De Leon vs Esguerra

G.R. No. 78059

153 SCRA 602
August 31, 1987

Petitioner: Alfredo M. De Leon, et al.

Respondents: Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra in his capacity as
OIC Governor in the province of Rizal, et al.

FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain together with other petitioners as
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Pronice of Rizal in a
Barangay election held under Barangay Election Act of 1982.

Petitioner received a Memorandum from OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra which provided
the designation of respondent Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of the same barangay
and the other respondents as members of the barangay Council of the same barangay and
municipality. Petitioners maintain that Sec 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 provides
that the terms of office shall be six (6) years which shall continue until their successors
shall have elected and qualified. Also, in accordance with the recent ratification of the 1987
Constitution, it seems that respindent OIC Governor no longer had the authority to replace
them as well as designate successors.

Petitioner prayed that the Memorandum be declared null and void and that respondents be
prohibited from taking over their positions.

ISSUE: Whether or not designation of respondents to replace petitioners was valid.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. SC declared that the Memorandum issued by
respondent OIC Governor designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date
therefore, the provisional constitution must be deemed to have been superseded.
Effectivity of the Constitution is also immediately upon its ratification.

Tañada vs. Tuvera

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish
and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It
would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force
and effect.

Department of Agriculture
vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a
contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity.
Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the
various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment
of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security
agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the
security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The
DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and
executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the
judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City
Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case

Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued
without its consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of
the State and an expressaffirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt
from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any
circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be given expressly
or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied
consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the
government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to
have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.

But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its
sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be
said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to
have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It
does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact, performed any act proprietary incharacter.

But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute
money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed
claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to
Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to
the Commission on Audit.

EPG Construction Co. vs.

Vigilar
Second Division

Buena, March 16, 2001

Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Justice and Equity

Facts:

 In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS Development
Corporation, intiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank of
Manggahan Floodway in Pasig
 The MHS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Ministry of Public
Works and Highways (MPWH) where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and
construct thereon 145 housing units
 By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual contracts with petitioners EPG,
Ciper, Septa, Phil. Plumbing, Home Construction, World Builders, Glass World, Performance
Builders, and De Leon Araneta Construction for the construction of the housing units
 Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only around
"2/3 of each housing unit"
 Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions" for the
completion of the housing units despite the fact that there was only a verbal promise, and
not a written contract, by the MPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds will
be available and forthcoming
 Unpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to P5,918,315.63
 Upon a demand letter from the petitioners, on November 14, 1988, DPWH Asst.
Secretary Madamba opined that payment of petitioners' money claims should be based on
quantum meruit (what one has earned) and should be forwarded to the Commission on
Audit (COA)
 In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated December 20,
1994, the amount of P5,819,316.00 was then released for the payment of the petitioners'
money claims under Advise of Allotment No. A4-1303-04-41-303
 In an indorsement dated December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew the money
claims to the DPWH
 In a letter dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the
subject money claims
 Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch 226 a Petition for Mandamus to order
the respondent to pay petitioners their money claims plus damages and attorney's fees.
 Lower court denied the petition on February 18, 1997
Issue:
1. Whether or not the implied, verbal contracts between the petitioners and
then Undersecretary Canlas should be upheld
2. Whether or not the State is immune from suit
Holding:
1. Yes.
2. No.
Ratio:
1. While the court agrees with the respondent that the implied contracts are
void, in view of violation of applicable laws, auditing rules, and lack of legal
requirements, it still finds merit in the instant petition
 The illegality of the implied contracts proceeds from an express declaration
or prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic illegality
 "in the interest of substantial justice," petitioners-contractors' right to be
compensated is upheld, applying the principle of quantum meruit
 Even the DPWH Asst. Sec. for Legal Affairs recommends their compensation;
even the DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment of the money claims
2. The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against
suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions.
 The State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injustice
Petition granted. RTC decision reversed and set aside.
 NHA VS. HEIRS OF GUIVELONDO

Topic: Execution/Garnishment

NHA vs. Heirs of Guivelondo

Facts:

Ø NHA filed with RTC of Cebu Branch 11 a complaint as amended regarding the eminent
domain against Heirs of Guivelondo docketed as civil case.

Ø The petitioner alleged that defendant heirs et. al were the rightful private owners of the land
which the petitioner intends to develop a socialized housing project.

Ø The respondent heirs filed a manifestation of waiving their objections to petitioners power
to expropriate their properties, thereafter trial court declares plaintiff has a right to
expropriate the properties of the defendant heirs and appointed 3 commissioners who
ascertain the just compensation of the said properties be fixed at 11, 200.00 php. per
square meter.

Ø Petitioner NHA filed 2 motion for reconsideration that assails inclusion of lots 12, 13 and
19 as well as the amount of just compensation, however the respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts partial judgment . but the trial court issued an omnibus
order to deny the motion of respondent granting the petitioner’s motion and of just
compensation.

Ø Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. Thereafter, heirs filed a
motion for execution since the trial court move for the entry of the partial judgment as
modified by the omnibus order.
Ø The Court of Appeals rendered dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the ground of
partial judgment and omnibus order became a final and executory when petitioner failed to
appeal.

Ø The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but then it was denied by the court. The
courts of appeals serve on petitioner for a notice of levy pursuant to writ of Execution and a
Notice of third garnishment from the Land bank of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the state can be compelled and coerced by the courts to continue with its
inherent power of eminent domain.

2. Whether or not judgment has become final and executory and if estoppel or laches
applies to government.

3. Whether or not writs of execution and garnishment may be issued against the state in an
expropriation where in the exercise of power of eminent domain will not serve public use
or purpose

Ruling:

Ø The state as represented by the NHA for housing project can continue its inherent power of
eminent domain provided that the just compensation for the property sought is taken.
 After the rendition of such order the plaintiff shouldn’t be permitted to dismiss or
discontinue such proceedings except on such terms of the court be equitable.

Ø The order was final after the non-appealing of the petitioner as the lawful right to
expropriate the properties of respondent heirs of Guivelondo.

Ø Petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or execution, although it is public in
character since it is arbitrary and capricious for a government entity to initiate
expropriation proceedings that seize a private owner’s property.

Ø Petition was DENIED and the trial court’s decision denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss
expropriation proceeding was AFFIRMED. Its injunctive relief against the levy and
garnishment of its funds and personal properties was also DENIED. The temporary
Restraining Order was LIFTED.

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]

Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ),
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe,
his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X.
Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two
assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before
his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F.
Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the
COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004,
Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by
the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC
before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a
writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR
161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the
basic issue on the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the
President of the Philippines.

Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be
elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of
the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term
"natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus
soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of
some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents,
the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2)
FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married
to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
(5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during
the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly
failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity
given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not
there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were
dismissed.

Ma vs Fernandez
Facts:
Petitioners are children of a Taiwanese father and a Filipino mother. Upon reaching the age
of majority, they executed their affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took
their oath of allegiance before proper authorities. However, they failed to have the
necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No.625. It was only 30 years after, in 2005 that petitioners complied
with the said requirement after a complaint was filed against them before the Bureau of
Immigration (BI). The BI ruled that they violated Commonwealth Act No. 613, in relation to
BI Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-031and ADD-01-035 respectively. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the CA affirmed the BI’s ruling.
Hence, this present petition for review.
Issue:
Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father but who failed to immediately file the documents of election with the nearest civil
registry, be considered foreign nationals?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court laid down the statutory formalities in electing Philippine
citizenship: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of
election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. In the case at bar, the Court ruled
that the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and petitioners should be
allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election, subject to any
administrative penalties, if any. This is because the petitioners have complied with the first
two requirements, and even though they are late in registering their documents, they
should be allowed to still do so because of their positive acts of citizenship. These positive
acts were equivalent to formal registration. In justifying their ruling, the Court said that
registration is made for the purpose of notification, and does not add value to the validity of
an instrument nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one. In the case at bar,
registration is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed.

Republic vs. Sagun

Facts: Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and
after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. Said document was notarized but was not recorded and registered with the
Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

In 2005, Sagun applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the
citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has
elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her
election of Philippine citizenship averring that she was raised as a Filipino and she is a
registered voter in Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as shown in
the Voter Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively
elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so
as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.

After hearing, the trial court granted the petition and declaring Sagun a Filipino citizen.

Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed a petition for review on certiorari, pointing out
that while Sagun executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no
affidavit of her election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which
was not registered with the nearest local civil registry was executed when she was already
33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of majority.

Issues:

1. Is an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship procedurally

and jurisdictionally permissible?
2. Has Norma complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine
citizenship?

Held:

1. No. There is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of
the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of
a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. Clearly, it was
erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino
citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts competence.

2. When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens
of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1,
Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child
born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless,
upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Being a
legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless
upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. For respondent to be
considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.

Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid
election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4),
[S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and
shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.

Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a
statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the
oath with the nearest civil registry.

Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under

C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the
requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be
required to register as an alien. Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is
required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now
Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on
his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on
the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. Afterwards, the same is
elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.
It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes
the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the
courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested
party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e.,
election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the
respondent.

Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts
conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the
records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements
for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her
election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent
in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years
after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the
petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance suffices, its
execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority
and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A.
No. 625. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should
be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover,
there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure
to register with the nearest local civil registry.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the
procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.
Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere
exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other
similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of
Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention
of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly
elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required
of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter,
file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing
requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18069 May 26, 1962

ALFONSO DY CUENCO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
THE HONORABLE, THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, and
THE HONORABLE, THE COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION, respondents-appellants.
Platon A. Baysa for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case is before us for the
main facts have been stipulated and only questions of law are involved in the appeal.

It appears that on May 19, 1951, a counsel for petitioner Alfonso Dy Cuenco wrote to the
Commissioner of Immigration a letter requesting the cancellation of his alien certificate of
registration, upon the ground that he had exercised the right to elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to Article IV, section I(4) of the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625. Said
election appears in an affidavit dated May 15, 1951, stating, among other things, that
petitioner was born in Dapa, Surigao, on February 16, 1923; that his parents are "Benito Dy
Cuenco, Chinese (now deceased)" and "Julita Duyapit, Filipina, a native of Surigao,
Philippines"; that he is "married to Rosalinda Villanueva, a Filipino," by whom he has four
(4) legitimate children; that he renounces all allegiance to the Republic of China; that he
recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that he will obey, support and defend the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines. On the same date, petitioner, likewise, took the
corresponding oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

The Commissioner of Immigration referred the matter to the Secretary of Justice who, on
June 18, 1957, rendered an opinion (No. 129) holding that the alleged Philippine
citizenship of petitioner's mother had not been sufficiently established, that said election of
Philippine citizenship by petitioner herein was legally ineffectual and that he did not
thereby become a Filipino citizen. Petitioner sought a rehearing and a reconsideration of
said opinion. In the course of said rehearing he tried to establish that his delay in electing
Philippine citizenship was due to the belief that he was a citizen of the Philippines. Once
again, the Commissioner of Immigration referred the matter to the Secretary of Justice, who
denied the petition for reconsideration on January 27, 1959.

