Professional Documents
Culture Documents
, CORAL BEACH
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF According to the Solicitor General, the Court of First Instance
BATAAN, vs CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint
and in
In this petition for review on certiorari, Convenience Foods
Corporation (hereafter simply SUNBEAM) and Coral Beach a. Not finding that since the lower court acted in a Motion to
Development Corporation (hereafter simply CORAL BEACH) Dismiss, the correctness of its decision must be decided in the
bring to our attention the decision rendered by the Court of assumed truth and accuracy of the allegations of the complaint.
Appeals in "Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Pedro T. Santiago, The complaint alleges that the lands in question are forest lands;
et al.," disposing as follows: hence, inalienable.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted. The order of the b. Finding that Lots I and 2 are alienable and disposable lands of
respondent judge dated October 7, 1977, dismissing Civil Case No. the public domain under the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands
4062 is set aside, and respondent judge is ordered to require despite clear and positive evidence to the contrary.
private respondents to file their answer to the complaint in said
Civil Case No. 4062 and thereafter to proceed with the trial of the c. Concluding that the complaint for reversion is defective as it
case on the merits and to render judgment thereon.' was not initiated by the Director of Lands.
The following facts stated by the respondent Court in its decision d. Finding that the complaint for reversion states no cause of
and restated by the petitioners in their petition are accurate: action for alleged failure of petitioner to exhaust administrative
remedies. 6
(a) On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance
of a Sales Patent in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for
Foods, Inc., over the parcels of land both situated in Mariveles, certiorari, set aside the Order of Dismissal rendered by the Court
Bataan and more particularly described and bounded as follows: of First Instance in Civil Case No. 4062, and ordered the presiding
judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago to receive the answers of the private
Lot 1-Sgs-2409 (area 3,113,695 sq. m ) respondents SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH in the action for
reversion.
Lot 2-Sgs-2409 area 1,401,855 sq. m
Hence Sunbeam and Coral Beach filed this petition for review.
(b) On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered
with the defendant Register of Deeds of Bataan who in turn A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion,
issued Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 in favor of defendant and is granted only when there are special and important reasons
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two parcels of land therefore. The following, while neither controlling nor fully
above-described; measuring the Court's discretion, enumerates the premises for
granting a review:
(c) Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- (a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
12421 was issued over Lot 1, Sgs-2409, while Transfer Certificate substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court or
of Title No. 12422 was issued over Lot 2, Sgs-2409, both in favor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or the
of defendant Coral Beach Development Corporation I applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; and
(d) On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General in the name of the (b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the
Republic of the Philippines instituted before the Court of First accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or so far
Instance of Bataan, an action for reversion docketed as Civil Case sanctioned such departure by a lower court as to call for
No. 4062. 2 supervision .7
SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH filed a Motion to Dismiss on the We agree with the Court of Appeals' granting of the petition filed
following grounds: by the Republic of the Philippines charging the then Court of First
Instance with grave abuse of discretion. The filing of the Motion
1. The Republic of the Philippines should have exhausted all to Dismiss the complaint for reversion by SUNBEAM and CORAL
administrative remedies before filing the case in court; BEACH on the ground of lack of cause of action, necessarily
carried with it the admission, for purposes of the motion, of the
2. The title issued to SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH had become truth of all material facts pleaded in the complaint instituted by
indefeasible and imprescriptible; the Republic.
3. The action for reversion was defective, having been initiated by An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the
the Solicitor General and not by the Director of Lands. 3 classification of the lands as forest lands. This material allegation
stated in the Republic's complaint' was never denied specifically
The then Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissed the 9 by the defendants (petitioners herein) SUNBEAM and CORAL
complaint in the Order of October 7, 1977,4 adopting mainly the BEACH.
theory that since the titles sought to be cancelled emanated from
the administrative act of the Bureau of Lands Director, the latter, If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these
not the courts, had jurisdiction over the disposition of the land. proceedings become moot and academic. Land remains
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open
The Solicitor General received the copy of the Order on October to disposition.10
11, 1977 and filed a Notice of Appeal dated October 25, 1977 .5
The Solicitor General then moved for an extension of thirty days Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural,
within which to file the Record on Appeal and to pay the docket timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State.11 Thus,
fee in order to perfect the appeal. This was to be followed by before any land may be declassified from the forest group and
another motion for extension filed by the Solicitor General, converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
resulting in the Court of Appeals granting the petitioner another other purposes, there must be a positive act from the
extension of fifteen days from December 10, 1977. Finally before government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do
this period of extension lapsed, instead of an appeal, a petition for not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is
certiorari with the respondent Court of Appeals was filed. released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain. 12
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does
not confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the
title or patent is part of the public forest. 13
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC vs HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Judge, Br. I, C I, Nueva 3) as counsel of the Republic, he should have been but
Vizcaya, HEIRS OF CASIANO SANDOVAL, HEIRS OF LIBERATO was not given notice of the compromise agreement or otherwise
BAYAUA, JOSE C. REYES, and PHILIPPINE CACAO AND FARM accorded an opportunity to take part therein;
PRODUCTS, INC.
