COMMENTARY
Pakistan: Rescuing a
Drowning State
Raza Ahmad Rumi
The floods in Pakistan are a
humanitarian disaster of massive
proportions, yet international
assistance has been slow to come
due to the purported lack of
credibility of the State. The
Pakistani state has been
weakened over decades of abuse,
in which the west has been
complicit. Today this is being used
to further discredit and weaken
the State, a course which will
only strengthen the military
establishment and the militants.
The international community
should understand that aid needs
to be given in large amounts and
in ways which reinforce the
legitimacy of the State.
Raza Ahmad Rumi (razarumi@gmail.com) is a
policy analyst, writer and editor based
in Lahore.
12
A
cruel month of unprecedented
floods and widespread displace-
ment of people has virtually broken
Pakistan’s back. The international commu-
nity is yet to show its full resolve in helping
a country in dire need. Twenty million
people or more may have lost their homes
and livelihoods and remain acutely vulner-
able to disease. As estimated by the United
Nations (UN), nearly 10 million are without
food and water and Pakistan’s cumulative
losses are tentatively pegged at $20 billion.
This should have been enough to propel
the world into action, if not on the basis of
a humane response but even on a utilitarian
calculation, given Pakistan’s strategic place-
ment in the world and its inherent instability.
But the response has been slower than
expected and scepticism pervades the
mainstream discourse on saving Pakistan.1
The reasons for this slow response have
been speciously understood in the context
of the civilian government in power. Never-
theless, the real distrust shown by the
world is at the Pakistani state and not the
quasi-autonomous government in power.
The situation is also reflective of the dis­
ingenuousness of the international opinion-
makers and power-centres in labelling
Pakistan as a place with an “image problem”.
Elizabeth Byrs, spokeswoman of the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, recently remarked, “We note often
an image deficit with regard to Pakistan
among  Western  public opinion. As a re-
sult, Pakistan is among countries that are
poorly financed, like Yemen.” If image was
really an issue then perhaps the United
States should not even be coming close to
a wide variety of states in Asia, Latin
America and the Arab world. But this is
about iniquitous power relations.
Fragmented State Monopoly
Prior to the floods the “international com-
munity” seemed solely focused on the
September 4, 2010  vol xlv no 36  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly
unsubstantiated Wikileaks and how the
Pakistani security apparatus had been
“playing games” with the west by collabo-
rating with the Taliban militants to gain
influence in the region. Earlier, a report
titled “The Sun in the Sky: The Relation-
ship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan
Insurgents”2 based on research by Matt
Waldman and published by the London
School of Economics had “proved” through
“anonymous” sources how Pakistan was
breeding insurgency in Afghanistan.
Most of these accounts contain elements
of truth. But the reality for an ordinary
Pakistani has been that no urban centre or
state installation has been safe from these
very militants who have been relentlessly
attacking the Pakistani state and its people.
Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, Rawalpindi,
Peshawar and Quetta have borne the
brunt of terrorist attacks since 11 Septem-
ber 2001.3 Contrary to widespread percep-
tions, the Pakistan army has been fighting
these terrorists and its successful opera-
tions in Swat and Waziristan speak for
themselves. However, the price of these
battles against home-grown militants and
foreign elements has been high. Over
30,000 Pakistanis have lost their lives in a
period of two years in this war on terror.
According to the Inter Services Public
Relations (ISPR), the information arm of
Pakistan’s military, 10 soldiers have been
killed every day since 2009. Table 1 gives a
brief account of military and civilian casu-
alties as well as terrorists who have been
killed or captured.
Table 1: Pakistan’s War on Terror?