About a year later, or on January 9, 1960, petitioner instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Manila the present action for mandamus against the Secretary of Justice and the
Commissioner of Immigration, to compel them to recognize as valid said election of
Philippine citizenship by petitioner and to cancel his alien's certificate of registration. In
their answer to the petition for mandamus, respondents assailed petitioner's right to said
writ, but, after appropriate proceedings, said court rendered judgment for the petitioner.
Hence, this appeal by respondents.

Petitioner's cause of action is based upon Article IV of our Constitution, the pertinent part
of which reads:

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine Citizenship.
Pursuant to this provision, two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of
Philippine citizenship therein mentioned may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the
person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must
be made "upon reaching the age of majority."

In the case at bar, the only evidence on the political status of petitioner's mother, Julita
Duyapat, consists of a certificate of baptism, stating that Julita Gonzaga was born in General
Luna, Surigao, on July 30, 1881, and that her parents were Marcelino Duyapat and
Consolacion Gonzaga and a picture showing that she has the features of a Filipina and is
attired in the typical dress of a Filipina. Considering that the writ of mandamus will issue,
not to control the exercise of judgment in the construction of a law and the application of
the facts thereto (Policarpio vs. Veterans Board, 52 Off. Gaz., 6178; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs.
Autholty, 51 Phil. 796), but merely to exact compliance with a clear legal duty resulting
from an office trust or station (Viuda e Hijos de C. Zamora vs. Wright, 53 Phil. 613; Ng Gioc
Lin vs. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 47 Off. Gaz., 5112), we are not prepared to hold that the
Secretary of Justice erred in finding that said proof is insufficient to establish that
petitioner's mother was a citizen of the Philippines.

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age
on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was
over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of
majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of
majority."

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the
age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the
reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted
to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. For this reason, petitioner introduced
evidence to the effect that he is referred to as a Filipino in his birth certificate, in his
marriage contract and in the birth certificates of his children; that he married a Filipina;
and that he enlisted in the Philippine guerrilla forces in December, 1942.1äwphï1.ñët

It should be noted, however, that he joined a unit of Chinese volunteers and that he
registered himself in the Bureau of Immigration as a Chinese. Moreover, it appears that, as
early, at least, as 1947, petitioner knew that he had to make a formal election, if he wanted
to be a citizen of the Philippines, and yet he did not do so until four (4) years later, or in
May 1951. The reasons given by him for such delay were his alleged financial difficulties
and the illness of members of his family. We agree with the Secretary of Justice that such
explanation is patently insufficient to excuse said delay or to warrant extension of the
period to elect Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be
entered dismissing the petition, with costs against petitioner. It is so ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
vs Chuley Lim
In 1999, Chuley Lim filed a petition for correction of entries in her birth certificate with the
regional trial court of Lanao del Norte. Her maiden name was Chuley Yu and that’s how it
appears in all her official records except that in her birth certificate where it appears as
“Chuley Yo”. She said that it was misspelled. The Republic of the Philippines through the
local city prosecutor raised the issue of citizenship because it appears that Lim’s birth
certificate shows that she is a Filipino. The prosecutor contends that Lim’s father was a
Chinese; that she acquired her father’s citizenship pursuant to the 1935 Constitution in
place when she was born; that she never elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the
age of majority (she is already 47 years old at that time); that since she is a Chinese, her
birth certificate should be amended to reflect that she is a Chinese citizen. Lim contends
that she is an illegitimate child hence she is a Filipino.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim is a Chinese citizen.
HELD: No. The provision which provides the election of Filipino citizenship applies only to
legitimate children. In the case at bar, Lim’s mother was a Filipino. Lim’s mother never
married the Chinese father of Lim hence Lim did not acquire the Chinese citizenship of her
father. What she acquired is the Filipino citizenship of her mother. Therefore, she is a
natural born Filipino and she does not need to perform any act to confer on her all the
rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship.

RENALD F. VILANDO,
Petitioner,vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SYLIMKAICHONG AND HON.
SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES,
Respondents.

Facts: In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia
Paras. Consequently, she was proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers and
assumed office. Meanwhile, petitions involving the disqualification or the proclamation of Limkaichong
were filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which reached the Court. Three petitions
which questioned her citizenship were consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by Limkaichong
assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved the disqualification cases
against her.

The Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec,
dismissed the three (3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way
of a petition for Quo Warranto as they challenged the eligibility of one and the same respondent.
Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected
and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained
finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to
the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichong’s citizenship,
which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio
Sy. For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred that
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already attained the
status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through
a collateral attack. On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not
disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives.

Issue: 1. Whether or not a petition for quo warranto may collaterally attack the citizenship of
Limkaichong’s father as evidenced by his certificate of naturalization.

2. WON Limkaichong satisfy the requirement of being a natural born Filipino citizen.

Held: 1. The Court ruled in the negative. The Court held that in our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. The proper proceeding to assail the
citizenship of Limkaichong’s father should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No.
473.The HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility
on the ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members. This
constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. Such power is regarded as full, clear
and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise
restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.

2. Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959.
The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET,
therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September
21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the
petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.
Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not
whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following
the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent
has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished

voter's affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad,
Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The
case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in
actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had informally
elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution
considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with
the 1935 Constitution.

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION ET AL v
ERMITA
FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition to set aside the appointment of Gregory Ong as Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleged that Ong is not a natural-born citizen and thus, is
disqualified to become a member of the Supreme Court. Respondent Ermita, on the other
hand, contended that Ong was appointed from a list of candidates given by the JBC and they
have referred the matter back to the latter for the determination of the issue regarding
Ong’s citizenship. Respondent Ong contended that he is truly a natural-born citizen,
following a series of changes in nationalities and whatnot with respect to his ancestors. He
also contended that the petitioner has no standing to file the said petition.

HELD:

First, on the issue of standing, the petitioners have standing as the issue involved is of
utmost importance—the citizenship of a person to be appointed as a member of the
SupremeCourt.
Second, on the principal issue of the case, the Court took judicial notice of Ong’s petition to
be admitted to the Philippine Bar. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar,
respondent alleged that he is qualified to be admitted because among others he is
a Filipino citizen, and that he became a citizen because his father became a
naturalized Filipino citizen and being a minor then, thus he too became a Filipino citizen. As
part of his evidence, he submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his
father.
It was on basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of no less than
Ong that the Court allowed him to take his oath as a lawyer. It is clear therefore, that from
the records of this Court, Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot
amend the final decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother were naturalized
along with his father. Furthermore, as the petitioner correctly submitted, no substantial
change in an entry in the civil register can be made without a judicial order. Change in the
citizenship status is a substantial change. The long string of events that Ong alleged leading
to him being a natural-born citizen, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out
in proper judicial proceedings.

NOTE: In this case, there has been no ouster from an appointment. There may
be approval of the appointment but it lacks other acts that
will complete the appointment.
The last act in an appointment is the delivery of the commission. It is now up to the
appointee—he must accept the appointment, take an oath of office, assume office, etc. It
doesn’t end here. The CSC can either reject or approve of the appointment. When the
appointee doesn’t pursue all the acts to assume office, the question is whether or not he can
be held liable. The law doesn’t provide really that there is a period to accept or reject
an appointment.

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest

[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes.
However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification
filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of
the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. (Dual
Citizenship)

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective
position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the

respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when
he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992,
1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854
Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV
Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship
to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to
the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces
his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and
complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies
with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive
prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative
department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce
his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not
a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does
so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may
have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves
no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the
ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M.
BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and
WILMA P. PAGADUAN,Respondents.
Facts:

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on
August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing
to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before

the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225
otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The
application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on December 5, 2005.

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of

Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying
that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.6

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She
lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time
for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was
proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M.
Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate
petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The
petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on
the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she
ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2),
R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her
Australian citizenship.

The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon disqualified and ineligible to
hold office of vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified her proclamation as the winning
candidate.

After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was dismissed y the
second division and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27,
2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her
certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual
citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her.

Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to
renounce her Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225

Ruling:

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-
born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic.

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and
all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain
conditions imposed in Section 5.

Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed
a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the
same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was invalid due
to it was not oath before any public officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of
Condon void.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE).

Jacot vs. Dal

Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running
for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and
Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US
citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized
citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225.

ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as
a vice-mayor?

HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all
those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of
foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or
reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective
public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.

REPUBLIC VS DELA ROSA

G.R. No. 104654, 6 June 1994 [Citizenship; Naturalization; Naturalization Proceedings; C.A.
No. 473]

FACTS:
September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the Commonwealth
Act No. 63 before the RTC Manila.

October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and
directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a
newspaper of general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks, the last publication of which
should be at least 6 months before the date of the said hearing.

January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and move it to
January 24, 1992, citing his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections.
Judge granted the motion and the hearing was moved to February 21. No publication or
copy was issued about the order.

February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.

February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Frivaldo is
readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.

Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to annul the
decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo
on same date.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.

RULING:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the Province
of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office and to surrender the same to the Vice-
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. The
proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment;
and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
GR No. L-83882, January 24, 1989

FACTS:

Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971. On February 10, 1978,
he was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Despite his naturalization, he applied for and
was issued Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in
Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired
on 20 July 1986. He also declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents
he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong
sometime in April 1980.

The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed a petition for habeas
corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc.
The Court en banc denied the petition. When his Motion for Reconsideration was denied,
petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship

HELD:

Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal
capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine
citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for
a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents
even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of
Philippine citizenship.

While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his
Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversaryproceedings,
this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to
look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued
Philippine citizenship is meritorious.

Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed

when required and suppressed when convenient.

Tabasa vs CA
In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a
naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived
from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization),
petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner theorizes that he could be
repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost
his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.

ISSUE: Is Jeovanie Tabasa a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171?

HELD: He does not. The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the
following: a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens;
and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. Petitioner overlooks the fact that
the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who
lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor
children of said natural-born Filipinos. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of
repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said
natural-born Filipinos. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor
age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.

BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
 BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino
parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he
lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in
the armed forces of a foreign country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by
his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630
[(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the
United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District
of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then
running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz
the duly elected Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:

1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from
the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided
in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the
act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.

