less several times during the campaign. When this is taken
into account, Obama’s percentage of small donor contributions was
similar to that of George W. Bush in 2004.43 Obama’s established
connections do not determine, but may help to explain, the mix of
policies he accepted as president.
Obama Assembles a Team

After the election, Obama assembled an economic policy team that
included many figures representing continuity with corporate neolib-
eralism. Treasury secretary Timothy Geithner, National Economic
Council director Lawrence Summers, and Office of Management and
Budget director Peter Orzag were associates of President Clinton’s
Treasury secretary, Robert Rubin. In 2006 Obama was the only sena-
tor to address the inaugural meeting of the Hamilton Project, created
by Clinton-era Treasury officials Robert Rubin and Roger Altman
and others to formulate Democratic economic strategy. “Rubinomics”

was a Wall Street-friendly approach to economic policy on the part
of Democrats who supported balanced budgets, free trade, and finan-
cial deregulation. The New York Times observed that these selections
signaled that “Obama intended to pursue aggressive, yet centrist poli-
cies, in finding ways to help jump-start the economy.” The Economist
found Obama’s choices “reassuring especially for those who feared a
shift to the left.” The magazine quoted a hedge-fund manager who
“breathed a sigh of relief” that there were “no Robert Reichs” in the
cabinet, in reference to Bill Clinton’s progressive labor secretary. Even
Karl Rove found Obama’s economic team “reassuring.”44 Progressive
journalist and economic analyst Robert Kuttner interpreted these key
appointments differently: “Obama felt he needed men like Rubin and
Summers for tutelage, access, and validation. That itself speaks vol-
umes about where power resides in America.”45
Having reviewed Obama’s relationship to economic and political
elites, we might predict that, as president, Obama’s record would be com-
promised in terms of his ability or willingness to create new models that
break sharply with business-oriented, neoliberal orientations. At times
Obama adopted a populist pose. For example he attacked the Supreme
Court’s January 2010 Citizens United d decision on campaign spending
by corporations, stating, “This ruling opens the floodgates for an unlim-
ited amount of special interest money into our democracy.”46 But he
also took pains to reassure and court the business community, perhaps
in accord with the “demand constraint” of capitalist democracy noted
previously. Obama told Bloomberg News that he did not “begrudge” JP
Morgan Chase &Co. CEO, Jamie Dimon, his $17 million dollar bonus,
nor Goldman Sachs Group Inc. CEO, Lloyd Blankfein, his $9 million
award. “I know both these guys; they are very savvy businessmen. I, like
most of the American people, don’t begrudge people success or wealth.
That is part of the free-market system,” Obama explained.477 About two
weeks later, in a speech to members of the Business Roundtable, Obama
declared himself an “ardent believer in the free market.” Acknowledging
that government has a “vital, if limited, role to play in fostering eco-
nomic growth,” Obama maintained that, “I want everyone in this room
to succeed...Because I firmly believe that America’s success in large
part depends on your success.”48
One area of significant progressive achievement in Obama’s first term
was the rebuilding of regulatory agencies such as the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
and the Securities and Exchange Commission.49 Other decisive breaks
include the appointment of Hilda Solis as labor secretary.50 Obama’s
approaches to economic stimulus, banking and financial regulation

and health care reform were, in different ways, more problematic. As
we attempt to show briefly, they reflect both the limitations of Obama’s
market-deferential biases and the resource constraints that help to
shape outcomes in key policy battles.51 While private capital has great
structural advantages in these policy battles, it cannot be assumed that
their interests will prevail. As Domhoff argues, “The corporate com-
munity’s ability to transform its economic power into policy influence
and political access makes it the most important influence on the fed-
eral government.” He goes on to contend that
despite their preponderant power in the federal government and the

many necessary policies it carries out for them, leaders within the cor-
porate community are constantly critical of it because of its potential
independence and its ability to aid their opponents. They know they
need government, but they also fear it, especially during times of eco-
nomic crisis when they need it the most. 52
Economic Recovery
After the election, Obama developed a stimulus plan that would
provide up to $1 trillion to build infrastructure, provide assistance
to debt-strapped state and local governments, invest in energy-effi-
ciency projects, and other measures. Obama’s turn to the stimulus
approach was greeted warmly by leading progressive economists as a
neo-Keynesian measure to put the brakes on rising unemployment and
stop the hemorrhaging of state and local government jobs and services.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which passed
Congress in February 2009 with the support of three Republicans in
the Senate and no Republicans in the House, included a mix of tax
cuts, aid to state and local governments, emergency unemployment
assistance, and spending for a variety of infrastructure projects. The
cost was $787 billion. A number of studies and assessments con-
cluded that the Recovery Act boosted employment. A November 2010
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimated that as many as
3.6 million people were employed as a result of ARRA. In addition
to saving and creating jobs, ARRA increased the number of hours
worked, the CBO concluded. A summary of the CBO report noted,
Among ARRA’s most effective provisions for saving and creating

jobs, according to CBO estimates, are direct purchases of goods and
services by the federal government, transfer payments to states (such

as extra Medicaid funding), and transfer payments to individuals (such
as increased food stamp benefits and additional weeks of unemploy-
ment benefits). CBO estimates indicate that tax cuts are less effective
job producers, and tax cuts for higher-income people and corporations
have very little bang for the buck. 53
A study by Alan S. Blinder, a Princeton professor and former vice

chairman of the Fed, and Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s
Analytics, concluded that without the Obama administration’s fis-
cal stimulus program and other measures, the US GDP would have
been about 6.5 percent lower in 2010, there would have been about
8.5 million fewer jobs, on top of the more than 8 million already lost,
and the economy would have been experiencing deflation, instead
of low inflation.54 A 2014 study by Obama’s Council of Economic
Advisers (CEA) claimed that Recovery Act saved or created an aver-
age of 1.6 million jobs a year for four years through the end of 2012.
The CEA also maintained that Recovery Act boosted the GDP level
by between 2 and 3 percent from late 2009 through mid-2011, and
that the debt added by the stimulus may have been entirely offset by
new economic activity.55
Obama economic advisers predicted that unemployment would
decline significantly in 2009 and 2010. But as unemployment rose
in 2009, some argued that, although the economy would be in much
worse shape without the Recovery Act, the initial stimulus should
have been larger and that a second stimulus package was needed. 56
By early 2010, however, in the wake of Scott Brown’s Senate victory
in Massachusetts, while the Obama administration was willing to
tout the relative success of the stimulus and push for a modest jobs
bill, the president did not seem inclined to pursue a second stimulus
package. 57 By this time conservatives used the rise in unemployment
as proof that the stimulus was not working. With Republicans taking
control of the House of Representatives in 2010 and with President
Obama pledging commitment to a chimerical “fiscal responsibility,”
prospects for any new Keynesian pump priming seemed remote. In
itself, the stimulus was insufficient to restore economic growth and
employment levels to pre-recession levels. A June 2014 report by the
administration-friendly Center for American Progress found,
Economic growth lags behind similar points in prior business cycles.

Gross domestic product, or GDP, fell sharply in the first quarter of 2014
at an inflation-adjusted annual rate of 2.9 percent. Domestic consump-
tion increased by an annual rate of 1 percent, and housing spending
substantially shrank by 4.2 percent, while business investment growth

fell at a rate of 1.2 percent. Exports decreased by 8.9 percent in the
first quarter, and government spending increased by 0.6 percent. The
economy expanded by 11 percent from June 2009 to March 2014—its
slowest expansion during recoveries of at least equal length. 58
Health Care Reform

On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed a broad health care
reform bill called the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (or
ACA). The legislation, passed without a single Republican vote, rep-
resented the largest expansion of health care coverage since the pas-
sage of Medicare and Medicaid 45 years earlier. Among the chief
goals of the reform was to expand coverage to about 30 million cur-
rently uninsured Americans through subsidies to buy private health
insurance through state-level “exchanges” and through the expansion
of Medicaid. Other provisions aimed at better standards for coverage
and to bar exclusion from coverage for preexisting conditions. While
the overall cost-control effects of the legislation appeared to be mod-
est, the CBO estimated that the ACA would reduce federal budget
deficits by $143 billion over 2010–2019. 59
The 2010 health care reform is a historically significant social pol-
icy achievement, passed amidst hysterical cries about “socialism” and
“death panels.” In addition to being a victory for Obama and House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the final push for health care reform saw the
mobilization of liberal, left-wing, and labor groups such as Moveon.
org, Health Care for America Now, the AFL-CIO and Organizing for
America in which, “the politics of maneuver within Washington was
supplemented . . . by a politics of vigorous protest and advocacy.”60 How
should it be assessed? President Obama himself clearly saw the ACA
as resting on a regulated private market model. “This piece of historic
legislation is built on the private insurance system that we now have
and runs straight down the center of American political thought,”
he explained.61 Obvious questions are whether or not this was a
good thing, and what explains why no alternative approaches were
possible? Social policy experts Jonathan Oberlander and Theodore
Marmor noted that “the new health care law is anything but radical.”
They argued, “Despite such deep flaws in the U.S. health care sys-
tem, the central assumptions of both the Obama administration and
the Democratic leadership in Congress was that only legislation that
did not radically change it has a chance of success.”62 Indeed prec-
edents for the ACA were to be found in proposals of the conservative
Heritage Foundation and in legislation supported by Massachusetts

Republican Governor Mitt Romney. A Canadian-style “single payer”
plan, or “Medicare for All,” was ruled out from the start. A “pub-
lic option” that would have offered competition to private insurance
companies was removed at the insistence of insurance company lob-
byists and key legislators. While the public option was unacceptable,
the private insurance companies did accept an “individual mandate”
to bring in healthier and younger clients to offset costs incurred by
less healthy and older people.63
Given the decision of the Obama administration to defer to
Congress on the details of health care reform, the legislative process
was marked both by intense bargaining and compromises among
political leaders in search of votes and by a broad mobilization of
health care lobbyists.64 One report found $133 million in lobbying
by health insurance interests in the second quarter of 2009 alone.
Another analysis found that statements of a dozen lawmakers had
been ghostwritten by Washington lobbyists working for Genetech,
one of the world’s largest biotechnology companies. The Washington
Postt noted that health care interest groups “operate with opaque
financing, often receiving hidden support from insurers, drugmakers,
or unions.”65 Key legislators received large campaign contributions
from health industry sources, and a number of legislators had large
financial holdings in the health industry.66
Political scientist Jacob Hacker, who developed the idea of a pub-
lic option, stated, “The White House promised to protect hospi-
tals and drug manufacturers from those (like me) who believed that
government should play a stronger countervailing role. In return,
the industries wouldn’t kill reform.”67 Here too the parameters of
change were set by political clout of private economic interests. In
addition to these more visible forms of corporate influence, the posi-
tion of the health industry within the economy, where it accounts
for 18 percent of GDP, means that government revenues rely on the
tax base generating by this sector. As Kevin Young and Michael
Schwartz argue,
In effect, then, the state is dependent upon both the profit levels and
the economic trajectory of the corporate world. Politicians must pur-
sue policies that guarantee profits, even when such policies undermine
the overall well-being of the population or the economy as a whole.
U.S. healthcare firms thereby wield incredible power quite apart from
the more visible mechanisms of influence.68
Banking and Financial Reform

Perhaps the least progress was in finance and banking reform where,
to the chagrin of progressive critics, the approaches of Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner, National Economic Council Director
Lawrence Summers, and Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke held
sway during Obama’s first year.69 In January 2010, accompanied
by a good deal of populist rhetoric, Obama announced several new
measures, including a new tax on the 50 largest US financial institu-
tions to recover losses from the financial bailout, endorsement of an
independent consumer fiscal protection agency, and support for for-
mer Fed Chair Paul Volcker’s plan to restrict the involvement of com-
mercial banks in running hedge funds and engaging in proprietary
trading. Economist Joseph Stiglitz called Obama’s proposals “only a
good beginning.”70 By the spring of 2010, with business groups set to
spend record amounts on lobbying in opposition to the plans, finan-
cial reform loomed as the next battleground in the struggle for power
in Obama’s America.71
In July 2010 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act passed Congress and was signed by President
Obama. Among its features was a “resolution authority” given to
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to be appointed
as a receiver in the “orderly liquidation” of large financial compa-
nies as an alternative to bankruptcy court. The legislation expanded
federal banking and securities regulation over a wider range of
financial activities, created a council of federal regulators to detect
financial risk, and established a new regulator to protect consum-
ers of financial products. The so-called Volcker rule on proprie-
tary trading was watered down in a compromise allowing banks to
invest up to 3 percent of their capital in private-equity and hedge
funds. Also weakened was a proposal by Senator Blanche Lincoln
for tightened restrictions on the trading of financial instruments
known as derivatives. Lincoln’s plan would have forced banks to
move derivatives trading into a separately capitalized institution
within the larger bank holding company. In a last-minute agree-
ment, Congress decided to force banks to segregate their dealings
in only the riskiest categories of derivatives. The New York Times
noted, “The derivatives deal also headed off a last-minute rebellion
by some New York lawmakers concerned about the effect of Mrs.
Lincoln’s proposal on Wall Street businesses.” Sheila Bair of the
FDIC said of bankers, “I think they are breathing a sigh of relief
today because the derivatives piece ended up being much less oner-
ous than they originally expected. It could have been a lot worse.” 72
The implementation of the complicated bill will rely heavily on
federal regulators, which in itself is a problem. As Robert Reich
noted, “Reliance on the discretion of regulators rather than struc-
tural changes in the banking system plays directly into the hands
of the big banks and their executives and traders who contribute
mightily to Democratic and Republican campaigns.”73 An evalua-
tion of the rule-making process with respect to proprietary trading
and derivatives two years after passage of Dodd-Frank concludes,
“Wall Street has been racking up major victories over the last two
years.” 74
Influencing the financial legislative process was a massive lob-
bying effort by Wall Street financial interests. In an example of the
revolving door, at least 70 former members of Congress and 56 for-
mer congressional aides on the Senate or House banking committees
were lobbying for the financial sector by 2009. According to the
Center for Responsive Politics, members of the Senate Agriculture
Committee, which took up the derivatives issue, received $22.8 mil-
lion from people and organizations connected with financial, insur-
ance, and real estate companies in the then-current election cycle,
two and a half times what they received from agricultural donors.
The House Financial Services Committee was also a major draw
for Wall Street money. One report stated that executives and politi-
cal action committees from Wall Street banks, insurance compa-
nies, hedge funds and other financial sectors had contributed $1.7
billion to congressional candidates in the last decade, with much
of it going to members of the financial oversight committees.75 At
a more structural level, the process of financial reform was prob-
ably affected by what John Bellamy Foster and Hannah Holleman
call the “financialization of the capitalist class.” They note that, by
2008, the ten largest US financial conglomerates held more than
60 percent of US financial assets, compared to only ten percent in
1990. They also contend that, in the Obama administration, “the
figures who were selected to develop and execute federal policy, with
respect to finance, were heavily drawn from executives of finan-
cial conglomerates.”76On April 13, 2011, the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations released a 650-page report titled
“Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial
Collapse.” Its executive summary states: “The investigation found
that the crisis was not a natural disaster, but the result of high-risk,
complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; and
the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market
itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street.” In an interview, sub-
committee co-chair Senator Carl Levin stated, “The overwhelming
evidence is that those institutions deceived their clients and deceived
the public, and they were aided and abetted by deferential regulators
and credit ratings agencies who had conflicts of interest.”77
After the “Shellacking”

In the midterm elections of 2010, Republicans made a net gain of
63 seats in the House of Representatives. This was the largest gain
for either party in a House election since 1948, and the largest in a
midterm election since 1938. The GOP had lost 55 seats in the House
in the two previous elections (2006 and 2008). President Obama
described the results as a “shellacking.” How are these results to be
explained? A perhaps dominant “narrative” among political elites
and in the mainstream media was that President Obama had “over-
reached” on domestic policy in his first two years, and needed to
move away from the “Left” toward the “center” by embracing “pro-
business” and deficit reduction policies.78 This interpretation rejects
the possibility that Obama, like President Clinton, made less progress
on the economy and job creation than many Americans expected pre-
cisely because he did d pursue centrist and business-friendly policies
that amounted to political insufficiency rather than overreach. In so
doing he alienated many erstwhile supporters and conceded political
mobilization to a highly disciplined right-wing.79
Nevertheless, President Obama worked assiduously after the mid-
term elections to convince the business community that he was their
friend and understood their pain. Thus, at a post-election press con-
ference he stated,
You just had a successive set of issues in which I think business took
the message that, well, gosh, it seems like we may be always painted
as the bad guy. And so I’ve got to take responsibility in terms of mak-
ing sure that I make clear to the business community as well as to
the country that the most important thing we can do is to boost and
encourage our business sector.80
In January, Obama penned an opinion piece for the Wall Street

Journall in which he touted an executive order to “remove outdated
regulations that stifle job creation and make our economy less
competitive.” An accompanying piece in the newspaper suggested the

structural influence of capital on Obama’s agenda:
The move is the latest effort by the White House to repair relations
with corporate America. Business leaders say an explosion in new
regulations stemming from the president’s health-care and financial
regulatory overhauls has, along with the sluggish economy, made
them reluctant to spend on expansion and hiring. Companies are sit-
ting on nearly $2 trillion in cash and liquid assets, the most since
World War II.81
Obama followed up in early February with an address to the

US Chamber of Commerce, which spent many millions to defeat
Democratic candidates in 2010. “I will tell you . . . I’ll go anywhere
to be a booster for American businesses, American workers, and
American products. And I don’t charge you commission,” the presi-
dent stated. “So if I’ve got one message, that message is: now is the
time to invest in America.”82
Accompanying the campaign to win business confidence were
such moves on the part of President Obama as the announcement
of a two-year pay freeze for civilian federal workers, the acceptance
of the extension of Bush-era tax cuts for all brackets for two years
in a December 2010 compromise tax package with Congressional
Republicans, and the appointments of William Daley as his chief of
staff and Gene Sperling as head of the National Economic Council.
Both Daley and Sperling worked in the Clinton administration where
they championed deficit reduction and supported “free trade” policies
such as NAFTA, and both have extensive connections to Wall Street
and the business community.83 Obama’s Fiscal Year 2012 budget pro-
posal included about $1.1 trillion of deficit reduction measures over a
decade, of which tax reforms and new revenue sources accounted for
roughly one-third.84
After Obama won reelection in 2012, progressives found a number
of things to like in his second inaugural address (Seneca Falls, Selma,
Stonewall) and in his 2013 State of the Union address in which the
president stated that “we can’t just cut our way to prosperity” and
“deficit reduction alone is not an economic plan.”85 In March Obama
reportedly told House Republican leaders, “Our biggest problems in
the next 10 years are not deficits,” which was certainly the view of
progressives and social democrats.86 Behind the deficit hawk cam-
paign were material interests. The Fix the Debt campaign led by for-
mer Commerce secretary and billionaire Pete Peterson and others was
organized among dozens of CEOs of America’s largest corporations.87

Obama negotiated with Congressional Republicans at the end of
2012 to avoid the so-called fiscal cliff. None other than the long-time
conservative anti-tax activist Grover Norquist told Robert Kuttner
that “when House Republican negotiators were told that Obama
would settle for as little as reverting to the pre-Bush tax rates only
on the top one percent, they were astonished at their good fortune.
Obama’s cave-in was almost too good to be true.”88 Despite Obama’s
occasional warning against deficit reduction mania, the sequestration
debate showed the extent to which austerity and deficit reduction had
captured the US political establishment.89
National Security Policy

“Change” was a mantra of Barack Obama’s presidential campaign in
2008, including a promise to alter course in American foreign policy.
But change from what? Obama promised change from the foreign
policy of George W. Bush, which had resulted in a disastrous war in
Iraq, deepening alienation of world opinion, and the prospect of a
“war on terrorism” without terminus. But what was the distinctive
nature of Bush’s foreign policy, when put in the context of broader
historical patterns, and in what ways could the Obama administra-
tion be expected to depart from it?90
One view is that Bush made a radical departure from a mainstream
multilateral and bipartisan tradition of post–World War II American
foreign policy, with his emphasis on unilateralism, militarism, and
preventive war, operationalized in the attack on Iraq.91 Under Bush
the idea of preventive war was articulated more explicitly and aggres-
sively than ever before. The neoconservative policy current played an
important role in planning and supporting Bush’s strategy, which was
implemented in ways that were both extreme and inept, notably in
Iraq. However the thesis of a radical break overlooks an abundance
of historical precedents for Bush’s imperial militarism in the previous
century of American foreign policy.92 Moreover, regime change in
Iraq, if not in the form undertaken by Bush, was supported by quite
a few prominent members of the Democratic Party’s foreign policy
establishment.93
In order to situate Obama’s national security policies, a broader
context is needed, one that emphasizes continuity in US “grand strat-
egy” since at least the 1940s. Two scholars from different analytical
and political perspectives help make this point about historical conti-
nuity in US global strategy. Vivek Chibber explains that
containment had never been the centerpiece of US strategy during the

Cold War. It had always been guided by vigorous expansionism, both
economically and politically. In fact, American foreign policy since
the Spanish-American war should be seen as a punctuated pursuit of
global power, the tempo of which has increased as constraints to its
operation have been removed.94
For his part Christopher Layne argues that
The story of American grand strategy over the past six decades is one
of expansion, and that strategy’s logic inexorably has driven the United
States to attempt to establish its hegemony in the world’s three most
important regions outside North America itself: Western Europe, East
Asia, and the Persian Gulf . . . The U.S. rise to global dominance has
been enabled by extraordinary geopolitical fortune, but Washington
deliberately has strived for that hegemony since the early 1940s.95
This elite consensus on US hegemony is bipartisan. We believe its

premises serve to block Americans from understanding clearly the
larger world and the role of the United States within it. Historian
Andrew J. Bacevich characterizes the “bedrock assumption” of US
national security policy as holding that
the United States itself constitutes the axis around which history turns.
We define the future. Our actions determine its course. The world
needs, expects, and yearns for America to lead, thereby ensuring the
ultimate triumph of liberty. For the United States to shrink from its
responsibility to lead is, at the very least, to put at risk the precarious
stability to which humanity clings and in all likelihood would open the
door to unspeakable catastrophe. Alternatives to American leadership
simply do not exist.96
What appears to have happened during the Bush years is that sig-
nificant layers of the US political and economic elite concluded that
the Iraq War specifically, and Bush’s incompetence generally, were
counterproductive from the long-term standpoint of empire manage-
ment.97 This is one context for understanding the support Barack
Obama received in 2008 from the likes of Zbigniew Brzezinski and
Colin Powell. But this is not the whole story. Popular opposition to
the Iraq War was an important factor in Obama’s rise and capture of
the Democratic nomination. In many ways this opposition challenged

the ends and not just the means of US foreign policy and took on an
anti-imperial character. Thus Obama represented both elite-level and
popular-level desires for change, but the desired change was different
within the two camps. Since Obama won the election and since he
became president, the system of power of which the US presidency is
a part allowed for certain changes but channeled them within fairly
narrow parameters as defined by the US foreign policy establishment
and other elite sectors of power.
Barack Obama once said he not only wanted to end the war in
Iraq, he wanted to end “the mind-set that led to war.”98 To what
extent did President Obama change the conduct of US foreign and
national security policy from those of President Bush, especially the
unilateral use of military force to solve foreign policy problems?99
While his administration jettisoned the term “war on terror” in favor
of “overseas contingency operations,” Obama conducted national
security policy, unsurprisingly, on the premise that the United States
must retain massive military primacy in the world. The culturally
ingrained belief that because of the exceptional nature of America
the United States should endeavor to reproduce its way of life on a
global basis was unlikely to be rejected.100 Sky-high military budgets,
a worldwide system of military bases, and a military configured for
deployment and intervention rather than defense continued.
Within the constraints of the national security state Obama none-
theless moved to reject a number of actions of the Bush administra-
tion early in his presidency. Obama repudiated the use of torture
and vowed to close the Guantanamo prison camp, though he was
blocked in the latter effort by Congress. He reached out to Arabs
and Muslims, declaring that the United States “is not and never
will be at war with Islam.” In his June 4, 2009, speech in Cairo,
President Obama stated that Israel “must acknowledge that just as
Israel’s right to exist cannot be denied, neither can Palestine’s.” He
referred to the Palestinian people’s situation as “intolerable” and
declared that the United States “does not accept” the legitimacy of
continued Israeli settlements.101 In so doing, Obama was undoubt-
edly responding to world public opinion on the Israel/Palestine
conflict, but within the confines set by US administrations prior
to George W. Bush, and in that way including elements both of
continuity and correction.102 Despite these shifts in tone and policy,
his administration backtracked on opposition to the expansion of
Israel’s West Bank settlements and, under pressure from the so-
called Israel lobby and its supporters, rejected the United Nations
Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (the Goldstone Report).

