Professional Documents
Culture Documents
To cite this article: Np Ventikos Assistant Professor & Di Stavrou (2013) Submarine power cables:
laying procedure, the fleet and reliability analysis, Journal of Marine Engineering & Technology,
12:1, 13-26
This paper investigates the possible problems of laying submarine power cables (SPC).
It provides information about the power cables themselves, the laying procedure, and the
respective fleet. It also describes the medium voltage (MV) transmission grid in Greece
and determines the correlation of different parameters that affect the operation of the
network. Furthermore, a reliability analysis, based on a statistical model, is conducted;
the model is used to evaluate the operational characteristics of cables, such as the rate
of failures from natural or human causes, and is also used to choose between different
candidate cable routes in order to determine the one with the maximum reliability.
AUTHORS’ BIOGRAPHIES
Dr Nikolaos P Ventikos is an Assistant Professor in the School to a significant development of submarine power cables for
of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering at the National the transfer of electricity from the mainland.1 Moreover, the
Technical University of Athens (NTUA), Greece. Dr Ventikos’s use of submarine power cables was expanded to other appli-
expertise is in marine safety; risk analysis/assessment; marine cations, such as the interconnection of autonomous power
(oil) pollution; maritime security; human factors; and statistical transmission grids to meet the needs of consumption during
modelling. He was awarded the GP Livanos Grand Prize on periods of high demand, to transfer electric energy produced
Environmental Issues (2000). from offshore wind parks, to provide electric power to off-
shore oil and gas production platforms (in an effort to opti-
Dimitrios I Stavrou is a Lieutenant Commander in the Hellenic mise the onboard space and reduce maintenance costs), and
Navy. He serves the Amphibious Assault Forces Command as to perform electric heating to submarine pipelines in order to
Chief Engineer. He also served in frigates for two years, in sub- prevent wax and hydrate deposits.2,3
marines for 10 years (six as chief engineer) and in landing ships The cables must have suitable specifications for surviving
(two years as chief engineer). He was awarded the Diploma in a significantly corrosive water environment and the capa-
of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering by the National bility of unimpeded electric energy transfer without failures.
Technical University of Athens, Greece. His research interests The quality of construction of cables needs to be of a high
focus on models of reliability. standard in order to endure the potential mechanical strains
of natural or human origin. In addition to a cable’s techni-
cal characteristics, which enable it to function in a difficult
INTRODUCTION
S
environment, there are a variety of parameters related to the
ubmarine power cables have for many years played a laying procedure or the retraction after failure. Laying pro-
significant role in the transfer of energy on a world- cedures are undertaken by specifically designed/built vessels
wide scale. In Greece, the initial use of power cables with modern systems of position tracking and navigation.
was limited to providing electricity to inshore light- The success of the effort is safeguarded by special equipment
houses. However, the increasing demands for electric energy that ensures both the proper laying procedure as well as the
on the islands, in combination with the disproportional cost protection of cables. Mistakes at any stage may result in huge
of maintaining local electric energy production plants, led financial and social cost.
Aside from the characteristics of cables and their laying stability and mechanical protection during storage, load,
procedure, a reliability analysis is needed. The evaluation of installation, function and repair;
interconnection is necessary to improve the protection for The outer sleeve: it gives the outer view of the cable
future prevention of failures. Furthermore, means for the prop- whereas, at the same time, it protects the armour from
er selection of choice between two or more interconnections is scratches. The outer sleeve consists of spiral overlay of
needed, taking into account and aiming at maximum reliability. wires or extruded polymer.
