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142 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Our adversaries, indeed, try to undermine this argument. They say that they con-
cede that by postulating eccentric orbs and epicycles all the phenomena can be sav-
ed, but that from this it does not follow that the said orbs are to be found in nature:
they are, rather, altogether fictitious. [This is so], they say, because it may be that
the phenomena can be saved in some more appropriate way, even though it is as yet
unknown to us, and because it is possible that the true appearances are saved by
means of the said orbs, even though they are altogether fictitious and in no way the
true causes of those appearances; just as one can derive what is true from what is
false, as is well known from Aristotle’s Dialectic.’
‘In Sphaeram Ioannii de Sacro Bosco commentarius, nunc iterum ab ipso auctore recognitus,
Rome, 1581 (hereafter cited as ‘In Sphaeram’). For details of the editions see C. Sommervogel,
BibtiothPque de la Compagnie de J&us, Vol. 2, Paris, 1891, ~01s. 1212- 1213.
‘In Sphaeram, 434 - 435. The reference to Aristotle’s Dialectic is to Prior Analytics, 11: 2 - 4.
The Forging of Modern Realism: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics 143
II
and renaissance natural philosophers including many who are not in any
technical sense Averroists. One of Averroes’ sixteenth century Italian ad-
mirers, Agostino Nifo (1473 - 1538). summarises Averroes’ argument as
follows:
Averroes argued logically against epicycles and eccentrics in the following way.
One should understand that a sound demonstration is one in which the cause is
necessary for the effect. Now it is granted that when eccentrics and epicycles are
posited the appearances follow and can be saved. But the converse is not true.
When the appearances are posited, epicycles and eccentrics do not have to be
[posited], except for the time being until another better cawa is discovered which is
necessary [for the appearances]. The proponents of epicycles and eccentrics are,
therefore, in error, because they argue from a proposition having several causas for
the truth of one of them. But these appearances can be saved both in this way and
in others which have not yet been discovered.13
Nifo, still following Averroes, goes on to claim that a true astronomy, one
consistent with Aristotelian physics, must be founded on homocentrics. But
unlike his contemporaries, Giovanni Amici and Girolamo Fracastoro, whose
Homocentrica of 1538 Clavius attacks in the course of his defence of the
Ptolemaic system, Nifo offers no detailed account of the way in which such a
system can save the phenomena. By no means all of those who endorse Av-
erroes’ ‘logical argument’ against the Ptolemaic astronomy actually declare
that the celestial phenomena can be saved using only homocentrics. Aquinas,
for example, remains non-committal as do several Italian renaissance
Aristotelians including Tommaso de Vio Gaetano (1469 - 1534) and Benedict
Pereira (1535 - 1610).”
Duhem’s treatment of those who deny or doubt the truth of Ptolemaic
astronomy is puzzling. Nifo, Fracastoro and other declared homocentrists, he
assigns to the realist camp, but many of those who fail to declare themselves
homocentrists he describes as fictionalists or near-fictionalists. Yet the
passages he cites all admit of a simple interpretation. Whatever they may have
believed about the prospects for a workable homocentric astronomy, all these
Aristotelians held that Ptolemaic astronomy is useful, being the best predictive
advice yet discovered, but that it is false; false because it describes a universe
inconsistent with the principles of Aristotelian physics. Clavius’ adversaries
are surely realists sceptical of the established astronomy.
‘aNifo, In Aristoteh libros de coelo et mundo commentaria (1517), Venice, 1553, 90v col. 2
(cited in Duhem, Phenomena, 48). ‘Causa’ evidently has the weak sense of sufficient condition
here.
“Aquinas, Summa, 1:32, I -2; Tommaso de Vio Gaetano (Cajetanus), Expositio in libro[s] de
coelo et mundo. Venice, 1502, f.39r; Pereira. De communibus omnium rerum naturaiium prin-
cipiis et affectionibus (1562), Rome, 1576, 47D -48D. Pereira, who taught at Rome at the same
time as Clavius, and who held views on the nature of mathematics and the mathematical arts
strongly opposed to his, is a likely target for some of Clavius’ remarks.
146 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
through the innate ‘light of the mind’ we can apprehend with certainty truths
stored in our own memory; notably truths about numbers and figures, and the
fact of God’s existence. Finally, we can be sure of all instances of the rules of
logic.” But though Augustine rejects extreme scepticism, his stance here (as in
the books of the Confessions and De Trinitafe in which he treats of human
knowledge) remains markedly sceptical. The misleading power of the senses is
largely conceded to the sceptic, and knowledge of nature is supposed to be
granted to men only insofar as such knowledge is needed to provide a basis for
apprehension of the existence and benevolence of a Creator. Further,
Augustine’s own style of argument is frequently that of the Ciceronian dialec-
tician; for example, in the Contra Academicos, after presenting arguments on ’
both sides of the question, he concludes only that it is more probable than not
that we can answer some questions with certainty.
Philipp Melanchthon’s views on the attainability of knowledge combine
elements of Augustinian epistemology with the tenets of the humanist dialectic
of which he was so influential a protagonist. And Melanchthon is, for our pur-
pose, a key figure. As Luther’s right-hand man he was an instigator of
humanist curricula in over a dozen German universities and gymnasia. Promo-
tion of the mathematical arts was a central part of the humanist programme,
and astronomy flourished as never before in the academies which fell under
Melanchthon’s aegis.” Further, though subsequently violently at theological
odds with Melanchthon and Luther, Osiander was, up to the time he wrote the
notorious preface to Copernicus’ De revolutionibus, an intellectual ally of
Melanchthon’s and involved in the creation of a humanist curriculum at the
Ntirnberg Gymnasium.1g
Melanchthon’s views on the attainability of knowledge are set out in almost
identical terms in each of his major non-theological works: his dialectic text-
book, his lectures on physics, and his De anima.ao Here he adopts the tradi-
“In 2~12, 27 Augustine argues that the academic position is incoherent since all judgements of
probability are relative to evidence which must be certain; and in 3: 10, 24 - 13, 29 he presents his
three sources of certainty. The best general account of Augustine’s epistemology that I have found
is J. Hessen,Augustins hfetuphysik der Erkenntnti, 2nd edn. (Leiden, 1960).
“On humanist promotion of the mathematical arts see, H. &hilling, Die Geschichte der Ax-
iomatischen Methode im 16. und beginnenden 17. Jahrhundert, (Hildesheim, 1969); R. Hooykaas,
Humantsme, Science et Reforme: Pierre de la Romee (1515 - 1572) (Leyden, 1958); P. L. Rose,
The Itahon Renaissance of Mathematics: Studies on Humanists and h4athematician.s from
Petrarch to Galileo (Geneva, 1975).
“On Osiander’s relations with Melanchthon see, A. B. Wrightsman. Andreas Osiunder ond
Lutheran Contributions to the Copernicun Revolution, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
Wisconsin, 1970.