4) that he was not even served with notice of the decision
Sought to be annulled and set aside in this special civil action of approving the compromise; it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
certiorari is the decision of respondent Judge Sofronio G. Sayo of Quirino Province that drew his attention to the "patently
rendered on March 5, 1981 in Land Registration Case No. N-109, erroneous decision" and requested him to take immediate
LRC Record No. 20850, confirming, by virtue of a compromise remedial measures to bring about its annulment.
agreement, the title of the private respondents over a tract of
land. The respondents maintain, on the other hand, that the Solicitor
General's arguments are premised on the proposition that Lot
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original 7454 is public land, but it is not. According to them, as pointed
application for registration of a tract of land identified as Lot No. out in the application for registration, the private character of the
7454 of the Cadastral Survey of Santiago, BL Cad. 211 (July 17, land is demonstrated by the following circumstances, to wit:
1961) and having an area of 33,950 hectares. The land was
formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela, 1) the possessory information title of the applicants and
but had been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic their predecessors-in-interest;
Act No. 236.
2) the fact that Lot 7454 was never claimed to be public
Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director land by the Director of Lands in the proper cadastral proceedings;
of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and some others, including
the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua.1 In due course, an order of general 3) the pre-war certification of the National Library dated
default was thereafter entered on December 11, 1961 against the August 16, 1932 to the effect that the (Estadistica de
whole world except the oppositors. Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896 and appearing in the
Bureau of Archives, the property in question was registered
The case dragged on for about twenty (20) years until March 3, under the 'Spanish system of land registration as private property
1981 when a compromise agreement was entered into by and owned by Don Liberato Bayaua, applicants' predecessors-in-
among all the parties, assisted by their respective counsel, interest;
namely: the Heirs of Casiano Sandoval (who had since died), the
Bureau of Lands, the Bureau of Forest Development, the Heirs of 4) the proceeding for registration, brought under Act 496
Liberato Bayaua, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, (the Torrens Act) presupposes that there is already a title to be
Inc. Under the compromise agreement, the Heirs of Casiano confirmed by the court, distinguishing it from proceedings under
Sandoval (as applicants) renounced their claims and ceded — the Public Land Act where the presumption is always that the
land involved belongs to the State.
1) in favor of the Bureau of Lands, an area of 4,109
hectares; Under the Regalian Doctrine 2 all lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
2) in favor of the Bureau of Forest Development, 12,341 the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land registration
hectares; proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that
the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public
3) in favor of the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua, 4,000 domain. 3 Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and
hectares; and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by
him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
4) in favor of Philippine Cacao & Farm Products, Inc., Government or by possessory information title, or any other
8,000 hectares. means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property
must be held to be part of the public domain . 4 The applicant
The remaining area of 5,500 hectares was, under the compromise must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his
agreement, adjudicated to and acknowledged as owned by the claim; he may not rely on general statements, or mere
Heirs of Casiano Sandoval, but out of this area, 1,500 hectares conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and
were assigned by the Casiano Heirs to their counsel, Jose C. Reyes, title. 5
in payment of his attorney's fees. In consideration of the areas
respectively allocated to them, all the parties also mutually In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal document
waived and renounced all their prior claims to and over Lot No. relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration, to
7454 of the Santiago Cadastre. prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of
their application, was a photocopy of a certification of the
In a decision rendered on March 5, 1981, the respondent Judge National Library dated August 16, 1932 (already above
approved the compromise agreement and confirmed the title and mentioned) to the effect that according to the Government's
ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms. (Estadistica de Propiedades) of Isabela issued in 1896, the
property in question was registered under the Spanish system of
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, land registration as private property of Don Liberato Bayaua. But,
has taken the present recourse in a bid to have that decision of as this Court has already had occasion to rule, that Spanish
March 5, 1981 annulled as being patently void and rendered in document, the (Estadistica de Propiedades,) cannot be considered
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The a title to property, it not being one of the grants made during the
Solicitor General contends that — Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting primary evidence
of ownership. 6 It is an inefficacious document on which to base
1) no evidence whatever was adduced by the parties in any finding of the private character of the land in question.
support of their petitions for registration;
And, of course, to argue that the initiation of an application for
2) neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forest registration of land under the Torrens Act is proof that the land is
Development had legal authority to enter into the compromise of private ownership, not pertaining to the public domain, is to
agreement; beg the question. It is precisely the character of the land as
private which the applicant has the obligation of establishing. For
there can be no doubt of the intendment of the Land Registration
Act, Act 496, that every applicant show a proper title for
registration; indeed, even in the absence of any adverse claim, the
applicant is not assured of a favorable decree by the Land
Registration Court, if he fails to establish a proper title for official
recognition.
SO ORDERED.
