Court upholds reinstatement of workers' claims

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
COURT OF APPEALS
MANILA
SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION
KMM-KATIPUNAN, DENNIS
DOMINGO, APRIL MENDOZA,
JERAMIL REYES, EDUARDO
CAMUA, MICHAEL GARCIA,
MARVIN JACINTO, CESAR
SANTOS, JOEL ALVAREZ,
GARRY CRUZ, FREDERICK
DELA CRUZ, WILLIAM DELA
CRUZ, OSCAR DELA CRUZ,
FRANCISCO ATOP, PAOLO
ANGELO CABUGA, RICHARD
ROXAS, LEONILO ROXAS,
GILBERTO C. YAMBOT, NEL
M. RESURRECION, ROMAN DE
GUZMAN, JOVIT SANTOS,
GREGORIO SALVADOR,
ENGELBERTO MENDOZA,
ARMANDO DELA CRUZ,
FELIPE VINTA, RONALD
DIONISIO, ANDRES
GUERRERO, JOVY SAN DIEGO,
GARRY SANTOS, ISAGANI C.
MARTINEZ, MARLON
MOLDON, EDMOND C. REYES,
ASTRO M. AQUINO, BAL
DERION, FREDERICK
BERNARDINO, ROWELL Z.
SANTOS, HERNAN
ORBANOZO, ALEXANDER
DELOS SANTOS, EDGARDO
LORENZO, ERNESTO DE
GUZMAN, FREDDIE V.
SANTOS, FLORENCIO DELOS
SANTOS, WILLIAM GAPASIN,
JOHN ERIC PALTAO, ADRIAN
BERNARDO, JEFREY DE
GUZMAN, ROBERTO DAGUNO,
RENE B. MAMARIL, RAUL
REPLY to Petitioners’ COMMENT dated July 14, 2017
KMM-Katipunan, Domingo, et al. v. NLRC, Cargill Philippines, Inc.,
IDS Employment Services, Charlie Park, and Ignacio Santos
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SANTOS, CRISTONINO
MARCELO, ANDRIAN
SEBASTIAN, JIMMY A. REYES,
RUBEN ROXAS, SERAFIN C.
REYES, JR., ROMNICK
PADOLINA AND JOEMEL
DATILES,
Petitioners,
- versus - CA-G.R. SP NO. 145225

NLRC LAC Case No. 11-
003100-15
NLRC Case No. RAB III 03-
21281-14, Labor Arbiter
Leandro M. Jose
NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION,
SIXTH DIVISION, CARGILL
PHILIPPINES, INC./IDS
EMPLOYMENT SERVICES,
CHARLIE PARK AND IGNACIO
D. SANTOS
Respondent.
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REPLY
(to Petitioner’s COMMENT dated July 14, 2017)
Private Respondent Cargill Philippines, Inc. (the “Company” or

“Cargill”), by counsel, respectfully submits this Reply to Petitioner’s
Comment dated July 14, 2017 (“Reply”) and respectfully states:
I.
Resolution of the Honorable Court
1. Cargill received on June 1, 2017 the Decision dated May 26,

2017 (“Assailed Decision”) which, among other things, reinstated the
decision of Labor Arbiter Leandro M. Jose (“Labor Arbiter”).
2. The dispositive portion of the Assailed Decision states:
2
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“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision dated December 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated
February 15, 2016 of the National Labor Relations Commission
in NLRC LAC No. 11-003100-15 (NLRC Case No. RAB-III-03-
21281-14) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated July 6, 2015 of Labor Arbiter Leandro M. Jose is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.”1
3. On June 14, 2017, Respondents timely filed the Motion for

Reconsideration, praying that the Assailed Decision of this Honorable Court
be reconsidered and in lieu thereof, a new one be rendered dismissing
Petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari dated April 26, 2016 (“Petition for
Certiorari”) and reinstating the December 29, 2015 Decision and February
15, 2016 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(“NLRC”).2 On August 1, 2017, Cargill received the Comment of the
Petitioners dated July 14, 2017 (“Comment”).
4. To further assist the Honorable Court in its judicious review of

the material facts, to respond to the baseless allegations of Petitioners in the
Comment, and in the interest of substantial justice, Cargill respectfully files
this Reply.
II.
Grounds
5. Respondent respectfully prays that this Honorable Court

reconsider the Decision on the following grounds:
A.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE DOCTRINE OF RES
JUDICATA APPLIES IN THE INSTANT CASE. THE
CASE OF HIJO RESOURCES CORP. V. MAJERAS
RELIED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT IS NOT
APPLICABLE.
B.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, MOST OF THE
PEITIONERS STATED IN THE CASE HAVE, BY ONE
WAY OR ANOTHER, DROPPED THEIR CLAIMS IN
1
Decision, at 14.
2
See Page 16 of Motion for Reconsideration dated June 14, 2017.
3
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THE INSTANT CASE AND SHOULD NOT BE

CONSIDERED AS PEITITONERS.
C.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, IDS EMPLOYMENT
SERVICES (“IDS”) WAS A DULY-REGISTERED
LEGITIMATE JOB CONTRACTOR WITH
SUBSTANTIAL CAPITAL AND INVESTMENTS IN
TOOLS.
D.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SERVICES
RENDERED BY THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT
DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE BUSINESS OF CARGILL
AND IT EXERCISES CONTROL OVER ITS
EMPLOYEES.
E.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, AN EMPLOYER-
EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN IDS
AND PETITIONERS.3
F.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, PETITIONERS4 WHO
CLAIM TO BE THE MAGSASAKO/POURER, YAG-YAG
AND LOADERS ARE NOT EMPLOYEES OF IDS NOR
CARGILL.
III.
Discussion
A. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE

DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
APPLIES IN THE INSTANT CASE. THE
CASE OF HIJO RESOURCES CORP. V.
MAJERAS RELIED UPON BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IS NOT
APPLICABLE.
6. In the Comment, the Petitioners state that “[c]ontrary to private

respondents’ insinuation, the case of HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION
versus EPIFANIO P. MEJARES, REMEGIO C. BAL URAN, JR. DANTE
SAYCON, and CECILIO CUCHARO, represented by NAMABDJERA-
3
[SyCip to list down Petitioners applicable.]
4
4
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HRC, G.R. No. 208986, January 13, 2016 is in all fours with this case.”5 With
all due respect, but the case of Hijo Resources Corp. v. Mejares,6 (the “Hijo
case”) as mentioned in Cargill’s Motion for Reconsideration “was decided
against a different factual milieu and the Honorable Supreme Court’s
decision in the said case is inapplicable to the instant case.”7
7. Here, unlike the Hijo case, Petitioners did not abandon, as in fact
they pursued, the certification election case until the adverse ruling became
final and executory.
8.1. On November 04, 2013, Petitioners were allegedly

dismissed en masse.8
8.2. On January 30, 2014, after Petitioners’ alleged dismissal,

the Mediator-Arbiter issued a resolution finding no employer-employee
relationship between Petitioners and Cargill.9
8.3. On February 13, 2014, KMM-CPIC (“Union”) filed an

appeal to the DOLE Bureau of Labor Relations (“BLR”) from the
Mediator-Arbiter’s decision.10
8.4. On February 25, 2014, Petitioners filed the instant case.11
8.5. It must be noted that in the Hijo case, the employees did
not appeal the Order of the Med- Arbiter:
“On 19 November 2007, DOLE Med-Arbiter Lito A. Jasa

issued an Order, 4 dismissing NAMABDJERA-HRC's
petition for certification election on the ground that there
was no employer-employee relationship between
complainants (members of NAMABDJERA-HRC) and
HRC. Complainants did not appeal the Order of Med-
Arbiter Jasa but pursued the illegal dismissal case they
filed.”12 (emphasis supplied)
8. As such, it cannot be said that similar to the Hijo case, Petitioners

“were left with no option but to pursue their illegal dismissal case.”13 In fact,
on December 19, 2014 the BLR issued a resolution affirming the Mediator-
5
See Page 2 of Petitioners’ Comment dated July 14, 2017.
6
G.R. No. 208986, January 13, 2016.
7
8
See Page 5 of Complainants’ Position Paper dated May 15, 2014.
9
See Page 5 of NLRC Decision dated December 29, 2014.
10
11
Id.
12
G.R. No. 208986, January 13, 2016.
13
Id.
5
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Arbiter’s decision, to which the Petitioners still filed a motion for

reconsideration.14 Petitioners therefore actively pursued both remedies at the
same time.
9. On March 05, 2015, the BLR denied the motion for

reconsideration of the Petitioners. Subsequently, the BLR issued an Entry of
Judgment stating that its resolution has become final and executory.15
10. In its Decision dated December 29, 2015, the NLRC had the
opportunity to explain that res judicata is indeed present in this case:
“There are four elements of res judicata specifically (1) the

judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the
case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as
between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action.
The first three elements of res judicata are undoubtedly present

under the present circumstances. First there is no appeal filed
from the BLR’s December 19, 2014 and March 5, 2015
resolutions in RO3-CE-05-12-0613 / OS-A-7-3-14 to the
appellate court. Hence, the BLR’s subject resolutions became
final and executory. Second, the BLR has the authority to hear
and decide the issue pertaining to the existence or absence of
an employer-employee relationship between the parties
herein the certification election proceedings. The BLR’s
jurisdiction to resolve the controversy was not questioned in
RO3-CE-05-12-06-13 / OS-A-7-3-13. Third, the BLR’s
findings as to the absence of employer-employee relationship
between the parties herein and as to the status of IDS a
legitimate job contractor are judgment on the merits. Its
factual findings are based on the parties’ arguments and evidence
presented in the said proceedings.
Anent the last element of res judicata, We do not subscribe to

the Labor Arbiter’s opinion that the doctrine of res judicata is
inapplicable because the earlier case in RO3-CE-05-12-06-013 /
OS-A-7-3-14 and the present case do not involve the same causes
of action. It bears stressing that res judicata has two aspects, to
wit:
14
15
6
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(1) Bar by Prior Judgment which is provided in Rule 39,

Section 47 (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
(2) Conclusiveness of Judgment which is provided in
Section 47 (c) of the rule.
xxx
In other words, conclusiveness of judgment simply provides that

issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again
be raised in any future case between the same parties involving
a different cause of action. Again, for conclusiveness of
judgment to apply, only identity of issues and not identity of
causes of action is required. Thus, while the earlier case in
RO3-CE-05-12-06-13 / OS-A-7-3-14 and the present case
involve different causes of action, the identity of parties and
identity of issues in these two cases would suffice to apply the
doctrine of res judicata in the mode of conclusiveness of
judgment.”16 (emphasis supplied)
11. To reiterate, the res judicata clearly applies in this case. In fact,
as correctly ruled by the NLRC, all four elements of res judicata are present.
B. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, MOST OF

THE PEITIONERS STATED IN THE
CASE HAVE, BY ONE WAY OR
ANOTHER, DROPPED THEIR CLAIMS
IN THE INSTANT CASE AND SHOULD
NOT BE CONSIDERED AS
PETITIONERS.
12. Anent Petitioner Paolo Angelo Cabuga (“Mr. Cabuga”), the

Petitioners’ Comment states that he did not execute a Special Release of Claim
and/or Quitclaim on October 6, 2015. This argument of the Petitioners lack
factual basis. As we shall show below, Mr. Cabuga indeed executed a quit
claim.
13. On October 6, 2015, Mr. Cabuga executed a “Special Release of

Claim and/or Quitclaim” (“quitclaim”) which states as follows:
“That for and in consideration of the amount of FIFTY

THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (PHP 50,000.00), I
PAOLO ANGELO CABUGA, of legal age, Filipino, and with
postal address at Pulilan Bulacan, do hereby release, discharge,
16
See Pages 10-12 of NLRC Decision dated December 29, 2014.
7
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and quitclaim my employer IDS employment services