The aim of this study is to present/determine possible
aspects of the laying procedure of submarine cables in
Greece; particularly, reference is made to the fleet, the lay- Peripheral components
ing procedure itself, and the equipment which may be used To achieve successful interconnections between cables, and
towards this end. Moreover, a descriptive statistical analy- therefore the efficient operation of the system, certain periph-
sis is attempted in the context of presenting the submarine eral components are also used, the most important being the
medium-voltage power transmission grid in Greek waters. submarine cable joints. Data from recorded failures of sub-
Finally, a reliability analysis based on a statistical model is marine power cables indicate that joints account for 10.4%
made in order to evaluate the performance and protection of of the failures.7
cable routes, in terms of reliability. Factory joints are mainly used during the process of
production. Other kind of joints, such as installation joints,
can be used onboard during laying or repairing procedures,
SUBMARINE POWER CABLES (SPCs) and shore joints are used to connect submarine cables to
Construction elements underground cables in order to reduce the total cost of the
There are a lot of similarities between submarine power installation. The adequate functionality of shore joints is of
cables and underground power cables; however, the differ- high importance due to the nodal role they have operating
ences refer mainly to the adverse environmental conditions in in special environmental conditions (eg, a combination of
which submarine cables should operate.4,5,6,7,8 shallow water and fine-grained sand), and they must provide
The SPC comprises the following elements, as shown utmost reliability and flexibility.10
in Fig 1: Significant attention during the cable laying procedure is
given to the protective set-up of the cables, especially in areas
The conductor: it is made of copper (Cu) or aluminium where the prevailing conditions can cause serious damage to
(Al). It is the means by which the current passes through; the cable, eg, areas with rocky bottoms, or areas with intense
The isolation system: a system of successive layers professional fishing activities.7,11,12 In effect, the protection
made of isolating materials that prevent the conductor of the cable can be achieved by using a concrete mattress,
from contact with the atmosphere; or by using restraining or hanging systems that shoulder the
Semi-conductive screen layers: they come between the responsibility of holding the weight of the cables, or by rock
conductor and the isolator so as to form a stable dielectric placement or articulated piping.7,13,14 For example, dividing
surface not being affected by local stress caused from shells are used to protect the cable from damage caused by
irregularities of the inner (conductor) and outer (insula- the friction between the outer shell of cables and the seabed.15
tor) screen layers; Last but not least, equipment for electrical grounding of
A watertight sleeve: it protects the conductor and the the cable is also used at the terminal points to ensure effective
isolation system from penetration of water. This bime- grounding.
tallic sleeve is made of lead (Pb), or alternatively, alu-
minium (Al), or copper (Cu);
The armour: it is made of steel wires (alternatively LAYING PROCEDURE OF SPCs
stainless steel or alloy of aluminium). The main purpose The laying procedure of a submarine cable is a complex
of the armour is to provide the cable with both tension and laborious task due to the fact that the success of
Fig 1: (left) A MV SPC with XLPE isolation;9 (right) the types of SPC that have been used in Greece from their initial use in 1968
up to the present time
the project depends on several, different and sometimes 1. Loading of the cable onboard the cable laying vessels –
conflicting parameters. Miscalculation during the design preliminary checks focusing on the various stages of the
phase, or mishandling during implementation, can boost laying procedure;
the project cost to exceptional levels, prove extremely 2. Landing of the first end of the cable;
time-consuming, or even postpone the whole operation. 3. Laying of the cable between the two terminal points (on
The first phase of the activity addresses the preliminary the seabed or under the seabed); with an average speed
design which defines in detail all factors that affect the for the laying procedure of 30m/min;16
laying procedure; the second phase covers the actual lay- 4. Landing of the second end of the cable.
ing procedure itself.
Specifically, an analysis during the first phase of the
operation includes the following components:12,28 THE FLEET OF CABLE LAYING VESSELS
(CLVs) OPERATED IN GREECE
1. Geological structure of the region of the interconnec- In the early stages of submarine cable planning, consideration
tion; must be given to the multiple purpose vessels that can meet
2. Survey of the sea area of interest, which includes: the needs for the task of laying the cables. The tremendous
a. Detailed study of the morphology of the seabed of development in the field of submarine cables, in addition to
the coupling zone; the complex diversities of each operation, highlight the need
b. Examination of the morphology of the subsoil for vessels with special characteristics that can be used exclu-
beneath the seabed; sively for cable laying operations (or almost exclusively with
c. Checking the setting of the subsoil beneath the the subsequent integration of supporting missions).
seabed; A modern CLV that is able to lay power cables may also
d. Research of the coupling zone with marine magne- have the capability of laying communication cables,13 but
tometer; the reverse is not always valid due to the essential differ-
3. Examination of terminal points, including: ence in specific weight between power and communication
a. Research on the morphology of the coastal region of cables; this can exclude a number of vessels from the spe-
the terminal points; cific mission.