SEVILLE vs NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY '1. The Deed of Sale executed by Calixtra Yap on June 14, 1980 in
favor of LSBDA, (Exhibit PP and 25) conveying the subject
Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as property to said LSBDA is declared NULL and VOID ab initio;
alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person,
that piece of land remains part of the public domain. Hence, '2. The intestate estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA is declared the owner
occupation thereof, however long, cannot ripen into ownership. in fee simple of the 735,333 square meters real property subject
of the present action and defendant NDC is ordered to segregate
The Case the same area from OCT P-28131 and CONVEY the same to the
Estate of Joaquin Ortega;
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
November 29, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals1 (CA), as '3. Upon the segregation of the 735,333 square meters from OCT
well as the May 19, 1997 CA Resolution2 denying the Motion for No. P-28131 the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte is
Reconsideration. The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads as ordered to issue 8 new title to the said portion in the name of the
follows: Intestate Estate of Joaquin Ortega;
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET '4. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, PASAR, are ordered to pay jointly
ASIDE. Another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the and severally to [petitioners] the sum of FOUR MILLION SEVEN
complaint. The counterclaims of appellants are denied. Costs HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY
against plaintiffs-appellees."3 SIX PESOS (P4,784,846.00) as rentals due from 1979 to the
present, plus accrued interest pursuant to par. 2 of the Lease
The Facts Contract between NDC and PASAR. (Exhibit 54)
The appellate court narrated the undisputed facts in this manner: '5. [Respondents] LSBDA, NDC, and PHILPHOS are also ordered to
pay jointly and severally [petitioners] the sum of TWO MILLION
"1. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 625, Leyte Sab-A Basin EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT PESOS
Development Authority (LSBDA) was created to integrate AND SIXTY CENTAVOS (P2,086,398.60) as accrued rentals of
government and private sector efforts for a planned development PHILPHOS from 1979 to present, plus the accrued interest for
and balanced growth of the Sab-a Basin in the [P]rovince of Leyte, non-payment pursuant to paragraph 2 of the same Lease Contract
empowered to acquire real property in the successful prosecution cited above;
of its business. Letter of Instruction No. 962 authorized LSBDA to
acquire privately-owned lands circumscribed in the Leyte '6. [Respondents] are ordered to pay jointly and severally
Industrial Development Estate (LIDE) by way of negotiated sales [petitioners] P200,000.00 as indemnity for the value of the
with the landowners. ancestral home;
"2. On June 14, 1980, [Respondent] Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA '7. [Respondents] are also ordered to pay jointly and severally
Lot No. 057 SWO 08-000047 consisting of 464,920 square meters, [petitioners] the sum of P250,000.00 as reimbursement for
located at Barangay Sto. Rosario, Isabel, Leyte, covered under Tax attorney's fees and the further sum of P50,000.00 as expenses for
Declarations Nos. 3181, 3579, 3425, 1292 and 4251 under the litigation;
name of said vendor.1âwphi1.nêt
'8. Finally, [petitioners] and [respondents] are ordered to sit
"3. On June 1, 1982, appellant LSBDA fired a Miscellaneous Sales down together and discuss the possibility of a compromise
Application with the Bureau of Lands covering said lot together agreement on how the improvements introduced on the
with other lots acquired by LSBDA with an aggregate area of landholding subject of the present suit should be disposed of and
'442,7508 square meters.' for the parties to submit to this Court a joint manifestation
relative thereto. In the absence of any such compromise
"4. After due notice and investigation conducted by the Bureau of agreement, such improvements shall be disposed of pursuant to
Lands, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353 was issued in the Article 449 of the New Civil Code.
name of [Respondent] LSBDA on the basis of which Original
Certificate of Title No. P-28131 was transcribed in the 'Costs against [respondents].
Registration Book for the [P]rovince of Leyte on August 12, 1983
in the name of [Respondent] LSBDA. On December 14, 1989, 'SO ORDERED.'"4
LSBDA assigned all its rights over the subject property to its [Co-
respondent] National Development Company (NOC) as a result of Ruling of the Court of Appeals
which a new Transfer Certificate of Title "vas issued on March 2,
1990 by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Northern Leyte Citing the Regalian doctrine that lands not appearing to be
in the name of NDC. The subject property was leased to privately owned are presumed to be part of the public domain,
[Respondents] Philippine Associated Smelting & Refining the CA held that, first, there was no competent evidence to prove
Corporation (PASAR), Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer that the property in question was private in character. Second,
Corporation (PHILPHOS) and Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., possession thereof, no matter how long, would not ripen into
Inc. (LEPANTO). ownership, absent any showing that the land had been classified
as alienable. Third, the property had been untitled before the
"5. On November 29, 1988, the Estate of Joaquin Ortega issuance of the Miscellaneous Sales Patent in favor of LSBDA.
represented by judicial administrator Felipe Seville filed with the Fourth, petitioners were guilty of laches, because they had failed
Regional Trial Court (Branch 12) of Ormoc City, a complaint for to apply for the judicial confirmation of their title, if they had any.
recovery of real property, rentals and damages against the above- Fifth, there was no evidence of bad faith on "the part of LSBDA in
named [respondents] which complaint was later on amended on dealing with Yap regarding the property.
