Physical Injuries

Dulay v CA , G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995

Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies
only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA
193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto.
However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include
bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held
that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the accused in
the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the
defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a
civil action based on Article 33 lies.
Intentional Torts
a. Abuse of Rights
Velayo v Shell, G.R. No. L-7817. October 31, 1956
The basis of liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civi Code,which states:
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to aother in a manner that is
contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
Thus, at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing is approved (As it was
approved) would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes.
A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute
law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered
(Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act
contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
Saudi Arabia v CA, G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to
its provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondent's assertion that violations of
Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal
forum.
 The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the
concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide
in the statutes.
Globe Mackay v CA, G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether
or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under
Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances
of each case.
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does
not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable.
This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting
that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive
manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which
petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not
only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the
result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
Albenson v CA, G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise
of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that
in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed.
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is different, these
three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo
Tolentino puts it: "With this article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and 20, the
scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become much
more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to
conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the
application of these articles"

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There
is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other
provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction (Tolentino,
supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of
his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries
suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following
elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.

Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury
to another may be made the basis for an award of damages.

There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must
be intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either
"willfully", or "negligently".
Amonoy v CA, G.R. No. 140420 February 15, 2001
Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of
a person's rights is a loss without injury- damnum absque injuria - for which the law
gives no remedy. In other words, one who merely exercises one's rights does no
actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages.
Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outsset,
their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his
right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on
completing the demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that
engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a
right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the
TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then he was no longer entitled to proceed with
the demolition.
The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when
it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit
of justice which gives it life, is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot
be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another.
Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle
premised on the valid exercise of a right. Anything less or beyond such exercise will not
give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And when damage or
prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less
abated.
UE v Jader, G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract
of education is entered into between said institution and the student. The professors,
teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered merely as agents and
administrators tasked to perform the school's commitment under the contract. Since
the contracting parties are the school and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to
deal with the former's agents, such as the professors with respect to the status or result
of his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or students from sharing with
each other such information. The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional practice
in educational institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her students
their grades. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish
sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she
had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or
whether they would be included among those who will graduate. Although
commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary
occasion, since such ceremony is the educational institution's way of announcing to the
whole world that the students included in the list of those who will be conferred a
degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for such
degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly
inform the student of any problem involving the latter's grades and performance and
also most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal
examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the
bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be
sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for
abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest
intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms
and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of
facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic
status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference
of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his
act or omission can support a claim for damages.
Garciano v CA, G.R. No. 96126 August 10, 1992
The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance from
teaching was her own choice. While the respondents admittedly wanted her service
terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her
post, as ordered by the school's Board of Directors. That the school principal and Fr.
Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly
threatened to resign en masse, even if true, did not make them liable to her for
damages. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent
from the Board's decision. Their acts were not contrary to law, morals, good customs
or public policy. They did not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain
her prevailed. She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982, but she did not
comply with that order. Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in the form
of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.
Barons Marketing v CA, G. R. No. 126486. February 9, 1998
Test of Abuse of Right. — Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which,
although not unlawful, are anti-social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it
is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective
of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of
exercising a right. The principle does not permit acts which, without utility or
legitimate purpose cause damage to another, because they violate the concept of social
solidarity which considers law as rational and just. Hence, every abnormal exercise of
a right, contrary to its socio-economic purpose, is an abuse that will give rise to liability.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
injure another. Ultimately, however, and in practice, courts, in the sound exercise of
their discretion, will have to determine all the facts and circumstances when the
exercise of a right is unjust, or when there has been an abuse of right.

The question, therefore, is whether private respondent intended to prejudice or

injure petitioner when it rejected petitioner's offer and filed the action for collection.

We hold in the negative. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good

faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging
the same. In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad faith on the part of
private respondent. Petitioner's allegation that private respondent was motivated by a
desire to terminate its agency relationship with petitioner so that private respondent
itself may deal directly with Meralco is simply not supported by the evidence. At most,
such supposition is merely speculative.
BPI V CA, G.R. No. 120639 September 25, 1998
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent
suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card. However, there is a
material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal
right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are
the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the results
of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called
damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that the plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries
of which he complaints, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of
duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff
and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of
tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law.
Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury.
We therefore disagree with the ruling of the respondent court that the dishonor
of the credit card of the private respondent by Café Adriatico is attributable to
petitioner for its willful or gross neglect to inform the private respondent of the
suspension of his credit card, the unfortunate consequence of which brought social
humiliation and embarrassment to the private respondent.
It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which caused the suspension of
his credit card and subsequent dishonor at Café Adriatico. He can not now pass the
blame to the petitioner for not notifying him of the suspension of his card. As quoted
earlier, the application contained the stipulation that the petitioner could
automatically suspend a card whose billing has not been paid for more than thirty days.
Nowhere is it stated in the terms and conditions of the application that there is a need
of notice before suspension may be affected as private respondent claims.
B Acta Bonus Mores
1. Elements.
Ruiz v Secretary, G.R. No. L-15526 December 28, 1963

