Shigenori Kuroda vs Rafael Jalandoni

83 Phil. 171 – Political Law – Generally Accepted Principles of International Law

Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during
the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission, headed by
Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that were done against non combatant
civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to Executive Order No. 68
which established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations
governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO
arguing that the same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact
that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations
Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges because it
has no laws to base on, national or international.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?

HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the
case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that states “the
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.” The Hague
Convention and other similar conventions whose principles are generally accepted are hence
considered as part of the law of the land.

Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh

de facto government
CO KIM CHAM VS VALDEZ TAN KEH
G.R. No. L-5 75 Phil 113, 122 September 17, 1945
Facts:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila
initiated during the time of the Japanese occupation.
The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which
were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation
issued by General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and
without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had
the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of
the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such
authority.
Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese
occupation were no de facto government.

Issues:

Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese
occupation were valid and remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.
Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring
that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than
that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” has invalidated all judgments and judicial
acts and proceedings of the courts.
Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the
said judicial acts and proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.

Discussions:

Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto
government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of
the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments,
supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. The
doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law
(Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy
while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the
right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the
conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such
government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly
from the laws war, as established by the usage of the world, and confirmed by the writings
of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal
laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force
during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of
conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his
pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.”
General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his proclamation October
23, 1944, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction
would violate the law of nations.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military
occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that
the same courts, which had become re-established and conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of
postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases
then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon
them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said
principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military
force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such
political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to
regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same
exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content.”

Rulings:

The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts
and proceedings of the court of justice of those governments, which are not of a political
complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto
government, which are not of a political complexion, remained good and valid after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the
leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.
The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the
judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional,
processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in
the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above
indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and
judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments
during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after
the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be
presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas
MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation,
to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as
a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does
not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary
courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless
absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary
of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are
allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as
they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be
adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical
point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his
arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial.
From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of
the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far
as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that
the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch
as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the
occupant of transient character.

Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he
and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until
in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the
purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong
then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several
treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause
(pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here
in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal
opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there
is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The
equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal
protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.”
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with
a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police
power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls
in the Pasay city market.

Ramon Gonzales vs Rufino Hechanova

9 SCRA 230 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Treaty vs Executive Agreements – Statutes
Can Repeal Executive Agreements
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive
agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the
requisite of securing a certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is
a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova,
authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local
planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association
assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and
corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by
Macapagal.

HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through
an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point
of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but,
also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given
as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely
upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which
are fundamental in our constitutional set up.

As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be

invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly
settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction
to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law
or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases
in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter
to an act of Congress.