ALTAREJOS VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 163256, 10 Nov 2004 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that he is not a Filipino
citizen and that he made a false representation in his COC that he was not a permanent
resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor in
the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos answered that he was already issued a Certificate of
Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization in December 17, 1997.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of petitioner’s repatriation with the proper civil registry
and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.

RULING:
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry and
with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. Petitioner
completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of
candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioner’s repatriation
retroacted to the date he filed his application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a
mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.
 Romulo Macalintal vs Commission on
Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the
following grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed
to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to
return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must
be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to
vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates
for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for
it is Congress which is empowered to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in
the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood
in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of
his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one
has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his
intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes
of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute
the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow
COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and
presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to
usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential
elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by
virtue of RA 9189.

City of Davao v. RTC

G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005

o tax exemption rules governing GSIS and exceptions

o the plenary powers of Congress cannot be limited by passage of un-repealable laws

FACTS:

GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public bidding
of its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum
total of Php 295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequently reset by virtue of a
deadline extension given by Davao City.

On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of
land it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that same year, GSIS
filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the
Davao City RTC.

During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local
Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also
withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax.

RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC
W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC

HELD:

Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing powers of
LGUs cannot extend to the levy of “taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs.”

However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to
natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said section, are
withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its
exemption has been withdrawn.

Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting exemption,
Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the amendatory second
paragraph.

Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact
future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the plenary
power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws.

Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or
repeal laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the precise effect
of limiting the powers of Congress.

Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of
sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed
through legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal.
Thus, the two conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the LGC removed
the tax-exempt status of GSIS.

Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that “any tax exemption,
incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code shall be
construed strictly against the person claiming it.”

The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored by the
GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-1994 were
 assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the
City of Davao.

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the

Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October
18, 2011

DECISION

BRION, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established
the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No.
9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first
regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM
regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30,
2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013
to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?

2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
 III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of
RA No. 10153 in toto.]

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the
Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which
the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional
Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for
all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-
days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can
become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the
EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s
certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies
the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three
days before it is finally approved.
 In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following
our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate
from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress
in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order
to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective
officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the
terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections
assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to
last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the
incumbent ARMM officials

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term
through a holdover. xxx.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant
for the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally
infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way
that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be
legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress
cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the
new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover –
whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not
have undertaken.
 Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to
remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express
or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary
intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention
of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing
this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of
Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has
no authority to order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o
elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President,
Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of
Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either
the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled
August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections
synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing,
Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall
not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections
with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court,
particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and
effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of
Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave
abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a
contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate
what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended
through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier
than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a
term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while
synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of
the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is
valid.

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No.
10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-
synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure
that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed;
these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The
appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in
the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint.
These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers
and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or
naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls
under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional
basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs
under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the
ARMM executive and legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the
constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-
observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is
more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly
read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA
No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No.
9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is
to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor
and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining
to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for
the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May
2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in
fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in
the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was
written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization,
it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.

CASE DIGEST: MARCOS V.

COMELEC
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, plaintiff vs. COMMISSION OF
ELECTIONS, defendant
248 SCRA 300

Facts:

March 23,1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a petition for cancellation

and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that Imelda-Romualdez Marcos did not
meet the constitutional requirement for residency. March 29, 1995, Marcos filed a
corrected certificate of candidacy changing the entry “seven” months to “since childhood”.
The COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration declaring her not
qualified to run for the position of the member of the House of Representatives for the First
District of Leyte. In a supplemental petition, Marcos averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the election.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

Held:
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by
the 1987 Constitution. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that
an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It
cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Having determined that
Marcos posses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated
April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is
directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Aquino v COMELEC (1995)

Aquino vs. Comelec
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and
Juanito Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age,
able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative
District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident
of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10
months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground
that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which
under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one
year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his
certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a
resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election
of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the
latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission
resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to
warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence
(not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile”
not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court
cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was
applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is
it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was
domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at
times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical
and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of
domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain,
i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and
needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to
place through assent of voters those most cognizantand sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for
him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established
a domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior
to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he
was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52
years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as
his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district.
Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in
Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement
of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in
Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short
length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in
Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in
transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only
to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect
a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of
one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the
candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of
Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving
congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved
with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the
elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR
Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate
its questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has
to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year
against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one
year residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts
which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four
months in the case of petitioner’s district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered
the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining
qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of
the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the
electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new
political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing
their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these
areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one
year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself
establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.
 Domino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 134015,
July 19, 1999

Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative
of the lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in
the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents
filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging
that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident,
much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as
candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11,
1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voter’s Registration Record
and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year
immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections

Held: The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage
and for elective office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to
return.

Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime
in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of
candidacy for the position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May
1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in
Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.

A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
whichcorrespond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not
adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s
intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required
to proveabandonment of one’s original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his
permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not
result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot
in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period
of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his
residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act ofregistering as voter in Quezon City.
While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of
residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.
 EN BANC

REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. G. R. No. 187478

FERNANDEZ,

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:

December 21, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND JESUS L.
VICENTE,

Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court stems
from the Decision[1] in HRET CASE No. 07-034 for quo warranto entitled Jesus L. Vicente
v. Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez promulgated by the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) on December 16, 2008 as well as Minute Resolution No. 09-
080 promulgated on April 30, 2009, likewise issued by the HRET, denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.

The dispositive portion of the questioned Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DECLARES respondent Danilo Ramon S.

Fernandez ineligible for the Office of Representative of [the] First District of
Laguna for lack of residence in the district and [ORDERS] him to vacate his
office.

As soon as this Resolution becomes final and executory, let notices be

sent to the President of the Philippines, the House of Representatives
through the Speaker, and the Commission on Audit through its Chairman,
pursuant to Rule 96 of the 2004 Rules of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[2]

On December 22, 2008, petitioner Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez (petitioner) filed a

Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision. The HRET, in the questioned
Resolution, found petitioners Motion to be bereft of new issues/ arguments that [had] not
been appropriately resolved[3] in the Decision.

Petitioner thus applied for relief to this Court, claiming that the questioned Decision
and Resolution should be declared null and void for having been respectively issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, and praying for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition to enjoin and prohibit the HRET from implementing the
questioned Decision and Resolution.[4]

The antecedent facts are clear and undisputed.

Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of

the Province of Laguna in the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC),
he indicated his complete/exact address as No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo Subdivision,
Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna (alleged Sta. Rosa residence).[5]
 Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny
Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification
before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046
(PES). Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioners COC and the latters
disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material misrepresentation in
his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past elections, he had declared
Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth Legislative
District of the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner
maintained another house in Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First
District.[6] The COMELEC (First Division) dismissed said petition for lack of merit.[7]

Petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Laguna on June 27, 2007, having garnered a total of 95,927 votes, winning by a margin of
35,000 votes over the nearest candidate.[8]

On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the
HRET, docketed as HRET CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible
to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First
Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioners election and
proclamation be annulled and declared null and void.[9]

Private respondents main ground for the quo warranto petition was that petitioner
lacked the required one-year residency requirement provided under Article VI, Section 6 of
the 1987 Constitution. In support of his petition, private respondent argued that petitioner
falsely declared under oath: (1) his alleged Sta. Rosa residence; (2) the period of his
residence in the legislative district before May 14, 2007, which he indicated as one year and
two months; and (3) his eligibility for the office where he was seeking to be elected. Private
respondent presented the testimony of a certain Atty. Noel T. Tiampong, who stated that
petitioner is not from the alleged Sta. Rosa residence but a resident of Barangay Pulo,
Cabuyao, Laguna; as well as the respective testimonies of Barangay Balibago Health
Workers who attested that they rarely, if ever, saw respondent in the leased premises at
the alleged Sta. Rosa residence; and other witnesses who testified that contrary to the
misrepresentations of petitioner, he is not a resident of the alleged Sta. Rosa residence. A
witness testified that petitioner attempted to coerce some of the other witnesses to recant
their declarations and change their affidavits. Finally, private respondent presented as
witness the lawyer who notarized the Contract of Lease dated March 8, 2007 between
petitioner as lessee and Bienvenido G. Asuncion as lessor.[10]

Petitioner, as respondent in HRET Case No. 07-034, presented as his witnesses

residents of Villa de Toledo who testified that they had seen respondent and his family
residing in their locality, as well as Bienvenido G. Asuncion who testified that petitioner is
the lessee in Unit No. 13 Block 1 Lot I, Maharlika St., Villa de Toledo Subdivision, Brgy.
Balibago, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna. Petitioner likewise presented Mr. Joseph Wade, President
of South Point Homeowners Association of Cabuyao, Laguna, as well as Engr. Larry E.
Castro (Castro), who testified that since February 2006 up to the present, petitioner had no
longer been residing in his property located at Block 28, Lot 18, South Point Subdivision,
Cabuyao, Laguna, and that said property was being offered for sale and temporarily being
used by Castro, together with some security men of petitioner and employees of Rafters
Music Lounge owned by petitioner.[11] Petitioner testified that he had been a resident of Sta.
Rosa even before February 2006; that he owned property in another Sta. Rosa subdivision
(Bel-Air); that he and his wife had put up a business therein, the RAFTERS restaurant/ bar;
and that he had prior residence in another place also at Sta. Rosa as early as 2001.[12]

Since the HRET ruled in favor of private respondent, this petition was filed before
us.

In petitioners assignment of errors, he alleges that the HRET grievously erred and
committed grave abuse of discretion:

1. In not placing on the quo warranto petitioner Jesus L. Vicente the burden of
proving that then respondent (now petitioner) Fernandez is not a qualified
candidate for Representative of the First District of the Province of Laguna;

2. When it disregarded the ruling of a co-equal tribunal in SPA No. 07-046;

3. When it added a property qualification to a Member of Congress;

4. When it determined that the petitioner failed to comply with the one (1)
year residency requirement based on the contract of lease;

5. When it completely disregarded the testimonies of material witnesses;

6. When it failed to consider the intent of the petitioner to transfer domicile

based on the totality of the evidence adduced; and

7. When it failed to find the petitioner in HRET Case No. 07-034 guilty of
forum-shopping.[13]

On the first assignment of error, petitioner questions the following pronouncement

of the HRET in its decision:

In the case before us, petitioner has clearly asserted, and respondent
does not deny, that his domicile of origin is Pagsanjan in the Fourth District
of Laguna. Hence, the burden is now on respondent to prove that he has
abandoned his domicile of origin, or since his birth, where he formerly ran
for provincial Board Member of Laguna in 1998, for Vice-Governor of Laguna
in 2001 and for Governor of Laguna in 2004. In all his Certificates of
Candidacy when he ran for these positions, he indicated under oath that his
 domicile or permanent residence was in Pagsanjan in the Fourth District of
Laguna, not in the First District where he later ran in the last elections.[14]

Petitioner contends that it is a basic evidentiary rule that the burden of proof is on
he who alleges, and he who relies on such an allegation as his cause of action should prove
the same.[15] Since private respondent is the party alleging that petitioner is not eligible for
his position, it is therefore incumbent on the former, who filed the quo warranto case
before the HRET, to prove such allegation. He cites in support of his contention Sec. 1, Rule
131 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SECTION 1. Burden of proof . Burden of proof is the duty of a party to

present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law.