Obama continued the policy of rendition of terrorism suspects to
third countries for detention and interrogation and declined to pur-
sue investigations of torture and other violations of US and inter-
national law by the Bush administration. Exaggerated claims of
executive power have been used to defend secrecy and National
Security Agency surveillance, the pursuit of whistle-blowers, and
the use of targeted assassinations by drone aircraft.103
Promising a “new dawn of American leadership,” Obama initially
exercised US power in more sophisticated ways involving diplomacy,
multilateralism, the use of “soft power,” and a broader definition of
security threats. He expressed willingness to negotiate with regimes
like Iran, Syria, and Cuba and indicated greater support for agree-
ments on nuclear weapons reduction and climate change. In these
ways Obama’s “realism” represented a departure from the crusading
fantasies of his predecessor. Indeed Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize accep-
tance speech was widely lauded for its “realism.” Conservative pundits
and others praised the Obama Doctrine for its continuity with the
tradition of Democratic Cold War liberalism.104 In his Oslo address
Obama relied on myths about American exceptionalism to legitimize
his Afghanistan surge, stating that “The United States of America has
helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the
blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms.” In a more candid
comment to journalists, Obama explained that “The goal is not to win
a popularity contest or to get an award, even one as prestigious as the
Nobel peace prize. The goal has been to advance America’s interests.”105
Obama’s thinking about America’s place in the world was expressed in
a 2014 at West Point. Obama said, “I believe in American exception-
alism with every fiber of my being.” In his speech he reaffirmed the
need for American global leadership, backed by military force, with a
liberal internationalist gloss: “But what makes us exceptional is not
flouting international norms and the rule of law; it’s our willingness to
affirm them through our actions.” The president continued,
America must always lead on the world stage. If we don’t, no one else
will. The military that you have joined is and always will be the backbone
of that leadership. But U.S. military action cannot be the only—or even
primary—component of our leadership in every instance. Just because
we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.106
Obama’s self-understanding of his military role was revealed in

a 2010 speech to soldiers about to be deployed to Afghanistan. The
president stated, “I have no greater job, nothing gives me more honor

than serving as your commander in chief. To all of you who are
potentially going to be redeployed, just know that your commander
in chief has your back . . . God bless you, God bless the United States
of America, climb to glory.” As Tom Engelhardt noted, “Nowhere
did a single commentator wonder, for instance, whether an American
president was really supposed to feel that being commander in chief
offered greater ‘honor’ than being president of a nation of citizens.
In another age, such a statement would have registered as, at best,
bizarre. These days, no one even blinks.”107
During his first year in office Obama grappled with the legacies
of the invasion of Iraq by his predecessor. In one of his presidential
campaign debates with John McCain, Obama offered a pragmatic
critique of the Iraq war:
Six years ago I stood up and opposed this war because I said that not
only did we not know how much it was going to cost, what our exit
strategy might be, how it would affect our relationships around the
world and whether our intelligence was sound but also because we
hadn’t finished the job in Afghanistan.108
In the 2008 campaign Obama’s 16-month schedule for withdraw-

ing American combat brigades from Iraq was a major source of differ-
ence with McCain, who maintained that “victory” in Iraq should be
the goal. In November 2008 the US and the Iraq government worked
out a Status of Forces Agreement that seemed to rule out any neo-
colonial role for the United States in Iraq. The agreement called for
American troops in Iraq to withdraw from cities, towns, and villages
by June 30, 2009, and from all of Iraq by December 31, 2011. Obama
reaffirmed his commitment to this agreement. In 2011 the United
States conducted discussions with Iraqi leaders about the possibility
of several thousand American troops remaining to continue training
Iraqi security forces. Because of a disagreement over US troops being
granted immunity from prosecution in Iraqi courts, a full withdrawal
was completed by the end of the year, bringing to an end eight-plus
years of American combat involvement in Iraq.
In June of 2014 the security situation in Iraq deteriorated, as Sunni-
led forces of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took control of
large areas of the country and threatened the government of then-
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. President Obama ordered an air-
craft carrier battle group into the Persian Gulf and dispatched several
hundred combat-ready troops to the country. Hawkish supporters of
the 2003 attack on Iraq, such as Senator John McCain and his neo-
conservative allies, urged more far-reaching intervention. Columnist
Seamus Milne responded, “The idea that this horror story can be dis-
connected from the US-led military occupation of Iraq that preceded
it, as the war’s apologists still try to maintain, is an absurdity.”109 By
the Fall of 2014 American forces were launching air attacks against
ISIS targets inside Syria, without permission of either the Syrian gov-
ernment or the United Nations Security Council, and military leaders
were suggesting the latest US military intervention in Iraq would be
years in duration. Again commentator Tom Engelhardt states well the
conundrum of American power, especially in the Middle East: “In the
twenty-first century, the U.S. military has been neither a nation- nor
an army-builder, nor has it found victory, no matter how hard it’s
searched. It has instead been the equivalent of a whirlwind in inter-
national affairs, and so, however the most recent Iraq war works out,
one thing seems predictable: the region will be further destabilized
and in worse shape when it’s over.”110
Both Libya and Afghanistan offer cautionary lessons about mili-
tary intervention. In 2011 Obama supported United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1973 that allowed for international military
force to be used to protect civilians from the regime of Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi. Acting on the basis of the UN resolution NATO
forces, including those of the United States, supported the rebels who
were battling against the Gaddafi regime, which they successfully
overthrew later in 2011. US forces launched air attacks and missile
strikes on Libyan positions while CIA operatives on the ground coor-
dinated with rebel forces. The Obama administration, using a rather
tortured logic, maintained that a state of war against Libya did not
exist, and that it was not even engaged in the kind of “hostilities” that
would trigger the War Powers Resolution.111 Foreign involvement,
supported by a number of liberals and erstwhile leftists as a form of
“humanitarian intervention,” left Libya with a large number of heav-
ily armed, competing rebel groups. According to one policy analyst,
Powerful rebel forces have committed serious abuses, targeting and

displacing groups perceived as having been loyal to Gaddafi. UN bod-
ies and human rights organizations have also documented sweeping
detentions by the rebel factions in the wake of the war, as well as the
regular practice of torture in the prison system under control of the
non-state armed actors.112
By mid-2014 Libya was on the verge of civil war.

As for Afghanistan, on December 1, 2009, Obama announced he

was sending 30,000 more US troops to that country, winning the
approval of many neoconservatives and other hawkish foreign policy
experts.113 He also promised to begin bringing these forces home by
the middle of 2011. More than eight years after the United States
launched Operation Enduring Freedom by attacking and overthrow-
ing its Taliban government, in what would become America’s lon-
gest war, Afghanistan was a shattered and unstable country. US air
strikes that killed innocent civilians, including wedding guests, on a
regular basis stoked anti-American resentment. While the 2001 US
assault on Afghanistan was based on the view that al-Qaeda forces
planned the 9/11 attacks from that country, many observers believed
that al-Qaeda leadership was based in Pakistan, a long-time US ally.
Obama maintained that Afghanistan and Pakistan were “the epicen-
ter of violent extremism practiced by al-Qaeda. It is from here that we
were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being
plotted as I speak.”114 Obama’s surge in Afghanistan was framed by
his view that “we are bringing the Iraq war to a responsible end.”115
Other frames are possible. As Bacevich noted,
So the war launched as a prequel to Iraq now becomes its sequel,

with little of substance learned in the interim. To double down in
Afghanistan is to ignore the unmistakable lesson of Bush’s thoroughly
discredited ‘global war on terror’: sending U.S. troops to fight inter-
minable wars in distant countries does more to inflame than to extin-
guish the resentments giving rise to violent anti-Western jihadism.116
In March of 2014 President Obama met with NATO officials in

Brussels. He expressed optimism that America’s estimated $120 bil-
lion effort to reconstruct Afghanistan will leave behind “a stable
and secure country that serves the prosperity and the security of the
Afghan people.” However a report prepared for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff at about the same time drew sobering conclusions about the
effects on the long war in Afghanistan. Its main points, according to
a summary, were: US military forces were unprepared to deal with a
country where private profit-making dominated public policymaking;
US alliances with Afghan warlords helped solidify a corrupt leader-
ship style and a climate of impunity for those involved; the US made
the problem worse by flooding Afghanistan with more cash than it
could absorb in legitimate channels to undertake needed reforms; and
American military officers and civilian aid workers alike were unpre-
pared to manage Afghan contractors, resulting in what the report
said was “the expenditure of millions of dollars with almost no over-

sight or alignment with other . . . [U.S. government] efforts.”117 Again,
Bacevich states well the quandaries created by America’s imperial
adventures:
We have been engaged in the Islamic world at least since 1980, in a mil-
itary project based on the assumption that the adroit use of American
hard power can somehow pacify or fix this part of the world . . . I mean,
ask ourselves the very simple question: is the region becoming more
stable? Is it becoming more democratic? Are we alleviating, reducing
the prevalence of anti-Americanism? I mean, if the answer is yes, then
let’s keep trying. But if the answer to those questions is no, then maybe
it’s time for us to recognize that this larger military project is failing
and is not going to succeed simply by trying harder.118
President Obama supported and authorized unilateral US missile

strikes against Islamist militants in neighboring Pakistan. Pakistan
has a shaky civilian government. Its military and intelligence forces
evade civilian control and contain sections that are supportive of the
Islamist militants and regard neighboring India as a much greater
security concern than Afghanistan. On January 23, 2009, the third
day of his presidency, a CIA drone struck a house in one of Pakistan’s
tribal regions, killing ten Islamist fighters. In the first five years of
the drone campaign, conducted by the CIA and the military’s Joint
Special Operations Command, the Obama administration launched
more than 390 drone strikes across Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia,
killing more than 2,400, including at least 273 reported civilians.119
One 2011 drone strike in Yemen killed an American citizen, Anwar
al-Awlaki, an American-born Muslim cleric accused of terrorism. A
Justice Department memo, completed in July 2010, concluded his
killing would be lawful. “We do not believe al-Awaki’s citizenship
provides a basis for concluding that he is immune from a use of force
abroad,” the memo stated.120 Commenting on the abrogation of sub-
stantive due process by the Obama administration in its counterterror
campaigns, former State Department official Peter Van Buren makes
a sobering claim:
We have fallen from a high place. Dark things have been done. Imagine,
pre-9/11, the uproar if we had learned that the first President Bush
had directed the NSA to sweep up all America’s communications with-
out warrant, or if Bill Clinton had created a secret framework to kill
American citizens without trial. Yet such actions over the course of two
administrations are now accepted as almost routine, and entangled in
platitudes falsely framing the debate as one between “security” and

“freedom.” I suspect that, if they could bring themselves to a moment
of genuine honesty, the government officials involved in creating Post-
Constitutional America would say that they really never imagined it
would be so easy.121
Indeed there are many continuities between Bush and Obama in their
approaches to national security, executive power, secrecy, and the
rule of law.
Competing Narratives and

Political Prospects
President Barack Obama’s reelection in 2012 was far from certain,
given the weak recovery from the Great Recession of 2008. Obama
was aided by positive public opinion trends among voters in satisfac-
tion with the direction of the country, levels of economic confidence,
identification with the Democratic Party, and in the direction of his
own job approval ratings since November 2011.122 With a popular vote
advantage of about three million over Mitt Romney, Obama became
the first Democrat since Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the only president
since Ronald Reagan, to win two consecutive elections with more
than 50 percent of the popular vote. Obama held all the states he won
in 2008 except for Indiana and North Carolina, winning 332 elec-
toral votes, 33 below his 2008 total. He was largely able to reassemble
a coalition of young voters, minorities, women (especially unmarried
women), the less affluent, and the highly educated. The economy was
the dominant issue of the election, and voters were evenly divided as
to whether Obama or Romney would do a better job on this issue.
However voters blamed George W. Bush more than Obama for cur-
rent economic conditions, by a 53 percent to 38 percent margin, and
39 percent of exit poll respondents said the economy was getting bet-
ter, compared to 30 percent who said it was getting worse.123
Much post-election analysis focused on the changing demograph-
ics of the American electorate: 28 percent of voters were people of
color, an increase of two percentage points from 2008. The Latino
population made up a growing 10 percent of voters in 2012, and they
favored Obama over Romney by 71 percent to 27 percent, a 44 per-
cent Democratic advantage compared to a 36 percent Democratic
advantage for Obama over John McCain in 2008. Latinos made up
a growing share of voters in the key battleground states of Florida,
Nevada in Colorado. In Florida even Cuban American voters favored

Obama over Romney, by a narrow 49 percent to 47 percent split.
Non-Cuban American Latino voters in Florida gave Obama 66 per-
cent of their votes. By 2050 “minority” groups may become a majority
of the population, with the Latino or Hispanic share of the popula-
tion projected to be as high as 29 percent.124 Hispanics and African
Americans, along with young voters, the unmarried, and the highly
educated, appear to comprise a liberal constituency that some liberal
activists call the “rising American electorate.” These constituencies
favor investing in education and infrastructure over cutting taxes,
government action to reduce the gap between rich and poor, raising
taxes on the wealthy, and raising the minimum wage.125
After the election some conservative commentators at Fox News
and elsewhere appeared to view these trends with dismay and even
alarm. For Bill O’Reilly, “It’s a changing country. The demograph-
ics are changing; It’s not a traditional America anymore . . . Whereby
20 years ago, President Obama would have been roundly defeated by
an establishment candidate like Mitt Romney, the white establish-
ment is now the minority.” For his part, Sean Hannity fumed to his
listeners, “Americans, you get the government you deserve. And it
pains me to say this, but America now deserves Barack Obama.”126
The morning after the election Rush Limbaugh told his listeners, “I
went to bed last night thinking we’re outnumbered. I went to bed
last night thinking all this discussion we’d had about this election
being the election that will tell us whether or not we’ve lost the coun-
try. I went to bed last night thinking we’ve lost the country. I don’t
know how else you look at this.” Echoing Mitt Romney’s maladroit
“47 percent” comments, Limbaugh stated,
In a country of children where the option is Santa Claus or work, what

wins? And say what you want, but Romney did offer a vision of tra-
ditional America. In his way, he put forth a great vision of traditional
America, and it was rejected. It was rejected in favor of a guy who
thinks that those who are working aren’t doing enough to help those
who aren’t. And that resonated.127
Barack Obama’s conservative opponents have long sought to link

him to a politics that they see as alien to American traditions.128
Thus in 2009 the columnist Charles Krauthammer called a speech by
Obama to a joint session of Congress “the boldest social democratic
manifesto ever issued by a U.S. president.” In the 2012 Republican
presidential campaign, candidates Rick Perry, Michelle Bachmann,
and Newt Gingrich called Obama a socialist. Eventual nominee Mitt

Romney said in a CNN interview, “I don’t use the word ‘socialist,’
or I haven’t so far. But I do agree that the president’s approach is gov-
ernment-heavy, government-intensive, and it’s not working.” In one
of the GOP nomination debates Romney claimed that Obama “takes
his political inspiration from Europe, from the socialist-democrats
in Europe.” After Obama’s reelection in 2012 Sarah Palin told Sean
Hannity of Fox News that “Barack Obama is a socialist” and that
Obama’s approach to budgetary policy “is a sign of that idea of lov-
ing socialism.” She continued, “What goes beyond socialism, Sean, is
communism. I know I’m going to get slammed for speaking so bluntly
about what’s going on here, but that is exactly what is going on.”
Many other examples could be given. In response Obama brushed off
the charge and stated, revealingly, and in our view accurately in the
quote that frames this chapter, “The truth of the matter is that my
policies are so mainstream that if I had set the same policies that I had
back in the 1980s, I would be considered a moderate Republican.”129
Several election analyses identify a real basis to the fears of conser-
vatives in the form of increased support for a new progressive politi-
cal agenda on the part of rising sections of the American electorate.
A post-election Gallup poll found that Democrats and Democratic-
leaning independents have a more positive view of the federal gov-
ernment, by a 20 percentage point margin, while Republicans and
Republican-leaning independents are more positive about capitalism
than the federal government, by a 45 percentage point margin. A
somewhat puzzling finding is that 53 percent of Democrats have a
positive image of “socialism” and 55 percent have a positive view of
“capitalism” (the figures for Republicans are 23 percent and 72 per-
cent respectively).130 An analysis of post-election surveys conducted
by Democracy Corps (which is led by Democratic strategists James
Carville and Stanley Greenberg), in partnership with Women’s Voices,
Women Vote Action Fund, concluded that the “rising American elec-
torate” played a definitive role in reelecting Barack Obama and elect-
ing Democrats down ballot. They argue that “this not a group looking
for ‘austerity.’ Indeed their issues are explicitly progressive and invest-
ment-oriented.”131 In a companion analysis in association with the
Campaign for America’s Future, Democracy Corps contended bluntly
that Obama “succeeded because he waged class war and won . . . The
president won reelection by making the choice about the middle class
and defining Romney as for the rich and out of touch.” The bot-
tom-line message is that “the voters gave a very clear mandate to the
president: address the economy and growth, and protect middle class
social insurance.”132
In a post-election analysis for the Center for American Progress
political analysts Ruy Teixeira and John Halpin argued that Obama’s
victory may have created a durable “realignment” at the national level.
They call the 2012 election “the culmination of a decades-long proj-
ect to build an electorally viable and ideologically coherent progres-
sive coalition in national politics.” They identify the content of the
Obama coalition as “pragmatic progressivism” that is “grounded on
the notion that both private enterprise and government are necessary
for opportunity and growth; that our economy should work for every-
one, not just the wealthy few; that economic and social inequalities
should be reduced; and that America must work cooperatively with
others to solve global problems.”133 In a similar analysis for the New
Republic the veteran journalist John B. Judis argued that the 2012 elec-
tion was evidence of an ongoing realignment towards the Democratic
Party based both on shifts of voting blocs away from the GOP and
the growth of existing voting blocs within the GOP. Judis contended
that the common worldview or philosophy of the Democratic coalition
“envisages the United States as part of a global marketplace. It seeks to
provide Americans with the training to compete in that marketplace,
as well as sufficient economic security to cope with the hardship that
competition can bring. This vision entails funding education, scientific
research, and technological innovation, but also strengthening and
expanding the New Deal’s safety net.”134 Political analyst and former
reporter Thomas B. Edsall argues that a coalescence of “issue clusters”
on the Left has produced a social justice coalition that largely overlaps
with the Democratic Party. On his analysis,
Demographic groups that favor social justice dispute the even-hand-

edness of the marketplace; they often view business and corporations
with suspicion; and they believe that the state has an obligation to
provide for those struggling in a free market system. The demographic
constituencies have grown in numbers, and today form a relatively
robust coalition: the Democratic Party.
However he notes that both Democrats and Republicans have been

unable to figure out a solution to the hollowing out of the job mar-
ket. Despite Democratic gains in the culture wars, Edsall asks this
question: “Does the new and enlarged Democratic coalition have the
capacity to re-engineer capitalism to produce sustained economic
growth while working toward social justice?”135
Progressives believe that the Democratic Party, at the presidential

level, has mistakenly embraced corporate and Wall Street-friendly
policies since the Clinton years, if not before. They criticize President
Obama for insufficiently breaking with neoliberal modes of political-
economic governance, and for supporting domestic political-economic
policies that, in their view, are inadequate for resolving the economic
crises he inherited. In their view too many Democrats have bought
into the discourse of austerity and deficit reduction promoted by cor-
porations and conservatives. This essentially social democratic tradi-
tion has been weaker in the United States, than in Europe. However
the case can be made that the American New Deal was the functional
equivalent of European social democracy, with both approaches
emphasizing interventionist economic policies, expanded social pro-
grams, and increased government spending.136 The gap between the
scope of US and European social democratic regimes and welfare
states that widened in the postwar decades would have been narrower
if the United States had embraced President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
call for a Second Bill of Rights in his January 1944 State of the Union
Address to Congress, which included employment, housing, medi-
cal care, education, and several other provisions that FDR thought
should be considered rights. Roosevelt’s recommendations were based
on the “clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom can-
not exist without economic security and independence.” FDR hoped
that “after this war is won we must be prepared to move forward, in
the implementation of these rights, to new goals of human happiness
and well-being.”137
At the level of national government policymakers, this approach to
economic and budgetary policies is best represented by the proposals
of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, which was established in
1991 by then-Representative Bernie Sanders of Vermont and several
other House members. In February of 2013 the Caucus produced a
plan to avoid the sequestration cuts called the Balancing Act of 2013.
Caucus co-chairs Keith Ellison and Raúl M. Grijalva identified their
approach as follows:
The Balancing Act eliminates the haphazard cuts in the sequester and
ensures that we reduce our long-term deficit in a balanced way. The bill
equalizes budget cuts and revenue by closing loopholes for America’s
wealthiest individuals and corporations. It also creates over 1 million
jobs by investing in infrastructure, teachers, and putting money in con-
sumers’ pockets, paid for by cutting wasteful Pentagon spending to
achieve balance with non-defense cuts.
They claimed that the Balancing Act
rectifies the inequitable approach to deficit reduction taken so far. By

replacing the sequester with $960 billion in revenue, the Act achieves
a 1:1 ratio of cuts to revenue. The Balancing Act would close tax loop-
holes that encourage companies to ship jobs overseas, that pay billions
of dollars annually to the highly profitable fossil fuel industry, and
that allow tax breaks for yachts and corporate jets. It would also limit
deductions from the wealthiest tax payers, close loopholes for hedge
fund managers, and close estate tax loopholes.138
Business Insider polled registered voters and asked for their pref-
erences between the House Republican plan, the Senate Democratic
plan, and the Progressive Caucus plan. Instead of asking those sur-
veyed the titles of the plan, the poll removed the partisan labels and
explained each plan. The poll found that in addition to beating the
House Republican plan and the Senate Democrat’s plan overall, “more
than half of respondents supported [the Balancing Act] compared
to sequestration and [only] a fifth of respondents were opposed.”
Moreover and “shockingly,” a full 47 percent of Republicans preferred
the House Progressive plan to the across the board cuts pushed by
their party leaders in Washington. According to the Business Insider,
“This means that Republicans supported the House Progressive plan
just as much as they supported their own party’s plan.”139
The Congressional Progressive Caucus followed up in March
with a Back to Work Budget Plan for Fiscal Year 2014 that argued
that the jobs crisis and not a deficit crisis was the chief problem fac-
ing the country. Importantly the plan included a key role for public
investment, rather than spending cuts, as the key to job creation. The
Caucus contends,
The Back to Work Budget invests in America’s future because the best
way to reduce our long-term deficit is to put America back to work.
In the first year alone, we create nearly 7 million American jobs and
increase GDP by 5.7%. We reduce unemployment to near 5% in three
years with a jobs plan that includes repairing our nation’s roads and
bridges, and putting the teachers, cops and firefighters who have borne
the brunt of our economic downturn back to work. We reduce the
deficit by $4.4 trillion by closing tax loopholes and asking the wealthy
to pay a fair share. We repeal the arbitrary sequester and the Budget
Control Act that are damaging the economy, and strengthen Medicare
and Medicaid, which provide high quality, low-cost medical cover-
age to millions of Americans when they need it most. This is what
the country voted for in November. It’s time we side with America’s
middle class and invest in their future.140
In contrast to the House Republican plan of Paul Ryan, which he

derided, and the Senate Democratic plan, which he found “extremely
cautious,” Paul Krugman found the Back to Work plan to be “refresh-
ing” and based on “solid macroeconomic analysis.” “No doubt the
caucus plan is too audacious to have any chance of becoming law,”
Krugman wrote, but he thought that “progressives seem, at long last,
to be finding their voice.”141 Unfortunately for the Caucus, their pro-
posals have been met with a virtual media blackout, itself a telling
comment on the state of political discourse in America. Clearly there
is a solid basis for the blossoming of progressive perspectives in the
United States that go well beyond what President Barack Obama has
stood for. Time will tell whether a social democratically inflected pro-
gressive politics can bolster its position in political debate and help to
redefine the assumptions about political economy and national secu-
rity that underpin the modern American presidency.
Chapter Six
Toward a Deep Presidency: Coming

to Terms with Our Constitutional
Catastrophe-in-Chief
There have been five considerable crises in American history . . . So far,

it is clear, the hour has brought forth the man
—Harold Laski, 1940
If you had a President who said: “Nobody in America is going to make

less than $12 or $14 an hour,” what do you think that would do? If
you had a President who said: “You know what, everybody in this
country is going to get free primary health care within a year,” what do
you think that would do? . . . If you had a president who said, “Global
warming is the great planetary crisis of our time, I’m going to create
millions jobs as we transform our energy system. I know the oil com-
panies don’t like it. I know the coal companies don’t like it. But that is
what this planet needs: we’re going to lead the world in that direction.
We’re going to transform the energy system across this planet—and
create millions of jobs while we do that.” If you had a President say
that, what kind of excitement would you generate from young people
all over this world?
—Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT), 2013, asked about the
prospect that he might run for president in 2016
President Sanders?
If Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) were elected president in 2016, “what
do you think that would do?” Set aside for a second the implausibility
of a democratic socialist from the small state of Vermont—the longest-
serving independent in the history of the Congress—raising anything
like the hundreds of millions of dollars needed to contend for the office.
Turn your back on the obvious point that a Democratic Party insider
like former First Lady and former secretary of state Hillary Clinton has
nearly universal name recognition. As an Independent, Sanders would
run the risk of being labeled a “spoiler,” and held in contempt by many
liberals, as was Ralph Nader in the 2000 presidential election—do

not even consider that possibility. And if he contested the primary as a
Democrat, well, the party faithful might not exactly flock to such an
“outsider.” Suspend all of your disbelief. The proposition still remains:
what would happen if the United States—however far-fetched the pos-
sibility might seem—elected a progressive, socialist-leaning, working-
class advocate from an electorally insignificant state to serve as president
in 2016? Assume he rode a wave of popularity as a progressive voice for
working Americans, somehow managing to win the nomination of the
Democratic Party and then the general election. What would happen
the morning after, when the election night parties had died down?
The most predictable immediate impact of a Sanders victory
would be the sharp decline of global financial markets, as investors
registered their displeasure, possibly panic, at the “reckless” decision
rendered by US voters. Well before residents in Burlington, Vermont,
had taken a sip of their first cup of morning coffee, European mar-
kets would have opened in free fall, as London’s FTSE 100 and the
Frankfurt DAX registered steep declines in share prices across the
board. When the New York Stock Exchange finally opened, the
DOW, NASDAQ, and S&P 500 all would follow the path of their
European counterparts. The swift negative response of the markets
would be joined by the fears of corporate boardrooms across the
globe, as the specter of severe market instability, plummeting busi-
ness confidence and growing fears of inflationary pressure wracked
the capitalist world. Dramatic restrictions in business investment and
a curtailment of any expansion of employment would follow. FOX
News would be apoplectic with visions of impending “communism,”
even terrorism leaping out of every news report. Dire warnings about
the scourge of “class warfare” would be their rallying cry. The one
economic bright spot would be a spike in the sales of Sanders’ book
The Speech, the full account of his historic December 10, 2010,
Senate filibuster, where for more than eight and one half hours
he spoke out against the agreement reached between the Obama
Administration and congressional Republicans that extended Bush-
era tax cuts for the wealthy, lowered estate taxes for the superrich,
and diverted revenue from Social Security through a “payroll tax
holiday.”1 Sanders had long been the champion of working-class and
middle-class families, decrying the growing gap between the rich
and everyone else and fighting to protect Social Security, Medicaid,
Medicare and other provisions of the social “safety net” that has
grown so tattered in the United States. 2 Sales of his previous book
about his career as Mayor of Burlington and his early years serving
Toward a Deep Presidency 143
in the House of Representatives would get an equally nice boost too,

but not quite enough to offset a global financial meltdown. In short,
less than 24 hours after his historic election, president-elect Sanders
would be facing a reaction known as “capital strike,” with shattered
business confidence and immediate punishment taking its toll on the
economy and, thus, the well-being of the very people the Sanders
campaign had mobilized so passionately. The imprisoning effects of
the market discussed in the work of Charles Lindblom in chapter two
would be on full display.
And that is just day one. Every newly elected president has about
11 weeks between election and inauguration in January, the transi-
tion period. In the hypothetical case of president-elect Sanders that is
possibly more than two straight months of economic calamity before
he would actually take the oath of office. This is the “automatic pun-
ishing recoil” that Lindblom talked about with regard to capitalist
democracies. No other group—not labor unions, not women’s orga-
nizations, not environmentalists—could instantly and in a sustained
way punish the system for what had occurred. The “privileged posi-
tion” of corporations—acting with a kind of veto power over public
policy, or in this case, potential public policy—would register loud
and clear, repressing even the talk of serious systemic change. In the
wake of all this, what could the public do to support the chances
of realizing the fundamental change it had just voted for? After all,
we live in a democracy, right? What could Sanders do to keep the
magic alive and dampen fears that his presidency would profoundly
damage economic conditions? His transition period surely would be
among the most interesting and momentous ever. One constant pres-
sure he would have to face early on is the advice he would get to
nominate moderates to hold Cabinet positions in his administration,
non-confrontational, non-ideological people who would be “accept-
able” to political and economic elites. No radicals for the Treasury
Department, no thoughts of Ben and Jerry being co-secretaries of
Commerce, no Marxist (or even a progressive) economist to run the
Council of Economic Advisors, and certainly no prounion firebrand
to lead the Department of Labor. Only nice, safe choices for these
and countless other administrative posts would even have a chance
of placating the fears of Wall Street and corporate boardrooms, and
even those personnel decisions—decisions that would undermine the
progressive working class vision articulated during his campaign—
might not be enough to stop the bleeding in the body politic. Harold
Laski’s observation in chapter one that “the day of a successful elec-
tion is the day on which the president ceases to be a free man” would
take on new poignancy. In this sense, to some degree president-elect

