ADMIN CASE DIGESTS (3rd Batch)
Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to
1. SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on Reforms
and Government Operations, and the
PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and
FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public
Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY
SITUATED, respondents.
FACTS:
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under
Section 64 of the Revised Administrative
Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the
Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of
January 7, 1966 with the following functions:
b. To investigate all activities
involving or affecting immoral
practices, graft and corruptions,
smuggling (physical or technical),
lawlessness, subversion, and all other
activities which are prejudicial to the
government and the public interests,
and to submit proper
recommendations to the President of
the Philippines.
c. To investigate cases of graft and
corruption and violations of Republic
Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather
necessary evidence to establish
prima facie, acts of graft and
acquisition of unlawfully amassed
wealth ... .
h. To receive and evaluate, and to
conduct fact-finding investigations of
sworn complaints against the acts,
conduct or behavior of any public
official or employee and to file and
prosecute the proper charges with the
appropriate agency.
For the performance of these functions, the
President vested in the Agency all the powers of an
investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580
of the Revised Administrative Code, including the
power to summon witnesses by subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take
testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.
Paragraph 5 of EO No. 4 empowered the PARGO to
"summon witness, administer oaths, and take
testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the
authority "to require the production of documents
under a subpoenaduces tecum or otherwise,
subject in all respects to the same restrictions as
apply in judicial proceedings of a similar
character."
On June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as
respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City
Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad
testificandumcommanding him "to be and appear
as witness at the Office of the PARGO to declare
and testify in a certain investigation pending
therein." Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with
the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended
Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction
with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
questioning the legality of the PARGO’s order.
ISSUE:
Whether PARGO the Presidential Agency on
Reforms and Government Operations enjoys the
authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-
finding investigations.
RULING:
Yes. PARGO enjoys the authority to issue the
subpoena.
The life blood of the administrative process is the
flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the
analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for
all administrative functions, not only for rule
making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for
prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for
determining general policy, for recommending,
legislation, and for purposes no more specific than
illuminating obscure areas to find out what if
anything should be done. 8 An administrative
agency may be authorized to make investigations,
not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial
nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose
is to obtain information upon which future action of
a legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and
may require the attendance of witnesses in
proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It
may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for
correction, and to report findings to appropriate
bodies and make recommendations for actions and
qualifications.
Petitioner agency’s subpoena power is from
Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an
effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon
witness, administer oaths, and take testimony
relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority
"to require the production of documents under a
subpoenaduces tecum or otherwise, subject in all
respects to the same restrictions as apply in
judicial proceedings of a similar character.” Such
subpoena power is not merely confine to quasi-
judicial or adjudicatory functions because to limit
such would imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its
investigatory functions. More than that, the
enabling authority itself fixes no distinction when
and in what function should the subpoena power be
exercised. Where the law does not distinguish the
court should not distinguish.
Nor could we impress upon this subpoena power
the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under
the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The
seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code that the right to summon
witnesses and the authority to require the
production of documents under a subpoena duces
tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all
respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a
similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to
require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a
subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be
pending before a court for hearing or trial and that
the hearing or trial must be in connection with the
exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory
functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be
issued by an administrative agency like petitioner
Agency. It must be emphasized, however, that an
administrative subpoena differs in essence from a
judicial subpoena. What the Rules speaks of is a
judicial subpoena, one procurable from and
issuable by a competent court, and not an
administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore,
the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in
Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code
could mean the restraints against infringement of
constitutional rights or when the subpoena is
unreasonable or oppressive and when the
relevancy of the books, documents or things does
not appear. 15
Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas
issued in the course of investigations, whether or
not adjudication is involved, and whether or not
probable cause is shown 16 and even before the
issuance of a complaint.17 It is not necessary, as in
the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or
complaint of violation of law be pending or that the
order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that
the investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to
discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge,
but upon which to make one if the discovered
evidence so justifies. It is enough that the
proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed
to have information that might shed some helpful
light. Administrative agency has the power of
inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or
controversy in order to get evidence, but can
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is
being violated or even just because it wants
assurance that it is not. When investigative and
accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an
administrative body, it, too may take steps to
inform itself as to whether there is probable
violation of the law. 21
In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the
requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1)
within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand
is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is
reasonably relevant.
In the present case, there is no doubt that the fact-
finding investigations being conducted by the
Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain
public officials of the City Government of Manila in
anomalous transactions 23 fall within the Agency's
sphere of authority and that the information sought
to be elicited from respondent Fernando
Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in
possession, 24 is reasonably relevant to the
investigations. Therefore, the Court of First
Instance of Manila should dismiss the petition.
2. GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
vs.
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN VASQUEZ, HONORABLE
MOJICA, et al.
FACTS: Jessica Dayon, public health nurse of Santa
Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated
rape and an administrative complaint against
Mayor Ilustrisimo before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Ombudsman Vasquez directed
Lastimosa and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar that
Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape
in the Regional Trial Court. It appears that
Lastimosa conducted a preliminary investigation
on the basis of which she found that only acts of
lasciviousness had been committed. As no case for
attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's
Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered
Kintanar and Lastimosa to show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt for "refusing
and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the
Office of the Ombudsman. Noteworthy to mention,
is the previous administrative and criminal
complaints filed by one Julian Menchavez against
Lastimosa and Kintanar, based on the alleged
refusal of the two to obey the orders of the
Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with
attempted rape on a different occasion.
ISSUE: WON the Office of the Ombudsman has the
power to punish Lastimosa and Kintanar for
contempt. Yes.
HELD: Section 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives
the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish
for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of
Court and under the same procedure and with the
same penalties provided therein."
In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is
authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance.
This is because under the Ombudsman's Act, when
a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the
"supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which
means that he is subject to the power of the
Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or
modify his (prosecutor's) decision. Lastimosa
cannot legally act on her own and refuse to
prepare and file the information as directed by the
Ombudsman.
3. TAÑADA vs TUVERA
FACTS: Petitioners seek to compel private
respondents for the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, etc.
Respondents contend that publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as
to the date they are to take effect; publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity.
ISSUE: WON the subject statutes still need
publication in the Official Gazette even if they
provide for their effectivity dates
RULING: Yes. Article 2 of the Civil Code does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity. The publication of all
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden to the people, such as
tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply
only to particular persons or class of persons such
as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. Without
publication, the people have no means of knowing
what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of
such decrees.
4. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, Petitioner vs. PICOP RESOURCES,
INC., Respondent.
Facts: PICOP filed with SEC an application for
amendment of its Articles of Incorporation
extending its existence for another 50 years. PICOP
paid the filing fee of P210.00 based on SEC
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 (1994
Circular).
The SEC, however, informed PICOP of the
appropriate filing fee of P12 Million, or 1/5 of 1% of
its authorized capital stock of P6 Billion.
PICOP posited that SEC Memorandum Circular No.
1, Series of 1986 (1986 Circular) rules on the
specific subject matter of "Filing Fees for Amended
Articles of Incorporation Extending the Term of
Corporate Existence” prescribed the filing fee as
1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock, with the
qualification that it should not be less
than P200.00 or more than P100,000.00. PICOP
pointed out that no equivalent provision appears in
any of the subsequent SEC circulars such as the
1994 and 2001 circulars. Hence, the 1986 Circular
should prevail.
The SEC, on the other hand, contends that Circular
No. 2, Series of 1990 (1990 Circular) removed the
filing fee ceilings provided for in the 1986 Circular.
The SEC also enumerated the subsequent EOs and
Circulars which called for the increase in SEC fees
and charges. The latest of these was the 2001
Circular, which now prescribes the formula of 1/5 of
1% of the authorized capital stock.
When the matter was raised before the Office of
the President, it was found out that the 1990
Circular relied on by the SEC was only submitted to
the UP Law Center on the same day that it filed its
second motion for reconsideration (January 23,
2004). The OP ruled, which was affirmed by the CA,
that the 1990 Circular was not effective at the time
PICOP applied for the extension of its corporate
term.
Issue: WON the 1986 Circular should be applied in
the matter of application filed by PICOP for
extension of its corporate existence.
Ruling: The 1986 Circular is the proper basis of the
computation since it specifically provided for filing
fees in cases of extension of corporate term. A
proviso of the same nature is wanting in the other
circulars relied on by the SEC at the time PICOP
filed its request for extension.
According to the SC, there was an evident violation
of the due process requirement. It was admitted
that the SEC failed to satisfy the requirements for
promulgation when it filed the required copies of
the said regulation at the UP Law Center only
fourteen (14) years after it was supposed to have
taken effect.
The SEC violated the due process clause insofar as
it denied the public prior notice of the regulations
that were supposed to govern them. The SEC
cannot wield the provisions of the 1990 Circular
against PICOP and expect its outright compliance.
The circular was not yet effective during the time
PICOP filed its request to extend its corporate
existence in 2002. In fact, it was only discovered in
2004, fifteen (15) days before the SEC filed its
second motion for reconsideration.
5. GSIS VS. COA
FACTS: In November 1936, Congress enacted
Commonwealth Act No. 186, creating the
Government Service Insurance System (hereafter
GSIS) to provide insurance coverage and
retirement benefits to government officials and
employees, replacing the existing pension systems
established in prior laws.
On December 2, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino,
exercising legislative powers enacted Executive
Order No. 79, Section 1 (c) of which provides that
“a reserve officer who has satisfactorily rendered a
total of ten (10) years continuous active
commissioned military service shall not be
reverted to inactive status, except upon his own
request or for cause, up to the time he reaches the
compulsory retirement of thirty (30) years of
service or-fifty six (56) years of age, whichever
comes later but not later than sixty (60) years of
age.”
On November 16, 1987, Brig. General Arturo T.
Asuncion met his untimely death in a helicopter
crash.
The heirs of the late General Asuncion filed a claim
with the GSIS for payment of death benefits due to
him as a member of the System.
The GSIS Quezon City Branch (military) paid the
claim of the heirs of Brig. General Asuncion.
In the course of audit of the account, the corporate
auditor's office officer in charge, GSIS, disallowed
in audit the payment of the claim, pointing out that
at the time of his death, General Asuncion was not
a member of the GSIS despite E. O. 79.
On appeal to the Commission on Audit en banc it
denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the
local auditor.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON EO 79 became effective at the time of
General Asunsion’s death?
RULING: YES.
>The President issued the executive order on
December 2, 1986. It was published in the Official
Gazette on December 22, 1986.
Thus, E. O. No. 79 is effective fifteen (15) days
following its publication in the Official Gazette, or
on January 07, 1987. At that time, the late General
Asuncion was a reserve officer who had rendered a
total of ten (10) years of continuous active duty
service commission in the AFP. Hence, he was
compulsorily covered as a member of the GSIS on
the date he died on November 15, 1987, in line of
duty in a helicopter crash. Consequently, his heirs
are entitled to payment of death benefits.
The aforecited executive order provides for
compulsory membership in the GSIS of qualified
reserve officers of the AFP like General Asuncion.
It was effective at the time of the death of General
Asuncion. Hence, it becomes the duty of the
auditor to approve and pass in audit the valid claim
of his heirs for death benefits. The Commission on
Audit's disallowance amounts to a grave abuse of
discretion.
Commonwealth Act No. 186, enacted on November
14, 1936, as amended, provides that membership in
the system shall be compulsory upon all regular
officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
Executive Order No. 79, issued on December 2,
1986, has the force of law.
By the terms of this enactment, qualified reserve
officers, meaning, those who have satisfactorily
rendered a total of ten (10) years of continuous
active duty commissioned service in the AFP shall
not be reverted to inactive status except upon their
own request, or for cause.
Thus, they have the same status as regular
commissioned officers of the AFP, who are
unquestionably compulsory members of the
System.
6. Phil International Trading vs COA April 4, 2001
FACTS: PITC, herein petitioner is a GOCC for the
purpose of promoting and developing Philippine
trade and national economic development. On
1988, its Board of Directors approved a Car Plan
Program for qualified PITC officers.
On July 1, 1989, RA 6758 took effect. It provides for
the consolidation of allowances and additional
compensation into standardized salary rates.
Section 12 thereof provides that other additional
compensation being received by incumbents as of
July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized
salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
However, the DBM issued DBM-CCC No. 10 which
discontinued effective November 1, 1989, all
allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of
basic salary, not otherwise enumerated under the
said circular.
Now, PITC contested this alleging that the
disallowance of these emoluments including the
car plans are not valid on the grounds that RA 6758
does not intend to revoke existing benefits (car
plans) enjoyed by the PITC and that the circular is
of no force and effect for lack of publication.
Respondent COA, on the other hand alleges that
the subsequent reissuance of the circular cured
the defect of non-publication.
ISSUE: WON the DBM Circular is valid and
enforceable?
HELD: No, the circular is of no force and effect.
First, petitioner correctly pointed out that there
was no intention on the part of the legislature to
revoke existing benefits being enjoyed by
incumbents of government positions at the time of
the passage of RA 6758 by virtue of Sections 12
and 17 thereof. There is no dispute that the PITC
officials who availed of the subject car plan
benefits were incumbents of their positions as of
July 1, 1989. Thus, it was legal and proper for them
to continue enjoying said benefits.
Second, since the circular which completely
disallows payment of allowances and other
emoluments to public officers and employees is of
general application, it follows that publication is
required as a condition precedent to the effectivity
of a law to inform the public of the contents of the
law or rules and regulations before their rights and
interests are affected by the same. The reissuance
did not cure the defect.
7. PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and
SERVICES CORPORATION VS SECRETARY OF
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ET AL
FACTS: Petitioner Philsa is a domestic corporation
engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment. Private respondents were recruited
by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia and
were required to pay placement fees in the amount
of P5,000.00 for private respondent Mikin and
P6,500.00 each for private respondents de Mesa
and Leyson. They were, however, terminated from
services and repatriated to the Philippines due to
their refusal to sign a new contract that increases
their work hours without corresponding increase in
their basic monthly salary.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, due to the
refusal of petitioner Philsa to return their
placement fees and payment of their salaries for
the unexpired portion of their contract, they filed a
case before the POEA against petitioner Philsa and
its foreign principal. One of their causes of action
was illegal exaction/the refund of the placement
fees.
On appeal in the SC, Petitioner insists that it
cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983, which
enumerated the allowable fees which may be
collected from applicants, is void for lack of
publication.
POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983
provides that the maximum amount which may be
collected from prospective Filipino overseas
workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was
apparently issued in compliance with the
provisions of Article 32 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not POEA Memo Order No. 2 is
void for lack of publication.
RULING: Yes, the Memorandum is void due to its
lack of publication.
In Tañada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows:
"We hold therefore that all
statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are
presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the
same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution:
Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published
if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to
a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature,
that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative
agency and the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letter of
instructions issued by the
administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines
to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of
their duties."
Applying the doctrine laid down in Tañada vs
Tuvera, the court have previously declared as
having no force and effect those administrative
issuances that were not published or filed with the
National Administrative Register as required by the
Administrative Code of 1987.
It is thus clear that the administrative circular
under consideration is one of those issuances
which should be published for its effectivity, since
its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing
law pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that
POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
has not as yet been published or filed with the
National Administrative Register, the same is
ineffective and may not be enforced.
8. GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, petitioner,
vs.
THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (LEO DACERA,
SUSAN F. DACANAY, EDNA A. VALENZUELA AND
SEBASTIAN F. CAPONONG, JR.), CIDG-PNP-
P/DIRECTOR EDUARDO MATILLANO, and HON.
OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO, respondents.
Facts:
1. an affidavit-complaint was filed with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) by respondent
CIDG-PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano
accusing Sen. Honasan of the crime of coup
de etat in OAKWOOD MUTINY.
2. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of
the Department of Justice (DOJ Panel for
brevity) sent a subpoena to petitioner for
preliminary investigation.
3. Honasan, petitioner, together with his
counsel, appeared at the DOJ. He filed a
Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's
jurisdiction over the case, asserting that
since the imputed acts were committed in
relation to his public office, it is the Office of
the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the
jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding
preliminary investigation; that should the
charge be filed in court, it is the
Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that
can legally take cognizance of the case
considering that he belongs to the group of
public officials with Salary Grade 31; and
praying that the proceedings be suspended
until final resolution of his motion.
Issue: Whether respondent Department of Justice
Panel of Investigators has jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation over the charge of coup
d'etat against petitioner.
Ruling: YES.
