Journal of Contemporary African Studies

ISSN: 0258-9001 (Print) 1469-9397 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjca20

Religion, ethnicity and citizenship: demands for

territorial self-determination in southern Kaduna,
Nigeria

Henrik Angerbrandt

To cite this article: Henrik Angerbrandt (2015) Religion, ethnicity and citizenship: demands for
territorial self-determination in southern Kaduna, Nigeria, Journal of Contemporary African
Studies, 33:2, 232-250, DOI: 10.1080/02589001.2015.1066081

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2015.1066081

Published online: 07 Aug 2015.

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 Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 2015
Vol. 33, No. 2, 232–250, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2015.1066081

Religion, ethnicity and citizenship: demands for territorial

self-determination in southern Kaduna, Nigeria
Henrik Angerbrandt*

Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

(Received 20 March 2014; final version received 20 October 2014)

This article analyses the ‘politics of scale’ of how identity is linked to territory in the
quest for self-determination by actors on the Christian side of the ethno-religious
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conflict in Kaduna State, Nigeria. Ethnic and political relations are framed with
reference to scale, such as ‘the local’ and ‘the regional’, in ways that support
claims for territorial control on an ethnic and religious basis. The experience of
lack of access to the state is seen to be grounded in community identities.
Furthermore, the state relates to citizens through religious and neo-customary
authorities as a way to localise authority. This is connected to an idea that neo-
customary institutions represent ‘the local’. It is argued in this article that these
institutions are just as entangled in various constructions of scale as the state.
Keywords: conflict; ethnicity; identity; scale; territory; Nigeria

Nigerian federalism – one of the few cases of federalism in Africa – has repeatedly
been said to be in crisis (Osaghae 2005). Despite the fact that the federal system
helps to reduce national competition and with the forging of elite alliances that trans-
cend ethnic and religious divides (Suberu 2005), federalism and decentralisation have
not weakened ethnic and religious competition locally. On the contrary, conflicts are
prevalent in many places, including Kaduna State, where there have been recurrent
episodes of ethno-religious violence since the late 1980s. Hausa–Fulani Muslims, pre-
dominantly based in the north of the state, are set against Christians of different eth-
nicities. The latter are largely based in the southern part of the state and are agitating
for the division of the existing state and the creation of a separate Gurara State.
One of the peculiarities of Nigerian federalism is the non-resolution of the federa-
tion’s territorial units. Since independence in 1960, the initial 3 regions have over time
been divided into 36 states, and there is presently a suggestion that 18 additional states
be created, for a total of 54. This article analyses the ‘politics of scale’, specifically how
Christian and Southern Kaduna actors in the conflict in Kaduna State link identity to
territory in the quest for self-determination. Starting with the demands to split
Kaduna State into two, the article interrogates the ways in which the conflict is
framed by these actors with reference to local, regional and national scales, an
approach that challenges the spatial organisation promoted by the state. It is,
however, not only statutory units that structure the connection between territory

*Email: henrik.angerbrandt@statsvet.su.se
© 2015 The Institute of Social and Economic Research
 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 233

and identity in Kaduna: the conflict also relates to how different neo-customary or
‘traditional’1 authorities embody political projects.
The objective of the article is to provide an understanding of how actors frame the
conflict in Kaduna by referring to geographical scale to promote perspectives on the
causes of the conflict as well as its resolution. The analysis shows how different
ethnic and religious identities are constructed around, and connected to, scalar cat-
egories such as ‘the local’ and ‘the regional’. Different groups are thus associated
with different scales. Ethno-religious mobilisation is, however, framed in ways that
support the quest for territorial self-determination on an identity basis.
Primary material for the analysis was gathered during field work between 2007 and
2012. The data consist principally of material produced by Southern Kaduna actors in
the form of press releases, magazine articles, memoranda and communiques. Central
actors such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), the Southern Kaduna
People’s Union (SOKAPU) and influential individuals were prioritised and I have con-
ducted semi-structured interviews with leaders of Southern Kaduna organisations,
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churches and youths as well as with politicians and civil servants. Government
reports and memoranda from meetings between Christian and Muslim leaders and
Southern and Northern Kaduna leaders have been examined insofar as they include
the voices and perspectives of Christian and Southern Kaduna actors. While author-
itative voices have been prioritised, as these are influential in the framing of the con-
flict, it should be recalled that there is a diversity of voices that may challenge the
constructions among Christians.
This introduction is followed by a section that outlines the theoretical perspective of
the analysis, followed by a short overview of how the Nigerian federation has developed
and a summary of the setting for the state-creation demands in Kaduna State. The fol-
lowing two sections analyse how demands for territorial self-determination are based on
the ways in which ethnic and religious identity is conceived as relating to territory. This
is first investigated through the way Southern Kaduna is constructed in relation to the
Zaria emirate and then through the framing of the local as comprising small non-
Muslim ethnic groups. Next, I turn to how local autonomy has been striven for
though the creation of neo-customary institutions and how the state has used these to
foster a sense of belonging and to defuse violence. I then return to the issue of state cre-
ation and argue that states in Nigeria increasingly represent ethnic-based citizenship,
not least through the practice of indigeneity, which assigns ‘ownership’ of specific
spaces to certain groups of citizens. In the conclusion, I elaborate on how the politics
of scale is used in the Kaduna conflict with regard to the spatial organisation of the
Nigerian state, in which territories are defined with reference to group identities.

Territory, identity and scale

In large parts of Africa, democratisation and decentralisation have, since the 1990s,
triggered processes whereby people are defined in relation to different localities.
Examples include who is entitled to stand as a candidate and to vote in a specific
area (Geschiere and Jackson 2006). Such conflicts have been intensified through
manipulation of the citizenship question (Joseph 1999). This has contributed to
ethnic mobilisation in relation to territorialised belonging, which in numerous
countries has triggered tension and often violence (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Geschiere
2009; Keller 2014). These conflicts over who is to control and gain from state resources
 234 H. Angerbrandt