Petitioner avers that private respondent failed to establish his claim and to adduce
evidence sufficient to overcome petitioners eligibility to be a candidate for Representative
of the First District of Laguna.

On the second assignment of error, petitioner submits that the HRET should have been
guided and/or cautioned by the COMELECs dispositions in SPA No. 07-046, wherein he
was adjudged as qualified to run for the position of Congressman of the First District of
Laguna by an agency tasked by law and the Constitution to ascertain the qualifications of
candidates before election. Petitioner claims that the HRET should have respected the
findings of the COMELEC and should have discreetly denied the petition.

On the third assignment of error, petitioner argues that under Article V, Section 1, of the
1987 Constitution, any citizen of the Philippines who is a qualified voter may likewise, if so
qualified under the appertaining law and the constitution, be able to run and be voted for
as a candidate for public office. Said provision reads:

SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of

the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen
years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

Petitioner alleges that in the questioned Decision, the HRET added a new
qualification requirement for candidates seeking election to the position of Member of the
House of Representatives, and that is, they must be real property owners in the legislative
district where they seek election.

On the fourth assignment of error, petitioner addresses private respondents arguments

against the contract of lease that he presented as part of the proof of his compliance with
the residency requirement.Petitioner asserts that the nomenclature used by contracting
parties to describe a contract does not determine its nature, but the decisive factor is the
intention of the parties to a contract as shown by their conduct, words, actions, and deeds
prior to, during and after executing the agreement.[16] Petitioner claims that he has
presented ample proof of his residency in terms of evidence more numerous and bearing
more weight and credibility than those of private respondent. He proceeds to highlight
some of the evidence he offered in the quo warranto case that allegedly prove that his
transfer of residence and intention to reside in Sta. Rosa were proven by his stay in Villa de
Toledo, to wit: (1) even earlier than 2006, he had purchased a house and lot in Bel-Air
Subdivision in Sta. Rosa which he rented out because he was not yet staying there at that
time; (2) he sent his children to schools in Sta. Rosa as early as 2002; and (3) he and his
wife established a restaurant business there in 2003. Petitioner contends that when he and
his family moved to Sta. Rosa by initially renting a townhouse in Villa de Toledo, it cannot
be said that he did this only in order to run for election in the First Legislative District.[17]

As regards the alleged infirmities characterizing the execution of the contract of lease and
the renewal of said contract of lease, petitioner contends that these are not material since
the lessor, Bienvenido Asuncion, affirmed his stay in his townhouse; the neighbors and
other barangay personalities confirmed his and his familys stay in their area; and
petitioner has continued actual residence in Sta. Rosa from early 2006 to the
present. Petitioner claims that all these prove that he had effectively changed his residence
and could therefore likewise transfer his voters registration from Pagsanjan to Sta. Rosa
under Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 8189.[18] Petitioner also alleges that he had become qualified to
seek elective office in his new place of residence and registration as a voter.

To further prove that he has made Sta. Rosa his domicile of choice from early 2006 to the
present, petitioner points out that he and his wife had purchased a lot in the same area,
Villa de Toledo, on April 21, 2007, built a house thereon, and moved in said house with
their family.

Regarding the non-notarization of the contract of lease raised by private respondent,

petitioner avers that this does not necessarily nullify nor render the parties transaction
void ab initio.[19]

On the fifth assignment of error, petitioner alleges that the HRET relied on private
respondents witnesses in negating petitioners claim that he had validly resided at the
alleged Sta. Rosa residence for more than one year and two months prior to the May 14,
2007 elections, and did not touch on the testimonies of his witnesses. The questioned
Decision pointed out petitioners alleged non-appearance in the day-to-day activities of the
Homeowners Association and considered this as failure to prove that he is a resident of
Villa de Toledo, without considering the fact that private respondent failed to discharge the
burden of proof in support of his indictment against petitioner.

On the sixth assignment of error, petitioner claims that the questioned Decision was
arrived at based on the perceived weakness of his evidence and arguments as respondent,
instead of the strength of private respondents own evidence and arguments in his quo
warranto petition.
On the seventh and last assignment of error, petitioner alleges that the matters raised
in HRET Case No. 07-034 were no different from the ones raised by private respondent
before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-046 (PES); thus, private respondents petition should
have been dismissed by the HRET for forum-shopping.

In his Comment dated June 22, 2009, private respondent summarized the issues raised in
petitioners assignment of errors into two: (1) those that involve the issue of conflict of
jurisdiction between the HRET and the COMELEC respecting the eligibility, qualification/s
or disqualification of elective public officials; and (2) those that involve factual and
evidentiary matters designed as supposed errors.[20]

Regarding the first issue, private respondent contends that the 1987 Constitution is most
equivocal in declaring that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, under the following
provision:

Art. VI, SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members.

Private respondent alleges that the above constitutional provision was adopted by
the HRET in its Rules, which read:

THE 1998 RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal hereby adopts and

promulgates the following Rules governing its proceedings as the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members
of the House of Representatives, pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

RULE 17
Quo Warranto

A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a

Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any voter within
ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the
petition shall be designated as the petitioner while the adverse party shall be
known as the respondent.
The rule on verification provided in Section 16 hereof shall apply to
petitions for quo warranto.
 xxx xxx xxx

Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to
claim that the HRET, when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of
Representatives is concerned, is co-equal to the COMELEC, such that the HRET cannot
disregard any ruling of COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and qualification of a
member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other way around, because the
COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers to the
eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives. A petition
for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot
be considered forum shopping even if another body may have passed upon in
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the Members qualification while
the Member was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping only where two cases involve
the same parties and the same cause of action. The two cases here are distinct and
dissimilar in their nature and character.

Anent the second issue, private respondent contends that petitioner raised errors of
judgment, mistakes in the factual findings, and/or flaws in the evidence appreciation,
which are appropriate on appeal, but notin a petition for certiorari which is a special civil
action, where the only allowable ground in order to prosper is grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

For its part, public respondent HRET, through the Solicitor General, filed a Comment dated
July 14, 2009, arguing that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it held that petitioner failed to comply with the one year
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.[21]

The HRET avers that the questioned Decision is supported by factual and legal basis, for it
found that the original and extended contracts of lease presented by petitioner were
defective and fabricated, as it contained several apparent, if not visible, deficiencies as to
form, i.e.[,] it being not notarized; the absence of witnesses, the intercalations thereat
especially on the term/period of the alleged lease; the absence of respondents participation
therein and some others pointed out in the petition.[22] The Decision states that even if the
contract of lease was valid and legitimate, a fixed period of one year negates the concept of
permanency that would suffice to prove abandonment of respondents previous residence
or domicile at Pagsanjan. The Decision further reads as follows:

Respondents connection to the First District of Laguna is an alleged

lease agreement of a townhouse unit in the area. The intention not to
establish a permanent home in the First District of Laguna is evident in his
leasing a townhouse unit instead of buying one. The short length of time
he claims to be a resident of the First District of Laguna (and the fact that
his domicile of origin is Pagsanjan, Laguna is not within the First District
of Laguna) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical
residence is not to acquire a new residence or domicile but only to qualify
as a candidate for Representative of the First District of Laguna.[23]
 xxx xxx xxx

Exhibit 3 is the very document that was produced and presented by

respondent to attest that while the original contract, replete with infirmities, as
only for one year expiring even before the May 14, 2007 elections, here now
comes the renewed Contract of Lease, signed by respondent himself, no longer
his wife, immaculately perfect on its face, now notarized and properly
witnessed, and even the terms and conditions thereof undeniably clear and
explicit, with the added feature of a prolonged 2-year period of lease that will
go well beyond the May 14, 2007 elections.

We cannot however, simply accept the renewed Contract of Lease

(Exhibit 3) on its face. In fact, as succinctly pointed out by petitioner, the
renewed Contract of Lease suffers from a more grievous infirmity.

x x x As respondents brother-in-law, Atty. Macalalag is prohibited from

notarizing a document that involves the respondent.[24]

xxx xxx xxx

But the lack of notarial authentication does not even constitute the main
defect of [Exhibit 3]. The surfacing of Exhibit 3 very late in the day cannot but
lead to the conclusion that the same was a mere afterthought. x x x[25]

xxx xxx xxx

We have to emphasize that the initial one-year lease contract expired on

February 27, 2007, and as such, standing alone, the same cannot prove and will
not establish the declared one-year and two months prior residence eligibility
requirement of respondent, unless it is shown that the expired lease agreement
was extended or renewed beyond the May 14, 2007 elections, and, more
importantly, accompanied by a copy of the claimed existing renewed lease
agreement. x x x[26]

xxx xxx xxx

By the unexplained delay in the production and presentation of Exhibit

3, respondents residence qualifications suffered a fatal blow. For it can no
longer be denied that respondents claimed residence at the alleged townhouse
unit in Sta. Rosa for one year and two months prior to the May 14, 2007
election is not only most doubtful, but also negates the concept of permanency
that would suffice to prove abandonment of respondents previous residence or
domicile at Pagsanjan.[27]
 Furthermore, the HRET alleges that, as it found in the questioned Decision, the
witnesses presented who were residents of Sta. Rosa, Laguna were consistent and credible
in disputing petitioners alleged physical presence at any given time in said place. Among
these witnesses were three Barangay Health Workers, one of whom, Rowena Dineros,
submitted an affidavit that her job required her to frequently go around Villa de Toledo,
knocking on every household door to inquire about its occupants, and not once did she see
petitioner at the alleged Sta. Rosa residence. The HRET claims that this testimony was
corroborated by another Barangay Health Worker (BHW), Jeanet Cabingas, who stated in
her affidavit that every time she accompanied her niece, who was petitioners goddaughter,
to request a favor from petitioner, the latter would ask them to return to his house in
Cabuyao, Laguna, even if she was a resident of Sta. Rosa.[28] The Solicitor General quotes the
following portion from the questioned Decision:

What appears very evident from this is that respondent has absolutely
not the slightest intention to reside in Sta. Rosa permanently.