Sanders would be a prisoner-elect.
But what if, for the sake of argument, a president truly wanted
to pursue a more progressive agenda, and lead the country in a new
direction? Emboldened by electoral victory and anxious to deliver
on the progressive hopes fueled during the campaign, what if a new
president wanted to use the office to achieve fundamental change in
the face of economic and foreign policy crises? There are precious
few clues to draw upon for inspiration from recent presidents. Yet,
might there be lessons we could learn from former President Jimmy
Carter’s experience? At first glance the proposition seems absurd.
Carter’s generally is viewed as a failed presidency, punctuated as it
was by his reelection defeat in 1980 to the triumphal optimism of
Ronald Reagan. Why would Obama or his successor look to him for
guidance? Historian Kevin Mattson’s detailed account of the prepa-
ration for, delivery of, and aftermath of Carter’s infamous “crisis of
confidence” speech on July 15, 1979, offers a glimpse into why such
questions are not so easily brushed aside. 3
Mattson tells the story of 1979 in the United States—a story of
an energy crisis leading to mile-long gas lines and riots breaking out
in frustration. The economy was in a steep tailspin and by summer
Carter’s approval rating had hit an all-time low, lower even than that
of Richard Nixon. In the midst of multiple crises and national tur-
moil Carter sought the advice of many prominent Americans in an
unprecedented series of somewhat mysterious secret meetings, look-
ing for advice and inspiration to help him turn the nation around and
perhaps inject some life into what seems like dim prospects for re-
election. In the resulting “crisis of confidence” address Carter high-
lighted an historical and psychological crisis rooted in events that had
shaken citizen confidence in public institutions. The crisis “is nearly
invisible,” he noted with urgency, an outgrowth of rampant self-inter-
est, consumerism, self-indulgence and a decline in civic participation.
Mattson comments that it seemed that the President was condemning
the American way of life as it had evolved in the post–World War II
period.4 But he ended the barely half-hour speech on a more positive
note, saying that faith in the system could be restored by tackling the
energy crisis honestly with a series of measures that if enacted would
allow us to unify as a confident nation once again.
The speech was extraordinarily risky, remarkable for its frank
tone and its edgy criticism of some very fundamental aspects of what
American life had become. In the two months leading up to the speech,
Carter’s Treasury secretary Michael Blumenthal had sent him a memo
strategizing on the need for the Administration to focus on “how best

to sell publicly a policy of long-term economic austerity.”5 He believed
that Americans would accept “continuation of tough and austere mac-
roeconomic policies, requiring sacrifices by many” if the president
could lead the charge by “creating genuine excitement and commit-
ment for economic policies that would otherwise cause him [Carter]
great political problems.” That Blumenthal and Stuart Eizenstat,
director of Carter’s Domestic Policy Staff, both tried to convince the
president to turn the psychology of damage control into an exciting
prospect speaks volumes about the depth of the crisis facing Carter’s
team. Attempting to make austerity sexy seems like a sure loser. But
in fact, the speech was initially well-received, with 85 percent of the
public voicing a favorable view of it. Carter’s anemic approval rat-
ings jumped 11 percent overnight. But then a series of circumstances
quickly undid whatever good groundwork the speech had laid.
Only two days after the address, Carter inexplicably asked for the
resignation of his entire cabinet. And the focus on his speech was
overwhelmed. Carter came to be viewed as unbalanced and desperate.
What was remembered about the speech in the mass media was that it
emphasized that the nation was mired in “malaise,” although Carter
never used the term. Mattson contends that Carter had not thought
enough about the fact that “the news media would be reporting it
[the speech] immediately through its filter.” Moreover, “the speech
entered a world not of its own creation.”6 As the political and eco-
nomic news spiraled out of control for the administration, culminat-
ing in the seizing of American hostages in Iran on November 4, 1979,
things went from bad to worse for Carter. And although he has come
to be viewed as perhaps the most effective ex-president the nation has
ever had, his presidency ended in shambles.7 It was replaced by the
conservative resurgence of the Reagan Revolution and the optimism
of “morning in America.” No need for tough choices or rethinking of
our social and economic values. America would stand tall again by
pursuing continuity with what had made us “great” in the past.
Deep Structure/Deep Presidency:

Economic Growth and National Security
In hindsight it seems remarkable, almost unbelievable, that Carter and
his staff did not anticipate that the media would spin the speech to fit
its own narrative. It would appear to be an obvious tactical point, one
to manage and plan for in advance. Additionally one wonders why
Mattson thinks the speech (after all, just one public address) “should
have changed the country,” as his subtitle asserts. It came largely out
of the blue. And the moderate southern Democrat in the White House
did not exactly prepare the nation for fundamental change with a
campaign for office calling for a profound restructuring of American
attitudes and practices. While analyzing the presidency of JFK,
Miroff concluded that “the stabilization of corporate capitalism is the
paramount domestic duty of the modern Presidency.” Nonetheless, he
also noted that within limits presidents do have “some potential for
progressive action, some authentic political education. But they must
be drawn out by public action.”8 Certainly Carter did not lay the
groundwork for authentic political education in the summer of 1979,
nor did he have a potent progressive social movement to draw him
out. But the possibilities are there to be seized.
More than three decades removed from Carter’s experiences,
President Obama, of course, is not likely to take a left turn toward
challenging the structure of American economic and military power
as his second term winds down. But the demands of the twenty-first
century may well call for such a course of action that challenges the
power structure of the United States. America’s dilemma, its multiple
domestic and foreign policy crises, run deep to the heart of what we
have been since the dawn of the modern presidency. Conventional
definitions of economic growth and national security were the foun-
dation of modern and postmodern theories of the presidency. The
problem is, American power underwritten by economic growth and
security increasingly appears unsustainable in its traditional formula-
tion. Growth and security desperately need to be rethought.
Such national introspection and reformulation of the basics are
mostly not on the minds of those engaged in conventional discourse
about the presidency. In fact, the type of public action that might draw
out a president’s authentic political education and progressive intent
is seen as a drawback to some political elites. The globally focused
Trilateral Commission is an organization of establishment elites who
were significant in the early presidential ambitions of Jimmy Carter. In
their 1975 report The Crisis of Democracy, political scientist Samuel
Huntington, author of the US section, warned against “the danger
of overloading the political system with demands which extend its
functions and undermine its authority.” And the presidency was at
the center of this turmoil: “Probably no development of the 1960s
and 1970s has greater import for the future of American politics than
the decline in the authority, status, influence, and effectiveness of the
presidency.”9 Popular demands articulated by an engaged citizenry
were a problem, from this perspective, posing a crisis not just to the
presidency and democracy but to capitalism and corporate power
generally.
Other analyses see reform of the machinery of government as the
core task, restoring healthy political institutions and the balance of
power between Congress and the president. For instance, release of the
2014 report of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Commission on Political
Reform was met with much fanfare, the latest in a long love affair
between government officials and reform commissions.10 Lamenting
Washington dysfunction and governmental gridlock—most emblem-
atically, the Republican-led government shutdown on October 1,
2013—the Commission’s 18-month study of our polarized national
political scene prescribed numerous reforms to “ease the friction that
has contributed to fiscal cliffs, government shutdowns and a record-
low public approval rating for Congress.” This is common fare for
academics and policy think tanks. The report makes dozens of recom-
mendations for changes focused on elections (election administration
at the state level, redistricting and primaries), increased voter turnout
in primary and general elections, and gridlocked Congress, notably
limiting the use of filibusters in the Senate, requiring the House and
Senate to work five-day work weeks in DC for three weeks, followed
by one week off, and once a month meetings between the president
and congressional leaders. Why is this report likely to have staying
power whereas others have collected dust on office shelves? Is it the
high-powered resumes of many Commission members, led by former
Senate Majority Leaders Tom Daschle (D-SD) and Trent Lott (R-MS)?
Is serious commitment to bipartisanship, as the Reform Commission
believes, adequate to get the job done?
Still others look to tinker specifically with the presidency as laid
out in the Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution. Some
political scientists want to reform the office by changing the length
of service to a single six-year term. Larry Sabato offers an alternative
to the oft-heard debate between advocates of the four-year and the
six-year term. Instead he suggests a six-year term with the president
granted the option of requesting a fifth year presidential confirmation
election that would extend the term by two years beyond year six11
This confirmation election would focus solely on the performance on
the sitting president—a referendum on the job being done. If success-
ful, the president’s two-year extension would result in the same eight
years tenure as currently allowed. These and other potential reforms
have some merits. Removing the financial and political pressure of
a full-blown reelection campaign commencing sometime after the
second year in office might reduce fundraising pressures and allow a

president to focus more intently on addressing the challenges of the
nation. Having congressional leaders meet more regularly with the
president might promote more comity and potentially smoother gov-
ernance. But there are limits to the efficacy of reforms at the level of
the institutional structure. When a Democrat like President Obama
adheres to “American exceptionalism” as tightly as his counterparts
in the GOP, or is actually tougher on government national security
whistle-blowers than President Bush; when President Obama pro-
poses to “relentlessly push a growth agenda” as an antidote to income
inequality and lack of social mobility, as he did in his December 2013
speech on the economy at THEARC in Washington, DC; or when he
offers market-based environmental policies that center on economic
growth as the key to fighting climate change, as he did at Georgetown
University in June of 2013—in all of these instances, it makes sense to
ask: how would more frequent discussions with congressional leaders
of both parties change this conversation?12 Is gridlock in Washington
really at the heart of the problems we face?
Renowned environmentalist and activist Bill McKibben makes an
impassioned case for a deeper conceptual reformulation with urgent
emphasis in his book Deep Economy.13 McKibben carefully builds
his case that we now face three fundamental challenges to the ortho-
dox idea of growth as “more is better.” The first challenge is politi-
cal. Defining economic growth (think rising GDP) as the continued
quest for more—“the endless More”—produces staggering levels of
inequality and insecurity, with unacceptable negative political and
economic consequences.14 Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph
Stiglitz has clearly elucidated these consequences when income and
wealth are so tightly in the hands of the top 1 percent. “Of all the
costs imposed on our society by the top 1 percent,” he observed,
“the greatest is this: the erosion of our sense of identity, in which
fair play, equality of opportunity, and a sense of community are so
important.”15 President Obama acknowledged as much—albeit fol-
lowing it with policy inaction—in perhaps the most populist speech
of his first term. Citing a litany of statistics on growing inequality
in his December 2011 speech in Osawatomie, Kansas, in the wake
of the uproar over the Occupy Wall Street movement, he commented
that “this kind of inequality . . . hurts us all . . . Inequality also distorts
our democracy,” giving “an outsized voice to the few.”16 Common
needs, the common welfare—democracy as a meaningful concept—
simply cannot survive a return to levels of inequality reminiscent of
the Gilded Age.
The second challenge to orthodox economic growth is scientific,

coming from physics and chemistry. We do not have the energy sources
we need to keep the magic of economic growth going without doing
irreparable harm to the environment due to rapid climate change and
assorted other maladies. The continued burning of fossil fuels por-
tends a global climate catastrophe, the scientific basis of which has
gotten noticeably worse with recent projections, a point driven home
even more dramatically in May of 2013 as the concentration of car-
bon dioxide in the atmosphere passed 400 ppm for the first time, well
above the 350 ppm level climate scientists view as the “safe limit” for
Earth as we have known it.17 As McKibben points out, even an accord
to limit the rise in average global temperatures to 2° Celsius (3.6°
Fahrenheit)—a target that climatologists view as itself alarmingly
high—would spell ecological hardship of unimaginable proportions
for much of the world. And currently the fossil fuel industry plans
to burn an amount of carbon in proven coal and gas reserves five
times higher than the 565 giga ton limit that would keep the planet
below a 2° rise.18 Finally, the third challenge he deems spiritual. Even
when growth does make us wealthier, beyond a certain point research
shows that greater wealth does not make us any happier. Clearly, to
achieve lasting and widespread satisfaction, something other than
linear GDP growth will need to drive the pursuit. The confluence of
these three challenges has turned our old planet Earth into Eaarth,
an “uphill planet,” where basic life will get progressively more dif-
ficult. As he warns, “This is the biggest thing that’s ever happened.”
In essence “we’re running Genesis backward, decreating.”19 In this
rapidly deteriorating environment traditional presidential plans to
“grow the economy” will do more than simply ring hollow; they will
do absolute harm to the maintenance of life.
The need to rethink economic growth is not the only structural
challenge we face. National security defined by an ever-expanding
military budget to meet never-ending global threats of terrorism and
regional instability carries its own set of growing limitations. Long-
time foreign policy analyst and Asian specialist Chalmers Johnson’s
magisterial trilogy, deconstructing the contours of American empire,
asks the same type of penetrating questions about the national secu-
rity state that McKibben asks of economic growth. 20 With more than
800 military bases around the world, Johnson argues that the United
States no longer can afford the staggering financial costs of global
empire. The massive use of resources, the environmental destruction
that accompanies such a worldwide deployment, and the encroach-
ment on civil liberties at home all make us substantially less safe and
less democratic as well. Empire increasingly weighs us down. We

need to dismantle it, which poses a direct threat to the elite bipartisan
consensus in favor of US hegemony and the mythology of American
exceptionalism.21 What Andrew Bacevich calls the “Sacred Trinity of
global power projection, global military presence, and global activ-
ism” threatens our national survival. According to Bacevich, “Far
from abrogating the Sacred Trinity, the president [Obama] appears
intent on investing it with new life.”22 Paul Street echoes this concern,
situating his analysis of Obama’s foreign policy decisions within the
“narrow institutional and ideological framework” that underlies the
drive to enhance corporate profitability and empire—national secu-
rity objectives shared by both political parties and trumpeted within
our political culture under the rubric of vital “national interests.”23
In moments of candor, American officials even admit the bipartisan
unity around the shared ends and means of national security policy. In
an interview with the Australian Financial Review in May of 2014, for-
mer director of the National Security Agency, General Keith Alexander,
highlighted the policy continuities between the administrations of
George W. Bush and Barack Obama, transcending party differences:
Obviously they come from different parties, they view things differ-
ently, but when it comes to the security of the nation and making those
decisions about how to protect our nation, what we need to do to
defend it, they are, ironically, very close to the same point. You would
get almost the same decision from both of them on key questions about
how to defend our nation from terrorists and other threats. 24
Madeleine Albright, secretary of state of the United States and ambas-

sador to the United Nations during the Clinton administration, echoed
this point when she formulated the elite foreign policy consensus in
response to a question on the NBC Today Show:
It is the threat of the use of force [against Iraq] and our line-up there
that is going to put force behind the diplomacy. But if we have to use
force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation.
We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future,
and we see the danger here to all of us. 25
The pursuit of these shared interests, underscored by the “indispens-

able nation” mindset, often fuels rage against American foreign policy,
as Elizabeth Sanders contends in her analysis of the impact of the use
of unmanned drone attacks in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Drone
attacks sharply escalated under President Obama, far surpassing the
number of attacks authorized by the Bush administration and argu-

ably leaving the nation less secure and our enemies more determined
than ever to do us harm. And in addition to thousands of civilian
casualties, the office of the presidency has been part of the collateral
damage. “The American presidency is, I have come to believe, a path-
ological institution,” Sanders concludes. “It turns good men into kill-
ers without reflection or remorse.”26 This point was only reinforced
by the recent revelation of the president’s remark to his aides that he
is “really good at killing people” with drone attacks. 27
Deep economy is, as McKibben explains, an echo of environmen-
talists’ insistence on a “deep ecology” that asks “more profound ques-
tions about the choices in their daily lives.” “We need a similar shift in
our thinking about economics,” he writes, a more mature discipline of
Economics.28 McKibben himself has become more explicitly political in
this process of asking deeper questions, through his grassroots organiza-
tion 350.org and its many protests, including his November 2012 “Do
the Math” road tour aimed at increasing public awareness and putting
pressure on lawmakers and the president. He urges us to move beyond
environmental platitudes and directly challenge the fossil-fuel indus-
try, which he terms “a rogue industry, reckless like no other force on
Earth.” He continues, “These numbers make clear that with the fossil-
fuel industry, wrecking the planet is their business model. It’s what they
do.”29 The May 2014 release of the “National Climate Assessment” only
confirmed the region by region “sweeping changes”—severe drought in
some areas, severe floods in others, rampaging wildfires, heat waves,
and dying forests under siege from insects—already affecting the United
States as a result of human-induced climate change.30 National security
policy merits such attention too, given that the Pentagon is “the largest
burner of fossil fuels on the planet.”.31 And in September of 2014 the
grassroots call for urgent action to address climate change intensified
with the People’s Climate March in New York City, in advance of the
UN Climate Summit—what was billed as the largest climate march in
history. National security policy also desperately needs such close scru-
tiny and serious citizen involvement too. Accordingly, is it too much of
a stretch to call for a “deep presidency,” a reimagining and maturing
of how Political Science thinks about presidential leadership in an age
when structural assumptions need to shift?
Presidents can no longer lean on paeans to linear measures of “the
endless more” while ignoring the unacceptable harm such a doctrine
will continue to inflict on the planet. Nor can appeals to the pro-
motion of national security via militarism and empire withstand the
harm they do to anything like real security, not to mention how the
attendant secrecy and surveillance evident in the growing controversy

over the National Security Agency undermines basic civil liberties.32
The twin state imperatives of economic growth and national security—
the pillars upon which the modern presidency and presidential schol-
arship have been built—are no longer sustainable. Mike Lofgren, a top
Republican congressional staffer, caused a stir in 2014 when he blew
the whistle on what he termed the corporatist “deep state”—a perma-
nent group of Washington politicians, Wall Street executives, and mili-
tary leaders who fashion policy on behalf of neoliberal economic goals
and military empire. Some call it the national security state, an out-
growth of the National Security Act passed in 1947 during the Truman
administration—famously captured in the phrase “military-industrial
complex” in President Eisenhower’s historic farewell address in 1961.
“What America lacks,” Lofgren wrote, “is a figure with the serene self-
confidence to tell us that the twin idols of national security and corpo-
rate power are outworn dogmas that have nothing more to offer us.”33
In the twenty-first century our way of life undermines our way of
life; a self-defeating logic is at work. Obama, or his eventual succes-
sor, may find himself in a Carteresque position of needing to fashion a
new way of looking at old policies. 34 This would require not merely a
regime change or the rearrangement of a governing coalition, as Stephen
Skowronek’s analysis might suggest. This is a worldview shift—an
alteration of what constitutes “progress” and “security”—necessary
to move the country in a sustainable direction. Environmental polit-
ical economist Naomi Klein frames the challenge clearly with regard
to the mounting threat of climate change: “Climate change. It is not
an issue for you to add to the list of things to worry about. It is a civili-
zational wake up call.”35 No mere shift of governmental priorities by
this or that presidential administration will suffice to answer the call.
No single dramatic speech will be enough. Every aspect of the polit-
ical economy, every facet of the military-industrial complex, every
point of the “iron triangle,” will be arrayed against such changes.
The formidable obstacles to change sometimes are acknowledged in
analysis laced with humor, as in Mark Leibovich’s scathingly funny
critique of contemporary Washington, DC: This Town. Leibovich dis-
mantles the “self-intoxication” and “non-self-awareness” of the smug
interconnected world of politicians, lobbyists and media personali-
ties, the “permanent establishment of Washington.” Likening them to
“a permanent political class,” he exposes Political Washington as “an
inbred company town where party differences are easily subsumed
by membership in The Club. Policy argument can often devolve into
the trivial slap fights of televised debate: everyone playing a role,
putting on a show . . . .”36 But of course the joke is on us. A city of self-
promoting climbers whose prime goal is to build their personal brand
by “monetizing government employment” is not likely to voluntarily
heed a civilizational wake-up call.
Beyond the Catastrophe-in-Chief:

Toward a Sustainable Deep Presidency
Eric Alterman illustrates with more programmatic, systematic analysis,
how “the system is rigged” against progressive ideas, in terms of the
institutions of politics, the power of money, the culture of finance, the
force of American ideology, and the way the mass media frame public
debate.377 Our case studies of Clinton, Bush, and Obama surveyed the
contours of some aspects of that system in the policy process. Posing such
a direct challenge to vested interests would be political suicide. A can-
didate would have to run on a populist platform emboldened by a sus-
tained social movement to make the foregoing ideas anything more than
a fantasy. In responding to questions about a potential run for the white
House in 2016, Senator Bernie Sanders captured that spirit in describing
what he termed “a political revolution.” “So when I talk about a political
revolution, what I am referring to is the need to do more than just win the
next election.” He continued, “It’s about creating a situation where we
are involving millions of people in the process who are not now involved,
and changing the nature of media so they are talking about issues that
reflect the needs and the pains that so many of our people are currently
feeling.”38 Frances Fox Piven reminds us of the crucial role of developing
a conscious strategy of education and building grassroots movements to
push leaders beyond conventional policy positions:
FDR became a great president because the mass protests among the
unemployed, the aged, farmers and workers forced him to make choices
he would otherwise have avoided. He did not set out to initiate big new
policies . . . But the rise of protest movements forced the new president
and the Democratic Congress to become bold reformers. 39
For as historian Howard Zinn was fond of pointing out, “What mat-
ters most is not who is sitting in the White House, but ‘who is sit-
ting in’—and who is marching outside the White House.” “Political
power, however formidable,” he observed, “is more fragile than we
think.”40 This reminds us that ultimately we do know that institu-
tional inertia can be overcome; structures can change.41
A structural theory of the presidency is best situated to take

account of the myriad factors that would need to be analyzed in order
to confront the deep changes necessary for American democracy to
survive and flourish in a world where nothing short of a paradigm
shift will suffice. This is not to say that conventional theories of the
presidency, with their focus on the institutional balance of power, are
not useful. Institutions matter, since the institutional framework of
American government powerfully inhibits anything but slow, incre-
mental change.42 And Neustadt’s concern for presidential persuasion
matters greatly as well. After all, persuasion, bolstered by sustained
social movements, is all we really have if we are to undertake funda-
mental alterations of our political economy.43
As Klein observed in chapter one, “There’s a hole in the world,”
and the American presidency as it currently stands simply can-
not plug that larger hole with either the continued quest for endless
economic growth or American use of military hard power in end-
less pursuit of national security. Elizabeth Kolbert puts it starkly in
her book Field Notes from a Catastrophe: “It may seem impossible
to imagine that a technologically advanced society could choose, in
essence, to destroy itself, but that is what we are now in the process
of doing.”44 In short, we live in a catastrophic world. And unless a
president—emboldened by a long term social movement and acting in
concert with other world leaders—is willing to challenge the interests
of corporate power and financial capital that underlie our political
economy, the office of the presidency will remain wedded to out-
moded and destructive definitions of economic growth and national
security.45 And theories of the presidency within Political Science will
remain as intellectually imprisoned as Lindblom warned they were
at the dawn of the Reagan Revolution. Neustadt once referred to
Eisenhower as a sort of “Roosevelt in reverse,” discounting the possi-
bility that public expectations for the president could ever be lowered
save for very limited periods of time. Reagan also was characterized
the same way, for mobilizing the powers of the office in the pursuit
of conservative purposes. But for the American presidency to be truly
sustainable—for it to survive as anything more than a Kabuki drama
of spectacle and self-defeating shared partisan ends—we need not a
“Roosevelt in reverse.” Rather we are in dire need of a Roosevelt
reconfigured, a Roosevelt redefined. Absent that type of transfor-
mational leadership, the American presidency is likely to remain our
Catastrophe-in-Chief—an unsustainable catastrophe of an office,
situated in a catastrophic world.
Notes
1 Theories of the American Presidency

1. Antonia Juhasz, “Two Years Later: BP’s Toxic Legacy,” The Nation, May
7, 2012. See also Naomi Klein, “Gulf Oil Spill: A Hole in the World,”
The Guardian (UK), June 20, 2010. The Exxon-Valdez spill occurred in
1989. For an account of the record $4.5 billion settlement between BP
and the Department of Justice in November of 2012, see Jason Leopold,
“BP Will ‘Kill Again,’ Former EPA Officials, Attorney Warn,” Truthout,
November 18, 2012. For an analysis of the oil spill, see also William R.
Freudenburg and Robert Gramling, Blowout in the Gulf: The BP Oil
Spill Disaster and the Future of Energy in America, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2011.
2. Dahr Jamail, “Gulf Ecosystem in Crisis Three Years after BP Spill,”
Al Jazeera English, October 21, 2013. Rebecca Leber, “Judge Deals a
Blow to BP’s Efforts to Dodge Deepwater Horizon Payments, Nation of
Change, December 26, 2013.
3. President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on Climate
Change,” The White House, June 25, 2013.
4. Ibid.
5. Obama, quoted in Bill McKibben, “Our Protest Must Short Circuit the
Fossil Fuel Interests Blocking Obama,” The Guardian (UK), January 6,
2013.
6. See William F. Grover, The President as Prisoner: A Structural Critique
of the Carter and Reagan Years, Albany, NY: SUNY, 1989, especially
Chapter 1, “The Rise and Decline of Presidency Fetishism.” Some of the
language and analysis in this chapter is from The President as Prisoner.
7. Ibid., pp. 1–5. See also the discussion of Hamilton’s fuller meaning in
Michael A. Genovese, ed., Contending Approaches to the American
Presidency, Washington, DC: SAGE/CQ Press, 2012, pp. 12–19.
8. Grover, The President as Prisoner, p. 5. See also p. 188, note 9.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid, p. 6.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid, p. 16.
13. Ibid., p. 17.
14. See Genovese, Contending Approaches to the American Presidency,
pp. 11–19, for a solid brief discussion of the Framers’ effort to balance
Hamiltonian energy with republican safety.
15. Theodore Lowi, The Personal President, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1985, p. 96.
156 Notes
16. Ibid, p. 115.