in a specific area illustrate the fact that state-making involves struggles over space and
identity (Bøås and Dunn 2013, 32). In Nigeria, struggles over state resources and
representation are more often made ‘on the grounds of ethnic, communal, religious,
indigenous, regional and geopolitical (zonal) identities’ than on the basis of state-
recognised subnational units, according to Osaghae (2005, vii). This has the effect
of challenging the scalar delineations of the state. One expression of how identity
and territory are tied together in Nigeria is the practice of ‘indigeneship’. People
whose ancestors are identified as the original inhabitants of a state are treated as ‘indi-
genes’ of that state, and thereby enjoy certain privileges in education, political appoint-
ments, the civil service and other areas (Adebanwi 2009; Fourchard 2015; Kraxberger
2005). This practice aims to ensure a nationally balanced federation, as indigenes of all
states are to be represented in federal appointments and in the federal government. It
has, however, tended to create tension locally by prompting disagreement over who is
to be considered indigenous.
The literature on ethnicity and religion in Nigeria is dominated by studies that
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privilege the role of the state and instrumental perspectives (Ukiwo 2005). This
approach is also reflected in analyses of the recurrent violence in Kaduna State. The
roots of the crisis have been explained by some as part of the colonial legacy
(Kazah-Toure 1999; Mustapha 2000) and as being expressions of elite competition
for socio-political relevance and power (Kukah 1993). Other explanations focus on
the rise of religious fundamentalism in Nigeria, in terms of which religion has been
made a tool for political coalitions (Ibrahim 1989). Yet others look at the character
of the Nigerian state and the ways in which it has responded to historically rooted con-
flict and to wider socio-economic challenges (Abdu 2010). Less developed, however,
are the analyses of the ways in which state processes interact with identity construction
by the actors involved in the conflicts. ‘Constitutive meanings of ethnicity at particular
spaces across different scales’ are regarded by Kanbur, Rajaram, and Varsney (2011,
151) to be the other important explanation of why ethnic diversity sometimes trans-
lates into ethnically defined conflict. In all the above analyses, the spatial character
of ethnic and religious relations is treated as a reflection of how the state is spatially
organised at a particular time. However, ideas and frames of understanding about
identities are constituted with reference to different scales that do not necessarily
mirror the hierarchical organisation of the state. This article analyses how not only
the state, but also the social actors’ framing of ethnicity and religion draw on different
scales, and how this contributes to the instability of Nigerian federalism as the links
between territory and identity are contested.
The analysis subscribes to the view that geographical scale is an actor-strategic
concept that is subject to empirical analysis (Delaney and Leitner 1997). This perspec-
tive contrasts with notions in which specific scales of social activity are treated as
neutral and given, such as when political issues are analysed at different ‘levels’, for
example, the local, national or global. It is argued here that political processes, as
well as conceptions of ethnic and religious relations, are framed by actors in terms
of different scales. Such framings are central to how actors legitimise or contest decen-
tralised political authority in the struggles for state resources and recognition. In short,
actors frame scalar relations in ways that (seek to) shape how the territory is spatially
structured by the state.
The framing of scales as part of political strategies contributes to the specific defi-
nition of problems and to the promotion of certain solutions and actions, while
 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 235

foreclosing others. At the same time, officially prescribed geographical scale shapes
how territories are structured – as, for example, in the levels or tiers of government
in federal and decentralised countries (Herod 2011, 40). The Nigerian case illustrates
that the way in which this structuring is institutionalised can be more or (in this case)
less stable.

State creation in Nigeria

Federalism and the policy of state creation have been central measures in both
national integration and local autonomy in Nigeria. At independence in 1960, the
Nigerian federation comprised three regions, and a fourth was created in 1963. In
1967, 12 states replaced the regions in an attempt to counter secessionist demands
(Obi 2005). This did not, however, prevent the 30-month civil war that started in
July the same year. State creation in 1967 was rationalised by the need to ensure
that one state would not be able to control the central government. In 1976, after
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which Nigeria had 19 states and the federal capital territory of Abuja, the official jus-
tification was ‘to bring government nearer the people while, at the same time, ensuring
even development within a federal structure of government’.2 In 1987, two additional
states were created. One of these was Katsina State, carved out of northern Kaduna
State. In 1991, 9 additional states were created, for a total of 30. The present structure,
involving 36 states and a federal capital territory, divided in turn into 774 local gov-
ernment areas, was set up in 1996.
State creation has been tightly entwined with ethnicity and has been one of the
elements of Nigerian federalism for accommodating ethnic and religious diversity.
While smaller ethnic groups were the main complainants during the initial federal
era, claiming to be marginalised by one of the three major ethnic groups (Hausa,
Yoruba and Igbo) associated with the regions, subsequent reorganisations have also
triggered demands from larger ethnic groups to control an equal number of states
(Alapiki 2005, 59).
Despite increased fragmentation and the economic dependence of many of the
federal units on the central government, the National Conference3 in August 2014 rec-
ommended that Gurara State be created out of the southern parts of Kaduna State,
along with 17 other new states (Umoru 2014). According to analysts, however, new
states have had little impact on people’s access to and influence over politics. State cre-
ation has only taken place during periods of military rule and should not be mistaken
for an effort to have people represented in decision-making. Rather, it has been
pursued to gain control (Obi 2005, 196), and new majorities and minorities have
been created when boundaries are redrawn (Adebanwi 2009, 9–10). Still, groups
across the nation pursue the creation of new states as a way to gain autonomy for
specific areas. Some of these groups are found in Southern Kaduna.

Demands for state creation in Kaduna

Kaduna city in north-central Nigeria was established as an administrative centre for
the northern region by the British during the colonial era. It has since remained a pol-
itical centre and has drawn in people from all over the country. Since 1987, there have
been five major episodes of violence in the state between Hausa–Fulani Muslims and
Christian ethnic groups, along with numerous minor incidents. In 1987, there were
 236 H. Angerbrandt

confrontations in Kafanchan in the south of the state when an evangelical event

was hosted at a college (Ibrahim 1989); in 1992, a market relocation triggered
clashes in Zangon Kataf (Mustapha 2000); and in 2000, as part of the conflict over
the sharia issue, Kaduna city became a battleground in February and again in May
(Angerbrandt 2011). Kaduna city was again affected in 2002 when protests against
the Miss World beauty competition scheduled to be held in Abuja turned violent
(HRW 2003). In 2011, there was serious post-election violence in the state, especially
in Kafanchan and Zonkwa in the south (HRW 2011). Since then, there have also been
‘retaliatory attacks’ (Shiklam 2012) in the south of the state, also related to the post-
election violence.
Most clashes are between Hausa–Fulani Muslims associated with the north of the
state and various Christian ethnic groups associated with the south. Both Muslims and
Christians claim to be a majority in the state. The recurrent crises have more sharply
divided the city and the state along religious lines, in that people have relocated to
areas where people of the same faith reside (Harris 2013, 293).
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The SOKAPU is described by its representatives as a sociocultural body that

organises local ethnic communities in a bid to transform state and national politics.4
Its aim is to end what it identifies as economic and political bias in favour of the north-
ern part of the state. One of the main issues on its agenda is the demand to split
Kaduna State and create Gurara State. ‘The only way of solving the problem is creat-
ing a state. When we find ourselves in a new state, everybody will begin to work hard’,5
is the press secretary of SOKAPU’s assessment. It is claimed that this campaign has
widespread support. According to a magazine that canvasses Southern Kaduna,
‘the creation of a new state out of the present Kaduna State is the dream of every
true indigene of Southern Kaduna today’.6 This in effect links the demand for a
new state to whether or not people are really considered to belong in southern Kaduna.

