the new bioethics, Vol. 23 No.

2, 2017, 165–182

Transhumanism: How Far Is Too Far?

Joel Thompson
Heythrop College, University of London, London, UK

Transhumanism promises us freedom from the biological limitations inherent

in our nature. It aims to enhance physical, emotional and cognitive capacities
thus opening up new possibilities and horizons of experience. Since many
transhumanist aspirations resemble those within the domain of religion,
this paper compares Christian ethics to transhumanist ethics with respect
to the body and the environment and offers a critique of transhumanism.
Three areas of contention are discussed: the modification of our given
human nature, the radical extension of our lifespans and our relationship to
the natural environment. It argues that in these three areas, the underlying
values being transmitted to future generations about the body and the environ-
ment are incompatible with Christian principles.

keywords transhumanism, religion, designer children, immortality, enhance-

ment, environment

This paper examines the transhumanist movement and offers a Christian (primarily
Roman Catholic) critique of it. The fundamental idea of the movement is that
human nature can be improved using applied science and reason (Humanity+
2016). Transhumanists envision a world where the use of biotechnology leads to
extended life and health spans, enhanced physical, intellectual and emotional
capacities and reduced suffering. The expectation in this utopian world is that
after being freed from the limits of human nature, people will be happier and the
world will be a much better place. From a theological perspective, one might
claim that this seems to be in harmony with the abundant life which Jesus promises
in the Gospels (See Jn 10:10).
Jackelén (2002, p. 294), while commenting on Mt 11:2–6, observes that the
movement towards a posthuman reality could well be regarded by some as a step
towards the kingdom of God in a world where it is possible for the lame, blind
and deaf to be cured and the dead to be at least virtually alive. While the transhu-
manist vision of an earthly utopia giving way to everlasting life may sound religious,
key Christian concerns are whether humans can be its sole architect, and whether it
is compatible with religious beliefs and the requirements of social justice. Will this
‘good news’ really be accessible to the poor? As presented above, it may prima

© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group DOI 10.1080/20502877.2017.1345092
166 JOEL THOMPSON

facie appear to be an alluring vision, but it has been called the most dangerous idea
in the world (Fukuyama 2004). Since the movement is a wide one with many differ-
ing visions of the future, it is useful to separate the helpful ideas from the so-called
‘dangerous’ ones.
At the outset, I should perhaps state that I am not arguing that human enhance-
ment is inherently unethical. Enhancements to our human nature are a feature of
modern life. Some reading this may use spectacles, have cochlear implants or be reci-
pients of laser eye surgery. Most others will have had vaccines. The ideas and pos-
sibilities surrounding human enhancement exist on a continuum ranging from the
ordinary and ubiquitous (vaccines) to the extraordinary (mind uploading and cog-
nitive enhancement). In the early enhancement debates a distinction was drawn
between therapy and enhancement to argue that the latter might make a moral
difference. However, the consensus is that they are overlapping categories as in
the case of vaccines which heal by enhancing the immune system. The continuum
approach can be used instead to draw a line between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ enhancement
or what Agar refers to as ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ enhancement (Agar 2010). Agar
argues against radical enhancement (anything significantly exceeding the maximum
attainable by a current or past human being) by stating that it is likely to take our
humanity from us by removing many of the valuable experiences of living and
loving that make us human. On his species-relative view, the problem with enhance-
ment is one of degree. My argument in this paper is similar insofar as I focus on the
human values and dispositions being promoted or eroded through the transhuma-
nist quest but differs by including a Christian anthropology. This contrasts with
arguments which find fault primarily with the means of enhancement or view
enhancement itself as being unnatural. The approach advocated here supports asses-
sing enhancements on a case-by-case basis.
For example, consider someone who is born without arms or loses them through
an accident but gains prosthetic ones or ones specially regrown using nanotechnol-
ogy. Suppose that with the aid of these enhanced arms they can lift a ton (which is
significantly more than the current human maximum) due to its design. Should these
enhanced arms be limited to those without arms if existing human arms could be
modified to produce the same effect? Two questions to guide the ethical analysis
here are: Why is the enhancement being undertaken? and What values or disposi-
tions might it promote or erode? If someone wants to deliberately amputate their
arms to gain a competitive edge at work or sport or for sheer pleasure, then the dis-
positions expressed towards their body would be ethically dubious. It becomes more
difficult to discern the best course of action if they were to modify their arms without
amputating them. One way is to weigh the negative effects on the relationships and
human experiences that we value against the expected benefits. A line can then be
drawn between those enhancements that might violate these values and those that
do not. The goal of the ongoing dialogue between transhumanists and those con-
cerned about their aspirations is to clearly articulate what these potentially affected
values might be and ascertain whether they are negotiable.
What is wrong with the transhumanist vision from a Christian perspective? This
question is explored throughout the paper by examining three areas of contention.
Section one defines transhumanism and renders a sketch of its general vision. Section
 TRANSHUMANISM: HOW FAR IS TOO FAR? 167

two evaluates arguments for and against modifying our ‘given’ human nature.
Section three assesses the goal of radical life extension. The final section challenges
transhumanism on ecological grounds. The conclusion is that the transhumanist
aspirations identified appear to be incompatible with Christian theological ethics
and environmental ethics.