17. See Grover, The President as Prisoner, Chapter 1, for a full account of
the Expansivist-Restrictivist debate among a wider range of authors
within Political Science. Genovese uses the language of this debate in
his analysis. See Genovese, Contending Approaches to the American
Presidency, p. 11.
18. Harold Laski, The American Presidency: An Interpretation, New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1940, p. 11.
19. Ibid., p. 274.
20. Ibid., p. 123.
21. Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency, revised ed., New York:
Mentor Books, 1960, p. 14.
22. Grover, The President as Prisoner, p. 26. See also note 34 on p. 193.
23. Rossiter, The American Presidency, p. 102.
24. Ibid., p. 140.
25. Grover, The President as Prisoner, pp.32–39. Among many accounts,
see also Thomas E. Cronin and Michael A. Genovese, The Paradoxes of
the American Presidency, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
2004, pp. 107–115; Stephen Skowronek, “Mission Accomplished,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly 39, no. 4, December 2009, pp. 795–804;
and Michael Nelson, “Neustadt’s ‘Presidential Power’at 50,” Chronicle
of Higher Education, March 28, 2010.
26. Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power, New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1980, p. 136.
27. Genovese, A Presidential Nation: Causes, Consequences and Cures,
Boulder, CO: Westview, 2013, p. 3.
28. Lori Cox Han, New Directions in the American Presidency, New York:
Routledge, 2011, p. 4.
29. For an account of this crisis of the office, see Grover, The President as
Prisoner, pp. 7, 39–61.
30. Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 4th ed., New
York: New York University Press, 1957, pp. 29–30, 307.
31. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., War and the American Presidency, New
York: W. W. Norton, 2004. See especially Chapter 3, “The Imperial
Presidency Redux.”
32. Schlesinger, War and the American Presidency, p. 45.
33. Thomas E. Cronin, The State of the Presidency, 2nd ed., Boston: Little
Brown, 1980; Cronin and Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American
Presidency, especially Chapter 1; and Theodore J. Lowi, The Personal
President, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985.
34. Lowi, The Personal President, p. 151.
35. Schlesinger, War and the American Presidency, p. 66.
36. Ibid., pp. 67, 119.
37. Andrew J. Bacevich, “The American Political Tradition,” The Nation,
July 17, 2006, p. 23.
Notes 157
38. Jennifer Van Bergen, “The ‘Unitary Executive’ and the Threat to
Democratic Government,” in William F. Grover and Joseph G. Peschek,
Voices of Dissent: Critical Readings in American Politics, 8th ed., New
York: Longman, 2010, pp. 253–260. On the balance of power gener-
ally within American governmental institutions weighted toward the
presidency, see Genovese, Contending Approaches to the American
Presidency; Cox Han, New Directions in the American Presidency; and
Schlesinger, Jr., War and the American Presidency. For the counterpoint
that embraces the inevitability of the strong presidency, see Eric A. Posner
and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian
Republic, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
39. This is true even with much more richly developed approach of “new
institutionalism” via analysis of political regime changes. See Stephen
Skowronek, “Presidential Leadership in Political Time,” in Michael
Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, 5th ed., Washington,
DC: CQ Press, 2003; Skowronek, “Mission Accomplished”; and his sem-
inal The Politics Presidents Make, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997.
40. Bruce Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions: The Presidential Politics of John F.
Kennedy, New York: David McKay Co., 1976, p. xiii.
41. See Lawrence R. Jacobs and Desmond S. King, “Varieties of Obamaism:
Structure, Agency and the Obama Presidency,” Perspectives on Politics, 8,
no. 3, September 2010, pp. 794–795.
42. Ira Katznelson and Mark Kesselman, The Politics of Power, 2nd ed.,
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979, p. 265. For a solid brief
overview of similar critiques of Neustadt and the ends of power, see
Cronin and Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American Presidency,
pp. 111–113.
43. Klein, “Gulf Oil Spill: A Hole in the World.”
2 Beyond Institutions-as-Structure:
A Deeper Structural Perspective
1. Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom, New York: Doubleday, 1913, p. 4.
Some of the language and analysis of the structure of the presidency is
from William F. Grover, The President as Prisoner, Albany, NY: SUNY,
1989. Other portions appeared previously in William F. Grover “Deep
Presidency: Toward a Structural Theory of an Unsustainable Office in a
Catastrophic World—Obama and Beyond,” New Political Science, 35,
no. 3, September 2013, pp. 432–448.
2. Ibid., p. 57.
3. Ibid., pp. 164–165.
4. Ibid., p. 44. For two classic interpretations of the essentially conservative
nature of Progressive Era reforms, see Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of
Conservatism, New York: The Free Press, 1963, and James Weinstein,
158 Notes
The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.
For an application of this type of analysis to the supposedly progres-
sive presidency of JFK, see Bruce Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions: The
Presidential Politics of John F. Kennedy, New York: David McKay Co.,
1976.
5. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval, Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1960, p. 620.
6. See the celebrated works of James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock
of Democracy, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963; James
MacGregor Burns, Presidential Government, Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1973; and James MacGregor Burns, The Power to Lead: The Crisis of
the American Presidency, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984.
7. The term is from the work of Fred Block and Frances Fox Piven, as
quoted in Brian Waddell, “When the Past is Not Prologue: The Wagner
Act Debates and the Limits of American Political Science,” New Political
Science 34, no. 3, September 2012, p. 357. It is a particularly apt charge
with regard to the work of Jacobs and King, “Varieties of Obamaism,”
which creates the misimpression that encounters between theories of the
presidency and theories of the state are a quite new development. For a
broader example of this misimpression within presidential studies, see
Michael A. Genovese, ed., Contending Approaches to the American
Presidency, Washington, DC: SAGE/CQ Press, 2012.
8. Waddell, “When the Past is Not Prologue,” and Charles E. Lindblom,
“The Market as Prison,” Journal of Politics 44, no. 2, May 1982, p. 334.
9. President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the United States
Military Academy Commencement Address,” The White House, May
28, 2014.
10. Harold Laski, The American Presidency: An Interpretation, New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1940. See also William F. Grover, The President
As Prisoner: A Structural Critique of the Carter and Reagan Years,
Albany, NY: SUNY, 1989, pp. 20–25; all brief Laski quotes are cited
therein.
11. Stephen Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time: Reprise
and Reappraisal, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011;
Stephen Skowronek, “Presidential Leadership in Political Time,” in
Michael Nelson, ed. The Presidency and the Political System, 8th ed.,
Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006; and Stephen Skowronek, “Mission
Accomplished.”
12. Skowronek, Presidential Leadership in Political Time: Reprise and
Reappraisal, p. 5.
13. Ibid, Ch. 2; and Skowronek, “Presidential Leadership in Political Time,”
pp. 89–135.
Reappraisal, p. 20. Skocpol and Jacobs also make this point about the
advantages of change-oriented presidents starting from scratch, as it were,
Notes 159
when comparing FDR’s more favorable circumstances to Obama’s. See

Theda Skocpol and Lawrence R. Jacobs, “Accomplished and Embattled:
Understanding Obama’s Presidency,” Political Science Quarterly, 127,
no. 1, Spring 2012, pp. 1–24.
Reappraisal, p. 30.
16. Perry Anderson, “Homeland,” New Left Review, no. 81, May/June
2013, p. 31.
17. Theodore J. Lowi, The Personal President, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1985.
18. The following discussion of theories of the state draws on Grover, The
President as Prisoner, pp. 74–87. See also Waddell, “When the Past is
Not Prologue,” for a fuller discussion of how the insights of critical/
radical theories of the state are downplayed or ignored within Political
Science generally.
19. Lindblom, “The Market as Prision.” See also his seminal work Politics
and Markets, New York: Basic Books, 1977, and Waddell, “When the
Past is Not Prologue.”
20. Lindblom, “The Market as Prison,” cited in Grover, The President as
Prisoner, p. 3.
21. Lindblom, Politics and Markets, p. 356.
22. Grover, The President as Prisoner, pp. 3–4.
23. Erik Olin Wright and Joel Rogers, American Society: How It Really
Works, New York: Norton, 2011, p. 345.
24. Classic critiques of the democratic pluralist conception of the state are
offered in Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, New York:
Basic Books, 1969 and William E. Connolly, ed., The Bias of Pluralism,
New York: Atherton Press, 1969. For specific application to the study of
the presidency, see Grover, The President as Prisoner, and Jacobs and
King, “Varieties of Obamaism.”
25. See Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, On Democracy, New York: Penguin,
1983, particularly Chapter Three on “Structure.” See also Wright and
Rogers, American Society, especially Chapter Sixteen, “Democracy:
How It Works.”
26. Wright and Rogers, American Society, p. 347; and Joshua Cohen and Joel
Rogers, “American Exceptionalism and the Politics of Fragmentation,”
quoted in William F. Grover and Joseph G. Peschek, eds., Voices of
Dissent: Critical Readings in American Politics, 9th ed., New York:
Pearson, 2013, p. 82.
27. Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on
Politics 12, no. 3, Fall 2014, pp. 575, 577.
28. See G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America, 6th ed., Boston: McGraw-
Hill, 2010; Miliband. The State in Capitalist Society; and C. Wright
Mills, The Power Elite, New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.
160 Notes
29. Grover, The President as Prisoner; Domhoff, Who Rules America?; and
Joseph G. Peschek, “The Obama Presidency and the Great Recession:
Political Economy, Ideology, and Public Policy,” New Political Science 33,
no. 4, December 2011, pp. 427–444.
30. G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1983, p. 1.
31. Poulantzas, “The Problem of the Capitalist State,” in Ideology in Social
Science, ed. Robin Blackburn, New York: Vintage, 1973, p. 245. In the
Blackburn volume, see also Miliband’s “Reply to Nicos Poulantzas.”
What we call “capital dominance” theory is often called a “structural”
theory of the state or “structural Marxism.”
32. The role of capital accumulation and business confidence is discussed
in Michael A. Genovese, The Presidential Dilemma: Leadership in the
American System, 2nd ed., New York: Longman, 2003, pp. 73–79.
See also James O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, New York:
St. Martin’s, 1973.
33. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, “The Crisis of Liberal Democratic
Capitalism The Case of the United States,” Politics and Society 11, no. 1,
March 1982, p. 52; Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Democracy
and Capitalism, New York: Basic Books, 1986; Fred Block, “The
Ruling Class Does Not Rule,” in The Political Economy: Readings in
the Politics and Economics of American Public Policy, eds. Thomas
Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1984; Waddell,
“When the Past is not Prologue,” and Grover, The President as Prisoner,
Chapter Two.
34. Lawrence Jacobs and Desmond King, “America’s Political Crisis: The
Unsustainable State in a Time of Unraveling” PS: Political Science and
Politics, April 2009, pp. 277–285.
35. Two especially useful texts that explore the issue of legitimacy are Jurgen
Habermas’s classic Legitimation Crisis, Boston: Beacon, 1973, and
William Connolly, ed., Legitimacy and the State, New York: New York
University Press, 1984.
36. See Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions; Kim McQuaid, Big Business and
Presidential Power: From FDR to Reagan, New York: William Morrow,
1982; Laurence H. Shoup, The Carter Presidency and Beyond, Palo
Alto, CA: Ramparts, 1982; Alan Wolfe, America’s Impasse: The Rise
and Fall of the Politics of Growth, New York: Pantheon, 1981; Alan
Wolfe, “Presidential Power and the Crisis of Modernization,” democ-
racy 1, no. 2, April 1981, pp. 19–32; Grover, The President as Prisoner;
and Jacobs and King, “Varieties of Obamaism.”
37. Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions, p. 272.
38. Ibid., p. 279.
39. Wolfe, America’s Impasse, p. 237. See also his “Presidential Power and
the Crisis of Modernization,” for an insightful discussion of how the
presidency came to be used as the instrument through which American
capitalism modernized and expanded.
Notes 161
40. Wolfe, “Presidential Power and the Crisis of Modernization, pp. 27–28.
41. Wolfe, America’s Impasse. For a very readable account the decline of the
long wave of US expansion and power after World War II, see Robert
Reich, Aftershock: The Next Economy and America’s Future, New
York: Vintage, 2011, particularly Chapters Three and Six.
42. Wolfe, “Presidential Power and the Crisis of Modernization,” p. 31.
43. Cass Sunstein, a senior White House advisor on regulatory reform, as
quoted in Robert Kuttner, A Presidency in Peril: The Inside Story of
Obama’s Promise, Wall Street’s Power, and the Struggle to Control our
Economic Future, White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, 2010, pp.
xvi–xvii.
44. Joseph G. Peschek, “The Obama Presidency and the Great Recession,”
p. 444.
45. Frank Rich, “Obama’s Original Sin,” New York Magazine, July 3,
2011.
46. Larissa MacFarquhar, “The Conciliator: Where is Barack Obama
Coming From?” The New Yorker, May 7, 2007.
47. See Paul Street, “Obama, As Predicted,” ZNet, November 22, 2009.
Street wrote some 30 articles detailing the likely conventional path
Obama would take if elected, in preparation for his 2009 book Barack
Obama and the Future of American Politics, Boulder, CO: Paradigm,
2009. New York Times columnist and Pulitzer Prize winning economist
Paul Krugman found many reasons to be skeptical of the branding of
Obama as a progressive force; among them see, “The Obama Agenda,” The
New York Times, June 30, 2008.
48. Burns, The Power to Lead. See also Kuttner, A Presidency in Peril,
p. xvii.
49. Krugman, “The Obama Agenda.” Note that Krugman later defended
President Obama’s record. See Paul Krugman, “In Defense of Obama,”
Rolling Stone, October 8, 2014.
50. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005, pp. 2, 37.
51. David Harvey, “The Party of Wall Street Meets Its Nemesis,” quoted in
Gary Olson, Empathy Imperiled: Capitalism, Culture, and the Brain,
New York: Springer, 2013, p. 44.
52. Polanyi quoted in Susan George, “A Short History of Neoliberalism,” in
Voices of Dissent, eds. Grover and Peschek, 9th ed., p. 19.
53. Wright and Rogers, American Society, pp. 392–395
3 Bill Clinton and the Neoliberal Presidency

1. Thomas I. Palley, From Financial Crisis to Stagnation: The Destruction
of Shared Prosperity and the Role of Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012, p. 34.
162 Notes
2. See David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2005. On this shift, see Joseph G. Peschek, Policy-
Planning Organizations: Elite Agendas and America’s Rightward Turn,
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987.
3. Michael Lind, “How Reaganism Actually Started With Carter,” Salon.
com, February 8, 2011. For good short treatments of Carter, see Thomas
Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats
and the Future of American Politics, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986,
pp. 105–113; Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All
Politics, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010, pp. 98–100. For a more
extended discussion, see William F. Grover, The President as Prisoner:
A Structural Critique of the Carter and Reagan Years, Albany: SUNY,
1989, especially pp. 97–112 and 139–151.
4. Jeff Faux, “Big Dollar, Little Democracy,” Dissent, Fall 2012, p. 90.
5. Quoted in E. J. Dionne, Jr., “Democrats Fashion Centrist Image in
New Statement of Party Policy,” New York Times, September 21,
1986.
6. Quoted in Gregg Easterbrook, “The Business of Politics,” Atlantic
Monthly, October 1986, p. 30.
7. Quoted in Jon F. Hale, “The Making of the New Democrats,” Political
Science Quarterly, 110, no. 2, Summer 1995, p. 215.
8. Jonathan Chait, “The Slippery Center,” New Republic, November 16,
1998, p. 19. On From’s career, see Rick Perlstein, “From and Friends,”
The Nation, March 3, 2014, pp. 27–32.
9. Hale, “The Making of the New Democrats,” p. 225.
10. Kenneth S. Baer, Reinventing Democrats: The Politics of Liberalism
from Reagan to Clinton, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000,
pp. 164, 195. For discussion, see Robert Dreyfuss, “How the DLC Does
It,” American Prospect, April 23, 2001, pp. 20–25.
11. Hale, “The Making of the New Democrats,” p. 226.
12. Chait, “The Slippery Center,” p. 19.
13. Hale, “The Making of the New Democrats,” pp. 227–228.
14. Roger Morris, Partners in Power: The Clintons and Their America,
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996, pp. 450–456.
15. Quoted in Alexander Cockburn and Ken Silverstein, American Babylon,
London and New York: Verso, 1996, p. 258.
16. Thomas Ferguson, “The Democrats Deal for Dollars,” The Nation, April
13, 1992, pp. 475–478; idem., Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of
Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 296–305.
17. Quoted in Paul Starobin, “An Affair to Remember,” National Journal,
January 16, 1993, pp. 120–124.
18. Hale, “The Making of the New Democrats,” pp. 207, 224–228.
Notes 163
19. Walter Dean Burnham, “Bill Clinton: Riding the Tiger,” in The Election
of 1996: Reports and Interpretations, ed. Gerald M. Pomper, Chatham,
NJ: Chatham House, 1997, p. 2.
20. For discussion, see John B. Judis, “What’s the Deal?” Mother Jones,
April 1994, p. 28.
21. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., “Clinton Unveils His Economic Blueprint,”
New York Times, June 22, 1992.
22. Steven Greenhouse, “Clinton’s Economic Plan Has a Roosevelt Tone,”
New York Times, July 9, 1992.
23. Robert B. Reich, “Clintonomics 101.” New Republic, August 31, 1992,
pp. 23, 25. Clinton and Reich met in 1968, when they were en route to
Oxford as Rhodes Scholars.
24. Michael Kelly, “Though Advisers Differ, Clinton’s in Tune With All,”
New York Times, September 13, 1992.
25. Steve Lohr, “Clinton Proposals Seek Political Middle Ground,” New
York Times, April 18, 1992.
26. Martin Walker, The President We Deserve: Bill Clinton—His Rise,
Falls, and Comebacks, New York: Crown Publishers, 1996, pp 14–15.
27. Harold Meyerson, “The Election: Impending Realignment,” Dissent,
Fall 1992, pp. 421–424.
28. Matthew Rothschild, “Beyond the Lesser Evil: The Case Against Clinton,”
The Progressive, October 1992, p. 18. The convict was Ricky Ray Rector,
who had been sentenced for a 1981 murder of an Arkansas police officer.
Rector had been lobotomized after suffering brain damage in a suicide
attempt. Some observers thought Clinton’s actions were a calculated attempt
to differentiate himself from 1988 Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis. In
a debate with George H. W. Bush, Dukakis was asked if he would support the
death penalty if his wife were raped and murdered. Dukakis responded that
he would not. Rector was executed by lethal injection on January 24, 1992.
29. Robert Pear, “The Picture From the Census Bureau; Poverty 1993:
Bigger, Deeper, Younger, Getting Worse,” New York Times, October
10, 1993; Steve Berg, “36,900,000 Americans in Poverty in ’92,” Star
Tribune (Minneapolis), September 5, 1993.
30. See Hobart Rowen, “Jobless Recovery,” Washington Post, September 2,
1993.
31. Jason DeParle, “Census Sees Falling Income and More Poor,” New York
Times, October 7, 1994.
32. Guy Gugliotta, “The Minimum Wage Culture,” Washington Post
National Weekly Edition, October 3–9, 1994.
33. Quoted in Louis Uchitelle, “The Rise of the Losing Class,” New York
Times, November 20, 1994.
34. Sylvia Nasur, “The 1980’s: A Very Good Time for the Very Rich,” New
York Times, March 5, 1992.
164 Notes
35. Ruth Marcus and Ann Devroy, “Asking Americans to ‘Face Facts,’
Clinton Presents Plan to Raise Taxes, Cut Deficit,” Washington Post,
February 18, 1993.
36. Gwen Ifill, “Economic Plan Grew Slowly Out of Marathon of Debate,”
New York Times, February 21, 1993.
37. Michael Wines, “Senate Suspends Effort for Accord on Clinton’s Plan,”
New York Times, 6 April 1993; Andrew Pollack, “Huge Stimulus
Package Is Announced by Japan,” New York Times, April 14, 1993.
38. Steven Greenhouse, “Clinton Delays Push to Increase Minimum Wage,”
New York Times, June 3, 1993; David E. Rosenbaum, “A Fading Call to
Arms,” New York Times, August 3, 1993.
39. M. Stephen Weatherford and Lorraine M. McDonnell, “Clinton and the
Economy: The Paradox of Policy Success and Political Mishap,” Political
Science Quarterly, 111, no. 3, Fall 1996, pp. 423–427.
40. Jack Beatty, “Who Speaks for the Middle Class,” Atlantic Monthly,
May 1994, p. 73.
41. Dean Baker and Todd Schafer, “The Clinton Budget Package: Putting
Deficit Reduction First?” Challenge, May-June 1993, pp. 4–10.
42. Louis Uchitelle, “How Clinton’s Economic Strategy Ended up Looking
Like Bush’s,” New York Times, August 1, 1993; Rosenbaum, “A Fading
Call to Arms.”
43. Bob Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House, New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1995, p. 165.
44. Woodward, The Agenda, pp. 103, 141–145, 269–271. For an analysis of
Clinton’s retreat from a public investment agenda that emphasizes the
role of public opinion and electoral politics, see James Shoch, “Bringing
Public Opinion and Electoral Politics Back In: Explaining the Fate of
‘Clintonomics’ and Its Contemporary Relevance,” Politics and Society,
36, no. 1, March 2008, pp. 89–130.
45. For data, see G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? Power and
Politics in the Year 2000, Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing,
1998, pp. 252–255.
46. Thomas Ferguson, “Smoke in Starr’s Chamber,” The Nation, March 8,
1999, p. 11.
47. Patrick Akard, “Where Are All the Democrats? The Limits of Economic
Policy Reform,” in Social Policy and the Conservative Agenda, eds.
Clarence Y. H. Lo and Michael Schwartz, Malden, MA: Blackwell,
1998, pp.199–200.
48. Viveca Novak and Paul Starobin, “Spreading the Money,” National
Journal, August 14, 1993, p. 2022.
49. On Morris’s background, see John Harris, The Survivor: Bill Clinton
in the White House, New York: Random House, 2005, pp. 164–166.
By 1996, Jeff Madrick contends, “Clinton Democrats could hardly be
distinguished from moderate Republicans.” Age of Greed: The Triumph
Notes 165
of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 to the Present, New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2011, p. 237.
50. Quoted in James K. Galbraith, “The Economy Doesn’t Need the Third
Way,” New York Times, November 24, 1999.
51. Michael Meeropol, Surrender: How the Clinton Administration
Completed the Reagan Revolution, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1998, p. 4.
52. Bill Clinton, “It’s Still the Economy, Stupid,” Newsweek, June 27, 2011:
http://www.newsweek.com/its-still-economy-stupid-67899
53. David Cay Johnston, “‘97 Middle-Class Tax Relief Benefits Wealthy
First,” New York Times, April 5, 1998; “’97 Tax Cut Gives Zero to
Most Families This April,” Washington: Citizens for Tax Justice, March
31, 1998.
54. Vikas Bajaj and David Leonhardt, “Tax Break May Have Helped Cause
Housing Bubble,” New York Times, December 19, 2008.
55. Quoted in Robert Weissman, “Reflections on Glass-Steagall and
Maniacal Deregulation,” CommonDreams.org, November 12, 2009:
https://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/11/12–8
56. Quoted in Stephen Labaton, “Congress Passes Wide-Ranging Bill Easing
Bank Laws,” New York Times, November 5, 1999. For a detailed anal-
ysis of the process leading to the adoption of the Financial Services
Modernization Act, see Sandra Suarez and Robin Kolodny, “Paving the
Road to ‘Too Big to Fail’: Business Interests and the Politics of Financial
Deregulation in the United States,” Politics and Society, 39, no. 1, March
2011, pp. 74–102.
57. Dan Roberts, “Wall Street Deregulation Pushed by Clinton Advisers,
Document Reveals,” Guardian (UK), April 19, 2014: http://www.the-
guardian.com/world/2014/apr/19/wall-street-deregulation-clinton-
advisers-obama
58. Matthew Sherman, “A Short History of Financial Deregulation in the
United States,” Washington: Center for Economic and Policy Research,
July 2009.
59. Quoted in Louise Story, “A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Trading in
Derivatives,” New York Times, December 11, 2010. For a careful analy-
sis of the politics behind the bill, see Paul Blumenthal, “How Congress
Rushed a Bill that Helped Bring the Economy to its Knees,” Huffington
Post, May 11, 2009. Economist Alan Blinder, who served on the Council
of Economic Advisers and as Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System during the Clinton years, later referred to
the legislation as “odious.” Alan S. Blinder, “Five Years Later, Financial
Lessons Not Learned,” Wall Street Journal, September 10, 2013.
60. “Power of Progressive Economics: The Clinton Years,” Washington:
Center for American Progress, October 28, 2011.
61. Quoted in Amy Chozick, “Bill Clinton Defends His Economic Legacy,”
New York Times, May 1, 2014.
166 Notes
62. See Doug Henwood, “Booming, Borrowing, and Consuming: The U.S.
Economy in 1999,” Monthly Review, July–August 1999, pp. 120–133;
Louis Uchitelle, “107 Months, and Counting,” New York Times,
January 30, 2000.
63. Kevin Phillips, “The Wealth Effect,” Los Angeles Times, April 16,
2000.
64. Dean Baker, “Bill Clinton is Baaaaaaaaack!” Huffington Post, October 3,
2011.
65. Dean Baker, “Farewell to Bill,” Huffington Post, September 2010. For a
related critique, see Timothy A. Canova, “The Clinton Bubble,” Dissent,
Summer 2008, pp. 41–50.
66. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties: A New History of the World’s
Most Prosperous Decade, New York: W.W. Norton, 2004, p. xliv.
67. Robert Pollin, Contours of Descent: U.S. Economic Fractures and the
Landscape of Global Austerity, London and New York: Verso, 2003,
p. 75. For a much more positive assessment of Clinton’s economic poli-
cies, see Raymond Tatalovich and John Frendreis, “Clinton, Class and
Economic Policy,” in The Postmodern Presidency: Bill Clinton’s Legacy
in U.S. Politics, ed. Steven E. Schier, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 2000, pp. 41–59. The authors see Clinton’s legacy as a “post-
Keynesian commitment to pro-business growth strategies, to market-
based solutions for policy problems, and to free trade” p. 58.
68. Isaac Shapiro and Robert Greenstein, “The Widening Income Gulf,”
Washington: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, September 4, 1999:
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2204
69. “Household Income Fails to Grow in 2000,” Washington: Economic
Policy Institute, September 25, 2001.
70. “Economic Inequality Seen as Rising, Boom Bypasses Poor,” Washington:
Pew Research Center, June 21, 2001.
71. Colin Gordon, “Who Killed Health Care,” In These Times, October 28,
1996, pp. 31–33. This article is a very interesting critical review of Theda
Skocpol’s book, cited below.
72. Theda Skocpol, Boomerang: Clinton’s Health Security Effort and the Turn
Against Government in U.S. Politics, New York: W. W. Norton, 1996, p. 42.
73. Beth Mintz, “The Failure of Health Care Reform: The Role of Big
Business in Policy Formation,” in Social Policy and the Conservative
Agenda, eds. Clarence Y. H. Lo and Michael Schwartz, Malden, MA:
Blackwell, 1998, p. 212.
74. Colin Gordon, The Clinton Health Care Plan: Dead on Arrival,
Westfield, NJ: Open Magazine Pamphlet Series, 1995, p. 11.
75. Well-Healed: Inside Lobbying for Health Care Reform, Washington:
Center for Public Integrity, 1994.
76. Cathie Jo Martin, “Stuck in Neutral: Big Business and the Politics of
National Health Reform.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law,
20, no. 2, Summer 1995, p. 432.
Notes 167
77. Ibid., p. 433.