Figures since 11 September 2010
Total civilians killed or injured 21,672
Military personnel killed 8,785
or injured 2,273 6,512
killed injured
Total Pakistanis killed or injured 30,452
Total no of terrorists killed or
captured since 9/11 17,742
The rise of militancy in Pakistan and
the tacit support to sectarian and militant
organisations has come into sharp focus
over the years. Effectively, as stated by
many analysts, the State’s monopoly over
the legitimate use of violence has been al-
lowed to weaken. The critical question here
is to ask, who, in the first place, abetted
the Pakistani state in de-concentrating its

monopoly over violence? It was the west
and the venal ruling classes of Pakistan.4
Pakistan was a western ally in the 1980s
playing a different game and in the 2000s
it is made to sing a different tune. The net
result is that the country has suffered as
its institutions have been weakened and
multiple centres of power allowed to
emerge. Nature has not been kind either and
the present floods along with their massive
destruction, if not managed properly, will
further erode the State. The consequences
are unsavoury and perhaps alarming. Yet,
there has only been diatribe and ill-informed
judgments damning Pakistan, and thus
further weakening the State, at a time
when it needs assistance to feed millions
of people and to save them from a more
protracted disaster. A disaffected popula-
tion will be an even greater threat to
regional and global stability.5
Credibility Deficit
Who lacks credibility here is a question
worth asking. The London-based Daily
Telegraph recently ran a story claiming
that £300m aid, given after the earth-
quake of 2005, was diverted by President
Zardari for other purposes.6 In 2005, a
military dictator was ruling Pakistan and
the entire world willingly did business
with him without any talk of “credibility”.
At that moment, the issues of democracy,
transparency and human rights all took a
backseat and strategic imperatives dictat-
ed the handing out of all the money that
was donated. The 2005 earthquake, which
killed more than 73,000 people, generated
$5 billion of aid to finance over 13,000
­reconstruction projects in nine districts
of Pakistan-administered Kashmir and
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. In the present
floods, 74 districts are affected and the
floods at the time of writing this paper are
not over. Despite a civilian government
buffeted by military and fundamentalists,
struggling to come to terms with the
­disaster, the “international community”
seems more bothered about “image” and
“credibility” even though it directly
­weakens the legitimate government.
In terms of how the earthquake recon-
struction money was to be spent, the donors
were the ones who defined the channels and
modalities. They urged the setting up of
separate institutions which were like a
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   September 4, 2010  vol xlv no 36
parallel government, through the establish-
ment of the Earthquake Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA), State Earth-
quake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
Authority (SERRA) as well as provincial
and district level supra structures. All of
these have led to colossal inefficiencies
and a wastage of resources.7 Should not
the donors be held accountable for this
wastage of money and the diversion of
earthquake relief?
The slow disbursement of funds and
the obvious crash of those transparency
mechanisms designed by the wizards of aid
bureaucracy demand answers. Pakistanis
have yet to take stock of this failed devolu-
tion-of-power experiment which was made
to ride piggyback on earthquake aid and
which has cost billions of rupees and then
died its natural death due to a lack of
political ownership.
The lesson to be learnt here is that the
State and its embedded institutions with
centuries of lived reality cannot be bypassed.
The present juncture may be a good time to
build local government systems by speed-
ing up the agenda of provincial autonomy.
What we need to avoid is working through
a framework of centralised planning and
decision-making which rarely works in a
tenuous federation such as Pakistan.
Aid and the State
Aside from the millions who have been
directly affected by the floods and the
millions more who will suffer indirectly due
to cuts in public spending, inflation and
food shortages, the Pakistani state – already
a weakened entity – will be a major victim
of this calamity. According to present
reports, Pakistan’s economy may contract
in the next 12 months. Some predict zero
GDP growth combined with a 25% infla-
tion in the near future.8
As a direct result of the floods, 1.2 million
homes have been damaged or destroyed,
1.2 million large animals and six million
poultry have perished and 2.6 million acres
of cultivable land have been inundated. The
agricultural base of the economy has been
decimated, with 1 million metric tonnnes
of wheat damaged (farmers have lost 37%
of the rice crop, 17% of the cotton crop and
15% of the sugar cane crop). Food inflation
is likely to cross 20% and exports could
plunge by $3-4 billion, worsening the
COMMENTARY
balance of trade, due to the adverse im-
pact on the textile sector. Amidst these
looming crises in which the Pakistani
state finds itself, it has to be rescued and
aided, not trashed and further weakened.
The Pakistani media, and by extension
its global counterpart, have not helped.
Instead of hosting informed debates and
setting up an appropriate discourse, they
are regurgitating clichés about corruption
in Pakistan without any focus on how to
reform the weakened state institutions.
Instead, there is an ill-informed emphasis
on the medieval theories of “a few good
men” who can ensure accountability and
restrict corruption. The former Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif recently proposed
setting up a “credible national body com-
prising men of integrity” and recommended
a few former jurists for this body. The sup-
porters of this idea started discussing the
names of “reputable characters” in the
media. What is forgotten is that credibility
may not be sufficient for an efficient dis-
bursement of aid, an area of expertise in
itself and not something innate to most
jurists or politicians as the perpetual crisis
of expertise with the Indus River System
Authority aptly illustrates.