What is transhumanism?
The term ‘transhumanism’ was first used by Julian Huxley in 1927 in his work Reli-
gion without Revelation (Bostrom 2005). Humanity Plus (previously the World
Transhumanist Association), gives two definitions of Transhumanism:
1. The intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirabil-
ity of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason,
especially by developing and making widely available technologies to eliminate
aging and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical and psychological
capacities.
2. The study of the ramifications, promises and potential dangers of technologies
that will enable us to overcome fundamental human limitations, and the
related study of the ethical matters involved in developing and using such tech-
nologies (Humanity+ 2016).
In definition one, we are told that transhumanists hope to make enhancement tech-
nologies as widely available as possible but exactly how they plan to ensure this is
not mentioned. It is likely that those who are rich enough will pursue these enhance-
ments and live for centuries while those who lack the means will continue to experi-
ence the limitations of mortality and eventually fade away. This would lead to a
wider social gap between the privileged and underprivileged and is a source of
real tension between Christian morality and transhumanism (Tirosh-Samuelson
2011; Delio 2013; Green 2015). The current global inequality may also spread
extensively. As it stands, 1% of humans own more wealth than the other 99% com-
bined and the gap between the rich and powerful and the poor keeps widening and
threatening economic growth (OECD 2015; Hardoon et al. 2016). Ensuring that the
principles of the common good and of solidarity are upheld are part of any fruitful
Christian engagement with Transhumanism so that the flourishing of all people and
not just elite sections of society occurs.
Transhumanists view any objections to the movement and to technological inno-
vation along the lines of social inequality as misguided. They admit that those who
are already well off would become smarter and richer. However, they claim that it is
up to the state to remedy existing inequalities and ensure that genetic enhancements
are covered by means such as social security (Hughes 2004; Humanity+ 2016).
Hughes argues that ‘democratic transhumanism’ addresses the legitimate concerns
surrounding equity, solidarity and public safety of those he dubs ‘bio-luddites’.
His argument is that an expanded concept of citizenship — based on personhood
(the capacity for self-awareness) coupled with strong state regulation and the univer-
sal provision of enhancement technologies (through subsidised access) reduces these
168 JOEL THOMPSON

social imbalances (Hughes 2004). I cannot fully comment here on all facets of his
democratic transhumanism but will offer brief comments on his notions of solidarity
and equality between humans and posthumans.
One prominent argument against creating posthumans is that they may view the
unenhanced as moral inferiors and decide to enslave or eradicate them. Hughes
argues that creating a society highly tolerant of diversity, having institutions to
protect civil rights, and ensuring that the enhanced have empathy towards humanity
and a moral code are three ways to avoid a human-posthuman schism (Hughes
2004). I focus here on the last point. An extraordinary amount of confidence is
placed in designing posthumans capable of moral enhancement. This ignores the
fact that we currently have very little understanding of the biological contributions
to morality and empathy. Hughes’ argument of recommending a policy of screening
the enhanced for morals, benevolence and empathy rests on the assumption that
these are programmable for both humans and super intelligent machines and exhi-
bits what theology might describe as ‘Pelagian optimism’. Recent research by Calis-
kan et al. (2017) has found that machine learning systems pick up gender and racial
biases embedded within daily language. For example, ‘names associated with being
European American were found to be significantly more easily associated with plea-
sant than unpleasant terms, compared to a bundle of African American names’
(Caliskan et al. 2017). There was also the embarrassing case in 2016 of the Micro-
soft AI chatbot ‘Tay’ producing racist and sexist posts on Twitter after only 16 hours
of interaction with other online users. Even if empathy and morality were somehow
able to be coded into one’s genes there would still be other problems with equality.
Agar argues that posthumans may cause suffering to humans not because they lack
empathy, but because they view that suffering as morally justified (Agar 2010). He
argues that a widening gap between the two species is likely to cause them to view
our moral value and contributions to society as having little worth and by prioritiz-
ing their welfare over ours may justify our sacrifice like cancer researchers experi-
menting on monkeys (Agar 2010). While democratic transhumanism is an
attractive prospect, its overly optimistic approach to the complexities of morality
and politics overlooks ways in which the rights and interests of the unenhanced
may be ignored.
Further questions which emerge from the first definition are: Why should we elim-
inate aging and enhance our physical and mental capabilities? Is there any value in
feeling vulnerable? Should we induce or suppress some emotions? Tirosh-Samuelson
maintains that anxiety, insecurity and uncertainty are valuable and are very much
part of being human. He argues that aspects of human culture such as art would
not have been possible without these allegedly negative emotions and if they are
removed we may lose our cultural depth and creativity (Tirosh-Samuelson 2011).
He does not say that we should never try to ease cases of extreme anxiety or
depression but takes umbrage with the desire to eradicate all negative feelings.
The Scream by Edvard Munch is a widely admired work of art and as the product
of an ill feeling of the artist is the type of anecdotal evidence usually given to support
such points. Munch once remarked that ‘My sufferings are part of myself and my
art. They are indistinguishable from me, and their destruction would destroy my
art. I want to keep those sufferings’. (Prideaux 2007, p. 251). However, there is
 TRANSHUMANISM: HOW FAR IS TOO FAR? 169

little empirical evidence for such cases due to the limitations in examining the links
between mental illness and creativity. (See Andreasen 2008). The paucity of such
information should therefore give us pause before we totally eliminate human
emotional suffering.
An estimate of when the transhumanist reality begins is 2045 — the year of the
singularity. According to Kurzweil, this will be ‘the culmination of the merger of
our biological thinking and existence with our technology, resulting in a world
that is still human but transcends our biological roots’ (Kurzweil 2005, p. 9). In
other words, through this consummation, humans and machines will become
‘one’. Furthermore, should we grow tired of a biological body and wish to be free
of any limitations, then we can choose to upload the essence of our consciousness
into a computer where we will be able to live forever and interact with others by pro-
jecting avatars of ourselves as we would like to appear (Kurzweil 2005, p. 325).
Given such an extraordinary vision and the assurance by transhumanists that they
will ‘study the ramifications, promises, and potential dangers of such technologies’
(Humanity+ 2016) should we not then welcome the transhumanist vision of the
future? In the next section I begin to separate the useful elements from the proble-
matic elements in the transhumanist vision.