*nMelanchthon, Compendiario dialectices rutio (Leipzig, 1520) (revised versions include De
dialectico libri IV, Wittenberg, 1531, and Erotemata dialectices. Wittenberg, 1547); Initia doc-
trinae physicae, dictato in Academia Vitebergensi (Wittenberg, 1549); Liber de anima (Wit-
tenberg, 1553). Subsequent references are-to C. G. Bretschneider (ed.) Phihppi Mehmchthoni
opera quaesupersunt omniu, Halle, 1834 - 1843 and Braunschweig, 1853 - 1860 (hereafter cited as
‘M.O. 7. Meianchthon’s De anima shows numerous close parallels with passages from Augustine
who is repeatedly cited. His account of the role of memory in cognition is thoroughly Augustinian,
148 Studies in Htitory and Philosophy of Science
and many of the scriptural texts he uses to justify his theses had been used by Augustine to justify
similar theses. Melanchthon’s moral objections to academic scepticism are almost certainly deriv-
ed from Conrru Acudenricox, as are the three criteria which he presents as sources of certainty.
I’ ‘Scientiu is apprehension in which demonstration compels us to assent to a proposition; opinio
is apprehension in which we are moved by a probable reason to incline more to one side [of a ques-
tion] than to the other, and assent or acceptance is suspended’, De onimu, M.O., XIII, col. 166.
“M.O., XIII, col. 137.
“M.O., VII, col. 412.
“This account is based on the sections of Melanchthon’s De unimu and Erotemutu diulectices
entitled ‘Quue sum cuusue certitudinis doctrinutum. 7’, together with the section of Initiu docfrinue
physicue entitled ‘Dine certirudo uliquu doctrinu. ” (M.O.. XIII, col. 150; col. 647; cols
185-186).
“M.O., XIII, col. 186.
The Forging of Modern Realism: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics 149
“For Melancnthon’s views on the status of astronomical hypotheses see M.O.. XIII, cols
213 -292. There have been few general studies of Melanchthon’s epistemology. B. Sartorius,
‘Melanchthon und das spekulative Denken’, Deutsche Vierteoahrsschrift fur Literatur,
Wissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 5 (1927). 644 -678, emphasises the eclecticism of Melan-
chthon’s epistemology and draws attention to his agnosticism on natural philosophical questions.
W. Maurer, ‘Melanchthon und die Naturwissenschaft seiner Zeit’, Arch. Kufturgeschichte. 44
(1962). 199- 226. emphasises the conservatism of Melanchthon’s natural philosophy and its
subordination to his natural theology. Both authors have characterised what I have diagnosed as
Augustinian elements in his epistemology as ‘neoplatonic’.
“From E. Rosen’s excellent translation of Osiander’s preface, in E. Rosen, Three Copernican
Treatises (New York, 1939), 24 - 25.
“Tractatus, f.Biv,v.
“Of these letters only the passages quoted by Kepler are known (Opera, I. 246).
‘0So hypotheses do not err in the least if they contradict the common principles of other arts
and disciplines, or, indeed, even if they contradict the infallible and certain authority of the sacred
scriptures’, Tractatus, f.Biv,v. Cf.. ‘1 shall give no other reasons for my version [of Apollonius of
Perga’s hypotheses] except the demonstration from the Sacred Scriptures which follows (for thin
alone is sufficient, though I have other reasons)‘, Tractatus, f.Div,v. The latter passage constitutes
a part of Ursus’ reply to Helisaeus Roeslin who had described Ursus’ hypotheses as ‘contrary to
physics ano the sacred scriptures’, De opere lki creation& . . ., (Frankfurt, 1597). 46.
150 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
that the primary source of knowledge is reading of scripture, and his occa-
sional remarks on medicine, alchemy and astrology emphasise the uncertainty
of all remedies and the dependence of cure on God’s wi1L3’ Indeed, Osiander
may well have been less moderate in his scepticism than Melanchthon. In the
case of Ursus, appeal to his other works is inconclusive. The Geodaesia Rant-
zoviana, 1583, contains nothing relevant to the issue, and the Fundamentum
astronomicum, 1588, is ambiguous. It does indeed contain a Job-inspired out-
burst on the awfulness of man’s lot and his moral and intellectual feebleness,
as well as specific sceptical remarks on our inability to answer certain ques-
tions about the form of the universe; but it contains also a number of
arguments from physical premises designed to vindicate Ursus’ own (or rather,
if the plagiarism charge is correct, Tycho’s) world-system.32 Perhaps Ursus is
confused (one possible source of his confusion being his repeated identifica-
tion of astronomical hypotheses with systems of spheres, an identification
which may have led him to regard his own arguments against the existence of
solid spheres as demonstrating the unreality of astronomical hypotheses), or
perhaps we should regard the sceptical opening to the Tracfatus as a polemical
stance designed to facilitate his attack on Tycho’s claim to originality.
Fortunately, for our purposes, both the precise degree of scepticism adopted
by Osiander and Ursus and the sincerity of the adoption are immaterial. It suf-
fices to note that Osiander’s and Ursus’ pronouncements are consistent with a
widely prevalent, indeed, in the protestant universities of Germany, orthodox,
moderate sceptical position.
Those forms of scepticism which cast doubt on the existence of an external
world are surely conducive to, even if they do not actually entail, an in-
strumentalist interpretation of the natural sciences. Berkeleyan phenomen-
alism is an obvious example. But it is perfectly clear that the scepticism of
Osiander and Ursus is not of this kind. However, short of such radical scep-
ticism, there appear to be available in the sixteenth century few options for a
scepticism conducive to an instrumentalist interpretation of astronomical
hypotheses. Indeed, I can think of only two plausible candidates, both based
on dualistic ontologies. One, whilst acknowledging the existence of the objects
of the terrestial world, would place the celestial world altogether beyond our
“On Osiander’s theological and exegetical writings see E. Hirsch, Die Theologie des Andreas
Osiander und ihre geschichtlichen Voraussetzungen (Gottingen, 1919); A. B. Wrightsman, An-
dress Osiander and Lutheran Contributions to the Copernican Revolution, unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1970, Ch.3.
“The bulk of the Fundamentum astronomicurn is devoted to trigonometrical methods of use in
practical astronomy. Ursus’ ‘new world-system is illustrated by a large fold-out diagram inter-
polated between the dedicatory letter and the first chapter, and is described in detail in the final
chapter, in which twenty ‘physical theses’ are offered in support of it. These include a denial of the
existence of solid spheres and a denial of the triple motion of the earth on the Aristotelian ground
that a simple body must have a single natural motion. Ursus also questions the finitude of the
universe and conjectures that the fixed stars may be at distances proportional to their magnitudes.
But he raises a doubt about our ability to answer these questions conclusively.
The Forging of Modern Real&m: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics 151
ken, denying that we can know even that it includes real celestial bodies perfor-
ming real motions in space. The other, maintaining an unbridgeable gulf bet-
ween things as they are and the world of appearances would deny that
knowledge of the true form of the universe, if attained, would enable us to ex-
plain the apparent positions and motions of the stars. Elements of both these
forms of scepticism are perhaps to be found in certain renaissance authors
with Platonist sympathies; for example, Giovanni Pontano (1426 - 1503) and
Lefevre d’Etaples (Faber Stapulensis cu 1455 - 1536), to both of whom Duhem
ascribes a fictionalist position.” But there is no evidence that Melanchthon,
Osiander or Ursus held such radical views. I conclude that instrumentalism, in
the technical philosophical sense, cannot be ascribed to them.
The term ‘instrumentalist’ is, however, sometimes used in a much looser
sense, roughly equivalent to ‘pragmatist’. Consider a hydrodynamic theorist
interested in drag on irregular hulls due to turbulence, or a physical chemist in-
terested in the kinetics of very complex chemical reactions. In principle the
problems they face are soluble from physical first principles by analytic means.
