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On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through
Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao."The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao,
Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of
the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under R.A. 6734.
Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9333 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the
2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and
RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8,
2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country. With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from different parties arose as a
consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of said
laws.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation
of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform
their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend
RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements
prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to
comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also
cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as
the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative" character of the executive and legislative
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power
to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected
under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the
power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete
violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
A. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections
B. Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates the provisions of the 1987
Constitution
HELD:
Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in toto. The
Court agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position that the
Constitution mandates synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress
has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned
from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the extent to which
the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others
through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to
synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three
years.This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the
schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on
RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be
held in May 2013).
In Osme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of
Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-
President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of
synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise
intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the sameday or occasion.This common termination date
will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials
(under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice
President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x xrecords of the proceedings in
the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to
be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and
regional assembly representatives fall within the classification of "local" elections, since they pertain
to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the perspective of
the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as
evident from Article Xof the Constitution entitled "Local Government."Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local
Government.
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate.
Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness
in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be
accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty nor is there reason to
accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local
elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the
other.If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization
operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly
carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and
approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that
does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms.Under these limitations,
the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were elected in executive and
legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have
chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the case of the terms
of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an
interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3)
years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to"appoint officers-
in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office."This power
is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the
assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be therefore
emphasized that the law must be interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize elections and
must not be interpreted otherwise.
- versus -
- versus -
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, through its Chairman,
SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR.,
in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and
Management, and HON. ROBERTO
B. TAN, in his capacity as Treasurer
of the Philippines,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
- versus -
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing
for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other
Purposes” was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of
August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years
thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections. The
law as well granted the President the power to “appoint officers-in-charge (OICs)
for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.”
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already
spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No.
2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied
after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region
with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees
from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of
government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative
assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws.
RA No. 9054 (entitled “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, as Amended”) was the next legislative act passed. This law
provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the
original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM – RA No. 9140[1] - on June
22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA
No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No.
9054 to not later thanAugust 15, 2001.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional
offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate
Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted
favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred
with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.
10153 into law.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the
following petitions against its constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a
member of the House of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his
capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R.
No. 197221;
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3,
Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The Issues
From the parties’ submissions, the following issues were recognized and
argued by the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:
VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.
OUR RULING
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the
Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites
Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President,
which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It
shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the
Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local
officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noonof June 30,
1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the
highest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three
years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can
be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution,[10] which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to
attain synchronization of elections.[11]
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective
officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve
winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of
all future elections – whether national or local – to once every three years.[12] This
intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations.[13]
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting
the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the
national and local elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmeña v. Commission
on Elections,[14] we explained:
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word “local” refers to something that
primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or
minor political subdivision.[17] Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions
of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall
within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve
within the limited region of ARMM.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No.
10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution[18] which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the
Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days.
The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s
immediate enactment.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of
three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed
with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill
defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the
Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third
readings in the House of Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after
the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections.[20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted
both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a
national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the
President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic
rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential
certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis
supplied.]
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both
advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunities
to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the
cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged
because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
in amending this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act
may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of
two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate voting separately.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No.
9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for
the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333
and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws – RA No. 9333
and RA No. 10153 – cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they
did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a
gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the
subsequent regular elections.
This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the
date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion – finds support in
ARMM’s recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the
ARMM elections. The First Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the
date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first
ARMM elections,[24]leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment.
Consequently, RA No. 7647,[25] RA No. 8176,[26] RA No. 8746,[27]RA No.
8753,[28] and RA No. 9012[29] were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the
ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision
of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there
was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March
31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of
September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140[30] to reset the date of
the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the
plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new
date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the
provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter,
Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31] which further reset the date of the ARMM
regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat
the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and
distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent
when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA
No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32] has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054
the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a “majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.” In other words, as long as
majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present,
these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold
session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally
sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no
less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of
the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly,
this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the
passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend,
revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Court’s pronouncement in City of
Davao v. GSIS[33] on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality:
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether
pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce
new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the
federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its
successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every
legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors.
This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act
was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This
legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It
cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.[34](Emphasis ours.)
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required
only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces,
cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While the
settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the
plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,[35] questions on the extent of
the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly
general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a
plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that “The creation of
the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the
votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose.” With
these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the
Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act – require
ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those
that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the region’s
judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally
conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.[36]
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that
the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act.
Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite
requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a
substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with
these requirements.
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to allow the
elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity,
pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office;[38] (2) to hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint
OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations
posed by the prescribed basic structure of government – i.e., that the government
must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both of which must
be elective and representative of the constituent political units; national
government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted under
Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17, Article
X, “all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.”
The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period,
consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its established supporting
jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim
measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal
landscape. The Constitution’s Transitory Provisions themselves collectively
provide measures for transition from the old constitution to the new[46] and for the
introduction of new concepts.[47] As previously mentioned, the adjustment of
elective terms and of elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpired
under the Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far
enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that synchronizing
regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present problem is with us
today.
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-
the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to
the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the
Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choice
of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the
guideposts and markers in our discussion of the options available to Congress to
address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the ARMM
elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to
provide. The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume
prime materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153
should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional objective of synchronization
that cannot legally be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate
the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the concomitant
problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it?
We rule out the first option – holdover for those who were elected in
executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term – as
an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three yearsand no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot
extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmeña v.
COMELEC:[52]
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly
and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect
to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from
this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3)
years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this
Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant to
Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as
evident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President
and Vice-President, states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act
to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the
Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for
being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion.[64] But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul
a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor
to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its
legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges,
we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the
COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the
newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials
elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective
officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective
officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials,[67] is
specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as
shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the
least votes,[68] and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President[69] in
order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The
settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere
statute.[70] More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has
the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or
more, than the constitutionally mandated three years[71] as this tinkering would
directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an
expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call
for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the
result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be
elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on their term (where the “term”
means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another,
while the “tenure” represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds
the office).[72] As with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor
the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials.
They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if
they do so.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly
construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized.[73] The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may,
by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
[emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can
appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public
ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the
rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested
in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.[74]
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional
problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153
were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative
character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of
structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the
May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending
on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and
plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA
No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections
and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is
how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its
unambiguous facial terms.[75] Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely
and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances
contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly,
the terms of governance – both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and
RA No. 9054 – will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what
has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously,
with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and
temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments
that upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous
precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in the
country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation
of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the President, to address. It is a power
that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its legislative
powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively
undertake with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a
very specific and limited purpose – the synchronization of elections. It was a
temporary means to a lasting end – the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No.
10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and
specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the
cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for
special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by
Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in
a holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot
compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal
with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary
appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may
occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive
positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent
reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is
the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the
President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the
members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem
ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be
synchronized with the national and local elections in order to maintain the
autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough
and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far from
convinced of its merits.
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the
central government, but rather an efficient working relationship between the
autonomous region and the central government. We see this as an effective
partnership, not a separation.
Conclusion
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should
address what is essentially a legislative problem. It is not within the Court’s power
to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the
exclusive prerogative of Congress.[89] The petitioners, in asking this Court to
compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so,
are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is
abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic
government – the separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with
grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.[90]
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its
constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due
constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused
of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find
no reason to accord merit to the petitioners’ claims of grave abuse of discretion.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Entitled “An act fixing the date of the plebiscite for the approval of the amendments to Republic Act No. 6734
and setting the date of the regular elections for elective officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao on
the last Monday of November 2001, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 9054, entitled “An Act to
Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the
purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled ‘An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,’ as
amended,” and for other purposes.
[2]
Entitled “An Act amending fixing the Date or Regular elections for Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao pursuant to Republic Act No. 9054, entitled “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled
‘An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended”
[3]
Filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, in his personal capacity, and in representation of Maguindanao
Federation of Autonomous Irrigators Association, Inc., Hadji Muhmina Usman, John Anthony L. Lim, Jamilon T.
Odin, Asrin Timbol Jaiyari, Mujib M. Kalang, Alih Al-Saidi J. Sapi-e, Kessar Damsie Abdil, and Bassam Aluh
Saupi.
[4]
Petition for Prohibition with Very Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order dated April 11, 2011 was filed against Sixto Brillantes, as Chairperson of COMELEC,
to challenge the effectivity of RA No. 9333 for not having been submitted to a plebiscite. Since RA No. 9333 is
inoperative, any other law seeking to amend it is also null and void.
[5]
With Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writs of Preliminary Prohibitive and
Mandatory Injunction dated June 30, 2011.
[6]
With Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction dated July 1, 2011.