This ineluctably confirms that respondent has not developed animus

manendi over the latter place, Sta. Rosa[,] and that he has not actually
abandoned his old domicile of origin in Pagsanjan.[29]

As for the third BHW witness, Flocerfina Torres, the HRET gives credence to her
testimony that she conducted a household census in Villa de Toledo every three months,
but not once had she seen petitioner in the alleged Sta. Rosa residence, and that she was
advised by petitioner to proceed to his house in Cabuyao, Laguna when she had attempted
to solicit from petitioner at his Rafters establishment because it was near her residence in
Sta. Rosa. From the foregoing testimonies, the HRET found in the questioned Decision that:

The uniform testimony of our 3 BHW witnesses disputing the physical

presence of the respondent at his claimed Toledo address during all the time
that they were performing their routine duties at that community, and which
encompassed the period of 1 year and 2 months before the May 14, 2007
election, revealed that he was not staying in Sta. Rosa.[30]

The HRET likewise contends that the fact that petitioner registered as a voter in Sta. Rosa
does not prove that he is a resident thereat, given that a voter is required to reside in the
place wherein he proposes to vote only for six months preceding the election.

The HRET avers that this Court had explained the importance of property ownership
in Aquino v. COMELEC, et al.[31] and finds no merit in petitioners insistence that the will of
the electorate attests to his residence in Sta. Rosa because, the HRET further avers, [a]
disqualified candidate cannot assume office.[32]

The HRET likewise contends that the purpose of the residency requirement is to
ensure that the person elected is familiar with the needs and problems of his constituency.
The issues for determination are: (1) whether the HRET had jurisdiction over the case; and
(2) whether petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency requirement to be
a Member of the House of Representatives, as provided in the 1987 Constitution.

The first issue is procedural and involves the jurisdiction of the HRET vis--vis that of the
COMELEC in cases involving the qualification of Members of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner suggests that the matters raised in HRET Case No. 07-
034 were already passed upon by the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-046 (PES), thus the HRET
should have dismissed the case for forum-shopping.

We do not agree. The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17
thereof that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete.
The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
Tribunals,[33] which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the
proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and
who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of
Representatives. [34]

Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping
even if, as in this case, the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-
judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the Member of the House of
Representatives while the latter was still a candidate.

Anent the second issue pertaining to petitioners compliance with the residency
requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, after studying the evidence
submitted by the parties, we find for petitioner, taking into account our ruling in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC,[35] which reads in part:

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the
electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of
our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to
give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the
ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the
way of the sovereign will. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

For the foregoing reason, the Court must exercise utmost caution before disqualifying a
winning candidate, shown to be the clear choice of the constituents that he wishes to
represent in Congress.

The qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives are found in Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution, which provides:
 Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. (Emphasis
supplied)

We find the interpretation of the HRET of the residency requirement under the
Constitution to be overly restrictive and unwarranted under the factual circumstances of
this case.

The evidence presented by private respondent before the HRET hardly suffices to prove
that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under the
Constitution. Private respondents documentary evidence to disqualify petitioner mainly
consisted of (a) petitioners certificates of candidacy (COCs) for various positions in 1998,
2001 and 2004, which all indicated his residence as Pagsanjan, Laguna within the Fourth
District of said province; (b) his application for a drivers license in August 2005 that
indicated Pagsanjan, Laguna as his residence; and (c) the statement in his COCs including
his 2007 COC for Congressman for the First District of Laguna that his place of birth was
Pagsanjan, Laguna.

The only thing these pieces of documentary evidence prove is that petitioners domicile of
origin was Pagsanjan, Laguna and it remained his domicile up to 2005, at the latest. On the
other hand, what petitioner asserted in his 2007 COC is that he had been a resident of Sta.
Rosa, Laguna in the First District of Laguna as of February 2006 and respondents evidence
failed contradict that claim.

If it is true that petitioner and his family had been living in Sta. Rosa, Laguna as of February
2006 with the intent to reside therein permanently, that would more than fulfill the
requirement that petitioner be a resident of the district where he was a candidate for at
least one year before election day, which in this case was May 14, 2007.

In order to buttress his claim that he and his family actually resided in Sta. Rosa, Laguna
beginning at least in February 2006, petitioners evidence included, among others: (a)
original and extended lease contracts for a townhouse in Villa de Toledo, Barangay
Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna; (b) certification issued by the President of the Villa de Toledo
Homeowners Association, Inc, that petitioner has been a resident of said Subdivision since
February 2006; (c) affidavits of petitioners neighbors in Villa de Toledo attesting that
petitioner has been a resident of said subdivision since February 2006; (d) certification of
the barangay chairman of Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna that petitioner is a resident
of Villa de Toledo within the said barangay; (e) certificates of attendance of petitioners
children in schools located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2005; and (f) DTI certificates of
business issued in the name of petitioner and his wife to show that they own and operate
businesses in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2003.
The fact that a few barangay health workers attested that they had failed to see petitioner
whenever they allegedly made the rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no moment, especially
considering that there were witnesses (including petitioners neighbors in Villa de Toledo)
that were in turn presented by petitioner to prove that he was actually a resident of Villa de
Toledo, in the address he stated in his COC. The law does not require a person to be in his
home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven days a week, in order to fulfill the residency
requirement. It may be that whenever these health workers do their rounds petitioner was
out of the house to attend to his own employment or business. It is not amiss to note that
even these barangay health workers, with the exception of one, confirm seeing petitioners
wife at the address stated in petitioners 2007 COC. Indeed, these health workers
testimonies do not conclusively prove that petitioner did not in fact reside in Villa de
Toledo for at least the year before election day.

Neither do we find anything wrong if petitioner sometimes transacted business or received

visitors in his Cabuyao house, instead of the alleged Sta. Rosa residence, as there is nothing
in the residency requirement for candidates that prohibits them from owning property and
exercising their rights of ownership thereto in other places aside from the address they had
indicated as their place of residence in their COC.

As regards the weight to be given the contract of lease vis--vis petitioners previous COCs,
we find Perez v. COMELEC[36] to be instructive in this case, and quote the pertinent portions
of the decision below:

In the case at bar, the COMELEC found that private respondent changed
his residence from Gattaran to Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July
1990 on the basis of the following: (1) the affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza,
the owner of the residential apartment at 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, where private respondent had lived in 1990; (2) the contract of lease
between private respondent, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor, of a
residential apartment at Kamias St., Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the
period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996; (3) the marriage certificate, dated
January 18, 1998, between private respondent and Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the
certificate of live birth of private respondent's second daughter; and (5)
various letters addressed to private respondent and his family, which all show
that private respondent was a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the elections on May 11, 1998.

There is thus substantial evidence supporting the finding that private

respondent had been a resident of the Third District of Cagayan and there is
nothing in the record to detract from the merit of this factual finding.

Petitioner contends that the fact that private respondent was a resident
of Gattaran, at least until June 22, 1997, is shown by the following
documentary evidence in the record, to wit: (1) his certificates of candidacy
for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections; (2) his voter's
registration records, the latest of which was made on June 22, 1997; and (3)
the fact that private respondent voted in Gattaran, Cagayan, in the elections of
1987, 1988, 1992 and 1995.
 The contention is without merit. The fact that a person is registered as a
voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district.
Thus, in Faypon v. Quirino, this Court held that the registration of a voter in a
place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to
have abandoned or lost his residence.

Nor is it of much importance that in his certificates of candidacy for

provincial governor in the elections of 1988, 1992, and 1995, private
respondent stated that he was a resident of Gattaran. Under the law,
what is required for the election of governor is residency in the province,
not in any district or municipality, one year before the election.

Moreover, as this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC:

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of

candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or
appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

In this case, although private respondent declared in his certificates of

candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of
Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third
District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for
more than seven (7) years since July 1990. His claim that he had been a
resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he
was governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient
for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of
the province of Cagayan.

As always, the polestar of adjudication in cases of this nature is Gallego

v. Vera, in which this Court held: "[W]hen the evidence on the alleged lack
of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears,
as in the instant case, that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted
by upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be
respected." In this case, considering the purpose of the residency
requirement, i.e., to ensure that the person elected is familiar with the needs
and problems of his constituency, there can be no doubt that private
respondent is qualified, having been governor of the entire province of
Cagayan for ten years immediately before his election as Representative of
that province's Third District.[37]
Thus, in the case above, the Court found that the affidavit of the lessor and the
contract of lease were sufficient proof that private respondent therein had changed his
residence. In the case now before us, although private respondent raised alleged formal
defects in the contract of lease, the lessor himself testified that as far as he was concerned,
he and petitioner had a valid contract and he confirmed that petitioner and his family are
the occupants of the leased premises.
 Petitioner correctly pointed out that the lack of proper notarization does not
necessarily nullify nor render the parties transaction void ab initio. In Mallari v. Alsol, we
found a contract of lease to be valid despite the non-appearance of one of the parties before
a notary public, and ruled in this wise:

Notarization converts a private document into a public document.

However, the non-appearance of the parties before the notary public who
notarized the document does not necessarily nullify nor render the parties'
transaction void ab initio. Thus:

. . . Article 1358 of the New Civil Code on the necessity of a

public document is only for convenience, not for validity or
enforceability. Failure to follow the proper form does not invalidate
a contract. Where a contract is not in the form prescribed by law,
the parties can merely compel each other to observe that form, once
the contract has been perfected. This is consistent with the basic
principle that contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may
have been entered into, provided all essential requisites are
present.

Hence, the Lease Contract is valid despite Mayor Perez's failure

to appear before the notary public. [38]

The HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a townhouse in
Sta. Rosa while he owns houses in Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His ownership of properties in
other places has been taken to mean that petitioner did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his
permanent residence or that he had not abandoned his domicile of origin.

Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not necessarily the domicile of choice of
a candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which require a
congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one district and buy a new
one in the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that
other district. Neither do we see the fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta.
Rosa at the time of his candidacy as a barrier for him to run in that district. Certainly, the
Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the
district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year
prior to election day. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative
indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish
compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a
property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would
be unconstitutional.

This case must be distinguished from Aquino v. COMELEC[39] and Domino v.