Rage against the given

Sandel argues that the deepest moral objection to enhancement lies in the human dis-
position it expresses and promotes (Sandel 2007). This disposition is a ‘boundless
bid for mastery and domination’. What is wrong with such a bid? He locates the
moral problem in a failure to cultivate an appreciation for an ‘ethic of giftedness’.
This ethic is best explained and explored within the context of the ‘designer children’
debate.
Let us imagine that all the attributes mentioned in the transhumanist vision above
were possible to have ‘on demand’ in a laboratory which produced specially
designed babies. We can imagine that in such a case it might be possible to choose
the physical appearance of the child, its gender, talents and cognitive ability as a
minimum. One assumption here is that there is a genetic predisposition to attributes
such as musical, athletic or cognitive ability. Would this possibility be a step too far
along the bioengineering road? Harris maintains that our moral imperative to
prevent harm and confer benefit, leads to an obligation to enhance future gener-
ations (Harris 2007).
Against the view that we should try to produce designer children in the same way
that we buy designer clothing (by picking and choosing the latest trends), Sandel
argues that children should be accepted and appreciated as gifts. He views parent-
hood as a relationship where ‘openness to the unbidden’ is clearly taught and
where the norms of parental love invite an unconditional acceptance of the child
which is not reliant on any of their attributes. It is the disposition of hubris and of
wanting to master the mystery of birth which he argues disfigures the relationship
between parents and child and deprives the parents of qualities like humility
(Sandel 2007, pp. 47–50).
170 JOEL THOMPSON

It might be objected that accepting children as they are limits what parents can
and should do. However, Sandel utilizes the distinction between accepting love
(beholding) and transforming love (moulding). The former accepts the child as he/
she is, while the latter seeks the well-being of the child. Together in a dynamic
tension the two types of love are meant to correct the excesses of each other.
Sandel’s argument so far is that the central problem with genetic engineering is
that ‘it represents the one-sided triumph of willfulness over giftedness, of dominion
over reverence, of moulding over beholding’ (Sandel 2007, pp. 85–92). However, he
goes deeper than simply identifying these dispositions and identifies humility, soli-
darity and responsibility as three moral qualities in society which will be trans-
formed if we fail to cultivate giftedness. His examples invite us to consider the
attitudes and virtues that we are developing and striving towards as a society. A
failure to pay attention to the virtues of humility and solidarity is most likely
causing what Pope Francis has repeatedly called the ‘Globalization of Indifference’
— our failure to truly reach out to those most in need (See Evangelii Gaudium 2013,
§ 54).
It is quite prophetic that Sandel states that a failure to cultivate humility by being
‘open to the unbidden’ would lead to an inhospitable world, ‘a great
gated-community’ (Sandel 2007, p. 86). In the light of the global refugee crisis,
these arguments should be seriously reflected upon since they capture the Christian
anxiety about the erosion of humility and solidarity within society. Both the Pope
and Sandel see this erosion as possibly stemming from an exaggerated sense of self-
sufficiency. Nevertheless, one can surely say that since such sentiments of self-
sufficiency already exist without genetic engineering, introducing it is unlikely to
be at a great cost to society. As long as technology exists, Sandel’s three important
moral features will be under threat and if not genetic engineering there will be some-
thing else.
Another problem with Sandel’s position (which he acknowledges) is that it is only
persuasive if someone values the virtues he mentions (Sandel 2007, p. 95). Harris for
example, states that he does not regard humility as a virtue and sees no merit in
openness to the unbidden. He also argues that a failure to identify and respond to
changes in the moral landscape is a recipe for disaster since on a cost-benefit analy-
sis, if the gains were sufficiently beneficial and the risks acceptable, we would want
to make the relevant alterations and be justified in doing so (Harris 2007). For him,
the loss of humility, solidarity and responsibility in society would be acceptable risks
if the gains were something such as a cure for dementia or heart disease.
Bostrom and Roache also do not find Sandel’s critique of designer children con-
vincing. They argue that it is not obvious that genetically engineering children
would make parents appreciate them or others less and that there is no empirical evi-
dence of this. On the contrary, they think that it is plausible that some parents may
find it easier to love an enhanced child who is bright, beautiful, happy and healthy
(Bostrom and Roache 2008). However, they misrepresent Sandel by stating that
there is room between ‘Sandel’s extremes of accepting children as they come and
viewing them as objects of our design’ (Bostrom and Roache 2008, p. 140).
Sandel does not advocate blind acceptance of nature. His distinction of accepting
and transforming love both working in a dynamic tension ensures that while
 TRANSHUMANISM: HOW FAR IS TOO FAR? 171