Southern Kaduna and Zaria emirate

Southern Kaduna is less a geographical entity than an identity concept referring to
those ethnic groups in Kaduna State that share the Christian religion and are
unified against what they identify as Hausa–Fulani dominance. In a book by an aca-
demic and influential advocate for the Southern Kaduna project with a foreword by
the then SOKAPU president, two features are emphasised as distinguishing Southern
Kaduna. First, Southern Kaduna is said to denote a religious group, Christians, and
second, it refers to ‘a subordinate community’ (James 1997, 20). The very notion of
Southern Kaduna is intertwined with the conflict itself, and the historical relationship
with the Hausa–Fulani is central in defining Southern Kaduna.7 Grievances are
directed against the influence of the Zaria (Zazzau) emirate over Southern Kaduna.
As the people in the latter area live on the fringes of what in precolonial times was
the precolonial Sokoto Caliphate, of which Zaria emirate was part, there is a narrative
of resistance against Islamic expansion and the emirate system. The emirate remains a
so-called traditional institution, and while it has no constitutional power it is widely
hailed as a ‘custodian of culture’.
The people of southern Kaduna are described as having a common cultural and
ancestral past (James 1997, 85). SOKAPU describes Southern Kaduna as comprising
‘53 minority ethnic nationalities’ with distinct traditional and chieftaincy systems.
At the same time, it is emphasised that ‘we are known as the Nok culture people
 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 237

with a [sic] ancient civilization and not the product of Jihad’ (SOKAPU 2000, 1).
Mamdani (2002, 661) distinguishes between a cultural community, which defines
itself on the basis of a shared history independent of other groups, and a political com-
munity, which takes a common future as point of reference. In those terms, the subor-
dination SOKAPU refers to is regarded as a threat to the cultural community and
group distinctiveness.
Southern Kaduna came under emirate rule during the British colonial era. As
noted above, it is important for Southern Kaduna actors to emphasise that they
were united before the dan Fodio jihad that established the Sokoto caliphate, and
that they were not ruled by it. When the British created Zaria Province, most of the
southern part of today’s Kaduna State was included and placed under the customary
jurisdiction of the emirate, and local administration came to be controlled by Hausa
Muslims (Kazah-Toure 2003, 35–38). According to a memorandum by high-ranking
members of Southern Kaduna groups to the committee investigating the Kafanchan
crisis in 1987, colonial intervention meant that ‘the authentic history of these commu-
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nities [to the south, east and south-west of Zazzau emirate] remains submerged in
emirate claims and fabrications’.8 While international forces shaped relations
between northern and southern Kaduna, grievances are articulated in relation to
the regionally framed emirate. The conflict is not described as being about southern
Kaduna in particular, but about the relations of the latter with ‘the Muslim North’
as represented by the emirate.
According to a leading Southern Kaduna activist and former secretary of the North-
ern Nigeria branch of CAN, the British ‘indirect rule’ system added political aspects to
the conflict that is described as having previously been religious.9 In this account of the
conflict, political control connotes religious territorial expansion. Southern Kaduna
resistance to perceived Hausa–Fulani dominance is accordingly viewed as having
been to protect locally specific cultures. The resistance is, however, also articulated in
a regional perspective that links Southern Kaduna to a wider ‘Middle Belt’ project.
According to analysts, this is based on ‘a common consciousness arising from the dis-
advantaged position’ of smaller ethnic groups in situations where Hausa–Fulani politi-
cal dominance is identified as the obstacle to desired development (Egwu 2001, 12).
Thus, Christianity links Southern Kaduna to global elements, putting the struggle in
a wider perspective, and with the possibility of embedding it in a national and transna-
tional setting (Harris 2013, 296). Perhaps more importantly, however, Christianity
strongly links Southern Kaduna with other ethnic groups in the region.

‘Local christians’ versus ‘non-local muslims’

Missionaries were successful in spreading Christianity in north-central Nigeria and
church organisations have provided a common platform for non-Hausa–Fulani
ethnic groups in the area (Kastfelt 1994, 63). These organisations have also brought
different ethnic groups in southern Kaduna closer together, and in the decolonisation
process religion was strengthened as a political category. This was expressed in the for-
mation of the Northern Nigeria Non-Muslim League, a political party formed in Jos
in 1949 and embraced in southern Kaduna (Kazah-Toure 2003, 60). Although the
party became the Middle Zone League a year later, and then merged with the
United Middle Belt Congress in 1955, the non-Muslim basis of mobilisation persisted.
Notwithstanding efforts to regionalise the basis for political domination, the party
 238 H. Angerbrandt

consisted of local ethnic branches without central coordination (63). This also suggests
that conflicts were framed in relation to local institutions, such as the colonial native
authority system. Tension remains around local institutions, and religion continues to
be articulated as the dividing line, as in the case of the Jama’a emirate located in
southern Kaduna and with its palace in Kafanchan. When a new emir was to be
installed in 1999, violence erupted after non-Muslim youths staged a protest and
wanted the emirate removed from the town.10 The placement of the palace is
further discussed below.
Like most other settings, southern Kaduna is not ethnically or religiously homo-
geneous: indeed, Southern Kaduna is framed as a community of different locally situ-
ated groups. But the local territory is constructed as non-Muslim, even though
Muslims live in the area. This is illustrated in the memorandum referred to above
after the Kafanchan clashes in 1987. In this document, the lead-up to the clashes is
described as follows:
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… the minority muslim community mounted road blocks, harassed passers-by from the
local community, humiliated women, and carried it to the extreme by attacking churches
in Sunday … on not less than three previous occasions, these muslims students had
marched from Manchok to Kafanchan, insulting the local inhabitants.11