b. Research on the seabed topography of the terminal
points;
c. Underwater inspection of the landing areas using an Specifications of CLVs
underwater detector, for metal objects or previous The aspects and conditions that can be attributed to the opera-
submerged submarine cables); tions of laying submarine cables led to the development of
4. Oceanographic, hydrographic data; an independent fleet with special characteristics; to this end,
5. Natural hazards, including: CLVs hold a nodal position within the framework of such
a. Active faults, earthquakes and gravitational move- operations.
ment of sediment; Sometimes, the existence of special operational condi-
b. Gaseous hydrocarbons and related landforms (eg, tions, such as shallow waters, may demand the additional use
craters-pockmarks); of other type of vessels, like floating barges – with or without
c. Water gravity waves (tsunamis); self-propulsion – temporarily modified for the needs of the
d. Landforms erosion, transport and deposition of specific operation.17
sediment; The special characteristics and operational aspects that
e. Steep slopes; must be considered during the shipbuilding of a CLV com-
f. Uneven topography of the seabed; prise the following:18
6. Human related hazards, including:11,12
a. Anchoring of ships; 1. Loading capacity (turntables, fixed cable tanks, cable
b. Fishing activities; drums);
c. Failures during the laying procedure; 2. Ability to define accurate position (eg, DGPS);
d. Other aspects of human activities. 3. Ability to maintain accurate position, eg, anchoring sys-
tems, or dynamic positioning systems (DPS);
The organisation/company undertaking the responsibil- 4. Jointing house;
ity of a cable laying operation has the obligation to develop 5. Laying procedure control room (LPCR);
and present detailed instructions on the nature of the planned 6. Cable tension mechanisms;
work, the means and the necessary equipment that will be 7. Emergency cutter;
used, and the description of the exact procedures that will be 8. Remote operated vehicle (ROV) and ROV supporting
employed during the progress of the work. Additional items equipment;
that must meet the consideration at the preliminary analysis 9. Other equipment;
are the owner’s special requirements (preferred cable route, 10. Helicopter landing pad.
landing points and others), and regulatory factors on the area
that might affect the laying procedure. Table 1 lists the CLVs that have been deployed and
The phase of the actual cable laying is detailed in the o perated in Greek waters for undersea power cable laying
following steps:6 operations over the last twenty years.
and it is called L9.Each one of those parts is laid to a specific In effect, the domain of this parameter is:
depth, Di with i = 0,1,2,...7; The parameters of length Li and
depth Dk are discussed later. D {D0, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D7} =
In addition to the above, for each cable the number of D{0–9m, 10–19m, 20–29m, 30–39m, 40–49m, 50–59m,
failures was studied at intervals of one year. The employed 60–69m, more than 70m}.
data of failures provide a reliable basis for the period between
2000 and 2011, which is the time period under examination Length of the cable route at the point of failure/mini-
in this paper. mum distance from the coast Lj (j = 0 to 9)
According to these assumptions, each cable has a unique This parameter focuses on the point of failure in terms
‘identity’ which corresponds to it from the time of its laying of the length of the segment of the cable that suffers the
up to-date. In effect, each cable segment of 250m at a specific problem and its minimum distance from the coast, ie, from
depth is assigned to each year that passes in a unique way the two terminal points of the submarine cable. The total
with a white square segment. Fig 4 (taken from Nakamura19) length of cables is partitioned for the first 2.25km (from
represents the set-up of the implemented model. Assuming a both sides of terminal points) to segments of 250m each.
failure after some years of the laying procedure at a specific Beyond the threshold of 2.25km (hence towards the mid-
length and depth the respective square element is illustrated dle part of the cable, if this is of adequate length) there
with a darker colour. is no further partition, taking it as a unified segment. The
As shown in Fig 4, every square segment has three descriptive statistics show that failures further in from
dimensions: the resolution of x-axis equals 250m per cell, 2.25km are uniformly distributed. The domain of the
of y-axis year per cell and, of z-axis, the particular depth of parameter is given (in km) as:
the cable. For example, if the focus is upon the connection
between the Greek islands of Paros and Naxos with a life L {L0, L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L6, L7, L8, L9} =
of cable from 2004 up to-date, and a total length of 3500m, {0–0.24, 0.25–0.49, 0.50–0.74, 0.75–0.99, 1.00–1.24,
L
then x-axis includes seven cells, y-axis 14 units of 250m 1.25–1.49, 1.50–1.74, 1.75–1.99, 2.00–2.24, above 2.25}
each, and the z-axis reaches a maximum depth of 35m.