The authority of respondent DOJ Panel is based not
on the assailed OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 but
on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code
under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the
DOJ, which provides:
Sec. 1. Declaration of policy - It is the
declared policy of the State to provide the
government with a principal law agency
which shall be both its legal counsel and
prosecution arm; administer the criminal
justice system in accordance with the
accepted processes thereof consisting in
the investigation of the crimes, prosecution
of offenders and administration of the
correctional system; …
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions - To
accomplish its mandate, the Department
shall have the following powers and
functions:
… respondents.
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes,
prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system; (Emphasis
supplied)
and Section 1 of P.D. 1275, effective April 11, 1978,
to wit:
SECTION 1. Creation of the National
Prosecution Service; Supervision and
Control of the Secretary of Justice. – There
is hereby created and established a National
Prosecution Service under the supervision
and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be
composed of the Prosecution Staff in the
Office of the Secretary of Justice and such
number of Regional State Prosecution
Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal's
Offices as are hereinafter provided,
which shall be primarily responsible for the
investigation and prosecution of all cases
involving violations of penal laws. (Emphasis
supplied)
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an
internal circular between the DOJ and the Office of
the Ombudsman, outlining authority and
responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and
of the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of
preliminary investigation. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular
No. 95-001 DOES NOT regulate the conduct of
persons or the public, in general.
Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner's
submission that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001
has to be published.14 (emphasis by Lyndon. Mao
ning gi hatagan ug dakong weight ni sir sa
discussion, no need daw publication since the
requisite of general applicability was not met)
Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation because petitioner is a public officer
with salary Grade 31 so that the case against him
falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Considering the Court's finding
that the DOJ has concurrent jurisdiction to
investigate charges against public officers, the fact
that petitioner holds a Salary Grade 31 position
does not by itself remove from the DOJ Panel the
authority to investigate the charge of coup
d'etat against him.
9) REPUBLIC (represented by NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC),
petitioner, vs. EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATION
CO., INC. (Extelcom) and BAYAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. (Bayantel),
FACTS:
In 1992, International Communications Corporation
(now Bayantel) filed an application with the NTC
for a Certificate of Public Convenience or
Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and maintain a
digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service
(CMTS). Thereafter (January 1993), the NTC issued
Memorandum Circular directing all interested
applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file
their respective applications before the
Commission on or before February 15, 1993. The
Bayantel’s application was archieved due to the
recent grant of Provisional Authorities in favor of
ISLACOM and GMCR, Inc., which resulted in the
closing out of all available frequencies for the
service being applied for by Bayantel.
In February 2000, the NTC granted Bayantel's
motion to revive the latter's application.
Respondent Extelcom filed an Opposition and
argued that Bayantel's motion sought the revival of
an archived application filed almost eight (8) years
ago and thus outdated. Moreover, Extelcom alleged
that there was no public need for the service
applied for by Bayantel as the present five CMTS
operators --- Extelcom, Globetel, Smartcom.,
Pilipino Telephone Corp., and ISLACOM. --- more
than adequately addressed the market demand,
and all are in the process of enhancing and
expanding their respective networks based on
recent technological developments.
The NTC, applying the 1978 Rules of Practice and
Procedure, issued an Order granting in favor of
Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS
service. The CA declared that the orders of NTC be
annulled and set aside. Extelcom argued that NTC
should have applied the 1993 Revised Rules, not
the 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure.
ISSUE: W/N NTC should have applied the 1993
Revised Rules instead of the 1978 Rules.
HELD. NO. (1978 Rules)
In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to
operate a CMTS, the NTC applied Rule 15, Section
3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure,
which provides:
Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. --- Upon the filing of
an application, complaint or petition or at any
stage thereafter, the Board may grant on
motion of the pleader or on its own initiative,
the relief prayed for, based on the pleading,
together with the affidavits and supporting
documents attached thereto, without prejudice
to a final decision after completion of the
hearing which shall be called within thirty (30)
days from grant of authority asked for.
(underscoring ours)
Respondent Extelcom, however, contends that the
NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which
were filed with the Office of the National
Administrative Register on February 3, 1993. These
Revised Rules deleted the phrase "on its own
initiative;" accordingly, a provisional authority may
be issued only upon filing of the proper motion
before the Commission.
The NTC answered that inasmuch as the 1993
Revised Rules have not been published in a
newspaper of general circulation, the NTC has
been applying the 1978 Rules.
The absence of publication, coupled with the
certification by the Commissioner of the NTC
stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978
Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules
have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the
provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the
1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law
Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There
is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which
implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law
Center is the operative act that gives the rules
force and effect.
Also as explicitly mentioned in the case Tañada v.
Tuvera: that Administrative rules and regulations
must be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or
those so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in
the performance of their duties.
The Administrative Order under consideration is
one of those issuances which should be published
for its effectivity, since its purpose is to implement
an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993
Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall
take effect only after their publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. In the absence of
such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules
that governs.
In any event, regardless of whether the 1978 Rules
or the 1993 Revised Rules should apply, the
records show that the amended application filed by
Bayantel in fact included a motion for the issuance
of a provisional authority. Hence, it cannot be said
that the NTC granted the provisional authority
motu proprio. The CA, therefore, erred when it
found that the NTC issued its Order of May 3, 2000
on its own initiative.
The CA ruled that there was a violation of the
fundamental right of Extelcom to due process
when it was not afforded the opportunity to
question the motion for the revival of the
application. However, it must be noted that said
Order referred to a simple revival of the archived
application of Bayantel. At this stage, it cannot be
said that Extelcom's right to procedural due
process was prejudiced. In fact, the records show
that the NTC has scheduled several hearing dates
for this purpose, at which all interested parties
shall be allowed to register their opposition. We
have ruled that there is no denial of due process
where full-blown adversarial proceedings are
conducted before an administrative body. With
Extelcom having fully participated in the
proceedings, and indeed, given the opportunity to
file its opposition to the application, there was
clearly no denial of its right to due process.
Likewise, the requirements of notice and
publication of the application is no longer
necessary inasmuch as the application is a mere
revival of an application which has already been
published earlier. At any rate, the records show
that all of the five (5) CMTS operators in the
country were duly notified and were allowed to
raise their respective oppositions to Bayantel's
application through the NTC's Order.
10. G.R. No. 164026 December 23, 2008
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, petitioner,
vs.
GMA NETWORK, INC., respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA, for
brevity), a domestic corporation, filed an
application for collective approval of various
amendments to its Articles of Incorporation
and By-Laws with the respondent Securities
and Exchange Commission, (SEC, for
brevity). The amendments applied for
include the change in the corporate name of
petitioner from "Republic Broadcasting
System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well
as the extension of the corporate term for
another fifty (50) years from and after June
16, 2000. Upon such filing, the petitioner had
been assessed by the SEC’s Corporate and
Legal Department a separate filing fee for
the application for extension of corporate
term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its
authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or
an amount of P1,212,200.00. On September
26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of
its intention to contest the legality and
propriety of the said assessment. However,
the petitioner requested the SEC to approve
the other amendments being requested by
the petitioner without being deemed to have
withdrawn its application for extension of
corporate term. Consequently, the
respondent SEC, through Associate
Commissioner Fe Eloisa C. Gloria, on April
18, 1996, issued its ruling upholding the
validity of the questioned assessment, the
dispositive portion of which states that the
questioned assessment is in accordance
with law and that petitioner is required to
comply with the filing fee because it is in
accord with SEC Circular No. 2, Series of
1994.
An appeal from the aforequoted ruling of the
respondent SEC was subsequently taken by the
petitioner on the ground that the assessment of
filing fees for the petitioner’s application for
extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of
1% of the authorized capital stock plus 20%
thereof on the ground that it is not in accordance
with law. The appellate court agreed with the
SEC’s submission that an extension of the
corporate term is a grant of a fresh license for a
corporation to act as a juridical being endowed
with the powers expressly bestowed by the State
and that it is not an ordinary amendment but is
analogous to the filing of new articles of
incorporation.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum
Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is legally invalid and
ineffective for not having been published in
accordance with law.
ISSUE: WON the SEC’s separate assessment for
filing fee for the application for extension of
corporate term is valid.
RULING:
No. The SEC’s assessment for filing fee is not valid.
It should be mentioned at the outset that the
authority of the SEC to collect and receive fees as
authorized by law is not in question. 7 Its power to
collect fees for examining and filing articles of
incorporation and by-laws and amendments
thereto, certificates of increase or decrease of the
capital stock, among others, is recognized.
Likewise established is its power under Sec. 7 of
P.D. No. 902-A to recommend to the President the
revision, alteration, amendment or adjustment of
the charges which it is authorized to collect.
The subject of the present inquiry is not the
authority of the SEC to collect and receive fees and
charges, but rather the validity of its imposition on
the basis of a memorandum circular which, the
Court of Appeals held, is ineffective.
Republic Act No. 3531 (R.A. No. 3531) provides that
where the amendment consists in extending the
term of corporate existence, the SEC "shall be
entitled to collect and receive for the filing of the
amended articles of incorporation the same fees
collectible under existing law as the filing of
articles of incorporation."8 As is clearly the import
of this law, the SEC shall be entitled to collect and
receive the same fees it assesses and collects
both for the filing of articles of incorporation and
the filing of an amended articles of incorporation
for purposes of extending the term of corporate
existence.
The SEC, effectuating its mandate under the
aforequoted law and other pertinent laws, 9 issued
SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986,
imposing the filing fee of 1/10 of 1% of the
authorized capital stock but not less than P300.00
nor more than P100,000.00 for stock corporations,
and 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock but
not less than P200.00 nor more than P100,000.00
for stock corporations without par value, for the
filing of amended articles of incorporation where
the amendment consists of extending the term of
corporate existence.
Several years after, the SEC issued Memorandum
Circular No. 2, Series of 1994, imposing new fees
and charges and deleting the maximum filing fee
set forth in SEC Circular No. 1, Series of 1986, such
that the fee for the filing of articles of
incorporation became 1/10 of 1% of the authorized
capital stock plus 20% thereof but not less
thanP500.00.
A reading of the two circulars readily reveals that
they indeed pertain to different matters, as GMA
points out. SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series
of 1986 refers to the filing fee for the amendment
of articles of incorporation to extend corporate life,
while Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994
pertains to the filing fee for articles of
incorporation. Thus, as GMA argues, the former
circular, being squarely applicable and, more
importantly, being more favorable to it, should be
followed.
What this proposition fails to consider, however, is
the clear directive of R.A. No. 3531 to impose the
same fees for the filing of articles of incorporation
and the filing of amended articles of incorporation
to reflect an extension of corporate term. R.A. No.
3531 provides an unmistakable standard which
should guide the SEC in fixing and imposing its
rates and fees. If such mandate were the only
consideration, the Court would have been inclined
to rule that the SEC was correct in imposing the
filing fees as outlined in the questioned
memorandum circular, GMA’s argument
notwithstanding.
However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
the questioned memorandum circular is invalid as
it does not appear from the records that it has
been published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation.
Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Art. 2 of
the Civil Code, provides that "laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
unless it is otherwise provided."
In Tañada v. Tuvera,10 the Court, expounding on the
publication requirement, held:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees
and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature, or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their
duties.11
The questioned memorandum circular, furthermore,
has not been filed with the Office of the National
Administrative Register of the University of the
Philippines Law Center as required in the
Administrative Code of 1987.12
It should be emphasized that the said
memorandum circular cannot be construed as
simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531. This
administrative issuance is an implementation of
the mandate of the said RA and also it indubitably
regulates and affects the public at large. It cannot,
therefore, be considered a mere internal rule or
regulation, nor an interpretation of the law, but a
rule which must be declared ineffective as it was
neither published nor filed with the Office of the
National Administrative Register. Rate-fixing is a
legislative function which concededly has been
delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other
pertinent laws. The due process clause, however
requires that the said fixed rate by the SEC be
published first in the official gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation.
11. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (CHREA) Represented by its
President, SANCHEZ, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
FACTS:
Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise
known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It
provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All
Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy.
On the strength of such law, the CHR adopted an
upgrading and reclassification scheme among
selected positions in the Commission without
imprimatur from the DBM. On presentment of the
staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the
DBM with a request for its approval, secretary
Diokno denied the request. In light of the DBMs
disapproval of the proposed personnel modification
scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office
recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the
subject appointments be rejected owing to the
DBMs disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of CHREA, requested the
CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation
of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground
in saying that the DBM is the only agency with
appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate
and approve matters of reclassification and
upgrading, as well as creation of positions.
However, the CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs
request and reversed the recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be
censured. The CA affirmed the decision of the CSC.
CHREA bewails that the CSC and CA erroneously
assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar
as financial matters are concerned, particularly
with regard to the upgrading and reclassification of
positions therein.
ISSUE: Can the CHR lawfully implement an
upgrading and reclassification of personnel
positions without the prior approval of the
Department of Budget and Management? No.
HELD: The disputation of the Court of Appeals that
the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary
Standardization Law is flawed considering that the
coverage thereof encompasses the entire gamut of
government offices, sans qualification. It is within
the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the
upgrading, reclassification, and creation of
additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on
its finding that such scheme lacks legal
justification.
Palpably, the Court of Appeal’s Decision was based
on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to
the species of constitutional commissions. Article
IX of the Constitution states in no uncertain terms
that only the CSC, the Commission on Elections,
and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as
Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant
right to fiscal autonomy. The CHR, although
admittedly a constitutional creation is,
nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices
accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or
legislative fiat. Moreover, being a member of the
fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency
with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and
create positions without approval of the DBM.
While the members of the Group are authorized to
formulate and implement the organizational
structures of their respective offices and
determine the compensation of their personnel,
such authority is not absolute and must be
exercised within the parameters of the Unified
Position Classification and Compensation System
established under RA 6758 more popularly known
as the Compensation Standardization Law.
12. CHREA vs CHR; 2006
FACTS: Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522,
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act
of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions
Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying
Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII
covers the appropriations of the CHR.
On the strength of this special provisions, the
Commission on Human Rights [or CHR], through its
then Chairperson and Commissioners promulgated
Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998
adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme
among selected positions in the Commission.
CHR also issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing
for the upgrading or raising of salary grade of the
following positions in the Commission.
Said proposed personnel modification scheme was
disapproved by the DBM. The Supreme Court
denied said petition in its decision on 2004; hence,
this motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON CHR is a constitutional commission
which is entitled to fiscal autonomy
RULING: No. As already settled in the assailed
Decision of this Court, the creation of respondent
may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in
the strict sense, a constitutional commission.
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, plainly entitled
"Constitutional Commissions," identifies only the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit. The
mandate for the creation of the respondent is
found in Section 17 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution on Human Rights.
Thus, the respondent cannot invoke provisions
under Article IX of the 1987 Constitution on
constitutional commissions for its benefit. It must
be able to present constitutional and/or statutory
basis particularly pertaining to it to support its
claim of fiscal autonomy.
13. Re: Clarifying and Strengthening The
Organizational Structure and Administrative Set-Up
of the Philippine Judicial Academy
Facts: The instant administrative matter has its
roots in the Resolution of the Court promulgated
on February 24, 2004, clarifying and strengthening
the organizational structure and administrative set-
up of the Philippine Judicial Academy
(PHILJA). Pursuant to said resolution, the positions
of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and Supervising
Judicial Staff Officer with Salary Grades (SG) 25
and 23.
However, in its Notice of Organization, Staffing, and
Compensation Action (NOSCA) dated May 5, 2005,
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
downgraded said positions and their corresponding
salary grades. The SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer’s
title was downgraded and its SG reduced to
24. And Supervising Judicial Staff Officer’s title
was downgraded and its SG reduced to 22.
Issue: WON DBM may downgrade the said
positions.
Ruling: No. The primary role of the DBM is to demanded that he be furnished a copy of the
breathe life into the policy behind the Salary guidelines adopted by the committee for the
Standardization Law of providing equal pay for investigation and imposition of penalties. As he
substantially equal work and to base differences in
received no response from the committee, counsel
pay upon substantive differences in duties and
walked out. Later, however, counsel, was able to
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of
the positions. Pursuant to its mandate, the DBM is obtain a copy of the guidelines.
authorized to evaluate and determine whether a The teachers filed a an injunctive suit with the RTC
proposed reclassification and upgrading scheme is in Quezon City, charging the committee appointed
consistent with applicable laws and by Secretary Cariño with fraud and deceit and
regulations. The task of the DBM is simply to praying that it be stopped from further
review the compensation and benefits plan of the
investigating them and from rendering any decision
government agency or entity concerned and
in the administrative case. However, the trial court
determine if it complies with the prescribed
policies and guidelines issued in this regard. Thus, denied them a restraining order.
the role of the DBM is supervisorial in nature, its Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee
main duty being to ascertain that the proposed rendered a decision finding the petitioner-
compensation, benefits and other incentives to be appellees guilty, as charged and ordering their
given to [government] officials and employees immediate dismissal.
adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in
The trial court dismissed the petition
accordance with applicable laws.
for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit.