‘Local inhabitants’ are assumed to be Christians and even though there is a ‘minority
Muslim community’ in the area, its members are not seen as part of what is local, but
as coming from ‘the outside’. There are also Christian ‘outsiders’. Their presence in
southern Kaduna is, according to a memorandum by Christian leaders in Southern
Kaduna after the 2002 crisis, legitimate:

… those Christians who are Kaduna State indigenes, or who are here by their calling and
placement of God to be here have no option to run away but to embrace the Spirit of mar-
tyrdom and stay put at their duty post to defend our God-given freedom of worship, God-
given life, God-given rights as guaranteed in our Constitution with the last drop of our
blood.12

In the description of the conflict by Southern Kaduna organisations, the Hausa–

Fulani Muslims are ‘settlers’, in contrast to the ‘indigenes’, who are stated to be the
first to have settled in an area. Muslims are accordingly not recognised as original
inhabitants, but are seen by Christians as trying to gain ground politically and
economically through the crises. This view is expressed in a statement after the post-
election violence on behalf of the Southern Kaduna Christian Leadership Council:

… a new face being added to the meaning to Jihad – that of acquisition of land and
political power through violence … these Muslims since the time of the Sardauna have
fought to control these lands both economically, politically and spiritually and have
failed. Years after their sons still fight the same fight instead of respecting the natural
boundaries and creation of Almighty God. (Kure 2011, 4)

There are, however, Christian leaders who try to downplay religious differences, and
numerous inter-religious dialogue initiatives have been organised, of which CAN and
its Muslim corresponding body, Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), are part. When the
sharia crisis of 2000 escalated, CAN and JNI jointly addressed the demonstrators and
went on television to promote peaceful coexistence.13 However, in a controversial
 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 239

statement in 2011 after a Christmas Day attack by Boko Haram on a church outside
Abuja, the national chairman of CAN since 2010, Ayo Oritsejafor, accused Muslim
clerics of being passive and encouraged Christians to form vigilante groups to protect
their communities against Islamic militants.14 A more hardline attitude has also been
evident in the Kaduna chapter of CAN, whose chairman, Samuel Kraakevik Kujiyat,
encouraged the formation of vigilante groups so that people could protect themselves
against those who ‘come with sophisticated weapons from Chad and Niger’. He added
that Christians do not possess such resources, as ‘only an expansionist mind needs
weapons’.15 By stressing religious aspects in this way, the conflict is portrayed as less con-
nected to the specific context of Kaduna. Rather, Kujiyat places the crises in Kaduna in a
national perspective and claims that ‘Kaduna happens to be the centre of the North. If
you want crises in Nigeria, you start in Kaduna’,16 while at the same time suggesting
that Muslims nurture foreign ties. There is also a wider dynamic at play: this changed
outlook came about when the militant Islamist Boko Haram insurgency had spread
across a wide area of the north, creating and exacerbating suspicions of Muslims.
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The new attitude among the CAN leadership has, however, provoked criticism
from those who stress the political aspects of the conflict. The Anglican archbishop
of Kaduna, Josiah Idawou-Fearon, is deeply engaged in Muslim–Christian dialogue.
He identifies a Hausa bias in government as the underlying cause:

The Hausa Muslim does not face the non-Hausa Christian saying ‘I am going to kill you
because you refuse to embrace Islam’. No. Never. It is because of power, authority, who is
in power … It has nothing to do with ‘he is a Muslim, he is a Christian’.

At the same time he identifies religious elements in the Hausa Muslim bias, rooted
in precolonial history:

The Hausa-Fulani has it at the back of his mind: ‘this is a Muslim area and if you are not a
Muslim, you should not enjoy the same facilities as the Muslims. There are certain rights
that you are denied’ … This is what informs our relationship as Hausa and non-Hausa in
every part of the north.17

The quest for power is accordingly identified as being entrenched in religiously

informed mind-sets.

Chiefdom creation in Kaduna state

Apart from the calls for a new state, another strategy to dissociate territories in
southern Kaduna from the emirate and Islamic influence has, since the 1960s, been
the demands for the creation of traditional institutions in the form of chiefdoms in
the Zaria emirate (Abdu 2010, 195; Yusuf 2007, 246). Chiefdoms have been created
at various times and larger reform was undertaken after the severest crisis in 2000,
when 22 new chiefdoms were created and some existing chiefs were elevated to
become so-called first class rulers. This was intended to provide people with a ‘sense
of belonging’ (Makarfi 2005) and autonomy from the emirate. The chiefdoms are
regarded as expressions of local cultures in southern Kaduna. They are, however,
dependent on the state government, which determines boundaries and the grading
of traditional rulers. Earlier demands had been articulated after the crises in 1987
 240 H. Angerbrandt

and 1992 in Kafanchan and Zangon Kataf, respectively. In a controversial report,

never released, by the judicial commission of inquiry examining the Zangon Kataf
unrest, the role of traditional authorities as a force for progress was, however,
viewed less optimistically:

reverting back to the traditional way of rulership of the Katafs would be a step backwards
… the system of rulership of the Katafs is tied to the mode of their religion of old … [it]
will hardly be practicable in present day Nigeria.18

Still, new chiefdoms were created in 1995, among them the Atyap (Kataf) chiefdom.
Again, the fact that authority is claimed on the basis of tradition and history does
not mean that this authority is fixed in form regardless of circumstances. It is the idea
of a shared past and certain traditions and habits that is seen as being important to pre-
serve. For this, it is considered essential to have a recognised territory to which the tra-
ditional rulers are linked. With the proliferation of traditional institutions, especially
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first class rulers, expectations on bringing development to the areas increase. Chiefdoms
created today cannot, however, draw legitimacy from history in the same way as the emi-
rates can. Chiefs are thus not necessarily on par with the emirs of the same grade. This is
also an effect of the fact that while projects may invoke culture and tradition, they are
still part of contemporary politics (Mamdani 2002), and the struggle over different his-
torical narratives is part of current political contestation rather than a matter of histori-
cal accuracy. There is accordingly an important symbolic dimension in separating the
territory of the chiefdoms from the emirate. The prominent Catholic priest and now
Bishop of Sokoto, Matthew Hassan Kukah, believes that people feel strongly about tra-
ditional institutions because

in 1903 our people had fought for almost a hundred years … well before 1804 to fight Islam
until the British came in 1903. Awar of resistance that said, ‘no, we don’t want to be like you’.
The British came and subordinated our people to the Islamic traditional institutions.19