(hereinafter called “IDS”), with office address at Dampol 1st
Pulilan, Bulacan and principal company Cargill Philippines,
Inc, (hereinafter called “Cargill”) where I was previously
assigned or deployed by my employer as well as their respective
owners, managers, officers and staff, from any and all claims,
demands, and/or rights or causes of action whatsoever that may
now or hereafter develop as a consequence of my past services
with the said Service Provider and Principal Company.
xxx
I further agree that this Special Release of Claim

and/or Quitclaim shall constitute as an absolute bar to any
suit or proceeding which I, or anyone on my behalf, may take
or shall have taken in consideration with my past services
with my employer IDS Employment Services and principal
company Cargill Philippines, Inc, more particularly the case
entitled “KMM-Katipunan, Dennis Domingo, et. al., Marlon
O. Moldon, et. al. v. Cargill Philippines, Inc./IDS
employment Services, Charlie Park, and Ignacio D. Santos”,
docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB III-03-21281-14, it being
understood that the essence and nature of this Special
Release of Claim and/or Quitclaim is to totally and absolutely
render IDS Employment Services and Cargill Philippines,
Inc., its owners, managers and corporate officers, clean, free,
and blameless from whatever cause/s of action or of any kind
of obligation that may arise in my favor. (emphasis supplied)
xxx
(signed)
Paolo Angelo Cabuga”17
14. Petitioners merely deny the fact that Mr. Cabuga did not execute
a quitclaim without presenting any evidence to support its baseless claim. It
is undeniable that the Petitioners did not present any proof whatsoever to deny
the existence of such quitclaim. The Supreme Court has ruled in Iladan v. La
Suerte International Manpower Agency, Inc18. citing Plastimer Industrial
Corp. v. Gopo19:
17
See SPECIAL RELEASE OF CLAIM AND/OR QUITCLAIM attached as ANNEX “1” of Respondents’
Appeal Memorandum to the NLRC dated October 15, 2015 which is hereby reattached as ANNEX []..
18
G.R. No. 203882. January 11, 2016.
19
G.R. No. 183390, February 16, 2011.
8
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“[t]he Court has ruled that a waiver or quitclaim is a valid and

binding agreement between the parties, provided that it
constitutes a credible and reasonable settlement, and that the
one accomplishing it has done so voluntarily and with a full
understanding of its import. Absent any extant and clear proof
of the alleged coercion and threats Iladan allegedly received from
respondents that led her to terminate her employment relations
with respondents, it can be concluded that Iladan resigned
voluntarily.”20 (citation removed and emphasis supplied)
15. Absent any proof that the quitclaim executed by Mr. Cabuga was
attended by fraud or duress, such agreement must be upheld. The convenient
argument of the Petitioners that he did not execute such agreement deserves
scant consideration.
16. As regards Petitioners Romnick Padolina (“Mr. Padolina”),

Frederick dela Cruz (“Mr. dela Cruz”), Engelberto Mendoza (“Mr.
Mendoza”) and Michael Garcia (“Mr. Garcia”), they should be dropped in
the Court of Appeals proceedings because they failed to sign the Petition for
Certiorari dated April 20, 2016.
17. Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provide:
SEC. 4. Verification – Except when otherwise specifically

required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
xxx
A pleading required to be verified which contains a

verification based on “information and belief” or upon
knowledge, information and belief, or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.21
The Rules of Court further provide that a Rule 65 Petition for

Certiorari must be verified.22
20
G.R. No. 203882. January 11, 2016.
21
Rules of Court, Rule 7, Section 4.
22
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
9
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18. Clearly then, any person signing a verification must have either
been personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity. The verification requirement is
significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter
of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The absence of
proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as unsigned and dismissible.23
19. A careful review of Petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari reveals

that their petition is procedurally infirm in this regard. Specifically, the
aforementioned four Petitioners failed to properly verify the Petition for
Certiorari, which makes the Petition for Certiorari (as to them) nothing but a
mere scrap of paper.
20. Petitioners Mr. Padolina, Mr. Dela Cruz, Mr. Mendoza, and Mr.
Garcia did not sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
attached to the Petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari. This leads to no other
conclusion except that they did not personally appear before the notary
public to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
21. To reiterate, jurisprudence states that the verification

requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
faith.24 The absence of proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as
unsigned and dismissible.25
22. Considering that the four Petitioners failed to sign the

Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping of the Petition for
Certiorari, the Petition for Certiorari should be immediately dismissed with
respect to the four Petitioners since as to them, the Petition for Certiorari is an
unsigned pleading and a mere scrap of paper. It produces no legal effect, and
cannot be considered in the resolution of the individual claims filed by these
Petitioners.
23. With respect to Mr. Nel Resurrecion (“Mr. Resurrecion”), his

claim has already prescribed. He specifically stated in his sworn complaint26
in NLRC CASE NO. RAB III 08-20428-13 that he was allegedly dismissed
from employment on June 10, 2009.
23
Chua v. Torres, G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005.
24
Felix Martos, et. al. v. New San Jose Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 192650, October 24, 2012; Christine Chua
v. Jorge Torres and Antonio Beltran, G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005.
25
Christine Chua v. Jorge Torres and Antonio Beltran, G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005.
26
See Complaint attached as ANNEX “3” of Respondent Cargill Phils. Inc.’s Position Paper dated April
21, 2014.
10
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24. Jurisprudence instructs that claims for illegal dismissal and

backwages must be instituted within four years from the time the cause of
action accrued. In Arriola v. Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc.27, the Supreme Court
had the opportunity to rule:
“However, we find that Arriola's claims for backwages,

damages, and attorney's fees arising from his claim of illegal
dismissal have not yet prescribed when he filed his complaint
with the Regional Arbitration Branch for the National Capital
Region of the National Labor Relations Commission. As
discussed, the prescriptive period for filing an illegal
dismissal complaint is four years from the time the cause of
action accrued. Since an award of backwages is merely
consequent to a declaration of illegal dismissal, a claim for
backwages likewise prescribes in four years.
The four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 also applies

to actions for damages due to illegal dismissal since such actions
are based on an injury to the rights of the person dismissed.”28
(emphasis supplied)
25. As applied in the instant case, since Mr. Resurrecion claimed that
he was illegally dismissed on June 10, 2009, counting four years from said
date, he should have filed his case for illegal dismissal before June 10, 2013.
The current Petition was filed with the Labor Arbiter on January 30, 2014,
more than four years from June 10, 2009.
26. Since Mr. Resurrecion’s claim has prescribed, he should be

dropped from the instant case.
27. Regarding Serafin Reyes (“Mr. Reyes”) his signature in the Joint
Affidavit29 dated May 28, 2014 filed with the NLRC and his signature on the
attendance sheet30 during the Certification Election do not match. Thus, since
his signature is obviously forged, the Joint Affidavit executed supposedly by
Mr. Reyes should not be considered as to him.
C. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, IDS