With the above considerations, a flat area which reflects Modified protection Ei (i = 1 to 4)
the 69 deployed links with 169 wires of a total length The seabed is organised into four categories: muddy, sandy,
of 1092km was constructed; hence the set-up consists of gravel, and rocky; according to the characteristics of the sea-
about 45 311 cells. bed the required protection of the cable is differentiated. The
experience of repairing failures has indicated that for both
muddy and sandy sea bottoms there was a natural penetration
Detailed description of the parameters of the of the cable within the seabed of about 0.3–0.5m.
employed statistical model Furthermore, the protection of cables along cable routes
Depth of the cable route at the point of failure Dk integrates two different aspects: on the one hand, there is the
(k = 0 to 7) protection of cables from both natural and human-related
This is the distance of each cable segment from the sea hazards, such as from the burying of cables in trenches, the
surface. In the case of failure, this depth corresponds to the usage of protection set-up systems (such as concrete mat-
depth of the segment that suffers the fault. The total depth is tresses or the placement of rocks), or the use of restraining
divided for the first 70m into intervals of 10m each. Beyond or hanging systems (eg, dividing shells and chains); and on
this threshold there is no further partition, thus taking it as a the other hand, there is the self-protection of the cable due
unified segment; the descriptive statistics show that failures to the armour that is used during manufacturing. In this case,
at a depth of more than 70m are uniformly distributed. For the important issues relate to the choice of the right material
cases in which the segment under examination follows a for the wires of the armour and the usage of single or double
(significantly) inclined bottom, eg, from depth D1, to depth armour to provide both tension stability and mechanical pro-
D2, then the referred depth of the cable segment equals Dk = tection to the cable.
(D1+D2)/2. It is assumed that the change of the depth at each Considering the high correlation between the features of
interval is less than 10m. This means that in the case of a the seabed and the protection characteristics of cables these
seabed with an inclination of more than 4%, the choice of two parameters were integrated into the model as a unified
the average depth must be done with caution. variable called ‘modified protection’. Table 3 illustrates the
Table 3: Categorisation of the modified protection to represent the quality of seabed along with the protection of cables
Stavrou_JMET_Jan.indd 20
D D0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7
L E1 E2 E3 E4 E1 E2 E3 E4 E1 E2 E3 E4 E1 E2 E3 E4 E1 E2 E3 E4 E1 E2 E3 E4 E1 E2 E3 E4 E1 E2 E3 E4
Table 4: Allocation of SPCs to the Greek electrical network according to the selected characteristics Ei, Lj, Dk
Submarine power cables: laying procedure, the fleet and reliability analysis
1/22/13 8:08 AM
Submarine power cables: laying procedure, the fleet and reliability analysis
way this new parameter is set-up; it also takes into consid- Finally, the failure factor is calculated; this factor indi-
eration the possible depth of penetration from a ship anchor cates the ‘tendency’ for failure at each level of protection with
and the specifications for the laying procedures, as they are respect to level E1:
edited from the Hellenic Distribution Network Operator.20,21
The modified protection is based on the combination of the 1
F ( Ei ) = (3)
characteristics of the seabed along the cable route with the S ( Ei )
protection of the cable itself. In effect, the domain of this
variable is: E {E1, E2, E3, E4}.