Recognition of traditional institutions in Southern Kaduna accordingly equates with

acceptance of a version of history claimed in Southern Kaduna.
Traditional institutions continue to generate tension, however. In Kafanchan,
reform is regarded as incomplete as the status and location of the Jama’a emirate
and its palace is still contested. The 2011 post-election violence hit Kafanchan
hard. Afterwards, Christian leaders claimed in press releases that the ‘host community’
(Bajju ethnic group) had been attacked by ‘Muslim militants’.20 Emmanuel Kure of
the Southern Kaduna Christian Leadership Council regarded the emirate as ‘the
genesis of the problem’ and accused the palace of being behind the fighting in an
effort to gain political and economic control of Kafanchan at the expense of Chris-
tians.21 The state government has authority over chieftaincy matters and Kaduna
State has a special ministry for chieftaincy affairs. Because of a perceived link
between the state government and emirs, Southern Kaduna actors appealed to the
federal government to intervene and ‘correct’ the placement of the palace to Gidan
Waya outside Kafanchan, where, it is argued, the emirate’s original headquarters were.
The stakes associated with the creation of traditional institutions are, however, not
only cultural. Apart from expectations of material benefit, there are also hopes of
representation. As a newly installed traditional ruler expressed it:
 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 241

Gbagyi people are in government now – we have political representatives … We were mar-
ginalised; we had to go to Zaria to beg. Now we have our freedom. We can do things
according to our own tradition … If they are sharing something today in Kaduna, at
least, Gbagyi will also have their own, their little fraction.22

This suggests that recognition of ethnically based authority is instrumental in the dis-
tribution of political power and influence. A chiefdom confined to a local territory
actually has a wider bearing, as the group, or segments of it, are now in a new position
in relation to other groups. In this light, the demand for chiefdoms is not only a matter
of (cultural) self-determination but also to gain relevance beyond the local area. When
new chiefdoms were created out of the Zaria emirate, this circumscribed the influence
of emirate authorities in cultural and political decision-making. I interviewed the
former governor, Ahmed Makarfi, who took the decision to carve out new chiefdoms
from existing emirates just after a court rejected a challenge to his election victory for a
senatorial seat. With a chastened attitude, he said that ‘some of the traditional rulers
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were not happy’ with the new chiefdoms, thereby suggesting that those rulers had
sponsored the court challenge.23
Even though traditional institutions have no constitutional power, the creation
of chiefdoms in Kaduna State has been widely hailed as a form of popular self-
determination. The emirs are associated with the powerful ‘northern oligarchy’,
which is seen as having dominated Nigerian politics since independence. The informal
political power of traditional leaders renders connections beyond the locality essential
for actualising transformative ambitions. While emirs are part of the regional cali-
phate, the newly created chiefdoms in southern Kaduna are localised and lack
similar institutional connections. The chiefdoms, furthermore, have smaller territories.
This has led some activists to question the role of chiefdoms in achieving autonomy.
The SOKAPU press secretary has argued:

… chiefdom creation has further bastardised the struggle of the Southern Kaduna,
because everybody now sees himself as having the autonomy to do a lot of things and
… it gives them [Hausa-Fulani Muslims] more control in Kaduna, because today …
out of 23, I think 4 local governments are under the emir of Zazzau. So to say, he
could talk to them, he’s like a governor himself … I think the number of District Heads
he has under his emirate is equivalent to about 32 traditional rulers we have in southern
Kaduna. In some local government you find three chiefs. Three in one local government.
So even to control the local government is a problem.24

In this perspective, the creation of chiefdoms has fragmented Southern Kaduna

through the localisation of traditional authorities. The relevance of the chiefdoms is
in relation to the state and the ability to control political authority, and especially
to local governments, which are weak but control resources and have the right to
issue certificates of indigeneity.
Although portrayed as custodians of local values and traditions, traditional insti-
tutions, as well as religious organisations, are often, like the state, hierarchically struc-
tured. In a similar way, the more influential religious organisations have connections
beyond the local. CAN and JNI, for example, are national organisations with subna-
tional branches. The emirate is the most obvious example of a hierarchical traditional
system. So when it is argued that traditional institutions are ‘closest’ to the people, the
meaning is that the institutions branch out through district heads, village heads, etc.
 242 H. Angerbrandt

More importantly, however, this means that traditional institutions penetrate social
relations in a way the state does not. As for the state, these structures may be a
means of control or for responding to people’s needs and requests. There is,
however, an essential difference: traditional institutions have the assignment of sus-
taining ‘the community’ as an idea, while the state supposedly responds to citizens.
After new chiefdoms were created for groups in southern Kaduna, resistance to the
Zaria emirate became less acute, and instead ethnic and religious identities now dom-
inate. Southern Kaduna as a concept is relatively new and was earlier called Southern
Zaria. The new name underscores the distancing from the emirate and the claim to
territory south of Zaria. Some are sceptical about this terminological change, includ-
ing a former SOKAPU treasurer and elder:

When I was a student at the university, it was not called southern Kaduna, it was called
southern Zaria, which means the land south of Zaria, right from Jaji, where the army
installations are, down to the south, belongs to southern Zaria … So, they came and
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change it to Southern Kaduna so they are already conceding land.25

Others argue that Southern Kaduna covers the same area as Southern Zaria, but that
its name is adopted from that of the state. The name change may be seen as part of the
demand for state creation. There is also a territorial dimension in that the Southern
Kaduna concept relates to the structure of the state rather than to the Zaria emirate.