EMPLOYMENT SERVICES (“IDS”)
WAS A DULY-REGISTERED
27
G.R. No. 175689, August 13, 2014.
28
Id.
29
See Complainants Position Paper dated May 15, 2014.
30
See Attendance Sheet attached as ANNEX “10” of Respondent Cargill Phils. Inc.’s Position Paper dated
April 21, 2014.
11
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LEGITIMATE JOB CONTRACTOR

WITH SUBSTANTIAL CAPITAL AND
INVESTMENTS IN TOOLS
28. The Petitioners’ argue that “private respondent IDS Employment

Services is just a mere labor-only contractor of private respondents, the same
have been sufficiently discussed and explained by the Honorable Labor
Arbiter a quo and this Honorable Court, the same are just hereby repleaded,
incorporated and made integral parts hereof by reference.”31 With all due
respect, but the Petitioners’ are gravely mistaken. IDS is an independent
contractor as correctly found by the Honorable Commission.
29. Labor-only contracting is defined under the Labor Code as

follows:
Article 106. Contractor or Subcontractor. –

…
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying
workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by
such person are performing activities which are directly related
to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the
person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of
the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same
manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.
(Emphasis supplied).
…
30. It is further defined under DO No. 18-A32, to wit:
SECTION 6. Prohibition Against Labor-only Contracting.

— Labor-only contracting is hereby declared prohibited. For this
purpose, labor only contracting shall refer to an arrangement
where:
a) The contractor does not have substantial capital or

investments in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, among others, and the
employees recruited and placed are performing
activities which are usually necessary or desirable
31
See Page 4 of Petitioners’ Comment dated July 14, 2017.
32
DO 18-A has now been superseded by DO 174-17. However, this Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration makes reference to DO 18-A given that it was the applicable regulation at the time Cargill
engaged the services of IDS.
12
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to the operation of the company, or directly related

to the main business of the principal within a
definite or predetermined period, regardless of
whether such job, work or service is to be performed
or completed within or outside the premises of the
principal; or
b) The contractor does not exercise the right to control

over the performance of the work of the employee.
(Emphasis supplied).
31. From the foregoing, there are two distinct scenarios under which
a labor-only contracting arrangement may exist. Under the first scenario,
labor-only contracting exists if the [a] contractor lacks substantial capital or
investment in tools and equipment; and [b] the contractor’s employees
perform services which are either necessary or desirable to the operation of
the company, or directly related to the main business of the principal. Under
the second scenario, labor-only contracting exists regardless of the
circumstances in the first scenario if the contractor does not exercise the right
to control over its employees. Under neither scenario can the Cargill-IDS
arrangement be classified as a labor-only contracting arrangement.
Under the first scenario, there is no labor-only contracting because IDS

possesses substantial capital and investment and its employees do not perform
activities that are directly related to the main business of Cargill.
32. At the outset, it must be noted that IDS is a legitimate job

contractor as it was duly registered with, and licensed by, the Department of
Labor and Employment (“DOLE”) under Department Order No. 18-02, the
prevailing job contracting rules in 2014. Upon faithful compliance with all
the requirements of the DOLE, IDS was issued a Certificate of Registration
with No. III-093-0408-031 on June 10, 2011 and valid until April 27, 2014,
thus covering the material period of this case.33 Thus, IDS enjoys the
presumption that it is a legitimate contractor with substantial capital and
investment in tools and equipment.
33. Before a Certificate of Registration can be issued, the contractor,

in this case, IDS, must present to the DOLE that it has substantial capital. In
the instant case, substantial capital refers to a net worth of at least three million
pesos (P3,000,000.00) for a sole proprietorship.
33
See Certificate of Registration attached as ANNEX “8” of Respondent Cargill Phils. Inc.’s Position
Paper dated April 21, 2014.
13
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D. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE

SERVICES RENDERED BY THE
PETITIONERS ARE NOT DIRECTLY
RELATED TO THE BUSINESS OF
CARGILL AND IT EXERCISES
CONTROL OVER ITS EMPLOYEES.
34. In addition, the services rendered by the Petitioners are not

directly related to the business of Cargill. Cargill’s Articles of Incorporation
state that its principal or primary business is to own, operate, run and manage
plants and facilities for the production, crushing, extracting or otherwise
manufacture and refining of coconut oil, coconut meal, vegetable oil, lard,
margarine, edible oil and other articles of similar nature and their by-products;
to engage in researching, breeding, development, experiments, production,
culture, processing, importation and exportation, and sale by wholesale of
agricultural seeds/products of all kinds whatsoever and the rendition of
technical assistance and services related thereto; to engage in the buy and/or
sell, export and/or import, acquisition, exchange, or otherwise dealing in sugar
and other related products by way of wholesale in the domestic as well as
export markets and to engage in all activities, including the purchase or lease
of machineries and equipment, necessary for the operation thereof.34
35. In contrast, a cursory perusal of the Service Agreement between

Cargill and IDS would show that the services rendered by the Petitioners are
not directly related to Cargill’s animal feeds production business. The services
rendered by the Petitioners are general cleaning and upkeep services, more
specifically described as follows:
“PROJECT TO BE PERFORMED BY THE

CONTRACTOR
1. GENERAL WORK OR WORK AREAS
1.1 trees, plant grass cutting, trimming and watering

1.2 sweeping, cleaning of all covered lawns;
1.3 yard, building perimeter sweeping and cleaning
1.4 wiping and cleaning of all door and window glass panels
1.5 plant perimeter fence up keeping and cleaning
1.6 cleaning and maintenance of all comfort rooms
1.7 sweeping, polishing and maintenance of all stairs, floor,
offices, aisles, corridors, filing rooms and lobbies
1.8 sweeping cleaning of roads and pathways
1.9 cleaning of drain vat and perimeter
34
A copy of the Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation and Amended Articles of
Incorporation is attached as Annex [●].
14
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1.10 collecting of waste

1.11 trash and garbage collection
1.12 cleaning and up keeping of offices
1.13 segregation of waste and other debris including transport to
the waste disposal area
1.14 upkeeping and cleaning of all building
1.15 upkeeping and cleaning of fuel oil receiving area
1.16 upkeeping of drain pool including oil scooping and water
level control so that the plant cleanliness could be maintained at
all times
1.17 cleaning and upkeeping of plant modules from basement to
the top floor
2. SPECIFIC AREAS TO BE CLEANED
2.1 BUILDING
2.1.1. Central Laboratory