Reforms have been patchy in Pakistan,
and have often been led by external
agencies. However, in recent years one
particularly good innovation has been
introduced in the form of the Improved
Financial Reporting and Auditing (PIFRA)
mechanism.9 PIFRA builds a financial
accounting and budgeting system for all
tiers of government. The new accounting
system is based on modern standards,
skills and employs information technolo-
gy tools which foster accountability and
transparency in public finances. However
up to this point in time, it has not been put
into place effectively at the provincial and
district levels. This mechanism offers a
systemic way in which we could ensure
transparency and efficient tracking of the
money received and spent for flood relief.
The existing provincial governments
and their machinery require capacities,
resources and a reporting framework
such as PIFRA. Donors should focus on
how Pakistani state systems can be
strengthened to deliver instead of divert-
ing funds to largely non-accountable non-
governmental organisations and other
13
COMMENTARY
seasonal organisations that crop up during
times of crisis. Already, the propaganda
against the State is so pernicious that
militant organisations are collecting funds
and extending services when the state is
paralysed and dealing with widespread
invective. Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) is already
carrying out relief operations in various
parts of the country in collaboration with
other organisations like Falah-e-Insaniyat.10
Organisations like these earn a good repu-
tation amongst the local people as they
rush to fill the void created by the absence
of state institutions.11
Usual Recipe – Loans?
Pakistan’s foreign debt, which stands at
$54 billion, has already spiralled out of
control with almost $3 billion spent annu-
ally on servicing it. Present solutions offer
only an extension of their date of closing
and a broadening of their scope. Surpris-
ingly, no proposal has been made for
deferred payments (or even cancellation)
now that Pakistan has told the United
Nations that it has suffered losses worth
$43 billion through the war on terror and
floods. The US has already committed $7.5
billion through the Kerry-Lugar Bill – a
package which should be redesigned for
urgent service delivery in affected areas.12
There is a need to develop a framework
for external debts which eases the debt
load on the country, rather than unthink-
ingly accepting offers from international
finance institutions.13
Political Stability Essential
In a time when an economic collapse is
being predicted, it would be dangerous to
talk of a change in government. If any-
thing, the most desperate need right now
is a national consensus on post-disaster
rehabilitation. Any move to undermine
the government for its perceived and
actual incompetence, or on the basis of
“distrust” will be disastrous.
Pakistan’s opinion industry has em-
barked on a dangerous game. The scale of
the floods was incredible but misinformed
reporting and half-baked analyses are
fuelling political uncertainty that will
damage the chances of achieving any
form of economic stability in the future.
Pakistan is currently governed by a
coalition comprising the Pakistan People’s
14
Party and regional parties such as the
Awami National Party (ANP) and the
Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) based
in urban Sindh. Even though the ruling
coalition is a junior partner of the military
establishment when it comes to national
security and foreign policy, their role in
building popular consensus for the anti-
terrorism drive of the Pakistan army has
been vital. If the civilian power-sharing
formula is altered at this time of crisis, it
will, first, lead to further delays in relief
and rehabilitation and second, will result
in divisive politics undermining the demo-
cratic gains of the past few years. Political
turbulence will also help the militants and
their patrons. The noted analyst Ahmed
Rashid recently wrote,
Coming at a time of widespread unrest, grow-
ing Taliban extremism, and increasingly shaky
civilian government, the floods could lead to
the gravest security crisis the country – and
the region – has faced. Unless the interna-
tional community takes immediate action to
provide major emergency aid and support, the
country risks turning into what until now has
remained only a grim, but remote possibility –
a failed state with nuclear weapons.14
The Pakistan army since the onset of
floods has done an efficient job of rescue
and relief operations. However, this role
has been assigned to the army via the
national flood protection plan (NFPP)-I of
1978. Unfortunately, this has also been in-
terpreted in Pakistan as a failure of civil-
ian governance, even leading to calls for
army intervention and takeover.
