Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs.

Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 153888. July 9, 2003.
Facts:

Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines is a non-governmental organization that extends

voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim Communities. They issue Halal
certifications for a fee to qualified products and food manufacturers on account of the actual need
to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food producers' request.

Subsequently, the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme was created under EO 46

designating Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. In this petition for
prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others, that the subject EO violates the constitutional
provision on the separation of Church and State.
Issue:

Whether or not Executive Order 46 violates the constitutional provision on the separation
of Church and State
Held:

No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom of religion was accorded
preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this
preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because
the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive
power to classify food products as halal, Executive Order 46 encroached on the religious freedom
of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products
are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications,
the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah
on halal food.

The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar,
the Court found no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations,
like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that
the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive
power to issue halal certificates.

Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In the
case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on
the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA
the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim
Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government
agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human
consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious
freedom of Muslims.

The halal certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official
religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption. The petition is GRANTED.
Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
 Brother Mariano Mike Z. Velarde vs. Social Justice Society
G.R. No. 159357. April 28, 2004
Facts:

On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila
against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the
interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and
state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing
a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a
specified candidate.

The religious leaders (Cardinal Sin, Eddie Villanueva, Eli Soriano, Mike Velarde, Erano
Manalo) said there was no cause of action against them and no justiciable controversy. The court
a quo opined that the endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a
clear violation of the separation clause. The decision contained no statement of facts, much less an
assessment, or of the court’s findings as to probable facts, beginning with a statement of the nature
of the action and then the question, and then a brief explanation of the provisions involved, and
then to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state.
Issue:
Whether endorsements of candidacies by religious leaders is unconstitutional
Ruling:

No.There is no justiciable controversy since the petition did not sufficiently state what
specific legal right of petitoner was violated by respondent, it also did not state what acts were in
breach of rights or the constitution. Respondent did not state ultimate facts. SJS merely speculated
without facts that, as religious leaders, herein petitoner had endorsed or threatened to endorse
candidates for elective office, and that it posed a clear and present danger of serious erosion of
people’s faith in the electoral process, reinforcing the belief that religious leaders determine the
ultimate result of the elections, violative of separation clause.

Furthermore, SJS did not ask for a declaration of rights, nor stoppage of and threatened
violation; it merely asked for an advisory opinion. SJS did not state any certainty that loss for them
will occur or that asserted rights will be invaded. Not even transcendental importance. The
initiatory pleading of SJS immediately revealed gross inadequacy, contained no element of
ultimate facts upon petitioner relied for its claim. It did not specify the relief sought, merely asked
for answer to a hypothetical question. Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any
public office is a clear violation of the separation clause, found on page 10 of the decision is not
sufficient. But whether or not endorsements by religious leaders is unconstitutional is of paramount
interest, for it concerns the governance of the country and its people. SJS’ counsel utterly failed to
convince the court that there are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue.
OSG sided with Velarde insofar as there were no facts to support the petition. Even SJS claimed
there were no factual allegations.

Wherefore, the petition for review of Brother Mike Velarde is granted. The assailed June
12, 2003 decision and July 29, 2003 order of the RTC are hereby declared null and void and thus
set aside. The SJS petition for declaratory relief is dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
 Dominador L. Taruc, Wilberto Dacera, Nicanor Galanida, Renerio Canta, Jerry Canta,
Cordencio Consigna, Susano Alcala, Leonardo Dizon, Salvador Gelsano and Benito Laugo,
vs. Bishop Porfirio B. De La Cruz, Rev. Fr. Rustom Florano and Delfin Bordas
G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005

Facts:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). Taruc with the
other petitioners clamored for the transfer of parish priest Rustom Florano for the reason that Fr.
Florano’s wife’s family belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Taruc. Bishop De la
Cruz found this reason too flimsy so he did not give in to the request. Things worsened when Taruc
conducted an open mass for the town Fiesta celebrated by Fr. Ambong who was not a member of
the clergy of the diocese of Surigao.

On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners excommunicated from the
Philippine Independent Church for the reason of (1) disobedience to duly constituted authority, (2)
inciting dissension resulting in division of the Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual Help and (3)
threatening to forcible occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety among the General Membership.

Because of the order of excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with
preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court and impleaded
Fr. Florano and a certain Delfin Bordas for conspiring with the Bishop. They said that their rights
to due process were violated because they were not heard before the order of expulsion was made.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?

Held:

No. The expulsion or excommunication of members of a religious institution or

organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. “Civil Courts will not interfere in
the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights.
Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to
determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.”

Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

 Francisco I. Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and
Magtanggol Gunigundo, (In His Capacity as Chairman of The PCGG),
Gloria A. Jopson, Celnan A. Jopson, Scarlet A. Jopson, And Teresa A. Jopson, Petitioners-
In-Intervention
G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998
Facts:

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who
initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of
the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country’s economy, alleges that what
impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets
sometime in September 1997.

These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos’
assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a
compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or
share these assets.

Chavez, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state
to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents
make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the
Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.
He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue
of paramount public interest, since it has a debilitating effect on the countrys economy that would
be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general
have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.
Issue:

Whether or not the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses
within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information?

Ruling:

Yes, the petition is imbued with merit. Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have
decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.

Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage
when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory”
stage.