2.1.1. Country Office
2.1.2. Operations Building 1 and 2
2.2 COMFORT ROOMS
2.2.1 COUNTRY OFFICE

2.2.2 Plant Operations Office
2.2.3 Central Laboratory
2.2.4. Truckers Quarter 1 & 2
2.2.5. Guardhouse
2.2.6. Canteen
2.2.7. Pulilan 1010- Warehouse”35
36. In essence, the services to be rendered by IDS and its employees

are janitorial in nature. In Kimberly Independent Labor Union v. Drilon36 (the
“Kimberly case”), the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the general
practice that janitorial services are typically performed by an independent
contractor:
“We do not find it necessary to disturb the finding of then

Minister Sanchez holding as legal the service contract executed
between KIMBERLY and RANK, with respect to the workers
performing janitorial and yard maintenance service, which is
35
See Service Agreement attached as ANNEX “1” of Respondent Cargill Phils. Inc.’s Position Paper dated
April 21, 2014.
36
G.R. No. 77629, May 9, 1990.
15
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
supported by substantial and convincing evidence. Besides, we

take judicial notice of the general practice adopted in several
government and private institutions and industries of hiring
a janitorial service on an independent contractor basis.
Furthermore, the occasional directives and suggestions of
KIMBERLY are insufficient to erode primary and continuous
control over the employees of the independent contractor. Lastly,
the duties performed by these workers are not independent and
integral steps in or aspects of the essential operations of
KIMBERLY which is engaged in the manufacture of consumer
paper products and cigarette paper, hence said workers cannot be
considered regular employees.”37
37. Applying the principles in the Kimberly case, the Honorable
Court, with all due respect, seriously erred in treating IDS as a labor-only
contractor. To reiterate, contracting out by government and private institutions
(such as Cargill) of janitorial services on an independent contractor basis has
been recognized and considered by no less than the Supreme Court as a valid
and common practice (such as in this case) adopted to improve the efficiency
of businesses.
38. Further, Mr. Edwin Paguia (“Mr. Paguia”) and Mr. Aldwin San
Diego (“Mr. San Diego”), two supervisory employees of Cargill, executed an
affidavit explaining that the Pulilan Plant (“Plant”) is highly mechanized38:
“6. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that Pulilan Plant is a

highly mechanized plant meaning its business operation is
highly dependent on the maintenance and operation of its labor
saving devices. All machine operators are exclusively assigned
to regular employees for it requires specific skills and technical-
know-how. On the other hand, the functions of IDS
employees in Pulilan Plant are mere incidental or peripheral
activities in the operation of Pulilan Plant.”39 (emphasis
supplied)
39. Thus, in a highly mechanized plant, janitorial services are

evidently not directly related to the business of Cargill. In Neri v. National
Labor Relations Commission40, the Supreme Court has ruled that “[w]hile
these [janitorial] services may be considered directly related to the principal
business of the employer, nevertheless, they are not necessary in the conduct
of the principal business of the employer.”41
37
Id.
38
See ANNEX “1” – REPLY of Reply dated July 28, 2014.
39
Id.
40
G.R. Nos. 97008-09, July 23, 1993.
41
Id.
16
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
40. In any event, the Supreme Court has recognized the right of
management to outsource any of its activities. In Digital Telecommunications
Phils., Inc. v. Digitel Employees Union42, the Supreme Court held:
Indeed, it is management prerogative to farm out any of its

activities, regardless of whether such activity is peripheral or
core in nature. (emphasis supplied)
27. Furthermore, Department Order 18-A itself requires that not only
must an activity relate to the main business of an employer, it must, in addition
to that, also be contracted to an entity that has neither substantial capitalization
or investment in tools, equipment, machineries, and so on, which IDS clearly
had. So, clearly, it is well within Cargill’s management prerogative to
outsource any of its activities, including those which are related to its main
business. For it to constitute basis for a finding of labor-only contracting, such
outsourcing of activities related to the main business of the principal must be
coupled with a lack of substantial capital or investment of the contractor.
28. Finally, under the second scenario, there is no labor-only

contracting because Cargill did not exercise day-to-day control and
supervision over IDS’s employees. IDS deployed a supervisor to oversee and
direct the activities of its deployed workers.
29. Further, the deployed workers were only required to comply with
Cargill’s rules and regulations or policies with respect to safety regulations.
These rules are merely “general guidelines towards the achievement of the
mutually desired result”.43 The Supreme Court, in Manila Electric Co. v.
Benamira, has held that such guidelines are not indicative of control.
30. With all due respect, the foregoing facts established by evidence
that clearly demonstrate that IDS was a legitimate contractor were
conveniently ignored by the Petitioners.
E. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, AN

EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN
IDS AND PETITIONERS
31. The Petitioners set aside the numerous pieces of evidence

showing that an employer-employee relationship does not exist between them
and IDS. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship,
the Supreme Court established the four-fold test: (1) the selection and
42
G.R. Nos. 184903-04, October 10, 2012.
43
Manila Electric Co. v. Benamira, G.R. No. 145271, July 14, 2005.
17
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct.44
Selection and engagement

32. Anent the first test, records would show that it was IDS who
selected and hired the Petitioners. It was only pursuant to the terms of the
Service Agreement that the Petitioners were deployed by IDS to perform
services within the premises of Cargill. Quoted below is the relevant portion
of the Service Agreement:
“The CONTRACTOR shall, to all intents and purpose, be

deemed to be and (sic) independent contractor. Thus, the
laborers employed by the CONTRACTOR to undertake any
work her in (sic) specified shall not be in anyway considered
as employees of the CLIENT. The CONTRACTOR hereby
agrees to hold the CLIENT free and harmless from any and all
claims which may be made by the CONTRACTOR’S laborers
for unpaid wages and/or benefits under the Philippine Labor Law
and Regulations, including but not limited to the Minimum Wage
Law, 13th Month Pay, 11 paid legal holidays and Employees
Compensation. The CONTRACTOR also agrees to hold the
CLIENT free and harmless from any and all claims which maybe
(sic) made by CONTRACTOR’s laborer for any claims resulting
from any incident or accident at CLIENT’s premises.”45
33. Further, in an affidavit executed by Jennifer Gladys G. Manuel