78. Mintz, “The Failure of Health Care Reform,” pp.216–217; John Judis,
“Abandoned Surgery: Business and the Failure of Health Care Reform,”
American Prospect no. 21, Spring 1995, pp. 65–66.
79. Julie Kosterlitz, “Paying the Bill,” National Journal, April 16, 1994,
pp. 885–886.
80. Skocpol, Boomerang, pp. 134–139.
81. William Kristol, “Defeating President Clinton’s Health Care Proposal,”
Memorandum to Republican Leaders, December 3, 1993.
82. Marie Gottschalk, The Shadow Welfare State: Labor, Business, and the
Politics of Health Care in the United States, Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2000, pp. 141–143. A number of labor rank-and-file activists
defied union leadership and campaigned for single payer.
83. Ibid., p. 162.
84. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Questioning the
Conventional Wisdom on Public Opinion toward Health Reform.” PS:
Political Science and Politics, June 1994, p. 212.
85. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Don’t Blame the Public for
Failed Health Reform.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law, 20,
no. 2, Summer 1995, p. 413.
86. Colin Gordon, Dead on Arrival: The Politics of Health Care in Twentieth
Century America, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003, p. 41.
87. Quoted in Ronald Waters, “The Democratic Party and the Politics of
Welfare Reform,” in Social Policy and the Conservative Agenda, eds.
Clarence Y. H. Lo and Michael Schwartz, Malden, MA: Blackwell,
1998, p. 37.
88. Douglas J. Besharov, “Don’t Expect Miracles: But a Few Rules Would
Go a Long Way Toward Fixing the Welfare Mess,” Washington Post,
July 23, 1995.
89. For an analysis and critique of the legislation and its early implemen-
tation, see Michael B. Katz, The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the
American Welfare State, New York: Henry Holt, 2001, pp. 317–340.
On Clinton’s decision to sign the legislation, see Taylor Branch, The
Clinton Tapes: Wrestling History with the President, New York: Simon
and Schuster, 2009, pp. 368–371, 414–415.
90. Robert B. Reich, “Clinton’s Leap in the Dark,” Times Literary
Supplement, January 22, 1999, pp. 3–4. Economist Randy Albelda
stated, “There are no federal requirements to increase the supply or
funding of child care, little is being done to create jobs for women that
pay living wages, there are no plans to expand health care to low wage
workers, and there is no talk of boosting the educational and training
opportunities for single mothers.” “Farewell to Welfare, But Not to
Poverty,” Dollars and Sense, November-December 1996, p. 16.
168 Notes
91. Joe Soss and Sanford F. Schram, “A Public Transformed? Welfare

Reform as Policy Feedback,” American Political Science Review, 101,
no. 1, February 2007, pp. 111–127.
92. Sanford F. Schram and Joe Soss, “Success Stories: Welfare Reform,
Policy Discourse and the Politics of Research,” Annals of the American
Academy, September 2001, pp. 49–65.
93. Pamela Loprest, Families Who Left Welfare: Who Are They and How
Are They Doing? Washington: The Urban Institute, 1999.
94. “Chart Book: TANF at 16,” Washington: Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, August 22, 2014: http://www.cbpp.org/
cms/?fa=view&id=3566
95. Ibid.
96. Jason DeParle, “Welfare Limits Left Poor Adrift as Recession Hit,”
New York Times, April 7, 2012.
97. Peter Edelman, “We Have Blown a Huge Hole in the Safety Net,”
TalkPoverty.org, May 23, 2014: http://talkpoverty.org/2014/05/22/
edelman/
98. Jeffrey Toobin, Too Close to Call: The Thirty-Six Day Battle to Decide
the 2000 Election, New York: Random House, 2001, p. 8.
99. Lars Erik Nelson, “The Republicans’ War,” New York Review of
Books, February 4, 1999, p. 6.
100. Chip Berlet and Matthew Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America: Too
Close for Comfort, New York: Guilford Press, 2000, pp. 306–307.
101. Ibid., p. 306.
102. Buying a Movement: Right-Wing Foundations and American Politics,
Washington, DC: People for the American Way, 1996.
103. Robert Kaiser and Ira Chinoy, “The Right’s Funding Father,”
Washington Post National Weekly Edition, May 17, 1999, pp. 6–8.
104. Buying a Movement: Right-Wing Foundations and American Politics,
Washington, DC: People for the American Way, 1996, p. 11.
105. Sally Covington, Moving a Public Policy Agenda: The Strategic
Philanthropy of Conservative Foundations, Washington, DC: National
Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, 1997, pp. 21–22.
106. Daniel Callahan, $1 Billion for Ideas: Conservative Think Tanks in the
1990s, Washington: National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy,
1999, p. 5.
107. Quoted in Eric Alterman, Sound and Fury: The Making of the
Punditocracy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, p. 271.
108. Erik Eckholm, “From Right, A Rain of Anti-Clinton Salvos,” New
York Times, June 26, 1994; Robert Parry, “Clinton ‘Oppo’ Wildfire,”
ConsortiumNews.com, February 10, 1999.
109. Dan Balz and Richard Brownstein, Storming the Gates: Protest Politics
and Republican Revival, Boston: Little, Brown, 1996, p. 170.
110. Michael Dolny, “What’s in a Label?” Extra!, May–June 1998,
pp. 9–10.
Notes 169
111. Amy Bach, “Movin’ On Up With the Federalist Society,” The Nation,
October 1, 2001, pp. 11–18; The Federalist Society and the Challenge
to a Democratic Jurisprudence, New York: Institute for Democracy
Studies, 2001.
112. Julie Gerchik, “Slouching Towards Extremism,” IDS Insights,
November 2000, p. 2.
113. The Federalist Society: From Obscurity to Power, Washington: People
for the American Way, 2001, p. 6.
114. McCurdy quoted in John B. Judis, “From Hell,” New Republic,
December 19, 1994; Al From, “Can Clinton Recover? Or Will GOP
Prevail?” USA Today, November 10, 1994; Roberts’s comments were
made on ABC News, November 8, 1994. For discussion, see Jim
Naureckas, “‘Move to the Right’: Pundits’ Tried-and-Failed Advice,”
Extra! January-February 1995.
115. Richard L. Berke, “Democratic Party Struggles to Find New
Equilibrium,” New York Times, November 27, 1994; Michael Duffy,
James Carney, and Adam Zagorin, “Getting Out the Wrecking Ball,”
Time, December 19, 1994.
116. Ruy Teixeira and Joel Rogers, “Who Deserted the Democrats in 1994?”
American Prospect no. 23, Fall 1995, p. 76.
117. Quoted in Alison Mitchell, “Clinton’s Triumph Prompts Democratic
Soul Searching,” New York Times, January 20, 1997.
118. Quoted in ibid.
119. Al From, “The Path Back to Power: Congressional Democrats Should
Follow Clinton’s New Democrat Lead,” New Democrat, November–
December 1996, p. 36.
120. Quoted in Joel Bleifuss, “Whose Party Is It?” In These Times, February
3–16, 1997, p. 12.
121. Bill Clinton, “Remarks by the President to the Democratic Leadership
Council,” Washington, December 11, 1996.
122. See E. J. Dionne, Jr., “Look Who’s Got the Blues,” Washington Post,
January 14, 1997.
123. Ruy Teixeira, Who Joined the Democrats? Understanding the 1996
Election Results, Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 1996.
124. Ruy Teixeira, “The Real Electorate,” American Prospect no. 37,
March–April 1998, pp. 82–85.
125. For overviews of Clinton’s foreign and national security policies with
interpretations quite different from our own, see Emily O. Goldman
and Larry Berman, “Engaging the World: First Impressions of the
Clinton Foreign Policy Legacy,” in The Clinton Legacy, eds. Colin
Campbell and Bert Rockman, New York: Chatham House, 2000,
pp. 226–253; James M. McCormick, “Clinton and Foreign Policy:
Some Legacies for a New Century,” in The Postmodern Presidency:
Bill Clinton’s Legacy in U.S. Politics, ed. Steven E. Schier, Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000, pp. 60–83; Derek Chollet and
170 Notes
James Goldgeier. America between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11,

New York: Public Affairs, 2008. Closer to our perspective is Nicholas
Guyatt, Another American Century? London: Zed Books, 2000.
126. David E. Sanger, “Economic Engine for Foreign Policy,” New York
Times, December 28, 2000.
127. Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for
World Dominance, London and New York: Verso, 1999, p. 27.
128. Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” Remarks at the
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies,
Washington, September 21, 1993. For discussion see Peter Gowan,
“The American Campaign for Global Sovereignty,” Socialist Register
2003, edited by Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, London: Merlin Press,
2003, pp. 9–10.
129. Quoted in Morris Morley and James Petras, “Wealth and Poverty in
the National Economy: The Domestic Foundations of Clinton’s Global
Policy,” in Social Policy and the Conservative Agenda, eds. Clarence Y.
H. Lo and Michael Schwartz, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998, p. 133.
130. Sherle R. Schwenniger, “Clinton’s World Order,” The Nation, February 16,
1998, p. 19.
131. Jeff Faux, The Global Class War, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons,
2006, p. 11.
132. Dean Baker, The United States Since 1980, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007, p. 131.
133. Quotes in Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, The Making of Global
Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire, London and
New York: Verso, 2012, pp. 228, 229.
134. Gwen Ifill, “How Clinton Won, 56 Long Days of Coordinated
Persuasion,” New York Times, November 19, 1993.
135. Peter H. Stone, “Lobbyists Lend a Hand on NAFTA,” National
Journal, October 30, 1993, pp. 2595–2596; The Trading Game: Inside
Lobbying for the North American Free Trade Agreement, Washington:
Center for Public Integrity, 1993; William P. Avery, “Domestic Interests
in NAFTA Bargaining,” Political Science Quarterly, 113, no. 2,
Summer 1998, pp. 281–305.
136. For critical assessments of NAFTA, see NAFTA’s Broken Promises:
Outcomes of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Washington:
Public Citizen, 2013; Jeff Faux, “NAFTA, Twenty Years After: A
Disaster,” Huffington Post, January 1, 2014.
137. Quoted in Faux, The Global Class War, p. 159.
138. Joshua Cooper Ramo, “The Three Musketeers,” Time, February 15,
1999.
139. Guyatt, Another American Century? p. 14.
140. Chollet and Goldgeier. America between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11,
pp. 35–37; Fred Barnes, “They’re Back!” New Republic, August 3,
1992, pp. 12–13.
Notes 171
141. Clinton’s support for NATO enlargement to include the former

Soviet allied states went against a pledge reportedly made by Secretary
of State James Baker to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990, as a
condition of winning Soviet acceptance of a reunified Germany being
part of NATO. See the careful reconstruction by former CIA analyst
Ray McGovern, “How NATO Jabs Russia on Ukraine,” Consortium
News.com, May 15, 2014.
142. Quoted in Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, “Making the
World Safe for Business,” Los Angeles Times, April 2, 1999.
143. Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences
of U.S. Diplomacy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 142.
144. Quoted in David Gray Adler, “The Clinton Theory of the War Power,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 30, no. 1, March 2000, p. 162.
Albright famously asked Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair Colin Powell,
“What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking
about if we can’t use it?” Quoted in Michael Dobbs, “With Albright,
Clinton Accepts New U.S. Role,” Washington Post, December 8,
1996.
145. Statement of December 16, 1998. Quoted in ibid., p. 162.
146. Adler, “The Clinton Theory of the War Power,” pp. 156, 163–164.
147. Sidney Blumenthal, The Clinton Wars, New York: Farrar, Strauss, and
Giroux, 2003, p. 633.
148. Quoted in Layne and Schwarz, “Making the World Safe for Business.”
149. See the careful analysis of possible interpretations by Peter Gowan,
“Making Sense of NATO’s War on Yugoslavia,” Socialist Register
2000, edited by Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, London: Merlin Press,
2000, pp. 257–283. The war in Kosovo is analyzed in historical context
by David N. Gibbs, First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention
and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, Nashville: Vanderbilt University
Press, 2009.
150. Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, “Dubious Anniversary:
Kosovo One Year Later,” Policy Analysis 373, Washington: Cato
Institute, June 10, 2000.
151. “Remarks by The President to the 1998 DLC Annual Conference,”
December 2, 1998: http://www.dlc.org/ndol_cid059.html?kaid=127&
subid=173&contentid=663.
152. Perry Anderson, “Testing Formula Two,” New Left Review no. 8,
March–April 2001, pp. 7–8.
4 The Conservative Mirage: George W. Bush and

Empire Waning
1. Address in Austin, Texas, Accepting Election as the 43rd President of
the United States. December 13, 2000.
172 Notes
2. Bert A. Rockman, “Presidential Leadership in an Era of Party

Polarization: The George W. Bush Presidency,” in The George W. Bush
Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects, ed. Colin Campbell and Bert A.
Rockman, Washington: CQ Press, 2004, p. 352.
3. Michael Isikoff, “The Money Machine,” Newsweek, January 24, 2000,
p. 48; Don Van Natta, Jr., “Early Rush of Contributors Opened the
Floodgates for Bush,” New York Times, January 30, 2000; Anthony
Corrado, “Financing the 2000 Elections,” in The Election of 2000, ed.
Gerald M. Pomper, New York: Chatham House/Seven Bridges Press,
2001, pp. 97–101.
4. John B. Judis, “Taking Care of Business: George W. Bush’s Compassion
for Corporations,” New Republic, August 16, 1999, p. 28.
5. See Brent Staples, “The Republican Party’s Exercise in Minstrelsy,” New
York Times, August 3, 2000.
6. Quotes from Nicholas Confessore, “The Winner: Clintonism,” American
Prospect, December 4, 2000, p. 12.
7. Al From, “Building a New Progressive Majority: How Democrats Can
Learn From the Failed 2000 Campaign,” Blueprint, January 24, 2001.
See Will Lester, “‘New Democrats’: Gore Lost By Not Being Republican
Enough,” Associated Press, January 24, 2001.
8. Jeff Madrick, “Are Bush and Gore Flip-Flopping Over How to Manage
the Economy?” New York Times, October 26, 2000.
9. See Stan Greenberg, “The Progressive Majority and the 2000 Elections:
A Report on Post-Elections National Surveys,” Institute for America’s
Future, December 15, 2000; Ruy Teixeira, “Lessons for Next Time,”
American Prospect, December 18, 2000, pp. 12–14.
10. David S. Broder, “Bizarre Twists Raise Fairness as an Issue,” Washington
Post, November 9, 2000.
11. Kevin Phillips, “Gridlock Central,” Los Angeles Times, November 12,
2000.
12. David S. Broder, “One Nation, Divisible; Despite Peace, Prosperity,
Voters Agree to Disagree,” Washington Post, November 8, 2000;
Thomas B. Edsall, “Bush Cuts Deeply Into Democratic Coalition; But
Gore’s Base Kept Contest Competitive,” Washington Post, November 8,
2000; Marjorie Connelly, “Who Voted: A Portrait of American Politics,
1976–2000,” New York Times, November 12, 2000.
13. On voter irregularities in Florida, see Mireya Navarro and Somini
Sengupta, “Arriving at Florida Voting Places, Some Blacks Found
Frustration,” New York Times, November 30, 2000; Ford Fessenden,
“No-Vote Rates Higher in Punch-Card Counts,” New York Times,
December 1, 2000; John Mintz and Dan Keating, “Fla. Ballot Spoilage
Likelier for Blacks; Voting Machines, Confusion Cited,” Washington
Post, December 3, 2000; Dan Keating, “Fla. ‘Overvotes’ Hit Democrats
the Hardest,” Washington Post, January 27, 2001; Joel Engelhardt and
Scott McCabe, “Under-Votes Could Have Meant Victory For Gore,”
Notes 173
Palm Beach Post, March 10, 2001; Joel Engelhardt and Scott McCabe,
“Over-Votes Costs Gore the Election in Florida,” Palm Beach Post,
March 11, 2001.
14. For discussion see Linda Greenhouse, “Bush Had Sought Stay—Hearing
is Tomorrow,” New York Times, December 10, 2000.
15. Stevens’ dissenting opinion may be found at: http://www.law.cornell.
edu/supct/pdf/00–949P.ZD.
16. Ronald Brownstein, “Bush Has Legitimacy, But It’s Fragile,” Los
Angeles Times, December 17, 2000; Janet Elder, “Poll Shows Americans
Divided Over Election,” New York Times, December 19, 2000; Richard
Morin and Claudia Deane, “Public Backs Uniform U.S. Voting Rules,”
Washington Post, December 18, 2000.
17. Thomas Edsall, Building Red America: The New Conservative Coalition
and the Drive for Permanent Power, New York: Basic Books, 2006,
p. 50.
18. On Whitman, Chavez, and Norton, see Doug Ireland, “Whitman: A
Toxic Choice,” David Moberg, “Labor’s Fight Has Just Begun,” and
David Helvarg, “The Three Horsemen,” all in The Nation, January 29,
2009, pp. 18, 12, and 19–20. Doug Kendall, “Gale Norton is No James
Watt; She’s Even Worse,” Los Angeles Times, January 9, 2001.
19. On Rumsfeld, see William D. Hartung, “Rumsfeld Reconsidered: An
Ideologue in Moderate’s Clothing,” Foreign Policy in Focus, January 1,
2001: http://fpif.org/rumsfeld_reconsidered_an_ideologue_in_moder-
ates_clothing; Michael T. Klare, “Rumsfeld: Star Warrior Returns,” The
Nation, January 29, 2001, pp. 14–19; Jason Vest, “Darth Rumsfeld,”
American Prospect, February 26, 2001, pp. 20–23.
20. Falwell quoted in Mike Allen, “Bush’s Choices Defy Talk of Conciliation;
Cabinet is Diverse but Not Politically,” Washington Post, December 31,
2000. On Ashcroft, see Ed Vulliamy, “Unrepentant South Mounts
New Assault on Washington,” Observer (UK), January 14, 200; Joshua
Green, “How Ashcroft Happened,” American Prospect, February 26,
2001, pp. 16–17.
21. Dana Milbank, “Religious Right Finds Its Center in Oval Office,”
Washington Post, December 24, 2001.
22. See Jonathan Freedland, “Big Business, Not Religion, is the Real Power
in the White House,” Guardian (UK), June 7, 2006. Mark A. Peterson
argues, “Bush’s White House and his administration throughout the
executive branch have promoted—I would posit more than any pre-
vious presidency—relationships with a consistently narrow band of
like-minded interests for the singular purpose of prosecuting an unusu-
ally ideologically-focused policy agenda.” Mark A. Peterson, “Still a
Government of Chums: Bush, Business, and Organized Interests,” in
The George W. Bush Legacy, ed. Colin Campbell, Bert A. Rockman,
and Andrew Rudalevige, Washington: CQ Press, 2008, p. 288.
174 Notes
23. Julian Borger, “All the President’s Businessmen,” Guardian (UK), April
26, 2001.
24. Dan Morgan and Kathleen Day, “Early Wins Embolden Lobbyists for
Business,” Washington Post, March 11, 2001. The Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act did not become law until
2005.
25. Thomas B. Edsall, “In Bush’s Policies, Business Wins,” Washington
Post, February 8, 2004.
26. Quotes in Sam Parry, “‘Real Men’ Don’t Conserve,” ConsortiumNews,
May 15, 2001.
27. In the 1990s Cheney served as chairman and CEO of the Halliburton
Co., an oilfield services company. On the task force’s consultation with
industry, see Dana Milbank and Justin Blum, “Document Says Oil Chiefs
Met With Cheney Task Force,” Washington Post, November 16, 2005;
Michael Abramowitz and Steven Mufson, “Papers Detailed Industry’s
Role in Cheney’s Energy Report,” Washington Post, July 18, 2007.
28. Quoted in Don Van Natta, Jr. and Neela Banerjee, “Bush’s Policies Have
Been Good to Energy Industry,” New York Times, April 21, 2002.
29. The bill did not allow for drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.
For an analysis of Bush’s energy policies, see Meg Jacobs, “Wreaking
Havoc from Within: George W. Bush’s Energy Policies in Historical
Perspective,” in The Presidency of George W. Bush: A First Historical
Assessment, ed. Julian E. Zelizer, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2010, pp. 139–168.
30. “In Climate Denial, Again,” New York Times, October 17, 2010.
31. “The Medicare Drug War,” Washington: Public Citizen, June 2004:
ht tp: //w w w.citi zen.org /docu ments / Medicare _ Dr ug _War%20 _
Report_2004.pdf.
32. Olga Pierce, “Medicare Drug Planners Now Lobbyists, With Billions
at Stake,” ProPublica, October 29, 2009: http://www.propublica.
org/article/medicare-drug-planners-now-lobbyists-with-billions-at-
stake-1020 On the strong-arm tactics used to win passage, see Common
Cause, “Democracy on Drugs: How a Bill Really Becomes a Law,” in
Voices of Dissent: Critical Readings in American Politics, eds. William
F. Grover and Joseph G. Peschek, 9th ed., New York: Pearson, 2013,
pp. 192–199.
33. Janet Hook, “They Invested Years in Private Accounts,” Los Angeles
Times, January 30, 2005. For a historical analysis see Nelson Lichtenstein,
“Ideology and Interest on the Social Policy Home Front,” in The
Presidency of George W. Bush: A First Historical Assessment, ed. Julian
E. Zelizer, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010, pp. 187–193.
34. Address to a joint session of Congress, February 27, 2001.
35. “Overview Assessment of President Bush’s Tax Proposal,” Washington:
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, revised February 14, 2001.
Notes 175
36. Testimony of January 25, 2001: http://www.federalreserve.gov/