COMELEC,[40] where the disqualified candidate was shown to be merely leasing a residence
in the place where he sought to run for office. In Aquino and Domino, there appeared to be
no other material reason for the candidate to lease residential property in the place where
he filed his COC, except to fulfill the residency requirement under election laws.
In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa
as his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other previous
domicile. To begin with, petitioner and his wife have owned and operated businesses in Sta.
Rosa since 2003. Their children have attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since
2005. Although ownership of property should never be considered a requirement for any
candidacy, petitioner had sufficiently confirmed his intention to permanently reside in Sta.
Rosa by purchasing residential properties in that city even prior to the May 2007 election,
as evidenced by certificates of title issued in the name of petitioner and his wife. One of
these properties is a residence in Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa which petitioner acquired even before
2006 but which petitioner had been leasing out. He claims that he rented out this property
because prior to 2006 he had not decided to permanently reside in Sta. Rosa. This could
explain why in early 2006 petitioner had to rent a townhouse in Villa de Toledo his Bel-Air
residence was occupied by a tenant. The relatively short period of the lease was also
adequately explained by petitioner they rented a townhouse while they were in the process
of building their own house in Sta. Rosa. True enough, petitioner and his spouse
subsequently purchased a lot also in Villa de Toledo in April 2007, about a month before
election day, where they have constructed a home for their familys use as a residence. In
all, petitioner had adequately shown that his transfer of residence to Sta. Rosa was bona
fide and was not merely for complying with the residency requirement under election laws.

It was incumbent upon private respondent to prove his assertion that petitioner is indeed
disqualified from holding his congressional seat. Private respondents burden of proof was
not only to establish that petitioners domicile of origin is different from Sta. Rosa but also
that petitioners domicile for the one year prior to election day continued to be Pagsanjan,
Laguna which was petitioners domicile of origin or that petitioner had chosen a domicile
other than Sta. Rosa, Laguna for that same period. In other words, to prove petitioners
disqualification, the relevant period is the one year period prior to election day. It would be
absurd to rule that the petitioner in a quo warranto suit only needs to prove that the
candidate had some other previous domicile, regardless of how remote in time from
election day that previous domicile was established, and then the candidate would already
have the burden to prove abandonment of that previous domicile. It is the burden of the
petitioner in a quo warranto case to first prove the very fact of disqualification before the
candidate should even be called upon to defend himself with countervailing evidence.

In our considered view, private respondent failed to discharge his burden of proof.
Petitioners COCs for previous elections and his 2005 application for a drivers license only
proved that his domicile of origin was Pagsanjan, Laguna and it remained to be so up to
2005. Affidavits/testimonies of respondents witnesses, at most, tended to prove that
petitioner was on several instances found in his house in Cabuyao, Laguna, which was not
even his domicile of origin. Cabuyao, Laguna is in the Second District of Laguna while
petitioners domicile of origin, Pagsanjan, is in the Fourth District of Laguna. Based on
private respondents own documentary submissions, Cabuyao was never even stated as a
domicile or residence in any of the petitioners COCs. Moreover, owning an abode in
Cabuyao where petitioner is occasionally found did not prove that Cabuyao is petitioners
real domicile. Indeed, disregarding Cabuyao as petitioners domicile would be consistent
with the established principle that physical presence in a place sans the intent to
permanently reside therein is insufficient to establish domicile. Neither did private
respondents submissions refute petitioners evidence that since February 2006 petitioner
has chosen Sta. Rosa as his domicile.

To summarize, private respondents own evidence did not categorically establish where
petitioners domicile is nor did said evidence conclusively prove that for the year prior to
the May 14, 2007 petitioner had a domicile other than where he actually resided, i.e. Sta.
Rosa, Laguna. To be sure, Gallego v. Vera[41] decreed that:

We might add that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence
qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from
an elective office to serve that community; and when the evidence on the
alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive and it
clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of the law would
not be thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of the
electorate should be respected. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Frivaldo[42] likewise prescribed that:

xxx xxx xxx To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications,

the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so
patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent
will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws
so zealously protect and promote. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

In Torayno,[43] the Court had the occasion to say that:

The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking
and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity
to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth
and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables
the electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for the
job they aspire for. xxx xxx xxx

Recently, in Japzon v. COMELEC,[44] the Court, citing Papandayan, Jr. v. COMELEC,[45] said:

In Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court provided a

summation of the different principles and concepts in jurisprudence relating to
the residency qualification for elective local officials. Pertinent portions of
the ratio in Papandayan are reproduced below:

Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving

the issue of whether or not a candidate has complied with the residency
requirement for elective positions. The principle of animus revertendi has
been used to determine whether a candidate has an "intention to return"
to the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a
determination whether there has been an "abandonment" of his former
residence which signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v.
Court of Appeals, this Court set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC
and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as
Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's
immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of
his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder,
which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the
United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such
before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be
disqualified under 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of

Representatives, respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against
claims that he was not a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar. In sustaining the ruling of the HRET, this Court,
citing Faypon v. Quirino, applied the concept of animus revertendi or
"intent to return", stating that his absence from his residence in order to
pursue studies or practice his profession as a certified public accountant
in Manila or his registration as a voter other than in the place where he
was elected did not constitute loss of residence. The fact that respondent
made periodical journeys to his home province in Laoag revealed that he
always had animus revertendi.

In Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larrazabal v. Commission

on Elections, it was explained that the determination of a person's legal
residence or domicile largely depends upon the intention that may be
inferred from his acts, activities, and utterances. In that case, petitioner
Adelina Larrazabal, who had obtained the highest number of votes in the
local elections of February 1, 1988 and who had thus been proclaimed as
the duly elected governor, was disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of
residence and registration qualifications, not being a resident nor a
registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. The COMELEC ruled that the attempt
of petitioner Larrazabal to change her residence one year before the
election by registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run for the
position of governor of the province of Leyte was proof that she
considered herself a resident of Ormoc City. This Court affirmed the
ruling of the COMELEC and held that petitioner Larrazabal had
established her residence in Ormoc City, not in Kananga, Leyte, from 1975
up to the time that she ran for the position of Provincial Governor
of Leyte on February 1, 1988. There was no evidence to show that she
and her husband maintained separate residences, i.e., she at Kananga,
Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City. The fact that she occasionally
visited Kananga, Leyte through the years did not signify an intention to
continue her residence after leaving that place.

In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held that

"domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence", as
used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. In that case, petitioner Philip G.
Romualdez established his residence during the early 1980's in Barangay
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It was held that the sudden departure from the
country of petitioner, because of the EDSA People's Power Revolution of
 1986, to go into self-exile in the United States until favorable conditions
had been established, was not voluntary so as to constitute an
abandonment of residence. The Court explained that in order to acquire a
new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus
manendicoupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or
at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Ultimately, the Court recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr. that it is the fact of

residence that is the decisive factor in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the residency qualification requirement.

We do not doubt that the residency requirement is a means to prevent a stranger or

newcomer from holding office on the assumption that such stranger or newcomer would
be insufficiently acquainted with the needs of his prospective constituents. However, it is
appropriate to point out at this juncture that aside from petitioners actual, physical
presence in Sta. Rosa for more than a year prior to election day, he has demonstrated that
he has substantial ties to Sta. Rosa and the First District of Laguna for an even longer period
than that. Petitioner has business interests in Sta. Rosa comprised of restaurants and a
residential property for lease. Petitioner has two children studying in Sta. Rosa schools
even before 2006. These circumstances provided petitioner with material reasons to
frequently visit the area and eventually take up residence in the said district. Significantly,
petitioner previously served as Board Member and Vice-Governor for
the Province of Laguna, of which the First District and Sta. Rosa are a part. It stands to
reason that in his previous elected positions petitioner has acquired knowledge of the
needs and aspirations of the residents of the First District who were among his
constituents.

Simply put, petitioner could not be considered a stranger to the community which he
sought to represent and that evil that the residency requirement was designed to prevent is
not present in this case.

We take this occasion to reiterate our ruling in Sinaca v. Mula,[46] to wit:

[When] a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly

and clearly expressed, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the
candidate's eligibility for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the
people.Above and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the
electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else,
that must prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we continue to hold
sacred.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
HRET in HRET CASE No. 07-034 promulgated on December 16, 2008, and its Minute
Resolution No. 09-080 promulgated on April 30, 2009 in the same case, are
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
 SO ORDERED.

Tolentino v. COMELEC
TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971
Ponente: Barredo, J.

FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10,
1970, the convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of
September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to
amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On
September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention that it
will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo
Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.

ISSUE:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a
resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a
justiciable one and thus subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court
is superior to the Convention but they are both subject to the Constitution.
2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic
Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all
amendments must be submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover,
the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess the amendment in
relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately but together.

Philippine Constitution Association,

Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay G.R. No. L-25554,
October 4, 1966

Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the
Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently
enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries
authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before
December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of
the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.
Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10)
of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963,
and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30,
1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said
Act expired on December 30, 1965.

Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all
the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must
have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?

Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to
“all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a
single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the
Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not
the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the
purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in
the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and
the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the
fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that
enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become
operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and
House that approved it will have expired.

People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-

76. February 3, 2000]
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts
and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this
motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under
law by reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”.

RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws.”, this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated
alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the
“mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality.
The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification
in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, the
performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison.

TRILLANES vs PIMENTEL
Case Digest
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY, et al.
556 SCRA 471 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.

FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national
officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening.

In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F.
Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four
years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting
his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to
Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.

Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as
senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to
allow him to work and serve his mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal
treatment of detention prisoners who are held without bail
HELD:
No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos
that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as
the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules
also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply
equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is
beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable
penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude
involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release
on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong,
whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's
judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his
right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail
in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."

Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense
applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like
Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under
preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage
in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This
is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

Trillanes’ election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his
mandate

The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to
speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to
office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies
pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness
of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by
the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the
Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the
overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the
people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of
legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House
of Representatives, not to mention the 24 membersof the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all

prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was
gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed
petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in
February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his
oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial
court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these
prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

Sergio Osmeña, Jr. vs Salipada Pendatun

‘In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to
Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his
administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in
order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his
allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary
actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court.
Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred
that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to
discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary
immunity upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the
courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him
from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is
dismissed.

Senator abuses parliamentary immunity

In the recent administrative case of ANTERO J. POBRE vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, the Philippine Supreme Court dismissed the
letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago,
conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, but castigated, so to speak, the feisty and
aggressive, if not foul-mouth, respondent lady senator for using what I would call
intemperate and hate-filled language in a privilege speech she had delivered before the
Philippine Senate which was directed against the Philippine Supreme Court Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

The JBC had previously rejected her nomination as Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme
Court.

I am truly glad the JBC had rejected her nomination to the highest tribunal of the land,
considering her notorious public image as a war-freak person.

In the aforecited case, although the Court held that the privilege speech of the combative
lady senator was not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules
of Court, it however expressed its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a
member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the
Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good
professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were
intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as
stating that she wanted “to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and
his cohorts in the Supreme Court,” and calling the Court a “Supreme Court of idiots.”

The offensive and disrespectful words of the lady senator were as follows:

“x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am

suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated.
I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x.”

Let me digest the case for legal research purposes.