(“Ms. Manuel”), Secretary of IDS, she stated “[t]hat IDS Employment
Services used to place its employees at the premises of Cargill Philippines Inc.
in Pulilan, Bulacan by virtue of a Service Contract.”46
Payment of wages
34. As regards the second test, it has been established by evidence
on record that IDS paid for the wages of its employees. In Ms. Manuel’s
affidavit, she stated the following:
“7. That I am very familiar with the above names of

employees and personally know them because I am the officer in
charge of preparing and processing payrolls and SSS, PhilHealth,
and Pag-ibig records of IDS Employment Services.”
44
Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. Devera, G.R. No. 157214, June 7, 2005.
45
See Service Agreement attached as ANNEX “1” of Respondent Cargill Phils. Inc.’s Position Paper dated
April 21, 2014.
46
See Affidavit attached as ANNEX “11” of Respondent Cargill Phils. Inc.’s Position Paper dated April
21, 2014.
18
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Her statements are further corroborated by the payroll register47, SSS

Employer Contributions Payment Forms48, Pag-IBIG receipts49, PhilHealth
Quarterly Remittance Report50 which were attached to the Respondent’s
Memorandum. The same are reattached as Annexes [●] to [●], respectively
35. In Chevron (Phils.) Inc. v. Galit51, the Supreme Court ruled that
it is unlikely for an employer to report a worker as his employee, pay SSS,
Philhealth and Pag-IBIG premiums if it were not true that said worker is
indeed his employee:
“With respect to the payment of wages, the Court finds no error

in the findings of the LA that Galit admitted that it was SJS which
paid his wages. While Galit claims that petitioner was the one
which actually paid his wages and that SJS was merely used as a
conduit, Galit failed to present evidence to this effect. Galit,
likewise, failed to present sufficient proof to back up his claim
that it was petitioner, and not SJS, which actually paid his SSS,
Philhealth and Pag-IBIG premiums. On the contrary, it is
unlikely that SJS would report Galit as its worker, pay his
SSS, Philhealth and Pag-IBIG premiums, as well as his
wages, if it were not true that he was indeed its employee.”52
Power of dismissal
36. The Company does not have the power to dismiss any of the
Petitioners. It is IDS, who is wholly responsible for disciplining its personnel
and, if necessary, terminating their services.
Power of control
37. Out of the four tests, it is the control test which is the most
important. In order to be considered as a legitimate labor-contractor, IDS must
exercise control over the work of the Petitioners. The Affidavit of Mr. Paguia
and Mr. San Diego, would show that it is indeed IDS which exercises control
over the Petitioners:
47
See Payroll register attached as ANNEXES “12-A to 12-AA” of Respondent Cargill Phils. Inc.’s
Position Paper dated April 21, 2014.
48
See SSS Contributions attached as ANNEXES “13 to 13-16” of Respondent Cargill Phils. Inc.’s Position
Paper dated April 21, 2014.
49
See HDMF Receipts attached as ANNEXES “13-A to 13-A-5” of Respondent Cargill Phils. Inc.’s
50
See PhilHealth Receipts attached as ANNEXES “13-B to 13-B-9” of Respondent Cargill Phils. Inc.’s
51
G.R. No. 186114, October 7, 2015.
52
Id.
19
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
“1. We are supervisory employees of Cargill Philippines Inc.

(company). We are presently assigned at the company’s
manufacturing plant located at Dampol 1st Pulilan, Bulacan
(Pulilan Plant).
2. Part of our duties and responsibilities is to supervise the work

of the company’s regular employees at Pulilan Plant. However,
with regard to agency employees deployed by an independent
contractor, it has always been a company policy that any concern
involving agency employees shall be coursed through with
agency’s own supervisor.
3. Regarding the agency employees formerly deployed by IDS

Employment Services (IDS) in Pulilan Plant including Mr.
Dennis Domingo et. al., their supervisor was Mr. Ignacio D.
Santos (Mr. Santos), the owner-proprietor of IDS. Hence, it
was not us nor any company supervisors who directly
supervises the work and performance of IDS employees.
Needless to state, the exercise of the power to control,
transfer, discipline, and dismiss IDS employee is Mr. Santos’
sole prerogative. The allegation of Mr. Dennis Domingo et al in
their joint affidavit dated May 29, 2014 that we directly supervise
their performance is therefore not true.”53 (emphasis supplied)
38. To reiterate, the Petitioners deployed at Cargill were under the

direct control and supervision of IDS owner Mr. Ignacio D. Santos (“Mr.
Santos”), also known as “Mang Asyo.” The records would show that part of
the Respondents’ position paper are copies of written explanations54
submitted by IDS employees to Mr. Santos regarding their work. The notes
would state excuses as to why the IDS employee was absent.55 These are
attached as Annexes [●] to [●]. Clearly, by informing Mr. Santos as to why
they were absent, the employees acknowledge that the former exercises
supervision and control over their duties.
53
54
See Notes attached as ANNEXES “9 to 9-B” of Respondent Cargill Phils. Inc.’s Position Paper dated
April 21, 2014.
55
A note dated October 05, 2013 signed by Individual Petitioner Michael Garcia states:
“Mang Asyo,
Magandang araw pos a inyo humihingi po ako ng karagdagang bakasyon dahil kylangan ko lang ng
mabilisang kita baka po pag tapos na ng gapasan ditto samin tyaka po ako makabalik. Hindi nap o ako
nakapag paalam ng personal kasi na nabalitaan ko na kayo po ay naospital kayo na po sana ang bahala
sakin. Kung anu-ano po sasabihin nyo paki txt nyo na lang po ako ditto sa # nato 0922-7267-829.
Maraming Salamat po.
Sgd.
Michael Garcia
Employee”
20
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
39. With all due respect, the Honorable Court failed to consider the
foregoing decisive pieces of evidence in the Assailed Decision.
F. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT,

56
PETITIONERS WHO CLAIM TO BE
THE MAGSASAKO/POURER, YAG-
YAG AND LOADERS ARE NOT
EMPLOYEES OF IDS NOR CARGILL.
40. The Petitioners lump together two separate groups and treat them
as if they were hired under similar circumstances. The Petitioners are divided
into two groups: (a) the first group is composed of the IDS employees and (b)
the second group are the magsasako, pourer, yag-yag and loaders. These
individuals falling under item (b) are neither employees of Cargill nor IDS
and they should be treated separately from those falling under item (a).
41. To reiterate the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the

Respondents, since the magsasako, pourer, yag-yag and loaders were not
employees of Cargill or IDS, they were not affected by the expiration of the
Service Agreement between the Cargill and IDS. The following is a list of the
individual Petitioners considered as either magsasako, pourer, yag-yag or
loaders57:
NAME ID PRESENTED DURING