Ordinarily, “incompetent” civilian gov-
ernments are thrown out of power if and
when they fail to deliver. Therefore, calls
from a few politicians and media persons
for the derailment of the democratic system
are disturbing. Recently, the MQM leader
Altaf Hussain stated, “...the MQM will
openly support the patriotic generals if they
take any martial law-type action against
corrupt politicians and feudal lords”.15
Additionally, sportsman-turned politician,
Imran Khan and a Sindhi spiritual and
political leader, Pir Pagara have supported
a military intervention for the “stability”
of the country.16 Some popular television
news anchors, while talking about the
“corrupt” nature of the civilian govern-
ment, have been calling for a “revolution”
backed by the army.17 Pakistan’s history
is a testament to the fact that military
September 4, 2010  vol xlv no 36  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly
adventurism has always resulted in more
political instability and fragmentation,
not the other way around.
The Way Forward
Pakistan’s flood disaster has exposed the
festering crisis of its statehood. Having
said that, it should also be remembered
that even the best prepared country would
have been swamped by the sheer scale of
the floods that have hit Pakistan.18 The
manner in which central institutions such
as the National Disaster Management
Authority (NDMA) were unable to respond
indicates the weaknesses of the country’s
governance structures. Similarly, the pro-
vincial irrigation departments, which had
neglected canal and embankment main­
tenance, were also exposed. The lack of
building regulation around rivers, canals
and widespread encroachments demon-
strates that many of the regulatory and
oversight functions of the State, often
inherited from the colonial times, had
fallen to pieces. Pakistan’s provincial
governments need to strengthen local
government systems across the country
on an urgent basis. This essential reform
cannot be delayed as the governance
vacuum at the local level is a ripe field for
the non-state actors of the Islamist variety
to assume control.
Much has been written about the nexus
between the climate change imperatives
and the recent natural disaster. Merciless
deforestation in the catchment areas may
have contributed to climate change but it
surely reduced the warning time between
excess rains and floods. Concurrently, state
failures have also meant that the capacity
to respond to disasters has been compro-
mised beyond belief. Local adaptation
plans need to be devised by local govern-
ments with adequate capacities. Relief and
rehabilitation without sound local govern-
ance structures will be in­effective and re-
sult in further erosion of state legitimacy.
In conclusion, Pakistan’s grave govern-
ance challenges have been amplified due
to the recent floods. All predictions and
scenarios have become redundant within
a matter of weeks. The multidimensional
disaster in Pakistan could lead to unrest
and instability in a country where the
State writ has eroded and non-state actors
operate with impunity.

Looking at the Pakistani state from a
cynical lens serves no purpose and will
only exacerbate the crisis, which is still
unfolding. It remains the best mechanism
to deliver aid and for channelising recon-
struction despite its dwindled capacities.
Bypassing the State would widen the
citizen-state gap and further weaken its
capacity and would be akin to scripting
Pakistan’s collapse.
Notes
1 As of 28 August 2010, $687 million have been
committed to the efforts by the international
community, and $324 million have been pledged
(Reliefweb Financial Tracking)
2 Matt Waldman (2010), “The Sun in the Sky: The
Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan
Insurgents”, Crisis States Discussion Papers – London
School of Economics, 18.
3 In 2006, 657 terrorist attacks, including 41 of a
sectarian nature, took place, leaving 907 people
dead and 1,543 others injured. In 2007, 1,503 ter-
rorist attacks and clashes, including all the sui-
cide attacks, target killings and assassinations,
resulted in 3,448 casualties and 5,353 injuries. In
2008, the country saw 2,148 terrorist attacks,
Thinking of Surve
GPD
Narayan Surve was a “people’s
poet” who was a shade romantic
about his faith in communist
ideology. His romanticism carried
within it the principle of Karuna.
The pain of the exploited life and
the exploitative society was there
forever present in his writing.
G P Deshpande (govind.desh@gmail.com) is a
well-known commentator on literary and
political affairs.
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   September 4, 2010  vol xlv no 36
which caused 2,267 fatalities and 4,558 injuries.
In 2009, the worst year, 2,586 terrorist, insurgent
and sectarian-related incidents were reported,
killing 3,021 people and injuring 7,334 (Pakistan
Institute of Peace Studies).
4 For a detailed review see Abbas, Hassan, Pakistan’s
Drift into Extremism – Allah, the Army and the
America’s War on Terror (New York: M E Sharpe,
Inc), 2005. Print.
5 Syed Irfan Raza, “Militants Can Take Advantage
of Crisis, Says Zardari”, DAWN. The Dawn Media
Group, 20 August 2010. Web. 28 August 2010.