parents accept children as they are, they also work to ensure that they are the best
that they can be.
In recognizing the limitations of his argument, Sandel states that his goal was to
try to shift the discourse onto a higher platform by seeking to place the enhancement
debate beyond the categories of autonomy and rights on one hand and cost-benefit
calculations on the other. He states that his ‘concern with enhancement is not as
individual vice but as habit of mind and way of being’ (Sandel 2007, pp. 96–97).
With his use of the phrases ‘way of being’ and ‘habit of mind’, he seems to want
to transfer the enhancement debate into a virtue ethics framework but does not
explicitly say so.
Sandel’s argument that the stance of mastery violates the parental norms of
unconditional love and openness to the unbidden in the case of designer children
is persuasive from a virtue perspective. A question to ask here is whether any
genetic intervention should be permitted or only those in the best interests of
the child? Perhaps intelligence or health? Where might the limit be? It would be
difficult to make the case that green eyes or red hair are in the child’s best inter-
ests. Even transhuman advocates like Bostrom and Roache recognize that charac-
teristics such as intelligence and health are more likely to serve the interests of the
child than attributes like competitiveness, and sporting ability (Bostrom and
Roache 2008). Sandel’s framework of accepting love and transforming love
working together in a dynamic tension offers a guide to dilemma but does not
fully resolve it.
Apart from the social consequences, the dispositions that we hold and the values
that we transmit to the next generation are the morally objectionable aspects in the
quest for designer children. A theological argument grounds this positon more
firmly and it is to this that we now turn.

A theological perspective on the ethic of giftedness

One of the limitations of Sandel’s argument for an ethic of giftedness is that it loses
some of its persuasive force when expressed in purely secular terms. This is not sur-
prising given the fact that the argument rings with theological overtones. In his phi-
losophical argument, he fails to adequately show why we should appreciate life as a
gift. It comes down to him arguing that we should appreciate it as a gift because it is
beyond our control (Sandel 2007, p. 93). But why should someone who regards
nature as a ‘thoughtless’ or random giver have gratitude or reverence for it?
Sandel asserts that we can understand the concept of giftedness and grasp its
moral weight whether or not we trace the source of the gift to God. I am not con-
vinced by his assertion that we can.
The concepts of being ‘open to the unbidden’ and open to children and our talents
as gifts are not likely to be convincing to non-religious persons (Smith 2009). If
someone deems our genetic heritage as solely the product of random selection,
then they will have no qualms about rejecting its gifts whenever they find it undesir-
able. Smith argues that a forthright religious argument which upholds human
dignity is the only hope of staying off the slippery slope to a dystopian future
(Smith 2009, p. 162). While I would not say that a religious argument is the only
172 JOEL THOMPSON

hope, I argue that Christian theology provides a more solid framework in which to
debate the issue of designer children. Sandel’s argument transposed into a theologi-
cal framework amounts to saying that the boundless drive towards perfection and
mastery constitutes an attempt at usurping God’s role by becoming God ourselves.
This temptation to ‘be like God’ has been with humanity from the beginning (See
Gen 3:5). For a Christian, the revelation that the ‘giver’ of the gift of life is God,
grounds the reason why reverence, restraint and gratitude toward our created
nature is normative. The recent Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation on the Family
(Amoris Laetitia — The Joy of Love), sums up quite succinctly the Catholic stance
on designer children by expressing what giftedness means:
Scientific advances today allow us to know beforehand what colour a child’s hair will be
or what illnesses they may one day suffer…Yet only the Father, the Creator, fully knows
the child; he alone knows his or her deepest identity and worth. Expectant mothers need
to ask God for the wisdom to fully know their children and to accept them as they are.
For children are a gift. Each one is unique and irreplaceable… We love our children
because they are children, not because they are beautiful, or look or think as we do,
or embody our dreams. The love of parents is the means by which God our Father
shows his own love. He…accepts that child unconditionally, and welcomes him or her
freely (Amoris Laetitia 2016, § 170).

This reinforces some of the Church’s earlier teachings on the matter such as those in
the Instruction Dignitas Personae. The instruction raised concerns about genetic
engineering, stating that some of the proposals ‘exhibit a certain dissatisfaction or
even rejection of the value of the human being as a finite creature and person’ (Dig-
nitas Personae 2008, §27). Concerns about genetic manipulation promoting a
‘eugenic mentality’ leading to indirect social stigma against people lacking certain
qualities while privileging transient cultural qualities were also raised. Issues of
equality — an ‘unjust domination of man over man,’ and the attempt by humans
to take the place of the Creator were also noted (Dignitas Personae 2008, §27).
On a Catholic understanding, the revelation of being created in the image and
likeness of God (Gen 1:26), carries with it certain features, beliefs and practices
which entail limits. I briefly mention three limits here. First, the Church has consist-
ently upheld the dignity of the human person and the sanctity of life which both flow
from being created in his image. Consequently, biotechnical means which violate
human dignity such as those involving the destruction of embryos are incompatible
with Catholic doctrine. Second, it is clear that humans are distinguished from God
by being finite creatures and not creators. We are called to be stewards of God’s cre-
ation and not masters of every aspect of it. Third, the Giver of life is revealed: life as a
gift comes from God and should therefore be appreciated. The given is not ours to do
with as we please. Biblical stories such as the Tower of Babel (Gen 11:1–9) empha-
size that not every human innovation is acceptable. Against these theological views,
objections of hubris make better sense. If as Sandel argues, the disposition of hubris
of the designing parents is morally objectionable because it disfigures the relation-
ship between parent and child, it can also be said that this hubris disfigures the
relationship between humans and God. This occurs when we try to usurp his role
and is a form of idolatry. In the subsequent section, I will argue that this tendency
 TRANSHUMANISM: HOW FAR IS TOO FAR? 173

towards hubris and idolatry is glimpsed more clearly in the transhumanist vision of
radical life extension.

