Crim 2 Midterm Case Digest Complete Version PDF

Compiled by: FM3
1. LAUREL V MISA
FACTS:
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the
enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of
the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto
were then suspended; and that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the
Philippine Republic.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE
GOVERNMENT BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING ENEMY OCCUPATION.
WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 114 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE.
HELD:
No. The absolute and permanent allegiance (Permanent allegiance is the unending allegiance owed by citizens or
subjects to their states. Generally, a person who owes permanent allegiance to a state is called a national.) of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated
(repealed) or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is
not transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the legitimate government. (Article II, section 1, of the
Constitution provides that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.")
What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the
reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military
occupation.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same government and same
sovereign people. (Art. 114. Treason. — Any person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the
Government of the Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies,
giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion temporal to
death and shall pay a fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos.)
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2. PP v Perez
Facts: Seven counts of treason were filed against Susano Perez aka Kid Perez, the accused, for recruiting,
apprehending, and commandeering women (Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, and Flaviana
Bonalos) against their will to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and other Japanese of
Officers.
Only counts 1,2,4,5,6 were substantiated. In the 4th and 5th counts, the accused personally assaulted and abused
two of the offended girls.
Susano Perez was convicted of treason and sentenced to death by electrocution by the People’s Court.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of the accused constitute a crime of treason
Held : NO. There is a dilemma in trying to draw a line between treasonable and untreasonable assistance, since the
scope of adherence to the enemy is comprehensive, and its requirement indeterminate, but as a general rule acts
providing aid and comfort to the enemies are considered treasonable when the aid and comfort rendered are
directed to them as enemies not as mere individuals. To lend or give money to an enemy as a friend so that he may
buy personal necessities is not technically traitorous, but to lend or give money to an enemy to enable him to buy
arms or ammunition to use against the government of the giver is treason.
The act of the accused of providing the enemies with women and entertainment, boosting their (the enemies’)
morale and making their lives more pleasant, is not treason. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not
directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or weaken the power of the government. Any favourable
effect toward the Japanese that the accused might have made was trivial, imperceptible and unintentional. Intent of
disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which in the absence of admission may be gathered from the
nature and circumstances of each case. In this particular case, it was not evident that the intent of the accused in
providing the enemies with women was to help them overthrow the government.
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3. PP V. PRIETO 80 PHIL 138 -PICTURE

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4. PP v manayao
Pedro Manayao was a member of the Makapili (a group of Filipino traitors aiding the Japanese cause). Manayao
conspired together with his Japanese comrade soldiers to inflict terror upon the barrio of Banaban in Bulacan
where they killed 60 to 70 residents. The residents they killed were alleged to be supporters, wives and relatives of
guerillas fighting the Japanese forces. Manayao was positively identified by credible witnesses and he was later
convicted with the high crime of treason with multiple murder. He was sentenced to death and to pay the damages.
Manayao’s counsel argued that his client cannot be tried with treason because Manayao has already lost his
Filipino citizenship due to his swearing of allegiance to support the Japanese cause. Hence, Manayao cannot be
tried under Philippine courts for any war crimes for only Japanese courts can do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manayao is guilty of treason.
HELD: No. Manayao’s swearing of allegiance to Japan was not proven as a fact nor is it proven that he joined the
Japanese Naval, Army or Air Corps. What he joined is the Makapili, a group of Filipino traitors pure and simple. The
Supreme Court also emphasized that in times of war when the state invokes the Constitutional provision which
state
The defense of the state is a prime duty of the government, in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be
required to render personal, military or civil service…
no one can effectively cast off his duty to defend the state by merely swearing allegiance to an enemy country,
leaving and joining the opposite force, or by deserting the Philippine Armed Forces. Or even if Manayao did lose his
citizenship it is also indicated that no such person shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be held
guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not strictly observe this duty.
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5. PP v Adriano
Facts: Apolinar Adriano, a Filipino citizen was convicted in the People’s Court for treason, for being a member of
the Makapili Army (remember the guys with the bayongs over their heads and pointed fingers?) during the
Japanese Occupation.
The only evidence the prosecution substantiated was his joining of the Makapili Army. The People’s Court found
out that he participated in various acts of participation as a Member of the M. Army (joining in raids and
confiscating property, etc.) But these acts were not established by 2 witnesses.
What the Court did establish though was that 2 witnesses saw Adriano in Makapili uniform and drilling under a Jap
instructor; that he performed sentry duties in a Jap garrison and he retreated with the Japs in the mountains when
the Americans liberated Nueva Ecija (where the Jap garrison was located). No two of the prosecution witnesses
testified to a single one of the various acts.
But the witnesses all agree that they saw the accused wearing the Makapili uniform.
Issue:Whether or not a person can be convicted of treason even though the conviction was not based on the 2-
witness rule as required in Art. 114 of the RPC.
Held: In satisfying the 3rd element of the crime of treason, Adriano’s joining of the Makapili Army was an evidence
of both his adherence to the enemy and of giving them aid and comfort.
It was an evidence of adherence because joining that Army means agreeing to the adverse intentions and purposes
of its creation (which was to fight the Japs’ enemy = America which at that time still exercised sovereignty over the
Philippines.
It constituted an overt act because he placed himself a t the enemy’s disposal to fight by their side. The enemy was
strengthened by the psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with
which it was with war with. The practical effect was no different from enlisting in the enemy’s army.
But, the crime of treason is an Anglo-American origin. All the materials and cases from that jurisprudence states
that. Every act, movement, deed and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the
testimony of 2 witnesses. It is necessary to produce 2 direct witnesses to one whole overt act. If it is possible to
piece bits and pieces together of the overt act each bit must be supported by two oaths.
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6. PP v. Lol-lo and Saraw
FACTS:
• 2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other
boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived between the Islands of Buang
and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all
armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked
some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the 2
young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros
finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. 2 of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro the 2 women were able to escape.
• Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they
were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy
• All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high
seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
• Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
• Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of
piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
• As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."
ISSUE: W/N the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
HELD:In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the
crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead.
YES.
• Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the
Philippines.
• The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of
persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine
as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed.
• At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of
superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act,
must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
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7. PP V RODRIGUEZ 135 SCRA 485
Facts: On August 29, 1981, MV Noria 767, owned and registered in the name of Hadji Noria Indasan, left Jolo. On
August 30, 1981, it arrived at the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. On the evening of the same day, the vessels left for
Labuan, on board were several trackers and cre members. A few hours after departure, while sailing about 25
miles from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins. From 3 testimonies, the 4 were
armed with bladed weapons and high caliber firearms, they stole and carried away personal properties and cash
totaling to P3, 687,300, they killed people.
On August 31, they reached the island and secured pumpboats. On January 8, 1982 after having been arrested and
detained by Malaysian authorities, the NBI fetched and bought them to Manila where they executed their
respective statements. Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez, assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty; Dano Raymundo
pleaded not guilty, but withdrew it and substituted it guilty; Peter Ponce waived his right to counsel, pleaded not
guilty. They were charged and convicted of piracy under PD 532.
Issue:W/N the lower court erred in holding that peter ponce is guilty of piracy?
Ruling: No. The sworn statement established conspiracy among the accused. They also said that he was armed. He
also gave a statement to the authorities stating his participation.
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8. PP v. Siyoh
FACTS
• Julaide Siyoh and Omarkyam Kiram, together with Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were accused of
qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder
• On July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who were also travelling merchants like him
(Danilo Hiolen. Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman) were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of
Basilan, to sell goods they received from Alberto Aurea.
• They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that
night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island. Who also helped them from selling their goods to
different Islands near Pilas.
• Before the incident happened, Antonio, the lone survivor saw that Kiram was talking with another two
persons that he can only recognize in their faces somewhere near the house where they were selling the
goods
• On July 14, 1979, When they were heading back to Pilas Island from Baluk-Baluk Island through riding a
pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine.
• On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red and green about 200
meters away from their pumpboat Shortly after" Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter
two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them
• There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized
them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island.
• When the boat came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's
pumpboat towards Mataja Island.
• On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of their money and their
goods by Kiram. Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to undress. Taking
fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on.
• With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo
Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into the water. As he was
swimming away from the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring his back. But he was
able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of
Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought
to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where he received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the
J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province.
• On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and
Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram
was wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail
to get back his pants from Kiram
ISSUE: WoN the respondent-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD: They were said to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified piracy with triple murder and
frustrated homicide
RATIONALE
1. Number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy, not material; Piracy, a special complex crime punishable
by death—but the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. PD 532 considers qualified
piracy as a special complex crime punishable by death. Therefore, the guilt of respondent were proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. There was no other evidence presented on why should the lone survivor tell lies and fabricate story as to
apprehend the accused.
3. Appellants claim that they were not the assailants but also the victim and that the two persons they have
identified (Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali) is baseless as view in the proven conspiracy among the
accused. The Conspiracy was established through the testimony of the lone witness and survivor- De Guzman"
Compiled by: FM3
9. UMIL V RAMOS 187 SCRA 311
Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon
City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member)
who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was
among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31
January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old
of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the
wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional
Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.
RULING: RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since subversion is
a form of a continuing crime – together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and
crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was
legal since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result
of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise, it would
be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not
sufficient to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.
10. PEOPLE V. BURGOS 144 SCRA 1
Facts: Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben Burgos (D) as member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against his
life, if he refused. Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members went to the house of the Burgos (D) and saw him
plowing his field when they arrived. One of the arresting offices called Burgos (D) and asked him about the firearm.
At first, Burgos (D) denied having any firearm, but later, Burgos's (D) wife pointed to a place below their house
where a gun was buried in the ground.
After recovery of said firearm, Burgos (D) pointed to a stock pile of cogon where the officers recovered alleged
subversive documents. Burgos (D) further admitted that the firearm was issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, team
leader of sparrow unit.
Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid? Is the warrantless search valid?
Ruling: No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing,
or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in
his presence or within his view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it
came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by
the wife of Burgos (D).
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed
first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime
may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable
ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the Burgos (D) was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the
authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not
yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a
frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made,
generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterward can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is
necessarily also tainted.
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11. MILO V. SALANGA 152 SCRA 113
FACTS
An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private respondent (accused Barrio Captain
Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez by hitting him with butts of
their guns and fist blows. Immediately thereafter, without legal grounds and with deliberate intent to deprive
the latter of his constitutional liberty, accused respondent and two members of the police force of Mangsat
conspired and helped one another in lodging and locking petitioner inside the municipal jail of Manaoag,
Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.
Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute the elements of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an opposition thereto.
Consequently, averring that accused-respondent was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary
Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
HELD
Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the
detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary
Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their
functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that
they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is
smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to
detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that
with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.
12. SAYO V. CHIEF OF POLICE OF MANILA GR NO. L-2128, MAY 12, 1948
Facts: Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging Melencio Sayo (D) and Joaquin Mostero (D) with having
committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the Sayo (D) and
Mostero (D), and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. When the petition for
habeas corpus was heard, the Sayo (D) and Mostero (D) were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had
not yet released or filed charges against them with the proper courts justice.
Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid?
Ruling: No. Under the constitution, no person may be deprived of his liberty except by warrant of arrest or
commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the complainant and his witness.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended
party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do
in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal or directly with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities
and other political subdivisions. A fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged
with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he
becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
Compiled by: FM3
13. MEDINA V. OROZCO, JR. GR NO. L-26723 DECEMBER 1966-PICTURE

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14. AGBAY V. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY GR NO. 134503 JULY 2 1999
Facts:
Petitioner, together with one SHERWIN Jugalbot, was arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station, Metro
Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610. The following day, a Complaint for violation of R.A. 7610 was filed
against petitioner and Jugalbot before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu. Subsequently,
counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding the immediate release of petitioner
considering that the latter had failed to deliver the petitioner to the proper judicial authority within thirty-six (36)
hours from his detention. September 7, 1997, this was not acted upon. When petitioner was able to post bond and
was released, he filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of detained persons against herein private respondents.
By virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 14 of the Office of the Ombudsman,[11] the case for delay in delivery filed
by petitioner against herein private respondents was transferred to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military for its
proper disposition. Thus, it was this office which acted on the complaint, and issued the Resolution recommending
its dismissal against herein private respondents. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this Resolution but it was
denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not there was delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities.
Held:
No, there was not, the petition is thus dismissed. The filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court
constitutes delivery to a proper judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal
ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law.
The continued detention of the accused becomes illegal upon the expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125
without such detainee having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities. The words judicial authority
as contemplated by Art. 125 mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order
the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, the
Supreme Court and other such inferior courts as may be established by law.In contrast with a city fiscal, it is
undisputed that a municipal court judge, even in the performance of his function to conduct preliminary
investigations, retains the power to issue an order of release or commitment[32]. Furthermore, upon the filing of
the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act,
the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may
be released on bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the
complaint with the MCTC.
Compiled by: FM3
15. STONEHILL V. DIOKNO 20 SCRA 383
Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or
corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises
of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties “books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective residences of the
petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to
deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the
admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962
with respect to some documents and papers.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both premises
Held:
Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general warrants.
There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the
requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence
at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is
not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by
the circumstances.Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the
corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of the
corporation.
Compiled by: FM3
16. BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF 133 SCRA 800
Facts:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search
warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively,
were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used
in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books
and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the
“We Forum” newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said
search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from
using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).
Issue:
Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the basis of the issuance of search
warrants.
Held:
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In
mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”; the Constitution
requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance
of a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos “is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and
are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as
amended” is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such
particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant. Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
Compiled by: FM3
17. PEOPLE VS. MANDORIAO 51 OG 4619 –PICTURE