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-
content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/06-zardari-
says-militants-could-exploit-flood-rs-03 (accessed
on 28 August 2010).
6 News story in Telegraph titled: “£300m Earthquake
Aid ‘Misused by Zardari’” http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/7944792/
300m-earthquake-aid-misused-by-Zardari.html
(accessed on 28 August 2010).
7 http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId
=89113 (accessed on 28 August 2010).
8 Advisor for Finance, Sakib Sherani, quoted in
Pakistan’s Economic Meltdown Has Begun by
Safiya Aftab published in The Friday Times, 27
August-2 September 2010, Vol XXII, No 28.
9 www.pifra.gov.pk (accessed on 28 August 2010)
10 The JuD is the charity arm of the banned Lashkar-
e-Taiba (LeT) militant group.
11 News story in Guardian titled: “Pakistan Floods:
Islamic Fundamentalists Fill State Aid Void”,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/03/
I
t is very difficult to say what the con-
temporary Marathi poetry lost in
Narayan Surve’s death. The state gov-
ernment’s 21-gun salute on his last journey
in a way summed up the situation.
The ruling people were vaguely aware
of the greatness of the man but were clearly
uncertain what that greatness c­onsisted in.
In such a situation the gun salutes serve a
purpose. It is all a matter of huge but un-
decipherable noise! When the legendary
actor Niloo Phule died not so long ago, a
village on the Satara-Kolhapur highway
decided to have a huge placard with his
picture and just two words. The words were
beautiful in their utter simplicity, just two
words. Motha Manus (“A great man”). You
can see it even now as you leave Pune on the
highway to Kolhapur. There are no admirers
mentioned. We live in times when a placard
announcing the 50th or 60th birthday of
our leaders with a 100-odd signatures
adorns the streets of Maharashtra towns.
In contrast this placard mourning the
death of Niloobhau is without a single
OF LIFE, LETTERS AND POLITICS
islamist-groups-pakistan-aid-void (accessed on
28 August 2010).
12 “Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of
2009”, popularly known as Kerry-Lugar Bill, was
recently passed by both House of Representatives
and Senate and it promised Pakistani government
an aid of $7.5 billion over a period of five years.
13 Pakistan’s Finance Minister Abdul Hafeez Shaikh
is busy negotiating with IMF to restructure the
$10 billion loan and to discuss ways in which IMF
can further help.
14 “Last Chance for Pakistan” – Ahmed Rashid, http://
www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/aug/16/
last-chance-pakistan/ (accessed on 28 August 2010).
15 Dawn, 23 August 2010 (http://www.dawn.com/
wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/
the-newspaper/front-page/altaf-wants-army-to-
act-against-corrupt-leaders-380) (accessed on 28
August 2010).
16 http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-
content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/national/
govt-inefficiency-cant-justify-military-intervention-
leaders-680 (accessed on 28 August 2010).
17 Dr Shahid Masood, a notable anchorperson, in his
programme, “News with Views” on ARY TV hosted
Imran Khan as his guest and discussed various
possibilities of army’s intervention in his entire
episode, http://www.arynews.tv/english/news-
detail.asp?nid=36706 (accessed on 28 August 2010).
18 The recent experience of storm Katrina in the United
States is a case in point. The inability of the govern-
ment to respond to the disaster, large-scale looting
and mismanagement are all too well known.
signature. In a sense it is a voice of the
people, that too of the unknown people.
In the case of Surve the politicals decided
to make sure that the common people do
not appropriate the tribute-giving to a gen-
uinely people’s poet who stayed away all
his life from things like gun salutes. And
they succeeded. Surve could not escape
official salutes. He had to take them in his
death. The entire government leadership
was there to say goodbye to him. In fact, the
establishment made the farewell to Surve
typically its job. Of course, one cannot
complain. The only danger the establish-
ment faced was the possibility that Surve
might suddenly rise up and protest even
louder than the guns against this honour he
had not asked for. He would have probably
said, “I am a communist and a working
p­eople’s poet. As such in today’s Maharash-
tra I am used to neglect, at times even
c­ontempt. So don’t try and make up for it.”
Indeed nothing could have been truer.
Even with the greatest radical today you can
scarcely mention class, especially working
class because if you did you would be guilty
of a brahmanical conspiracy of undermining
caste by raising other issues. Why should
that be so? One cannot say. It is not as
though an old-fashioned radical is not aware
of the relevance of other socio-political
15