Modification-fitting of Lj
According to Fig 6, the number of cable failures can be
Modification-fitting of Ei calculated for any combination of Lj and Dk by using the
The raw data presented in Table 4 provide information for safety factor:
both the actual number of failure segments and total segments
4
corresponding to each Ei level. The data refer to the MV SPC
network in Greece over the last decade. The failure rate per N f ( L j , Dk|E1 ) = ∑ N f ( Ei , L j , Dk ) . S ( Ei ) (4)
i =1
250m and year at any combination between Ei, Lj, and Dk is:
4
N f ( Ei , L j , Dk ) N t ( L j , Dk ) = ∑ N t ( Ei , L j , Dk ) (5)
P( Ei , L j , Dk ) = (1) i =1
N t ( Ei , L j , Dk )
where Nf (Ei, Lj, Dk) and Nt (Ei, Lj, Dk) are calculated from
where Nf (Ei, Lj, Dk) is the number of failure segments and Table 3. For integrating the parameter Lj into the ‘dimen-
Nt (Ei, Lj, Dk) corresponds to the corresponding number of sional reduction’, the number of equivalent failure elements
total segments. Nf(Lj|E1) and the number of total elements Nt(Lj) must be
Fig 5 shows that no failures were recorded at the highest calculated for each combination of Lj and Dk.
protection level, namely E4. In this case, the use of actual
7
failures to calculate the failure rate with equation (1) equals
zero for this protection level. N f ( L j|E1 ) = ∑ N f ( L j , Dk|E1 ) (6)
k =0
However, to be able to predict the failures, these are best 7
fitted through a theoretical distribution; a discrete distribution N t ( L j ) = ∑ N t ( L j , Dk ) (7)
is employed due to the nature of the parameter of interest. In k =0
particular, the Poisson distribution with λ = 0.2 is selected.
To this end, the approximation of actual failures is illustrated Fig 6 presents the number of equivalent failures and the
in Fig 5, along with the modified factors according to the number of total segments calculated from equation (6) and
Poisson distribution; the rate of failures, the safety factor and (7), respectively. The equivalent failures are also illustrated
the failure factor for each level Ei are calculated and presented through the Log-Normal distribution.22,23 The approxima-
accordingly. tion of equivalent failures is called ‘modified failures’ and is
The safety factor shows the relative correlation represented in the column labelled ‘Mod. fail.’ of Fig 6. The
between the failure rates of the four employed protection safety factor and the failure factor are respectively derived
levels, taking as the basis the failure rate of protection from the following formulas:
level E 1 which equals one. It is calculated from the fol-
lowing equation: P( L1| E1 )
S( L j ) =
P( L j| E1 ) (8)
P( E1 )
S ( Ei ) = (2)
1
P( Ei ) F(L j ) = (9)
S( L j )
Safety Failure
Total Rate of
Factor Failures Transf. factor factor
segments failures
S F
Nf(Ei)/ F(Ei)=
Ei Nf(Ei) Nf(Ei) Nt(Ei) S(Ei)
Nt(Ei) 1/S(Ei)
E
E1 53 79.47 37598 0.0021 1.0000 1.0000
E2 29 15.89 4232 0.0038 0.5628 1.7768
E3 15 1.59 3305 0.0005 4.3952 0.2275
E4 0 0.11 176 0.0006 3.5108 0.2848
97 97 45311
Fig 5: The modified-fitted parameter of protection and its related factors (left); the fitting of the protection parameter with the
Poisson distribution for λ = 0.2(right)22
Length
Rate of Failure
Eqt. Mod. fail. Total Safety
failures factor
Failures Nf(Lj|E1) Segm. factor
Nf(Lj|E1)/ F(Lj)
Li Nf(Lj|E1) Nt(Lj) S(Lj)
Nt(Lj)
Fig 6: The modified-fitted parameter of length and its related factors (left); the fitting of the parameter of length with the
Log-Normal distribution (right)23
Depth Rate of
Eqt. Total
Mod. fail. failures
Failures Segm.