Compiled by: FM3
18. PEOPLE VS. BAES 68 PHIL 203-PICTURE

Compiled by: FM3
19. PEOPLE VS. TENGSON 67 OG 1552 –
Facts:
On the morning of 10 Apr 1962, Alfonso Tengson, a minister of a Christian sect called “Christ is the Answer” received a
telegram
from Leopoldo Cepillo that Ines Cepillo has died and her interment would be held the following day. Thereafter, he and his
assistant
Eduardo Olegario, proceeded to the deceased’s residence at Bauan, Batangas. Upon the request of the widower, Tengson
performed a religious service for the dead at the residence, the barrio chapel, and in front of the chapel of the Roman Catholic
cemetery. Such religious service includes the singing of hymns, the reading of passages from the Bible and an explanation of
such, and a prayer for the repose of the soul. After the interment, Tengson and Olegario then returned to Lucban, Quezon.
Upon the facts narrated, Tengson was found guilty of violation of Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code and was sentenced to
serve six months and one day of prision correctional. It was found that he performed acts notoriously offensive to the feelings
of the faithful when he performed the religious service for the dead in the Roman Catholic chapel in Bauan.
Issue: Did Tengson and Olegario perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of a Roman Catholic faithful?
Held:
There are two essential elements to the offense penalized under Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1) that the acts
complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony;
and (2) that the act or acts must be notoriously offensive to those who are faithful in their religion. A religious ceremony is
defined as religious acts performed outside of a church, such as processions and special prayers for burying dead persons. The
first element is present in this case as the acts complained of happened inside the Roman Catholic cemetery where there is a
chapel. As to the second element, the Court does not believe that the acts come within the purview of the law.
For an act to be notoriously offensive to religious feelings, it must be directed against a religious practice, dogma, or ritual for
the purpose of ridicule. The acts of performing burial rites in accordance with the rules of practices of “Christ is the Answer,” a
Christian sect, is not notoriously offensive provided there was no intent to mock, scoff at or to desecrate any religious act or
object venerated by the Roman Catholic faithful. Since there was a permit to use the said Catholic cemetery, he had not
incurred criminal liability because he was requested to perform such acts by the members of the family of the deceased who
belong to his sect. Hence, the Court acquitted Tengson of the charges.
Compiled by: FM3
20. PEOPLE VS. NANOY 69 OG 8043
FACTS:
 While the congregation of the Assembly of God was having its afternoon services in its chapel, accused
Epifanio Nanoy, who was drunk, entered with uplifted hands, approached Levita Lapura, the song leader,
and attempted to grab her.
 Levita Lepura ran away from Nanoy. Romeo Zafra, also a member of said congregation, held the accused
and led him outside the church.
 The other members of the sect also ran out of the church and the religious services were discontinued.
 Accused was charged with the crime of offending religious feelings penalized under Art. 133 of the RPC.
The complaint alleged that he had the intention of stopping the said rite in an unholy manner.
 Trial court found Nanoy guilty of disturbance or interruption of a religious ceremony, penalized under
A153 of the RPC and sentenced him to 10 months and 21 days of imprisonment, plus a fine of Php50 with
subsidiary imprisonment in the case of insolvency.
 Accused appealed, arguing that the offense, if any is unjust vexation.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the TC erred in convicting Nanoy of disturbance or interruption of a religious ceremony.
O WON the offense was unjust vexation.
RULES
 Art. 133. Offending the religious feelings. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted to religious
worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful.
 There must be deliberate intent to hurt the feelings of the faithful.
ANALYSIS
1. YES. The appellant did NOT perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. Neither did he
cause such a serious disturbance as to interrupt or disturb the services of the said congregation. That he
had no intention of interrupting the services was shown by the fact that appellant allowed himself to be
led outside the church by Zomeo Zafra.
CONCLUSION/HELD/DISPOSITIVE:
Decision MODIFIED. Accused-appellant guilty of only unjust vexation and sentenced to pay a fine of Php100 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Compiled by: FM3
21. ENRILE VS SALAZAR 186 SCRA 217

In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime Salazar. Said crime arose from the failed coup
attempts against then president Corazon Aquino. There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of the
crime charged against him. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed a petition for habeas corpus
questioning his detention and alleging that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. He insists that there
is no such crime as rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the
landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes
such as murder; as such, the proper crime that should have been charged against him is simple rebellion – which
is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. He claimed that it only
took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling of the case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile
claimed that such period is so short that it was impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the
voluminous record of the case from the prosecution’s office – that being, the constitutional provision that a judge
may only issue a warrant of arrest after personally determining the existence of probable cause has not been
complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned and that it should
be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes like murder.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the case at bar.
HELD:
1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there was actually a previous law (P.D. 942)
which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law provided that graver crimes may not be complexed
with rebellion. However, President Corazon Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power granted to her by the
1986 Freedom Constitution). That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law under the
Revised Penal Code, still stands. The courts cannot change this because courts can only interpret laws. Only
Congress can change the rebellion law (which the SC suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as it
stands, Enrile is correct, there is no such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder are
absorbed. He can only be charged with rebellion – which is bailable.
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only took an hour and twenty minutes to issue the
warrant from the time the case was raffled to him despite the fact that the prosecution transmitted quite a
voluminous record from the preliminary investigation it conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows
established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to
comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that
single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Compiled by: FM3
22. UMIL VS RAMOS, SUPRA
Issue: W/N accused is guilty of rebelllion?
Ruling:
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State are in the
nature of continuing crimes.—However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of
continuing crimes.
Compiled by: FM3
23. ENRILE VS AMIN 189 SCRA 573

FACTS:
An information was filed against Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion "complexed" with murder and
charging him of violation of PD No. 1829.
It was alleged that Ponce Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort in his
house. Kwowing that Col. Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have
Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure of the petitioner that prevented Col. Honasan's
arrest and conviction was allegedly a violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
On March 2, 1990, Sen. Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion but was denied. Then, Sen. Filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information but then again was denied.
In return, Sen. Enrile filed for certiorari on the SC imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the respondent court on the following grounds:
a. the facts do not constitute an offense;
b. the alleged harboring and concealing of Col. Honasan is absorbed in complexed rebellion;
c. that justice requires only one prosecution for all the components of rebellion;
d. no probable cause for the violation of PD No. 1829; and
e. no preliminary investigation was conducted for the alleged violation of PD No. 1829.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sen. Enrile be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 not withstanding the rebellion case
earlier filed against him.
HELD:
The Supreme Court granted the petition of Sen. Enrile and quashed the information.
The SC reiterated the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and
subjecting them to separate prosecutions. It is Hernandez case that remains binding doctrine to prohibit the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as means necessary to its
commission or as an intended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
Petitioner's act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion
thus constituting a component thereof. All crimes, whether punishable under special law or general law, which are
mere components or ingredients, or committed in the furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes. It is the rule that the ingredients of a crime form
part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom
or by application of Art. 48 of the RPC.
Compiled by: FM3
24.PEOPLE VS DASIG 221 SCRA 549
Facts:
Appellants Rodrigo Dasig, Edwin Nuñez and 6 others were charged together of shooting Redempto Manatad, a
police officer, as he died while performing duties. Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nuñes entered a plea of
"not guilty." However, after the prosecution had presented its first witness, accused Nuñes changed his plea of "not
guilty" to "guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said accused
until the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuñez died on March 10,
1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin
Nuñez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad.
On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of
members of the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo
Dasig and Edwin Nuñes trying to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nuñes and confiscated a .45
caliber revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who
threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left upper arm and subsequently apprehended while a .38
caliber revolver with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated from him. Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the
hospital for treatment, while Nuñes was turned over to the Metrodiscom for investigation. Dasig confessed that he
and the group of Edwin Nuñes killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nuñes were members of the
sparrow unit and the their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi," respectively.
The extra-judicial confession of appellant was signed by him on every page thereof with the first page containing a
certification likewise signed by him. However, Dasig contends that the procedure by which his extra-judicial
confession was taken was legally defective, and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further contends that
assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple rebellion and not
murder with direct assault. Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he was still very
sick and consequently, he could not have fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious offense.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for extra-judicial killing of the deceased and participated in the act
of rebellion?
Held:
Yes. Accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of
Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of
rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes,
maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig
headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person
giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an unknown leader. Hence,
he should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting
death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity.
Compiled by: FM3
25. PEOPLE VS LOVEDIORO 250 SCRA 389
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo while Lucilo was walking along Burgos St.
away from Daraga, Albay Public Market. The victim died on the same day from massive blood loss. On November 6,
1992, Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the crime of murder, and subsequently found guilty. Lovedioro then
appealed the decision, contesting the verdict of murder instead of rebellion. It was confirmed by the prosecution’s
principal witness that Lovedioro was a member of the New People’s Army.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder, instead of rebellion?
- Yes. Because, overt acts and purpose are essential components of the crime of rebellion, with either of these
elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not exist.
- Political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime- alleging rebellion in order
to lessen the possible imposable penalty- could benefit from the law’s relatively benign attitude towards political
crimes. If no political motive is established or proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and
not of rebellion.
- In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the
furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself suffice.
- The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no contribution to the achievement of the
NPA’s subversive aims, in fact, there were no known acts of the victim’s that can be considered as offending to the
NPA.
- Evidence shows that Lovedioro’s allegation of membership to the N.P.A was conveniently infused to mitigate the
penalty imposable upon him.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the
accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.
Compiled by: FM3
26. PEOPLE VS CABRERA 43 PHIL 64-PICTURE