CERTIFICATION ELECTION
1. Gilberto C. Yambot NO ID
2. Francisco Atop PhilHealth 2300-1880-1294
3. Joemel Detiles NO ID
4. Oscar Dela Cruz PhilHealth 2120-0038-4698
5. Armando Dela Cruz NO ID
6. Jovy San Diego NO ID
7. William Dela Cruz Voter’s ID 1481-0050A-G-1373W
8. Roberto Daguno PhilHealth 23-001880143-6
9. Hernan Orbanozo NO ID
10. Raul Santos NO ID
11. Andrian Sebastian -
12. Gregorio Salvador -
13. Jeramil Reyes -
THE MAGSASAKO/POURERS ARE NOT

EMPLOYEES OF IDS OR CARGILL.
56
57
21
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
42. In the course of its business, Cargill accumulates used sacks

from ingredients used in the production of animal feeds. These sacks are then
sold by Cargill to the highest bidder.58 Cargill entered into a contract for the
sale of the used sacks with the highest bidder, Ms. Imelda P. Del Fonso (“Ms.
Del Fonso”).59
43. In the said contact, it was agreed upon that Ms. Del Fonso would
provide the manpower for the handling of Cargill’s used sacks:
“13. The Contractor shall be required to provide at his/her own

expense the following manpower and their supervision to
ensure that Cargill’s used sacks will be handled properly to
maximize their re-sale value.”60
44. It is clear from the foregoing that it is not Cargill’s duty to hire
the employees who will handle the used sacks. Said magsasako/pourers are
hired and paid for solely by Ms. Del Fonso. In her affidavit dated July 25,
2014, Ms. Del Fonso further explains her agreement with Cargill:
“1. I have an existing agreement with Cargill Philippines Inc.

(hereinafter referred to as “Cargill”) for the purchase of emptied
or used sacks.
2. One of the stipulations of my business agreement with Cargill

is to allow me to deploy “magsasako” at my own expense in the
company premises who would be solely responsible for pouring
or emptying the sacks of raw materials/ingredients and thereafter
collect the sacks.
3. The rationale of the said agreement is to preserve the

maximum resale value of the sacks by carefully emptying the
same and to avoid any damage.
4. To emphasize, the engagement and payment of wages of

magsasako deployed at Cargill’s premises are my sole
responsibility pursuant to my existing contract with Cargill.
This arrangement has been our business practice from the
time I entered into a contract with Cargill.”61 (emphasis
supplied)
58
59
See Agreement between Cargill Philippines, Inc. and Imelda P. Del Fonso attached as ANNEX “16” of
Respondent Cargill Phils. Inc.’s Position Paper dated April 21, 2014.
60
Id.
61
22
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
45. To emphasize, it is Ms. Del Fonso who selects the

magsasako/pourers, pays their salaries, and supervises their work. The
foregoing overwhelming evidence that establishes the employer-employee
relationship between Ms. Del Fonso and the magsasako/pourers was ignored
by this Honorable Court in its Assailed Decision.
THE YAG-YAG ARE NOT EMPLOYEES

OF IDS OR CARGILL.
46. The yag-yag are the individuals responsible for unloading sacks
of materials from the from the supplier’s delivery truck to Cargill’s
warehouse. The suppliers of Cargill would hire a truck to transport the
purchased raw materials to the Plant. To quote Cargill’s Position Paper,
“[d]epending upon the agreement between the supplier and truck-owner,
either of them would engage and pay yag-yag who would be responsible for
unloading sacks of raw materials from truck container to the company’s
warehouse.”62
47. Thus, it is either the supplier or truck-owner who employs the

yag-yag. Three truck drivers of different suppliers individually executed a
sworn statement (sinumpaang salaysay63) stating that:
“2. Ako ang nagmamaneho ng delivery truck tuwing may

ihahatid na sako-sakong darak sa Planta o warehouse ng Cargill
Philippines Inc. Buhat ng magsimula akong magdeliver ng darak
sa nasabing kumpanya, ang aking amo at hindi ang Cargill
Philippines Inc. ang nagpapasahod sa mga yag-yag o mga
taong nagbaba ng mga darak mula sa delivery truck at ilalagay
sa warehouse o bodiga.
3. Dahil hindi sumasama ang aking amo sa pagdeliver ng

darak sa Planta, ipinamahala sa akin ang pagpapasahod sa
mga yag-yag. Ang aking ibinabayad sa kanila ay depende sa
bilang ng sakong ininaba mula sa delivery truck at
nababayaran lamang sila pagkatapos madiskarga lahat ng
darak.”64 (emphasis supplied)
48. To emphasize, it is the truck driver of Cargill’s supplier who

selects the yag-yag, pays his salary, and supervises their work. Neither Cargill
nor IDS exercises control and supervision over the duties of the yag-yag. The
62
See Page 22 of Respondent Cargill Phils. Inc.’s Position Paper dated April 21, 2014.
63
64
See ANNEX “3” – REPLY of Reply dated July 28, 2014. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Michael Carlos
23
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
foregoing overwhelming evidence that establishes the employer-employee

relationship between Cargill’s suppliers and the yag-yags was ignored by this
Honorable Court in its Assailed Decision.
THE LOADERS ARE NOT EMPLOYEES

OF IDS OR CARGILL.
49. It must be emphasized that Cargill does not transport or deliver

its final products to its dealers. The dealers send their own trucks or hire trucks
to pick up the feed products from Cargill’s warehouse. In order to haul the
feeds to the trucks, the truck driver requests the assistance of certain
individuals or “loaders” to help haul the products from the warehouse to the
truck.
50. These loaders are not selected by Cargill. It is the individual

dealers or truck drivers who select the loaders. The record shows a sworn
affidavit of a truck driver stating the following:
“1. Ako ay regular na namimili ng productong feeds mula sa

Cargill Philippines Inc. na matatagpuan sa Dampol, Pulilan
Bulacan.
2. Tuwing ako’y namimili ng produkto ng nasabing kumpanya,

ako ay nagbabayad ng mga loaders o mga taong magbubuhat
ng mga sako-sakong produkto ng kumpanya upang ikarga or
isakay sa delivery truck.
3. Ang aking ibinabayad sa mga loader ay depende sa bilang ng

sakong sinakay sa delivery truck.”65 (emphasis supplied)
51. At the risk of being repetitive, all of the aforementioned

individuals, the magsasako/pourers, yag-yag, and loaders are not employees
of Cargill. Applying the four-fold test, Cargill does not hire, fire, pay wages
or control the duties of the said individuals. It is their individual employers.
As such, there is no employer-employee relationship between the said
individuals and Cargill. Cargill thus implores the Honorable Court to nullify
and set aside its Decision dated May 26, 2017.
PRAYER
65
24
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court