Dk Nf(Dk|E1,L0) Nf(Dk|E1,L0)/
Nf(Dk|E1,L0) Nt(Dk)
Nt(Dk)
D0 (0–9) 127.92 143.04 4779 0.0299
D1 (10–19) 66.62 286.09 4229 0.0676
Fig 7: The modified-fitted parameter of depth and its related factors (left); the fitting of depth with the Poisson distribution for
λ = 2 (right)22,23
Fig 9: Two alternative cable routes, A and B, are proposed and examined to decide which one would be chosen (in terms of
reliability)
Lavrio Syros
Cable Cable Sea Cable Cable
Sea depth
A B depth A B
200m 10m 250m 50m
From LP From LP
(Land point) Trench 1.0m in Trench 0.6m in (Land point) Trench 1.0m in Trench 1.0m in
to −10m sandy substrate rocky substrate to −10m sandy substrate sandy substrate
Fig 10: Reliability results for the two candidate routes, A and B.
length with maximum depth up to 270m.The main charac- 5. The study of failures against the depth and the minimum
teristics of these two candidate cable routes are displayed distance from shores of the point of failure yields a nega-
in Table 5. tive exponential distribution. More specifically, the bulk
Fig 10 shows the results of the reliability analysis for of failures are recorded near landing points and there is a
both cable routes A and B. According to the analysis the strong reduction in their numbers as cables routes draw
most critical areas for the routes are located near terminal away from the shores and depth increases;
points; namely near the coasts. The highest probability 6. Failures related to human-derived hazards amount to
of failure is assigned to route B and more specifically 63.4%, whereas failures related to natural hazards are
near the coasts of the island of Syros. Moreover, cable 22.6% and those due to hardware failure are just 12.9%.
route B appears to have more segments with minimum or According to a Cigre (Council for Large Electrical
less possibility of failures than the respective values of Systems) study in 1986, failures related to human and
route A. natural hazards were 82% and those related to hardware
The comparison between the estimated MTBF for the failure (joints) were 18%;26
two candidate cable routes shows that route B appears to be 7. The type of protection for cables plays a significant role
a better choice than adopting route A; the model yields the in order to avoid damages.
following MTBFs:
A statistical analysis/model using four parameters (depth,
MTBFA = 1/RA = 20.46 years; distance, protection of cable and type of seabed) that affect
MTBFB = 1/RB = 22.31 years. submarine cables with regards to failures is presented in this
paper. The application of this reliability model can be used for
In the case that the cables deployed for both alternative studying the reliability of medium-voltage power cables in a
cable routes were unprotected, then the respective values for two-fold manner:
MTBF would reduce significantly to:
1. To determine critical and safe areas along a certain cable
MTBFA(unprotected) = 1/RA = 6.6 years; route. This is achieved by calculating the reliability
MTBFB (unprotected) = 1/RB = 12.97 years. of each segment of cable (of 250m length). Moreover,
through the development of a reliability-driven diagram
Hence, route A appears to be (significantly) less reliable the segments that have adequate protection, or the seg-
than route B, even though route B has a critical segment ments of the cable that need to be reinforced, can be
for which additional protection should be considered due to illustrated;
intense local human activities. 2. During the phase of preliminary design the optimum
route for laying the cable can be chosen. More specifi-
cally, the model can assess the reliability of candidate
CONCLUSIONS cable routes and help select the safest one, ie, the route
The use of submarine power cables is very important for with the higher reliability or with the higher Mean
Greece with regards to the transfer of energy and the elec- Time Between Failures (MTBF), and can be adequately
trical interconnection of the islands with the mainland. The justified.
descriptive statistics focusing on the failures of the submarine
medium-voltage network in Greek waters give the following
conclusions: References
1. RAE. 2005. Workgroup for the power interconnection
1. The rate of failures in the Hellenic electrical subsea of Cyclades with the mainland. Technical report, 88pp.
network is 0.0562 failures per km per year. This also 2. Hviddsten S, et al. 2004. HV cable design appli-
depends on the region of interest with a minimum rate cable for direct electrical heating of very long flowlines.
of 0.0104 failures per km per year (for the south Aegean Proceeding of Oceans ’04 and MTTS/IEEE Techno-Ocean
Sea) to a maximum rate of 0.6780 failures per km per ’04, Kobe, Japan.
year (for the Ionian Sea; the latter high value should alert 3. Nexans AS. 2007. Subsea technology, submarine
the responsible authorities and proceed to further investi- cables, umbilicals and services, handbill for submarine power
gation/survey for this region); cables. Norway, 36pp.