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre
invited the Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor:

"x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I

am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be
living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would
rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x."

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker
towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and
constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asked that disbarment
proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel,
did not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those
statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being
part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its
committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open
controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She
averred that she wanted to expose what she believed “to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar
Council [JBC],” which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be
vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent
justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should
have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her,
would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment,
be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.”
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success for it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he
should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense, the Court said, citing previous decided cases.

Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a

polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the
public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard
of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives.

The Court said that it does not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner
they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member
of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly
and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in
the name of parliamentary immunity.

Although the Court held that the privilege speech of the combative lady senator was not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court, it felt,
however, expressed its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the
Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady
senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is
at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in
substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted “to spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court,” and calling the
Court a “Supreme Court of idiots.”

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be
allowed to erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. The Court stated that in this case, the
lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:

"Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

"Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others."

It will be noted that Senator/Atty. Santiago was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law
professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of
numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator
Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, was duty-bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members.
Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.
Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her
statements would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.

The Court stressed that a careful re-reading of her foul and repulsive utterances would
readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not
being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were
outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must
not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the
Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are
agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual
members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for
the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

The Court stated that Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she
considered as an “unjust act” the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the
position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Court’s supervision, its
individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC’s ex-officio
chairperson, have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position
of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and
indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and
defamatory words against all of them.

As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that it is the duty of a lawyer
to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. That
same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the
courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds
him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity to the courts.

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice.” His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, “not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.” Faith in
the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice “is
disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the
people.” Thus has it been said of a lawyer that “[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn
and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.”

The Court in a subtle way criticized the Senate itself for neglecting its duty to discipline the
respondent senator for her offensive language. The Rules of the Senate itself contains a
provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under
any circumstance, “offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any
public institution.” But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the Senate
President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate
Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is
unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Jimenez v. Cabangbang [Aug. 3, 1966]
FACTS:
Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert and Jose Lukban– they are the persons mentioned in the
open letter of Cabangbang to the President

Bartolome Cabangbang – member of the HOR and wrote the letter to the President

A civil action was originally instituted by the petitioners in the CFI of Rizal for recovery of
several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter
of defendant Cabangbang. The letter contains information that:

1. There is an insidious plan or a massive political build up

2. There is a planned coup d’état
3. Modified #1, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in a
effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind General Arellano.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.
2. Whether or not it is libelous.

HELD:
1. It was held that the letter is not considered a privilege communication because the
publication:

a. was an open letter,

b. the Congress was not in session
c. it was not a discharge of an official function or duty

2. It was held not libelous because the letter clearly implies that the plaintiffs were not the
planners but merely tools, much less, unwittingly on their part.

The order appealed is confirmed

DANTE V. LIBAN v. RICHARD J.

GORDON, GR No. 175352, 2009-07-15
Facts:
Issues:
whether the respondent holds the chairmanship of PNRC in an ex officio capacity.
may hold any other office or employment in the Government
Ruling:
the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office
or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Principles:
a position held in an ex officio capacity does not violate the constitutional proscription on
the holding of multiple offices.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation... in
an ex officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said
officials' office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an... imposition of
additional duties and functions on said officials.
The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office,
it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his
services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already... paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.
The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived
from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but
rather annexed to the official position." Ex officio likewise... denotes an "act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority other than that conferred by the office." An ex officio member of a board is one
who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and... without further warrant or
appointment.
the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-
owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it... creates the
PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code
and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private
corporation.

PUYAT, ET. AL. vs. DE GUZMAN JR., ET.

AL.
G.R. No. L-51122, 25 March 1982 Case Digest
The suit is for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction poised against the
Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), Hon. Sixto T. J. De Guzman, Jr., granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave
to intervene in a SEC Case.

FACTS:

On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries
(IPI), a private corporation, was held – six of the elected directors were herein petitioners
that may be called the Puyat Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the
Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the
management of IPI.

On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings
questioning the election.

Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional
grounds the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa, as counsel for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973
Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before
xxx any administrative body" and SEC was an administrative body. The prohibition being
clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance.

When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had
purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was
notarized only on 30 May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for
Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the
matter in litigation, which motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect

appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of
the Constitutional provision.

RULING:

The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention,
Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could
theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman

Fernandez. He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them
"after the fact", that is, on 30 May 1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the
quo warranto suit had been filed, and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case
before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his
intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which was objected to by
petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided,
instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel
before an administrative body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition.
 The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings
in some other capacity.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective.
All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a
minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the
proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by
indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects
specifically or impliedly prohibited.

Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of
the prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order
granting Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set
aside.

Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr.

0

G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998

o While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that
the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could
thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate
shall automatically become the minority leader.
o Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate
President and House Speaker
o Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
o Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to
revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them

FACTS:

During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both
 nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was
declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the
agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was
assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen.
Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing
nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the
minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of
respondent as Senate minority leader
o Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative
procedure

RULING:

The petition fails.

The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a
certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half
or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more
than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who
comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no
showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of
these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected
by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide
that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who
could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

xxx

Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast,
minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the
majority.” Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the
greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority.
But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the
minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with
a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves),
there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as
the “dominant minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing
composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or
are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many
minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the
minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate
President and House Speaker

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be
such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine the
rules of its proceedings.” xxx

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate,
such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds
of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress
how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is
of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist,
then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to
revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said
rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of
a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such
officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to
prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to
interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of
constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies
the Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a
coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To
repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and
judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial

legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this
argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
 Avelino vs Cuenco (G.R. No. L-2821)
0

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the
court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano
Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to
formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the
leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to
delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters employed
delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were
left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco
was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the
President of the Philippines.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.

HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature
and in doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first
question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political
nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.
192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the
power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken
over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of
the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate
remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding
officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable,
the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate
Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four
justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty
three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately
after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will
side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful
President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the
will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of
that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held
with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said
twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts
and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
 Arroyo v De Venecia G.R. No. 127255.
August 14, 1997.
Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate
on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos
on November 22, 1996.

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules
of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false
and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House
Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.

Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding
that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is
therefore dismissed.

Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect
due the other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of
the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action
as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or
to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested
with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave
abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal
or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must
assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct
was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body.

In view of what is essential

Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for
the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27 are VIOLATED.

First, in Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. Theymay be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform
to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when
the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may
be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform
to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction

This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency
has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a
different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is
that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does
not present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction".

In view of House Rules

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in
cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must
restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House.
Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came
here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects,
then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken
every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and
third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and
in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.

In view of grave abuse

Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"
has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as
to amount to lack of power.

In view of the enrolled bill doctrine

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and
the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.

This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good,
if old-fashioned democratic theory: “Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an
inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is
not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to
do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent,
careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to
reflect credit upon the name of popular government.”

(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we
assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of
judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by
its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be
a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to
say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just.

Osmena vs Pendatun (G.R. No. L-

17144)

FACTS: Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity
as member of the Special Committee created by House Resolution # 59. Specifically,
petitioner asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement of his
parliamentary immunity; and asked the member of the Special Committee be enjoined
from proceeding, as provided by Resolution # 59, requiring the petitioner to substantiate
his charges against the President during his privilege speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”
wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of the President’s administration selling pardons.
For refusing to provide evidence as the basis of his allegations, Osmena was suspended for
15 months for the serious disorderly behavior.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not petitioner’s words constitute disorderly conduct.
3. Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from
investigating the speech and words of Osmena.
4. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.

HELD:
1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect him from responsibility before the
 legislative body itself as stated in the provision that “xxx shall not be questioned in any
other place”.

2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body
and not the judiciary, because it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual
circumstances of which the House knows best. Anything to the contrary will amount to
encroachment of power.

3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such approval amounted
to the suspension of the House Rules, which according to the standard parliamentary
practice may be done by unanimous consent.

4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be censured,
committed to prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

0

G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

o Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative

to discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS:

A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a

complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID
Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the
application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan
then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive

suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING:

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent

public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both
legal and jurisprudential support. xxx

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of

suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an
order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.”
Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs.
Sandiganbayan observed:

“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact,

if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.”

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to

the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the
Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of
public officials and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’ Prerogative

to Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner,
behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of
preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure

that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the
case may be, upon an erring member.

xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and
that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive
suspension order.

Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R.

No. 191970 April 24, 2012]
FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired
Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and
lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his
return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian
citizenship in September 2009.

He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the
Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans
Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo
before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also
affirmed the lower court's decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga

Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of
failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local
government code.

COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a
gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish
his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide
intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

RULING:

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial
governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For
purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile,
meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also
have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the
following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where
once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can
have but one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has
met the residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for
granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he
migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country
for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga
Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left
Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country.
In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to
live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived
nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the
loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of
law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or
residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he
has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support
such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to
have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It
is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a
friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make
property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two
things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he
lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences
with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived.
Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court
of Zamboanga Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the
COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable
misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos
presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga
Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all
doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.

Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v Judge

Majaducon
Facts: Respondent Judge Majaducon was alleged to have committed grave abuse of
discretion when he dismissed the Blue Ribbon Committee’s petition to lift the cease and
desist order filed against them by Atty Flaviano in connection to fund irregularities in the
AFP. Also, respondent judge is also alleged to have erred in convicting petitioner Pimentel
et
al of indirect contempt of court when the latter published in The Phil Star information
about
the previous case which, for Majaducon, created in the minds of readers the impression
that
he violated the Constitution and was guilty of gross ignorance of the rules and procedures.
Issue:
1. WON Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed the petition
of the Committee
2. WON Majaducon erred in convicting Pimentel et al for indirect contempt of court
Held/Ratio: GRANTED. Reversed decision on the Committee as well as that of Pimentel.
1. Courts have no jurisdiction to restrain Congress from performing its function to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation
2. Yes. Pimentel did not cause the publication in the Phil Star. Also, There was nothing
malicious about his statement regarding Majaducon’s gross ignorance of the rules
and procedures since this always comes up in administrative cases.
 SEC 22 – Senate v Ermita
Facts: Petitioner Senate filed for certiorari & prohibition before the Court challenging the
constitutionality of EO 464 (granting head of departments executive privilege) which was
proclaimed after the Senate invited members of the executive to a public hearing about
alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract concerning the North Rail
Project.
EO 464: deprives Congress of the information possessed by executive officials
Sec 21: power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation which aims to elicit information
that may be used for legislation
Sec 22: power to conduct a question hour with the objective of obtaining information
in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function (inquiring how dep heads are implementing
the statutes given to them)
Issues: WON EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress
Held/Ratio: PARTIALLY GRANTED. EO 464 Sec 1 & 2a are VALID. Sec 2b & 3 are VOID.
Sec 1: Limited only to appearances during question hour (Sec 22) as opposed to
inquiries in aid of legislation (Sec 21)