NULLIFY and SET ASIDE its Decision dated May 26, 2017 and
REINSTATE the December 29, 2015 Decision and February 15, 2016
Resolution of Public Respondent NLRC.
Private Respondent pray for other just and equitable relief.
Makati for Manila, August [●], 2017.
SYCIP SALAZAR HERNANDEZ & GATMAITAN

Collaborating counsel for
Private Respondent Cargill Philippines, Inc. 4th Floor, SyCipLaw Center
105 Paseo de Roxas, Makati
Tel No. 9823500; Fax No. 8173896
E-mail: sshg@syciplaw.com
25
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
By:
RUSSEL L. RODRIGUEZ
PTR No. 5913916 MD; 01/05/17; Makati
IBP Lifetime No. 014251; 01/06/16; PPLM
MCLE Compliance No. V-0015822; 03/15/16
Roll No. 47471
EASTER PRINCESS U. CASTRO-TY

PTR No. 5913835 MD; 01/05/17; Makati
IBP No. 1057011; 01/04/17; Paranaque City
Roll No. 57931
MARIANNE C. SIBULO
PTR No. 5913922 MD; 01/05/17; Makati
IBP No. 1057069; 01/04/17; Makati
Roll No. 64729
MARK KEVIN U. DELLOSA

PTR No. 5913845 MD; 01/05/17; Makati
IBP No. 1057019; 01/04/17; Makati
Admitted to the Bar in 2016
Roll No. 66363
CARLO MIGUEL ROMEO S. GO

PTR No. 6281643 MD; 06/19/17; Makati
IBP Lifetime No. 17007; 05/16/17; Manila IV
Admitted to the Bar in 2017
Roll No. 70331
COPY FURNISHED:
ATTY. PABLO R. CRUZ

Collaborating Counsel for Cargill
Philippines, Inc. and Counsel for Charlie
Park
P.R. Cruz Law Offices
Units 2A & 2D Genesis Condominium
26 E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue
Quezon City, Metro Manila
26
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
ATTY. ERNESTO R. ARELLANO

Counsel for Petitioners
LEGAL ADVOCATES FOR WORKERS’ INTEREST
Room 206, JIAO Building
No. 2 Timog Avenue, Quezon City
110 Metro Manila
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION
Public Respondent
Sixth Division
PPSTA Building
Banawe corner P. Florentino Street
1100 Quezon City, Metro Manila
EXPLANATION FOR SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL
Due to time constraints, the distances involved, and lack of messengers to

effect personal service, this Reply shall be served by registered mail.
CARLO MIGUEL ROMEO S. GO
/19322-3-13
27

Court upholds reinstatement of workers' claims

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Court upholds reinstatement of workers' claims

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION

- versus - CA-G.R. SP NO. 145225

Private Respondent Cargill Philippines, Inc. (the “Company” or

1. Cargill received on June 1, 2017 the Decision dated May 26,

2. The dispositive portion of the Assailed Decision states:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

3. On June 14, 2017, Respondents timely filed the Motion for

4. To further assist the Honorable Court in its judicious review of

5. Respondent respectfully prays that this Honorable Court

THE INSTANT CASE AND SHOULD NOT BE

A. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE

6. In the Comment, the Petitioners state that “[c]ontrary to private

8.1. On November 04, 2013, Petitioners were allegedly

8.2. On January 30, 2014, after Petitioners’ alleged dismissal,

8.3. On February 13, 2014, KMM-CPIC (“Union”) filed an

8.4. On February 25, 2014, Petitioners filed the instant case.11

“On 19 November 2007, DOLE Med-Arbiter Lito A. Jasa

8. As such, it cannot be said that similar to the Hijo case, Petitioners

Arbiter’s decision, to which the Petitioners still filed a motion for

9. On March 05, 2015, the BLR denied the motion for

“There are four elements of res judicata specifically (1) the

The first three elements of res judicata are undoubtedly present

Anent the last element of res judicata, We do not subscribe to

(1) Bar by Prior Judgment which is provided in Rule 39,

In other words, conclusiveness of judgment simply provides that

B. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, MOST OF

12. Anent Petitioner Paolo Angelo Cabuga (“Mr. Cabuga”), the

13. On October 6, 2015, Mr. Cabuga executed a “Special Release of

“That for and in consideration of the amount of FIFTY

and quitclaim my employer IDS employment services

I further agree that this Special Release of Claim

“[t]he Court has ruled that a waiver or quitclaim is a valid and

16. As regards Petitioners Romnick Padolina (“Mr. Padolina”),

17. Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provide:

SEC. 4. Verification – Except when otherwise specifically

A pleading required to be verified which contains a

The Rules of Court further provide that a Rule 65 Petition for

19. A careful review of Petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari reveals

21. To reiterate, jurisprudence states that the verification

22. Considering that the four Petitioners failed to sign the

23. With respect to Mr. Nel Resurrecion (“Mr. Resurrecion”), his

24. Jurisprudence instructs that claims for illegal dismissal and

“However, we find that Arriola's claims for backwages,

The four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 also applies

26. Since Mr. Resurrecion’s claim has prescribed, he should be

C. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, IDS

LEGITIMATE JOB CONTRACTOR

28. The Petitioners’ argue that “private respondent IDS Employment

29. Labor-only contracting is defined under the Labor Code as

Article 106. Contractor or Subcontractor. –

30. It is further defined under DO No. 18-A32, to wit:

SECTION 6. Prohibition Against Labor-only Contracting.

a) The contractor does not have substantial capital or

to the operation of the company, or directly related

b) The contractor does not exercise the right to control

Under the first scenario, there is no labor-only contracting because IDS

32. At the outset, it must be noted that IDS is a legitimate job

33. Before a Certificate of Registration can be issued, the contractor,

D. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE

34. In addition, the services rendered by the Petitioners are not

35. In contrast, a cursory perusal of the Service Agreement between

“PROJECT TO BE PERFORMED BY THE