Compiled by: FM3
27. US vS. TOLENTINO 5 PHIL 682
Facts:
Aurelio Tolentino, on or about the 14th day of May, 1903, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, did unlawfully
utter seditious words and speeches and did write, publish, and circulate scurrilous libels against the Government
of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which tend to obstruct the lawful officers
of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices, and
which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and which suggest and incite
rebellious conspiracies and riots, and which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb
the peace of the community and the safety and order of the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, which said seditious words and speeches are false and inflammatory, and
tend to incite and move the people to hatred and dislike of the government established by law within the
Philippine Islands, and tend to incite, move, and persuade great numbers of the people of said Philippine Islands to
insurrection, riots, tumults, and breaches of the public peace; which said false, seditious, and inflammatory words
and scurrilous libels are in Tagalog language in a theatrical work written by said Aurelio Tolentino, and which was
presented by him and others on the said 14th day of May, 1903 at the "Teatro Libertad," in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, entitled 'Kahapon Ñgayon at Bukas' (Yesterday, To-day, and Tomorrow). Counsel for the
appellant insists that the intent of the accused to commit the crime with which he is charged does not appear from
the evidence of record, and that the drama is, in itself, a purely literary and artistic production wherein the
legendary history of these Islands and their future, as imagined by the author, are presented merely for the
instruction and entertainment of the public.
Issue: whether the drama or any part of it was of a "scurrilous" nature in the legal acceptation of the word
Held: it was scurrilous in nature. (abusive or defamatory: containing abusive language or defamatory allegations)
Ruling:
We are all agreed that the publication and presentation of the drama directly and necessarily tend to instigate
others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots
and to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the safety
and order of the Government. The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time, place, and
manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and the
Government of the United States. The court is satisfied that the principal object and intent of its author was to
incite the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed resistance to the constituted authorities, and to
induce them to conspire together for the secret organization of armed forces, to be used when the opportunity
presented itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government and setting up another in its stead.
In rebuttable to the defense, the court said that the public presentation of the drama took place in the month of
May, 1903, less than two years after the establishment of the Civil Government. The smouldering embers of a wide-
spread and dangerous insurrection were not yet entirely extinguished, and here and there throughout the Islands
occasional outbreaks still required the use of the armed forces of the Government for their suppression.
Compiled by: FM3
28. ESPUELAS VS. PEOPLE 90 PHIL 524
Facts:
On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had
his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the
limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his
photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general
circulation and other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for
their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide,
Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note, stating his
dismay and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing
his wife his dear wife to write to President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the
government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.
Issue:
Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the Government of the
Philippines?
Held:
Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the legality of the
penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written bybthe accused, cannot fail to impress
thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort
to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to
particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances,
the rationable of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and
his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any
of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the
President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were
naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld.
Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people against
the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may seek to silence the writer. Which is
the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.
The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of
illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the
Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds.
Compiled by: FM3
29. UMIL VS. RAMOS, Supr
ISSUE: Is the petitioner guilty of inciting to sedition?
Ruling:
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State are in the
nature of continuing crimes.—However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of
continuing crimes.
Compiled by: FM3
30. MARTINEZ VS. MORFE 44 SCRA 22
Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional Convention. Both were
facing criminal prosecutions. Martinez was charged for falsification of a public document before the sala of Judge
Jesus Morfe. While Bautista was charged for violation of the Revised Election Code. The two were later arrested,
this is while the Constitutional Convention was still in session. They now assail the validity of their arrest. They
contend that under the 1935 Constitution, they are immune from arrest because the charges upon which they were
arrested are within the immunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.
HELD: No. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise
delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They are accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and
representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from
the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace. In the case at bar, the crimes for which
Martinez and Bautista were arrested fall under the category 0f “breach of peace”. Breach of the peace covers any
offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. Therefore, Martinez and Bautista cannot
invoke the privilege from arrest provision of the Constitution.
NOTE: Under the 1987 Constitution:
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in Congress or in any committee thereof.
Compiled by: FM3
31. PEOPLE VS. BELTRAN 138 SCRA 521
FACTS:
Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran and others were indicted for murder and double attempted murder with direct
assault evidence shows that in Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto Alvarado was bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep.
Passing by the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran shouted at them, "Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your mother).
They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had brought Urbi to his house he went to the
house of Mayor. The newly elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that something should be done about it.
When they came near the compound, they saw appellants and suddenly there was a simultaneous discharge of
gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente, and Mayor also suffered injuries.
I: W/N appellants guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.
H: Yes. considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at
the time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the
community, the finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty. For the double attempted murder with direct
assault, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed on the aforesaid appellants is reduced to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum.
Compiled by: FM3
32. PEOPLE VS. DOLLANTES 151 SCRA 592- PICTURE

Compiled by: FM3
33. ALBERTO and INTIA vs. HON. DE LA CRUZ and ORBITA
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of the respondent Judge directing
petitioners to amend the information filed in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the CFI of Camarines Sur entitled, “People
of the Philippines versus Eligio Orbita”, so as to include as defendants Governor Armando Cledera and Assistant
Provincial Warden Jose Esmeralda of Camarines Sur. In said case, Orbita, a provincial guard, was prosecuted for
infidelity in the custody of a prisoner for the escape of detention prisoner, Pablo Denaque. In the course of the trial,
the defense alleged that Esmeralda received a written note from Gov. Cledera asking him to send in five prisoners
which party included Denaque, who was then under the custody of Orbita, to his house in Taculod, Canaman,
Camarines Sur to work in the construction which made Denaque’s escape possible, and thus, Esmeralda and Gov.
Cledera should be equally guilty of the offense with Orbita.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge erred in equally incriminating Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda with Orbita
for the escape of Pablo Denaque.
HELD/DECISION:
YES. Respondent Judge erred in equally incriminating Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda with Orbita for the
escape of Pablo Denaque. Decision annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge directed to proceed with the trial of
the case.
RATIO:
The offense of delivering prisoners from jails as defined in Article 156 is usually committed by an outsider
who: (1) removes from jail any person therein confined or (2) helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer
who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoners defined and
penalized under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the jailer of the province
and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape of Pablo Denaque
under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code. There is likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution
for conniving with or consenting to evasion under Art. 223, and Art. 224 which punishes evasion through
negligence.
Compiled by: FM3
34. ADELAIDA TANEGA vs. HON. JUDGE MASAKAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner Adelaida Tanega appealed her conviction of the crime of slander to the City Court of Quezon City. Found
guilty once again by the CFI, she was sentenced to suffer 20 days of arresto menor. The CA affirmed her conviction.
The City Court of Quezon City directed that the execution of the sentence be set for 27 January 1965. On
petitioner’s motion, execution was deferred to 12 February 1965 at 8:30 am. At the appointed day and hour,
petitioner failed to appear prompting Respondent Judge Masakayan to issue warrants for her arrest but the former
was never arrested. More than a year later, Petitioner moved to quash the warrants on the ground of prescription
of penalty but such plea was rejected and Respondent Judge issued another warrant of arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty has prescribed.
HELD/DECISION:
No. The penalty has not prescribed. Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
By Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code, light penalties "imposed by final sentence" prescribe in one year. The
period of prescription of penalties — so the succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall commence to run from the
date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". Under Art. 157 of the RPC, the elements of evasion
of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which
consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence. This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence", by
"escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but
another expression of the term "jail breaking". For prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final
sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment. Adverting to the
facts, we have here the case of a convict who — sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment — was thereafter
never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her favor.
Compiled by: FM3
35. PP VS ABILONG 82 PHIL 172- PICTURE

Compiled by: FM3
36. TORRES VS GONZALES 152 SCRA 272
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the condition
that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986,
then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence,
the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that the
Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges
against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.
HELD: The SC affirmed the following:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such
breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of
his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict
had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes
the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who “having been granted conditional pardon
by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to
proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise
of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
Compiled by: FM3
37. PEOPLE VS DIOSO 132 SCRA 616
FACTS: Accused Dioso and Abarca were members of the" Balang Mindanao" gang. While serving their sentence at
the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, they killed their fellow inmates namely: Gomez and Reyno who were
members of Happy Go Lucky gang who have been suspected as authors of the slaying of their gangmate. Both
accused voluntarily surrendered and entered plea of guilty that they inflicted fatal blows while Gomez was lying
down under a mosquito net and Reyno was taking his breakfast. The trial court found them guilty and imposed
death penalty for the crime of murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not a quasi- recidivist who committed murder be imposed a death penalty despite the presence
of mitigating circumstances.
HELD: Yes, a quasi a recidivist who committed murder be imposed a death penalty despite the presence of
mitigating circumstances
RATIO: The Supreme Court ruled that it is thus noted that in their briefs, no attempt was made to impugn the lower
court's conclusion as to their guilt. Instead, they seek attenuation of the death sentence imposed by the trial court
by invoking the circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty. The court finds no necessity to discuss at
length the effects of such mitigating circumstances on the penalty imposed. Suffice it to say that the accused are
quasi-recidivist, having committed the crime charged while serving sentence for a prior offense. As such the
maximum penalty prescribed by law for the felony (murder) is death, regardless of the presence or absence of
mitigating or aggravating circumstance or the complete absence thereof. But for lack of the requisite votes, the
Court is constrained to commute the death sentence imposed on each of the accused to reclusion perpetua.
Compiled by: FM3
38. PEOPLE VS KONG LEON 48 OG 664
Facts:
Kong Leon was accused of counterfeiting and selling illegally fabricated United States gold dollar coins. Gold smith
tools where found inside the “Fitting Room” which was once occupied by a Chinese tailor. On an extra judicially
statement, in the police station, the Kong Leon admitted that he fabricated 8 pieces of finished dollar coins,
unfinished 5 dollar and 2 unfinished 10-dallr pieces. The chemist found that most gold dollar coins confiscated
were genuine except for the above mentioned. He only found 16-17 karat gold whereas a genuine US gold coin
should have 18 karats. The accused asserted here that the coins he counterfeited were already withdrawn from the
circulation pursuant to US Gold Reserve Act of 1934. Thus, he can not be charged of such crime. Therefore, the
accused was charged of Counterfeiting coins of a foreign country (163 (3))
Issue: Can he be charged of counterfeiting of foreign coins?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
Kong Leon claims that the gold coins have been withdrawn from circulation, that have ceased to be a currency of
US within the meaning of RPC 163. However the court held that the law punishing the fabrication is evidently
derived from the Spanish Penal Code. It will be noted that the Spanish text and the local authors maintains the view
that the coins that are subject of the said articles may be a former coins which have been withdrawn by the State or
a foreign coins which have been authorized as currency in the Kingdom.
Compiled by: FM3
39. DEL ROSARIO VS. PEOPLE 3 SCRA 650
Facts:
Del Rosario and two others were accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, and were convicted for illegal
possession of the forged treasury notes. They are now appealing, saying that the notes were counterfeit paper
money manufactured by them, the fact remains that they were genuine treasury notes from the Philippine
government with one of the digits of each having been altered and changed. The defendants were able to secure
Php. 1,700.00. They claim that since that they are genuine treasure notes of the government, the possession cannot
be illegal.
Issue: Is the possession of printed counterfeit paper money made from genuine treasury notes illegal?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
Art 169 provides that the possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines with any of the “figures, letters,
words or signs contained” had been erased or altered, with knowledge of such notes is punishable under Art. 168
Compiled by: FM3
40. PEOPLE VS. GALANO 54 OG 5897
Facts:
Galano was accused of falsification of a one-peso bill when he used that to pay Lilia Cruz for the 4 balut eggs. It was
falsified to look like the the genuine one-peso bill by inscripting the word VICTORY at the back using an ink.
Issue: Can Galano be charged of Falsification
Held: Yes, under Article 169 paragraph 2
Ruling:
The unauthorized addition of the word “Victory” was made for no other purpose than to give to it the appearance
of true legal tender of the current Victory series. Although the bill is no legal tender and It can be presented only to
Central Bank and be exchange of the same value, it still showed the intention to deceive and defraud the
Government in its avowed fully to protect not only the public but also the paper bulls legally issued or authorized
for circulation.
The forgery committed comes under first paragraph (. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument,
payable to bearer or order mentioned therein, the appearance of a true genuine document.)
The court held that this provision does not only contemplate situations where a spurious, false or fake document
or instrument is given the appearance of a true and genuine document, but also situation involving originally true
and genuine documents which have been withdrawn or demonetized or have outlived their usefulness.
Compiled by: FM3
41. PEOPLE VS ROMUALDEZ 57 PHIL 148
FACTS:
• Estela Romualdez was the secretary of Supreme Court Justice Norberto Romualdez (then the head of the Bar
Examination Committee), and by reason of said duty, had under her care the compositions and documents for
the bar examinations of August and September 1926. Luis Mabunay was one of the takers of the said bar
exams.
• During this time there were two separate committees for the bar exam: the Committee of Bar Examiners,
which was in charge of preparing the test questions, and the Committee of Correctors, which was in charge of
reviewing and grading the test booklets.
• Romualdez, together with Mabunay, went through the archives of the Supreme Court, took the compositions
of Mabunay, and erased his grade of 58% in Remedial Law and 63% in Civil Law, and replaced them with
64% and 73%, respectively. The resulting general average of Mabunay became 75% (originally 72.8%), thus
enabling him to pass the bar exam. (Passing grade was 75%).
• A review of Mabunay’s booklets led to the discovery of the alterations. Romualdez admitted that she was the
one who changed the grades, arguing that she had the authority to revise the compositions already reviewed
by the other correctors and to change the grades already given, in her capacity as secretary of the head of the
Bar Exam Committee, as one of the correctors, and also as supervisor of the other correctors. In addition, she
claimed that she corrected said composition without knowing the identity of its owner, and that she had
never met Luis Mabunay prior to the first day of the trial of this case.
• Trial court found Romualdez guilty as principal of the crime of falsification on public and official documents,
while Mabunay was found guilty as an accomplice.
ISSUES:
• WON Estela Romualdez is guilty of falsification of public documents. YES.