As such, the authority of the DBM to review The teachers then filed a petition
Supreme Court issuances relative to court for certiorari with the Supreme Court which issued
personnel on matters of compensation is limited by a resolution en banc declaring void the trial court's
the provisions of the Constitution, specifically
order of dismissal and reinstating petitioner-
Article VIII, Section 3 on fiscal autonomy and
Article VIII, Section 6 on administrative supervision appellees' action, even as it ordered the latter's
over court personnel. Fiscal autonomy means reinstatement pending decision of their case.
freedom from outside control. ISSUE: WON due process were accorded to private
respondents?
Clearly then, in downgrading the positions and
RULING: NO.
salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and
In the present case, the issue is not whether
SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer in the PHILJA,
the DBM overstepped its authority and encroached private respondents may be punished for engaging
upon the Courts fiscal autonomy and supervision of in a prohibited action but whether, in the course of
court personnel as enshrined in the Constitution; in the investigation of the alleged proscribed activity,
fine, a violation of the Constitution itself. their right to due process has been violated. In
short, before they can be investigated and meted
out any penalty, due process must first be
14. FABELLA VS.CA
observed.
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, then DECS
In administrative proceedings, due process has
Secretary Cariño issued a return-to-work order to
been recognized to include the following: (1) the
all public school teachers who had participated in
right to actual or constructive notice of the
walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the
institution of proceedings which may affect a
period September to October 1990. The mass
respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to
action had been staged to demand payment of 13th
be heard personally or with the assistance of
month differentials, clothing allowances and
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among
one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a
other things.
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases against
constituted as to afford a person charged
herein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of
administratively a reasonable guarantee of
the Mandaluyong High School for: grave
honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by
misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation
said tribunal which is supported by substantial
of Civil Service Law and rules on reasonable office
evidence submitted for consideration during the
regulations; refusal to perform official duty;
hearing or contained in the records or made known
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
to the parties affected.
service.absence without leave (AWOL).
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670
At the same time, Secretary Cariño ordered
known as the Magna Carta for Public School
petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventive
Teachers, which specifically covers administrative
suspension.
proceedings involving public schoolteachers.
Administrative hearings started on December 20,
Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the
1990. Petitioner-appellees' counsel objected to the
committee to hear public schoolteachers'
procedure adopted by the committee and
administrative cases should be composed of the
school superintendent of the division as chairman,
a representative of the local or any existing
provincial or national teachers' organization and a
supervisor of the division.
In the present case, the various committees
formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges
against private respondents did not include "a
representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teacher's
organization" as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Accordingly, these committees were deemed to
have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all
proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily
void. They could not provide any basis for the
suspension or dismissal of private respondents.
The inclusion of a representative of a teachers'
organization in these committees was
indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It
was this requirement that would have given
substance and meaning to the right to be heard.
Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of
procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be
heard.
Because the administrative proceedings involved in
this case are void, no delinquency or misconduct
may be imputed to private respondents.
15. EMIN vs CHAIRMAN DE LEON Feb 27, 2002
FACTS: Martin Emin, herein petitioner a Non-Formal
Education Supervisor was charged in the CSC with
acts of dishonesty and grave misconduct in
connection with his acts of receiving fees in return
for the issuance of false certificates of eligibility.
The CSC found him guilty and ordered his dismissal
from the service. He then filed a petition for
reconsideration of the same in the CSC and later
appealed to the CA which both denied the petition.
He now comes to the SC alleging that as a teacher,
original jurisdiction over the administrative case
against him is lodged with a committee and not
with the CSC, as provided for by Republic Act 4670
otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public
School Teacher and that he was not accorded with
due process.
ISSUE: WON the CSC has jurisdiction over the case
and WON he was given due process?
HELD: While it is true that petitioner is correct in
pointing out that he is covered by RA 4670 and that
a committee has original jurisdiction over his
administrative case and not the CSC, the SC held
that he cannot now invoke such lack of jurisdiction
on the ground of estoppel by laches.
In this instant case, the CSC had afforded
petitioner sufficient opportunity to be heard and
defend himself against charges of participation in
faking civil service eligibilities of certain teachers
for a fee. Not only did he answer the charges
before the CSC Regional Office but he participated
in the hearings of the charges against him to the
extent that we are left with no doubt that his
participation in its proceedings was willful and
voluntary. Thus, he may not anymore question the
authority of the CSC.
The rule is well established that due process is
satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy or given opportunity to move for a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.
16. ALCALA VS CHAIRMAN DE LEON ET AL.
FACTS: Respondent Jovencio D. Villar is the School
Principal of Lanao National High School.
Complainants who were teachers of Lanao National
High School and Dapdap National High School filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman an
administrative complaint against respondent for
dishonesty alleging that on August 18-22, 1997,
they attended a mass training/seminar at Cebu.
Later, Respondent refunded the complainants their
expenses during the said training/seminar.
However, it was discovered that Respondent did
not give back the full amount due to them.
Complainants further alleged that some of the
teachers received from respondent P1,500.00 each
representing Loyalty Benefits, however, they
learned from the DECS Division Office that they
were entitled to receive P2,000.00 each.
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution
finding respondent guilty of dishonesty and
dismissing him from service.
On appeal, the CA nullified and set aside the
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman on the
ground that the latter was without jurisdiction over
administrative complaints against public school
teachers. It ruled that the governing law is RA
4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, and not RA 6770, the
Ombudsman Act of 1989.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the
Ombudsman has jurisdiction over complaints
against public school teachers.
RULING: Yes, the Office of the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction.
In the case of Emin vs De Leon, the Court ruled
that the proceedings conducted by the public
respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on
procedural grounds. Under the principle of estoppel
by laches, petitioner is now barred from impugning
the CSC’s jurisdiction over his case. Participation
by parties in the administrative proceedings
without raising any objection thereto bars them
from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an
adverse decision is rendered against them.
Applying the decision of Emin vs De Leon in the
case at bar, respondent was amply afforded due
process in an administrative proceeding, the
essence of which is an opportunity to explain one’s
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. Not only did
respondent file a counter-affidavit and a motion for
reconsideration, he also participated in the
hearings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman and was given the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses against him. Verily,
participation in the administrative proceedings
without raising any objection thereto amounts to a
waiver of jurisdictional infirmities.
In the same vein, respondent in this case should be
barred under the principle of estoppel by laches
from assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Therefore, the CA should have resolved the appeal
on its merits, considering that respondent’s right to
procedural due process was properly observed.
17. MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR., G.R. No. 153155
- versus -
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Facts:
1. Petitioner Manuel D. Laxina, Sr. was
Barangay Chairman of Brgy. Batasan
Hills, Quezon City.
2. Evangeline Ursal (Ursal), Barangay Clerk of
Batasan Hills, Quezon City, filed with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a
complaint for attempted rape against
petitioner. Petitioner was subsequently
charged with sexual harassment before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.[6]
3. Thereafter, Ursal filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a similar complaint-affidavit
charging petitioner with grave misconduct.
4. Petitioner filed his counter-affidavit and
attached thereto the affidavits of two
witnesses.
5. The Administrative Adjudication Bureau
(AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, upon
review, and with the approval of the
Ombudsman, petitioner was found guilty of
grave misconduct and meted the penalty of
dismissal, with forfeiture of material
benefits, per its Memorandum Order. [10]
6. Meanwhile, Ursal asked the City Council to
waive its jurisdiction in favor of the
Ombudsman.[12] The City Council merely
noted Ursals motion.
7. petitioner seeks the dismissal of the
administrative charge against him for the
CA committed a grave error of law in
refusing to dismiss the cases against
petitioner on the ground of forum shopping
and misapplying instead the principle of
estoppel.
Issue: WON there was forum shopping when the
petition was filed both in the City council and in
the Ombudsman?
Ruling: NO.
At the onset, it must be stressed that the rule on
forum-shopping applies only to judicial cases or
proceedings,[36] and not to administrative cases.
Petitioner has not cited any rule or circular on
forum-shopping issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman or that of the City Council.
Ursal filed identical complaint-affidavits before the
City Council, through the DILG, and the Office of
the Ombudsman. A review of the said complaints-
affidavits shows that far from being the typical
initiatory pleadings referred to in Supreme Court
Administrative Circulars Nos. 04-94 and 28-91, they
merely contain a recital of the alleged culpable
acts of petitioner. Ursal did not make any claim for
relief, nor pray for any penalty for petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the Ombudsman has
no jurisdiction over the case since the City Council
had earlier acquired jurisdiction over the matter.
The Court is not convinced.
The mandate of the Ombudsman to investigate
complaints against erring public officials, derived
from both the Constitution[38] and the law[39] gives it
jurisdiction over the complaint against petitioner.
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7160 or
the Local Government Code, the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary
authority over any elective barangay official.
[43]
Without a doubt, the Office of the Ombudsman
has concurrent jurisdiction with the Quezon City
Council over administrative cases against elective
officials such as petitioner.
The Ombudsman was not aware of the
pending case before the Quezon City Council when
the administrative complaint was filed before it.
There was no mention of such complaint either in
the complaint-affidavit or in the counter-affidavit of
petitioner. Thus, the Ombudsman, in compliance
with its duty to act on all complaints against
officers and employees of the government, took
cognizance of the case, made its investigation, and
rendered its decision accordingly.
Petitioner is also estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. A perusal of the
records shows that he participated in the
proceedings by filing his counter-affidavit with
supporting evidence. Neither did he inform the
Ombudsman of the existence of the other
administrative complaint of which he is presumably
aware at the time the proceedings in the
Ombudsman were on-going. It was only when the
Ombudsman rendered an adverse decision that he
disclosed the proceedings before the Quezon City
Council and raised the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, it
has been held that participation in the
administrative proceedings without raising any
objection thereto bars the parties from raising any
jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is
rendered against them.[45]
(THE FF IS THE DISCUSSION PROPER RE: ADMIN
DUE PROCESS. GI CITE KO LANG NANG SA
IBABAW KAY MAO NAY GI DISCUSS NI SIR, AMBOT
NGANO NGA PROCEDURAL MAN)
Another submission made by petitioner is
that he was deprived of his right to administrative
due process when he was dismissed from service
without substantial evidence and without
consideration of the evidence he proffered. He
raises as a defense Ursals failure to state the
actual date of commission of the alleged
attempted rape, the impossibility of the assault,
and the affidavits of his other subordinates.
[46]
Calling attention to the weakness of Ursals
evidence, he states that such evidence is not
sufficient to establish the crime of rape, in
whatever stage.[47] Finally, he argues that as
testament to his innocence, his constituents voted
him to a third term.[48]
Again, the Court is not impressed.
Petitioner was accorded the opportunity to
be heard. He was required to answer the formal
charge and given a chance to present evidence in
his behalf. He was not denied due process. More
importantly, the decision of the Ombudsman is well
supported by substantial evidence.
A finding of guilt in an administrative case
would have to be sustained for as long as it is
supported by substantial evidence that respondent
has committed the acts stated in the complaint or
formal charge.[49] Substantial evidence has been
defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. This is different from the degree of
proof required in criminal proceedings, which calls
for a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
[50]
Petitioners reliance on the rules on prosecution
for the crime of rape is therefore misplaced. What
is at issue in the case before the Ombudsman is
whether his acts constitute grave misconduct, and
not whether he is guilty of the crime of attempted
rape.
18) OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs.
VICTORIO N. MEDRANO, respondent.
FACTS:
Ma. Ruby Dumalaog, a teacher, filed a sworn letter-
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
charging her superior–herein respondent, with (1)
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7877 (Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995), and (2) grave
misconduct (administrative case). Respondent
denied the charge, claiming that it was
"maliciously designed to harass and threaten him
to succumb to Ma. Ruby’s demand that she be
given a regular teaching post and thus prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint.
By Decision rendered in the administrative case,
petitioner adjudged respondent guilty of grave
misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of
dismissal from the service. Respondent moved for
reconsideration and assailed for the first time, the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over the case. He
argued that under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 (the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers), an
administrative complaint against a public school
teacher should be heard by an investigating
committee of the DECS, now DepEd, composed of
the school superintendent of the division where the
teacher belongs, a representative from a teachers’
organization, and a supervisor of the division.
The appellate court annulled petitioner’s Decision,
as modified, in the administrative case and
dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that
petitioner has no jurisdiction over it. It held that
although respondent raised the issue of jurisdiction
only after petitioner rendered an adverse decision,
"the rule on estoppel will not apply against
Medrano" because such jurisdictional issue was
raised "when the case was still before the
Ombudsman."
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in not ruling
that it (petitioner) has concurrent jurisdiction with
the DepEd over the administrative complaint
against respondent.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner has jurisdiction over the
administrative complaint against respondent.
HELD: YES. (because of the principle of estoppel)
Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution "created
the independent Office of the Ombudsman." The
constitutional and statutory provisions taken
together reveal the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to bestow upon the petitioner full
administrative disciplinary power over public
officials and employees except those impeachable
officials, Members of Congress and of the
Judiciary.
However, when an administrative charge is
initiated against a public school teacher, Section 9
of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers
specifically provides that the same shall be heard
initially by an investigating committee composed
of the school superintendent of the division, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national
teachers’ organization, and a supervisor of the
division.
Significantly, The Ombudsman Act of 1989
recognizes the existence of some "proper
disciplinary authorities," such as the investigating
committee of the DepEd mentioned in Section 9 of
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Thus,
Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs
that the petitioner "may refer certain complaints to
the proper disciplinary authority for the institution
of appropriate administrative proceedings against
erring public officers or employees."
In light of this, the Court holds that the
administrative disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an
exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper
committee of the DepEd.
In the instant case, respondent, although
designated as then OIC of a public school and
concurrently the school principal of another public
school, is undoubtedly covered by the definition of
the term "teacher" under Section 2 of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers which provides:
SEC 2. Title – Definition.– This Act shall x x x apply
to all public school teachers except those in the
professorial staff of state colleges and universities.
As used in this Act, the term ‘teacher’ shall mean
all persons engaged in the classroom, in any level
of instruction; on full time basis, including
guidance counselors, school librarians, industrial
arts or vocational instructors, and all other persons
performing supervisory and/or administrative
functions in all schools, colleges and universities
operated by the Government or its political
subdivisions; but shall not include school nurses,
school physicians, school dentists, and other
school employees. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, the administrative complaint against
respondent should have been referred by petitioner
to the proper committee of the DepEd for the
institution of appropriate administrative
proceedings, in light of Section 23 of The
Ombudsman Act of 1989.
But while petitioner should have desisted from
hearing the administrative complaint against
respondent and referred it to the proper DepEd
committee, respondent is now barred from
assailing petitioner’s acts under the principle of
estoppel. He had actively participated in the
administrative proceedings before petitioner. In his
Counter-Affidavit, he asked petitioner for
affirmative relief by seeking the dismissal of the
administrative complaint allegedly for being
baseless. From then on, he was assisted by
counsel in filing several motions. When he was
preventively suspended for six months without pay,
he filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that
"a new Order be issued reversing or setting aside
the said Order." When this was denied, he again
filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for
the lifting of his suspension since he was already
replaced as OIC, which motion was granted. It was
only after petitioner had rendered an adverse
Decision that he, in a Motion for Reconsideration,
impugned petitioner’s assumption of jurisdiction
over his case. Verily, respondent cannot be
permitted to challenge petitioner’s acts belatedly.
19. Ombudsman vs. Delijero Jr.
Facts:
Cleofas P. dela Cruz, was the mother of the alleged
victim Myra dela Cruz (Myra). At the time of the
incident, Myra was only 12 years old and a first
year high school student at the Burauen
Comprehensive National High School. Respondent,
on the other hand, was Myra's 52-year-old
Mathematics teacher.5 Sometime in May 2003,
complainant learned from her cousin that
respondent was courting her daughter Myra.