There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in

general, such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence
and other classified information.
 Francisco I. Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
Facts:

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos tasked PEA "to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any
and all kinds of lands." On 1988, President Corazon C. Aquino granted and transferred to PEA the
parcels of land so reclaimed under MCCRRP.

PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997 reported among the conclusions: (1) the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these
lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself
is illegal. Then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365
creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate
Committee Report.

Fank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining

Order contending the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the
reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987
Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
Petitioner now prays that on constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be
declared null and void.
Issue:
Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going
negotiations before a final agreement
Ruling:
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces
the people's right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus: “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest."

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations
leading to the consummation of the transaction."

However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. The right only affords access to
records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who
exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of
the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and
to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct
the inspection and copying.
 Romulo L. Neri, Petitioner vs. Senate Committee On Accountability Of Public Officers
And Investigations, Senate Committee On Trade And Commerce, And Senate Committee
On National Defense And Security

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

Facts:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered
into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S.
$ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The project was to be financed by the People’s
Republic of China.

The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared
in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hours and during which he admitted that Abalos
of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project.
He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions
on:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring
that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an
order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Issue:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
Held:
The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464
(advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws
and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to
legislative inquiries in aid of legislation), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive
privilege. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the
area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation as may be
provided by law.
Center For People Empowerment In Governance (CENPEG) vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 189546 September 21, 2010

Facts:

This case concerns the duty of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disclose the
source code for the Automated Election System (AES) technologies it used in the 2010 national
and local elections.

On May 26, 2009 petitioner Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), a
non-government organization, wrote respondent COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code
of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) programs, the Board of Canvassers
Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS) programs for the municipal, provincial, national,
and congressional canvass, the COMELEC server programs, and the source code of the in-house
COMELEC programs called the Data Capturing System (DCS) utilities.

COMELEC failed to provide plaintiffs with the source code of identified canvass machines
despite repeated requests and demands. CenPEG is now praying for the issuance of a writ
of mandamus, despite the lapse of the May 2010 elections, claiming that the
sourcecode remained important and relevant "not only for compliance with the law, and thepurpo
se thereof, but especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions of errors and claims of fraud."

Issue:

Whether or not COMELEC could be compelled to release the source code to CenPEG

Ruling:

The Court finds the petition and this last manifestation meritorious.

The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that once an AES technology
is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that
technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their
own review thereof.

The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this requirement of the law.
Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source code was that it was not yet available when
CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for security
reason, under a controlled environment. The elections had passed and that reason is already stale.

Wherefore, the Court grants the petition for mandamus and directs the COMELEC to make
the source codes for the AES technologies it selected for implementation pursuant to RA 9369
immediately available to cenPEG and all other interested political parties or groups for
independent review.
 People of the Philippines vs. Magsi
GR L-32888, 12 August 1983
Facts:

On 14 January 1968 in the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, Philippines, Eloi

Magsi, Juan Ponce y Billon (aka Johnny), Perfecto Arce (aka Peping), along with Gerardo Flores
(aka Gerry), Opring Olazo, Doro Doe and Peter Doe, conspired in the killing of one Jesus Gallardo
outside the latter's house through the use of carbine, pistols and revolvers.

Magsi, et. al. were charged before the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial
District on 10 January 1968 for murder, with aggravating circumstances attendant in the
commission of the offense. "Doro Doe," subsequently identified as Teodoro del Rosario.

Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled
before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and
rescheduled for six times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that date, despite
appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was
re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of
accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel.

Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was
favorably acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8,
1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case,
the hearing was re-set for the next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio
counsel for the accused. On the third hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel
was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment
purposes only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation
that he committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other
coaccused. Appellant was found guilty of murder and made to suffer the death penalty.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the accused.
Ruling:

The Court has consistently enjoined strict and substantial adherence to its rulings in cases
where defendants are charged with capital offenses. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio
counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the
court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries
addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are
not sufficient compliance with the Court's injunctions. The conduct of the trial court clearly
established the fact that it had been remiss in its duties to the accused, who was convicted on an
improvident plea of guilty.

The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the
basic rights of the accused. The trial courts should exercise solicitous care before sentencing the
accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital offenses by first insuring that the accused fully
understands the gravity of the offense, the severity of the consequences attached thereto as well as
the meaning and significance of his plea of guilty; and that the prudent and proper thing to do in
capital cases is to take testimony, to assure the court that the accused has not misunderstood the
nature and effect of his plea of guilty.
 Joevanie Arellano Tabasa vs.
Hon. Court Of Appeals, Bureau Of Immigration And Deportation And Wilson Soluren
G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006

Facts:

In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a
naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that
of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization), Joevanie A. Tabasa
also acquired American citizenship when his father became a naturalized citizen of the US.

In 1995, he arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was
arrested and detained by the agent of BIR. Th Consul General of the US embassy of Manila filed
a request with the BID that his passport has been revoked and that Tabasa had a standing warrant
for several federal charges against him. Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA
8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by
derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.

Issue:

Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
therefore, is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation

Ruling:

No. The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: 1) either a
Filipino woman who lost her Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-born
Filipino, including his minor children who lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity.

Tabasa overlooked the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available
only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. Petitioner overlooks the fact
that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who
lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of
said natural-born Filipinos.

Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be applied
in his case because he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in 1996. The privilege
under RA 8171 only belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of filing of the petition
for repatriation.