BoardDocs/Testimony/2001/20010125/default.htm For discussion, see
Richard W. Stevenson, “Did Greenspan Drop Nonpartisan Stance?”
New York Times, January 27, 2001; Jeff Madrick, Age of Greed: The
Triumph of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 to the Present,
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011, p. 243.
37. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2001, which ended on September 30, the federal
budget had a surplus of $127 billion. Deficits then returned, reaching
$158 billion in FY 2002, $378 billion in FY 2004, and $413 billion for
FY 2004.
38. Quoted in Paul Krugman, “Hitting the Trifecta,” New York Times,
December 7, 2001.
39. Richard W. Stevenson, “Bush Unveils Plan to Cut Tax Rates and Spur
Economy,” New York Times, January 8, 2003; Robert Kuttner, “Bush’s
Titanic Tax Deceptions,” Boston Globe, January 8, 2003.
40. Kevin Phillips, “A Tax Cut Rooted in the Bush Pedigree,” Los Angeles
Times, January 12, 2003.
41. “Excerpts From Bush’s Speech on His Proposal to Stimulate the
Economy,” New York Times, January 8, 2003. For reaction, see Richard
W. Stevenson and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Bush Says His Tax Proposal
Will Be Fair for All Incomes,” New York Times, January 10, 2003.
42. Hendrik Hertzberg, “Dividends,” New Yorker, January 20, 2003.
43. Robert Greenstein, Richard Kogan, and Joel Friedman, “New Tax Cut
Law Uses Gimmicks to Mask Costs; Ultimate Price Tag Likely to be
$800 Billion to $1 Trillion,” Washington: Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, revised June 1, 2003.
44. For an overview, see John Maggs, “Winners and Losers in the Bush
Economy,” National Journal, May 15, 2004, pp. 1494–1501.
45. Paul Krugman, “Our So-Called Boom,” New York Times, December
30, 2003.
46. Jonathan Weisman, “Recovery Trickles Down Very Slowly, Washington
Post, January 16, 2004.
47. Isaac Shapiro and David Kamin, “Share of Economy Going to Wages and
Salaries Drops for Unprecedented 14th Straight Quarter,” Washington:
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, October 29, 2004.
48. Jacob Hacker, “Call It the Family Risk Factor,” New York Times,
January 11, 2004.
49. Edmund L. Andrews, “Budget Office Forecasts Record Deficit in ‘04,”
New York Times, January 27, 2004.
50. Robert Greenstein and Richard Kogan, “Analysis of the President’s
Budget,” Washington: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, revised
5 March 2004. The budget deficit for fiscal year 2005 came down to
$318 and continued to decline for the next two years, reaching a $161
billion deficit in fiscal year 2007. With the onset of the recession in late
2007, the fiscal year 2008 deficit was $455 billion. The deficit for fiscal
176 Notes
year 2009 skyrocketed to over $1.4 trillion. Fiscal year 2009 began on
October 1, 2008, overlapping Bush’s last several months in office, which
saw the intensification of the effects of the September financial crisis.
51. Nick Beams, “U.S. Trade Gap Highlights Rising Debt Burden,” World
Socialist Web Site, March 15, 2004. January 12, 2004; Sherle R.
Schwenninger, “America’s ‘Suez Moment’,” Atlantic Monthly, January-
February 2004, pp. 129–130.
52. Robin Toner and Janet Elder, “Poll Bolsters Bush on Terrorism But Finds
Doubts on Economy,” New York Times, January 18, 2004.
53. Richard Morin and Dana Milbank, “Support for Bush Falls on Economy
and Iraq,” Washington Post, March 6, 2004.
54. John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira, “Movement Interruptus,” American
Prospect, January 2005, p. 27.
55. The survey was conducted by the University of Maryland’s Program on
International Policy Attitudes (PIPA). For a summary of the findings, see
Jim Lobe, “Bush Backers Steadfast on Saddam-al Qaeda, WMD,” Inter
Press Service, October 21, 2004.
56. Ronald Brownstein, “GOP’s Future Sits Precariously on Small Cushion
of Victory,” Los Angeles Times, November 15, 2004.
57. Adam Nagourney and Janet Elder, “Americans Show Clear Concerns on
Bush Agenda,” New York Times, November 23, 2004.
58. Michael A. Fletcher, “Poverty Rate Held Steady Last Year, Census Says,”
Washington Post, August 27, 2008. Arloc Sherman, Robert Greenstein,
and Sharon Parrott, “Poverty and Share of Americans Without Health
Insurance were Higher in 2007—and Median Income for Working-
Age Households was Lower—Than at Bottom of Last Recession,”
Washington: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, August 26, 2008.
59. Chye-Ching Huang and Chad Stone, “Average Income in 2006 Up
$60,000 for Top 1 Percent of Households, Just $430 for Bottom 90
Percent,” Washington: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Revised
October 22, 2008.
60. Jared Bernstein, “Median Income Rose as Did Poverty in 2007,”
Washington: Economic Policy Institute, August 26, 2008.
61. Elise Gould, “Overall Health Insurance Coverage Rises, But Masks
Decline in Private Coverage,” Washington: Economic Policy Institute,
August 26, 2008.
62. Tara Siegel Bernard and Jenny Anderson, “Downturn Drags More
Consumers Into Bankruptcy,” New York Times, November 16, 2008;
Steven Greenhouse, “Will the Safety Net Catch Economy’s Casualties,”
New York Times, November 16, 2008.
63. Josh Bivens and John Irons, “A Feeble Recovery: The Fundamental
Economic Weaknesses of the 2001–07 Expansion,” Washington:
Economic Policy Institute, December 9, 2008.
64. Peter S. Goodman, “Economy Shrinks With Consumers Leading the
Way,” New York Times, October 31, 2008.
Notes 177
65. Louis Uchitelle, “Spending Stalls, and Businesses Slash U.S. Jobs,” New
York Times, October 26, 2008; Peter S. Goodman, “Jobless Rate at
14-Year High After October Losses,” New York Times, November 8,
2008.
66. Louis Uchitelle, Edmund L. Andrews, and Stephen Labaton, “U.S. Loses
533,000 Jobs in Biggest Drop Since 1974,” New York Times, December
6, 2008; David Leonhardt and Catherine Rampell, “Grim Job Report
Not Showing Full Picture,” New York Times, December 6, 2008.
67. Ronald Brownstein, “Closing the Book on the Bush Legacy,” Atlantic
Monthly (online), September 11, 2009: http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2009/09/closing-the-book-on-the-bush-legacy/26402/
68. Quoted in Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Robert Pear, “Bush Speaks in Defense
of Markets,” New York Times, November 13, 2008.
69. Matthew Benjamin, “Americans See Widening Rich-Poor Income Gap
as Cause for Alarm,” Bloomberg News, December 12, 2006.
70. Nell Henderson, “Bernanke Urges Reduction of Income Inequality,”
Washington Post, February 6, 2007.
71. Quoted in Richard L. Berke, “This Time, More Accord Than Discord,”
New York Times, October 12, 2000.
72. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
September 2002. Online: http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/63562.pdf
73. Rahul Mahajan, Full Spectrum Dominance: U.S. Power in Iraq and
Beyond, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003, pp. 112–113.
74. Hendrik Hertzberg, “Manifesto,” New Yorker, October 14–21, 2002.
75. For a text: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/
09/20010911-16.html.
76. Quoted in Walter LaFeber, “The Bush Doctrine,” Diplomatic History,
26, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 550.
09/20010920-8.html.
01/20020129-11.html.
06/20020601-3.html.
80. All quotes from Niall Ferguson, “Hegemony or Empire?” Foreign
Affairs, September-October 2003, p. 155.
81. Quoted in William Pfaff, “Look Who’s Part of the Harsh Disorder,”
International Herald Tribune, August 1, 2002.
82. Quoted in ibid.
83. Quoted in Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “Burden of Power is
Having to Wield It,” Washington Post, March 19, 2000.
84. Max Boot, “The Case for American Empire,” Weekly Standard, October
15, 2001.
178 Notes
85. Max Boot, “American Imperialism? No Need to Run Away From Label,”
USA Today, May 5, 2003.
86. Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global
Dominance New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003, pp. 13, 14.
87. Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of
U.S. Diplomacy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 3.
88. Ibid., pp. 142, 229.
89. Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans
Are Seduced By War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005,
pp. 4–5.
90. Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American
Nationalism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
91. Anatol Lieven, “Bush’s Choice: Messianism or Pragmatism?” open-
Democracy.net, February 22, 2005, p. 3. On the American national
destiny, see William Pfaff, “American Destiny,” Commonweal, May 17,
2002, pp. 13–17.
92. Paul T. McCartney, “American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy
from September 11 to the Iraq War,” Political Science Quarterly, 119,
no. 3, Fall 2004, p. 401.
93. Conn Hallinan, “The Cross of Iron,” Silver City, NM &Washington,
DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, December 19, 2003; Andre Verloy and
Daniel Politi, “Advisors of Influence: Nine Members of the Defense
Policy Board Have Ties to Defense Contractors,” Washington: Center
for Public Integrity, March 28, 2003.
94. Paul Rogers, “It’s the Oil, Stupid,” openDemocracy.net, March 24,
2005.
95. Michael T. Klare, “The Carter Doctrine Goes Global,” The Progressive,
December 2004, pp. 17–21; Klare, “The New Geopolitics,” Monthly
Review, July–August 2003, pp. 51–56. For a full development of
this analysis, see Michael T. Klare, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and
Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency on Imported
Petroleum, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004.
96. See Jason A. Vest, “The Men From JINSA and CSP,” The Nation,
September 2–9, 2002, pp. 16–20; Tom Barry and Jim Lobe, “The Men
Who Stole the Show,” Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign
Policy In Focus, October 2002; Jim Lobe, “All in the Neocon Family,”
AlterNet.org, March27, 2003; John Patrick Diggins, “The Ism That
Failed,” American Prospect, December 2003, pp. 22–27; and Michael
Lind, “A Tragedy of Errors,” The Nation, February 23, 2004, pp. 23–32;
Martin Durham, “The American Right and the Iraq War,” Political
Quarterly, 75, no. 3, July 2004, pp. 257–265.
97. For discussion, see Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Calls for Insuring No
Rivals Develop: A One-Superpower World,” New York Times, March
8, 1992; David Armstrong, “Dick Cheney’s Song of America,” Harper’s
Magazine, October 2002, pp. 76–83; Jim Lobe, “The Anniversary of a
Neo-Imperial Moment,” AlterNet.org, September 12, 2002.
Notes 179
98. The text may be found online at: http://web.archive.org/web/20070810-

113753/www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm
99. The text may be found online at: http://www.informationclearing-
house.info/pdf/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf
100. Chalmers Johnson, “Agenda Unmasked: Deposing Hussein Was
a Distant Dream for Administration Officials—Until 9/11,” Los
Angeles Times, January 12, 2003; Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of
Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, New York:
Metropolitan Books, 2004, pp. 228–229.
101. The text may be found online at: http://web.archive.org/
web/20070807153905/www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm
102. The development of the foreign policy views of Bush’s national security
team is examined in detail by James Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans:
The History of Bush’s War Cabinet, New York: Viking, 2004.
103. David Domke and Kevin Coe, “Bush, God, and State of Union,”
CommonDreams.org, January 29, 2005; David Domke, God Willing?
Political Fundamentalism in the White House, the “War on Terror,”
and the Echoing Press, London: Pluto Press, 2004; Chip Berlet and
Nikhil Aziz, “Culture, Religion, Apocalypse, and Middle East Foreign
Policy,” IRC Right Web, Silver City, NM: Interhemispheric Resource
Center, December 5, 2003.
104. Kevin Phillips, American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the
Politics of Deceit in the House of Bush, New York: Viking, 2004,
p. 11.
105. Michael Lind, Made in Texas: George W. Bush and the Southern
Takeover of American Politics, New York: Basic Books, 2003, pp. 143–
158; Ken Silverstein and Michael Scherer, “Born-Again Zionists,”
Mother Jones, September-October 2002, pp. 56–61; Bill Berkowitz,
“Religious Right Relishing Road Map’s Collapse,” workingforchange.
com, November 21, 2003.
106. Quoted in Paul Rogers, “Christian Zionists and Neocons: A Heavenly
Marriage,” openDemocracy.net, February 3, 2005, p. 2.
107. Anatol Lieven, “The Push For War,” London Review of Books,
October 3, 2002, p. 10.
108. Duane Oldfield, “The Evangelical Roots of American Unilateralism:
The Christian Right’s Influence and How to Counter It,” Foreign Policy
In Focus, Silver City, NM: Interhemispheric Resource Center, March
2004.
109. For a review of the systematically misleading statements on Iraq by mem-
bers of the Bush administration, see James P. Pfiffner, “Did President
Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War With Iraq?”
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 34, no. 1, March 2004, pp. 25–46.
110. Sidney Blumenthal, “There Was No Failure of Intelligence,” Guardian
(UK), February 5, 2004; Scott Ritter, “Not Everyone Got It Wrong on
Iraq’s Weapons,” International Herald Tribune, February 6, 2004.
180 Notes
111. Quoted in David S. Cloud and Mark Mazzetti, “Pentagon Group

Criticized for Prewar Intelligence Analysis,” New York Times, February
9, 2007.
112. Klare, Blood and Oil, p. 82. One of the best explorations of the rela-
tionship between oil interests, broadly defined, and the Iraq War is
by Michael Schwartz, War without End: The Iraq War in Context,
Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2008, Chs 1–4.
113. Andrew J. Bacevich, “Iraq Panel’s Real Agenda: Damage Control,”
Christian Science Monitor, November 28, 2006.
114. Glenn Kessler and Thomas E. Ricks, “The Realists’ Repudiation of
Policies for a War, Region,” Washington Post, December 7, 2006;
David E. Sanger, “Panel Urges Basic Shift in U.S. Policy in Iraq,” New
York Times, December 7, 2006.
115. Peter Baker and Robin Wright, “Bush Appears Cool to Key Points of
Report on Iraq,” Washington Post, December 8, 2006; Farah Stockman,
“Bush Faults Panel Ideas, Calls Victory in Iraq Vital,” Boston Globe,
December 8, 2006; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Bush Asserts That Victory
in Iraq is Still ‘Achievable’,” New York Times, December 21, 2006.
Cheney is quoted in Peter Baker, Days of Fire: Bush and Cheney in the
White House, New York: Doubleday, 2013, p. 514.
116. Michael Abamowitz and Robin Wright, “Bush to Add 21,500 Troops
in an Effort to Stabilize Iraq,” Washington Post, January 11, 2007;
David E. Sanger, “Bush Adds Troops in Bid to Secure Iraq,” New York
117. On right wing reaction to the Iraq Study Group report and to Bush’s
proposed surge, see John M. Broder and Robin Toner, “Report on Iraq
Exposes a Divide Within the G.O.P.,” New York Times, December
10, 2006; Michael Abamowitz and Robin Wright, “Hawks Bolster
Skeptical President,” Washington Post, December 10, 2006; Jim Lobe,
“The Urge to Surge,” Inter Press Service,” December 20, 2006; Jim
Lobe, “Bush’s Surge Strategy Faces Heavy Opposition,” Inter Press
Service, January 5, 2007.
118. Juan Cole, “Top Ten Myths About Iraq, 2008,” Informed Comment,
December 26, 2008. Available online at: http://www.juancole.
com/2008/12/top-ten-myths-about-iraq-2008.html; See Robert Parry,
“Reviving the ‘Successful Surge’ Myth,” ConsortiumNews, June 19,
2014.
119. For a text: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases
/2008/12/20081209-3.html
120. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., “Imperial Presidency,” Encyclopedia of the
American Presidency, edited by Leonard W. Levy and Louis Fisher,
New York: Simon and Schuster Macmillan, 1994, p. 798.
121. From an interview with David Frost. Quoted in James M. Naughton,
“Nixon Says President Can Order Illegal Actions Against Dissidents,”
New York Times, May 19, 1977.
Notes 181
122. Dahlia Lithwick, “The Imperial Presidency,” Washington Post, January

14, 2007; Editorial, “The Imperial Presidency at Work,” New York
123. Jennifer Van Bergen, “The ‘Unitary Executive’ and the Threat to
Democratic Government,” in Voices of Dissent: Critical Readings in
American Politics, eds. William F. Grover and Joseph G. Peschek, 8th
ed., New York: Pearson Longman, 2010, pp. 253–260.
124. Ron Suskind, “Without a Doubt,” New York Times Magazine, October
17, 2004, p. 51. The aide is widely thought to have been Karl Rove.
125. Elizabeth Drew, “Power Grab,” New York Review of Books, June 22,
2006.
126. Garrett Epps, “The ‘Unitary Executive’ Is a Dictator in War and
Peace,” Atlantic Monthly (online), June 9, 2011: http://www.theatlan-
tic.com/national/archive/2011/06/constitutional-myth-3-the-unitary-
executive-is-a-dictator-in-war-and-peace/239627/
127. Yoo’s memo of September 25, 2001, may be found online at: http://fas.
org/irp/agency/doj/olc092501.html
128. Charlie Savage, “Bush Signings Called Effort to Expand Power,” Boston
Globe, October 5, 2006; See also Charlie Savage, “Bush Challenges
Hundreds of Laws,” Boston Globe, April 30, 2006.
129. The best study of these practices and their relationship to the
Constitution is James Pfiffner, Power Play: The Bush Presidency and
the Constitution, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008.
130. Glenn Greenwald, “What Illegal ‘Things’ Was the Government Doing
in 2001–2004?” Salon.com, September 15, 2008.
131. Robert Parry, “Cheney’s Contempt for the Republic,” Consortium
News, December 23, 2008.
132. Greg Miller, “Cheney Was Key in Clearing CIA Interrogation Tactics,”
Los Angeles Times, December 16, 2008; Joby Warrick, “CIA Tactics
Endorsed in Secret Memos,” Washington Post, October 15, 2008.
133. Joby Warrick and Karen DeYoung, “Report on Detainees Abuse Blames
Top Bush Officials,” Washington Post, December 12, 2008; Editorial,
“The Torture Report,” New York Times, December 18, 2008.
134. Cheney quoted in Elisabeth Bumiller, “Enron’s Many Strands: The Vice
President; Cheney Is Set to Battle Congress to Keep His Enron Talks
Secret,” New York Times, January 28, 2002. On Cheney and presi-
dential power, see Charlie Savage, “Hail to the Chief: Dick Cheney’s
Mission to Expand—or ‘Restore’—the Powers of the Presidency,”
Boston Globe, November 26, 2006. “Cheney believed the president’s
inherent functions—command of the Army and Navy, direction of the
Cabinet, execution of the law—were indivisible. Exercise of those pow-
ers was beyond the reach, in principle, of legislative or judicial review.”
Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency, New York:
Penguin, 2008, p. 96.
182 Notes
135. Quoted in Joel K. Goldstein, “Cheney, Vice Presidential Power, and

the War on Terror,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 40, no. 1, March
2010, p. 115. On what the “dark side” actually involved, see the reveal-
ing account by Jane Mayer, The Dark Side, New York: Random House,
2008.
136. Cheney quoted in Dahlia Lithwick, “Open and Shut Cases,” Slate.com,
December 22, 2008.
137. Charles Lewis and Mark Reading-Smith, “Iraq: The War Card,”
Washington, Center for Public Integrity, January 23, 2008. Available
online at: http://www.publicintegrity.org/politics/white-house/iraq-
war-card On the Bush administration’s flawed decision-making pro-
cesses, see James P. Pfiffner, “Decision Making in the Bush White
House, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 39, no. 2, June 2009, pp. 363–
384. Pfiffner concludes, “The pattern that emerges . . . is one of secrecy,
top-down control, tightly held information, disregard for the judgments
of career professionals and the exclusion from deliberation of qualified
executive branch experts who might have disagreed with those who
initially framed the decisions.” p. 380.
138. Quoted in Robert Parry, “Bush Still Lies About Iraqi Inspections,”
ConsortiumNews, December 2, 2008.
5 Change You Can Believe In?

The Barack Obama Presidency
1. Quoted in David Moberg, “Obamanomics,” In These Times, April
2008.
2. Paul Krugman, “The Obama Agenda,” New York Times, June 30,
2008.
3. Quoted in Jeff Cohen, “Obama is NOT ‘Caving’ to Corporate Interests,”
CommonDreams.org, July 24, 2011: http://www.commondreams.org/
view/2011/07/24
4. David Moberg, “Moving Obama Left,” In These Times, September
2008.
5. Stephen Zunes, “Biden, Iraq, and Obama’s Betrayal,” Foreign Policy in
Focus, August 24, 2008: http://fpif.org/fpiftxt/5492
6. Rick Perlstein, “All Aboard the McCain Express,” The Nation, April
21, 2008; David Moberg, “Dismantling the Myth of McCain,” In
These Times, July 2008.
7. Jon Cohen and Dan Balz, “In Poll, McCain Closes the Gap with Obama;
White Women’s Shift Helps GOP,” Washington Post, September 9,
2008.
8. Jackie Calmes, “From 2 Rivals, 2 Prescriptions,” New York Times,
October 15, 2008.
Notes 183
9. Dan Balz and Jon Cohen, “Economic Fears Give Obama Clear Lead
Over McCain in Poll,” Washington Post, September 24, 2008.
10. Stephen Zunes, “Khalidi: The Republicans Latest Smear Against
Obama,” AlterNet, November 1, 2008.
11. Quoted in Michael Cooper, “Palin, on Offensive, Attacks Obama’s
Ties to ’60s Radical,” New York Times, October 5, 2008. For analy-
sis, see Stephen Zunes, “The Republicans Embrace the Cootie Effect,”
CommonDreams.org, October 20, 2008.
12. John F. Harris and Jim VandeHei, “The Obama Revolution,” Politico,
November 5, 2008.
13. McCain and Palin quoted in Dahlia Lithwick, “Nuts about ACORN,”
Slate.com, October 16, 2008.
14. Quoted in Lithwick, “Nuts about ACORN.”
15. David Morris, “Voter Fraud? No, Voter Suppression,” Star Tribune
(Minneapolis), October 29, 2008.
16. Quoted in Ali Gharib, “Much Ado about ACORN,” Inter Press Service,
October 17, 2008.
17. Dean Baker, Plunder and Blunder: Recovering from the Bubble
Economy, Sausalito, CA: PoliPointPress, 2010, p. 30; Daniel Gross,
“Subprime Suspects,” Slate.com, October 7, 2008.
18. Hendrik Hertzberg, “Like, Socialism,” New Yorker, November 3,
2008.
19. Quoted in Michael Lind, “Is Barack Obama a Socialist,” Salon.com,
November 1, 2008.
20. Quoted in Balz and Barnes, “Economy Becomes New Proving Ground
for McCain, Obama,” Washington Post, September 16, 2008.
21. Mike Allen, “Obama May Scale Back Promises,” Politico, September
23, 2008.
22. Mike Glover, “Obama: McCain Has Had ‘An Election Year Conversion’
on Economy,” Huffington Post, September 22, 2008; Scott Helman,
“Obama Broadens Economic Assault on Rival’s Proposals,” Boston
Globe, September 23, 2008.
23. “Examining the Candidates,” The Economist, October 4, 2010,
pp. 29–30.
24. Jackie Calmes and Megan Thee, “Voter Polls Find Obama Built a Broad
Coalition,” New York Times, November 5, 2008.
25. David Paul Kuhn, “Exit Polls: How Obama Won,” Politico, November
5, 2008.
26. United States Election Project, “2008 General Election Turnout Rates,”
December 13, 2008: http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2008G.html
27. “Bush and Public Opinion,” Pew Research Center for the People and
the Press, December 18, 2008: http://people-press.org/report/478/bush-
legacy-public-opinion
28. “Inside Obama’s Sweeping Victory,” Pew Research Center for the People
and the Press, November 5, 2008: http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1023/
exit-poll-analysis-2008
184 Notes
29. Ibid.
30. David Paul Kuhn, “Exit Polls: How Obama Won,” Politico, November
5, 2008.
31. Jackie Calmes and Megan Thee, “Voter Polls Find Obama Built a Broad
Coalition,” New York Times, November 5, 2008.
32. Quoted in Joshua Holland, “America Is a Center-Left Country No
Matter How Much the Corporate Media Say Otherwise,” AlterNet,
November 10, 2008.
33. Quoted in John B. Judis, “America the Liberal,” New Republic,
November 19, 2008.
34. Timothy A. Canova, “Legacy of the Clinton Bubble,” Dissent, Summer
2008, p. 41.
35. Neoliberalism, financialization, and globalization are connected to sys-
temic contradictions of the capitalist political economy by John Bellamy
Foster and Robert W. McChesney, “Listen Keynesians, It’s the System!”
Monthly Review, April 2010. See also John B. Judis, “Stop Blaming
Wall Street,” New Republic, August 4, 2011, pp. 8–11.
36. This section draws on Joseph G. Peschek, “The Obama Presidency and
the Great Recession: Political Economy, Ideology, and Public Policy,”
New Political Science, 33, no. 4, December 2011, pp. 429–444.
37. Jo Becker and Christopher Drew, “Pragmatic Politics, Forged on the
South Side,” New York Times, May 11, 2008; Thomas Sugrue, Not
Even Past: Barack Obama and the Burden of Race, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2010, pp. 43–46.
38. Ken Silverstein, “Barack Obama Inc” Harper’s Magazine, November
2006, p. 33.
39. Larissa MacFarquhar, “The Conciliator,” New Yorker, May 7, 2007.
40. David Leonhardt, “A Free-Market Loving, Big-Spending, Fiscally
Conservative, Wealth Redistributionist,” New York Times Magazine,
August 24, 2008, pp. 31–32. See also Naomi Klein, “Obama’s Chicago
Boys,” The Nation, June 30, 2008, p. 9.
41. G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? The Triumph of the
Corporate Rich, New York: McGraw Hill, 2014, p. 155.
42. Michael Luo and Christopher Drew, “Big Donors, Too, Have Seats at
Obama Fund-Raising Table,” New York Times, August 6, 2008.
43. Michael Luo, “Study: Many Obama Small Donors Really Weren’t,” New
York Times, November 24, 2008; “Reality Check: Obama Received
About the Same Percentage from Small Donors in 2008 as Bush in 2004,”
Campaign Finance Institute, November 24, 2008: http://www.cfinst.
org/Press/PReleases/08-11-24/Realty_Check_-_Obama_Small_Donors.
aspx
44. Jeff Zeleny, “Obama and Bush Working to Calm Volatile Market,”
New York Times, November 24, 2008; Jackie Calmes, “Rubinomics
Recalculated,” New York Times, November 24, 2008; “So Far, So Good,”
The Economist, November 29, 2008, p. 14; “Off to Work They Go,” The
Notes 185
Economist, 29 November 2008, pp. 31–32; John Harwood, “’Partisan’