May 11, 1990. [Respondents] filed their respective Answers. After
trial, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of Hence, this Petition.5
which reads as follows:
The Issues
'WHEREFORE, [a] decision is hereby rendered for [petitioners]
and against [respondents]. In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for
the consideration of the Court:6
"A. Whether or not the sale by Calixtra Yap of the Estate of the
Late Joaquin Ortega in favor of LSBDA was null and void. xxx xxx xxx
"B. Whether or not the issuance of a Miscellaneous Sales Patent (b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-
and an Original Certificate of Title in favor of LSBDA was valid. interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
"C. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of laches. domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
"D. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the remedy of application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
reconveyance and the damages awarded by the trial court." war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
In the main, the Court is called upon to determine the validity of grant and shall he entitled to a certificate of title under the
LSBDA's title. In resolving this issue, it will also ascertain provisions of this Chapter."
whether, before the issuance of the title, the land was private or
public. Under Section 4 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073,10
paragraph "b" of the aforecited provision applies only to alienable
The Court's Ruling and disposable lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
The Petition has no merit. "SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c),
Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act, are hereby amended in the
Main Issue: sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
Validity of LSBDA continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
Petitioners argue that LSBDA's title to 73 hectares of the 402- under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
hectare Leyte Industrial Development Estate was void, having 1945."
allegedly been obtained from Calixtra Yap who had no right to it.
They maintain that they acquired title to the disputed property by It should be stressed that petitioners had no certificate of title
acquisitive prescription, because they and their predecessors in over the disputed property. Although they claim that their title
interest had been in possession of it for more than thirty years.7 was based on acquisitive prescription, they fail to present
Although it was the subject of settlement proceedings, petitioners incontrovertible proof that the land had previously been
further claim that Yap sold the same to LSBDA without the classified as alienable. They simply brush aside the conclusion of
permission of the trial court. the CA on this crucial point by saying that it was "without factual
basis."11 Instead, they maintain that the private character of the
Disputing these contentions, respondents and the appellate court land was evidenced by various tax declarations, Deeds of Sale,
maintain that petitioners have not shown that the land had and Decisions of the trial court and even the Supreme Court.12
previously been classified as alienable and disposable. Absent
such classification, they argue that possession of it, no matter Petitioners' arguments are not convincing. Tax declarations are
how long, could not ripen into ownership. not conclusive proofs of ownership, let alone of the private
character of the land. At best, they are merely "indicia of a claim
We agree with respondents and the appellate court. First, there of ownership."13 In Spouses Palomo v. CA,14 the Court also
was no showing that the land had been classified as alienable rejected tax declarations as proof of private ownership, absent
before the title was issued to LSBDA; hence, petitioners could not any showing that the forest land in question had been reclassified
have become owners thereof through acquisitive prescription. as alienable.
Second, petitioners' challenge to LSBDA's title cannot be granted,
because it is based on a wrong premise and amounts to a Moreover, the Deeds of Sale of portions of the disputed property,
collateral attack, which is not allowed by law. which Joaquin Ortega and several vendors executed, do not prove
that the land was private in character. The question remains:
Public Character of the Land What was the character of the land when Ortega purchased it?
Indeed, a vendee acquires only those rights belonging to the
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong vendor. But petitioners failed to show that, at the time, the
to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to vendors were already its owners, or that the land was already
ownership of land. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly classified as alienable.
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.8
In Menguito v. Republic,9 the Court held that "[u]nless public land Also misplaced is petitioners' reliance on Ortega v. CA,15 in which
is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person the Supreme Court allegedly recognized the private character of
by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. the disputed property .In that case, the sole issue was "whether
Indeed, 'occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter the respondent judge x x x acted in excess of jurisdiction when he
how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a converted Civil Case No. 1184-O, an action for quieting of title,
title.' To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence declaration of nullity of sale, and annulment of tax declaration of
must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land a parcel of land, into an action for the declaration of who is the
sought to be registered remains inalienable." legal wife, who are the legitimate children, if any, and who are the
compulsory heirs of the deceased Joaquin Ortega."16 The Court
A person in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession did not at all make any ruling that the property had been
of a public land for more than thirty years acquires an imperfect classified as alienable.
title thereto. That title may be the subject of judicial confirmation,
pursuant to Section 48 of the Public Land Act, which provides: In any event, Ortega arose from a suit for quieting of title, an
action quasi in rem that was binding only between the parties.17
"SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, The present respondents as well as the Bureau of Lands, which
occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own any such subsequently declared that the land was public, are not bound by
lands or an interest thereon, but whose titles have not been that ruling, because they were not impleaded therein.