• WON the examination papers were public and official documents. (Stated differently, WON the act of altering
the grades in the examination papers constituted a crime). YES.
• WON Romualdez was authorized to make the alterations. NO.
• WON Luis Mabunay was liable of the same crime as an accomplice. NO. He is liable as a conspirator/ co-
principal.
RULES:
• Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister. The penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed 5000 pesos shall be imposed on any public officer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
o x x x (6) Making any alteraction or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning
xxx
• Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of note more than 5000 pesos shall be imposed
upon:
o (1) Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next
preceding article in any public or official document x x x
•
• The phrase “falsification of a document” has a technical meaning and according to Art. 300 (of the Penal
Code) may be committed in the following ways :
o (2) By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did
not in fact so participate
o (3) By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them
o (6) By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.
Compiled by: FM3
ANALYSIS
• YES. The acts of Romualdez are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6 (see Rule). She made the alterations in
such a way as to make it appear that the correctors had participated therein, because she blotted out the
grades of the correctors and wrote the new grades opposite their (the correctors’) initials. She in that way
attributed to the correctors’ statements other than those in fact made by them.
• YES. The examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial function. It cannot therefore be
maintained that the papers submitted by the candidates for the exam were not public and official
documents, or that the alleged alteration was not a crime.
• NO. The Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee was presumed to have discharged his duties in
accordance with the law and it was inconceivable that he would without any warrant of law give or attempt
to give Romualdez the unlimited authority which she claimed to have received, thereby allowing her to
alter the grades as she pleases, without recording or reporting the same. Even if she was given such
authority, she would no longer be allowed to make the alterations because she already knew that the
booklets belonged to Mabunay. She gave no explanation as to why she raised the grades of Mabunay other
than that it was a “happy coincidence”.
• NO. He is liable as a co-principal and conspirator. Mabunay had already failed in two previous bar exams,
making this his third failure. Evidence shows that Mabunay withdrew Php600 from his bank account and
that a few days later, Romualdez deposited Php510 in her own bank account. Both failed to present any
explanation for or proof of the purpose for withdrawing or depositing the said amounts. The alterations
were made AFTER Mabunay had failed (the third time), and he withdrew the money after he had time to
learn from Romualdez that he had failed. Therefore, Romualdez and Mabunay acted in common accord
with the crime.
42. BERADIO VS CA 103 SCRA 567
Facts:
Salud P. Beradio, an election registrar of COMELEC – Pangasinan was charged by one Raymundo Valdez of an
administrative complaint but upon knowledge that she has already resigned filed criminal charges for falsification
of her daily time records. She was convicted of 4 counts of falsification of public or official document by indicating
in her daily time records that she was in the office working but wherein it was established that she was in the
courts as counsel during those particular dates.
Issue: Did she commit falsification of official document penalized under Art. 171, par.4 ?
Held: No, she did not do the act with any criminal intent.
Ruling:
Salud’s position actually exempts her from keeping and submitting the daily time record being an officer who ranks
higher than chiefs and assistants as provided by Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of 1965. Also her appearances
in court are in consonance with the COMELEC’s promotion of their lawyer’s to act as legal counsel because during
that period of martial law there wasn’t much office work for them to do. She was even doing more for benefit of the
public than for her own well-being. Obviously there was no malus animus or criminal intent on her part and does
not cause damage to the government. She merely believed that she had to fill up her daily time cards in order to get
the salary she deserved, for the its purpose is a matter of administrative procedural convenience in the
computation of salary for a given period, characteristically, not an outright and strict measure of professional
discipline, efficiency, dedication, honestly and competence.
Compiled by: FM3
43. LUAGUE VS CA 112 SCRA 97
Facts: Iluminado Luague, died at G.B. Tan Memorial Hospital on January 24, 1972 after he was confined in said
hospital since January 3, 1972. The Bureau of Public Schools sent the deceased’s salary warrants to the
Superintendent of schools who forward them to the District Supervisor, Florencio Guillermo.
The paychecks were delivered; Florencio Guillermo signed the payroll-warrant registers certifying that on
his official oath, each employee whose name appeared on the rolls had received the salary warrant indicated
opposite his name on February 7, 17, and 25, 1972. Pilar Luague, the petitioner, signed the salary checks of her
deceased husband.
Florencio Guillermo claimed that upon discovering his mistake, he asked appellant to return the treasury
warrants issued in the name of her husband Illuminado, further claiming that appellant promised to do so, but
actually did not. Guillermo discovered that the treasury warrants had been encashed by appellant. The appellant
used it to pay debts incurred for the illness and death of her husband.
For signing the name of her husband as payee on three treasury warrants for purpose of endorsement,
appellant stands charged with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Document. The appellant was
charged with 3 counts of estafa thru falsification of document but was convicted of falsification only.
The petitioner contends that she acted in good faith or had no criminal intent when she cashed her
deceased husband’s paychecks.
Issue: WON the petitioner is guilty of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents
Held: No. The petitioner was acquitted.
The Court of Appeals failed to take into account the following facts: That the petitioner signed her husband’s
name to the checks because they were delivered to her by no less than her husband’s district supervisor long after
the husband’s death which was known to the supervisor; that she used the proceeds of the checks to pay for the
expenses of her husband’s last illness and his burial; and that she believed that she was entitled to the money as an
advance payment for her husband’s vacation and sick leave credits the money value of which exceeded the value of
the checks.
Also, there was no damage incurred against the government as the deceased employee deserved the salary
his wife availed of. Even if there was falsification when she signed for her husband, this was done with the
knowledge of her deceased husband’s supervisor that the husband was indeed dead.
Compiled by: FM3
44. CABIGAS VS PEOPLE 152 SCRA 18
Facts:
Dario Cabigas is the Securities Custodian of the Land Bank of the Philippines’ Makati Branch. On 9 March 1982, the
Fund Management Division delivered to him 19 pieces of treasury bills in the denomination of 500,000 pesos each
for safekeeping. After receiving the treasury bills, he reflected the same in the Daily Report on
Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR SDUC). In the course of his inventory on 29 March 1982, he discovered
the loss of six treasury bills with a total value of 3 million pesos. Benedicto Reynes, his co-accused and the
securities receiving clerk, crossed out the last two digits of the serial numbers from 82 to 76 with the notation “for
adjustment” in the 9 March 1982 Securities Delivery Report (SDR) and prepared a draft DR SDUC which stated the
existence of 1,539 pieces of treasury bills. However, Reynes did not follow the draft and instead indicated in the 29
March DR SDUC that only 1,533 treasury bills were in their possession. On 20 May 1982, Rosie Chua was found to
be authenticating with the Central Bank one of the missing treasury bills. Upon investigation of the NBI, it was
discovered that the Branch Manager Aurora Pigram negotiated the missing treasury bills to secure a loan. After the
investigation, Cabigas and Reynes were arrested for falsifying the 9 March SDR and the 30 March DR SDUC.
Informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan for falsification of official documents which acquitted both accused
on the first charge of falsifying the 9 March SDR but convicted Cabigas for his falsification of the 30 Mar DR SDUC.
Issue: Is Cabigas guilty of falsification of official documents?
Held: No. The DR SDUC was not an official document.
Ruling:
The crime of falsification by an employee in Article 171 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads “by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts” has four elements. These are: 1) that the offender makes in a
document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; 2) that he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the
facts narrated by him; 3) that the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and 4) that the perversion of
truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
In this case, it appeared that the elements were not present. The correction of the figure from 1,539 to 1,533 was
not falsification because it was made to speak the truth. The adjustment was not made to conceal the fact that six
treasury bills were missing and the evidence disclosed that he immediately reported such loss to the branch
manager and showed good faith and lack of motive on his part. Also, the Solicitor General agreed with Cabigas that
the DR SDUC was not an official form of the Land Bank or was required by law. It was a form he initiated for his
own reference purposes and therefore he was not under legal obligation to disclose or reveal the truth. In the
absence of such obligation and the alleged wrongful intent, Cabigas was acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt.
Compiled by: FM3
45. PEOPLE VS SANDAYDIEGO 81 SCRA 120
Facts:
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969 Licerio P.
Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a
lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice,
used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of
P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE OR SERVICE"
the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed by two officials of the
provincial engineer's office and by the governor's representative.
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs.
Paragraph 1 is a certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that the
expenses "were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed presumably
because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects. Paragraph 2 is a certification that
the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is signed by the provincial engineer. Paragraph 3
contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds being available therefore."
This is signed by the provincial treasurer. Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No.
10724 dated February 28, 1969, certifying that the voucher has been pre-audited and signed by the auditor.
Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the provincial
engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is chargeable as shown in the
summary hereof. " It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs two part of the voucher.
Issue:
Whether or not appellants are liable for the crimes of falsicification of public documents and six crimes of
malversation?
Held:
Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six crimes of malversation. In lieu of the
penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties: For each of the six falsification of
the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison
correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a
fine of three thousand pesos. For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh.
K), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of P16,727.52, and
to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO. 23349, L-33252). For the
malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23351, L-33254). For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60
covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of
prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a
fine of P6,290.60, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-
33253). For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson is sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of
reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan
in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by
voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of
P5,187.28, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same
amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold
limit provided for in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677),
meaning that the maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
Compiled by: FM3
years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51) years
(see People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533). The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years
(Penultimate par. of art. 70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69
Phil. 58).
The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the sum of
P57,048.23. Samson and the said estate are solitarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code).
Samson should pay one-half of the costs. SO ORDERED.
Compiled by: FM3
46. SIQUIAN VS PEOPLE 171 SCRA 223
Facts:
Manuel L. Siquian took advantage of his position as Municipal Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela by preparing and
signing a false document, knowing it to be false. This was an official communication to the Civil Service
Commissioner, which is required by law in order to support the appointment of Jesusa B. Carreon to the position of
clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary. In truth, there was no such a position existing and that there were no
funds available for it.
Earlier, Jesusa and her friends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask if there was any vacany for
employment, and she was informed, she went to see the Mayor. She was accompanied by the mayor to the Office of
the Municipal Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. Emilio, however, was not there. Even so, the mayor told her to report
for work the following day and that she should be included in the budget. She was then brought to the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer, of which the treasurer agreed that she could report for work.
As early as October 1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to receive her salary, but she was told that there
was no money yet. In November 1975, she went to see the mayor, but he told her to see the treasurer. She went to
the treasurer who told her that there was no money. Because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at
the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask regarding her unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty. Efren
Ambrosia Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she had complete appointment papers. She then
addressed her complaint to Governor Faustino N. Dy. Then when she filed a case, the court found the mayor guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of public document.
Issue:
1. Should the Supreme Court affirm the lower courts’ decision of having convicted him of falsification of public
document? Held: No.
2. Is there absence of criminal intent on the part of the mayor? Held: Intent is not a requisite of this crime.
Ruling:
It is immaterial whether or not the Civil Service Commissioner, to whom the certification was addressed, received
the document issued by the mayor. Since the certification was prepared by him in accordance with the standard
forms prescribed by the government (specifically the Civil Service Commission) pursuant to law, the certification
was invested with the character of a public document, falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The requisite of absolute falsity of the statement was met. The Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to enact the
annual budget of the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal
year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted. For the Fiscal Year 1974-1975, there is no such position as Clerk to the
Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary. The second element of the offense is likewise present.
Under the Guidelines in the Preparation of Appointment for Original Appointment, a certification of the availability
of funds for the position to be filled up is required to be signed by the head of office or any officer who has been
delegated the authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law to issue this certification, the mayor has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts which includes information as to the availability of the funds for the
position being filled up. Wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential
element of this crime. In falsification of public documents, the controlling consideration is the public character of a
document and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage
becomes immaterial.
Compiled by: FM3
47. PEOPLE VS VILLALON 192 SCRA 521-picture