Rage against death

Do not go gentle into that good night, Old age should burn and rave at close of day;
Rage, rage against the dying of the light. — Dylan Thomas
Should human beings go peacefully into the night of death or should they vigor-
ously fight against it? Transhumanists argue that we should do the latter. They hope
to defeat death by extending the life and health spans of humans indefinitely.
Although the challenge of finding cures for all types of cancer and for diseases
such as dementia seems insurmountable, transhumanists are optimistic. Aubrey de
Grey maintains that aging is the ultimate target of biomedical research. He estimates
that two-thirds of all global deaths and ninety percent of all deaths in the developed
world are age related (de Grey 2011). It can therefore be said that ultimately the
transhumanist fight is against aging and not necessarily death.
The central issue here is that while it is recognized that saving and preserving lives
is on the whole a good thing, it is ambiguous whether deliberately prolonging the life
span of the human race is. Furthermore, some means of achieving immortality such
as ‘mind uploading’ (which yields virtual or cybernetic immortality) are question-
able. Harris disagrees with this perspective and sums up the transhumanist senti-
ment by saying that ‘lifesaving is just death-postponing with a positive spin! If it
is right and good to postpone death for a short while, it is difficult to see how it
would not be better and more moral to postpone death for longer — even indefi-
nitely’ (Harris 2007, p. 33).
Can we have too much of a ‘good’ thing? Certainly! We know what happens if
someone consumes too much food or water. But those are instrumental goods
some might argue. True, but it is still too simplistic to move from the fact that it
is good to postpone death for a short time to wanting to postpone it indefinitely.
Why is unlimited life an obvious good? Such a move is only possible if we fully
understand the answer to existential questions concerning the meaning and
purpose of life. Using life extension technology to realize the meaning of life is a cat-
egory mistake (Grassie 2011). Broad interdisciplinary conversations are needed to
fully explore the ramifications of this enterprise.
A common anxiety about the possibility of radical life extension is the argument
that if people live for much longer periods of time then the world will soon become
overpopulated and will run out of vital natural resources. Yet, this is not a likely
outcome for two reasons. First, the initial high cost, availability, risk and uncertainty
about life-extending therapies is likely to curtail the number of people in the world
who will pursue it (Harris 2007). This is evident if radical life extension is compared
to cosmetic surgery, a service which only a small percentage of the UK population
uses (BAAPS 2016).1 Second, the state of longevity will not protect people against
new infectious diseases and unfortunate accidents.

1
The British Association of Aesthetic Plastic Surgeons (BAAPS) put this figure at around 51,000 in 2016.
174 JOEL THOMPSON

Bostrom and Roache in supporting a similar view state that such therapies are
likely to be first available in developed countries which in recent years have declining
birth rates. They argue that a policy which limits the rate at which those who receive
radical life extension bring children into the world would be more humane than
withholding ‘life-saving’ medical treatments (Bostrom and Roache 2008). Another
option might be to specify that those who want these therapies should agree to
have no children or to limit themselves to one child.
While the overpopulation objection has its merits on consequentialist grounds, it
is not very persuasive since overpopulation is a global problem that will have to be
tackled whether or not radical life extension therapies become widely available. As it
stands, life expectancy has been gradually increasing worldwide (WHO 2016). It is
also conceivable that ethical policies will be created to manage the phenomenon of
radically extended lives. The salient issue which deserves our attention now whether
or not life extension goals become a reality is the disparity in consumption levels
within and among countries. Laying the blame on overpopulation refuses to
acknowledge the problem of overconsumption (Laudato Si’ §50). Christians
should be wary of adopting the narrowly consequentialist argument of overpopula-
tion when trying to evaluate the goal of radical life extension.

Mind uploading
Another radical way of achieving immortality is by mind uploading. According to
Kurzweil, this will involve scanning a human brain, ‘capturing all [his emphasis]
of the salient details, and re-instantiating the brain’s state in a different and probably
more powerful computational substrate’ (Kurzweil 2005, p. 324). He imagines this
to be a feasible procedure which will most likely occur around the late 2030s. He
uses the concept of a digital file which can be transferred from one device to
another to describe what we can possibly do with our consciousness. When the
body dies, he imagines our personal ‘mind file’, living out on the web in virtual
reality and projecting either physical or holographic bodies when desired. This
software-based existence will not depend on the survival of a biological body or
brain.
Rothblatt reasons that a cybernetic existence might be a potential means of pre-
serving and sustaining the human species if the earth is destroyed by a future
cosmic catastrophe. She goes as far as suggesting that this ‘mind file’ will ‘feel’
emotions and argues that software that fears for its life and desires more life is
alive (Rothblatt 2011). The concept of mind uploading is based on the premise
that our human essence is housed within our minds and not in our bodies. An
additional attraction for this type of existence is the overcoming of loneliness and
isolation since the uploaded minds would be connected to each other in a form of
cybernetic community potentially leading to a globally connected consciousness —
Teilhard’s ‘noosphere’ (Rothblatt 2011). Although an enticing vision for some, there
are a number of practical, theological and philosophical problems which are uncov-
ered upon closer investigation.
First, it is not clear that it will be possible to design or upload a disembodied brain.
Some neuroscientists hold that the human brain at birth is highly immature and
 TRANSHUMANISM: HOW FAR IS TOO FAR? 175