In practice no one in his right mind would attempt to solve them in this way.
Too many boundary conditions would have to be ascertained for the problems
to be posed in analytic terms, and even were they so posed the analysis itself
would far outrun the joint capacities of the human mind and the computer.
Here the scientist is bound to make use of ad hoc generalisations and models
whose truth or range of valid applicability is gravely in doubt. The messier the
problems he faces the more likely he is to assess such ad hoc devices simply in
terms of their predictive success, with scant regard for theoretical foundations.
And in tackling a given problem he will frequently employ several models
which are, interpreted realistically, inconsistent. Such a scientist is often said
to adopt an instrumentalist or pragmatic stance. His stance is premised on
scepticism about the feasibility of acquiring certain kinds of knowledge, but it
is perfectly consistent with realism.
It is, I suggest, such pragmatism, premised on moderate scepticism that lies
behind Melanchthon’s at first sight curious assessments of the Ptolemaic and
Copernican hypotheses: for example his dismissal of Averroes’ objections to
the Ptolemaic hypotheses on the grounds that though geometers do not sup-
pose there really are epicycles and eccentrics, the hypotheses do ‘show the
CUUS(IS of the motions’; and his concession that though Copernicus’ system is
false, his lunar model is ‘altogether well constructed’.3’ The stance is the same
“G. G. Pontano, De rebus coelestibus libri xiv (Naples, 1512) (quoted in Duhem, Phenomena,
54 - 56); Lefkvre d’Etaples, Inrroductorium astronomicurn. . . ., (Paris, 1503) (quoted in Duhem.
Phenomena, 56 - 57).
“M.O., XIII, cols 232 and 244 (here, as often elsewhere, Melanchthon uses the term ‘cuusu’for
sufjicient condition; cf., fn. 13). There is a large literature on Melanchthon’s attitude to Coper-
nicus, and in particular on the significance of his mitigation of his criticism of Copernicus in the
152 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
when Osiander claims that since astronomers ‘cannot in any way attain to the
true causes’, they must ‘conceive and devise such hypotheses as, being assum-
ed, enable the motions to be calculated correctly from the principles of
geometry, for the future as well as the past’; and when Ursus maintains that ‘it
is permitted and conceded to astronomers . . . to fabricate hypotheses,
whether true or false and feigned, of such a kind as may yield the phenomena
and appearances of the celestial motions and correctly produce a method for
calculating them’.3s
Some of the passages (from Ptolemy, Simplicius, Proclus and Theon of
Smyrna) cited by Duhem in support of his general ascription of instrumen-
talism to Greek mathematical astronomers may be read as expressions of a
similarly pragmatic attitude to practical astronomy. And the same pragmatic
attitude may sometimes underlie the sharp distinction between physical and
mathematical astronomy that is commonly emphasised by both medieval and
renaissance natural philosophers. 36The evidence for the prevalence of this at-
titude amongst German professional astronomers in the latter part of the six-
teenth century is, however, much firmer. Following the pioneering work of
Zinner there has been intensive study of the reception of the Copernican
hypotheses. In particular, it has been shown by Westman that from the 1550’s
in the protestant German universities Copernicus’ planetary models were in-
creasingly widely presented alongside Ptolemaic planetary models by those
who either rejected the theory as a true description of the universe, or, more
often, refrained from commenting on the issue.37 This approach to the Coper-
nican system, the approach of Peucer, Reinhold and Praetorius, sceptical or
non-committal on the question of its truth, but committed on the question of
the practical usefulness of some of the Copernican planetary models, has been
called ‘the Wittenberg interpretation’. It represents precisely the sceptical,
second edition of his Initia docfrinaephysicae and of his own unpublished calculations on the mo-
tions of the sun. Useful recent assessments are K. Mtiller, ‘Ph. Melanchthon und das koper-
nikanische Weltsystem’, Cenfaunrs, 9 (1963 - 1964), 16-28, and the article by Maurer already
cited (fn.25). Maurer argues, as I do here, that, despite the discrepancies between their public pro-
nouncements on the Copernican system, Melanchthon and Osiander share a common view of the
status of astronomical hypotheses.
“Osiander, translation from E. Rosen, lot. cit. (fn.27); Ursus, Tracratus. f.Biv,v.
“Frequently cited sources for this distinction are Aristotle, Physics, I:2, 193b 22-36, and a
quotation from Geminus in Simphcius’ commentary on that passage (In Aristoteles physjcorum
Libras QuaffuorPriores, ed. H. Diels (Berlin, 1882). 291.21-292.31; transl. T. L. Heath, Arisfar-
thus of Samos (Oxford, 1913). 275-276). Although in contrasting the physicist with the
astronomer Geminus says that astronomers do sometimes save the phenomena without regard to
‘the causes’, the passage as a whole, far from claiming autonomy for mathematical astronomy,
emphasises the dependence of mathematical astronomy on physics. Cf. Lloyd, loccir. (fn.2).
“E. Zinner, Entstehung und Ausbreitung der coppernicanischen Lehre (Erlangen. 1943); J.
Dobrzycki (ed.) The Reception of Copernicus’ Heliocentric Theory (Dordrecht, 1973); R. S.
Westman, ‘The Melanchthon circle, Rheticus, and the Wittenberg interpretation of the Coper-
nican theory’, Isis, 66 (1975). 165 - 193; ‘Three responses to Copernican theory: Johannes
Praetorius, Tycho Brahe, and Michael Maestlin’, in The Copernican Achievement, R. S. Westman
(ed.), (Berkeley, 1975).
The Forging of Modern Realkm: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics 153
III
Clavius seeks to rebut a single sceptical argument: the fact that a set of
astronomical hypotheses ‘saves the phenomena’ does not provide grounds for
accepting those hypotheses; for, as Aristotle notes in the Prior Analytics, a
true conclusion can follow from false premises. Before countering this,
Clavius obligingly fortifies the argument:
I can add some support to their position as follows. Nicolaus Copernicus, in his
work on the revolutions of the celestial orbs, saved all the phenomena in another
way. He posited that the firmament is at rest and immobile, and the sun at rest also
in the centre of the universe, and he attributed to the earth, which he placed in the
third heaven, a triple motion, etc. So eccentrics and epicycles are not necessary for
the saving of the planetary phenomena. And again, in the case of the sun, Ptolemy
used an epicycle to explain all the appearances that he saved using an eccentric. So
it cannot be inferred from our third argument that the sun is moved in an eccentric,
for perhaps it is moved in an epicycle.3’
So if it is not right to infer from the appearances that eccentrics and epicycles are to
be found in the heavens, just because the true can be inferred from the false, the
whole of natural philosophy will tumble down. For, by the same token, whenever
from a known effect someone concludes that this or that is its cause, I can say: ‘It is
not true, because from what is false one can derive what is true’. And thus all the
principles of nature discovered by philosophers may be destroyed. Since this is ab-
surd, it seems that the force and strength of our argument is not in fact undermined
by our adversaries.‘O
Given Clavius’ earlier claim that inference from observed effects is the only
route to knowledge of causes, and given a rejection of global scepticism, his
conclusion surely follows: there must be something wrong with his opponents’
argument. Clavius’ choice of premises is dialectically astute. Many
Aristotelians would have accepted his empiricist premise: ‘There is nothing in
the intellect that was not first in the senses’ was, after all, a maxim of
scholastic philosophy. And his opponents could scarcely refuse to concede his
denial of global scepticism in natural philosophy, since their objection to
epicycles and eccentrics was founded on absolute commitment to the principles
of Aristotelian physics.