Localisation of state control

When confrontations occur in Kaduna, leading political actors react by prioritising a
national perspective, with the federal state the presumed target of the violence. After
the Kafanchan crisis in 1987, the president described it as an attempt to ‘subvert the
federal military government and the Nigerian nation’ (as quoted in Kukah 1993, 190).
Following the riots in February 2000, the governor claimed that ‘the whole confusion
was targeted at the president of the country, not me’ (Agekameh 2000, 30). State
government efforts have consequently been directed at ending the violence rather
than at resolving local grievances. To this end, community and religious leaders
have been instrumental as they have the capacity to control youths. CAN and JNI
are the main bodies for such dialogue. Self-initiated dialogue forums include the Inter-
faith Mediation Centre and the Women’s Interfaith Council. Although these have
accomplished much in terms of re-establishing communal relations, they are unable
to address issues beyond religious suspicion and ignorance. Their programmes and
activities aim to foster tolerance and understanding and the organisations lack the
means to resolve grievances based on experienced discrimination and marginalisation.
In this way, the state government further localises the causes of and solutions to con-
flicts and instead of treating them as part of political relations refers them to the com-
munity sphere. Thus, when during a newspaper interview the governor was asked ‘how
soon will the Lere issue [in which some wanted a new chiefdom, and others resisted] be
resolved? [Governor] Makarfi [responded]: This is communal. It is not for us [i.e. the
state government] to go and solve their problem’ (Dikko 2000, 3). So when a conflict is
labelled communal it is implied that it is also a local issue. While the state’s rhetoric
ascribes recurring crises to national political dynamics, its activities are, apart from
the focus on security, directed at supporting various aspects of local ethnic and reli-
gious relations.
 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 243

Instead of using and developing local state institutions when authority is localised,
traditional rulers and religious leaders are used to implement government pro-
grammes. This means that religious organisations gain access to and influence over
the state and can use state resources for their purposes, as the Kaduna State JNI
chairman explains:

We accorded audience at the slightest thing we wanted to see [the governor]. Any hour of
the day he gives us audience. Either singly to Jama’atu [Nasril Islam], or jointly [with the
Christian Association of Nigeria]. He has given us a lot of assistance. Whenever we meet
him, whatever we want – we get it. In terms of mobility, vehicles, money to buy petrol,
money to help the disabled, the poor, everything.26

On the other hand, as traditional and religious leaders become dependent on state
authorities, there is less scope for opposition to the government. The former governor
confirms the instrumental role of the traditional institutions as state actors:
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Traditional rulers cannot dictate any longer – they used to but can no longer. They inter-
fere, but tend to be on the side of authority [i.e. the government]. It is about survival in
office for them. Because they fear that politicians can remove them so they have to go
along. Anyone unfriendly to the government is seen as unfriendly to the traditional insti-
tutions … The government uses them.27

While traditional and religious leaders gain access to political and economic resources
and get increased control over people, they also become more associated with political
interests. At the same time, a political candidate who has not secured support from tra-
ditional and religious leaders has limited prospects of success.28 In line with the con-
servative character of tradition-based authority, the influence of traditional rulers not
only reduces the scope for opposition but also constitutes a barrier for women, who
need to rely on their husbands ‘advocacy’,29 and other less privileged groups.
The ways in which state institutions intervene (or not) are interpreted in relation to
the state’s positioning in the conflict. The ability and willingness of the state to protect
people have been questioned by international observers (e.g. ICG 2010, 24) as well as
by people in affected areas.30 After the 2011 violence, Muslim leaders in southern
Kaduna filed a case with the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice in which they
requested the federal government to compensate victims and establish a police base
in the area. This stratagem, according to a community leader in the Jama’a Local
Government Area, is grounded in distrust of the state courts and the perception
that the governor is reluctant to investigate the role of the perpetrators of violence
(Sa’idu 2011). While Muslim leaders appeal to international institutions, Southern
Kaduna leaders, and, as noted earlier, Christian leaders encourage the formation of
vigilante groups as a security measure (Binniyat 2013). Both these approaches
bespeak a refutation of regional and local state institutions. The divergence in
approach between Muslim and Southern Kaduna leaders has its basis in local con-
ditions, with Christian ethnic groups in a majority position and Hausa Muslims a min-
ority. It should be noted that on this occasion both the president and the Kaduna State
governor were Christian. When the former governor – the first Christian governor
from Southern Kaduna – visited Zonkwa in the south of the state after the violence
in 2011, he was pelted with stones by aggrieved youths.31 Hence, it is not necessarily
the case that executives are perceived by ‘their own’ religious and local groups as
 244 H. Angerbrandt

supportive. Elite politicians are instead often perceived as selfish and disconnected
from their kin, as discussed below.32

State creation
After the crises in 2000, leaders from the northern and southern parts of the state
agreed to split the state in two as a way to end the conflict, though both sides
claimed most of the present state (Kaduna State of Nigeria 2000). Even the governor
endorsed the suggestion (Gumi 2003). However, state creation is a federal and consti-
tutional matter and for the suggestion to be considered, it needs to be inserted into a
national process which considers similar requests in other localities. Abdu (2010, 196)
argues that the creation of new states, as well as chiefdoms, tends to heighten tension
and generate conflict instead of empowering disadvantaged groups, as these insti-
tutions are recognised as a means for distributing patronage, resulting in ‘almost
every ethnic group or community in Kaduna state … demanding … a Chiefdom
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and/or Local Government’. The fact that the conflict involves elite competition for
political and economic resources is also reflected, for example, in a report from a
forum of Southern Kaduna elders. They had come together to discuss whether to
push for a Christian governor and the principal question was who should be promoted
into that position (Southern Kaduna Elders Consultative Forum 2002).
The states are nevertheless important arenas for politics and policy-making.
Suberu (2005) argues that heterogeneous states have established state-based identities
independent of, and competing with, ethnicity. Inter-governmental competition and
coalitions thus do not overlap with ethnic competition and mobilisation, and serve
to de-emphasise ethnic sentiments in politics. However, the downgrading of ethnicity
in politics emerges only nationally. In Kaduna, alternative state-based coalitions are
instead accused of being based on personal interests rather than concerns about
how to develop the state. Southern Kaduna has produced federal ministers and sena-
tors, but politicians are said to be corrupted by ‘northern’ interests and are not dedi-
cated to the cause of Southern Kaduna: ‘They … have engaged themselves in the
struggle against one another for recognition, and have abandoned the key issue affect-
ing the people they ought to be representing’.33 This was the assessment of top poli-
ticians in a memorandum by Southern Kaduna personalities campaigning for a
Christian to be the top candidate for the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), at the
time the ruling party in Kaduna State. This has also led to internal rifts within
SOKAPU, which at one point expelled some prominent members, including the
deputy governor (Tell (Lagos), 18 September, 2000, 40–41). This ‘lack of integrity’
is seen as the consequence of scheming by Muslim politicians. Such machinations
include, according to one of my Southern Kaduna informants, gerrymandering of
the three senatorial districts so that two are associated with the ‘North’ while Southern
Kaduna gets only one.
Rather than fostering alternative identities, the creation of new states has entangled
ethnic and statist sentiments with concepts like ‘place of origin’ and ‘indigeneity’,
which inform official government practice and imply an ethnic categorisation
(Igwara 2001, 88–89). ‘Certificates of indigeneity’ are issued by local governments,
but in Kaduna State the district head34 must, according to HRW (2006, 48–54),
first approve the application, which in some areas leads to ethnic and religious bias.
Indigeneity implies being among the rightful ‘owners’ of a place and territory.
 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 245