Complainant then immediately confronted Myra,
who admitted having received from respondent
several handwritten love letters, a Valentine's card
and Two Hundred Pesos as allowance. Moreover,
Myra said that respondent kissed him in her cheek
when the respondent called her while respondent
is in his room. Respondent submitted a Counter-
Affidavit10 in his defense denying the allegation of
him kissing the 12 year old student. Petitioner
called the parties to a preliminary conference and
after which ordered them to submit their
respective position papers. However respondent
did not submit a position paper but instead
submitted a Manifestation11 stating that the
administrative aspect of the complaint was
likewise the subject of a complaint filed by
complainant before the Office of the Regional
Director, Department of Education, Regional Office
8 of Palo Leyte. As a result, the Ombudsman finds
resp PEDRO DELIJERO, JR. guilty of Grave
Misconduct and meted the penalty of DISMISSAL
from public service, forfeiture of all benefits and
perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Respondent then appealed to the CA with the latter
ruling in favor of respondent Delijero Jr. on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
over Delijero as Republic Act No. 4670 (RA 4670),
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
specifically covers and governs administrative
proceedings involving public school teachers.
Petitioner Ombudsman should have therefore
immediately dismissed the case after respondent
had informed it, through a manifestation, of the
pendency of an administrative complaint before the
DECS. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON there was due process.
RULING:
Yes. Under the Constitution and the law, the
Ombudsman has the full administrative disciplinary
power over public officials and employees except
those impeachable officials. However, when
an administrative charge is initiated against
a public school teacher, Section 9 of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers specifically
provides that Administrative charges against
a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee
composed of the
corresponding Schools Superintendent of the Divisi
on or a duly authorized representative who should
at least have the rank of a division supervisor,
where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representativeof the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or
national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of
theDivision, the last two to be designated by the
Director of Public
Schools. The committee shall submit its findingsan
d decision adverse to him was rendered did he
recommendations to the Director of Public Schools
within thirty days from termination of the hearings;
Provided, however, That where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested
party, all the members of the committee shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Education.
Significantly, Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of
1989 directs that the petitioner "may refer certain
complaints to
the proper disciplinary authority for the institution
of appropriate administrative proceedings against
erring public officers or employees." Hence under
the circumstances it would have been more
prudent for petitioner to have referred the
complaint to the DECS given that it would have
been in a better position to serve the interest of
justice considering the nature of the controversy.
Respondent is a public school teacher and is
covered by RA 4670, therefore, the proceedings
before the DECS would have been the more
appropriate venue to resolve the dispute.
Be that as it may, the foregoing does not mean that
the proceedings in the Ombudsman is null and void
by reasons of estoppel.
In Medrano, this Court ruled that while petitioner
should have desisted from hearing the
administrative complaint against respondent and
referred it to the proper DepEd committee, given
that it had already concluded the proceedings and
had rendered a decision thereon, respondent is
now barred from assailing petitioner’s acts under
the principle of estoppel. He had actively
participated in the administrative proceedings
before petitioner. In his Counter-Affidavit, he asked
petitioner for affirmative relief by seeking the
dismissal of the administrative complaint allegedly
for being baseless. From then on, he was assisted
by counsel in filing several motions. When he was
preventively suspended for six months without pay,
he filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that
"a new Order be issued reversing or setting aside
the preventive suspension Order." When this was
denied, he again filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration for the lifting of his suspension
since he was already replaced as OIC, which
motion was granted. It was only after petitioner
had rendered an adverse Decision that he, in a
Motion for Reconsideration, impugned petitioner’s
assumption of jurisdiction over his case. Verily,
respondent cannot be permitted to challenge
petitioner’s acts belatedly. (Underscoring
supplied). Likewise, in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Galicia,22 this Court ruled that the right to due
process was not violated, notwithstanding that the
DECS had original jurisdiction to hear the
complaint, thus:
In the present case, records show that Galicia was
given the right to due process in the investigation
of the charges against him. He participated in the
proceedings by making known his defenses in the
pleadings that he submitted. It was only when a
question the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Under the principles of estoppel and laches, We
rule that it is now too late for Galicia to assail the
administrative investigation conducted and the
decision rendered against him.
The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. During the
proceedings before the Ombudsman, Galicia filed a
Counter-Affidavit, Rejoinder-Affidavit, Comment on
the Certification of the CCPC Registrar, and a
Rejoinder to Reply. He also submitted documents in
support of his contentions. Likewise, there is no
indication that the proceedings were done in a
manner that would prevent him from presenting his
defenses. Verily, these suffice to satisfy the
requirements of due process because the
opportunity to be heard especially in
administrative proceedings (where technical rules
of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied)
is not limited to oral arguments. More often, this
opportunity is conferred through written pleadings
that the parties submit to present their charges
and defenses.
In sum, We reiterate that it is the School
Superintendent and not the Ombudsman that has
jurisdiction over administrative cases against
public school teachers. Yet, Galicia is estopped
from belatedly assailing the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman. His right to due process was satisfied
when he participated fully in the investigation
proceedings. He was able to present evidence and
arguments in his defense. The investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman was therefore valid.
20. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN -versus- MASING
and TAYACTAC
FACTS: Masing was the former Principal of the
Davao City Integrated Special School (DCISS) in
Bangkal, Davao City. Tayactac was an office clerk
in the same school. Respondents were
administratively charged before the Office of the
Ombudsman for allegedly collecting unauthorized
fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to
account for public funds. The complainants were
parents of children studying at the DCISS.
The Ombudsman, after investigation rendered
judgement against respondents. However, on
appeal before the CA, the appellate court reversed
the Ombudsman's decision. It is the contention of
the respondents that the findings of the
Ombudsman are mere recommendations, and that
it may not directly impose administrative sanctions
on public officials and employees.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman may directly
discipline public school teachers and employees.
Yes.
HELD: The authority of the Ombudsman to act on
complaints filed against public officers and
employees is explicit in Article XI, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution. He is vested with broad powers
to enable him to implement his own actions. The
Ombudsmans' order to remove, suspend, demote,
fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee
is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is
actually mandatory. Implementation of the order
imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed
through the proper officer.
Anent Masing's contention that she may be
administratively dealt with only by following the
procedure prescribed under The Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, the Court ruled that it is
erroneous for her to contend that The Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers confers an exclusive
disciplinary authority on the DECS over public
school teachers and prescribes an exclusive
procedure in administrative investigations
involving them. The Court ruled that the authority
of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct
administrative investigations is beyond cavil, as it
is mandated by no less than Section 13(1), Article
XI of the Constitution as the principal and primary
complaints and action center against erring public
officers and employees.
21. PADUA vs RANADA
FACTS: The focal point upon which these two
consolidated cases converge is whether the
Resolution issued by the Toll Regulatory Board
(TRB), authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments
at the Metro Manila Skyway is valid.
The resolution was issued by TRB as answer on the
petition of Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation,
as an investor and/or the operator because of
significant currency devaluation, which in turn,
according to CITRA, necessitates the need for the
increase of the toll rates to meet the loan
obligations of the Project and the substantial
increase in debt-service burden.
Petitioners Padua and Zialcita, as toll payer and
taxpayer, assail the validity and legality of TRB
Resolution before the court. Private respondent
CITRA, with the OSG, counter that the TRB has
primary administrative jurisdiction over all matters
relating to toll rates.
ISSUE: WON Toll Regulatory Board could authorize
the provisional toll rate adjustments.
RULING: Yes. The TRB may grant and issue ex-parte
to any petitioner, without need of notice,
publication or hearing, provisional authority to
collect, pending hearing and decision on the merits
of the petition, the increase in rates prayed for or
such lesser amount as the TRB may in its
discretion provisionally grant.
An administrative agency may be empowered to
approve provisionally, when demanded by urgent
public need, rates of public utilities without a
hearing.
In a catena of cases, this Court laid down the
cardinal requirements of due process in
administrative proceedings, one of which is that
"the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act
on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate."
Thus, it is logical to say that this mandate was
rendered precisely to ensure that in cases where
the hearing or reception of evidence is assigned to
a subordinate, the body or agency shall not merely
rely on his recommendation but instead shall
personally weigh and assess the evidence which
said subordinate has gathered."
Be that as it may, we must stress that the TRB’s
authority to grant provisional toll rate adjustments
does not require the conduct of a hearing.
Pertinent laws and jurisprudence support this
conclusion.
22. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Petitioners,
vs.
PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE L. PEREZ,
and IMELDA Q. AGUSTIN, Respondents.
Facts: On May 15, 1996, some concerned [DOH-
NCR] employees filed a complaint before the DOH
Resident Ombudsman against respondents for
alleged anomalous purchase of medical supplies.
On October 25, 1996, then Executive Secretary,
Torres issued AO 298 creating an ad-hoc
committee to investigate the administrative case
filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO
was indorsed to the Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption.
The PCAGC issued a resolution and found the
respondents guilty. The said resolution was
indorsed to President Ramos, who also found
respondents guilty and issued AO 390, which
remanded the records of the case to the Secretary
of DOH for appropriate action.
The Secretary of Health issued an Order, relying on
the resolution rendered by the PCAGC, dismissed
respondents.
The respondent filed an appeal before the CSC but
was denied. They then brought the matter to the
CA. The appellate court held that in simply and
completely relying on the PCAGC’s findings, the
secretary of health failed to comply with
administrative due process.
Issue: WON respondents were denied of their right
to due process.
Ruling: Yes.
The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department
secretaries with the authority to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary actions for
officers and employees under the former’s
jurisdiction. Thus, the health secretary had
disciplinary authority over respondents.
The health secretary has the competence and the
authority to decide what action should be taken
against officials and employees who have been
administratively charged and investigated.
However, the actual exercise of the disciplining
authority’s prerogative requires a
prior independent consideration of the law and the
facts. Failure to comply with this requirement
results in an invalid decision. The disciplining
authority should not merely and solely rely on an
investigator’s recommendation, but must
personally weigh and assess the evidence
gathered. There can be no shortcuts, because at
stake are the honor, the reputation, and the
livelihood of the person administratively charged.
The President’s endorsement of the records of the
case for the "appropriate action" of the health
secretary did not constitute a directive for the
immediate dismissal of respondents. The decision
of Secretary Reodica should have contained a
factual finding and a legal assessment of the
controversy to enable respondents to know the
bases for their dismissal and thereafter prepare
their appeal intelligently, if they so desired.
Being violative of administrative due process, the
Orders of the health secretary were annulled and
set aside. The records of the case was
then remanded to the Department of Health, so
that the proper steps be taken to correct the due-
process errors.
23. MALINAO VS. REYES
Petitioner Malinao is Human Resource Manager of
Marinduque. Respondent Mayor filed a case against
her in the Office of the Ombudsman for gross
neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence.
While the case was pending, he appointed a
replacement for petitioner.
The petitioner filed an administrative case against
respondent Mayor in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Marinduque, charging him with abuse
authority and denial of due process.
The case was taken up in executive session of the
Sanggunian. The transcript of stenographic notes
of the session shows that the Sanggunian, by the
vote of 5 to 3 of its members, found respondent
Mayor guilty of the charge and imposed on him the
penalty of one-month suspension.
The result of the voting was subsequently
embodied in a "Decision" signed by only one
member of the Sanggunian, who did so
"Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan."
On September 14, 1994, respondent Mayor filed a
manifestation before the Sanggunian, questioning
the "Decision" on the ground that it was signed by
Sotto alone, "apparently acting in his capacity and
designated as "Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon
Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan." He
contended that because of this the decision could
only be considered as a recommendation of the
Blue Ribbon Committee and he was not bound
thereby.
On September 13, 1994, respondent Mayor sought
the opinion of the Secretary of the DILG regarding
the validity of the "Decision."
DILG Secretary alluded that it does not appear to
be in accordance with Section 66 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and settled
jurisprudence".
On the other hand, petitioner sent a letter to
respondent Governor Reyes, demanding that the
"Decision" suspending respondent Mayor from
office be implemented without further delay but
respondent Governor agreed with the opinion of
the DILG for which reason he could not implement
the "Decision" in question.
On October 21, 1994, the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2,
acquitted respondent Mayor of the charges against
him. The vote was embodied in a Decision of the
same date, which was signed by all members who
had thus voted. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the decision of the Sanggunian voting
for the acquittal valid?
RULING: YES.
Under Section 6 of the LGC it requires that the
decision shall be in writing, stating clearly and
distinctly the factual findings and the reasons for
such conclusion reached.
If there was a deliberation and voting but without
the decision signed by the members of the
Sanggunian, the members of the Sanggunian can
still make a different ruling. So long as there is no
affirmation of the decision, they can still change
their votes.
In the instant case, the first decision rendered by
the Sanggunian voting for the administrative
sanctions against the mayor is not valid on the
of
ground that it was not in compliance with the law.
Thus, the subsequent decision voting for the
acquittal, signed and made in writing is valid.
24. GARCIA vs MOLINA and VELASCO
FACTS: The present case involves a case of grave
misconduct filed by petitioner Garcia as the
president of GSIS against respondents Molina and
Velasco as lawyers of GSIS.
as Respondents aver here that they were not
accorded with due process for the lack of the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. Petitioner,
on the other hand, avers that he has the power to
discipline petitioners under the GSIS Law and that
the lack of preliminary investigation does not make
his decision null and void.
ISSUE: WON there was the observance of due
process in the handling of the instant
administrative case?
HELD: The SC held in the negative.
It is true that under the GSIS law, petitioner, as
President and General Manager of GSIS, is vested
the authority and responsibility to remove, suspend
or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause.
However, despite the authority conferred on him by
law, such power is not without limitations for it
must be exercised in accordance with Civil Service
rules.
The CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a
formal charge without the requisite preliminary
investigation is null and void. However, as clearly
outlined above, upon receipt of a complaint which
is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining
authority shall require the person complained of to
submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath
within three days from receipt. The use of the word
shall quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory
for the disciplining authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation or at least respondent
should be given the opportunity to comment and
explain his side. As can be gleaned from the
procedure set forth above, this is done prior to the
issuance of the formal charge and the comment
required therein is different from the answer that
may later be filed by respondents.
In the case at hand, the filing by petitioner of
formal charges against the respondents without
complying with the mandated preliminary
investigation or at least give the respondents the
opportunity to comment violated the latter's right
to due process. Hence, the formal charges are void
ab initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly
at any time.
Therefore, as the administrative proceedings
involved in this case are void, no delinquency or
misconduct may be imputed to respondents and
the preventive suspension meted them is baseless.
Consequently, respondents should be awarded
their salaries during the period of their unjustified
suspension.
25. CRUZ AND PAITIM VS CSC
FACTS: A Formal Charge for Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service signed by the Director IV of
the CSC Regional Office was filed against Gilda
Cruz and Zenaida C. Paitim with the CSC. It was
alleged that Paitim, a Municipal Treasurer, falsely
pretended to be the examinee, Gilda Cruz, a co-
employee in the said office, and took the CSC Sub-
professional examinations for the latter. Records
revealed that the picture of Cruz pasted in the
Picture Seat Plan of the said examination bears no
resemblance to the pictures of Cruz as appearing
in the picture seat plans of the said CSC Sub-prof
examination.
The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge
entering a general denial of the material averments
of the Formal Charge. They also declared that they
were electing a formal investigation on the matter.
The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to
Dismiss averring that if the investigation will
continue, they will be deprived of their right to due
process because the CSC was the complainant, the
Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time.
However, the Motion to Dismiss was denied so was
the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
Dulce J. Cochon, Attorney III of the CSC conduct
the formal administrative investigation of
petitioners' case and, later, issued an Investigation
Report and Recommendation finding the
Petitioners guilty of Dishonesty and ordering their
dismissal from the government service.
The aforesaid Investigation Report and
Recommendation was then forwarded, to the CSC
for its consideration and resolution, which
thereafter, the CSC found the petitioners guilty of
the charges and ordered their dismissal from the
government service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners'
constitutional right to due process was violated
since the respondent commission acted as the
investigator, the complainant, the prosecutor, and
the judge, all at the same time, against petitioners.
RULING: No, the petitioners were not denied of
their right to due process.
The CSC is mandated to hear and decide
administrative case instituted by it or instituted
before it directly or on appeal including actions of
its officers and the agencies attached to it
pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987.
The fact that the CSC itself filed the complaint
does not mean that it could not be an impartial
judge. As an administrative body, its decision was
based on substantial findings. Factual findings of
administrative bodies, being considered experts in
their field, are binding on the Supreme Court.
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the
petitioners were formally charged after a finding
that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against
them. They were properly informed of the charges
and submitted an Answer and were given the
opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners
cannot, therefore, claim that there was a denial of
due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the CSC to take cognizance of the case.
26. WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as
President and General Manager of GSIS,
- versus -
MARIO I. MOLINA and ALBERT M. VELASCO,
Facts:
1. Respondents Molina and Velasco both held
the position of Attorney V in GSIS.