Having established by a neat transcendental argument that there must be
something wrong with his opponents’ argument, Clavius proceeds to diagnose
the fallacy in it:
It should indeed be said that the rule of dialectic - What is true can follow from
what is false - is irrelevant. For what is true is not derived from what is false in the
same way as the phenomena are saved by eccentrics and epicycles. In the former
case what is true is derived from what is false through the force of syllogistic form.
When we know the truth of any proposition, false premises can be disposed in such
a way that through the force of the syllogism the true proposition is necessarily
concluded. Thus, because I know that all animals are sensitive, I can contrive the
following syllogism: All plants are sensitive; All animals are plants; So, all animals
are sensitive. But if I doubt the conclusion in any way, I shall never acquire from
false premises any certainty about it, even though it is correctly concluded through
the force of the syllogism. By means of eccentric orbs and epicycles, however, one
not only saves the appearances already perceived at some time, but also predicts
future ones whose time [of occurrence] is altogether unknown. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that I am in doubt whether there will be an eclipse of the moon at the full moon
of January 1582. [By inference] from the motions of the eccentric orbs and
epicycles I am made entirely certain that there will be, so that I am no longer in
doubt.
but it is not reasonable to suppose that we compel the heavens to obey the figments
of our minds, and that they move as we wish, or rather so as to conform to our
principles. Yet if eccentrics and epicycles are figments, as our adversaries would
have it, it appears that we do so compel them.”
The implication is clear. Whilst yielding of already known conclusions does
not provide adequate grounds for acceptance of premises, yielding of suc-
cessful predictions does provide such grounds. This conclusion, however, re-
mains vulnerable to the extra weapon with which Clavius has armed his adver-
saries: the argument from observational-equivalence. For inconsistent but
observationally-equivalent hypotheses have precisely the same predictive
force.
Clavius’ attempt to counter the two alleged examples of observational
equivalence is somewhat diffuse. After a tendentious digression on Coper-
nicus’ motives in setting up his ‘paradoxical’ system he continues:
Moreover, it is far from being the case that eccentrics and epicycles are dispensed
with according to Copernicus’ doctrine. Given that this is so, they ought all the
more to be postulated. For astronomers think up these orbs because they perceive
quite surely from diverse phenomena that the planets are not always carried at a
constant distance from the earth. Indeed, Copernicus freely admits this. For accor-
ding to his doctrine the planets always have inconstant distances from the earth, as
is evident from his placing of the earth away from the centre of the universe in the
third heaven. This alone can be inferred from Copernicus’ postulate: that it is not
altogether certain that the arrangement of eccentrics and epicycles is as Ptolemy
had it, because the same large number of phenomena can be saved in another way.
Nor do we attempt to persuade the reader of more than the following: that the
planets are not carried at a constant distance from the earth. So, either there are ec-
centrics and epicycles in the heavens in the order in which Ptolemy placed them, or
there must at least be posited some equivalent cause of these effects using eccentrics
and epicycles. So if Copernicus’ postulate involved nothing false or absurd, there
would clearly be doubt whether one ought to adhere to Copernicus’ opinion or
Ptolemy’s on the question of how to save this kind of phenomena. But many ab-
surd and erroneous things are contained in Copernicus’ postulate.”
Moreover, from the fact that Ptolemy saved the solar phenomena both by means of
an epicycle and by means of an eccentric, it follows only that it is not certain
whether the sun is carried by an epicycle or by an eccentric. But whichever is af-
firmed, it is clear that the sun has an inconstant distance from the earth, and is cer-
tainly not carried in a concentric orb, which is, as we have said, enough for our
purposes.41
Clavius is here successful in his primary aim, that of showing that the scep-
tic’s examples of inconsistent but observationally-equivalent hypotheses fail to
cast doubt on the existence of epicycles’ and eccentrics. But such examples pre-
sent a far more general challenge, casting doubt on the existence of adequate
criteria for deciding between inconsistent hypotheses. Clavius does not ex-
plicitly answer this challenge. However, he does make two points - that in-
consistent hypotheses may have more in common than meets the eye; and that
predictive success does not provide the only criterion for choice between
hypotheses - which contain the germs of a general reply to the sceptic.
IV
I have never been able to agree with those who, relying on the example of an ac-
cidental demonstration which with syllogistic necessity yields something true from
false premises . . . , used to maintain that it could be that the hypotheses which
Copernicus adopted are false but nevertheless the true phenomena follow from
them as if from genuine principles.”
In fact the example is inappropriate. For this outcome of false premises is for-
tuitous, and that which is false by nature betrays itself as soon as it is considered in
relation to other related matters (primurn alii atque alii rei cognatae accom-
modatur); unless you would willingly allow him who argues thus to adopt infinitely
many other false propositions and never, as he goes backwards and forwards [in his
arguments] (net unquam in progrew regressuque), to stand his ground.”
As it stands, Kepler’s claim that false premises will always reveal their falsity
through evidently false consequences, like Clavius’ related claim that the war-
rant of truth in hypotheses is predictive power, is vulnerable to the sceptic’s
argument from observational equivalence. Kepler is aware of this, for he con-
tinues:
You might object as follows. It can be said with some truth to-day (and could have
been said with some truth in the past) that the ancient tables and hypotheses satisfy
the phenomena. Copernicus, nevertheless, rejects them as false. So, by the same
token, it could be said to Copernicus that although he accounts excellently for the
appearances, nevertheless he is in error in his hypotheses.”
I reply, to start with, that the ancient hypotheses clearly fail to account for certain
important matters. For example, they do not comprehend the causes of the
numbers, extents and durations of the retrogradations, and of their agreeing so
well with the position and mean motion of the sun. Since in Copernicus their
regularity is made so beautifully apparent, there must be some inherent cause of all
these things.”
We must be careful in interpreting this. Kepler is not denying the (near) obser-
vational equivalence of Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy: rather he
claims that though both world-systems ‘save the phenomena’ only the Coper-
nican system ‘comprehends the causes of’, that is, explains, certain regularities
in the phenomena.
The second part of Kepler’s reply is more substantial:
Further, Copernicus denied none of the things in the [ancient] hypotheses which
“K.G. W. 1, 15. The first bracketed clause could mean more specifically ‘when it is combined
with other related premises’.
“K.G.W. I. 15.
“K.G.W. 1, 15.