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their While petitioners refer to the trial court proceedings supposedly
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the recognizing the private character of the disputed property, they
Land Registration Act, to wit:
make no claim that these cases directly involve the classification Moreover, the title became indefeasible and incontrovertible after
of the land, or that the Bureau of Lands is a party thereto. the lapse of one year from the time of its registration and
issuance.23 Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that "[u]pon the
Clearly, the burden of proof that the land has been classified as expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration
alienable is on the claimant.18 In the present case, petitioners and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible. Any
failed to discharge this burden. Hence, their possession of the person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may
disputed property, however long, cannot ripen into ownership. pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or
other persons responsible for the fraud." Although LSBDA's title
LSBDA's Title was registered in 1983, petitioners filed the amended Complaint
only in 1990.
Equally unmeritorious is the argument of petitioners that the title
of LSBDA is void. As earlier stated, they claim that such title was Reconveyance
derived from Calixtra Yap, who was allegedly not the owner of the
property. Petitioners assume that LSBDA, having acquired the Petitioners also claim that the disputed property should be
rights of Yap, resorted to a confirmation of her imperfect title reconveyed to them. This cannot be allowed. Considering that the
under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. This argument is devoid land was public before the Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued
of factual or legal basis. to LSBDA, petitioners have no standing to ask for the
reconveyance of the property to them. The proper remedy is an
Petitioners fail to consider that the title of LSBDA was based, not action for reversion, which may be instituted only by the Office of
on the conveyance made by Yap, but on Miscellaneous Sales the Solicitor General, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land
Patent No. 9353 issued by the director of the Bureau of Lands. In Act, which reads as follows:
fact, after LSBDA had filed an application for patent, the Bureau of
Lands conducted an investigation and found that the land was "SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of
part of the public domain. After compliance with the notice and lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be
publication requirements, LSBDA acquired the property in a instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
public auction conducted by the Bureau of Lands.19 stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the [Republic] of the
Philippines."
Petitioners insist, however, that LSBDA was estopped from
claiming that the land was public, because the Deed of Sale Verily, the prayer for reconveyance and, for that matter, the
executed by Yap in its favor stipulated that "the seller is the entire case of petitioners rest on the theory that they have
absolute owner in fee simple of the x x x described property."20 It acquired the property by acquisitive prescription; and that Yap,
is scarcely necessary to address this point. To begin with, the without any right or authority, sold the same to LSBDA.
power to classify a land as alienable belongs to the State, not to
private entities. Hence, the pronouncements of Yap or LSBDA Conclusion
cannot effect the reclassification of the property. Moreover, the
assailed misrepresentation was made by Yap as seller. Hence, In the light of our earlier disquisition, the theory has no leg to
objections thereto should be raised not by petitioners but by stand on. Absent any showing that the land has been classified as
LSBDA, the contracting party obviously aggrieved. alienable, their possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot
ripen into ownership. In other words, they have not become
In any case, the actions of LSBDA after Yap's conveyance owners of the disputed property. Moreover, LSBDA's title was
demonstrated its position that the disputed land was part of the derived from a Miscellaneous Sales Patent, not from Yap. Finally,
public domain. That this was so can be inferred from LSBDA's petitioners cannot, by a collateral attack, challenge a certificate of
subsequent application for a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and, in a title that has already become indefeasible and incontrovertible.
public auction, its purchase of the property from the Bureau of
Lands. Indeed, Yap merely conveyed a claim, not a title which she If petitioners believe that they have been defrauded by Yap, they
did not have. should seek redress, not in these proceedings, but in a proper
action in accordance with law.
Collateral Attack
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
There is another reason for denying the present Petition. Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioners insist that they "are not seeking the re-opening of a
decree under the Torrens system." Supposedly, they are only SO ORDERED.
"praying for the segregation of 735,333 square meters of land, or
73 hectares more or less from the OCT No. P-28131 issued to
LSBDA."21 This disputation is mere quibbling over words, plain
and simple.
II. The lower court erred in not denying registration in However, We cannot go along with petitioners' position that the
favor of J. Antonio Araneta since the amendment of the absence of republication of an amended application for
application was simply an attempt to avoid the application of the registration is a jurisdictional flaw. We should distinguish.
constitutional provision disqualifying a private corporation — the Amendments to the application may be due to change in parties
or substantial change in the boundaries or increase in the area of with receipts attached, in the names of respondent's
the land applied for. predecessors-in-interest. Nevertheless, in that span of time there
had been no attempt to register the same either under Act 496 or
In the former case, neither the Land Registration Act, as amended, under the Spanish Mortgage Law. It is also rather intriguing that
nor Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Vicente Castelo who acquired almost 90% of the property from
Property Registration Decree, requires republication and Alejo Ambrosia, et al. on June 18, 1958 and from Julio Castelo on
registration may be allowed by the court at any stage of the June 19, 1958 immediately sold the same to applicant J. Antonio
proceeding upon just and reasonable terms. 11 On the other Araneta on 3 July 1958.
hand, republication is required if the amendment is due to
substantial change in the boundaries or increase in the area of the According to the report of Land Investigator Daroy, the land was
land applied for. declared for taxation purposes in the name of Vicente Castelo
only in 1958 and the purported old tax declarations are not on
As to the fourth assignment of error. We do not see any relevant file with the Provincial Assessor's Office.
dispute in the lower court's application of Presidential Decree No.