2. They received two separate memoranda
from Garcia, the GSIS President, charging
them with grave misconduct, particularly
connected with their acts in leading
concerted protest activities and/or
assemblies of GSIS employees against the
GSIS President. They were also preventively
suspended for 90 days without pay, effective
immediately.
3. The CA nullified the formal charges against
respondents for the lack of preliminary
investigation.
Issue: Whether or not the formal charges against
respondents are null and void.
Held: Yes.
According to the GSIS Act, petitioner, as President
and General Manager of GSIS, is vested the
authority and responsibility to remove, suspend or
otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause.
However, despite the authority conferred on him by
law, such power is not without limitations for it
must be exercised in accordance with Civil Service
rules. The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service lays down the procedure to be
observed in issuing a formal charge against an
erring employee.
Indeed, the CSC Rules does not specifically provide
that a formal charge without the requisite
preliminary investigation is null and void. However,
upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in
form and substance, the disciplining authority shall
require the person complained of to submit a
Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three
days from receipt. The use of the word "shall" quite
obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the
disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation or at least respondent should be
given the opportunity to comment and explain his
side. This is done prior to the issuance of the
formal charge and the comment required therein is
different from the answer that may later be filed by
respondents. Contrary to petitioner claim, no
exception is provided for in the CSC Rules.
Not even an indictment in flagranti as claimed by
petitioner.
This is true even if the complainant is the
disciplining authority himself, as in the present
case. To comply with such requirement, he could
have issued a memorandum requiring respondents
to explain why no disciplinary action should be
taken against them instead of immediately issuing
formal charges. With respondents’ comments,
petitioner would have properly evaluated both
sides of the controversy before making a
conclusion that there was a prima facie case
against respondents, leading to the issuance of the
questioned formal charges. It is noteworthy that
the very acts subject of the administrative cases
stemmed from an event that took place the day
before the formal charges were issued. It appears,
therefore, that the formal charges were issued
after the sole determination by the petitioner as
the disciplining authority that there was a prima
facie case against respondents.
27) CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, NATIONAL
CAPITAL REGION, Petitioner, vs. RANULFO P.
ALBAO, Respondent.
FACTS:
The Office of the Vice President of the Republic of
the Philippines issued an original and permanent
appointment for the position of Executive Assistant
IV to respondent Ranulfo P. Albao. Respondent was
then a contractual employee at said Office.
In a letter addressed to the Director of the CSC
(Manila), the Office of the VP requested the
retrieval of the said appointment paper. Instead of
heeding the request, petitioner CSC-NCR
disapproved the appointment. Petitioner issued an
Order holding that it has found that a prima facie
case exists against respondent Albao for
Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents
(PRC license).
Respondent Albao filed an "Urgent Motion to
Resolve" the issue of whether or not the Civil
Service Commission has original jurisdiction over
the administrative case. Respondent contended
that the Commission has no jurisdiction over the
same for the reasons that (1) The permanent
appointment issued to him never became effective,
even if it was later disapproved, because he never
assumed such position in the first place and
moreover, he is already out of government service
since he resigned from his position; (2) As he is no
longer with the civil service, the Commission has
no disciplinary jurisdiction over him as a private
person.
ISSUE: W/N the CSC has original jurisdiction to
institute the instant administrative case against
respondent Albao.
HELD: YES.
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred
only by the Constitution or the law. Republic v.
Court of Appeals also enunciated that only a
statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and
administrative agencies.
Section 12, Title 1 (A), Book V of EO No. 292
enumerates the powers and functions of the Civil
Service Commission, one of which is its quasi-
judicial function under paragraph 11, which states:
Section 12. Powers and Functions -- The
Commission shall have the following powers and
functions: x x x
(11)Hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by or brought before it directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments, and
review decisions and actions of its offices and of
the agencies attached to it. . . .
Section 47, Title 1 (A), Book V of EO No. 292, on the
other hand, provides, as follows:
SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.— x x x (2) The
Secretaries and heads of agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary action
against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. x x x
Furthermore, Section 48 of said EO provides for the
procedure in administrative cases against non-
presidential appointees, thus:
SEC. 48. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against
Non-Presidential Appointees. -– (1) Administrative
proceedings may be commenced against a
subordinate officer or employee by the Secretary or
head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local
government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional
directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any
other person.
Respondent Albao was a contractual employee in
the Office of the Vice President before his
appointment to a permanent position, which
appointment was, however, requested to be
retrieved by the Office and at the same time
disapproved by the CSC. Pursuant to Section 47 (1),
(2) and Section 48 above, it is the Vice President,
as head of office, who is vested with jurisdiction to
commence disciplinary action against respondent
Albao.
Nevertheless, this Court does not agree that
petitioner is helpless to act directly and motu
proprio, on the alleged acts of dishonesty and
falsification of official document committed by
respondent in connection with his appointment to a
permanent position in the Office of the Vice
President.
It is true that Section 47 (2) of said EO gives the
heads of government offices original disciplinary
jurisdiction over their own subordinates. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty
days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days’
salary. It is only when the penalty imposed exceeds
the aforementioned penalties that an appeal may
be brought before the Civil Service Commission
which has appellate jurisdiction over the same in
accordance with Section 47 (1) of said EO, thus:
SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.—(1) The
Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than
thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. . . .
The present case, however, partakes of an act by
petitioner to protect the integrity of the civil
service system, and does not fall under the
provision on disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It
falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on
administrative cases instituted by it directly. This
is an integral part of its duty, authority and power
to administer the civil service system and protect
its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of
the Constitution, by removing from its list of
eligibles those who falsified their qualifications.
This is to be distinguished from ordinary
proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide
member of the system, for acts or omissions that
constitute violations of the law or the rules of the
service.
28. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. vs. CA
Facts: In a certain mining case, Director Gozon
issued an order wherein he dismissed the case
filed by the petitioners Zambales which sought for
their declaration as the sole, rightful and prior
locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining
claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales. Zambales
then appealed said order to the Secretary of
Agricultural and Natural Resources. While the
appeal was pending, Director Gozon was appointed
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the
appeal affirming his own decision. Therefore,
petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Zambales, assailing Secretary Gozon's
decision which after hearing the lower court issued
a ruling sustaining Guzon’s decision. It held that
the disqualification petition to of a judge to review
his own decision or ruling provided under Rule 137
Section 1 does not apply to administrative bodies.
ISSUE: WON Guzon as Secretary of the Agriculture
and Natural Resources may validly review his prior
decision as Director of Mines.
RULING:
No. Guzon may not review his own decision when
he was still the Director of Mines. The palpably
flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as
Director of Mines is a mockery of administrative
justice.
Sec 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 13-i or the Mining
Law provides that conflicts and disputes arising
out of mining locations shall be submitted to the
Director of Mines for decision: Provided, That the
decision or order of the Director of Mines may be
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources within thirty days from the date
of its receipt. In case any one of the parties should
disagree from the decision or order of the Director
of Mines or of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, the matter may be taken to the
court of competent jurisdiction within thirty days
from the receipt of such decision or order;
otherwise the said decision or order shall be final
and binding upon the parties concerned. (As
amended by Republic Act No. 746 approved on June
18,1952).*
Undoubtedly, the provision of section 61 that the
decision of the Director of Mines may be appealed
to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources contemplates that the Secretary should
be a person different from the Director of Mines. In
order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce
the reviewing officer must perforce be other than
the officer whose decision is under review;
otherwise, there could be no different view or there
would be no real review of the case. The decision
of the reviewing officer would be a biased view;
inevitably, it would be the same view since being
human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in
his first view of the case. That is the obvious,
elementary reason behind the disqualification of a
trial judge, who is promoted to the appellate court,
to sit in any case wherein his decision or ruling is
the subject of review (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of
Court: secs. 9 and 27, Judiciary Law).
A sense of proportion and consideration for the
fitness of things should have deterred Secretary
Gozon from reviewing his own decision as Director
of Mines. He should have asked his undersecretary
to undertake the review. Zambales therefore is
deprived of its administrative due process or
fundamental fairness when Secretary Gozon
reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines.
WHEREFORE, we set aside the order of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and ordered the return of the case to the Minister
of Natural Resources.
29. MIGUEL SINGSON vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and PAL
FACTS: Singson was an employee of PAL. His duty
consisted of checking in passengers and baggage
for a particular flight. A certain Ms. Kondo lodged a
complaint alleging that Singson required her to pay
US $200.00 for alleged excess baggage without
issuing any receipt. Singson was administratively
charged and investigated by a committee formed
by private respondent PAL. Upon the
recommendation of the committee, PAL dismissed
Singson from the service. Singson lodged a
complaint against PAL before the NLRC for illegal
dismissal, attorney's fees and damages. Labor
Arbiter Aquino declared his dismissal illegal and
ordered his reinstatement with backwages. On
appeal by PAL to the Second Division of NLRC,
Aquino as presiding commissioner, reversed his
previous decision as the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE: WON Singson was denied due process. Yes.
HELD: Singson was denied due process when
Commissioner Aquino participated, as presiding
commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC,
in reviewing PAL's appeal. He was reviewing his
own decision as a former labor arbiter. The
composition of the Division guarantees equal
representation and impartiality among its
members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of
three (3) commissioners who are impartial right
from the start of the process of review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered
impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the
case under review. He should have inhibited
himself from any participation in this case.
The right of Singson to an impartial review of his
appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He
is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the
resolution of his motion for reconsideration.
Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of
three commissioners. The denial of his right to an
impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous
error. It negated his right to due process.
30. TEJANO vs OMBUDSMAN & SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: The instant petition stemmed from the
report of Philippine National Bank (PNB) Resident
Auditor on his investigation regarding an alleged
unfunded withdrawal in the amount of P2.2 million
by V&G Better Homes Subdivision (V&G).
The report of Resident Auditor implicated Vice
President Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., the petitioner
herein, Executive Officer Emilio Montesa, and
Supervising Branch Teller Jane Rita Jecong, all of
the PNB, Cebu City Branch, including Juana dela
Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G, as persons
involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million
of PNB funds.
In a resolution, Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo
G. Canton recommended the filing of the proper
information for violation of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, against Tejano, Juana dela Cruz
and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G. The case against
Montesa and Jecong was dismissed for lack of
evidence. The resolution was approved by Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and then
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
Tejano filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent
Motion for a Period of Time to File Motion for
Reinvestigation which the Sandiganbayan granted.
Tejano filed his motion for reinvestigation in the
Office of the Special Prosecutor. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation.
Convinced that no probable cause existed to indict
petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente
dela Cruz, Special Prosecutor Micael, in a
memorandum, recommended the dismissal of the
case. The recommendation was approved by
Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and
concurred in by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P.
Tamayo.
On 10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial
preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor,
disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal
of the case with the marginal note " assign the
case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case
aggressively."
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman acted in grave abuse
of discretion in disapproving the dismissal of the
case where he had earlier participated in the
preliminary investigation
RULING: Yes. Ombudsman Desierto, in this case,
committed grave abuse of discretion. Tejano
attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman
Desierto for having participated in the
reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact
that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary
investigation of the same when he was a Special
Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation
for the filing of the information before the
Sandiganbayan.
We agree with the petitioner. Steadfastly, we have
ruled that the officer who reviews a case on appeal
should not be the same person whose decision is
under review.
Having participated in the initial preliminary
investigation of the instant case and having
recommended the filing of appropriate information,
it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself
from participating in the review of the same during
the reinvestigation.
31. Republic vs Extelcom
Facts: On December 29, 1992, Bayantel filed an
application with the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public
Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install,
operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile
Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a
Provisional Authority (PA).
Shortly thereafter, or on January 22, 1993,
the NTC issued a memorandum directing all
interested applicants to file their respective
applications before the Commission on or before
February 15, 1993.
Bayantel filed a motion to amend its
application. Subsequently, hearings were
conducted on the amended application. But before
Bayantel could complete the presentation of its
evidence, the NTC issued an Order which granted
Provisional Authorities to two other applicants
which resulted in the closing out of all available
frequencies. Thus it archived Bayantel’s
application.
Upon the availability of new frequencies,
Bayantel filed a motion to revive its archived
application. The NTC granted a PA in favor of
Bayantel applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978
Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Extelcom, however, contends that the NTC
should have applied the Revised Rules which were
filed with the Office of the National Administrative
Register on February 3, 1993. These Revised Rules
deleted the phrase "on its own initiative;"
accordingly, a provisional authority may be issued
only upon filing of the proper motion before the
Commission.
In answer to this argument, the NTC, issued
a certification to the effect that inasmuch as the
1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a
newspaper of general circulation, the NTC has
been applying the 1978 Rules. The absence of
publication, coupled with the certification by the
Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was
still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate
that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect
at the time of the grant of the provisional authority
to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules
were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3,
1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the
Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the
filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the
operative act that gives the rules force and effect.
Issue: (1) WON NTC should have applied the 1993
Revised Rules;
(2) Won Extelcom’s right to procedural due process
was violated upon the revival of Bayantel’s
application
Ruling: (1) The Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the NTC, which implements Section 29 of the
Public Service Act (C.A. 146, as amended), fall
squarely within the scope of these laws, as
explicitly mentioned in the case Tañada v. Tuvera:
Administrative rules and regulations must be
published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.
Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation before it can take effect.
Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that
said Rules shall take effect only after their
publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. In the absence of such publication,
therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs.
In any event, regardless of whether the 1978
Rules or the 1993 Revised Rules should apply, the
records show that the amended application filed by
Bayantel in fact included a motion for the issuance
of a provisional authority. Hence, it cannot be said
that the NTC granted the provisional
authority motu proprio.
(2) The Court of Appeals ruled that there was a
violation of the fundamental right of Extelcom to
due process when it was not afforded the
opportunity to question the motion for the revival
of the application.
However, it must be noted that said Order
referred to a simple revival of the archived
application of Bayantel. At this stage, it cannot be
said that Extelcom's right to procedural due
process was prejudiced. It will still have the
opportunity to be heard during the full-blown modification of the charge against him only when
adversarial hearings that will follow. In fact, the he received notice of the resolution dismissing him
records show that the NTC has scheduled several from the service.
hearing dates for this purpose, at which all
Hence, this petition
interested parties shall be allowed to register their
ISSUES: Whether respondent Lucas was denied due
opposition.
process when the CSC found him guilty of grave
The SC ruled that there is no denial of due misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct?
process where full-blown adversarial proceedings YES; and whether the act complained of
are conducted before an administrative body. With
constitutes grave misconduct? NO.
Extelcom having fully participated in the
RULING:
proceedings, and indeed, given the opportunity to
file its opposition to the application, there was As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an
clearly no denial of its right to due process. existing guideline of the CSC distinguishing simple
and grave misconduct. In the case of Landrito vs.
32. CSC VS. LUCAS
Civil Service Commission, we held that "in grave
Raquel P. Linatok, an employee of Department of
misconduct as distinguished from simple
Agriculture, filed with the office of the Secretary,
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
DA, an affidavit-complaint against respondent Jose
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
J. Lucas, a photographer of the same agency, for
established rule, must be manifest, 10 which is
misconduct.
obviously lacking in respondent's case.
Raquel described the incident that while standing
Respondent maintains that as he was charged with
before a mirror, near the office door of Jose J.
simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his
Lucas, Raquel noticed a chair at her right side
right to due process by convicting him of grave
which Mr. Jose Lucas, at that very instant used to
misconduct.
sit upon. Thereafter, Mr. Lucas bent to reach for his
We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that:
shoe. At that moment she felt Mr. Lucas' hand
(a) a basic requirement of due process is that a
touching her thigh and running down his palm up to
person must be duly informed of the charges
her ankle. She was shocked and suddenly faced Mr.
against him and that (b) a person can not be
Lucas and admonished him not to do it again or she
convicted of a crime with which he was not
will kick him. But Lucas touched her again and so
charged.
she hit Mr. Lucas. Suddenly Mr. Lucas shouted at
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from
her saying "lumabas ka na at huwag na huwag ka
basic and fundamental procedural principles, such
nang papasok dito kahit kailan" A verbal exchange
as the right to due process in investigations and
then ensued and respondent Lucas grabbed Raquel
hearings.
by the arm and shoved her towards the door
The right to substantive and procedural due
causing her to stumble, her both hands protected
process is applicable in administrative
her face from smashing upon the door.
proceedings.