Seeks a Prefix: Bi- or Post,” New York Times, December 7, 2008.
45. Robert Kuttner, A Presidency in Peril, White River Junction, VT:
Chelsea Green, 2010, pp. 6–7. On Geithner, see Jo Becker and Gretchen
Morgenson, “Geithner, Member and Overseer of Financial Club,” New
York Times, April 27, 2009.
46. Quoted in Michael Lind, “Obama’s Populist Pose,” Salon.com, January
26, 2010.
47. Julianna Goldman and Ian Katz, “Obama Doesn’t ‘Begrudge’ Bonuses
for Blankfein, Dimon,” Bloomberg.com, February 10, 2010. For com-
mentary, see Paul Krugman, “Oh. My. God. Obama Clueless,” New
York Times, February 10, 2010.
48. Quoted in Steven Mufson and Anne E. Kornblut, “President Obama
Appeals to Business Leaders for Support of Administration Goals,”
Washington Post, February 25, 2010.
49. John B. Judis, “The Quiet Revolution,” New Republic, February 18,
2010, p. 15.
50. Mark Engler, “Hilda Solis: Protecting Workers, Not Corporations,” Yes!
Magazine, February 27, 2010; John B. Judis, “Labor and Delivery,” New
Republic, March 25, 2010, pp. 9–10; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Obama Bypasses
Senate Process, Filling 15 Posts,” New York Times, March 27, 2010.
51. In his sympathetic book on Obama’s intellectual influences, historian
James T. Kloppenberg asks, “Has [Obama] now been yanked by the
chains of power back from the commitment to economic democracy
proclaimed in The Audacity of Hope to the tepid economic centrism
of Democratic Party insiders since the 1980s? It is too soon to say, but
the early indications suggest there may be reason for concern.” James
T. Kloppenberg, Reading Obama: Dreams, Hope, and the American
Political Tradition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011,
pp. 190–191.
52. Domhoff, Who Rules America? p. xiii.
53. Michael Leachman, “New CBO Report Finds up to 3.6 Million People
Owe Their Jobs to the Recovery Act,” Washington: Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, November 29, 2010. For earlier progress reports
on ARRA, see David Leonhardt, “Judging Stimulus by Job Data
Reveals Success,” New York Times, February 17, 2010; David J. Lynch,
“Economists Agree: Stimulus Created Nearly Three Million Jobs,” USA
Today, August 30, 2010.
54. Sewell Chan, “In Study, 2 Economists Say Intervention Helped Avert a
2nd Depression,” New York Times, July 27, 2010.
55. Council of Economic Advisers, “The Economic Impact of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act Five Years Later,” Final Report to
Congress, February 2014: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/cea_arra_report.pdf
186 Notes
56. Dean Baker, “The US Needs Money, Not Time,” Guardian (UK), July
13, 2009.
57. During his campaign Brown claimed that the stimulus “didn’t create
one new job.” Quoted in David Leonhardt, “Judging Stimulus by Job
Data Reveals Success,” New York Times, February 17 2010; Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, “Obama and Republicans Clash Over Stimulus Bill, One Year
Later,” New York Times, February 18, 2010.
58. Christian E. Weller and Jackie Odum, “Economic Snapshot: June 2014,”
Washington: Center for American Progress, June 25, 2014. An extremely
favorable analysis of the stimulus bill and its effects is Michael Waldman,
The New New Deal: The Hidden Story of Change in the Obama Era,
New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012.
59. Paul N. Van de Water, “How Health Reform Helps Reduce the Deficit,”
Washington: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, May 10, 2010.
60. John B. Judis, “Democrats Discover Their Base,” New Republic (online),
March 21, 2010: http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/democrats-discover
-their-base
61. Quoted in Colleen M. Grogan, “You Call It Public, I Call It Private,
Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and
Law, 36, no. 3, June 2011, p. 401.
62. Jonathan Oberlander and Theodore Marmor, “The Health Bill Explained
at Last,” New York Review of Books, August 19, 2010, p. 61.
63. Jill Quadagno, “Interest Group Influence on the Patient Protection
and Affordability Act of 2010: Winners and Losers in the Health Care
Reform Debate,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law, 36, no. 3,
June 2011, pp. 449–450. Domhoff states that “the Obama admin-
istration’s proposal was very similar to, but more conservative than a
proposal put forth 37 years earlier by the corporate moderates in the
Committee for Economic Development.” Who Rules America? p. 185.
Marie Gottschalk argues, “The ACA is remarkably similar in spirit to the
controversial Medicare Part D prescription legislation pushed through
by the George W. Bush administration in 2003, which was based on fed-
eral subsidies and loosely regulated private insurance plans and which
imposed no serious cost controls on the pharmaceutical industry.” Marie
Gottschalk, “They’re Back: The Public Plan, the Reincarnation of Harry
and Louise, and the Limits of Obamacare,” Journal of Health Politics,
Policy, and Law, 36, no. 3, June 2011, p. 398.
64. Jonathan Cohn, “How They Did It,” New Republic, June 10, 2010,
pp. 14–25; Lawrence R. Jacobs and Theda Skocpol, Health Care Reform
and American Politics: What Everyone Needs to Know, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010, Chapter Two.
65. John Harwood, “The Lobbying Web,” New York Times, August 2,
2009; Robert Pear, “In House, Many Spoke With One Voice: Lobbyists,”
New York Times, November 15, 2009; Dan Eggen, “How Interest
Notes 187
Groups Behind Health-Care Legislation are Financed is Often Unclear,”

Washington Post, January 7, 2010.
66. Kevin Young and Michael Schwartz, “Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise: How
Corporate Power Shaped the Affordable Care Act,” New Labor Forum,
23, no. 2, May 2014, pp. 31–40.
67. Jacob S. Hacker, “The Road to Somewhere: Why Health Care Happened,”
Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 3, September 2010, p. 865.
68. Young and Schwartz, “Healthy Wealthy, and Wise,” pp. 35–36.
69. Lind, “Obama’s Populist Pose”; Matt Taibbi, “Obama’s Big Sellout,”
Rolling Stone, December 10, 2009.
70. Joseph Stiglitz, “Obama’s Banking Proposals Are a Good First Step,” Los
Angeles Times, January 29, 2010; Jacklie Calmes and Louis Uchitelle,
“Obama Will Seek Limits on Banks,” New York Times, January 21,
2010; Eli Clifton, “Obama Unveils Broad Banking Industry Reforms,
Inter Press Service,” January 25, 2010.
71. Eric Lichtbau and Edward Wyatt, “Pro-Business Lobbying Takes
on Obama’s Plan for Wall Street Overhaul,” New York Times,
March 28, 2010.
72. Edward Wyatt and David M. Herszenhorn, “In Deal, New Authority
Over Wall Street,” New York Times, June 25, 2010. Bair quoted in
Nathaniel Popper and Walter Hamilton, “Financial Reform Package
Wouldn’t Change Wall Street Much,” Los Angeles Times, June 26, 2010.
See also, Shahien Nasiripour, “Wall Street Smiles as Softened Financial
Reform Bill Passes,” Huffington Post, June 25, 2010.
73. Robert Reich, “The New Finance Bill: A Mountain of Legislative Paper, a
Molehill of Reform,” Huffington Post, July 16, 2010. See also, Binyamin
Appelbaum, “On Finance Bill, Lobbying Shifts to Regulators,” New
York Times, June 26, 2010; Jeff Madrick, “Obama’s Risky Business,”
New York Review of Books blog, July 15, 2010: http://www.nybooks.
com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/jul/15/obamas-risky-business/
74. Robert Pollin, “Fighting for Wall Street Regulation: Who Said It Was
Easy,” New Labor Forum, 22, no. 2, May 2013, p. 88.
75. Eric Lichtbau, “Lawmakers Regulate Banks, Then Flock to Them,”
New York Times, April 13, 2010; Edward Wyatt and Eric Lichtbau,
“A Finance Overhaul Fight Draws a Swarm of Lobbyists,” New York
Times, April 20, 2010; Eric Lichtbau and Edward Wyatt, “Financial
Overhaul Bill Poses Big Tests for Lobbyists,” New York Times, May
22, 2010.
76. John Bellamy Foster and Hannah Holleman, “The Financial Power
Elite,” Monthly Review, May 2010, pp. 9, 13.
77. Levin quoted in Gretchen Morgenson and Louise Story, “Naming
Culprits in the Financial Crisis,” New York Times, April 13, 2011;
Barry Grey, “Senate Report on Wall Street Crash: The Criminalization
of the American Ruling Class,” World Socialist Web Site, April 18,
2011.
188 Notes
78. “Media Misreading Midterms: As Usual, Press Urges a Move to the

Right,” Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, November 4, 2010: http://
www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/11/04-8; Jim Naureckas,
“Hoover Wins! Corporate Media Spin Mid-term Election as Victory
for Austerity,” Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, December 3, 2010:
http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/12/03-6
79. Christopher Phelps, “The Democrats’ Problem Was Not Overreach,”
Chronicle of Higher Education, November 14, 2010; Kevin Zeese,
“The Obama-Was-Anti-Business Myth,” Consortium News, February
10, 2011. Obama’s first-term battles with Republicans over economic
and budgetary policies are chronicled in Jonathan Alter, The Promise:
President Obama, Year One, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010
and Bob Woodward, The Price of Politics, New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2012.
80. Quoted in Jim Puzzanghera, “Business Gains a Friend: Congress,” Los
Angeles Times, November 4, 2010.
81. Quotes from Robert Scheer, “Obama Pulls a Clinton,” Truthdig, January
18, 2011.
82. Quoted in Abby Phillip and Chris Frates, “Barack Obama Urges
Chamber to Put U.S. First,” Politico, February 7, 2011.
83. Dean Baker, “The Progressive Case against Obama’s New Team,”
Huffington Post, January 11, 2011.
84. Andrew Fieldhouse, “President Obama’s 2012 Budget: An Analysis of
Tax Policies,” Washington: Economic Policy Institute, February 14,
2011. See also Rebecca Theiss, “President Obama’s 2012 Budget: An
Analysis of the Budget Cuts,” Washington: Economic Policy Institute,
February 14, 2011.
85. The 2013 State of the Union address may be found at: http://www.
whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2013/02/12/2013-state-union-
address-0#transcript Obama’s rebound in 2011 and 2012 is treated
in David Corn, Showdown: The Inside Story of How Obama Fought
Back Against, Boehner, Cantor, and the Tea Party, New York: William
Morrow, 2012, and Jonathan Alter, The Center Holds: Obama and His
Enemies, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013
86. Quoted in Jeremy W. Peters and Ashley Parker, “U.S. Budget Deal in Doubt;
Obama’s Trip to Hill Reveals Split,” New York Times, March 14, 2013.
87. “The CEO Campaign to ‘Fix’ the Debt: A Trojan Horse for Massive
Corporate Tax Breaks,” Washington: Institute for Policy Studies,
November 13, 2012; Robert Borosage, “Will Pete Peterson’s Half a
Billion Bucks Buy a New Recession?” Campaign for America’s Future
Blog, February 21, 2013: http://blog.ourfuture.org/20130221/95146
88. Robert Kuttner, “Grover Norquist’s Last Laugh,” American
Prospect, March 15, 2013: http://prospect.org/article/grover-
norquist%E2%80%99s-last-laugh For a more detailed critique of
Obama’s approach to economic and budgetary policy, see Robert
Notes 189
Kuttner, “The Sequestering of Barack Obama,” American Prospect,

February 26, 2013: http://prospect.org/article/sequestering-barack-
obama
89. The politics of austerity in Obama’s first term is reported in Noam
Scheiber, The Escape Artists: How Obama’s Team Fumbled the
Recovery, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012. A no-holds-barred
critique of austerity ideology is Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of
a Dangerous Idea, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
2013.
90. This section draws on Joseph G. Peschek, “The Obama Presidency and
the Politics of ‘Change’ in Foreign Policy,” New Political Science, 32,
no. 2, June 2010, pp. 272–278.
91. For an intelligent statement of this view, see Ian Shapiro, Containment:
Rebuilding a Strategy Against Global Terror, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2007. For Shapiro, the Bush Doctrine is “the Monroe
Doctrine on crack,” p. 18.
92. For discussion, see Melvyn P. Leffler, “Bush’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign
Policy, September-October 2004, pp. 22–28.
93. Numerous examples are provided in Vivek Chibber, “American
Militarism and the US Political Establishment: The Real Lessons of the
Invasion of Iraq,” Socialist Register 2009, edited by Leo Panitch and
Colin Leys, New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009, pp. 23–53.
94. Ibid., p. 26.
95. Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy
from 1940 to the Present, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006, p. 3.
96. Andrew J. Bacevich, “Americans Misperceive the World and Their
Role in Determining its Evolution,” Boston Review, January-February
2010, p. 17.
97. Stephen M. Walt, “Delusion Points,” Foreign Policy, November 8, 2010:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/08/delusion_points
98. Quoted in Gary Kamiya, “Why Obama Should End the ‘War on
Terror’,” Salon.com, November 25, 2008.
99. Space limitations demand that our treatment of Obama’s foreign and
national security policies be selective. On the Obama administration’s
opposition to left-leaning governments in Latin America, see Mark
Weisbrot, “Obama’s Latin America Policy: Continuity without Change,”
Washington: Center for Economic and Policy Research, updated
September 2013. For overviews see James Mann, The Obamians: The
Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, New
York: Penguin Books, 2012; David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal:
Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power, New
York: Crown Publishers, 2012.
100. In his December 1, 2009, address announcing his strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Obama stated, “For unlike the great pow-
ers of old, we have not sought world domination.” The text of Obama’s
190 Notes
speech may be found at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/

remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-
pakistan
101. For discussion, see John Feffer, “Obama’s First 100 Days: Foreign
Policy,” Foreign Policy in Focus, April 27, 2009; Phyllis Bennis,
“Changing the Discourse: First Step toward Changing the Policy?”
Foreign Policy in Focus, June 8, 2009.
102. Gilbert Achcar notes that Obama’s foreign policy approach “is actu-
ally much closer to Bush senior than was that of the latter’s own son”
and that it dovetails with several recommendations on diplomacy in
the Middle East of the 2006 Iraq Study Group that was co-chaired by
James Baker. Gilbert Achcar, “Obama’s Cairo Speech,” ZNet, June 6,
2009.
103. On these issues, see Richard M. Pious, “Prerogative Power in the Obama
Administration: Continuity and Change in the War on Terrorism,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly, June 2011, 41, no. 2, pp. 263–290;
Christopher H. Pyle, “Barack Obama and Civil Liberties,” Presidential
Studies Quarterly, 42, no. 4, December 2012, 867–880.
104. Robert Kagan, “Armed for Reality: The President’s Foreign Policy
Shift,” Washington Post, December 13, 2009; E. J. Dionne Jr., “Reality
Check From Oslo,” Washington Post, December 14, 2009; David
Brooks, “Obama’s Christian Realism,” New York Times, 15 December
15, 2009.
105. The text of Obama’s Oslo speech may be found at: http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-
nobel-peace-prize His comment to journalists is quoted in Jeff
Zeleny, “Obama Arrives in Oslo for Nobel Ceremony,” New York
Times, December 10, 2009. For a critique see Stephen M. Walt,
“Was Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize Really ‘Realist’,” Foreign Policy,
December 18, 2009: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/18/
was_obamas_nobel_peace_prize_speech_really_realist
106. Speech of May 28, 2014: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
of f i c e / 2 014 / 05/ 2 8 /r e m a rk s - p r e s id e nt-we s t- p o i nt- a c ad e my-
commencement-ceremony
107. Tom Engelhardt, “The Militarized Surrealism of Barack Obama,”
TomDispatch.com, June 30, 2011.
108. Quoted in Robert Parry, “Debate Evades Dark Realities,” Consortium
News, September 26, 2008.
109. Seamus Milne, “More US Bombs and Drones Will Only Escalate Iraq’s
Horror,” Guardian (UK), June 18, 2014.
110. Tom Engelhardt, “American Empire in the Year 2014: The Great
Concentration or the Great Fragmentation?” TomDispatch.com,
September 16, 2014.
111. See Louis Fisher, “Obama, Libya, and War Powers,” in The Obama
Presidency: A Preliminary Assessment, ed. Robert P. Watson, Jack
Notes 191
Covarrubias, Tom Lansford, and Douglas M. Brattebo, Albany: State

University of New York Press, 2012, pp. 297–311.
112. Jesse Franzblau, “Libya: A Cautionary Tale,” Foreign Policy in Focus,”
June 9, 2014.
113. See Eli Clifton, “Neo-Cons Get Warm and Fuzzy over ‘War President’,”
Inter Press Service, December 4, 2009. For the decision-making process
leading to the surge of troops into Afghanistan, see Bob Woodward,
Obama’s Wars, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010.
114. Speech of December 1, 2009.
115. Speech of December 1, 2009.
116. Andrew J. Bacevich, “Obama’s Folly,” Los Angeles Times, December
3, 2009.
117. R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Military Describes Its Mistakes in Afghanistan,”
Washington: Center for Public Integrity, May 6, 2014. On Obama’s
use of drone warfare for counter-terrorism purposes, see Greg Miller,
“Under Obama, a Deadly Drone Network Grows,” Washington Post,
December 28, 2011. For historical context, see Lloyd C. Gardner, Killing
Machine: The American Presidency in the Age of Drone Warfare, New
York: The New Press, 2013.
118. From an interview with Bill Moyers. See the transcript at: http://bill-
moyers.com/episode/full-show-chaos-in-iraq/
119. Jack Serle, “More than 2,400 Dead as Obama’s Drone Campaign
Marks Five Years,” Bureau of Investigative Journalism, January 24,
2014.
120. Quoted in Charlie Savage, “Court Releases Large Parts of Memo
Approving Killing of American in Yemen,” New York Times, June 23,
2014.
121. Peter Van Buren, “Dead is Dead: Drone-Killing the Fifth Amendment,”
TomDispatch.com, July 24, 2014.
122. Jeffrey M. Jones, “Improving National Outlook Key to Obama Victory
in 2012,” Gallup.com, November 8, 2012.
123. “Changing Face of America Helps Assure Obama Victory,” Pew
Research Center, November 7, 2012: Ruy Teixeira and John Halpin,
“The Return of the Obama Coalition.” Washington: Center for
American Progress, November 8, 2012; Emily Schultheis, “Exit Polls
2012: How President Obama Won,” Politico, November 7, 2012.
124. See Jim Lobe, “It Was the Demographics, Stupid.” Inter Press Service,
November 9, 2012; Mark Hugo Lopez and Paul Taylor, “Latino Voters
in the 2012 Election,” Pew Research Center, November 7, 2012;
Paul Taylor and D’Vera Cohn, “A Milestone En Route to a Majority
Minority Nation,” Pew Research Center, November 7, 2012.
125. Thomas B. Edsall, “Is Rush Limbaugh’s Country Gone?” New York
Times (online), November 18, 2012: http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.
com/2012/11/18/is-rush-limbaughs-country-gone/?ref=thomasbedsall;
“The 2012 Post-Election American Values Survey,” Public Religion
Research Institute, November 16, 2012: http://publicreligion.org/
research/2012/11/american-values-post-election-survey-2012/
192 Notes
126. O’Reilly quoted in Lobe, “It Was the Demographics, Stupid.” Hannity
quoted in Eric Boehlert, “Defeated Once Again, Right-Wing Media
Wage War . . . On Voters,” Media Matters for America, November 9,
2012: http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/11/09/defeated-once-again-
right-wing-media-wage-waron/191297
127. Quoted in Edsall, “Is Rush Limbaugh’s Country Gone?”
128. In contrast John Nichols sees socialism as a long, vibrant, legitimate
American tradition. John Nichols, The “S” Word: A Short History of
an American Tradition . . . Socialism, London and New York: Verso,
2011.
129. Krauthammer quoted in Jacob Weisberg, “Why Obama Won’t Bring
European Social Democracy to America,” Slate.com, March 7, 2009;
Romney quoted in David Crary, “Obama a Socialist? Many Scoff, But
Claim Persists,” Associated Press, June 4, 2012; 2012 Palin quote from
Nick Wing, “Sarah Palin: ‘Barack Obama is a Socialist, Communism
Could be Coming,” Huffington Post, December 4, 2012; Obama
quoted in Donovan Slack, “Obama: I’m Not a Socialist,” Politico.com,
December 14, 2012.
130. Frank Newport, “Democrats, Republicans Diverge on Capitalism,
Federal Gov’t,” Gallup.com, November 29, 2012; A December 2011
Pew Research Center poll found that pluralities of young people, liberal
Democrats, and African Americans held a positive view of socialism.
Hispanics were opposed to socialism by 49 percent to 44 percent, but
held negative views of capitalism by 55 percent to 32 percent. “Little
Change in Public’s Response to ‘Capitalism,’ ‘Socialism’.” Pew Research
Center, December 28, 2011.
131. “The Role of the Rising American Electorate in the 2012 Election,”
Democracy Corps, November 14, 2012: http://www.democracycorps.
com/National-Surveys/the-role-of-the-rising-american-electorate-in-
the-2012-election/
132. “The Real Election and the Mandate,” Democracy Corps, November
13, 2012: http://www.democracycorps.com/National-Surveys/the-
real-election-and-mandate/
133. Teixeira and Halpin, “The Return of the Obama Coalition.” idem,
“The Obama Coalition in the 2012 Election and Beyond,” Washington:
Center for American Progress, December 2012.
134. John B. Judis, “Is This It? The Ecstasy and Agonies of a Permanent
Majority,” New Republic, December 6, 2012, p. 13. Judis is the co-
author with Ruy Teixeira of The Emerging Democratic Majority (New
York: Scribner, 2002). Judis notes that Republicans and business groups
continue to dominate the pressure system of interests and lobbying that
influences both elections and governing.
135. Thomas B. Edsall, “The Culture War and the Jobs Crisis,” New York
Times (online), November 11, 2012: http://campaignstops.blogs.
nytimes.com/2012/11/11/edsall-the-culture-war-and-the-jobs-crisis/
Notes 193
136. Jeffry A. Friedan, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth
Century, New York: W. W. Norton, 2003, pp. 229–250.
137. The text of Roosevelt’s address may be found at: http://www.fdrlibrary.
marist.edu/archives/address_text.html
138. The Balancing Act plan may be found at: http://cpc.grijalva.house.
gov/balancing-act/For a supportive analysis of the Balancing Act, see
Andrew Fieldhouse, “The Progressive Caucus’s Sensible Approach to
Sequestration: Prioritizing Jobs and Growth,” Washington: Economic
Policy Institute, February 5, 2013.
139. Walter Hickey, “You’ll Be Surprised to Hear How People Want to Avert
the Sequester,” Business Insider, February 26, 2013.
140. The Back to Work plan may be viewed online at: http://cpc.gri-
jalva.house.gov/back-to-work-budget The Economic Policy Institute
Policy Center provided assistance in developing the plan, which was
strongly supported by the Campaign for America’s Future. See Andrew
Fieldhouse and Rebecca Theis, “The ‘Back to Work’ Budget: Analysis
of the Congressional Progressive Caucus Budget for Fiscal Year 2014,”
Washington: Economic Policy Institute, March 13, 2013.
141. Paul Krugman, “After the Flimflam,” New York Times, March 15,
2013. The Congressional Progressive Caucus plan was voted down in
the House on March 20 by 84–327.
6 Toward a Deep Presidency: Coming to Terms

with Our Constitutional Catastrophe-in-Chief
1. Bernie Sanders, The Speech, New York: Nation Book, 2011. See also
Bernie Sanders, with Huck Gutman, Outsider in the House, New York:
Verso, 1997.
2. For an analysis of Sanders’s approach to progressive politics in the US
House of Representatives, see William F. Grover, “In the Belly of the
Beast: Bernie Sanders, Congress and Political Change,” New Political
Science 28/29, Winter-Spring 1994, pp. 31–52.; William F. Grover,
“Creating New Political Priorities: Bernie Sanders and the Congressional
Progressive Caucus,” in William F. Grover and Joseph G. Peschek, eds.
Voices of Dissent: Critical Readings in American Politics, 3rd ed.,
New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999, pp. 124–136.
3. Kevin Mattson, “What the Heck Are You Up To, Mr. President?”
Jimmy Carter, America’s ‘Malaise,’ and the Speech That Should Have
Changed the Country, New York: Bloomsbury, 2009.
4. Ibid, p. 157.
5. William F. Grover, The President as Prisoner, Albany, New York:
SUNY, 1989, p. 111.
6. Mattson, “What the Heck Are You Up To, Mr. President?” pp. 164
and 166.
194 Notes
7. For an analysis of attempts by political scientists to rehabilitate Carter’s