1529, instead of Act No. 496, in adjudicating the land to the then In any case tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
applicant, assuming that the land involved is registrable. Both evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not
laws are existing and can stand together. P.D. 1529 was enacted supported by evidence.20 The fact that the disputed property
to codify the various laws relative to registration of property, in may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
order to facilitate effective implementation of said laws.12 applicants or of their predecessors-in-interest way back in 1921
does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of
The third, fifth and sixth assignment of errors are likewise a claim of ownership.21
meritorious and shall be discussed forthwith together.
Respondent's contention that the BFD, LC Map No. 681, certified
Respondent asserts that contrary to the allegation of petitioners, on August 8, 1927 which was the basis of the report and
the reports of the District Land Officer of Dagupan City, Land recommendation of the Land Examiner, is too antiquated; that it
Inspector Perfecto Daroy and Supervising Land Examiner cannot be conclusively relied upon and was not even presented in
Teodoro P. Nieva show that the subject property is an unclassified evidence, is not well taken. As We have said in the case of Director
public land, not forest land. This claim is rather misleading. The of Lands v. CA:22
report of Supervising Land Examiner Nieva specifically states that
the "land is within the unclassified forest land" under the And the fact that BF Map LC No. 673 dated March 1, 1927
administrative jurisdiction of the then Bureau of Forest showing subject property to be within unclassified region was not
Development.13 This was based on the reports of Land Inspector presented in evidence will not operate against the State
Daroy and District Land Officer Feliciano Liggayu. considering the stipulation between the parties and under the
well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the
Lands of the public domain are classified under three main omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, if omission
categories, namely: Mineral, Forest and Disposable or Alienable there was, in fact.
Lands.14 Under the Commonwealth Constitution, only
agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. Their disposition Respondent even admitted that Tambac Island is still an
was provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 6-7), unclassified public land as of 1927 and remains to be unclassified.
which states that it is only the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head, who has the Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever
authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable possession
or disposable, timber and mineral lands. Mineral and Timber or the applicant may have had and however long, cannot ripen into
forest lands are not subject to private ownership unless they are private ownership. 23 The conversion of subject property does
first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for not automatically render the property as alienable and
alienation. 15 In the absence of such classification, the land disposable.
remains as unclassified land until released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition. Courts have no authority to do so. In effect what the courts a quo have done is to release the subject
16 property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their
competence and jurisdiction. We reiterate that the classification
This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive
the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified until
with the conservation of such patrimony. Under the Regalian released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 24
Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, a In fairness to respondent, the petitioners should seriously
positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest consider the matter of the reclassification of the land in question.
land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other The attempt of people to have disposable lands they have been
purposes. 17 tilling for generations titled in their name should not only be
viewed with understanding attitude, but as a matter of policy
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of state encouraged. 25
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration that the land subject of the application is WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decisions
alienable or disposable.18 of the courts a quo are REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC vs REGISTER OF DEEDS QUEZON
(b) Ordering defendant Manuel G. Atienza to pay the
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify and set aside Development Bank of the Philippines, Lucena City Branch, the
the decision 1 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court reversing sum of P15,053.97, and all interests due thereon; and
the decision of the former Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch II at Lucena City 2 which annulled Original Certificate of (c) Ordering defendant Manuel G. Atienza to pay the costs
Title (OCT) No. P-13840 and Free Patent (FP) No. 324198 issued of this suit.
to Manuel Atienza for a 17-hectare piece of land which turned out
to be within the forest zone in Pagbilao, Quezon. SO ORDERED.
On April 18, 1967, Atienza was awarded FP No. 324198 over a On appeal, Atienza maintained that the land in question was not
parcel of land located in Ila, Malicboy, Pagbilao, Quezon, with an within the unclassified public forest land and therefore alienable
area of 172,028 square meters. By virtue of such award, he was land of the public domain. The then Intermediate Appellate Court
issued on May 5, 1967, OCT No. P-13840. relied only on the arguments he raised since petitioner had not
filed any brief, and arrived at the conclusion that "(t)he litigated
Sometime in 1968, an investigation was conducted by the Bureau land is part of public land alienable and disposable for homestead
of Lands in connection with alleged land grabbing activities in and [F]ree Patent." On December 27, 1985, the appellate court set
Pagbilao. It appeared that some of the free patents, including that aside the lower court's decision, declared as valid and subsisting
of Atienza's, were fraudulently acquired. Thus, on March 19, Atienza's OCT, and dismissed the cross-claim of the DBP.