But appellants invoke Article 21 of the Civil Code, which states —

Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damages.

contending that the word "injury" in the said article, refers not only to any
indeterminate right or property, but also to honor or credit (I Tolentino Civil Code, p.
67). It may be added, however, that this article also envisions a situation where a
person has a legal right, and such right is violated by another in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy; it presupposes losses or injuries, material or
otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of said violation. The pleadings do not show
that damages were ever asked or alleged, in connection with this case, predicated upon
the article aforecited. And under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case,
one cannot plausibly sustain the contention that the failure or refusal to extend the
recognition was an act contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
2. Examples:
2.1 Breach of Promise to Marry, Seduction and Sexual Assault
Wassmer v Velez, G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
 As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages,
defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under
Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted
in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is
devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant
clearly acted in a "wanton , reckless [and] oppressive manner."
Tanjanco v Santos, G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If
she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there
is no seduction. She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have
that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer.

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or

deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient
to warrant a recover.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire
or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and
would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to
profit."
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because
of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again
yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of
the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that
no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
complaint.
Bunag v CA, G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the
right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable,
except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the
necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under
Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was
adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the
statutes.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in
forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her
will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to
thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days,
irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly
insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly
justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation
to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Constantino v Medez, G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992

As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 & 21 of the
Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her
virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that more sexual intercourse
is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse
is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's
Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted
to Ivan. Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had
she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have
immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first
sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration
that in the months of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their
sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage
was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.

Quimiguing v Icao, G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

For a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred
in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his
victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21
of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and

analogous cases:

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff
herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the
order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.

Pe v Pe, G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962

The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot
lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or
trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is
shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits
to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative
and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each
other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where
Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs
reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their
house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against
defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs
with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion
can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but
through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the
extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family
is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has
committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

2.2 Malicious Prosecution

Lao v CA, G.R. No. 47013 February 17, 2000

Malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by one
against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been
instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.

As thus defined, the fact of termination of the criminal prosecution, civil suit or
legal proceeding maliciously filed and without probable cause, should precede the
complaint for malicious prosecution. Such a complaint states a cause of action if it
alleges: (a) that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or at least instigated the
prosecution; (b) that the prosecution finally terminated in the acquittal of the plaintiff;
(c) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause, and (d)
that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e., by improper and sinister motives.

Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his
action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or
accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an
amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible." Thus, the
circumstance that the estafa case concluded in respondent Lao's acquittal during the
pendency of the complaint for malicious prosecution did not cure the defect of lack of
cause of action at the time of filing of the complaint.

Indeed, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is
later on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse
of rights or on malicious prosecution.58 However, whether based on the principle of
abuse of rights or malicious prosecution, a reading of the complaint here reveals that
it is founded on the mere filing of the estafa charge against respondent Lao. As such,
it was prematurely filed and it failed to allege a cause of action. Should the action for
malicious prosecution be entertained and the estafa charge would result in respondent
Lao's conviction during the pendency of the damage suit, even if it is based on Articles
20 and 21, such suit would nonetheless become groundless and unfounded. To repeat;
that the estafa case, in fact, resulted in respondent Lao's acquittal would not infuse a
cause of action on the malicious prosecution case already commenced and pending
resolution.

The complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution and/or on Articles 20

and 21 should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Que v IAC, G.R. No. L-66865 January 13, 1989

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the

prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that
it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were
false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.

We agree with the petitioner that the mere dismissal of the criminal
complaint by the fiscal's office did not create a cause of action because the
proceedings therein did not involve an exhaustive examination of the elements
of malicious prosecution. What was inquired into in that preliminary
investigation was whether or not there was a prima facie showing of estafa that
would justify the filing of the corresponding information. Nowhere in the fiscal's
investigation report is there any statement imputing malice to the complainant
nor could it have as this was not the matter in issue.

While we must look upon the plight of hapless victims of unfounded and
malicious prosecutions with tolerance and sympathy, sound principles of justice
and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for
redress of wrongs and vindications of their rights without fear of later on standing
trial for damages whereby lack of sufficient evidence, legal technicalities or a
different interpretation of the laws on the matter the case would lose ground
and therein defendants acquitted. Proof and motive that the prosecution or
institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate
a person and to cast dishonor and disgrace must be clearly and preponderantly
established to entitle the victims to damages and other rights granted by law;
otherwise, there would always be a civil action for damages after every
prosecution's failure to prove its cause resulting in the consequent acquittal of
the accused therein.

Drilon v CA, G.R. No. 107019 March 20, 1997

An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal

prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously
and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or
other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the
putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or
injury.

The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution
are found in the provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations and on
damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8).
To constitute malicious prosecution, however, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person,
and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges
were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.
Thus, in order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must
prove three (3) elements: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact
that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally
terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor
acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or
impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive. All these
requisites must concur.