interactions with the physical, biological and social environment are important for
its growth and development (Auletta et al. 2014). Furthermore, the brain’s connec-
tivity networks are continuously modified by these interactions throughout the
whole of a person’s lifetime. The argument here is that the brain is essentially perfor-
mative: we can only discover what it can do by exploration (Pickering 2008). If a
consciousness is emulated or uploaded, this might be a static consciousness. How
will it interact with the environment? The transplantation of a brain may likely
result in violent rejection or a loss of personal identity (Auletta et al. 2014).
Transhumanists reply that the virtual experience ‘could in principle be identical to
that of a biological human since an uploaded mind could have a simulated body
which gives the same sensations and possibilities for interaction as a non-simulated
body’ (Humanity+ 2016). This might be true, but the main point I am making is:
Can it be said that such a ‘disembodied’ consciousness is a person or even ‘alive’?
The term ‘the walking dead’ seems a more apt description. This view seems very
reductionist and I agree with Pickering (2008) that it is a freezing, narrowing and
editing out of what it means to be human and what humans might be.
It takes the enlightenment conception that the essence of being human is mind
and rationality and privileges it above all other definitions. Delio makes a similar
point in stating that ‘to say that mind alone is the essence of a human being is
to reduce humans to a silicon chip detached from nonhuman creation’ (Delio
2011, p. 97). Films like The Matrix have imagined virtual worlds where human
consciousness can ‘live’ without knowing that it is simulated. Ironically, the film
depicted this scenario as the product of the enslavement of humans by machines.
The humans fought vigorously against this reality. Transhumanists would have
us rush headfirst into enslavement. Something does seem wanting about this
great aspiration of transhumanists to effectively live in a false (simulated) world.
A virtual existence effectively cuts a person off from the physical environment.
Though I agree with Bostrom that a Posthuman would be worthy of ‘dignity’
(Bostrom 2011), this deliberate separation from the natural environment seems
to be a form of dehumanization or erosion of an essential part of humanity. This
danger possibly comes from the phenomenon of so over-identifying with and privi-
leging our technology that our relationship to and respect for the environment is
forgotten (Peters 2011; Laudato Si’ 2015).
This respect would involve not developing a disposition of ‘fleeing’ from the real
world into a virtual one. It is beyond the scope of this essay to make a detailed case
for why nature is due respect, but a brief comment will do. Hursthouse, in making
the case for a new environmental virtue ethic (the ethic of being rightly oriented to
nature) states that the emotions of wonder and awe can be felt contrary to reason
(Hursthouse 2007). Nature and its works are proper objects of such emotions.
She therefore argues that getting this natural human emotion in harmony with
reason matters morally, so:
If we think and feel, not that nature is wondrous but that Disneyland or the Royal Family
of Windsors are, that the other animals are not, but we are, that the seas are not but
swimming pools on the twentieth floor of luxury hotels are, and act accordingly, then
we will act wrongly… (Hursthouse 2007, p. 162)
176 JOEL THOMPSON

In this context, perhaps I can say that if someone thinks and feels that life as an
uploaded ‘mind file’ is wonderful but life as a human being living in the natural
world and feeling emotions naturally is not, then they are acting against reason
and so immorally. This attitude fosters an unhealthy dualism which pulls one’s atten-
tion and focus away from not only the body, but from the earth (Delio 2013). Such
an attitude hardly aids the global movement against climate change. It would be a
very unfortunate state of affairs if in the quest for eternal endurance despite the
form, we inculcate attitudes in the next generation which make them yearn for a
false world while neglecting the real one.

Theology and radical life extension

What can Christian theology add to the discussion of Radical Life Extension? It
can argue that the aim of never dying (the goal of radical life extension) conflicts
with the belief in the resurrection of the dead. Christians who profess the Apostles’
or Nicene Creed state that they ‘look forward to the resurrection of the dead’. It is
through this resurrection that the hoped for transformation of our bodies will
occur through Christ (See Phil 3:21). Nevertheless, it can be said that the desire
for some form of immortality is a universal phenomenon and that Christians
are not immune to it. The difference between transhumanists and Christians is
the means by which they hope to achieve this immortality. As was noted in the
discussions on designer children and mind uploading, the underlying dispositions
and values of the agent are important to the moral analysis. When the pursuit of
radical life extension is examined in a theological framework, it is the dispositions
that are held towards human embodiment, finitude and mortality which are
problematic.
Brent Waters has neatly described the two differing perspectives:
‘Both…agree that humans need to be released from their current plight. For Post-
humanists, this is achieved through technologically driven transformation, while Chris-
tians believe they are transformed by their life in Christ. Both agree that death is the final
enemy. One conquers this foe by extending longevity and perhaps achieving virtual
immortality, while the other is resurrected into the eternal life of God’ (Cited in Peters
2011, p. 73)

The fear of death underlying the transhumanist goal primarily comes from their
materialist assumptions. On the other hand, Christians can triumphantly proclaim
that death is not the end since it has been conquered by Christ. It was never part
of God’s plans but entered the world as a consequence of human sin. Our mortality
is inextricably bound up with our full redemption.
Similarities have been noted between some transhumanist beliefs about human
nature and heresies in the early Christian Church (Waters 2011; Delio 2013). This
perhaps is not surprising given that ‘there is nothing new under the sun’ (Eccl
1:9). The Manichean, Gnostic and Pelagian heresies seem to be making a subtle
comeback in the guise of transhumanist aspirations. St. Augustine of Hippo who
was himself a Manichee successfully refuted the Pelagian and Manichean heresies
and defended the Church’s teachings.
 TRANSHUMANISM: HOW FAR IS TOO FAR? 177