Before the Board of Personnel Inquiry, DA,
Of course, we do not in any way condone
respondent Lucas submitted a letter denying the
respondent's act. Even in jest, he had no right to
charges. According to Lucas, he did not touch the
touch complainant's leg. However, under the
thigh of complainant what transpired was that he
circumstances, such act is not constitutive of
accidentally brushed Linatok's leg when he
grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that
reached for his shoes. A resolution finding
respondent was maliciously motivated. We note
respondent guilty of simple misconduct and
that respondent has been in the service for twenty
recommending a penalty of suspension for one (1)
(20) years and this is his first offense.
month and one (1) day.
Respondent appealed the decision to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). A resolution finding 33. LACSON vs PHIL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION
respondent guilty of grave misconduct and
FACTS: Petitioners herein are officers of the Phil.
imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from the Estate Authority (PEA) who were investigated by
service. the respondent PAGC in connection with the
The Court of Appeals, setting aside the resolution charge of dishonesty and grave misconduct against
of the CSC and reinstating the resolution of the them for the alleged overpricing of a certain
BOPI, DA and further ruled that "a basic project. The PAGC found them guilty and
recommended their dismissal which the Office of
requirement of due process on the other hand is
the President approved. They later sought for its
that a person must be duly informed of the charges
reconsideration to the CA which was however
against him (Felicito Sajonas vs. National Labor denied. Thus, this present petition.
Relations Commission, 183 SCRA 182). In the
instant case however, Lucas came to know of the
Petitioners herein argue that because they are not
presidential appointees, it is only the Ombudsman
which has jurisdiction over them.
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has the exclusive
jurisdiction over the case and WON the court can
still review their dismissal? WON petitioners were
denied of due process?
HELD: No to both issues.
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with
the other similarly authorized agencies.
Having been dismissed by PEA, petitioners should
have appealed to the Civil Service Commission. It
is only after appealing the case to the CSC that it
can be elevated to the CA via a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. From there,
said case can be appealed to the Court through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Unfortunately, petitioners chose the wrong remedy.
Instead of appealing their dismissal by the PEA to
the CSC, they chose to question it before the CA.
For their failure to appeal to the proper forum, the
decision of the PEA dismissing them has become
final and executory. It should be emphasized that
the right to appeal is a statutory right and the
party who seeks to avail himself of the same must
comply with the requirements of the law. Failure to
do so, the right to appeal is lost.
Anent the alleged failure of respondents to observe
due process, well-established is the rule that the
essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side
or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of, and to submit any evidence he may
have in support of his defense. The demands of due
process are sufficiently met when the parties are
given the opportunity to be heard before judgment
is rendered as in this present case whereby they
fully participated in the investigation done by the
PAGC.
34. RUVIVAR VS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND
DR. BERNARDO
FACTS: Private respondent filed an Affidavit-
Complaint charging the petitioner before the
Ombudsman of serious misconduct, conduct
unbecoming of a public official, abuse of authority,
and violations of the Revised Penal Code and of the
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The private
respondent stated in her complaint that she is the
President of the Association of Drug Testing
Centers (Association) that conducts drug testing
and medical examination of applicants for driver’s
license. In this capacity, she went to the LTO to
meet with representatives from the DOTC and to
file a copy of the Association’s request to lift the
moratorium imposed by the LTO on the
accreditation of drug testing clinics. Before
proceeding to the Commissioner of the LTO for
these purposes, she passed by the office of the
petitioner to conduct a follow up on the status of
her company’s application for accreditation. While
there, the petitioner, without provocation or any
justifiable reason and in the presence of other LTO
employees and visitors, shouted at her in a very
arrogant and insulting manner, hurled invectives
upon her person, and prevented her from entering
the office of the LTO Commissioner. In Petitioner’s
Counter-Affidavit, she denied the private
respondent's allegations. Thereafter, the
Ombudsman called for a preliminary conference
that the parties attended which he rendered the
decision finding the petitioner administratively
liable for discourtesy in the course of her official
functions and imposed on her the penalty of
reprimand.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari is
the proper and only available remedy when the
penalty imposed in an administrative complaint
with the office of the ombudsman is considered
final and unappealable.
RULING: Yes, the petition for certiorari is proper.
In the case of Lopez v. CA and Herrera v. Bohol, the
recognized that no appeal is allowed in
administrative cases where the penalty of public
censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, is imposed. The SC pointed out that
decisions of administrative agencies that are
declared by law to be final and unappealable are
still subject to judicial review if they fail the test of
arbitrariness or upon proof of gross abuse of
discretion; the complainant’s legal recourse is to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, applied as rules suppletory to the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The use of this recourse should take
into account the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court – i.e., the petition shall be
filed in and be cognizable only by the CA if it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or by the
Rules.
In the present case, the Ombudsman’s decision
and order imposing the penalty of reprimand on the
petitioner are final and unappealable. Thus, the
petitioner availed of the correct remedy when she
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to
question the Ombudsman’s decision to reprimand
her.
35. FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA
FACTS:
1. a letter-complaint was filed with CHED
against Florian Gaoiran (petitioner), Head
Teacher III in the High School Department of
the Angadanan Agro-Industrial College
(AAIC), a state- supervised school in
Angadanan, Isabela.
2. Edmond M. Castillejo, Administrative Officer
II of the same school, charged petitioner of
mauling him while he was performing his
duties. Appended to the letter-complaint
were the verified criminal complaint filed by
Castillejo against petitioner and the sworn
statements of his witnesses.
3. The criminal complaint for assault to a
person in authority was filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Angadanan-
San Guillermo.
4. The letter-complaint was referred to the
Legal Affairs Service of the CHED. Atty.
Felina S. Dasig, then OIC of the Office of the
Director III, Legal Affairs Service, conducted
a fact-finding investigation on the mauling
incident. After the fact-finding investigation
was terminated, and upon finding of a prima
facie case against the petitioner for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, Atty. Dasig
issued the Formal Charge and Order of
Preventive Suspension dated July 27, 1998.
5. The petitioner did not submit his written
counter-affidavit or answer to the charges
against him. Instead, he filed with the RTC of
Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for
certiorari and prohibition to restrain
enforcement of the preventive suspension
order. Having served the suspension, the
case was dismissed for being moot and
academic. Petitioner then sought
reconsideration of the formal charge
and preventive suspension order,
contending that the letter-complaint was not
under oath and that he was not informed nor
apprised of the complaint against him.
6. Joel Voltaire V. Mayo, who was later
appointed Director of the Legal Affairs
Service of CHED, issued a Resolution dated
February 20, 1999, dismissing the
administrative complaint against the
petitioner on the ground that the letter-
complaint was not under oath. However, Hon.
Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of CHED,
unaware of the existence of Mayo’s
resolution, issued another Resolution dated
June 3, 1999, finding petitioner guilty of
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. Petitioner
was dismissed form service.
7. Petitioner then filed with the RTC of
Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction. He
alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part
of Alcala in issuing the Resolution despite
that a previous Resolution already dismissed
the administrative complaint against him.
The RTC sided with the petitioner and
declared the Resolution of Alcala null and
void.
8. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of RTC. It declared as valid Alcala’s
Resolution.
9. Hence, this petition for review.
10. The petitioner continuously argued that the
letter-complaint is inexistent because it was
not made under oath and does not contain a
certification of non-forum shopping.
Petitioner cites Section 2, Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO
No. 292 and Section 4(d) of Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 94-0521 (Uniform
Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of
Administrative Legislation). Hence, the
formal charge and order of preventive
suspension stemming from it is likewise null
and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the letter-complaint should
be deemed inexistent as it was not made under
oath.
HELD: NO
The Court is not persuaded. The
pertinent provisions governing the initiation
of administrative complaints against civil service
officials or employees are provided in Book V of EO
No. 292, Sections 46 (c) and 48 (1) and (2), Chapter
6, Subtitle A. It must be pointed out that, while the
letter-complaint was not verified, appended thereto
were the verified criminal complaint that Castillejo
filed against the petitioner, as well as the sworn
statements of his witnesses. These documents
could very well be considered as constituting the
complaint against the petitioner. In fact, this Court,
through the Court Administrator, investigates and
takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but also
even anonymous complaints filed against court
employees or officials for violations of the Code of
Ethical Conduct. It is not totally uncommon that a
government is given wide latitude in the scope and
exercise of its investigative powers. Administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied.
In any case, the letter-complaint of
Castillejo is not a “complaint” within the meaning
of the provisions cited. The letter-complaint did not
by itself commence the administrative proceedings
against the petitioner. It merely triggered a fact-
finding investigation by CHED. The Court cannot
uphold the petitioner’s contention as it would
result to an absurd and restrictive interpretation of
EO No. 292. It was the formal charge and order of
preventive suspension filed by Atty. Dasig that
constituted the complaint. Atty. Dasig signed the
formal charge
in her capacity as the OIC. As the complaint was
initiated by the appropriate disciplining authority
under EO
No. 292, the same need not be subscribed and
sworn to. Neither is it required that the same
contain a
verification of non-forum shopping. Jurisdiction
was properly acquired over the case.
Petition is denied
36) CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE
SYSTEM (MWSS),petitioners,
vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND
MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE LARGE DIAMETER
PRESSURE PIPE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
(PLDPPMA), respondents.
FACTS:
The Ombudsman directed the Board of Trustees of
MWSS to set aside the recommendation of its Pre-
qualification, Bids and Awards Committee for
Construction Services and Technical Equipment
(PBAC-CSTE) that Contract be given to a contractor
offering fiberglass pipes and instead award the
contract to a complying and responsive bidder
pursuant to the provisions of PD 1594. The
subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied
by the Ombudsman. The Order are now sought to
be annulled in this petition for certiorari, with
prayer for preliminary injunction or a restraining
order, by petitioners led by its former Administrator
Teofilo I. Asuncion.
((MWSS focused its attention to the
Distribution System Phase of the Angat
Water Supply optimization (AWSOP). The
projects were denominated Projects APM-
01 and APM-02 which consist of the
construction of the Distribution System
Phase of the AWSOP, that would particularly
call for the supply of labor, materials and
equipment, and of the installation of new
watermains, comprising of fittings, valves
and pipes of different sizes. MWSS caused
the publication in two (2) leading
newspapers of an "Invitation for Pre-
qualification and Bids" for Projects were
opened for international competitive
bidding, copies of the "Invitation for pre-
qualification and Bids" were sent to the
respective embassies and trade missions of
member countries of the Overseas
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). There
was bidding and only 3 lowest bidders
remains for evaluation and the Acting
Chairman Eduardo M. del Fierro
recommended that no rebidding should be
undertaken and that an award should be
made to either the lowest (F.F. Cruz & Co.,
Inc.). Private respondent PLDPPMA filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman a letter-
complaint protesting the public bidding
conducted by the MWSS for Projects APM-
01 and APM-02, detailing charges of an
"apparent plan" on the part of the MWSS to
favor suppliers of fiberglass pipes (long
history of failures), and urging the
Ombudsman to conduct an investigation
thereon and to hold in abeyance the award
of the contracts.))
ISSUE: W/N the rudiments of due process have
been properly observed in the issuance of the
orders of the Ombudsman.
HELD: YES.
The records of this case shows that petitioners
have been amply accorded the opportunity to be
heard. Petitioners were asked to comment on the
letter-complaint of PLDPPMA. The they moved for
an extension of time within which to comment and
thereafter, they filed their letter-comment.
Responding to the reply of PLDPPMA, petitioners
later filed a rejoinder. When an adverse order was
rendered against them, petitioners moved for its
reconsideration, albeit to no avail.
The absence of due process is an opportunity to be
heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even many
times more creditably and practicable than oral
argument, through pleadings. In administrative
proceedings, moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative due process cannot be fully equated
to due process in its strict judicial sense.
((On the threshold matter that puts to issue the
Ombudsman's directive to the Board of Trustees of
MWSS to set aside the recommendation of the
PBAC — CSTE to award Contract to the lowest
complying bid, we find, this time, the petition to be
impressed with merit.
To begin with, the owners, functions and duties of
the Ombudsman have generally been categorized
into the following headings: Investigatory Power;
Prosecutory Power; Public Assistance Functions;
Authority to Inquire and Obtain Information; and
Function to Adopt, Institute and Implement
Preventive Measures. The particular aspect of its
functions that, however, really finds relevance to
the present case relates to its investigatory power
and public assistance duties which can be found in
the first and second paragraphs, respectively, of
Section 13, Article XI, of the Constitution, along
with the corresponding provisions of the
Ombudsman Act. It would seem to us that the
Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged
orders, has not only directly assumed jurisdiction
over, but likewise pre-empted the exercise of
discretion by, the Board of Trustees of MWSS. The
Order is more of an undue interference in the
adjudicative responsibility of the MWSS Board of
Trustees rather than a mere directive requiring the
proper observance of and compliance with law. The
MWSS, a GOCC created by law through R.A. 6234,
is charged with the construction, maintenance and
operation of waterwork system to insure an
uninterrupted and adequate supply and distribution
of potable water. It is the agency that should be in
the best position to evaluate the feasibility of the
projections of the bidders and to decide which bid
is compatible with its development plans. The
exercise of this discretion is a policy decision that
necessitates among other things, prior inquiry,
investigation, comparison, evaluation, and
deliberation — matters that can best be discharged
by it. MWSS has passed resolution No. 32-93 45 to
likewise show its approval of the technical
specifications for fiberglass. All these should
deserve weight.
In Razon Inc. v. PPA, we have said that neither this
Court nor Congress, and now perhaps the
Ombudsman, could be expected to have the time
and technical expertise to look into matters of this
nature. While we cannot go so far as to say that
MWSS would have the monopoly of technical know-
how in the waterworks system, by the very nature
of its functions, however, it obviously must enjoy an
advantage over other agencies on the subject at
hand.
In a long line of cases establish the basic rule that
the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.
It stands to reason for, in Bureau Veritas v. Office
of the President, we have further observed:
The discretion to accept or reject a bid and
award contracts is vested in the
Government agencies entrusted with that
function. The discretion given to the
authorities on this matter is of such wide
latitude that the Courts will not interfere
therewith, unless it is apparent that it is
used as a shield to a fraudulent award.))
37. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF
REGENTS, CHANCELLOR ROGER POSADAS, DR.
EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR.
ISAGANI MEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO, DR.
OLIVIA CAOILI, DR. FRANCISCO NEMENZO II, DEAN
PACIFICO AGABIN, CARMELITA GUNO, and
MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AROKIASWAMY
WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE,
FACTS: Private respondent Arokiaswamy William
Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and enrolled in
the doctoral program in Anthropology of the
University of the Philippines College of Social
Sciences and Philosophy. Subsequently, she
graduated and was issued with a Doctorate Degree
in philosophy. In a letter to the Dean of the Colloge
of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP), Dr.
Medina formally charged private respondent with
plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate
granted to her be withdrawn . Respondent was
informed of such charged or accusation. An ad hoc
committee was formed and after thorough
investigation, it was reported that they found at
least 90 instances or portions in the thesis which
were lifted from sources without due
acknowledgement. The CSSP College Assembly
unanimously approved the recommendation to
withdraw private respondent's doctorate degree
and forwarded its recommendation to the
University Council. The University Council, in turn,
approved and endorsed the same recommendation
to the Board of Regents following the same.
Meanwhile, in a letter, the U.P. Diliman Chancellor
summoned respondent to a meeting on the same
day and asked her to submit her written
explanation to the charges against her. During the
meeting, the respondent was informed of the
charges against her and provided her a copy of the
findings of the investigating committee.
Respondent submitted her written explanation.
Another meeting was held to discuss respondents
answer to her charges. Another third meeting was
scheduled which however respondent did not
attend alleging that the Board of Regents had
already decided her case before she could be fully
heard. Later the Chancellor issued Administrative
Order No. 94-94 constituting a special committee
known as the Zafaralla committee composed of
senior faculty members from the U.P. units outside
Diliman. The Zafaralla committee recommended
the withdrawal of respondent’s doctorate degree.
Resultingly, the Board of Regents withdrew said
degree of respondent and barred the respondent
from future admission to the University as either a
student or an employee. Hence, private respondent
filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction with damages before
the RTC of Quezon City against petitioner alleging
unlawful withdrawal of her degree by the petitioner
without affording her due process of law.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was not afforded due
process.
RULING: No. Petitioner was afforded due process.