2. The age of cables at the time of failure shows an empiri- 4. Worzyk T. 2009. Submarine power cables, design
cal distribution that can be fitted by the normal distribu- aspects. Springer, Ch.2 Submarine power cables and their
tion with a mean value of 18.65 years and a standard design. Berlin, 306pp.
deviation of 9.95 years; 5. Public Power Corporation, Standard of Public Power
3. Failures related to conductors made of copper are 50% Corporation S.A. GR-214, 11pp.
more per 100km than those related to aluminium; 6. Public Power Corporation, Standard of Public Power
4. The XLPE isolation seems to be better than the paper iso- Corporation S.A. TP-195, 11pp.
lation. The use of XLPE isolation has been applied since 7. Stavrou D. 2012. Submarine power cables, the fleet,
the year 2000 and, therefore, the sample of the XLPE the laying procedure and reliability analysis of submarine
isolation system cables is still significant lower than the medium voltage power transmission grid. D Th. NTUA,
one corresponding to paper isolation; Athens, 186pp.
8. Public Power Corporation. 2006. Technical specifica- 18. Worzyk T. 2009. Submarine power cables, design
tions for supply and laying submarine power cables with aspects. Springer. Ch.7 Installation and protection of subma-
X-LPE isolation for the link ‘Kalymnos-Kos’. Declaration rine power cables, Berlin, 306pp.
2170302, 35pp. 19. Nakamura M, et al. 1992. Reliability analysis of sub-
9. Nexans Industries GmbH & Co. 2003. Submarine marine power cables and determination of external mechani-
power cables, handbill for cables specifications, Deutschland, cal protection. IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol.7,
16pp. 895–902pp.
10. Worzyk T. 2009. Submarine power cables, design 20. Submarine power cables of distribution. 1986. DMKD/
aspects. Springer, Ch.4 Submarine Cable Joints, Berlin, TMSA. Characteristics of submarine power cables of medium
306pp. voltage, 64pp.
11. Stephen CD and Alan GH. 2009. Fishing and subma- 21. FULGOR, Greek electric cables. 2006. Offer for the
rine cables working together. 2nd edition. ICPC, 54pp. Inquiry of Hellenic PPC DD-164 for the link ‘Kalymnos-
12. Dr Papageorgiou G, Chasiotis Th, Dr Feredinos G Kos’. 18pp.
and Bogiatzakis I. 1995. Marine geological and man haz- 22. Perakis A. 1989. Reliability and safety of marine engi-
ards and their effect on dumping pipes and cables. PATRA, neering, theory and applications. Athens. 277pp.
150pp. 23. Hahn and Shapiro. 1994. Statistical model in engi-
13. International Cable Protection Committee Ltd. 2011. neering, Canada, 355pp.
Presentation about submarine power cables ,45pp. 24. Technical report, Akti Engineering. 2008. Marine and
14. Nexans Norway AS. 2009. Specialised in submarine land surveying services, subsea geophysical research to the
projects, cables and umbilical systems for offshore applica- link Aigina-Methana.
tions, Bremerhaven. 25. Public Power Corporation. 2011. Declaration DYPM
15. Ernesto Z. 2009. HVDC transmission cable systems, 40908, for the operation of: ‘Interconnection of Cyclades
state-of-the-art and future trends. Prysmian Powerlink, ICC islands with the mainland power transmission grid’.
Meeting Subcommitee, Orlando, USA, 46pp. 26. CIGRE paper. 1986. Methods to prevent mechanical
16. Alcatel-Fulgor. 1998. Technical report for submarine damage to submarine cables. Paris.
power cables. HTC 1350/12 12/20 (24) KV, 3x95mm2, XLPE, 27. CIGRE Study Committee. 2009. Update of service
55pp. experience of HV underground and submarine cable systems.
17. Axelsson T. 2008. Submarine cable laying and instal- Cigre Working group B1-10 2009.
lation services for the offshore alternative energy industry. 28. ICPC. 2007. Recommendation No 9: Minimum tech-
Energy Ocean 2008, 9pp. nical requirements for a desktop study. Portsmouth. 16pp.