presidency, see William F. Grover and Joseph G. Peschek, “The
Rehabilitation of Jimmy Carter and the Limits of Mainstream Analysis,”
Polity 8, no. 3, September 1990, pp. 139–152.
8. Bruce Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions, New York: David McKay, 1976,
pp. 293–294.
9. Michael J. Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis
of Democracy, New York: New York University Press, 1975, p. 114 and
p. 93.
10. Susan Page, “Can This Government Be Saved?” USA Today, June 24,
2014; and Niraj Chokshi, “A 15-part plan to restore democracy to
America’s states, The Washington Post, June 24, 2014.
11. Larry J. Sabato, A More Perfect Constitution, New York: Walker and
Co., 2008, pp. 87–92.
12. President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on Economic
Mobility,” The White House, December 4, 2013; President Barack
Obama, “Remarks by the President on Climate Change,” The White
House, June 25, 2013.
13. Bill McKibben, Deep Economy: The Wealth of Communities and the
Durable Future, New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2007. McKibben
has been voicing his unsettling environment call to action since the pub-
lication of his groundbreaking book The End of Nature in 1989.
14. The damaging outcomes of severe income and wealth inequality, and
how they undermine democracy, have been clearly elucidated by Nobel
Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz. See his “Of the 1%, by the 1%,
for the 1%,” Vanity Fair, May 2011. This essentially is a radically con-
densed version of his book The Price of Inequality, New York: W. W.
Norton, 2012.
15. Ibid. See also the ambitious and much-discussed analysis of the causes
and consequences of rampant inequality in Thomas Piketty, Capital
in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University, 2014.
16. “Remarks by the President on the Economy in Osawatomie, Kansas,”
The White House, December 6, 2011.
17. Bill McKibben, “Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math,” Rolling
Stone, August 2, 2012.
18. Ibid.
19. Bill McKibben, Eaarth: Making a Life on a Tough New Planet, New
York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2010.
20. Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Cost and Consequences of
American Empire, New York: Henry Holt, 2000; Nemesis: The
Last Days of the American Republic, New York: Henry Holt, 2006;
Dismantling the Empire: America’s Last Best Hope, New York: Henry
Holt, 2010.
Notes 195
21. See Joseph G. Peschek, “The Obama Presidency and the Politics of
‘Change’ in Foreign Policy,” New Political Science 32, no. 2, June 2010,
pp. 272–278.
22. Andrew J. Bacevich, “Obama’s Sins of Omission,” Boston Globe, April
25, 2009.
23. Paul Street, The Empire’s New Clothes: Barack Obama in the Real
World of Power, Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2010, p. ix.
24. Glenn Greenwald, The Intercept, May 8, 2014.
25. Madeleine Albright, NBC Today Show, February 19, 1998.
26. Elizabeth Sanders, “Executor-in-Chief,” In These Times, January, 2013,
p. 28.
27. Michael Kelley, “Report, Obama Said: ‘I’m Really Good at Killing
People,’” Slate Magazine, November 3, 2013.
28. McKibben, Deep Economy, pp. 2–3. On the need for a sustainable eco-
nomic outlook, see also Tom Wessels, The Myth of Progress: Toward
a Sustainable Future (Burlington, VT: University of Vermont Press,
2006); Steven Stoll, “The Mismeasure of All Things: How GDP Distorts
Economic Reality,” Orion Magazine, September/October, 2012; and
Chris Hedges, “Growth Is the Problem,” Truthdig, September 10, 2012.
29. McKibben, “Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math,” p. 7.
30. Justin Gillis, “U.S. Climate Has Already Changed, Study Finds, Citing
Heat and Floods, New York Times, May 7, 2014.
31. Craig Collins, “Overlooking the Obvious with Naomi Klein,” Counter-
punch, October 21, 2014.
32. Scott Shane, “No Morsel Too Minuscule for All-Consuming N.S.A.,”
New York Times, November 3, 2013.
33. Mike Lofgren, “Anatomy of the Deep State: Beneath Veneer of
Democracy, The Permanent Ruling Class,” Common Dreams.org,
February 24, 2014.
34. No such rethinking or refashioning was in evidence in Secretary of
Defense Chuck Hagel’s November 5th address as the keynote speaker
for the Global Security Forum 2013 at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, despite his recognition of rapidly changing world.
See William Boardman, “Only America Can Save the World (For Itself?)”
Reader Supported News, November 8, 2013.
35. Naomi Klein, “Why Unions Need to Join the Climate Fight,” Reader
Supported News, September 4, 2013.
36. Mark Leibovich, This Town: Two Parties and a Funeral—Plus Plenty
of Valet Parking!—in America’s Gilded Capital, New York: Blue Rider,
2013, pp. 100–107.
37. Eric Alterman, Kabuki Democracy: The System vs. Barack Obama,
New York: Nation Books, 2011.
38. Sanders quoted in John Nichols, “Bernie Sanders: ‘I Am Prepared to Run
for President of the United Sates,’” The Nation Blog, March 6, 2014.
196 Notes
See also Joel Bleifuss, “Bernie Sanders: The People’s President, In These
Times, May 29, 2014.
39. Quoted in Grover and Peschek, Voices of Dissent, 8th ed., p. 3.
40. Howard Zinn, You Can’t Be Neutral on a Moving Train, Boston: MA:
Beacon, 1994, p. 208.
41. See Patricia Siplon and William F. Grover, Congressional Inertia: Iron
Triangles Old and New,” in Grover and Peschek, Voices of Dissent, 8th
ed., pp. 220–228.
42. Jacobs and King, “Varieties of Obamaism”.
43. For a thought-provoking and troubling analysis of “spectacle” as a form
of presidential persuasion that does not sit well with democratic values,
see Bruce Miroff, “The Presidential Spectacle,” in Michael Nelson, ed.,
The Presidency and the Political System, 7th ed., Washington, DC: CQ
Press, 2006, pp. 255–282.
44. Elizabeth Kolbert, Field Notes from a Catastrophe: Man, Nature, and
Climate Change, New York: Bloomsbury, 2006, p. 189.
45. The limits and possibilities of such a sustained social movement were
brought into stark relief by the Occupy Wall Street movement in the
fall of 2011 when—however fleetingly—income and wealth inequality,
framed as the 1 percent v. the 99 percent, and the structure of class privi-
lege generally, entered mainstream political discourse worldwide.
Index
Abrams, Elliott, 95 Bennett, William, 57, 113

ACORN (Association of Bentsen, Lloyd, 44, 45
Community Organizations for Berger, Samuel, 68
Reform Now), 109 Berlet, Chip, 58
Addington, David, 103 Bernanke, Ben, 87, 121
Adler, David Gray, 69 Biden, Joseph, 107
Afghanistan, 131–2 Bipartisan Policy Center, and
Albright, Madeleine, 68, 150 the Commission on Political
Alexander, Gen. Keith, party and Reform report (2014), 147
policy continuity, 150 Blinder, Alan S., 118
Alterman, Eric, 153 Block, Fred, 26
Altman, Roger, 44, 115 Blumenthal, Michael, 144–5
American Century, 3, 12 Blumenthal, Sidney, 69, 97
American Enterprise Institute, 54, Boehner, John, 113
59, 60 bond market, 43
American exceptionalism, 18, 148, Boot, Max, 91
150 Bork, Robert, 57
American Recovery and Born, Brooksley, 47–8
Reinvestment Act (2009), Bowles, Samuel, 26
117–19 BP/Deepwater Horizon, 1, 13
American Spectator, 59, 60 Brock, David, 60
analytical amnesia, 17 Broder, David, 74
Anderson, Perry, 20, 70 Brookings Institution, 60
Ashcroft, John, 76 Brown, Scott, 118
Authorization for the Use of Brownstein, Ronald, 60, 84, 87
Military Force (2001), 101 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 126
Ayers, William, 108 Buchanan, James, 8
budget deficits, 31, 43, 83
Bacevich, Andrew, 12, 68, 92, 98, Burnham, Walter Dean, 38
126, 131, 132, 150 Burns, James MacGregor, 17, 31
Baer, Kenneth, 38 Bush, George H. W., 35, 43, 67
Bair, Sheila, 121 Bush, George W., viii, 10, 150
Baker, Dean, 48 appointments, 76
Baker, James, 98 axis of evil speech, 90
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 45 budget and economic policies, 80–3
Balz, Dan, 60 Bush Doctrine, 10, 89–90, 94, 97
Beams, Nick, 84 deficits, 83
Becker, Bill, 38 economy, 86
198 Index
Bush, George W.—Continued Clinton, Bill, viii, 31

election of 2000, 71, 73–4 as Arkansas governor, 38
election of 2004, 84–5 campaign contributions, 38
energy policy, 78–9 economic policies, 42–4, 46–50
executive power, 100–4 election of 1992, 35
and Iraq, 97–100 foreign and national security
misstatements about Iraq, 104 policies, 63–70
signing statements, 102 health care reform, 50–3
Social Security policies, 80 impeachment, 72
tax cuts, 82, 85 and Kosovo, 69
business lobbying, 44–5, 77–8, 120, and NAFTA, 65–7
122 and right wing, 57–61
Business Roundtable, 52, 116 welfare reform, 54–7
Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 50, 57,
Callahan, Daniel, 59 105, 106, 107, 115, 141
Calmes, Jackie, 108 Coe, Kevin, 96
Campaign Finance Institute, 115 Coelho, Tony, 36
Campaign for America’s Future, Cohen, William, 68
135 Cole, Juan, 99
Canova, Timothy, 113 Commodities Futures
capital strike, 22, 143 Modernization Act of 2000,
Card, Andrew, 76 47–8
Carter, Jimmy, 19, 36, 112 Community Reinvestment Act, 109
and Carter Doctrine, 93 Congress, as a limit on executive
and “crisis of confidence,” 144–6 power, 3–6, 8, 11
and shift to neoliberalism, 31 and balance of power with the
Carville, James, 35, 135 president, 28, 147
Cato Institute, 54, 59, 60, 80 Congressional Progressive Caucus,
Center for American Progress, 137–9
118, 136 conservatism
Center for Public Integrity, 51, 93, neoconservatism, 94, 98, 125
104 Religious/Christian Right, 72,
Center for Responsive Politics, 122 76–7, 94, 96
Center on Budget and Policy Right-turn, 35, 42, 58
Priorities, 56, 82 constitution
Chavez, Linda, 76 (Article II), vii, 5, 28, 101
Cheney, Dick, 78–9, 81, 94, 95, 99, Twenty-second amendment,
102, 103 147–8
Chibber, Vivek, 126 Corwin, Edward S., 9
Chomsky, Noam, 92 Covington, Sally, 59
Christopher, Warren, 64 Cronin, Thomas, 10
Citizens for Tax Justice, 46 Curry, Bill, 63
Citizens United (2010), 116
climate change, 148–9, 152 Daley, William, 124
and CO2 levels, 149 Daschle, Tom, 147
Index 199
deep presidency, viii, 14, 21, 28, of 2000, 71, 72–5, 87–8, 142
145–54 of 2004, 84–5
Defense Policy Board, 93 of 2008, 107–14
demand constraints, 23 of 2010, 123
Democracy Corps, 135 of 2012, 133–4
Democratic Congressional of 2016, 141–2
Campaign Committee, 37 Ellison, Keith, 137
Democratic Leadership Council, 37, Energy Policy Act of 2005, 79
38, 63, 70 Engelhardt, Tom, 129, 130
Democratic Policy Commission, 37 Ethics and Public Policy Center, 59
Denham, Robert, 66 expansivist theories of the
DeParle, Jason, 56 presidency, 6–9
Dimon, Jamie, 116 limitations of, 12–13
Dole, Robert, 58
Domhoff, G. William, 24–5, 114, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting
117 (FAIR), 60
Domke, David, 96 Falwell, Jerry, 60, 76, 96, 107
Dood-Frank Wall Street Reform Faux, Jeff, 36, 65
and Consumer Protection Act Federalist Society, 60–1
(2010), 121–3 Feith, Douglas, 97
Dowd, Matthew, 76 Ferguson, Thomas, 44
Drew, Christopher, 115 Financial Services Modernization
Drew, Elizabeth, 101 Act of 1999, 46–7
drone attacks, 149–50 Fix the Debt campaign, 124
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Ebbs, Garrett, 101 Act (FISA), 102
economic growth, viii, 12, 29–30 Foster, John Bellamy, 122
as one of the foundations of the From, Al, 37, 62, 63
modern presidency, 28, 146, 152
three fundamental challenges to Gaddafi, Muammar, 130
growth, 148–9 Gallup Poll, 135
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Geithner, Tim, 25, 115, 121
Reconstruction Act of 2001, 81 Genetech, 120
economy, 40, 48, 86–7 Gensler, Gary, 48
Edelman, Peter, 56 Gerchik, Julie, 60
Edsall, Thomas, 76, 78, 136 Gibson, Charles, 104
Edwards, John, 106 Gilens, Martin, 24
Eisenhower, Dwight, 8, 154 Gingrich, Newt, 45, 46, 57, 61, 72
on the military-industrial Gintis, Herbert, 26
complex, 93, 152 globalization, 36, 64
Eizenstat, Stuart, 145 Goolsbee, Austin, 25
Elders, Jocelyn, 62 Gordon, Colin, 51, 54
elections Gore, Al, 42, 73–5, 87
of 1992, 35 Gottschalk, Marie, 53
of 1994, 45, 61–2 Gowan, Peter, 64
200 Index
Gramm, Phil, 48 Jackson, Andrew, 19

Grant, Ulysses S., 8 Jackson, Jesse, 36, 106
Great Depression, 5 Jackson Hole Group, 51
Greenberg, Stanley, 63, 135 Jacobs, Lawrence, 26, 30, 53
Greenspan, Alan, 47, 48, 67, 81 Jefferson, Thomas, 7, 29
Grijalva, Raul, 137 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Gross, Daniel, 110 Reconciliation Act of 2003, 81,
Grover, William, 3 82–3
Guyatt, Nicholas, 67 Joe the Plumber (Samuel Joseph
Wurzelbacher), 110
Hacker, Jacob, 83, 120 Johnson, Chalmers, 95, and costs of
Hahn, Lori Cox, 9 US empire, 149–50
Hale, Jon F., 37 Johnson, Lyndon, 9, 74
Halpin, John, 136 Judis, John B., 39, 72, 84, 136
Hamilton, Alexander, 3, 5, 29
Hamilton, Lee, 98 Kagan, Robert, 91, 95
Hamilton Project, 115 Katznelson, Ira, 13
Hannity, Sean, 134, 135 Kay, David, 97
Harding, Warren, 8 Kennedy, John F. (JFK), 10, 13, 19,
Harris, John, 108 27–9, 74, 146
Harris, Katherine, 74 Kerry, John, 112
Harvey, David, 31–2 Kesselman, Mark, 13
Health Care Policy, Health Security Khalidi, Rashid, 108
Act, 50–4 Khalilzad, Zalmay, 95
Heritage Foundation, 54, 59, 60, King, Desmond, 26, 30
80, 119–20 Kirk, Paul, 37
Hertzberg, Hendrik, 89, 110 Klare, Michael, 93, 98
Holleman, Hannah, 122 Klein, Naomi, 14, 152, 154
House Financial Services Kolbert, Elizabeth, 154
Committee, 122 Kosovo, 69
Hudson Institute, 59 Krauthammer, Charles, 94
Huntington, Samuel, 146 Kristol, William, 53, 60, 91, 95
Hussein, Saddam, 68, 69, 95 Krugman, Paul, 31, 83, 106, 139
Kuttner, Robert, 30, 116, 125
Immelt, Jeffrey, 25
inequality, 41, 49–50, 86, 87 Lake, Anthony, 64
and economic growth, 148 Laski, Harold, and The American
institutions-as-structure, 15–33 Presidency (1940), 6–7, 11,
International Monetary Fund, 83–4 18–19, 141, 143–4
Iraq Liberation Act, 68 Layne, Christopher, 126
Iraq Study Group, 98 Leibovich, Mark, 152–3
Iraq Survey Group, 97 Lemann, Nicholas, 82
Iraq War, 10, 12 Leonhardt, David, 114
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria Levin, Carl, 123
(ISIS), 129–30 Levitt, Arthur, 47
Index 201
Lewinsky, Monica, 57, 61 Milne, Seamus, 130

Libby, I. Lewis, 94 Minnite, Lorraine C., 109
Libya, 130 Mintz, Beth, 51
Lieberman, Joseph, 99 Miroff, Bruce, 13
Lieven, Anatol, 92, 96 and Pragmatic Illusions (1976),
Limbaugh, Rush, 60, 134 27–9, 146
Lincoln, Abraham, 7, 101 Moberg, David, 106
Lincoln, Blanche, 121 Mondale, Walter, 36–7
Lindblom, Charles, 18, 22–4, Morris, Dick, 45
154
Lofgren, Mike, and the “deep Nader, Ralph, 73, 142
state,” 152 National Center for Responsive
Lott, Trent, 147 Philanthropy, 59
Lowi, Theodore, 5, 10–11 National Climate Assessment
and The Personal President (2014), 151
(1985), 20–1 national security, viii, 12, 29–30
Luce, Henry, 3. as one of the foundations of
Lyons, Matthew, 59 the modern presidency, 28,
146
MacFarquhar, Larissa, 30, 114 and limitations of definition,
Mahajan, Rahul, 88 149–50, 151–2
Manhattan Institute, 59 National Security Strategy of
Marmor, Theodore, 119 the United States (2002),
Martin, Cathie Jo, 52 88–9
Matsui, Robert, 66 Nelson, Lars-Erk, 57
Mattson, Kevin, 143–6 neoliberalism (defined), 31–3, 36,
McCain, John, 72, 99, 105, 106, 39, 40, 93
107–14, 115, 129, 130 Neustsadt, Richard, and
McCartney, Paul T., 93 Presidential Power (1960), 8–9,
McCurdy, David, 62 13, 19, 154
McKibben, Bill New Deal, 10, 20, 27
and Deep Economy (2007), 148 Nixon, Richard, 9, 10, 74, 100,
“Do the Math” tour (2012), 151 144
three fundamental challenges to Norquist, Grover, 125
economic growth, 148–9 North American Free Trade
Meachem, John, 113 Agreement (NAFTA), 65–7
Medicare Prescription Drug, Norton, Gale, 76
Improvement, and Nunn, Sam, 37
Modernization Act of 2003,
79–80 Obama, Barack, vii–viii, 1, 56, 87,
Meeropol, Michael, 45 104
Meyerson, Harold, 40 and 2012 post-reelection press
Michael, Robert, 66 conference, 2
Miliband, Ralph, 24–5 and 2014 commencement address
Mills, C. Wright, 24–5 at West Point, 18
202 Index
Obama, Barack—Continued Perot, H. Ross, 35, 65

and Afghanistan, 131–2 Peschek, Joseph, 30
appointments, 115–16 Peterson, Pete, 124
background, 114–15 Pew Research Center, 50
and business confidence, 111, 116, Phillips, Kevin, 72, 82, 96
124 Pierce, Franklin, 8, 11, 19
and climate change speech at Piven, Frances Fox, 153
Georgetown University, 1–2, pluralist model of politics, 21–2
148 Polanyi, Karl, and The Great
and continuity with George Transformation (1944), 32
W. Bush, 30 Polk, James, 19
drone attacks, 132 Pollin, Robert, 49
election of 2008, 105–13 Poulantzas, Nicos, 25–6
election of 2012, 133 poverty, 41, 85
elections of 2010, 123 Powell, Colin, 95, 126
financial reform, 121–3 Progressive Era reformism, 15–17
foreign and national security Progressive Policy Institute, 37
policies, 123, 133 Project for a New American
health care reform, 119–20 Century, 95
and Iraq, 127, 129–30 Public Citizen, 79
and Libya, 130
and Pakistan, 132 Reagan, Ronald, 36
speech on inequality in Reagan Revolution, 31, 145, 154
Osawatomie, KS, 148 Reich, Robert, 39, 41, 55, 62, 121
speech on the economy at Remnick, David, vii
THEARC, 148 resource constraints, 23–4
and stimulus bill, 117–19 restrictivist theories of the
Obama, Malia, 1, 13 presidency, 9–12
Oberlander, Jonathan, 119 limitations of, 12–13
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act Rivlin, Alice, 44
of 1993, 42–3 Roberts, Cokie, 62
O’Reilly, Bill, 134 Roberts, Dan, 47
Orzag, Peter, 115 Rogers, Joel, 22–3, 62
and Joshua Cohen, 23–4
Page, Benjamin, 24 Romney, Mitt, 120, 133, 134, 135
Pakistan, 132 Roosevelt, Franklin D. (FDR), 3,
Palin, Sarah, 108, 135 5–6, 7, 10, 29, 35, 62, 100, 137,
Palley, Thomas I., 36 153–4
Panetta, Leon, 44 and liberalism, 16, 19, 35
Parry, Robert, 103 Roosevelt, Theodore, 3, 4–5
Patient Protection and Affordable and stewardship theory of the
Care Act (2010), 119–20 presidency, 4–6, 11
Patriot Act, 10, 102 Rossiter, Clinton, and The
Pelosi, Nancy, 102–3, 119 American Presidency (1956),
Peoples’ Climate March (2014), 151 7–8
Index 203
Rothschild, Matthew, 40 Thatcher, Margaret, 31–2

Rove, Karl, 75, 116 theories of the state, 24–8
Rubin, Robert, 25, 44, 47, 49, 67, 115 capital dominance, 25–6
Rumsfeld, Donald, 76, 90, 95, 103 class dominance, 24–5
Ryan, Paul, 139 social struggle, 26–7
think tanks, 58–9
Sabato, Larry, 147–8 Toobin, Jeffrey, 57
Safire, William, 94 torture, 102, 103
Sanders, Bernie, 137, 141–4 Trilateral Commission, and The
need for political revolution, 153 Crisis of Democracy (1975),
and The Speech, 142 146–7
Sanders, Elizabeth, and drone Truman, Harry, 8
attacks, 150–1 and NSA, 152
Sanger, David, 64 Truman Doctrine, 87
Savage, Charlie, 102
Scaife, Richard Mellon, 59 unitary executive, 12, 101, 104
Scalia, Antonin, 75
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 10, 100 Van Buren, Peter, 132
and The Imperial Presidency VandeHei, Jim, 108
(1973), 10–12, 19 Vietnam War, 9, 10, 100
Schwartz, Michael, 120 Volcker, Paul, 36
Shapiro, Robert, 53–4
signing statements, 102 Walker, Martin, 40
Silverstein, Ken, 114 Wallace, Chris, 104
Skocpol, Theda, 51 Washington, George, 7
Skowronek, Stephen, 19–20, 152 Washington Consensus, 65
and political regimes, 19–20 waterboarding, 103
Snowden, Edward, 12 Watergate, 9, 11
Solis, Hilda, 116 welfare policy, 54–7
Sperling, Gene, 124 Personal Responsibility and Work
Stephanopoulos, George, 62 Opportunity Reconciliation Act
Stevens, John Paul, 75 of 1996, 55
Stiglitz, Joseph, 46, 49, 121, 148 Wellstone, Paul, 47
Street, Paul, 150 Whitman, Christine Todd, 76
structural theory of the presidency, Wigmore, Barrie A., 38
21–33, and Figure 2.1, 28 Williamson, John, 65
and sustainability, 145–54 Wilson, Woodrow, 7, 11, 33
Summers, Lawrence, 25, 47, 67, (Congressional Government,
115, 121 1885), 3
Suskind, Ron, 100 (Constitutional Government,
1908), 3–4
Taft, William Howard, 4–5, 6, 9 and his critique on monopolies,
Tauzin, Billy, 80 15–17
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, 46 and his notion of structure, 15–17
Teixeira, Ruy, 62, 63, 84, 136 Wolfe, Alan, 29–30
204 Index
Wolfowitz, Paul, 94 Yoo, John, 102

Woodward, Bob, 43 Young, Kevin, 120
World Trade Organization (WTO), 67
World War II, 5, 29, 101 Zandi, Mark, 118
Wright, Erik Olin, 22–3 Zinn, Howard, 153
Wright, Jeremiah, 108 Zunes, Stephen, 107

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The Evolving American Presidency Series

The Second Term of George W. Bush

The Presidency and the Challenge of Democracy

Religion and the American Presidency

Religion and the Bush Presidency

Accidental Presidents: Death, Assassination, Resignation, and Democratic

Presidential Power in Action: Implementing Supreme Court Detainee Decisions

President George W. Bush’s Influence over Bureaucracy and Policy: Extraordinary

Assessing George W. Bush’s Legacy: The Right Man?

Acting Presidents: 100 Years of Plays about the Presidency

America Responds to Terrorism: Conflict Resolution Strategies of Clinton, Bush,

Presidents in the Movies: American History and Politics on Screen

Watergate Remembered: The Legacy for American Politics

Clinton/Gore: Victory from a Shadow Box

Bad Presidents: Failure in the White House

Maligned Presidents of the Late 19th Century

Pitiful Giants: Presidents in Their Final Terms

The Unsustainable Presidency: Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Beyond

William F. Grover and

1. Presidents—United States. 2. Executive power—United States.

One Theories of the American Presidency 1

Two Beyond Institutions-as-Structure: A Deeper

Three Bill Clinton and the Neoliberal Presidency 35

Four The Conservative Mirage: George W. Bush and

Five Change You Can Believe In? The Barack Obama

Six Toward a Deep Presidency: Coming to Terms with

I think we are fortunate at the moment that we do not face a crisis of

Americans presidents seek to offer reassurance to citizens, and it

factors are at least as important as the impact of public opinion, elec-

Theories of the American Presidency

Did you plug the hole yet, Daddy?

At a press conference on May 27, 2010, President Obama addressed

He went on to announce what he called his “new national climate

Theories of the Presidency

If citizens in the nineteenth century were confronted with problems,

At the operational and philosophical level among presidents, this

The most important factor in getting the right spirit in my

Roosevelt’s expansive reading of the office gave the president wide

The president’s talent and power were not destined to remain

[S]ince the president has become the embodiment of government, it

The electoral primary system—relentlessly hyped by the 24-hour news

A weak president, in a word, is a gift to the forces of reaction in the

Only a president can rise above the obstacles to progressive reform.

Each is an authentic folk hero, each a symbol of some virtue or dream

peacemaker—these men are symbols of huge interest and value to the

Even chief executives routinely rated the worst by historians and

throughout he steadfastly maintained his original belief that served

This thought, particularly the “vice versa” captures the expansivist

Precedent and tradition ensure that the fruits of aggrandizement are

The president is the Wizard of Oz. Appearances become every-

personal, the more he reinforces the mythology that there actually

But it is in foreign policy where the wizardly threat to institutional

guidance” essential to restoring systemic balance. The system will self-

Toward a Deeper Structural Critique of

With regard to the Kennedy presidency, for example, Bruce Miroff

In our view, Neustadt is correct in stressing the need to understand the

A structural theory of the presidency seeks to move beyond the

demand that a president respond to such crises. But beyond that, he

However, the venom Wilson reserved for big manufacturers, bank-

Big business is no doubt to a large extent necessary and natural. The

Large corporations were viewed as “natural,” even organic, whereas

problem,” or would this simply leave different, somewhat less large,

expansivist and restrictivist assumptions, a point made more broadly