Compiled by: FM3
48. PEOPLE VS DAVA 202 SCRA 62
FACTS: Michael Dava bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas Clamor and Dolores E. Roxas, causing death to former
and physical injuries to the latter. As a consequence, his driver's license was confiscated and he was charged with
homicide and serious physical injuries. One day, the brother of Bernadette and the father of Dolores, saw Dava
driving a Volkswagen. Knowing that Dava's driver's license was used as an exhibit in court and that no traffic
violation receipt had been issued to Dava,
they had Dava apprehended for driving without a license. When he was apprehended, he showed the police officers
a non-professional driver's license No. 2706887 with official receipt No. 0605870 issued by Agency Pampanga in
the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of his license, Dava informed them that his officemate
(Manalili) had secured it for him. He was brought to the police station and charged w falsification of a public
document. Prosecution witnesses: Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT). He testified that the license was earlier brought to him and he was asked whether it was
fake or genuine. He examined it and found that it was "fake or illegally issued" because form No. 2706887 was one
of the 50 forms which had been reported missing from their office sometime in November, 1976 and that it was
never issued to any applicant for a license. He added that any license that was not included their office index card
was considered as "coming from illegal source' and "not legally issued by any
agency." Although the form used for the license was genuine, the signature of the issuing official was fake. Defense
witness: Manalili. He said he obtained the license by paying fixers
ISSUE: WON Dava can be convicted of falsification? – YES
RATIO: Elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial
proceed penalized under the last paragraph of Article 172) are following: (a) the offender knew that a document
was falsified by another person; (b) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1
and 2 of Article 172; (c) he used such document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d) the use of the false document
caused damage to another or at last it was used with intent to cause such damage. Except for last, all of these
elements have been proven beyond reason doubt in this case.
a. Petitioner himself requested officemate Manalili to get him a license. He misrepresented to Manalili that he has
not at any time been issued a driver's license. Through this misrepresentation petitioner was ableto induce
Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing the subject driver's license.
b. A driver's license is a public document. The blank form of the drivers license becomes a public document the
moment it is accomplished. Thus, when driver's license No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner's personal data
and the signature of the region of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the same was
simulated, the driver's license became a public document.
c. When petitioner was apprehended he presented the license to the officer. Because he was a detailman who did
his job with the use of a car, it is probable that he’s been using the license.
d. The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to another person or
at least an intent to cause such damage has become immaterial. In falsification of public or official documents, the
principal thing being punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed
therein.
Compiled by: FM3
49. PEOPLE VS CORTEZ 73 OG 10056
Facts:
The Cortez introduced himself to Mrs. Reyes as a BIR Agent by showing an ID card in the name of S. Begunia
together with other BIR Papers. He was telling Mrs. Reyes that he will inspect the books of accounts and receipts of
the shop, but will do away with the procedure of she will pay him P400 as a fee.
Therefore, Mrs. Reyes went to BIR and verified the identity of this BIR Agent and found out that Cortez as Begunia
was a fake BIR Agent. Thus, they came out with an entrapment plan to catch Cortez. The day when Mr. Cortez
returned to the shop to get his P400, he ws arrested and convicted of the complex crime of robbery thru
usurpation of authority and with the use of falsified public document.
Issue: Is the conviction for the said compex crim proper?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
The court agreed with the conviction under 172 (Falsification of Public Document by Private Individial0 and Article
177 ( Usurpation of authority) however, the court did not agree that the crime robbery with violence or
intimidation was committed. The element of intimidation or violence was lacking in this case because she already
knew that Mr. Cortez is a fake BIR Agent and she freely gave the marked money as part of the entrapment plan.
Therefore, the crome is complex crime of usurpation of authority thru falsification of a public document by a
private individual. In this case falsification was the means employed by the accused to perpetrate the crime of
usurpation.
Compiled by: FM3
50. GIGANTONI VS PEOPLE 162 SCRA 158
Facts:
On 14 May 1981, Melencio Gigantoni, then an employee of a private company named Black Mountain Mining Inc.,
went to the Philippine Air Lines office and falsely represented himself as a PC-CIS agent. There, he showed his
identification card showing that he was an agent and upon such belief, the PAL legal officers issued to him his
requested records. After he left, the PAL lawyers became suspicious of his real identity and verified with the PC-CIS
if he was really agent. They then found out that he was dismissed from the service since 30 June 1980 for gross
misconduct brought about by the extortion charges filed against him and his final conviction by the Sandiganbayan.
The next day, he was arrested by the NBI when he returned to the PAL office and admitted that he was no longer
with the CIS. He was charged with usurpation of authority and was later convicted by the Makati RTC. Upon appeal
at the Supreme Court, he claimed that he could not be guilty of the charge since at that time, he was still a CIS agent
who was merely suspended. He denied receiving the notice of dismissal effective 20 June 1980 but was only aware
of the notice of his suspension dated 23 June 1980.
Issue: Did Gigantoni knowingly and falsely represent himself as an agent of the CIS?
Held: No. The prosecution did not prove that he was aware of his dismissal during the said act of
misrepresentation.
Ruling:
Usurpation of authority under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who knowingly and
falsely represents himself to be an officer, agent, or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine
government or any foreign government.
In this case, there was no evidence by the prosecution showing that the dismissal was actually conveyed to
Gigantoni. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to prove that he was duly notified of his dismissal from the service
negates the charge that he knowingly and falsely represented himself to be a CIS agent. The burden of proof of the
offense charged lies with the prosecution. It is essential to present proof that he actually knew at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense that he was already dismissed from the service. Therefore, Gigantoni was
acquitted.
On the claim of the Solicitor General that it made no difference if he was suspended or dismissed because both
implied the absence of power to represent himself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office
to which he was knowingly deprived of [usurpation of official functions], the Court held that the Gigantoni was
charged only for knowingly and falsely representing himself to be a CIS agent [usurpation of authority]. It has not
been shown that the information given by PAL was confidential and was given to him only because he was entitled
to it as part of the exercise of his official function. It was shown that it was readily made available to him because
they believed at that time that he was a CIS agent.
Compiled by: FM3
51. LEGAMIA VS IAC 131 SCRA 478
Facts:
Corazon Legamia lived with Emilo N. Reyes for 19 years. Throughout the time they lived with each other, Corazon
was known as Corazon L. Reyes, because she and he introduced her as such to friends. When Emilio died, Corazon
filed a letter claim in behalf of Michael, their child, with the Agricultural Credit Admin for death benefits. She signed
the letter as Corazon L. Reyes. Felicisima Reyes, who was married to Emiilio filed a complaint which led to
Corazon's prosecution.
Issue: Is Corazon guilty of using a fictitious name?
Held: No
Ruling:
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name of the man
she is living with despite the fact that he may be married to another woman. Corazon publicly holds herself out as
the man's wife and uses his family name. Thus, it is in the light of the cultural environment that the law must be
construed and that the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done.
Compiled by: FM3
52. DIAZ VS PEOPLE 191 SCRA 86
Facts:
Reolandi Diaz sought for appointment as School Administrative Assistant I in Jose Abad Santos High School. In his
application he indicated that his highest educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B. (Liberal Arts) allegedly
pursued or obtained at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges, respectively, during the years 1950 to 1954
inclusive.
But it was found that he was never enrolled at the Cosmopolitan and Harvadian Colleges. Certification from the
school revealed that he never enrolled in the said school both in Tondo and San Fernando, Pampanga. The name of
petitioner was not included in all the enrollment lists of college students submitted to the then Bureau of Private
Schools of the Department of Education by the Harvardian Colleges at San Fernando, Pampanga and at Tondo,
Manila, during the period during which petitioner claimed to have been enrolled. The same thing is true with the
list submitted by the Cosmopolitan Colleges to the said bureau.
He only presented transcript of record signed by Mrs. Virginia King vda. de Yap, for and in behalf of the then
President of the school, Ildefonso Yap. But Mrs. Virginia Yap, disowned the said signature. Besides, at the bottom
portion of the transcript is a printed notation reading — this is only valid with the college seal and signature of
Pres. Ildefonso D. Yap. Exhibit "I" lacks the imprint of the college seal and the signature of President Ildefonso Yap
himself.
With foregoing facts, the lower court convicted him of crime of falsification of official document penalized under
Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code
Issue: Is the crime of falsification of official document correct?
Held: No. He committed perjury
Ruling:
Based on the facts, evidently the statement made by accused is devoid of truth. The records of these colleges do not
at all reveal that petitioner was even enrolled at any time from 1950 to 1954 in its College of Liberal Arts. His name
does not appear and could not be found in the enrollment lists submitted to the Bureau of Private Schools by these
colleges. The transcript presented lacks the authenticating marks-the imprint of the college seal and the signature
of the President of the college. His defense failed to present any corroborating piece of evidence which will show
that he was indeed enrolled
The elements of the crime of perjury are —
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
Compiled by: FM3
53. OUANO VS CA 188 SCRA 799-picture