158 Studies in H&tory and Philosophy of Science
give the cause of the appearances and which agree with observations, but rather m-
eludes and explains all of them. Though he appears to have changed many things in
the accepted hypotheses, it is not in fact so. For it can happen that the same [con-
clusion] results from two suppositions which differ in species, because the two are
in the same genus and it is in virtue of the genus primarily that the result in question
is produced. Thus Ptolemy did not demonstrate the risings and settings of the stars
from this as a proximate and commensurate middle term: ‘The earth is at rest in the
centre’. Nor did Copernicus demonstrate the same things from this as a middle
term: ‘The earth revolves as a distance from the centre’. It sufficed for each of
them to say (as indeed each did say) that these things happen as they do because
there occurs a certain separation of motions between the earth and the heaven, and
because the distance of the earth from the centre is not perceptible amongst the fix-
ed stars [i.e. there is no detectable parallactic effect]. So P’rolemy did not
demonstrate the phenomena from a false or accidental middle term. He merely sin-
ned against the law of essential truth (kath’auto), because he thought that these
things occur as they do because of the species when they occur because of the
genus. Whence it is clear that from the fact that Ptolemy demonstrated from a false
disposition of the universe things that are nonetheless true and consonant with the
heavens and with our observations - from this fact I repeat - we get no reason
for suspecting something similar of the Copernican hypotheses. Rather, it shows
what I said at the outset, namely, that the Copernican principles, from which we
obtain the constant reason unknown to the ancients for so many phenomena, can-
not, insofar as the reason is derived from them, be false.48
I take the central claim of this difficult passage to be that the Ptolemaic and
Copernican systems are nearly observationally equivalent precisely because
they are nearly kinematically equivalent. (Further Kepler is aware that for no
choice of finite parameters do they describe exactly the same relative motions,
hence the possibility of discrimination by a parallactic effect.) Though this
reading does succeed in providing Kepler with a coherent argument, it is liable
to the charge of textually-unwarranted and insensitive whiggish hindsight. The
reading requires us to interpret the ‘genus’ to which both the Ptolemaic and
Copernican hypotheses belong, which is said to provide the basis from which
‘the appearances are demonstrated’ in both cases, as a hypothesis about
relative motions. The main internal evidence for this is Kepler’s claim that to
demonstrate the risings and settings of the stars it suffices to appeal to the
generic hypothesis that there is a certain ‘motuum separatio’ between the earth
and the heaven. ‘Motuum separatio’ must be translated as ‘separation’,
‘divergence’ or ‘antithesis of motions’; but it can, I think, be glossed as ‘dif-
ferential or relative motion’. The use of Aristotelian terminology in this
passage - ‘proximate and commensurate middle term’, ‘in virtue of the genus
primarily’, ‘law of essential truth’ - diverges widely from that of its ultimate
“KG. W. 1, I5 - 16. Though my translation of this hard passage departs from his on several
points, A. Koyrt’s free version in LP Rholution Astronomique (Paris, 1961). provided an in-
valuable start.
The Forging of Modern Realism: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics 159
Tycho’s claim to originality, Tycho does not appear as the defendant. Instead
it is hypotheses that are, metaphorically, in the dock (just as in Sir Philip
Sidney’s Defence of Poesie, likewise a judicial oration composed on the
classical model, Poesie is the defendant).s0 Thus we are informed in the
preface that the aim is to ‘obliterate the calumnies against the discoveries of
mathematicians [that is, hypotheses] impressed on the minds of patrons’. And
in the first chapter the narration tells of Ursus’ defamation of hypotheses. So
where in the Mysterium Kepler’s brief is held for one particular set of
astronomical hypotheses, the Copernican, in the Apologia it is astronomical
hypotheses in general that are to be defended against misrepresentation.
The two main divisions of the first chapter, the confirmation and the refuta-
tion, are, as the rules of the game demand, very different in content and tone.
In the confirmation the tone is modest and the serious arguments in support of
Kepler’s own position are presented without much rhetorical embellishment.
In the refutation the tone is aggressive, witty and ironic. Ursus’ text is
dissected line by line and he and his ‘witness’ Osiander are convicted of each of
the fallacies in the traditional list; equivocation, petitio principii, false induc-
tion, etc.5’
It is the confirmation that is of primary interest to us. It opens with an
etymology and definition of the word ‘hypothesis’ which need not detain us,
though two points about it deserve notice. This is a conventional opening gam-
bit in a judicial oration in which the defendant is a thing, not a person. Fur-
ther, appeal to the pristine usage of a word of the kind Kepler makes here, was
perfectly acceptable as a form of argument in the period. Kepler moves on,
again strictly in accordance with the rules, to consider next the species of
hypotheses, and then their ‘proper nature’ (proprium).sz His argument under
this heading is evidently a response to the following passage in the Tractatus:
For it is the proper nature of hypotheses to inquire into, hunt for and elicit the
truth sought from feigned or false suppositions. And so it is permitted and granted
to astronomers as a thing conceded to astronomy that they should fabricate
hypotheses, whether true or false and feigned, of such a kind as may yield the
phenomena and appearances of the celestial motions and correctly produce a
method for calculating them, and thus achieve the intended purpose and goal of
this art.”
%ze. K. 0. Myrick, Sir Philip Sidney us (I Lilerary Craftsman (Cambridge, Mass., 1935). I am
indebted to Dr. L. A. Jardine for this reference.
“For Melanchthon’s account of the various fallacies of which one should seek to convict an op
nonent in the refututio of an oration. see 144.0.. XIII, cols 726-750. Such accounts derive
uhimately from Aristotle’s De sophbtiiis elenchh.
“Melanchthon gives the following list of ‘dialectical topics’, headings under which any concep
tual issue should be discussed: ‘1. Definitio et definitum; 2. Genus; 3. Differentia,
Proprium; . . . : M.O., XIII, col. 663.
“Tractatus, f.Biv,v.
The Forging of Modern Realkm: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics 161
As in every discipline, so in astronomy also, the things that we teach the reader by
drawing conclusions we teach seriously, and not in jest. So we hold whatsoever
there is in our conclusions to have been established as true. Moreover, for the truth
to be legitimately inferred, the premises of a syllogism, that is, the hypotheses,
must be true. For only when both premises are true in all respects and are made to
yield the conclusion by the rule of the syllogism shall we achieve our end: to make
the truth evident to the reader. And if an error has crept into one or other of the
premised hypotheses, even though a true conclusion may occasionally be obtained,
nonetheless, as I have already related in the first chapter of my Mysterium
cosmographicum, this happens only by chance, and not often, but only when the
error in the one proposition meets another proposition, whether true or false,
which is suitable for eliciting the truth. And just as in the proverb liars are caution-
ed to remember what they have said, so here, false hypotheses which together pro-
i duce the truth by chance, do not, in the course of a demonstration in which they
have been applied to many different matters, retain this habit of yielding the truth,
but betray themselves. Thus it happens that, because of the linking of syllogisms in
demonstrations, given one mistake an infinite number follow. None of those whom
we celebrate as authors of hypotheses would wish to run the risk of error in his con-
clusions. So it follows, as I have said before, that none of them would knowingly
admit amongst his hypotheses anything liable to error. Indeed they worry not so
much about the outcome and conclusions of demonstrations, but more often about
the hypotheses they have adopted. Indeed, almost all notable authors to date assess
them on both geometrical and physical grounds, and want them to be confirmed in
all respects (undiquaque concifiatas).54
Why then, you may well ask, given that everyone demonstrates the same motion of
the heavens, is there nevertheless so great a diversity of hypotheses?
‘4Opera. I, 239 - 240. The proverb ‘Mendaces memores esse oporrent’ is to be found in Quin-
tilian, Instirutiones Oratoriae, IV,ii,91, and is discussed at length by Erasmus in his Adagia.
“The most explicit of Ursus’ several allusions to the argument from observational equivalence is
in his preface (Tracfafus, f.Aiv.r). His claim that it is easy to contrive a variety of hypotheses
which save the phenomena is mocked by Kepler later in the Apologia (Opera, I, 246).
162 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Again as in the Mysterium, Kepler’s counter to the argument has two parts.