The basis of the Manichean religion was a cosmic dualism and materialism. Mani
taught that the cosmic struggle between the Kingdom of Light and the Kingdom of
Darkness was also ongoing in each person and in matter and that humans at their
core were sparks of divine light trapped in material bodies (Harmless 2010).
There was therefore a contempt for the corrupt body from which the soul should
be freed. The Manichaean heresy is evident in the transhumanist belief that the
human body is a prison from which the ‘good’ element of the mind in the form of
information should seek to escape.
Against Manicheism, Augustine affirmed the goodness of creation as proclaimed in
scriptures like Gen 1:31 ‘God saw everything that he had made, and indeed, it was very
good’. In commenting on this verse in the Confessions, Augustine states that ‘the body,
all of whose members are beautiful, is much more beautiful than the individual
members by whose harmonious arrangement the whole is completed … ’ (2006,
conf. 13 § 28.43). The doctrine of the Incarnation also allows Christians to maintain
the goodness of the human body while rejecting mechanistic conceptions of it as a mere
tool or shell.
However, in affirming the goodness of the body, Christians do not worship it. The
two forms of radical life extension explored above: longevity and mind uploading,
show the two extreme views that transhumanists can hold towards the body. It can
be said that the former is a form of ‘body-worship’ while the latter a form of ‘body-
loathing’. Both extremes are unacceptable in a Christian framework. To worship the
human body would be to commit idolatry: ‘honoring and revering a creature in
place of God’ (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1993, no. 2113). Hughes argues
that the dominant transhumanist attitude does not consist in either loathing or wor-
shipping. He states that the dominant attitude is one of pragmatism, of taking excel-
lent care of the body until we have a better alternative (Hughes 2007). Nevertheless,
this middle way is still unacceptable on a Christian understanding of the body if the
hoped for alternative is one made by human hands.
The Pelagianism of transhumanists is seen in their assertion that human beings can
create perfect bodies (including ones devoid of moral weakness) all on their own. It is
therefore difficult to see what room if any is left for the continual assistance of divine
grace. Apart from death, transhumanist aspirations include conquering moral frailty.
In theological terms, this target is the vanquishing of sin. The human heart is the place
from where our sordid intentions flow (Mt 15:19). This transformation requires
divine grace. Is it really possible to transform the human heart and its desires?
Those transhumanists who hope to make us morally better think so. I have my doubts.
Hughes argues that this transformation of ourselves into more virtuous people is
possible since research suggests that our inclinations and susceptibilities to addic-
tions, anger, sexual immorality and other vices have a genetic basis which can be
treated with drugs and possibly gene therapies (Hughes 2007). Our inclination to
be virtuous or not might have a basis in genetics but it is difficult to argue in
advance that genetics can provide the whole solution. Current attempts at treating
depression recommend both antidepressants and talking therapy. Furthermore, it
has been noted that attempts at moral enhancement express a tendency to have
more faith in human technologies than in interpersonal education and communi-
cation (Sutton 2015).
178 JOEL THOMPSON

Augustine would not be surprised at the attempt to think that we can ‘fix’ our
wounded nature on our own. This disposition is a violation of the first command-
ment by committing a sin of presumption. Presumption occurs when humans
presume upon their own capacities and hope to be able to save themselves
without God’s help (CCC no. 2092). Scripture continually warns against cultivating
such a disposition. Psalm 33 states that ‘the war horse is a vain hope for victory, and
by its great might it cannot save’. Perhaps I can say that ‘techno salvation’ — the
attempt to make us more moral through biotechnology is a vain hope.
In addition to the foregoing discussion, one final dimension that theology can add
to the discussion of radical life extension is in the area of wisdom. It can ask whether
there is any wisdom in growing frail and dying. The wisdom literature of the Old
Testament counsels that there is a time and a season for everything, including a
time to be born and a time to die (Eccl 3:2). Coming to terms with one’s mortality
is perhaps an opportunity to grow in the virtues of faith, hope, empathy, mercy
and love. Such wisdom can be seen in conflict resolution. When someone realizes
that they have no more energy for the fight, then alternative ways of coming to a
peaceful resolution are opened. The paradoxes of Christianity contain a great deal
of wisdom. Jesus cautioned his disciples that ‘those who want to save their lives
will lose it’ (Mt 16:25). In looking forward to salvation and to the ‘resurrection
of the dead’, Christians affirm that dying is their way to eternal life and more impor-
tantly, to a fuller communion with the Trinity.

Rage against the earth

The final point to be explored is whether (apart from changing what it means to be
human) transhumanist aspirations are destroying the Earth as we know it. The
central question is whether human beings can do as they please with the environ-
ment or whether there are limits to what should be done. Is nature owed any respect?
In arguing for a ‘preferential option for the Earth’, Tuchman and Schuck claim that
the transhumanist ideology of happiness through technology greatly contributes to a
human paradox. This paradox is that the desire for the ‘progress’ and ‘growth’ which
is characteristic of humans is destroying the very earth which provides what is
required for humans and biological life to exist (Tuchman and Schuck 2014).
Transhumanists are not unaware of this problem. Their solution to it is to make
even greater advances in technology in order to solve ecological problems. They
state that:

The environmental problems that technology creates are problems of intermediary, inef-
ficient technology, of placing insufficient political priority on environmental protection
as well as a lack of ecological knowledge. Once we develop molecular nanotechnology,
we will not only have clean and efficient manufacturing of almost any commodity, but
we will also be able to clean up much of the mess created by today’s crude fabrication
methods. This would set a standard for a clean environment that today’s traditional
environmentalists could scarcely dream of (Humanity+ 2016).
 TRANSHUMANISM: HOW FAR IS TOO FAR? 179