Compiled by: FM3
54. PEOPLE VS KOTTINGER 45 PHIL 352
FACTS: Accused Kottinger's camera business store was raided. Among the materials confiscated were some
pictures that show Filipino inhabitants in their native dress. Using these items, he was charged of violating section
12 of Act No. 277, the Philippine Libel Law. His pictures were being used as post cards of the non-Christian natives
of the country.
HELD: (Malcolm, J.) Although Philippine laws do not define what obscenity means, the Court defined obscene or
obscenity as "something offensive to chastity, decency, or delicacy." There are two tests whether something is
obscene: (1) whether it corrupts the mind of the viewers to such immoral influences, or (2) it shocks the ordinary
and common sense of men as an indecency. In the case at bar, the pictures merely portrayed the inhabitants in
their native dress as testified by a UP Professor. Moreover, there are pictures of similar nature which are imported
and circulated in the Philippines, such as a book about the Ifugaos. As such, the pictures were not obscene within
the meaning of the law.
55. PEOPLE VS APARICI 52 OG 249
FACTS: Accused Aparici was charged with obscenity. The accused was caught while performing in a theater
wearing nylon patches to cover her breasts and nylon panty. She avers that she was performing an artistic hula-
hula dance to portray a widow who lost her husband after being killed by the Japanese. However, the crowd
watching were howling and cheering to continue her performance because they were sexually aroused.
HELD: The accused was found guilty. The test of obscenity here is the reaction of the crowd. Regarding the defense
that the crowd was of the lower class, there was no proof. Moreover, it doesn't matter what class the crowd
belonged. What is important is that they were induced or encourage to think of immoral acts.
Compiled by: FM3
56. PEOPLE VS PADAN 101 PHIL 749
Facts:
The accused exhibited immoral scenes and acts in one of the Manila nightclubs. Moreover, the manager and ticket
collector were also part of the accused for hiring the women to perform sexual intercourse in the presence of many
spectators.
They were charged with a violation of the RPC Article 201 in the trial court. All pleaded not guilty. One of the
accused however, changed her mind and pleaded guilty. All were convicted. The evidence of the lewd show was
confiscated.
The accused filed an appeal in the Supreme Court. 2 of the appellants, manager Fajardo and ticket collector Yabut,
failed to file their briefs within the period prescribed by law and their appeal was dismissed by resolution of this
Court of November 25, 1955, and the decision as to them became final and executory on January 7, 1956.
The defendant who pleaded guilty, Marina Padan, in her appeal did not question her conviction; she merely urged
the reduction of the penalty by eliminating the prison sentence. The Supereme Court did not consider this because
the trial court judge reduced the fine from 600 to 200.
Issue: Were the acts obscene and thereby punishable by Art 201 of the RPC?
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
This is the first time that the courts in this jurisdiction, have been called upon to take cognizance of an offense
against morals and decency of this kind. We have had occasion to consider offenses like the exhibition of still
moving pictures of women in the nude, which we have condemned for obscenity and as offensive to morals. In
those cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of art; that connoisseurs of the same, and
painters and sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in the nude, or the human body exhibited
in sheer nakedness.
But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it,
there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to
public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence
specially on the youth of the land. We repeat that because of all this, the penalty imposed by the trial court on
Marina, despite her plea of guilty, is neither excessive nor unreasonable.
On the appeal of Fajardo, he claimed that he was an innocent bystander but that because of his popularity in the
neighborhood, he was requested by the spectators to select the man and the woman to engage or indulge in the
actual act of coitus before the spectators. After making the selection, he did not even care to witness the act but left
the scene and returned to it only when he heard a commotion produced by the raid conducted by the police.
The evidence on his active participation and that he was the manager and one in charge of the show is however
ample, even conclusive. In 1953, the place used for ping-pong was used for an exhibition of human "fighting fish",
the actual act of coitus or copulation. Tickets were sold at P3 each, and the show was supposed to begin at 8:00
o'clock in the evening.
The Manila Police Department must have gotten wind of the affair; it bought tickets and provided several of its
members who later attended the show, but in plain clothes, and after the show conducted a raid and made arrests.
At the trial, said policemen testified as to what actually took place inside the building. About two civilians who
attended the affair gave testimony as to what they saw.
The customers not provided with tickets actually paid P3 at the entrance to defendant Ernesto Reyes. He also
collected tickets. In all, there were about ninety paying customers, while about sixteen were allowed to enter free,
presumably friends of the management. Jose Fajardo y Garcia was clearly the manager of the show. He was at the
door to see to it that the customers either were provided with tickets or paid P3.00 entrance fee. He even asked
them from whom they had bought the tickets. He ordered that an army steel bed be placed at the center of the
floor, covered with an army blanket and provided with a pillow. Once the spectators, about 106 in number, were
crowded inside that small building, the show started.
Besides, as found by the trial court and as shown by some of the tickets collected from the spectators, submitted as
exhibits, said tickets while bearing on one side superimposed with rubber stamped name "Pepe Fajardo," which
defendant Fajardo admits to be his name.
Considering all the above circumstances, we agree with the trial court that Jose Fajardo is the most guilty of the
four, for he was the one who conducted the show and presumably derived the most profit or gain from the same.
Compiled by: FM3
57. FERNANDO VS CA GR NO 159751
FACTS:
the National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital Region (PNP-CIDG NCR)
conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair).
Judge Perfecto Laguio issued a search warrant against Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain Warren Tingchuy. The
warrant ordered the search of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair and the seizure of obscene pictures and
pornographic shows.
After searching the premises and confiscating twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazines, which
they deemed pornographic, Petitioners with Warren Tingchuy, were charged for selling and exhibiting obscene
copies of x-rated VHS Tapes pursuant to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not obscenity is a ground for the State to exercise its police power to restrain the Constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.
HELD:
Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is hereby affirmed.
OBITER DICTUM:
Obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to
protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation or
limitation. Obscenity as defined in People v. Kottinger, is something which is offensive to chastity, decency or
delicacy.
In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings.
Pictures of men and women in the nude doing the sexual act appearing in the nine (9) confiscated magazines and
two (2) issues of QUI are offensive to morals and are made and shown not for the sake of art but rather for
commercial purposes, that is gain and profit as the exclusive consideration in their exhibition. The pictures in the
magazine exhibited indecent and immoral scenes and acts. The exhibition of the sexual act in their magazines is but
a clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency and an offense to public morals, inspiring lust and lewdness, exerting
a corrupting influence especially on the youth.
Compiled by: FM3
58. MANIPON VS SANDIGANBAYAN 143 SCRA 267
Facts:
Accused of Direct Bribery Manipon is a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and he was
tasked to enforce an order by the Minister of Labor directing him to garnish the bank account of Harry Dominguez.
Dominguez, a building contractor, had been order by the labor arbiter to pay Tabek and other judgment creditors.
Manipon garnished the bank accounts and yet did not immediately report back to the labor arbiter. Dominguez
later sought Manipon's help expressing interest that he needed to make a withdrawal from his account. Manipon
then implied that if he were bribed he would help Dominguez. They agreed, yet unknown to Manipon, Dominguez
confided to the authorities (Col. Sanchez) and a plan was hatched to entrap Manipon by paying him with marked
money.
On the day of the execution, Manipon delivered his letter to the bank lifting the garnishment. With that done,
Dominguez made a withdrawal for Php. 1000 and gave it to Manipon. Manipon was later picked up by the
authorities. Manipon for his defense, claims that Dominguez caries a grudge against him and that was what
prompted him to set him up. Also, that the collection made by Dominguez was payment in partial satisfaction of the
judgment under execution to which the judgment creditors headed by Tabek had agreed to.
Issue: Is Manipon guilty of Direct Bribery?
Held: Yes
Ruling:
The overt acts of Manipon do not add up to his defense. First, for such an important agreement, there is no written
document proving Manipon's defense. Secondly, if there existed distrust between the two, why did they not have
the agreement in writing? Thirdly, the very fact that Manipon did not immediately report to the labor arbiter over
his accomplishment of the task of garnishment makes his behavior at the very beginning irregular.
Compiled by: FM3
59. DACUMAS VS SANDIGANBAYAN 195 SCRA 833
The Court has carefully considered the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings and finds no reason for
reversing the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner of direct bribery.
As found by the respondent court, the petitioner, a revenue examiner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue stationed at San
Pablo City, offered to settle the tax liability of R. Revilla Interiors, in the amount of P73,307.31 by pulling out its
assessments papers from the office of the BIR Commissioner and procuring a tax clearance. For such service, he would
require a fee of P35,000.00 (later reduced to P30,000.00). Gregorio Samia, the manager of the firm, pretended to go
along with him but reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation, which arranged an entrapment. This was
effected on October 28, 1986, near the Rizal Cafe in Makati. Samia, meeting with the petitioner there, told him he had
only P1,000.00 then but would deliver P9,000.00 to him that same evening at his residence and pay the balance of
P20,000.00 in November. The petitioner wrote his address on the back of a receipt, which he gave Samia. Samia
tendered the white envelope containing P1,000.00 previously dusted with fluorescent powder, but the petitioner
accepted it only when they had left the eatery and he was nearing his car outside. He put the envelope in his pocket. The
NBI agents closed in, identified themselves, and place him under arrest. The petitioner's reaction was to draw out the
envelope and throw it on the ground. One of the agents retrieved it. At the NBI headquarters, the petitioner's hands were
found positive for fluorescent powder, as so were the envelope itself and the bills inside.
The petitioner claims the charges against him were fabricated. He argues inter alia that he could not have promised to
remove the assessment papers from the Commissioner's office as he had no access to that place; that at the time of his
supposed offer the tax liability of the firm had not yet been ascertained and that in any case the percentage tax imposed
on it was mandatory and not subject to adjustment. He stresses that as a tax examiner with 29 years service he would
not have been "so crude and so rash" as to demand money from Samia whom he barely knew. He said he had met Samia
at the Rizal Cafe only because the latter was "irritatingly insistent" on securing his help regarding the firm's tax amnesty.
It was Samia who had urged the envelope on him but he had rejected it twice, first when they were at the restaurant and
later when they were outside. He also faults the respondent court for misappreciating the evidence and for obvious bias
in favor of the prosecution.
The issues he raises are mainly factual. The petitioner has not shown that the findings thereon of the respondent court
are tainted with arbitratriness or are not supported by substantial evidence. His charge that he was "framed" because
Samia resented his refusal to be bribed is not convincing. It is belied by his proven acts. The implausibility of his
promises does not mean they were not made or that they did not appear to be credible, coming as they did from one
with his long experience in the BIR and appeared to know his way around. The Court finds it especially remarkable that
he met Samia at a private place instead of his office at the BIR, considering that they were supposed to be discussing
official business and it was Samia who he says was requesting his assistance.
It was within the discretion of the respondent court to weigh the evidence of the parties and to admit such of it as it
regarded as credible and reject those that it considered perjurious or fabricated Every trial court must have that leeway.
If the Sandiganbayan chose to believe Samia and not the petitioner or Exhibit F-1, the NBI report, rather than Exhibit 5,
the petitioner's alleged assessment report, this would not necessarily prove that its decision was biased and arbitrary.
The Court is not inclined to believe that Samia would be so vindictive as to falsely incriminate the petitioner with the
serious charge of bribery simply because the petitioner refused to reduce the tax assessment of R. Revilla Interiors.
Samia was not even directly involved in the assessment. As for Exhibit 5, the respondent court cannot be faulted for not
accepting it in the absence of corroboration that the petitioner actually filed it only on October 17, 1986 (to show that he
could not have offered to reduce the assessment of the taxpayer company earlier in September, as alleged). On the other
hand, the technical report on the test conducted by the NBI for fluorescent powder on the petitioner's hands invited easy
acceptance.
While protesting his innocence, the petitioner has failed to rebut the evidence of the prosecution that has sufficiently
established his guilt and shifted the burden of proof to him. He has not discharged that burden by just contending that
the decision is based on "speculations, conjectures and assumptions" and that the conclusions drawn therefrom are
"mistaken, absurd and fallacious." The thrust of his defense is that the respondent court should have believed him
instead of the People, but he has not convinced us that the trial court has erred. In short, he has failed to prove, in this
petition for certiorari where only questions of law may be raised, that he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction.
The petitioner seems to be suggesting in the conclusion to his petition that judgment was rendered against him because
he happens to be a tax collector, whom he says "history, even from Biblical times, depicts . . . as the most unpopular and
vilified adjunct of any society." The plea does not persuade. It suffices to observe that he was convicted not because he is
a tax collector but because he accepted a bribe.
We find, on the basis of the evidence of record, that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome and
that the guilt of the petitioner has been established beyond reasonable doubt. ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision is
AFFIRMED and the petition DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
Compiled by: FM3
60. LABATAGOS VS SANDIGANBAYAN 183 SCRA 415
FACTS: Labatagos was the cashier and collecting officer of the Mindanao State University. She filed a leave of
absence and did not discharge her duties for the said period. When COA conducted the examination, the petitioner
did not have any cash in her possession, so she was asked to produce all her records, books of collection, copies of
official receipts and remittance advices and her monthly reports of collections. Petitioner incurred shortages. The
accused Labatagos was charged and convicted of malversation of public funds after she failed to explain the
shortages of the amount she remitted to the bank. It was found out that there were discrepancies in the
remittances.
ISSUE: WON Labagtos is guilty of the crime of Malversation.
HELD: YES. Conviction upheld.
Her claim that she signed the audit report and statement of collections and deposits prepared by the audit
team of Francisco Rivera on the understanding that her shortage was only P2,000.00 is belied by the figures clearly
reflected on the said documents. Mrs. Ester Guanzon, the prosecution’s rebuttal witness, confirmed that the
accused filed application for maternity leave in March 1978 but continued reporting for work during that month
and that she (Guanzon) was the one assigned to collect the fees in her stead. When the accused was physically
absent from office, she also turned over her collections to the accused in the latter’s house with the duplicate
copies of the receipts she issued which the accused signed after satisfying herself that the amounts turned over
tallied with the receipts. All the other sums allegedly taken from the accused by Director Osop, Alikhan
Marohombsar and Auditor Casan supported as they are by mere pieces of paper, despite the admission by Director
Osop of having signed some of them were not valid disbursements. Granting that the amounts reflected in the chits
were really secured by the persons who signed them, the responsibility to account for them still rests in the
accused accountable officer.
Regarding her defense that she was made to believe that she incurred only a small amount as shortage, the
evidence shows that she signed documents showing that it was a large amount. Moreover, her claim that she was
on maternity leave is belied by a witness who testified that she still continued working even after filing a maternity
leave
RATIO: Malversation consists not only of misappropriation or conversion of public funds or property to
one’s personal use but also by knowingly allowing others to make use of or misappropriate the same.
61. ESTEPA VS SANDIGANBAYAN 182 SCRA 269-PICTURE