In the first part he seeks to convince us that there always exist adequate
grounds for choosing between observationally-equivalent hypotheses:
Certainly one should not suppose that it is because what is true customarily follows
accidentally from what is false. For, as I said before, in the long and tortuous
course of demonstrations through diverse syllogisms, such as are wont to occur in
astronomy, it can scarcely ever happen, and no example occurs to me, that starting
out from a posited false hypothesis there should follow what is altogether sound
and fitting to the motions of the heavens, or such as one wants demonstrated. For
the same result is not in face always obtained from different hypotheses, even when
someone relatively inexperienced thinks it is. The results obtained from the Coper-
nican hypotheses were duplicated, with respect to the numbers, by Maginus from
different hypotheses designed to be as far as possible in agreement with the
Ptolemaic hypotheses. Do Copernicus and Maginus really offer the same things?
Far from it! Copernicus wanted also to demonstrate the cause of and necessity for
the greater proximity of the superior planets to the earth when they are in opposi-
tion to the sun, as well as wanting to represent their ensuing motions by numbers. I
here forbear to mention many further matters. And though some disparate
astronomical hypotheses may yield exactly the same results in astronomy, as
Rothmann boasted in his letters to D. Tycho of his own mutation of the Coper-
nican system, nevertheless a difference between the conclusions often arises
because of some physical consideration. Thus even were Tycho to have elicited ex-
actly the same numbers from his hypotheses as did Copernicus (Copernicus’
numbers are, however, in error), nevertheless there would be this difference in in-
tention between Tycho’s demonstrations and the Copernican demonstrations: for,
as well as wanting to predict the future motions of the heavens, Tycho wants to
avoid postulating the immensity of the fixed stars and certain other things that
Copernicus admitted into his hypotheses.5’
1 doubt indeed whether one will come across any hypothesis, either simple or com-
plex, which will not turn out to have a conclusion peculiar to it and separate and
*40pe~u, I, 240. By ‘numbers’ Kepler evidently means apparent celestial coordinates. The
reference to Magini is to Novae coelesrium orbium theoricae congruenles cum observationibus N.
Copernici (Venice, 1589). in which an attempt is made to find Ptolemaic planetary models which
yield results in accordance with the Prutenic tables. The reference to Rothmann is to letters to
Tycho written in 1587 and 1588, and published in Tycho’s Epistolarum aslronomicorum liber
primum (Uraniborg, 15%). Here Rothmann, a Copemican, sketches his own inverted Copernican
system, designed to make the mathematical details of Copernicus’ planetary models more accessi-
ble, and asks Tycho to explain the difference between the Tychonic system and such inverted
Copernican systems. Ursus mentions Rothmann’s system in the course of his claim that it is easy to
think up a variety of hypotheses which save the phenomena (Tructufu.~, f.Aiv.r; here as elsewhere
Ursus calls Rothmann ‘Rotzmann’, that is, ‘sniveller’, in retaliation for Rothmann’s denunciation
of him as a plagiarist and ‘dirty blackguard’ in the published letters to Tycho).
The Forging of Modern Realism: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics 163
different from [the conclusions of] all the others. Even though for two hypotheses
the conclusions in the geometrical realm coincide, each hypothesis will have its own
peculiar corollary in the physical realm.”
Well then, isn’t it necessary for one of the two hypotheses about the primary mo-
tion (to take an example) to be false, either the one that says that the earth moves
within the heavens, or the one which has it that the heavens gyrate about the earth?
Certainly if contradictories cannot both be true at once, these two will not both be
true at once, but one of them will be altogether false. But by both means the same
conclusion about the primary motion is demonstrated. The same emergences of the
signs [of the zodiac] follow, the same days, the same risings and settings of the
stars, the same features of the nights. So does what is true follow from what is false
just as it follows from what is true? Far from it! For the occurrences listed above,
and a thousand others, happen neither because of the motion of the heavens, nor
because of the motion of the earth, considered as a motion of the heaven or of the
earth. Rather they happen because there occurs a separation between the earth and
the heaven on a path which is regularly curved with respect to the path of the sun
(separatio super tractu quodam, qui legitime ad viam Solis sit inflemcs), regardless
of which of the two bodies is responsible for that separation. So the aforemention-
ed things are demonstrated from two hypotheses insofar as they belong to a single
genus, not insofar as they differ. Since, therefore, they are one for the purpose of
the demonstration, they do not differ. And even though a physical contradiction
inheres in them, that is entirely irrelevant to the demonstration. So this example
does not prove that what is true can follow both from what is true and from what is
false.5B
that Kepler tackles is that of the observational equivalence, for suitable choice
of parameters, of a planetary model which uses a concentric with epicycle and
one which uses an eccentric. Here again he claims, in what to us may appear
devious language, that the observational equivalence arises because the two
hypotheses describe the same relative motion.
Kepler’s analysis of this second example is, however, significantly different
from that of the first example. For here he does not admit that there is a
physical contradiction between the rival hypothesis. Instead he writes:
And we certainly do not ascribe eyes and human reasoning to the planets, so that
they can mark a point here or there with compasses, and authors introduce those
specific views I have mentioned as conceits of their own, rather than for the sake of
explaining nature. Therefore neither the former nor the latter supposition is worthy
of the title ‘astronomical hypothesis’, but rather what is common to both of
them.OO
This remark is far from clear. Yet it is, I think, crucial for the assessment of
Kepler’s argument. Fortunately, there is a passage later in the work in which
Kepler makes his point far more clearly. A letter from Osiander to Copernicus,
which Kepler quotes, contains the following declaration:
I have always been of the opinion that hypotheses are not articles of faith but bases
for calculation, so that even if they are false it does not matter provided they yield
the apparent motions exactly. For who could make us more sure that the unequal
motion of the sun comes about because of an epicycle rather than because of an ec-
centric, if we follow Ptolemy’s hypotheses, since it could come about in either way.
There appears in these words of the author a clear equivocation on the word
‘hypothesis’. For some hypotheses are said above to be, so to speak, small change,
scarcely worthy of the name, whereas others are said to be proper and truly
astronomical hypotheses. Thus when, in Osiander’s example, we determine and
report the part of the planetary circle which lies in one half of the circle of the
zodiac, it is worthy of the name ‘hypothesis’ and cannot be changed or be
altogether false. But when we set up a method for calculating the ascents and
descents of a planet in those unequal parts, it can often be achieved in several ways,
and so we set up further hypotheses for the purpose of implementing that prior and
astronomical hypothesis: one by placing the centre of the planetary circle away
from the centre of the world, another by inserting an epicycle into a concentric. But
these, indeed, are not in themselves astronomical, but rather geometrical
hypotheses. Thus if some astronomer says that the path of the moon has an oval
form, it is an astronomical hypothesis. But when he shows how a drawing of this sort
of oval can be constructed from circles he uses geometrical hypotheses . . . No-
600pera, I, 240.
The Forging of Modern Realism: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics 165
one is to be taken seriously who does not acknowledge and grasp this diversity in
hypotheses.e’
Thus, for Kepler, the second of the sceptic’s examples of inconsistent but
observationally-equivalent hypotheses is a sham. A planetary model which
employs an eccentric and one which employs a concentric with epicycle are (for
suitable choice of parameters) merely different geometrical expressions of one
and the same underlying astronomical hypothesis.
Let us now turn from presentation to assessment of Kepler’s defence of
astronomy against the sceptic.