The chiefdom is acknowledgement of a group’s linkages to the territory, and when

chiefdoms are established, indigeneity is reaffirmed. States consequently ‘belong’ to
a segment of the inhabitants, regarded as locals, while those not regarded as indigenes
are considered settlers coming from ‘outside’, regardless of how many generations they
have been in a certain place. Christian ethnic groups are recognised as indigenes of the
local governments they control in the southern part of the state and can thus benefit
from educational and employment benefits in the state and the so-called federal char-
acter principle, whereby the diversity of Nigeria is to be reflected in national appoint-
ments, the federal government, etc. Local recognition is thus necessary for inclusion in
national politics and it is on the basis of being part of an ethnic community that people
can claim historical territorial connections.
A new state in southern Kaduna would not be ethnically homogenous, but the
underlying logic of the demand for a new state is ethnic self-determination.
However, political concerns do not necessarily mirror patterns of belonging: the
Gbagyi are considered the original inhabitants of Kaduna city but, according to
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Harris (2013, 296), have been denied indigeneity status. Gbagyi elders have, according
to James Wuye, a Gbagyi well known as the co-coordinator of the Inter-Faith
Mediation Centre, been undecided as to whether to ally with ‘the north’ for political
and economic reasons, or join ‘the south’, ‘where we culturally belong’.35 Moreover,
the demand for a new state needs to be related to the way in which Nigerian federalism
has developed. A new state implies new arenas and opportunities for some of the
population to access state resources assigned from the centre. The character of fiscal
decentralisation in Nigeria, and high dependence on federal resources combined
with the institutionalisation of patronage politics, provide powerful incentives for
requesting new states to be created (LeVan 2005, 217).

Conclusion
In this article, I have analysed how geographical scale is framed in relation to territory
and identity by Christian and Southern Kaduna actors in the conflict in Kaduna State.
Contrary to perspectives that take scalar categories as given, for example, Harris
(2013, 288), who states that the division in Kaduna is ‘a clash between the Hausa
Muslim majority and local Christian tribes’, this article interrogates the sense in
which Christian groups claim local rootedness that Muslims allegedly do not share.
This politics of scale has been analysed in relation to the spatial organisation of the
Nigerian state, where territorial demarcations are defined with reference to group iden-
tities. This is expressed through the recurrent reorganisation of the federal units, the
practice of indigeneity and the restructuring of neo-customary institutions. The cre-
ation of additional territorial units is done to ‘bring government closer to the
people’, as it changes the identity-based composition of state governments and pre-
sumably gives people ‘a sense of belonging’. In the process, however, others become
alienated, since people who used to be able to claim indigeneity may end up in the
‘wrong’ state (Kraxberger 2005, 9). The practice of indigeneity makes political
inclusion dependent on community belonging, which in turn is linked to specific ter-
ritories. Strictly speaking, a change in government responsibilities does not necessarily
follow from federal reconfiguration. In Nigeria, the decentralisation slogan of bring-
ing the state closer to the people means having authorities associated with the ethnicity
of the majority within a specific territory. This is why decentralisation is considered to
 246 H. Angerbrandt

be achieved not only through state creation, but also through the transfer of authority
to not always localised traditional institutions. In other words, attaching ethnic and
religious identities to territorial institutions is intertwined with notions of decentrali-
sation. ‘The local’ thus represents a type of social relations based on factors other than
geographical proximity, and ‘closer’ refers to values and traditions rather than physical
distance.
This is further underlined by the insignificance of local state institutions in the con-
struction of the conflict. In the constitution, local governments are the third tier of the
state. They, however, enjoy limited autonomy and their ability to perform is closely
linked to the state government. Resources allocated from the federal government go
through state governments, which often find reasons to withhold or to lay claim to
resources through joint projects, thus limiting the space for local governments to prior-
itise their needs. Malfunctioning local governments have the effect of sidelining local
state institutions, which are seen as irrelevant by citizens, although a recurring issue is
the lack of representation and patterns of political domination. Instead, neo-custom-
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ary institutions have become the principal means for attaining local autonomy.
However, their authority is rooted in the identity sphere, based on perceptions of
the culture and tradition of a specific group, as opposed to political authority that,
in principle, is based on agreement between state and citizens.
The prioritisation of the local is reinforced through its association with community
authorities such as chiefdoms and customary courts. At the same time, a heightened
notion of the global comes into play with the focus on religion, both through dialogue
initiatives and perceived religious characteristics that are considered to nurture con-
flict. Actors who downplay the religious aspects of the conflict recognise the material
benefits associated with the chiefdoms and customary courts. They also stress that
when grievances are addressed through the creation of traditional institutions, the
chances for discussing and resolving issues related to state institutions and privileges
will improve. Bishop Kukah expresses this position: ‘I have gone and asked them
[the government] to set up a customary court in my village … then we can start
talking about other things’.36 The creation of additional neo-customary institutions
has, however, had little impact on perceived marginalisation, and, if anything, has
led to an increase in calls for a separate state. Grievances are not confined to the
local and the newly created traditional institutions have not been able to exert
power beyond the local. At the same time, more powerful traditional rulers can
extend their influence, and likewise draw on regional connections. Traditional rulers
must also be able to translate their authority based on custom and tradition into
the sphere of state politics, and in this endeavour local political relations are less
important.
Attempts to settle the conflict have thus been directed towards customary and reli-
gious issues (cf. Abdu 2010, 193–213). Ethnic commitments are upgraded as chief-
doms are recognised as the avenue for resource distribution; tradition is imposed as
customary courts apply conservative values in regulating relations; and religious
affiliations are endorsed by the resort to inter-religious dialogue as a mechanism for
conflict resolution. At the same time, local state institutions are sidelined. The regional
state – that is the federal unit – is more or less exclusively engaged, since the involve-
ment of federal institutions is limited to security. Taken together, this approach to con-
flict tends to reinforce ethnicity and religion as a basis for inclusion. The state divides
the population on a group basis according to supposed cultural and religious
 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 247

homogeneity, which also becomes the basis for inclusion and exclusion. Accordingly,
people are viewed and treated as members of communities rather than as citizens.