Compiled by: FM3
62. ILOGON VS SANDIGANBAYAN 218 SCRA 766
Facts:
Calinoco Ilogon was the acting Postmaster of the Bureau of Posts in Cagayan de Oro City and also performed the
task of a cashier from July 1978 to January 1986. On 19 Sep 1983, the Commission on Audit conducted an
examination of the cash and accounts under his possession and showed that he incurred a shortage of
₱118,003.10. He was charged with Malversation of Public Funds and was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan. He
raised the defense that the shortage was brought about by vales (cash advances) in payments of salaries that he
granted to his co-employees. He also argued that he never misappropriated the amount for his own personal use
and has since fully settled the same.
Issue: Is Ilogon guilty of the crime malversation of public funds?
Held: Yes. He was not in the possession of the money when the demand was made.
Ruling:
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received
public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when demand was made. There is even no need of
direct evidence of personal misappropriation as long as there is a shortage in his account and he cannot explain the
same. The fact that his immediate superiors acquiesced to his prating of giving out cash advances for convenience
did not legalize the distribution. His ability to fully settle the shortage is of no moment. At best, it is only a
mitigating circumstance.Also, the granting of vales which constituted the bulk of the shortage was a violation of the
postal rules and regulations. Postmasters are only allowed to use their collections to pay money orders, telegraphic
transfers and withdrawals from the proper depository bank whenever their cash advances for the purpose are
exhausted.
Compiled by: FM3
63. AZARCON VS SANDIGANBAYAN 268 scra 747
Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services
were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks
were left at the former’s premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property wasissued by BIR commanding one of its Regional
Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of JaimeAncla, a sub-contractor of
accused Azarcon and a delinquenttaxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by
accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession
owned byAncla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made representations to
retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said
property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that
Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17
yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently denied
by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a custodian of
distrained property.
Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only
instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges
the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has
been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public
officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a
public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the
truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he
obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law
nor by competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck,
the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appointAzarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power
authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a
public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.
Compiled by: FM3
64. RODILLAS VS SANDIGANBAYAN 161 SCRA 347
FACTS: Accused Rodillas was charged with infidelity in the custody of prisoners. The accused, a police officer, was
tasked with the custody of a detention prisoner charged with the crime of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. After
the hearing, the husband of the accused sought permission from the accused to have lunch with the detainee. The
accused consented. Later on, the detainee asked to go to the comfort room. After 10 minutes, the accused became
suspicious and entered the comfort room. Thereafter, he realized that the detainee had already escaped.
HELD/RATIO:
The accused was found guilty. In the crime of infidelity in the custody of prisoners, the offender may be liable even
if he acted negligently or even if he did not connive with the prisoner.
It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary precautions to assure the absence
of any means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions will make his act one of definite laxity or
negligence amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty. His tolerance of arrangements whereby the prisoner
and her companions could plan and make good her escape should have aroused the suspicion of a person of
ordinary prudence.
Compiled by: FM3
65. PEOPLE VS JUMAWAN 116 SCRA 739
Facts: A complaint for murder was filed in the Municipal Court of Sariaya, Quezon, on July 19, 1976, by Station
Commander Sisenando P. Alcantara, Jr. against Francisco Jumawan, Cesario Jumawan, Manuel Jumawan and
Presentacion Jumawan for the death of Rodolfo Magnaye. (Stabbing him with a bolo in the chest)
Rodolfo Magnaye was married to Presentacion Jumawan but they had been living separately from each other.
(During the trial Presentacion admitted her marriage to Rodolfo. – simper praesumitur matrimonio) The Station
Commander can perhaps be excused for not accusing Presentacion of parricide but when the case was elevated to
the Court of First Instance (RTC) of Quezon where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1408, the Provincial
Fiscal perpetuated the mistake by filing an information for murder against all the accused.
Issue: Whether or not Presentacion Jumawan- Magnaye should be convicted of Parricide?
Ruling: No, Wife of victim cannot be convicted of parricide if charged only with murder. However, relationship
must be considered aggravating even if not alleged in the information.—Presentacion should have been accused of
parricide but as it is, since her relationship to the deceased is not alleged in the information, she, like the others,
can be convicted of murder only qualified by abuse of superior strength. Although not alleged in the information,
relationship as an aggravating circumstance should be assigned against the appellants. True, relationship is
inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of murder. And as to the others, the relationships of
father-in-law and brother-in-law aggravate the crime.
Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her relationship to the deceased is not alleged
in the information, she, like the others, can be convicted of murder only qualified by abuse of superior strength.
Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should be assigned against
the appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of murder. And as to
the others, the relationships of father-in-law and brother-in-law aggravate the crime.
The penalty for murder with an aggravating circumstances is death. However, for lack of necessary votes, the
penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Compiled by: FM3
66. PEOPLE VS TOMOTORGO 136 SCRA 238
FACTS: Magdalena de los Santos, the wife of Jaime Tomotorgo, had been persistently asking her husband to sell the
conjugal home and that their family transfer to the house of her husband's in-laws. Tomotorgo would not accede to
his wife's request. He did not like to abandon the house wherein he and his wife were then living. Furthermore, he
had no inclination to leave because he has many plants and improvements on the land which he was then farming.
On June 23, 1977, at about seven o'clock in the morning, the accused left his home to work on his farm Upon his
return, he found his wife and his three-month old baby already gone. He finally saw his wife carrying his infant son
and bringing a bundle of clothes some 200m away from their home. He asked and pleaded with his wife that she
should return home with their child but she adamantly refused to do so. When appellant sought to take the child
from his wife, the latter threw the baby on the grassy portion of the trail hereby causing the latter to cry. This
conduct of his wife aroused the ire of the herein accused. Incensed with wrath and his anger beyond control,
appellant picked lip a piece of wood nearby and started hitting his wife with it until she fell to the ground
complaining of severe pains on her chest. Realizing what he had done, the accused picked his wife in his arms and
brought her to their home. He then returned to the place where the child was thrown and he likewise took this
infant home. Soon thereafter, Magdalena de los Santos died despite the efforts of her husband to alleviate her pains.
After the accused changed the dress of his wife, he reported the tragic incident to the Barangay Captain of their
place who brought him to Policeman Arellosa to whom the accused surrendered. He also brought with him the
piece of wood he used in beating his wife.
He was charged with parricide and pleaded not guilty. Upon realizing the gravity of his offense, he changed his plea
to guilty. The court found him guilty of parricide but with three mitigating circumstances – voluntary surrender,
plea of guilty and that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and
obfuscation.
He was given the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant claims that the court handed him the wrong punishment.
Appellant claims that article 49 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the proper applicable penalty when the crime
committed is different from what was intended. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed is higher than
the offense which the accused wanted to commit, the penalty corresponding to the later shall be imposed as the
maximum period. Appellant avers that the penalty for the felony committed by him – parricide – was higher than
that which he intended to commit – physical injuries.
ISSUE: W/N accused is guilty of physical injuries only and not parricide.
HELD: NO
RATIO: Accused is guilty of parricide. Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code expressly states that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act be different from that which
he intended and that the accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious acts.
Article 49 of the RPC does not apply to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the
offender result from his felonious act because under Art. 4 (1) of the same code, he is liable for all the direct and
natural consequences of his unlawful act. His lack of intentiosn to commit a grave wrong is at best mitigating.
The reference made by the accused to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code which prescribes graduated
penalties for the corresponding physical injuries committed is entirely misplaced and irrelevant considering that in
this case the victim died very soon after she was assaulted. The court held that the fact that the appellant intended
to maltreat the victim only or inflict physical imjuries does not exempt him from liability for the resulting and more
serious crime committed.
Compiled by: FM3
67. PEOPLE VS ABARCA 153 SCRA 735
FACTS: On July 15, 1984, upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of
sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his
revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away. The
accused went to look for a firearm. He went to the house of C2C Arturo Talbo and got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle,
and went back to his house. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session"
as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three
times with his rifle. Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room
where Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused. Kingsley Koh died instantaneously
as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen. Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and
operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet. His wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she was
hit by bullet fragments. The trial court then found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of murder with double frustrated murder.
The accused then contended that the trial court erred in convicting him for the crime charged instead of entering a
judgment of conviction under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Article 247 can be applied in the case

2) Whether or not the accused is liable for the injuries suffered by third persons
HELD:
1) Yes. Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant
discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the
shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant.
The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . .
immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the
killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing
should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by
external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
2) No. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one
committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act done
amounts to a felony. But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not
committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. The court cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for
the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
RATIO: There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in
the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act
of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the
accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Compiled by: FM3
68. PEOPLE VS BUENSUCESO 132 SCRA 143

Facts: Jose BUENSUCESO, Rodolfo AGUILAR, Condrado IZON, and Ernesto JOSON, all members of the police force of
Dinalupihan, Bataan were convicted of Murder.
Between 5pm and 6 pm of 21 April 1967, Patrolman Aguilar and Pariseo Tayag were cponversing as they were
walking towards the municipal building. Pat. Aguilar was trying to take fan knife of Tayag, but could not take it
because Tayag prevented him from taking it. At the suggestion of Pat. Aguilar, Tayag readily agreed to go to the
office of the chief police.
When they arrived in the said office, a heated argument took place between the two. Arising from the latter’s
refusal to give his fan knife to the former. Chief of Police Adriano Canlas arrived and inquired what the trouble, was
all about. Pat. Aguilar answered that the two of them (Aguilar and Canlas ) had been cursed by Tayag. Tayag
asserted that he did not curse them, but that Aguilar was trying to force him to give up his knife. Thereafter, Tayag
hurriedly left the office, he was followed by Pat. Aguilar. After having gone out of the building, Pat. Aguilar fired his
gun upward. Hearing the shot, Tayag turned about, then retreated backwards until he reached the fence of plaza.
When Tayag was near the wooden fence about a knee high,Pat. Aguilar aimed his gun at the former and fired,
hitting him above the right knee. Tayag continued to run toward his house followed by dela Cruz without a gun.
Pat. Mallari, carrying a gun, went to the waiting shed to intercept Tayag. Pat. Aguilar followed Mallare in the shed
and they took opposite sides of road. Then there were several successive gun shots.
After the commotion, Tayag was seen lying prostrate near the back of a jeep parked at the corner of Rizal and San
Juan Streets, about 60 meters away from the municipal building. Pat. Dela Cruz took the knife from Tayag and gave
it to Pat. Jose Buensuceso,who at the precise moment had his revolver tucked in its holster, Pat. Condrado Izon and
Pat. Ernesto Jose were also seen in immediate vicinity of the crime.
Issue: Whether or not accused were guilty of murder.
Held: Yes.
Rationale: The victim was already retreating backward when Aguilar fired his revolver making the victim
completely defenseless. Notwithstanding that he was already hit and wounded, and possibly immobilized, he was
still subjected to successive sot as shown by the wounds that he had received, even at his back. Certainly, the
means employed by the accused- appellants tended directly and specially to insure the execution of the crime
without risk to themselves.
The killing of the victim was aggravated by abuse of superior strength as shown by the number of assailants, which
circumstance, however, is absorbed by treachery.
SC further held that where victims died from several wounds inflicted by different persons and it is not known
which person inflicted the mortal wound, all of them are liable for victim’s death under theory of conspiracy.
Compiled by: FM3
69. PEOPLE VS PUGAY 167 SCRA 439

Facts: The deceased Miranda, a 25 year old retarded, and the accused Pugay were friends. Sometimes after
midnight of May 1982, Eduardo Gabion was setting in ferris wheel and reading comic book with his friend Henry.
Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as
they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him.
They made the deceased dance by tickling him with the piece of wood. Not content with what they are doing with
the decease the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of ferris wheel and poured its
contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in process of
pouring the gasoline. Then, accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him which eventually
caused his death. Cavite CFI convicted them for murder, qualified by treachery with mitigating circumstance of
praeter intentionem.
Issue: Whether or not accused are guilty of murder.
Held: No, the Supreme Court modified the crime of Homicide through Reckless Imprudence.
Rationale: In the case at bar, both accused were merely playing games on the deceased. Thus, there was neither
intent nor motive to kill the latter. On the other hand they were convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence because having taken the can from ferris wheel considering the stinging smell of flammable liquid and
even poured to the deceased and knew very will that liquid poured on the deceased was gasoline and flammable
still set the latter on fire. They failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence
arising from their act.
Compiled by: FM3
70. PEOPLE VS SALUFRANIA 159 SCRA 401
Facts: On 3 Dec. 1974, in Tagbilaran, Labo, Camarines Norte, Filomeno y Aleman killed Marciana Abuyo- Salufrania,
his lawfully wedded out of jealousy, by boxing and strangling her. By the same criminal act committed to the wife
of accused, who was at the 8 months on the family way, Salufrania caused the death of the child while still in its
material womb.
The lower court found the accused guilty of parricide and intentional abortion.
Issue: Whether or not the accused committed intentional abortion.
Held: No.
Rationale: There is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an abortion. He should not be held guilty
of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but of the Complex crime of Parricide with
unintentional abortion.
The elements of unintentional abortion are as follows:

1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That the violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending the abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom.
The court finds that accused intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the
stomach, taken together with immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show intent to
cause an abortion.
Therefore, Filomeo Salufrania committed and should be held liable for complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion.
Compiled by: FM3
71. PEOPLE VS ORITA 184 SCRA 105
Facts: In early morning of March 20, 1983, Cristina arrived at her boarding house. Her classmates had just brought
her home from a party. Shortly after her classmates had left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house. All of
sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized Orita a Philippine Constabulary
Soldier who was a frequent visitor of another boarder.
Orita dragged complainant upstairs. When they reached the 2nd floor, he commanded her to look for a room. With
the batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant’s room. Orita ordered Cristina to lie down on
the floor and mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it her vagina. She followed his order as he
continued to poke the knife to her. At said position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion
of his penis entered her as she keeps moving. Orita commanded the complainant to mount him. Only small part of
his penis was inserted into her vagina. In this position complainant manage to escape. She ran the next room and
jumped to the window. Still naked, she darted to the municipal building where she seeks for the help of policemen.
RTC found Orita guilty of frustrated rape.
Issue: Whether or not frustrated rape was proper.
Held: No.
Rationale: Clearly in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he
actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to
crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In long line of cases, the uniform rule is that for the consummation of rape,
perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by male organ is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Ernia ruling where the court found the offender guilty of frustrated rape was already a stray decision.
Compiled by: FM3
72. PEOPLE VS MANGALINO 182 SCRA 329
Facts: Marichelle Carlos, 6 years old and a Grade 1 pupil was playing “takbuhan” alone at the ground floor of the
two storey apartment of Semion Mangalinao, 53, a security guard. At the time of the incident Laura (Semion’s wife)
was in Batangas, having left the day before the incident. Mangalinao and Marichelle’s parents are neighbours, their
respective rented apartments being almost opposite each other.
Mangalinao called Marichelle to go inside his bedroom. Once inside the bedroom, the accused handed the girl P2.00
and told her not to tell anybody his calling, the girl assented.
Mangalinao then laid Marichelle down, removed her jogging pants, and placed them beside her feet. He kissed her
and fondled her infantile breasts. He inserted his finger into the private part of the victim, and then forcibly and
repeatedly introduced his sexual organ into her undeveloped genitalia, but in vain.
RTC found Mangalinao guilty of statutory rape. On the other hand the accused contend that it is impossible
considering the time, place and the presence of many people also the finding of bruises through the private part of
the victim is result of an accident , considering that she was playing takbuhan.
Issue: Whether or not Mangalinao was guilty of statutory rape.
Held: Yes.
Rationale: The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape as provided in Article 335 par.3 of the RPC is the carnal
knowledge of a woman below 12 yrs. of age. Marichell, a little over 6 yrs. of age at the time was raped. Beyond that
proof of intimidation or forced used on her, or lack of it, is immaterial.
The finding of the government doctor concludes that raped could have been perpetrated. He testified the existence
of indication of recent genital trauma caused by forcibly attempt of penetration of an erected penis. He also further
discounted the probability of an accident, such as bumping the edge of the chair, or violent contact with a blunt
object, as there was no contusion of labia.
In any case, the Court has consistently held that for a rape to be committed, full penetration is not required. It is
enough that there is proof of entrance of male organ within the labia or pudendum of female organ.
Compiled by: FM3
73. PEOPLE VS BALBUENA 129 SCRA 10
Facts:
On 28 August 1975 and after holding a drinking party, accused Abelardo Balbuena and Juanito Torres raped Elvira
Polintan, a lesbian. Elvira consumed half a glass of gin and asked permission from the group to lie down in a bench
in the billiard hall where they were drinking. It was at this instance that the accused undressed her and forced her
into sex on top of the billiard table, one after the other. One month and 23 days after, she related her experience to
her mother and thereafter filed charges against them. The medico-legal report concluded that there was no evident
sign of extragenital physical injury on her body and that she could have had sexual intercourse with a man on or
about the alleged date of commission. Both the accused rest their defense on alibi. After trial, the court convicted
them of rape and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Were the accused guilty of rape?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
The accused contend that the lower court should have declared Elvira as an incredible witness due to the delay of
more than a month before the rape was reported to the police. The court ruled that the delay in filing the complaint
was reasonable. It considered the inate modesty of Filipina womanhood and the inherent reluctance of the Filipino
family to be exposed to the rigors of a long drawn out trial scandalizing the family. She was also fearful over the
threats of the accused that they would kill her and her parents should she report the matter and expressed her
worry that her ongoing classes at school would be disrupted. Her desire to avoid further shame was more
sufficient to restrain her from immediately reporting the incident.
The general rule is that the testimony of the victim, whose chastity has not been questioned, is generally accorded
credence because she would not have fabricated facts that could bring shame and dishonor on her. When a woman
testifies that she has been raped, she says all that need to be said to signify that the crime has been committed.
During her testimony, she was steadfast in the fact that she was raped. The fact that she was a lesbian showed that
she would not willingly submit herself to a sexual intercourse with a male person. Also, the evidence was clear that
the accused employed force in raping her when they held her at her wrists and feet while she fought and struggled.
Compiled by: FM3
74. PEOPLE VS CASTRO 196 SCRA 679
Facts:
Delfin Castro y Lozada, being charged of statutory rape defined under Art. 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal
Code. Six (6) year old Diana Rose Castro , while playing with a neighbor sometime on 4 October 1986, she was
pulled by the accused inside a bathroom, prevented from going out, and made to stand on the toilet bowl. Accused
is a first cousin of Diana Rose's mother. Kuya Delfin, as Diana Rose referred to the accused, then put up her clothes,
took off her panty, made her lean on the wall and, despite her efforts to pull away he inserted his private part into
her causing pain. Then she was told by the accused to go home. At home, she refused to have her private part
washed by her Auntie Alice because it was hurting and painful.
Delfin's alibi is that Diana went to his house while he was taking a bath. She was crying and went inside the
bathroom. When asked by the accused why, she replied that while going down the stairs, a dog whose two (2) hind
legs were limping, chased her and so she tripped. In the morning of 4 October 1986, he woke up went to school,
pass a term paper, treated his godsister lunch and went home. Delfin further narrated that on or about 8 October
1986, he was invited to the Pasay Police Headquarters for questioning. While there, he was asked to undress, was
blindfolded and beaten by around 7 to 10 policemen for about half an hour and made to admit that he raped Diana.
Since he could no longer stand the torture, he told them that he used his small finger to touch her private part.
He contends now there is no rape because —
a. the hymen of the victim was not lacerated.
b. the victim was allegedly standing while the crime was being committed.
c. the victim is still a virgin.
Issue: Is it proper to charged Castro the crime of statutory rape?
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
The victim being of tender age, the penetration of the male organ could go only as deep as the labia. In any case, for
rape to be committed, full penetration is not required. It is enough that there is proof of entrance of the male organ
within the labia or pudendum of the female organ. Even the slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the
crime of rape. Perfect penetration, rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina are not essential for the offense
of consummated rape. Entry, to the least extent, of the labia or lips of the female organ is sufficient. Diana's
remaining a virgin does not negate rape. Sexual intercourse in a standing position, while perhaps uncomfortable, is
not improbable.
Compiled by: FM3
75. PEOPLE VS ATENTO 196 SCRA 357- picture

Compiled by: FM3
76. PEOPLE VS CAMPUHAN 329 SCRA 270
FACTS:
• April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went to the
ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her 2 children. There she met Primo
Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags
with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor.
• Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan inside her
children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already
removed, while his short pants were down to his knees and his hands holding his penis with his right hand
• Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows
and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and
shouted for help thus prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their
compound, to chase the Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the barangay officials who
detained.
• Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel ‘s hymen was intact
• Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him
down causing both of them to fall down on the floor.
• RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death
• Thus, subject to automatic review
ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape
HELD: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8)
years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.
• People v. De la Peña: labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated
• Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible
• Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration but her vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped
• Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to
attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim
• the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's own assertion that
she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close together and that she did not feel any intense pain
but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray
ko, aray ko!
• no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim
Compiled by: FM3
77. PEOPLE VS GALLO 315 SCRA 462
FACTS: ““That on or sometime in the period of May, 1994 in the Municipality of Cardona, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd designs and
by means of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with a 13 year old girl, Marites Gallo y Segovia.”3
The penalty of death imposed upon accused-appellant Romeo Gallo y Igloso by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68,
of Binangonan, Rizal, after finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, was affirmed
by this Court in its decision promulgated on 22 January 1998.
On 24 August 1999, accused-appellant filed a “Motion to Re-open Case (with Leave of Court)” seeking a
modification of the death sentence to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant proffers that the reduction sought by
him would be in line with the new Court rulings which annunciate that the seven attendant circumstances
introduced in Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances that must be
pleaded in the indicment in order to warrant the imposition of the penalty.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The additional attendant circumstances introduced by Republic Act 7659 should be considered as special
qualifying circumstances distinctly applicable to the crime of rape and if not pleaded as such could only be
appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances.—The Court in the case of People vs. Garcia, speaking through
then, Justice Florenz D. Regalado, ratiocinated that the additional attendant circumstances introduced by R.A. 7659
should be considered as special qualifying circumstances distinctly applicable to the crime of rape and, if not
pleaded as such, could only be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances.
Accused-appellant’s relationship to the victim although proven but not alleged in the information, cannot be
considered to be a qualifying circumstance.—The above indictment has not specifically alleged that accused-
appellant is the victim’s father; accordingly, accused-appellant’s relationship to the victim, although proven during
the trial, cannot be considered to be
Compiled by: FM3
78. PEOPLE VS BERANA 311 SCRA 664
Facts: On June 2, 1994 at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning, 14-year old Maria Elena Jarcia was sleeping with her
four-year old niece in one of the two rooms in a house her family was renting at Bayawas Street, Naga City when
she was awakened by her brother-in-law, herein accused-appellant, Raul Berana. Complainant recognized him
because light was filtering in from a nearby window. Berana pointed a "buntot page" at her neck and warned her
not to make any noise, otherwise she would be killed. The terrified girl was made to lie down while accused-
appellant raised her duster and proceeded to remove her shorts and her underwear, after which he mashed her
breast and lay on top of her. The helpless girl was again threatened not to make any noise otherwise he would kill
her. Complainant tried to cover her breasts with her arms but accused-appellant pushed her arms aside. As he
inserted his organ into her womanhood, Elena felt excruciating pain. He began kissing her and made several push
and pull movements, after which, the victim felt something liquid in her organ. Accused-appellant sat down and
warned her not to talk to anyone about the incident.
Issue: Whether or Not the Relationship between the Accused – appellant and the complainant aggravates the crime
?
Held: No
Ratio: Considering that the relationship of accused-appellant to complainant qualifies the crime of rape punishable
by reclusion perpetua to rape punishable by death, it is but proper that a more stringent proof of relationship
between the offender and the offended party must be established by the prosecution. Corollarily, a clearer proof of
relationship between the complainant and the spouse of accused-appellant must be presented. The relationship of
accused-appellant and the complainant, is not adequately substantiated since it is merely based on testimony of
the complainant, her mother's testimony and the accused-appellant's use of the words, "mama at papa" in his
letters. Needless to say, the evidence presented are not sufficient to dispel doubts about the true relationship of
accused-appellant and the complainant, to the benefit of which the accused is entitled.

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Compiled by: FM3

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE

GOVERNMENT BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING ENEMY OCCUPATION.

WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 114 OF THE REVISED

3. PP V. PRIETO 80 PHIL 138 -PICTURE

ISSUE: Whether or not Manayao is guilty of treason.

6. PP v. Lol-lo and Saraw

• Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.

7. PP V RODRIGUEZ 135 SCRA 485

ISSUE: WoN the respondent-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

9. UMIL V RAMOS 187 SCRA 311

Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

10. PEOPLE V. BURGOS 144 SCRA 1

Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid? Is the warrantless search valid?

11. MILO V. SALANGA 152 SCRA 113

Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid?

13. MEDINA V. OROZCO, JR. GR NO. L-26723 DECEMBER 1966-PICTURE

15. STONEHILL V. DIOKNO 20 SCRA 383

16. BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF 133 SCRA 800

17. PEOPLE VS. MANDORIAO 51 OG 4619 –PICTURE

18. PEOPLE VS. BAES 68 PHIL 203-PICTURE

19. PEOPLE VS. TENGSON 67 OG 1552 –

20. PEOPLE VS. NANOY 69 OG 8043

 Accused appealed, arguing that the offense, if any is unjust vexation.

1. WON the TC erred in convicting Nanoy of disturbance or interruption of a religious ceremony.

O WON the offense was unjust vexation.

 There must be deliberate intent to hurt the feelings of the faithful.

21. ENRILE VS SALAZAR 186 SCRA 217

22. UMIL VS RAMOS, SUPRA

Issue: W/N accused is guilty of rebelllion?

23. ENRILE VS AMIN 189 SCRA 573

24.PEOPLE VS DASIG 221 SCRA 549

25. PEOPLE VS LOVEDIORO 250 SCRA 389

FACTS OF THE CASE:

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

26. PEOPLE VS CABRERA 43 PHIL 64-PICTURE

27. US vS. TOLENTINO 5 PHIL 682

28. ESPUELAS VS. PEOPLE 90 PHIL 524

29. UMIL VS. RAMOS, Supr

ISSUE: Is the petitioner guilty of inciting to sedition?

30. MARTINEZ VS. MORFE 44 SCRA 22

NOTE: Under the 1987 Constitution:

31. PEOPLE VS. BELTRAN 138 SCRA 521

I: W/N appellants guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.

32. PEOPLE VS. DOLLANTES 151 SCRA 592- PICTURE

33. ALBERTO and INTIA vs. HON. DE LA CRUZ and ORBITA

34. ADELAIDA TANEGA vs. HON. JUDGE MASAKAYAN

Whether or not the penalty has prescribed.

No. The penalty has not prescribed. Petition dismissed.

35. PP VS ABILONG 82 PHIL 172- PICTURE

36. TORRES VS GONZALES 152 SCRA 272

HELD: The SC affirmed the following:

37. PEOPLE VS DIOSO 132 SCRA 616

38. PEOPLE VS KONG LEON 48 OG 664

Issue: Can he be charged of counterfeiting of foreign coins?

39. DEL ROSARIO VS. PEOPLE 3 SCRA 650

40. PEOPLE VS. GALANO 54 OG 5897

Issue: Can Galano be charged of Falsification

Held: Yes, under Article 169 paragraph 2

41. PEOPLE VS ROMUALDEZ 57 PHIL 148

• WON Estela Romualdez is guilty of falsification of public documents. YES.

42. BERADIO VS CA 103 SCRA 567

43. LUAGUE VS CA 112 SCRA 97