1970, a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, After receiving a copy of said decision, Assistant Solicitor General
against Atienza and four other persons for allegedly falsifying Oswaldo D. Agcaoili informed the Director of Lands of the adverse
their applications for free patent, the survey plans, and other decision of the appellate court, which noted that no appellee's
documents pertinent to said applications. brief had been filed in said court. Agcaoili also stated that the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had not been furnished with
In its decision dated October 4, 1972, the court acquitted the the appellant's brief; that the Bureau of Lands received notice of
accused of the crime charged but, finding that the land covered by hearing of the record on appeal filed by the appellant but the OSG
the application for free patent of private respondent was within had not been informed of the "action taken thereon;" that since
the forest zone, declared as null and void OCT No. P-13840 in the Bureau of Lands had been furnished directly with relevant
Atienza's name and ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon to pleadings and orders, the same office should "take immediate
cancel the same. appropriate action on the decision;" and that it may file a motion
for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from January 6, 1986,
Meanwhile, before the promulgation of said decision, or on May the date of receipt by the OSG of the copy of the decision sought
10, 1972, then Acting Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco filed to be appealed.
for the petitioner a complaint against Atienza, the Register of
Deeds of Quezon, and the Rural Bank of Sariaya, which was later On January 28, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for extension of
dropped as defendant and, in an amended complaint, substituted time to file motion for reconsideration which was denied in a
by the Development Bank of the Philippines as actual mortgagee resolution dated February 12, 1986. Petitioner's motion for
of the subject parcel of land. Docketed as Civil Case No. 7555, the reconsideration of said resolution was likewise denied.
complaint prayed for the declaration of nullity of FP No. 324198
and OCT No. P-13840. The instant petition for review on certiorari raises the following
arguments: (a) petitioner was denied due process and fair play
In his answer, Atienza claimed that the land in question was no when Atienza did not furnish it with a copy of his appellant's brief
longer within the unclassified public forest land because by the before the then Intermediate Appellate Court thereby depriving it
approval of his application for free patent by the Bureau of Lands, of the opportunity to rebut his assertions which later became the
the land "was already alienable and disposable public agricultural sole basis of the assailed decision of December 27, 1985; (b) the
land." Since the subject land was a very small portion of Lot 5139 appellate court erred in holding that the land in question is part
of the Pagbilao Cadastre, an area which had been declared of the alienable and disposable public land in complete disregard
disposable public land by the cadastral court on March 9, 1932 in of the trial court's finding that it forms part of the unclassified
Cadastral Case No. 76 entitled "El Govierno Filipino de las Islas public forest zone; and (c) the appellate court erred in declaring
Filipinas contra Jose Abastillas, et al., G.L.R.O. cadastral Record that the land in question could be alienated and disposed of in
No. 1124," he also averred that the Director of Lands had given favor of Atienza.
due course to free and homestead patent applications of
claimants to Lot 5139. He further alleged that through a certain We find for the petitioner.
Sergio Castillo, he had been in possession of the land since the
Japanese occupation, cultivating it and introducing improvements Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. As such, courts
thereon. The DBP, after due and proper investigation and should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the
inspection of his title, even granted him a loan with the subject right to appeal, particularly if the appeal is meritorious. 3 Respect
property as collateral. Finally, he stated that his acquittal in the for the appellant's right, however, carries with it the
criminal case proved that he committed no fraud in his corresponding respect for the appellee's similar rights to fair play
application for free patent. and justice. Thus, appeal being a purely statutory right, an
appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid
On July 27, 1981, the lower court rendered a decision with the down in the Rules of Court. 4
categorical finding based on "solid evidence" that "the land in
question was found definitely within the forest zone denominated Of paramount importance is the duty of an appellant to serve a
as Project 21-A." copy of his brief upon the appellee with proof of service thereof. 5
This procedural requirement is consonant with Section 2 of Rule
The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows: 13, which mandates that all pleadings and papers "shall be filed
with the court, and served upon the parties affected thereby." The
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, (J)udgment is hereby importance of serving copies of the brief upon the adverse party
rendered: is underscored in Mozar v. Court of Appeals, 6 where the Court
held that the appellees "should have been given an opportunity to
(a) Declaring as null and void Original Certificate of Title file their appellee's brief in the Court of Appeals if only to
No. P-13840 in the name of defendant Manuel G. Atienza, as well emphasize the necessity of due process."
as Free Patent No. V-324198;
In this case, however, the Court of Appeals, oblivious of the fact lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the
that this case involves public lands requiring as it does the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of such
exercise of extraordinary caution lest said lands be dissipated and classification, the land remains unclassified public land until
erroneously alienated to undeserving or unqualified private released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 16
individuals, decided the appeal without hearing the government's
side. In our jurisdiction, the task of administering and disposing lands
of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and
Atienza avers that he furnished Atty. Francisco Torres, a lawyer in ultimately, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources 17
the Bureau of Lands and designated special attorney for the Office (now the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources). 18
of the Solicitor General, with two copies of the appellant's brief, Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive prerogative of
thereby implying that it was not his fault that petitioner failed to the Executive Department through the Office of the President. 19
file its appellee's brief. Courts have no authority to do so. 20
Such an assertion betrays a lack of comprehension of the role of Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public
the Solicitor General as government counsel or of the OSG as the agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming the presumption of
government's "law office." 7 Only the Solicitor General, as the state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the
lawyer of the government, can bring or defend actions on behalf private claimant 21 who, in this case, is Atienza. The records
of the Republic of the Philippines and, therefore, actions filed in show, however, that he failed to present clear, positive and
the name of the Republic, if not initiated by the Solicitor General, absolute evidence 22 to overcome said presumption and to
will be summarily dismissed. 8 Specifically, he is empowered to support his claim.