[7]
With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order dated July 12, 2011.
[8]
With Injunction and Preliminary Injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order dated July 11, 2011.
[9]
With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Injunction, Both
Prohibitory and Mandatory dated July 1, 2011.
[10]
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on
the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with
the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal
councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for
six years and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election
is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992. [emphasis ours]
[11]
To illustrate, while Section 8, Article X of the Constitution fixes the term of office of elective local officials at
three years, under the above-quoted provisions, the terms of the incumbent local officials who were elected in
January 1988, which should have expired on February 2, 1991, were fixed to expire at noon of June 30, 1992. In the
same vein, the terms of the incumbent President and Vice President who were elected in February 1986 were
extended to noon of June 30, 1992. On the other hand, in order to synchronize the elections of the Senators, who
have six-year terms, the twelve Senators who obtained the lowest votes during the 1992 elections were made to
serve only half the time of their terms.
[12]
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (1996 ed.), p.
1199, citing Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 429-4.
[13]
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a section which we will temporarily indicate
as Section 14. It reads: “THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE
LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE
AT NOON OF JUNE 1992.”
This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state that in view of the action taken by the
Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: “THE SENATORS,
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED
UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992.”
I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory Provisions giving a term to the
incumbent President and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by the Commission for
Members of the Lower House and for local officials is three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next
election for said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We could never attain, subsequently,
any synchronization of election which is once every three years.
So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should not
have a local election or an election for Members of the Lower House in 1990 for them to be able to complete their
term of three years each. And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an election in 1993
for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be
elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their election will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections in
1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election will be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to local officials and
the Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we can never have an election once every three years,
therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we adopted the term of six years for the President and
another six years for the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and 12 for three
years insofar as the first Senators are concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect the first
synchronized election which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members of the Lower
House and a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?
MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was the one who proposed that in
order to synchronize the elections every three years, which the body approved — the first national and local officials
to be elected in 1987 shall continue in office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing.
That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the President will be for six years and continue
beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have national, local and presidential elections.This time, in 1992,
the President shall have a term until 1998 and the first twelve Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12
shall serve until 1995, and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall
have an election every three years.
So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we have to synchronize our elections every
three years which was already approved by the body.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the incumbent President and Vice-
President in 1992.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the election of the Senators and local
officials with the election of the President?
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is on the assumption that the provision
of the Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President would really end in 1992.
MR. GUINGONA. Yes.
MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for all, from the President up to the
municipal officials. [emphasis ours] (V Record of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 429-431; October 3,
1986)
[14]
G.R. Nos. 100318, 100308, 100417 and 100420, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750, 758.
[15]
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA
413; Ordillo v. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1990).
[16]
271 SCRA 633, 668 (1997); Occena v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52265, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA
755.
[17]
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, p.1327 (1993).
[18]
Section 26(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
[19]
G. R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630.
[20]
A copy of the letter that the President wrote to Honorable Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. as Speaker of the House of
Representatives dated March 4, 2011 is reproduced below:
14 March 2011
HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.
Speaker
House of Representatives
Quezon City
Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the 1987 Constitution, I hereby certify to the necessity of
the immediate enactment of House Bill No. 4146, entitled:
“AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ELECTIONS AND THE TERM OF OFFICE
OF THE ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO (ARMM)
WITH THOSE OF THE NATIONAL AND OTHER LOCAL OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9333, ENTITLED ‘AN ACT FIXING THE DATE FOR REGULAR ELECTIONS FOR
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO’, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES”
to address the urgent need to protect and strengthen ARMM’s autonomy by synchronizing its elections with the
regular elections of national and other local officials, to ensure that the on-going peace talks in the region will not be
hindered, and to provide a mechanism to institutionalize electoral reforms in the interim, all for the development,
peace and security of the region.
Best wishes.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
[85]
Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, p. 560.
[86]
391 Phil. 84, 102 (2000).
[87]
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
[88]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, 343 Phil. 411, 427 (1997) citing Pangilinan v. Maglaya, 225 SCRA
511 (1993).
[89]
Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468,
581.
[90]
Ligeralde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 315.
[91]
Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., 210 Phil. 187, 207 (1983); Peralta v. Commission
on Elections, Nos. L-47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-47791 and L-47827, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA
30; Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, No. L-24693, July 31,
1967, 20 SCRA 849.
[92]
See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290 (2001); Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et
al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.
[93]
Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on
Elections, supra.
[94]
G.R. No. 100883, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 516.
[95]
Id. at 523.