Acknowledgements
The author is grateful for comments on earlier versions of this article by Anders Sjögren, Henrik
Berglund, Lars Lindström and two anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes
1. The word is apostrophised here to indicate that the ‘traditional’ is seldom as historically
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rooted as portrayed. What counts as traditional practices were often developed under colo-
nial rule (Usman 2006, 44). For ease of reading, the quotation marks are omitted in the rest
of the text.
2. Head of State, General Mohammed in Daily Times, February 4, 1976, (as quoted in Alapiki
2005).
3. The National Conference, chaired by Justice Idris Kutigi, was inaugurated by President
Goodluck Jonathan in March 2014 with the aim of ‘realistically examining and genuinely
resolving, long-standing impediments to our cohesion and harmonious development as a
truly United Nation’ (www.nigerianationalconference2014.org/aim). It consisted of 20
committees, of which the Committee on political restructuring and forms of government
addressed the issue of state creation. In August 2014, the conference delivered its report
to the president.
4. Nock, Ishaya. 2008. President SOKAPU. Interview by author. Kaduna, March 12.
5. Gadani, Marc Jacob. 2008. Press Secretary SOKAPU. Interview by author. Kaduna,
March 23.
6. SOKAPU crisis: The Makarfi coup, New Impression October/November 2000. Emphasis
added.
7. When capitalised, Southern Kaduna refers to the conception of the groups living in the
area, while southern (lower case) Kaduna is a geographical reference.
8. A Group of Concerned Citizens of Netzit (Southern Zaria) Origin. 1987. Memorandum sub-
mitted to the Administrative committee of investigation into the March 1987 crisis in Kaduna
State, page 1.
9. Dogo, Saido. 2008 Secretary, CAN, Northern Nigeria. Interview by author. Kaduna,
March 12.
10. Weekly Trust (Kaduna). June 4, 1999, 2–6.
11. A Group of Concerned Citizens of Netzit (Southern Zaria) Origin. 1987. Memorandum sub-
mitted to the Administrative committee of investigation into the March 1987 crisis in Kaduna
State. p. 82. Emphasis added.
12. Press release by the Kaduna State Indigenous Pastors network on the 2002 ‘Miss World’
riots. Emphasis added
13. Hayab, John Joseph. 2008. Secretary-General, CAN, Kaduna State. Interview by author.
Kaduna, February 22; Makarfi, Jafa’arau. 2007. Kaduna State Chairman, JNI. Interview
by author. Kaduna, February 6.
14. BBC. 2011. Nigeria Christians ’to defend churches from Boko Haram’. December 28. (Avail-
able at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16350635, retrieved May 13, 2015.)
15. Kujiyat, Samuel Kraakivit. 2012. Chairman, CAN, Kaduna State. Interview by author.
Kaduna, February 2.
16. Ibid.
17. Idowu-Fearon, Josiah. 2012. Anglican Archbishop, Province of Kaduna; Bishop of
Kaduna diocese. Interview by author, February 16.
 248 H. Angerbrandt

18. Report of the Zangon Kataf (Market) Riots Judicial Commission of Inquiry, June 1992.
19. Kukah, Matthew Hassan. 2007. Catholic priest, diocese of Kafanchan. Interview by
author. Kaduna, March 6.
20. Office of Justice, Development and Peace Commission (JDPC), Catholic Diocese of Kafan-
chan. n.d. The violent crisis in Kafanchan and its environs following the April 16th 2011
presidential election. Press release.
21. Mernyi (2011); Kure, Emmanuel. 2012. Pastor. Throne Room Ministry. Interview by
author. Kafanchan, February 9.
22. Barde, Danjuma S. 2009. Gbagyi chief. Interview by author. Kaduna, October 5.
23. Makarfi, Ahmed Mohammed. 2012. Senator, former governor 1999–2007. Interview by
author. Kaduna, February 2.
24. Gadani, Marc Jacob. 2008. Press Secretary SOKAPU. Interview by author. Kaduna,
March 23.
25. Former SOKAPU treasurer. 2008. Interview by author. Kaduna, March 27.
26. Makarfi, Jafa’arau. 2007. Kaduna State Chairman, JNI. Interview by author. Kaduna,
February 6.
27. Makarfi, Ahmed Mohammed. 2012. Senator, former governor 1999–2007. Interview by
author. Kaduna, February 2.
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28. Local politician 2009. Kaduna State. Interview by author. Kaduna, October 4.
29. Ibid.
30. E.g. Youth Leader, Kabala West. 2012. Interview by author. Kabala West, Kaduna. Febru-
ary 4.
31. Interviews with youths in Zonkwa by author. February 9, 2012. Patrick Yakowa succeeded
the elected governor Namadi Sambo when the latter was appointed vice-president in 2010.
Yakowa died in a helicopter crash in 2013.
32. Likewise, the former Muslim governor Makarfi is reported to have been nicknamed ‘Pastor
Makarfi’ due to his perceived reluctance to introduce the sharia criminal code in 2000
(HRW 2003, 6).
33. Concerned Southern Kaduna People Movement for Power Shift. 2003. Memo in Support
of Power Shift to Southern Kaduna Submitted to the South Kaduna Political Committee.
February 26.
34. Emirates and chiefdoms are divided into a number of districts that have separate rulers
appointed by the emir or chief.
35. Wuye, James. 2012. Gbagyi; pastor; Inter-Faith Mediation Centre. Interview by author.
Kaduna, February 6.
36. Kukah, Matthew Hassan. 2007. Catholic priest, diocese of Kafanchan. Interview by
author. Kaduna, March 6.

Note on contributor
Henrik Angerbrandt is a Ph.D. candidate and lecturer in the Department of Political Science at
Stockholm University, Sweden. His teaching and research interests include: politics of democra-
tisation and development; identity mobilisation in conflicts; and peace and security in Africa.
His doctoral thesis interrogates ethnic and religious identities in Nigerian politics, with particu-
lar reference to Kaduna State. He has published previously in Journal of Contemporary African
Studies.

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