represent the Government in all land registration and related
proceedings, 9 such as, an action for cancellation of title and for Atienza's claim is rooted in the March 9, 1932 decision of the then
reversion of a homestead to the government. 10 Hence, he is Court of First Instance of Tayabas in Cadastral Case No. 76, which
entitled to be furnished with copies of all court orders, notices was not given much weight by the court a quo, and for good
and decisions. Consequently, service of decisions on the Solicitor reasons.
General is the proper basis for computing the reglementary
period for filing appeals and for finality of decisions. His Apart from his assertions before this Court, Atienza failed to
representative, who may be a lawyer from the Bureau of Lands, present proof that he or his predecessor-in-interest was one of
has no legal authority to decide whether or not an appeal should the claimants who answered the petition filed by the then
be made. 11 Attorney-General in the said cadastral proceedings. The
document reflecting said cadastral decision, a xerox copy,
Service of the appellant's brief on Atty. Torres was no service at indicated the claimants simply as "Jose Abastillas et al." In
all upon the Solicitor General. It may be argued that Atty. Torres support of that decision, Atienza presented a certification
could have transmitted one of the two copies of appellant's brief purportedly issued by someone from the Technical Reference
upon the Solicitor General, but such omission does not excuse Section of the Surveys Division, apparently of the Bureau of
Atienza's failure to serve a copy of his brief directly on the Lands, stating that "Lot 5886 is a portion of Lot 5139 Pagbilao
Solicitor General. Cadastre," which evidence is, however, directly controverted by
the sketch plan showing that the land in controversy is actually
On the part of the appellate court, its decision based solely on, outside the alienable and disposable public lands, although part
and even quoting verbatim from, the appellant's brief was of Lot 5139.
certainly arrived at in grave abuse of discretion. It denied
appellee (petitioner herein) of the opportunity to be heard and to The fact that Atienza acquired a title to the land is of no moment,
rebut Atienza's allegations, in rank disregard of its right to due notwithstanding the indefeasibility of titles issued under the
process. Such violation of due process could have been rectified Torrens system. In Bornales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 23
with the granting of petitioner's motion for reconsideration by we ruled that the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be
the appellate court, 12 but even the door to this recourse was invoked by one who procured the same by means of fraud. The
slammed by the appellate court with the denial of petitioner's "fraud" contemplated by the law (Sec. 32, P.D. 1529) is actual and
motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration in extrinsic, that is, "an intentional omission of fact required by law,"
a resolution dated February 12, 1986, which ruling erroneously 24 which in the case at bench consisted in the failure of Atienza to
applied the Habaluyas doctrine. 13 state that the land sought to be registered still formed part of the
unclassified forest lands.
Such denial notwithstanding, petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration. Considering the clear allegations thereunder, the WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
appellate court would have done well, in the interest of justice, and SET ASIDE and the decision of the court a quo dated July 27,
not to blindly adhere to technical rules of procedure by 1981, is REINSTATED.
dismissing outright said motion. As we declared in Villareal v.
Court of Appeals: 14 SO ORDERED.
On October 11, 1989, the Regional Director issued an order And the rule is "Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot
declaring that respondent had waived his right of repurchase, and ripen into private ownership."6
rejected his application for free patent for lack of interest, and
allowed petitioner to file a public land application for the subject What is more, there is yet no award or grant to petitioner of the
land. land in question by free patent or other ways of acquisition of
public land. Consequently, he cannot lawfully claim to be the
On May 8, 1990, the Regional Director ordered respondent to owner of the land in question.
vacate the land in question, but respondent refused.
WHEREFORE, the Courts hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision
On July 24, 1990, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42306, dismissing the
Basilan province, a complaint for recovery of ownership and complaint of petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Basilan
possession with preliminary injunction of the subject parcel of province, in Civil Case No. 441-63.
land.
No costs.
In Answer to the complaint, respondent alleged that the land
occupied by him belonged to the Republic of the Philippines, and SO ORDERED.
that he had introduced improvements thereon such as coconut
and other fruit trees.
After trial on the merits, on March 20, 1993, the trial court
rendered decision declaring petitioner the owner and the
possessor of the subject parcel of land with all the improvements
existing thereon, situated at Barangay Upper Bañas, municipality
of Lantawan, province of Basilan, with an area of 3.1248 hectares,
and ordering respondent to vacate the land in question, to pay
petitioner the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) as
attorneys fee, the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as
litigation expenses, the three hundred pesos (P300.00) as judicial
cost.