VI
ty. There is a third hypothesis, entailed by both, which yields the same obser-
vational conclusions.
Together, the argument from sufficiency of evidence and the argument from
common ground provide Kepler with a devastating rebuttal of the sceptic’s
specific examples. The sceptic thinks his examples show that in astronomy we
face choices between inconsistent hypotheses that cannot be settled on rational
grounds. Kepler demonstrates that he has shown no such thing. If our sole in-
terest is in making predictions the choice can be evaded. For in each case we
can opt for a hypothesis which has the same predictive force and is entailed by
both the rival hypotheses. If, however, our interest is, as Kepler holds that it
ought to be, in ‘portraying the true form of the universe’, then in the cases in
which the hypotheses really are rivals, not merely different formulations of the
same hypothesis, evidential grounds other than predictive success are to be
found on which a choice can be based. But though Kepler’s two arguments
combine to crush the sceptic’s astronomical examples, they are of very dif-
ferent weights.
The argument from common ground is, quite obviously, not generally ap-
plicable in response to the argument from observational equivalence. For it is
not true that whenever inconsistent theories predict the same phenomena,
there exists a third theory entailed by both which predicts those phenomena.
Kepler was, I think, aware that this argument, whilst effective for the specific
purpose of refuting Osiander and Ursus, does nothing to answer the general
sceptical doubt about our capacity to choose correctly between inconsistent
hypotheses. For in the Apologia he ushers in the argument from common
ground as follows:
But authors are not always in the habit of taking account of that variety in physical
matters, and they themselves very often confine their own thinking within the
bounds of geometry or astronomy and consider the question of equipollence of
hypotheses within one particular science, ignoring the diverse outcomes which
weaken and destroy that vaunted equipollence when one takes account of related
sciences. Given that this is so, it is proper that we too should adapt our argument
and reply to their manner of speaking [my italics].6’
In other words the argument is primarily designed to show up an internal weakness
in the position of his opponents, those who ‘confine their thinking within the
bounds of geometry or astronomy’, rather than to establish his own position.
The argument from sufficiency of evidence, however, constitutes a quite
general strategy for rebuttal of the sceptic. Crucial for this strategy is the
distinction between the substantive and conventional components of a theory,
the distinction which Kepler makes in distinguishing ‘true astronomical
hypotheses’ from the various ‘geometrical hypotheses’ which may be used to
express them. For this distinction makes it plausible to claim that every case in
which there appear to be no grounds for choice between rival hypotheses is of
“0pera, I, 240.
The Forging of Modern Reabn: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics 167
one of two kinds. Either: The hypotheses are not really inconsistent. They
have the same content, but employ different conventions to express it. Or: The
hypotheses are not really evidentially equivalent. With sufficient ingenuity
grounds for a rational choice can be found.
In the Apologia we have, of course, only a special case of the argument;
Kepler is concerned with astronomical hypotheses, not hypotheses in general.
Further his argument is seriously incomplete; no detailed categorisation of the
types of non-observational criteria he takes to be available for the resolution
of theoretical conflict is offered, nor is there any attempt to justify such
criteria as truth-linked. But limited in scope and incomplete though his argu-
ment is, it remains a remarkable performance, anticipating the response of
such twentieth-century realists as Reichenbach to the most direct of all
arguments against scientific realism, the argument from observational
equivalence.
VII
“‘And, because no more appropriate way has yet been found than that which saves all [the
phenomena] through epicycles and eccentrics, it is indeed credibile that the celestial spheres are
composed of orbs of this kind’, In Sphaeram, 435. The unfamiliarity of Clavius’ stance is confirm-
ed by the way in which it was misunderstood by the sceptic Francisco Sanchez. In a letter of cu
1589 Sanchez, who had clearly read the passages I have cited quite carefully, attributes to Clavius
both the view that certainty is not attainable in astronomy and the view that epicycles and eccen-
trics are figments of the mind. Evidently, despite Clavius’ claim to the contrary, he took it that to
concede that we cannot be certain of the existence of epicycles and eccentrics ir to concede their
fictional status. See. J. Iriarte-Ag, ‘Francisco Sanchez, el Esceptico disfrazado de Carneades en
discusi6n epistohu con Crist6bal Clavio’. Gregoriunum. 21(1940), 413 - 45 1. Clavius’ assessment
of Ptolemaic astronomy is close to Aristotle’s assessment of his own version of Cahppus’
homocentric system: ‘And thus it is reasonubfe ro suppose that there are just this number of im-
mobile substances and principles - the statement of necessity may be left to more competent
thinkers’ [my italics], Metuphysics, X11:8, 1074a 23 - 24. Many points of phrasing in Clavius’ ac-
count suggest that he consciously emulates Aristotle’s cautious approach to celestial matters.
“On the basis of Kepler’s anti-sceptical argument in the Mysterium. however, one might well
credit him with full adherence to the traditional distinction. For in answer to doubts about the
Copemican system he not only asserts that part, at least, of Copernicus’ account ‘cannot be false’,
but also claims that the entire system can be ‘demonstrated upriori’. The force and intent of these
remarks is open to question, for they are accompanied by other over-stated claims for the Coper-
nican system which Kepler must have known to be misleading, for example,, the claim that it
relieves nature of the ‘intolerable burden of so great a number of epicycles’.
“Iv0 Schneider, ‘Wahrscheinlichkeit und Zufall bei Kepler’, Philosophiu Nuturulk, 16 (1976).
40 -63, argues that in Kepler’s later works there is developed a quite sophisticated view of the
relative probabilities of hypotheses in the light of evidence.
“Tractatus. f.Biv,v.
The Forging of Modern Realism: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics 169
tially misleading because the few explicit examples of such criteria which
Kepler gives are readily assimilated to the modern categories of simplicity and
consilience of inductions, so that Kepler can all too easily be taken to be pro-
moting an empiricist hypothetico-deductive methodology. There is good
reason for Kepler’s reticence about the criteria for choice of theory. Kepler’s
views on the nature and justification of the ‘physical’ criteria by which
theoretical disputes may be resolved were forged in the specific context of
defence and emendation of the Copernican system. But the Apologia is a
defence of Tycho, and Kepler, whilst he evidently felt himself free to declare
his adherence to a Copernican system, scrupulously refrains throughout the
work from actively promoting Copernicanism. It is a measure of his restraint
that, though he alludes to arguments he could give ‘on behalf of Copernicus’,
he spells out only arguments which support both the Tychonic and the Coper-
nican systems against the Ptolemaic.
One possible way of relating the content of the Apologia to Kepler’s
epistemology as a whole is to ask - How can Kepler justify his repeated asser-
tion that even when observational evidence fails ‘physical’ evidence sufficient
to discern true from false hypotheses in astronomy can always be found?
Kepler, indeed, invites the request for justification, for twice in the Apologia
he draws attention to the fact that quite different ‘physical’ considerations
seem compelling to different men.‘* And the Apologia even contains a hint of
the way in which he might answer the question. For at the beginning of the
first chapter he alludes to ‘that illumination of our mind which most especially
thrives on geometrical figures, but also on other things, generally, and without
which there would be nothing of which the mind could have cognition’.”