Neri v Senate Committee

Facts:Romulo Neri has already testified before the respondent Committees in an 11-hour
proceeding regarding matters on National Broadband Project (NBN) awarded by DOTC to
ZTE. Petitioner disclosed that COMELEC Chair Abalos offered him 200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He, however, refused to answer questions pertaining to PGMA
by invoking executive privilege. Exec Secretary Ermita wrote respondents a letter for them
to dispense with questions under executive privilege. He did not show up in the succeeding
hearing and was held in contempt. He then explained that he had not shown contemptible
conduct and that he still was willing to cooperate provided that he be given in advance
what
he needs to clarify. Such is the nature of this present motion for reconsideration
Issues:
1. WON there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our
legal system
2. WON there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the 3
questions (WON PGMA followed up the project? WON she directed him to prioritize it?
WON she directed him to approve it?) are covered by executive privilege
3. WON respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the 3
questions are critical to exercise their functions.
4. WON respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
contempt order
Held/Ratio:
1. Presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government
and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.
2. In upholding executive privilege with respect to the 3 questions, it did not in any way
curb the public’s right to information
3. Inquiries by the legislature are not subject to the exacting standards of evidence
essential to arrive at accurate findings in court proceedings.
4. Yes. The subpoena issued to petitioner did not inform him of the questions to be
asked. It merely commanded him to testify on what he knows
 SEC 19, 20, 21 – Bengzon v Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee
Facts: The Senate, by way of the Blue Ribbon Committee, was called upon to investigate a
possible violation of the RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) regarding the sale
of
36 corporations owned by Kokoy Romualdez. As a result, the Committee subpoenaed
petitioners to appear before the Committee and testify on what they know. Petitioners
(Bengzon + Baby Lopa) refused by invoking the right of due process. The Court has
jurisdiction over the case at bar as it involves the determination of the scope and extent of
the power of the Committee in accordance with the constitution
Issues: WON the Committee violated Sec 21, Art 6 of the Constitution in their actions
against
the petitioners
Held/Ratio: GRANTED. There is already a case intimately similar to this in the
Sandiganbayan. Even more so, the investigation must be, as stated in Sec 21, Art 6 of the
Constitution, “in aid of legislation” and that the “rights of persons appearing or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.

Garcillano v. House of Representatives

Committee on Public Information, G.R.
No. 170338, 23 December 2008
FACTS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179275 seek to disallow the Senate to continue with the conduct of
the questioned legislative inquiry on the issue of “Hello Garci” tapes containing the
wiretapped communication of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument
that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to
the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session. Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended
since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page, invoking R.A. No. 8792.
ISSUE
Whether or not the invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is a substantial compliance of the constitutional
requirement of publication.

RULING
NO.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he Senate or the
House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of
publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.

R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional
equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic
data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation
of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.

Tolentino v Secretary of Finance

Facts: Petitioners assailing the constitutionality of RA 7716 (E-VAT Law) which seeks to
widen
the tax base of the existing VAT system (levied on the sale, barter, or exchange of goods and
properties and on the exchange/sale of services; equivalent of 10% of the gross selling
price
or gross value).
Issues:
1. Procedural: Does it violate Art 6, Sec 24 & Art 6 Sec 26(2) of the Constitution? What is
the extent of the power of Conference Committees?
2. Substantive: Does it violate Art 6 Sec 28(1) & (3) of the Constitution?
Held/Ratio: DISMISSED!
1. Art 6 Sec 24 – bill originated from the House of Reps
JMHRoco
Constitutional Law Case Digests
Art 6 Sec 26(2) – President certified the Senate bill as urgent
Conference Committee – It is within their power to include an entirely new provision
not found in the House or Senate bill as long as it is germane to the subject of the
bills of the committee. After all, its report is not final and would need the approval of
both Houses. Which it did.
2. Art 6 Sec 28(1) & (3): Tax burden, according to respondents, is actually distributed to
as many goods & services as possible particularly those within the reach of higherincome
groups.

Garcia v Mata
Facts: Petitioner filed for certiorari to review Court of First Instance’s decision which
declared
Par 11 of the “Special Provisions of the AFP” of RA No. 1600 (Appropriation Act for the FY
56-
57) unconstitutional and invalid. Petitioner also argues that his reversion to inactive status
 was in violation of the above provision which prohibits the reversion to inactive status of
reserve officers on active duty with at least 10 yrs of accumulated service.
Held/Ratio: DENIED. Court affirmed lower courts’ decisions. It is unconstitutional because
a
new and completely unrelated provision was attached to the Appropriation Act. Said
provision is a RIDER (LOL)

Lidasan v. Comelec Digest

Lidasan v Comelec

G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967

Sanchez, J.:

Facts:

1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a
qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and
petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be
nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are
transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries
of the two provinces.

2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon inthe Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the
municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in
another province — Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one
subject in the title

YES. RA 4790 is null and void

1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous
subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in
the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of
Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in
the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application,
originated.

2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language
of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand
that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public,
of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to
lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate
action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical
accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is
clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry
as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject
where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression
or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

4. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del
Sur" — projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the
creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent
province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the
Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading,
deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined
in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2)
it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

4. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law.
One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and
in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from
their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two,
it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected
by the bill.
 Philippine Constitution Association,
Inc. vs Pedro Gimenez
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of Republic Act
No. 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and
sick leave to Senators and Representatives. PHILCONSA now seeks to enjoin Pedor
Gimenez, the Auditor General, from disbursing funds therefor.
According to PHILCONSA, the provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent
the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term
of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same
provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because it allows members and officers of
Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to
one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of
reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the
government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a
gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in
any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable
at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another
attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the
Constitution.
The Solicitor General, arguing for Congress, averred that the grant of retirement or pension
benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers does not constitute “forbidden
compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution.
The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable
vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for
computing the gratuity due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme
to increase their salary.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.
HELD: No, the said law is unconstitutional. Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution,
provides:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise
provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each,
including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling
expenses to and from their respective district in the case of Members of the House of
Representatives and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when
attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of
Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special
proviso which reads as follows:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of
all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase.
In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the
National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected
subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the
term compensation “other emoluments”.
“Emolument” is “the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as
compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees
and perquisites.”
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is
a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
RA 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June
22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting
the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the
prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby declared
unconstitutional by the SC.

Tolentino v Secretary of Finance (1994)

Tolentino v Secretary of Finance GR No. 115455, August 25, 1994

FACTS:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties
as well as on the sale or
exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Herein, various petitioners seek to declare RA 7166 as unconstitutional. One of the reasons
is that it violates Article VI, Section 28 (1) which provides that “the rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.”

ISSUE:
Whether RA 7166 violates the principle of progressive system of taxation

RULING:
No. Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these arguments, any
discussion whether the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the poor and middle
income group in society harder than it will the rich is largely an academic exercise.

Regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. “Evolve a progressive system
of taxation” is a directive to Congress. These provisions are placed in the Constitution as
moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.
 Gonzales v Macaraig
Facts: Petitioner Gonzales (plus members of the Senate Committee on Finance) challenged
the constitutionality of Resolution No. 381 whose Sec 55 & Sec 16 were vetoed by the
president. They sought to enjoin respondents (Macaraig + Cabiet members) from
implementing Res No 381/RA 6688. Sec 55 & 16 were vetoed because it was in violation of
Art 6 Sec 25(5) which allowed the Pres et al to augment items in the General
Appropriations
Law.
Issue: WON the veto of Sec 55 & 16 is constitutional
Held: PRESIDENTIAL VETO UPHELD. PETITION DISMISSED.
Although labelled as “provisions”, sec 55 (FY89) & Sec 16 (FY90) are actually
“inappropriate
provisions” and should be treated as “items” because they don’t show any connection with
a
schedule of expenditures. As such, pursuant to Sec 25(5), they can be vetoed. In the same
vein, they also nullify the authority vested in the President and heads of different branches
to augment items in the GAA.

Bengzon vs Drilon (G.R. No. 103524)

Veto Power of the President

FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court
and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a
resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted.
The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the
Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional
Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.

HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to
them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and
override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to
enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of
existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove
any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an
item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.

NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed

Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e.,
disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his
veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically
causes the bill to become a law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto
messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what
new laws are in force.

When is it allowed?

The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the
President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff
bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

3 ways how a bill becomes a law.

1. When the President signs it

2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of
each House; and
3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have
been presented to him.

Abra Valley College v. Aquino (162 S

CRA 106 [1988])
FACTS:

Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly

incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint
to annul and declare void

the “Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and bui

lding located at Bangued, Abra, fornon-

payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure”
by

respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued
for thesatisfaction of the said taxes thereon.The parties entered into a stipulation of facts
adopted and embodied by the trial court in itsquestioned decision. The trial court ruled for
the government, holding that the second floor of
the building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor
used andrented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus
the property isnot being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an
appeal, petitioneravailed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction beforethe Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.
HELD:

Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution,
expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or
conventsappurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively
for religious,charitable or educational purposes.

Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemptionextends to facilities which
are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of themain purposes.
The use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neithercontemplated by
law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of
the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imaginatio
n beconsidered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption from taxation
is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.The decision of the
CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of theassessed tax be
returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the groundfloor is
being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as incidental
toeducation (residence of the director).

LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES VS

QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 [Constitutional Law - Article VI: Legislative Department;
Taxation ]

FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks
exemption from real property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the
land and the hospital building. Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable
institution. The request was denied, and a petition hereafter filed before the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City
Assessor. Petitioner alleged that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real property
taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and the
decision was likewise affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of
Quezon City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD 1823 and
the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160.
2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the
1973 and 1987 Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock
corporation which, subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the
Office of the President with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements.
The purpose for which it was created was to render medical services to the public in
general including those who are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity.
Under PD 1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even if the gift or donation is in
the form of subsidies granted by the government.

2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption
privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property
taxes only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in
order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a
charitable institution and; its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for
charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients
are exempt from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt
from such taxes.

Aglipay v. Ruiz (Case Digest)

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937
Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against
respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman
Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052
by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect
or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent
does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only
‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took
advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not violating the
Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the
Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of
profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’.
Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they
thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact,
certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations.’
 Manosca vs. CA
Manosca vs. CA

G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996

Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to
have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed
Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved
to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a
public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public
funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious
entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is valid and
constitutional.

Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt
that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in
at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The
other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private
enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.