Therefore, nanotechnology and knowledge appear to be the answers to the ecologi-

cal crisis. Nanotechnology also represents for transhumanists a cheap means of
colonizing space since on a cosmic viewpoint, Earth is an ‘insignificant speck’
(Humanity+ 2016). In the transhumanist response above, the Pelagian optimism
about what we can achieve with technology and on our own is again evident.
Such beliefs in an ecological techno salvation are barriers which can reduce the
incentive to take personal or collective responsibility for environmental problems
especially those which stem from overconsumption and a carbon intensive lifestyle
(Lorenzoni et al. 2007; Perkowitz et al. 2014). ‘We cannot solve our problems with
the same thinking we used when we created them.’ This popular quote which is often
attributed to Einstein seems apt here to condemn the ‘business-as-usual’ approach of
transhumanists to environmental problems. Technology can only ever be part of any
environmental solution and not the whole answer (Tuchman and Schuck 2014). The
human heart and educational communities have a role to play in the curbing of our
desires. This approach preempts the recent Catholic response to the ecological crisis
in the social Encyclical Laudato Si’.
In Laudato Si’, the Pope warns against the ‘technocratic paradigm’ — ‘the concept
of a subject who, using logical and rational procedures, progressively approaches
and gains control over an external object’ (Laudato Si’ §106). The object in this
case is nature and the contention is that humans have taken a confrontational
stance against it. The encyclical claims that this stance leads to the idea of unlimited
growth. Transhumanism in my view expressly represents such a position. The move-
ment represents what Francis describes as ‘making the method and aims of science
and technology an epistemological paradigm which shapes the lives of individuals
and the workings of society’ (Laudato Si’ §107). He supports the view that this
outlook on reality leads to the paradox described earlier and the ecological crisis
is a manifestation of this form of reductionism. Like the case of designer children,
one way of countering this drive to mastery is by appreciating nature as a gift.
As was argued earlier, the transhumanist vision of radical life extension fosters an
unhealthy dualism by drawing attention away from the earth. It does this by encoura-
ging the transcendence of an earthly existence through schemes such as mind upload-
ing. The concept of unlimited growth and the prospect of nanotechnology can also be
seen as cultivating this dualist attitude. As the advocates of Humanity Plus have said,
we can look forward to not being confined to our insignificant speck. The ‘integral
ecology’ which Laudato Si’ proposes affirms that we are part of the web of life and
that everything on the planet is interrelated (Laudato Si’ §138). Being a part of this
web means that we should not easily sacrifice the whole for the sake of a part since
‘the whole is greater than the part’ (Laudato Si’ §141).
Transhumanism threatens to depersonalize nature and disintegrate the whole in
search of personal enhancement (Delio 2013). The reminder that we are all inter-
related is an essential value to transmit to the next generation if we are serious
about caring for our common home. Delio is right in affirming that we should be
attentive to our relation to technology since it is a cause for concern when
someone loses a mobile phone and remarks that ‘they have lost a part of themselves’
(Delio 2013). Conversely I ask, when we hear of ecological destruction, do we feel
that we are losing a part of ourselves? How we relate to the environment can
180 JOEL THOMPSON

influence how we relate to people (Laudato Si’ §92). Fleeing world destruction by
inhabiting other worlds, by mind uploading or by techno salvation are fantasies
which clash with Christian environmental virtues.

Conclusion: rage against the machine

Parens argues that those who engage in the enhancement debate tend to operate either
from a stance which emphasizes gratitude or creativity (Parens 2014). An overly sim-
plistic approach might argue that Christian theology emphasizes gratitude and gift
while transhumanists emphasize creativity. Parens’ distinction while helpful, does
not fully capture the Christian concern about transhumanism since it is too inwardly
focused. The Christian’s love for God and neighbour; for hearing the cry of the poor
and the cry of the earth captures the concern and moves the debate beyond Parens’
polarities. Dispositions which erode this love cause the Christian contention.
The above engagement with some of the key ideas surrounding transhumanism
has revealed aspects which are incompatible with Christian ethics and Ecology.
Within the context of the ‘designer children’ debate, it has been argued that the
quest to control and change human nature fosters a disposition of hubris which
harms the relationship between children and parents and between humans and
God. It harms the former by violating the norms of unconditional love and the
latter by blurring the distinction between creator and creature. In both cases harm
results from a failure to appreciate the giftedness of human nature. It was also
argued that deliberately aiming to indefinitely prolong life-spans is not compatible
with the doctrine of the resurrection. The paradox of the resurrection affirms that
dying is the way to eternal life. Furthermore, the mechanistic attitudes underlying
radical life extension were found to be promoting an unhealthy dualism between
humans and the body and between humans and the earth.
The demon Screwtape, the eponymous character in Lewis’ The Screwtape Letters
suggests that since humans have an inveterate appetite for Heaven, ‘the best method
of attaching them to earth is to make them believe that earth can be turned into
Heaven at some future date by politics or eugenics or “science” or psychology, or
what not’ (Lewis 2009, ch. 28). Transhumanism tempts Christians to forget their
true origin, destination and capabilities. Christian theology can affirm that not
every modification of humans is prohibited while recognizing that there are limits to
human creativity. The hope is that this discussion has outlined some of those limits.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Agneta Sutton for her encouragement to submit this article and
for her comments on earlier drafts of it. I am also grateful for the helpful comments
offered by two anonymous reviewers.

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Notes on contributor
Joel Thompson is interested in questions surrounding the relationship between tech-
nology, ethics and the environment. He is currently a postgraduate student at the
London School of Economics and Political Science in the Department of Geography
and Environment.
Correspondence to: Joel Thompson. Email: j.thompson@heythropcollege.ac.uk
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