As the foregoing narration of facts in this case
shows, various committees had been formed to
investigate the charge that private respondent had
committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations
held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any
criticism may be made of the university
proceedings before private respondent was finally
stripped of her degree, it is that there were too
many committee and individual investigations
conducted, although all resulted in a finding that
private respondent committed dishonesty in
submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of
which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to explain one's
side of a controversy or a chance seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.27 A party who has availed of the opportunity to
present his position cannot tenably claim to have
been denied due process. In this case, private
respondent was informed in writing of the charges
against her29 and afforded opportunities to refute
them. She was asked to submit her written
explanation, which she forwarded on September
25, 1993.30Private respondent then met with the
U.P. chancellor and the members of the committee
to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several
letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her
position.31
As to the respondent’s contention that she is
entitled for an audience before the Board of
Regents, the same is not meritorious as due
process in an administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in
the courts of justice.32 It is noteworthy that the U.P.
Rules do not require the attendance of persons
whose cases are included as items on the agenda
of the Board of Regents.
As to the respondent’s contention that she was
entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of the
Zafaralla Committee as part of due process, the
same hold no water. To be furnished of copy of the
said report is not fatal to respondent’s due
process. As held by the Court in the case of Ateneo
de Manila v. Capulong students may not use the
argument that since they were not accorded the
opportunity to see and examine the written
statements which became the basis of petitioners'
February 14, 1991 order, they were denied
procedural due process. Granting that they were
denied such opportunity, the same may not be said
to detract from the observance of due process, for
disciplinary cases involving students need not
necessarily include the right to cross examination.
An administrative proceeding conducted to
investigate students' participation in an activity
such as the case at bar need not be clothed with
the attributes of a judicial proceeding.
Therefore respondents cannot be said to have been
denied to one’s right to due process.
38. NAPOCOR vs NLRC
FACTS: NAPOCOR, as owner of the Philippine
Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. I (PNPP-I), entered
into an agreement with private respondents
Westinghouse International Projects Company
(Westinghouse) as principal contractor and Power
Contractors Inc. (PCI) as sub-contractor for the
construction of the power plant in Morong, Bataan.
Pursuant to respondent PCI's sub-contract with co-
respondent Westinghouse, over six thousand
workers were hired on various dates to undertake
the civil works for the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant
(BNPP), as the PNPP-I has become more commonly
known. After the completion of certain phases of
work at the power plant, the services of private
respondent workers were terminated. The
dismissed employees did not receive any
separation pay.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered
its appearance in the cases as counsel for
petitioner. Petitioner and respondents
Westinghouse and PCI were held jointly and
severally liable for the adjudged separation pay
and money claims. A copy of the decision was
served on petitioner through the deputized special
attorney who received the same on January 18,
1989. The OSG was not served with a copy of the
Labor Arbiter's decision. The ACCRA Law Office, as
counsel for Westinghouse likewise received a copy
of the decision.
The special attorney represented petitioner during
the February 10, 1989 hearing on the motion and
filed its Opposition thereto on February 21, 1989.
Petitioner's Appeal Memorandum was filed by the
special attorneys only on February 22, 1989.
Respondent workers moved for the issuance of a
writ of execution. The Labor Arbiter issued an
Order denying due course to petitioner's appeal for
being filed out of time and directing the issuance
of a writ of execution. The OSG filed a Notice of
Appeal and Appeal Memorandum, questioning the
July 7, 1989 Order on the ground that it was not
served a copy of the Decision.
ISSUE: WON NAPOCOR was deprived of the right to
due process since its lawyer, the OSG, was never
served a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision
RULING: Yes. The fact that the OSG is petitioner's
counsel is unchallenged, the former having entered
its appearance. The lawyer deputized and
designated as "special attorney-OSG" is a mere
representative of the OSG and the latter retains
supervision and control over the deputized lawyer.
The OSG continues to be the principal counsel for
the National Power Corporation, and as such, the
Solicitor General is the party entitled to be
furnished copies of orders, notices and decisions.
The deputized special attorney has no legal
authority to decide whether or not an appeal
should be made.
As a consequence, copies of orders and decisions
served on the deputized counsel, acting as agent
or representative of the Solicitor General, are not
binding until they are actually received by the
latter. We have likewise consistently held that the
proper basis for computing the reglementary
period to file an appeal and for determining
whether a decision had attained finality is service
on the OSG.
In the present controversy, only the special
attorney was served with a copy of the decision of
the Labor Arbiter. Since service of said decision
was never made on the OSG, the period to appeal
the decision to the NLRC did not commence to run.
39. CASE NOT FOUND
40. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.
SARGASSO CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
CORP., PICK& SHOVEL, INC., ATLANTIC ERECTORS,
INC. (Joint Venture), respondents.
Facts: The petitioner Philippine Ports Authority
embarked on the development of the northwest
Ground Quadrangle. The construction of Pier 2 and
the rock causeway for the port of San Fernando, La
Union project was awarded to a consortium
composed of the respondents herein. As for the
reclamation project, the respondents offered to
complete the said project as extra work to its 41. ALBA VS. NITORREDA
existing contract with PPA. The petitioner’s FACTS: Private respondents were among the
General Manager Dayan, issued a Notice of Award twenty five (25) graduating students of the
of the project to the respondents. However, when
Arriesgado Institute of Medical Sciences
the said contract was presented to the Board of
Foundation, Inc. (AIMSFI) in Tagum, Davao who
Directors, it was rejected.
sought the intervention of petitioner in settling a
The respondents then filed a Complaint with dispute with the said school arising from the
the Regional Trial Court for specific performance implementation of certain school policies. Acting
against the petitioner, praying that the latter be
on the request for intervention, petitioner
ordered to execute a supplemental contract based
scheduled a meeting with the students. However,
on the Notice of Award for the project. The Trial
court ruled in favor of respondents. instead of conferring with the aggrieved students,
petitioner instead met with the Arriesgado
On February 26, the petitioner, through the spouses-owners of AIMSFI-who admittedly did not
Government Corporate Counsel, filed a Notice of
even have a previous appointment with petitioner.
Appeal of the decision and order of the trial court.
In view of this apparent discrimination, the
The CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal for being six
days late. students contacted respondent Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao who was impelled to
The petitioner argues that while the trial proceed to the DECS Office to admonish petitioner
court’s decision and order were served on it
for not conferring with both parties at the same
through its Legal Services Department, such
time in order to hear both sides of the controversy.
service was ineffectual since the OGCC is its
statutory lead counsel. Hence, all copies of the Petitioner submitted to the Office of the
trial court’s orders, as well as its decision, should Ombudsman for Mindanao (Office of the
be served on the petitioner through the OGCC and Ombudsman), a report on the said conference
not through the Legal Services Department. The wherein he claimed that he had succeeded in
petitioner asserts that since the OGCC was not facilitating an amicable settlement between the
served with a copy of the decision of the trial
parties. However, petitioner's claim of having
court, the period for it to appeal the decision had
settled the dispute between the Arriesgados and
not commenced; as such, the appeal from the said
decision was made within the reglementary period the complaining students is belied by private
therefor. respondents' affidavit-complaint attesting to the
fact that as a result of the said dispute, they were
Issue: WON the appeal was filed out of time.
barred from taking the, final examinations and
Ruling: Yes. participating in the graduation rites.
After both parties failed to attend the preliminary
The petitioner’s contention that the OGCC conference, a resolution was rendered by the
was its lead counsel in the trial court is belied by
Office of the Ombudsman finding petitioner guilty
the records. The records show that the petitioner
of violating Section 4(b), (c) and (e) of R.A. 6713.
was represented in the trial court by the OGCC in
collaboration with its Legal Services For such gross misconduct, petitioner was meted a
Department. The petitioner, through its General suspension of thirty (30) days without pay and
Manager, executed a Special Power of Attorney warned that any other instance of non-observance
appointing the OGCC and its Legal Services of the Code of Conduct will result in graver
Department, through any of their lawyers, as its punishment.
counsel, not only during the pre-trial but
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Section
throughout the entire proceedings. Hence, the
27 of R.A. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of
copies of the orders and decision of the trial court
Administrative Order No. 7 for their failure to
may be served on the petitioner, either through its
provide for the right of appeal in certain cases from
Legal Services Department or through the OGCC.
the decision of the Ombudsman, maintaining that
Based on the admission of the petitioner, it is
the same is tantamount to a deprivation of property
evident that the copy of the trial court’s decision
without due process of law.
which was intended for it and served on Atty.
Mancile, was transmitted to the OGCC on the same
ISSUE: WON Sec. 7 of the Ombudsman Act
day. The admission of the petitioner is conclusive
constitutes a curtailment of the right to due
on it and cannot be contradicted unless there is a
process?
showing of a palpable mistake. In sum, the
petitioner failed to perfect its appeal in the manner
RULING: NO.
and within the period provided for by law.
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part
However, a six-day delay in the perfection of of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege,
the appeal, does not warrant the outright dismissal and may be exercised only in the manner and in
of the appeal. The Court may exempt a particular accordance with the provisions of the law.
case from a strict application of the rules of Apparently, therefore, the constitutional
procedure. The case was then remanded to the CA.
requirement of due process may be satisfied
notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal
for the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in
support of one's case.
The Office of the Ombudsman is vested by law with
the power to promulgate its own rules of
procedure, and a perusal of the said rules of
procedure in administrative cases manifest
sufficient compliance with the requirements of due
process.
Further, a formal or trial type hearing is not, at all
times, necessary. So long as a party is afforded fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain his side, the
requirement of due process is complied with.
42. AMPONG vs CSC
FACTS: Petitioner, Ampong is a public school
teacher who later worked as a court interpreter
starting 1993. This case stemmed from the charge
of dishonesty and grave misconduct filed against
her in connection with the Professional Board
Examinations for Teachers on 1991 whereby she
allegedly took and passed the exam in the place of
one Decir. The CSC found both Ampong and Decir
guilty and ordered their dismissal.
Ampong now contends that as an employee of the
judiciary, it is the SC who has the authority to
conduct the investigation over her and not the CSC.
She further contends that she was denied of due
process for she was not assisted by a legal
counsel.
ISSUE: WON the CSC properly acquired jurisdiction
over the present case? WON she was accorded
with due process?
HELD: Yes to both issues.
While it is true that under the Constitution the SC
is given exclusive administrative supervision over
all courts and judicial personnel and hence the
bottom line is that administrative jurisdiction over
a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court,
regardless of whether the offense was committed
before or after employment in the judiciary, this
court nevertheless upholds the ruling of the CSC
based on the principle of estoppel. The previous
actions of petitioner have estopped her from
attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC. A party who
has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court
or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions to
secure an affirmative relief may not afterwards
deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
In the case at bar, petitioner was given ample
opportunity to present her side and adduce
evidence in her defense before the CSC and thus it
is clear that due process was accorded to her.
Anent the contention of lack of legal assistance in
the conduct of the administrative case, while a
party’s right to the assistance of counsel is sacred
in proceedings criminal in nature, there is no such
requirement in administrative proceedings. A party
in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel. The administrative body is
under no duty to provide the person with counsel
because assistance of counsel is not an absolute
requirement.
43. LUMIQUED ET AL. VS HON. EXEVEA ET AL.
FACTS: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional
Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform —
Cordillera Autonomous Region until President Fidel
V. Ramos dismissed him from that position
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52. In view of
Lumiqued's death, his heirs instituted this petition
for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such
order. The dismissal was the aftermath of three
complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and
private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with
the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The three
affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to
the DOJ for appropriate action. The DOJ, then by
virtue of a Department Order, created a committee
to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued.
Thereafter, Committee hearings on the complaints
were conducted but Lumiqued was not assisted by
counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for
its resetting to enable him to employ the services
of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but
neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the
date he himself had chosen, so the committee
deemed the case submitted for resolution.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the
investigating committee rendered a report finding
Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him.
Accordingly, the investigating committee
recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or removal
from office, without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate criminal charges against him.
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for
its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to
counsel during the hearing. They maintain that
his right to counsel could not be waived unless the
waiver was in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to be assisted by a
counsel is imperative in administrative
investigation.
RULING: No, the right to a lawyer is not imperative
in administrative investigation.
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived
unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence
of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an
accused during custodial investigation. It is not an
absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more
reason, in an administrative inquiry.
While investigations conducted by an
administrative body may at times be akin to a
criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under
existing laws, a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the
respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no
duty rests on such a body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel.
In an administrative proceeding such as the one
that transpired, a respondent (such as Lumiqued)
has the option of engaging the services of counsel
or not. This is clear from the provisions of the Civil
Service Act and the Administrative Code of 1987.
Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes
of the hearings attended by Lumiqued clearly show
that he was confident of his capacity and so opted
to represent himself . Thus, the right to counsel is
not imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers
and employees, with the purpose of maintaining
the dignity of government service.
44) EDWIN RAZON y LUCEA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
There was a crime commited and Razon admitted
having stabbed the victim (Gonzalo) but insisted
that he did so in self-defense because the victim
declared a hold-up and poked a knife at him. Not
finding credence in Razon's claim of self-defense,
RTC (Baguio City) convicted him of homicide.
Razon filed a notice of appeal, and the CA required
him, through his counsel Atty. Gallardo to file an
appellant's brief. Instead of filing the brief,
however, Atty. Gallardo filed a Motion to Withdraw
as Counsel, claiming that Razon had consistently
shown his disinterest in the case by not attending
much needed conferences. The CA granted the
motion to withdraw as counsel and directed Razon
anew to cause the entry of appearance of his new
counsel or manifest whether he wanted the CA to
appoint a counsel de oficio to defend him, within
five days from notice with warning that failure to
comply with said Resolution shall cause the
dismissal of his appeal. Because there was no
compliance by Razon , the court considered the
right of the accused to be represented by counsel
as waived; and directed the JRD to resend the
notice to file brief to Razon (and another notice to
file brief was issued and this time addressed to and
received by Razon himself). With the failure of
Razon to comply, the CA issued a Resolution
dismissing his appeal.
Razon filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The CA
denied Razon's motion.
Petitioner claims that he is not bound by the
actions of Atty. Gallardo who was negligent of his
duties to him; Atty. Gallardo failed to file the
required appeal brief before the CA despite the
many extensions given him; worse, Atty. Gallardo
filed a motion to withdraw his appearance as
petitioner's counsel without petitioner's
knowledge; it was only when he received the CA
Resolution that he learned of the withdrawal, and it
was only then that Atty. Gallardo advised him to
get another lawyer; petitioner received the records
of the case from Atty. Gallardo, only on March 9,
2001; petitioner failed to comply with the CA
resolutions because he could not understand the
same due to his educational deficiency; and given
the chance to ventilate his appeal, petitioner would
be absolved of the charge against him as he truly
acted in self defense.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) contended that petitioner himself is guilty of
negligence; the CA gave him ample opportunity to
secure the services of counsel or manifest his
desire to have a counsel de oficio appointed by the
court, but petitioner ignored said directives;
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also
filed out of time; and Sec. 8, Rule 124 of the Rules
of Court provides that the appellate court may
dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to file his
brief within the time prescribed by the said Rule.
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of petitioner's appeal for
failure to file appellant's brief is correct.
HELD: YES.
While appeal is an essential part of our judicial
system, a party must strictly comply with the
requisites laid down by the Rules of Court on
appeals, mindful of the fact that an appeal is purely
a statutory right. Procedural rules are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases. Both courts
and litigants are therefore enjoined to abide
strictly by the rules. While there are instances
when the Court allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, such liberality is not
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies
only in proper cases and under justifiable causes
and circumstances.
Indeed, the CA may dismiss an appeal for failure to
file appellant's brief on time. It is given the
discretion which must be exercised in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in
mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.
In this case, the CA gave petitioner sufficient
opportunity to file his appellant's brief. Instead of
complying, however, petitioner chose to ignore the
many directives of the CA and now puts the blame
on his former counsel Atty. Gallardo, who was
allegedly guilty of gross negligence.
Even if the Court were to admit that Atty. Gallardo
was negligent, the rule is that negligence of
counsel binds the client. The only exception is
when the negligence of said counsel is so gross,
reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived
of his day in court. No such excepting
circumstance can be said to be present in this
case because as properly observed by the
appellate court, petitioner himself was guilty of
negligence.
The records show that the CA issued a Resolution
(April 15, 1999) requiring petitioner to manifest
within five days from receipt thereof the
authenticity of his signature appearing in the
motion to withdraw as counsel (February 1, 1999)
filed by Atty. Gallardo, and to inform the CA of his
new counsel. The CA granted Atty. Gallardo's
motion to withdraw as counsel (August 27,
1999)_and required petitioner anew to cause the
entry of appearance of his new counsel or manifest
whether he desires the CA to appoint a counsel de
oficio to defend him, with a warning that failure to
comply with the said resolution shall cause the
dismissal of his appeal. The CA issued another
notice to file brief (February 28, 2000), this time
addressed to Razon himself. In a Resolution (July
12, 2000), the CA required Razon to show cause
why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure
to file the required brief. The CA finally issued a
resolution (January 31, 2001) dismissing
petitioner's appeal.