Behind this remark we may, if we so choose, see elements of Kepler’s theology
and metaphysics. For Kepler it is because the Creator reproduced a part of His
‘essence’ both in the human mind and in the created world that the human
mind is possessed of an ‘illumination’ through which knowledge of the hidden
form of the cosmos is attainable. It is because God created both the human
mind and the world as a geometer that the mind’s illumination ‘most especially
thrives on geometrical figures’, and hence can hope to resolve theoretical
disputes through apprehension of the geometrical harmony of the dispositions
and motions of the cosmos through which the Creator partially reveals His
essence. These commonplace aspects of Kepler’s metaphysics suffice to in-
dicate how he would justify one of the types of ‘physical consideration’ that he
took to be crucial for the resolution of theoretical disputes.7’ But the divine
“Opera, I, 243 and 261.
“Opera, I, 238-239. The remark occurs in the course of Kepler’s claim that the term
‘hypothesis’ was originally coined to describe the self-evident principles of geometry.
“Kepler’s theological cosmology and its historical context are explored in detail for the first
time in an important recent work of J. Hitbner. Die Theologie Johannes Keplers zwischen Or-
fhodoxie und Narurwissenschaft (Tiibingen, 1975).
The Forging of Modern Realism: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics 171
“G. Buchdahl, ‘Methodological aspects of Kepler’s theory of refraction’, Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci.
3 (1972). 265 - 298.
172 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
The ultimate source of the Aristotelian terminology in this passage is the Posterior Analytics.
According to Aristotle the proximate cause of an effect (in a later Aristotelian terminology ‘the
commensurate universal’) is that which is, as a matter of necessity, present when and only when
the effect is present. Demonstration of the reason (4podeU tou diotr) for an effect is achieved by
a syllogism whose middle term specifies its proximate cause. Take, for example, the following
syllogism:
Heavenly bodies which are near the earth do not twinkle;
The planets are near the earth;
So, the planets do not twinkle.
This is for Aristotle a demonstration of the reason, since ne4mes.s to the e4rth is the proximate
cause of not twinkling in the subject he4venIy bodies. Such demonstration is to be carefully
distinguished from demonstration of the fact (4~odeZs tou hoti) in which, though the premises
are true, the middle term does not specify the proximate cause (Past. AMI.. 1:13). Aristotle’s
distinction is most naturally interpreted as a distinction between demonstrations which have ex-
planatory force and those which do not. But, in practice, Aristotle offers many explanations which
cannot be cast in the form of an 4podeU tou dioti, and it is a moot point whether he considered
adherence to this exceedingly stringent scheme a necessary condition for explanation. For our pur-
poses it suffices to note that he was taken to have done so by the majority of mediaeval and
renaissance commentators (see N. Jardine. ‘Galileo’s road to truth and the demonstrative regress’,
Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 1 (1976), 277 -318, for an account of some renaissance elaborations of
Aristotle’s theory of demonstration). Earlier in the work Aristotle gives a more general account of
the conditions a demonstration must satisfy. In particular he requires that the major premise of a
demonstrative syllogism be true essentially (koth’outo) as opposed to accidentally (kato
sumbe&kds); that is, the predicate must specify an essential, not an accidental attribute of the
subject (Post. An4f., I, 3 - 5). Though the precise interpretation of this distinction is, and was in
the renaissance, a matter for controversy, it is clear that Aristotle took demonstration of the
reason for an effect to satisfy this criterion.
Kepler’s use of this terminology is far removed from Aristotle’s Thus, Aristotle’s account ap-
plies to simple syllogisms, whereas Kepler is concerned with complex geometrical deductions. Fur-
ther, in Aristotle’s account a middle term is a predicate and a cause a state or disposition of a
body. If my reading is correct, Kepler calls hypotheses ‘middle terms’ and treats such complex
states of affairs as systems of absolute and relative motions as causes. How is this bold extrapola-
tion of Aristotle’s terminology to be explained?
To start with there is a significant basis for Kepler’s extrapolation in Aristotle’s text. One of the
various ways Aristotle lists in which the rule of truth k&h’outo can be violated is by use of a
specific predicate in a demonstration where the generic predicate would suffice. For example, the
rule is violated by one who appeals to the fact that a figure is an isosceles triangle in order to show
that its angles sum to two right angles, when it suffices to appeal to the fact that the figure is a
triangle. (Post. An41.. 1:4). In Aristotle’s terminology the premise ‘all isosceles triangles have
angles equal to two right angles’ is said not to be ‘primary’ @tit-os). It is with an analogue of this
kind of violation that Kepler charges Ptolemy in terms which clearly echo Aristotle%. To ‘save the
phenomena’, Kepler claims, it suffices to appeal to the ‘genus’ of relative motion, ‘for it is in vir-
tue of the genus primarily that the result in question is produced’ [my italics]; Ptolemy, however,
appeals unnecessarily to the ‘species’ of absolute motion. Further, there is a clear classical prece-
dent for the application of Aristotle’s technical terminology to extended geometrical reasoning in
Proclus’ Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements (first published in Latin translation
in 1505, and subsequently in 1533 and 1560). Finally there is a clear renaissance precedent for
Kepler’s free interpretation of Aristotle’s rule of essential truth in Ramus’ dialectical writings.
There Aristotle’s rule is presented as a stipulation that nothing irrelevant to the purpose of an art
or science should be included by the teacher in presenting it (see W. J. Ong, Romus, Method, and
the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge, Mass., 1958) 258 - 262, for an account of Ramus’ version of
Aristotle’s rules of demonstration). Kepler’s charge against Ptolemy is precisely that for the pur-
pose of demonstrating ‘the phenomena’ consideration of absolute motions is irrelevant.
Was Kepler conversant with these sources? He had certainly read the Posterior Analytics. In the
Apo/ogia he refers to ‘Aristotle’s writing on demonstration’ (Opem, 1, 239) and later he claimed
that at Tubingen he had read the work carefully (Max Caspar, Kepler, London and N.Y ., 1959,
The Forging of Modern Real&m: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics 173
44). The appeal to Kepler’s possible use of Ramus and Pro&s is, however, problematic. Kepler
never cites Ramus’ dialectical works, and his earliest reference to Proclus’ commentary is in a let-
ter of September. 1599 to Herwart von Hohenberg (K.G. W., XIV, 63). Further, given Proclus’
remarks on the role of the Platonic solids as an archetype, remarks which Kepler duly cites in the
Hurmonice, it seems unlikely that he would have failed to cite the work, had he read it, in the
Mysterium. A likely source both for Kepler’s conversancy with Ramus’ reinterpretation of Aristo-
tle’s rule of truth kuth’auto and for his conversancy with Pro&s’ views on the nature of
demonstration is Ramus’ controversial and influential Prooemium mathematicarum (Paris, 1567).
(For a detailed account of the impact of this work see J. J. Verdonk, Petrus Rumus en de
Wiskunde, (Assert, 1966.) A revised version of this forms Books I-III of the Scholae
muthemuticue (EIasel, 1569), and Kepler refers to this edition in a letter to Mastlin of 1597
(K.G. W., 111, MO), and in several subsequent letters. In Book III, an attack on Euclid’s
unmethodical presentation of geometry, Ramus presents Prcclus’ views on the nature of
geometrical demonstration, and attributes to Proclus his own version of Aristotle’s rule of truth
kuth’uuto: ‘Then he [Proclus] declares that he [the geometer] will set out matters which are
cognate and of the same kind, nor will he teach anything foreign or superfluous . . . This is the
kuth’uufo, per se, of Aristotle’ (op. cit., 80):