Despite the many notices given him, Razon still
failed to comply with the CA's directives. He also
took a long time to file his motion for
reconsideration of the CA's January 31, 2001
Resolution because while he admittedly received a
copy of the said resolution on March 6, 2001, he
only filed his motion for reconsideration on July 19,
2001 or more than four months later.
It is thus clear that petitioner was guilty of neglect.
He was aware of his conviction and of the
requirement of filing an appellant's brief. Yet he had
no urgency in filing the same, even with the CA's
explicit orders. His excuse that his educational
deficiency prevented him from complying with the
CA's resolutions deserves scant consideration. He
was able to secure the services of counsel to file
for him a petition before this Court. Had he exerted
earlier the kind of effort he put in getting a new
counsel, or had he simply notified the court of his
desire to have a counsel de oficio assigned to him,
then he would not have to contend with the
predicament he is presently in. For the resolution
of the CA dismissing his appeal on the ground of
abandonment, petitioner has no one else to blame
but himself.
4 4 . VI RGI LIO MAQUI L A N, G.R . NO. 155 4 09
- versu s
D ITA MAQUI L A N Ju ne 8 , 20 0 7
Facts:
1. Here in peti tio n e r a nd he re in p r i vate
re sp o nd e n t a re sp o u se s who on ce ha d a
b lissf u l ma r r i e d lif e an d ou t of wh ich were
b le ssed to h ave a son . ( awww ww  )
2. Howeve r, th e ir o nc e su gar c oa te d
ro ma nc e t u r n e d b it t e r wh en peti tio ne r
d isc overe d th a t p r i vate re sp on d en t was
h avi ng ill ic it sexu a l a f fai r w ith he r
p a ra mo u r, wh ich thu s, p ro mp ted th e
p etit ion e r to f i le a ca se o f ad u lte r y a gain st
p r i vate re sp on d en t an d th e la t t e rs
p a ra mo u r. (ohhh h hh  )
3. C on se q ue n tl y, bo th th e p r i vate
re sp o nd e n t a nd he r pa ra mou r were
c on v i cte d o f th e c r i me cha rg e d a nd were
se n te nc e d to su f f e r a n imp r i so n me n t ( tsk
tsk tsk ) Th e re af t e r, p r i vate re spo n de n t,
th ro u gh co un se l, f i le d a Petitio n f o r
D ec la ra t ion of Nu llit y o f Ma r r i a ge,
D issolu t ion an d L iqu id a tio n of C on ju gal
Par t n e rsh ip of Ga in s a nd D a mag e s.
4. D u r i n g th e p re -tr i a l o f th e sa id ca se,
p etit ion e r an d p r i vate re spo n de n t en te re d
in to a C OMPR OMI S E AGR EEME NT wh ich was
g iven ju d ic ia l imp r i ma t u r by the re spo n de n t
ju d ge in th e a ssa ile d J ud g me n t On
C o mp ro mise Agree me n t
5. Howeve r, p etit ion e r f i le d an Omn ib u s
Mot ion da te d Jan u a r y 15, 2 0 0 2 , p rayin g fo r
th e re p ud ia t ion of the Co mp ro mise
Agre e me n t an d th e re c on sid e ra tio n of th e
J ud g me n t on Co mp ro mise Agre e me n t by th e
re sp o nd e n t ju d ge on th e g ro un d s tha t h is
p revi o u s lawye r d id n o t in te l lig e n tl y an d
ju d ic io u sl y a pp r i se h im o f th e
c on se qu e n tia l ef f ects o f th e C o mp ro mise
Agre e me n t.
I ssu e : WON petitio n e r ca n rep u d ia te th e
c o mp ro mise ag re e men t o n the ba sis th a t he
was n o t in te ll ig en tl y a nd jud ic io u sl y
in f o r m ed of the co n se q ue n tia l e f f e cts of
su ch ag re e men t.
R u lin g :
I t co u ld n o t b e sa id th a t the peti tio n e r was
n o t in te l lig en t l y an d ju d ic iou sl y in f o r me d o f
th e c on se q ue n tia l ef f ects o f th e
c o mp ro mise ag re e men t , a nd tha t , on th is
b a sis, h e may rep u d ia te th e C o mp ro mise
Agre e me n t. Th e a rgu me n t o f th e p etit io ne r
th a t he was n o t d u l y in f o r m ed by h is
p revi o u s c ou n se l a bo u t the legal ef f ects o f
th e volu n ta r y sett le me n t is n o t c on v i n c in g .
M ista ke o r v i tia t ion of co n se n t, a s n ow
c la imed by th e p etitio n e r as h is b a sis fo r
re p ud ia tin g the sett le me n t, co u ld h a rd l y b e
sa id to be evi d e n t.
. In Sa lon ga v. C ou r t o f App e a ls,[ 12] th is
C ou r t h e ld :
[ I ] t is wel l- set t le d th a t the ne g lig en c e o f
c ou n se l b in d s th e c lie n t. Th is is ba sed on
th e r u le tha t a ny act p e r f o r m e d by a lawyer
w ith in th e sc o pe of h is g en e ra l o r imp lie d
a u tho r i ty is regard e d a s a n act of h is
c lie n t. Co n seq u en t l y, th e mis ta ke o r
n eg lig e n ce of p etit io ne rs' co u n se l may
re su lt in the ren d it io n of an u n favora b le
ju d g me n t again st the m.

Excep tio n s to th e f o re goin g h ave be en
re c og n ized by th e Co u r t in c a se s wh e re
re ckle ss o r g ro ss n eg lig e n ce of c ou n se l
d ep r i ves th e c lie n t o f d ue p ro c e ss o f law,
o r whe n i ts ap p lica t ion "re su lts in th e
o u tr i g h t de p r i vatio n of o ne ' s p ro p e r t y
th ro u gh a te chn ic a lity." x x x x[ 13]
Non e of th e se excep t ion s ha s be en
su f f i c ien tl y sh own in the p re se n t ca se.
45. EDWIN RAZON y LUCEA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
There was a crime commited and Razon admitted
having stabbed the victim (Gonzalo) but insisted
that he did so in self-defense because the victim
declared a hold-up and poked a knife at him. Not
finding credence in Razon's claim of self-defense,
RTC (Baguio City) convicted him of homicide.
Razon filed a notice of appeal, and the CA required
him, through his counsel Atty. Gallardo to file an
appellant's brief. Instead of filing the brief,
however, Atty. Gallardo filed a Motion to Withdraw
as Counsel, claiming that Razon had consistently
shown his disinterest in the case by not attending
much needed conferences. The CA granted the
motion to withdraw as counsel and directed Razon
anew to cause the entry of appearance of his new
counsel or manifest whether he wanted the CA to
appoint a counsel de oficio to defend him, within
five days from notice with warning that failure to
comply with said Resolution shall cause the
dismissal of his appeal. Because there was no
compliance by Razon , the court considered the
right of the accused to be represented by counsel
as waived; and directed the JRD to resend the
notice to file brief to Razon (and another notice to
file brief was issued and this time addressed to and
received by Razon himself). With the failure of
Razon to comply, the CA issued a Resolution
dismissing his appeal.
Razon filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The CA
denied Razon's motion.
Petitioner claims that he is not bound by the
actions of Atty. Gallardo who was negligent of his
duties to him; Atty. Gallardo failed to file the
required appeal brief before the CA despite the
many extensions given him; worse, Atty. Gallardo
filed a motion to withdraw his appearance as
petitioner's counsel without petitioner's
knowledge; it was only when he received the CA
Resolution that he learned of the withdrawal, and it
was only then that Atty. Gallardo advised him to
get another lawyer; petitioner received the records
of the case from Atty. Gallardo, only on March 9,
2001; petitioner failed to comply with the CA
resolutions because he could not understand the
same due to his educational deficiency; and given
the chance to ventilate his appeal, petitioner would
be absolved of the charge against him as he truly
acted in self defense.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) contended that petitioner himself is guilty of
negligence; the CA gave him ample opportunity to
secure the services of counsel or manifest his
desire to have a counsel de oficio appointed by the
court, but petitioner ignored said directives;
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also
filed out of time; and Sec. 8, Rule 124 of the Rules
of Court provides that the appellate court may
dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to file his
brief within the time prescribed by the said Rule.
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of petitioner's appeal for
failure to file appellant's brief is correct.
HELD: YES.
While appeal is an essential part of our judicial
system, a party must strictly comply with the
requisites laid down by the Rules of Court on
appeals, mindful of the fact that an appeal is purely
a statutory right. Procedural rules are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases. Both courts
and litigants are therefore enjoined to abide
strictly by the rules. While there are instances
when the Court allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, such liberality is not
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies
only in proper cases and under justifiable causes
and circumstances.
Indeed, the CA may dismiss an appeal for failure to
file appellant's brief on time. It is given the
discretion which must be exercised in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in
mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.
In this case, the CA gave petitioner sufficient
opportunity to file his appellant's brief. Instead of
complying, however, petitioner chose to ignore the
many directives of the CA and now puts the blame
on his former counsel Atty. Gallardo, who was
allegedly guilty of gross negligence.
Even if the Court were to admit that Atty. Gallardo
was negligent, the rule is that negligence of
counsel binds the client. The only exception is
when the negligence of said counsel is so gross,
reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived
of his day in court. No such excepting
circumstance can be said to be present in this
case because as properly observed by the
appellate court, petitioner himself was guilty of
negligence.
The records show that the CA issued a Resolution
(April 15, 1999) requiring petitioner to manifest
within five days from receipt thereof the
authenticity of his signature appearing in the
motion to withdraw as counsel (February 1, 1999)
filed by Atty. Gallardo, and to inform the CA of his
new counsel. The CA granted Atty. Gallardo's
motion to withdraw as counsel (August 27,
1999)_and required petitioner anew to cause the
entry of appearance of his new counsel or manifest
whether he desires the CA to appoint a counsel de
oficio to defend him, with a warning that failure to
comply with the said resolution shall cause the
dismissal of his appeal. The CA issued another
notice to file brief (February 28, 2000), this time
addressed to Razon himself. In a Resolution (July
12, 2000), the CA required Razon to show cause
why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure
to file the required brief. The CA finally issued a
resolution (January 31, 2001) dismissing
petitioner's appeal.
Despite the many notices given him, Razon still
failed to comply with the CA's directives. He also
took a long time to file his motion for
reconsideration of the CA's January 31, 2001
Resolution because while he admittedly received a
copy of the said resolution on March 6, 2001, he
only filed his motion for reconsideration on July 19,
2001 or more than four months later.
It is thus clear that petitioner was guilty of neglect.
He was aware of his conviction and of the
requirement of filing an appellant's brief. Yet he had
no urgency in filing the same, even with the CA's
explicit orders. His excuse that his educational
deficiency prevented him from complying with the
CA's resolutions deserves scant consideration. He
was able to secure the services of counsel to file
for him a petition before this Court. Had he exerted
earlier the kind of effort he put in getting a new
counsel, or had he simply notified the court of his
desire to have a counsel de oficio assigned to him,
then he would not have to contend with the
predicament he is presently in. For the resolution
of the CA dismissing his appeal on the ground of
abandonment, petitioner has no one else to blame
but himself.
46. ATTY. ROMEO S. PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE CARLOS ABIERA, respondent.
FACTS:
On December 1966, a Civil Case for specific
performance of contract with injunction was filed
before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occ.
by a certain de Asia against an Alvarez. The case
was then presided by herein respondent judge
Abiera with Perez as the counsel for the Alvarez. .
Upon motion of plaintiff de Asia, Judge Abiera
issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the
defendant Alvarez without prior notice to the latter.
On February 1968, Atty. Perez filed a motion to
dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction which,
however, was denied by the Judge. On October
1968, Atty. Perez filed a motion for reconsideration
of said order requesting at the same time that his
motion be submitted for resolution on the same
month. Respondent did not render a decision on
such until on September of 1971. Meanwhile, Perez
has filed with the C of Appeals a petition for
certiori and mandamus against Abiera. The Court
of Appeals rendered its decision on July 11, 1972
having found that respondent Judge Abiera gravely
abused his discretion when he hastily granted a
writ of preliminary injunction without prior notice
to the defendants in the case. Briefly stated, the
present charge is concerned with Judge Abiera's
failure for a period of three years to resolve a
motion for reconsideration, and the collection of
his salary for that period of time despite the
pendency of said motion, all in flagrant violation of
Section 5 of the Judiciary Act as amended
For this defense, respondent claims among others
that this Court (Supreme Court) is without
jurisdiction to proceed and resolve the present
charge as he has retired from the service.
Respondent, asserts that because he retired from
the government service having reached the
compulsory retirement age of 70, the Court lost
jurisdiction to take disciplinary action against him
and as regards the prayer that if found guilty
"respondent be declared to have forfeited all
retirement benefits and emoluments said
respondent Judge may have been entitled to by
reason of his position or office", such forfeiture is
but an accessory to a principal penalty, like
dismissal, and may not be imposed in this
administrative proceeding for to deprive him of his
retirement benefit — is tantamount to divesting
him of his property without due process.
ISSUE:
(1) WON Supreme Court may continue to have
jurisdiction to try the administrative case against
the respondent judge given the fact that the latter
has already reached the compulsory retirement
age;
(2) WON the forfeiture of the respondent’s
retirement benefits may be imposed in this
administrative proceeding and if yes, WON it is
tantamount to absence of due process.
RULING:
(1) Yes. The Court may still continue trying the
case despite respondent’s retirable age.
Coming now to respondent Judge Abiera,
there can be no question that there was
undue delay on his part in resolving the
motion for reconsideration of complainant,
Atty. Perez. The cessation from office of
respondent Judge either because of
resignation, retirement or some other similar
cause does not per se warrant the dismissal
of an administrative complaint which was
filed against him while still in the service
unless on meritorious cases.
(2) Yes. Forfeiture may be imposed in this
proceeding subject to some mitigating
circumstances.
It may be well to state here that before
respondent may be entitled to retirement
gratuity, several requisites must concur.
First, he must have paid the premiums
required under Section 5 of Republic Act No.
660 known as the Government Service Act.
Second, he must have reached the
 compulsory age of retirement under Section
1 of Republic Act No. 910 as amended by
Republic Act No. 2614 and 5095. Third, he
must have rendered satisfactory and
meritorious service to the government, for a
grant of retirement benefits is not only an
act of generosity or liberality on the part of
the government but is equally a
compensation and reward for satisfactory,
faithful, meritorious and valuable service
rendered to the latter. In the case at bar,
although the first two requisites are present
the third, however, is absent.

However given the length of service of the

respondent and the claim of poor health at
the time the motion for reconsideration in
question was pending before him which are
sufficient to mitigate his liability, the SC only
imposes upon respondent a FINE equivalent
to his three (3) months' salary instead of
forfeiture of retirement of benefits is
imposed deductible from whatever
retirement benefits he is entitled to.

47. CEFERINO PADUA vs. HON. SANTIAGO RANADA

FACTS: It is the contention of Zialcita and Padua

that the resolution issued by the TRB in granting
provisional toll rate adjustments without hearing
and notice is violative of their right as an
expressway user to due process.

ISSUE: WON there is violation of administrative due

process. None.

HELD: The TRB’s authority to grant provisional toll

rate adjustments does not require the conduct of a
hearing. Pertinent laws and jurisprudence support
this conclusion. An administrative agency may be
empowered to approve provisionally, when
demanded by urgent public need, rates of public
utilities without a hearing. The reason is easily
discerned from the fact that provisional rates are
by their nature temporary and subject to
adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates
approved after final hearing.

The language of LOI No. 1334-A, issued by former

President Marcos is very clear. It "directs, orders
and instructs" the TRB to issue provisional toll
rates adjustment ex-parte without the need of
notice, hearing and publication. All that is
necessary is that it be issued upon (1) a finding
that the main petition is sufficient in form and
substance; (2) the submission of an affidavit
showing that the increase in rates substantially
conforms to the formula, if any is stipulated in the
franchise or toll operation agreement, and that
failure to immediately impose and collect the
increase in rates would result in great irreparable
injury to the petitioner; and (3) the submission of a
bond. Again, whether or not CITRA complied with
these requirements is an issue that must be
addressed to the TRB.