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The political economy Once upon a time, there was a small country called Greece. Actually,
of the Greek state according to a self-gratifying anecdote, the location was so beautiful that
God, when parcelling out land to various nationalities, had kept it aside for
Once upon a time, there his own retirement! The Greeks arrived late so they could not properly enter
was a small country the allotment process and started pleading for God’s own place to call
called Greece. Actually, home. God was finally persuaded and granted them their request. Much
according to a self- later, this same practice was referred to as ‘derogation’ – that is, securing
gratifying anecdote, the some exception from, or delayed application of European Union (EU) direc-
location was so beautiful tives and regulations. This attitude has defined Greek–EU relationships, as
that God, when parcelling the Greeks have always been vigilant in cushioning their way of life against,
out land to various usually imaginary, threats arising from European integration. In fact, Greece
nationalities, had kept it was the only EU country that adopted the euro with a two-year delay as
aside for his own Greeks were not ready at the prescribed time. Ever since Eurozone entry in
retirement! 2001, they have lived, beyond their means, happily thereafter – to the cha-
grin of their partners. Following a period of fiscal profligacy, which peaked
in 2009 with catastrophic consequences for the economy, Greece is now
again making use of a unique EU–International Monetary Fund (IMF) crisis
support mechanism, especially concocted for Eurozone countries with no
access to market funding [sic]. A very long trip has finally come to an end.
And this is the beginning of a new era. This time around, Greece has no
option but to change its ways.
What this paper intends to do is to probe how an underachieving state can
mess things up for a country with an enviable record of economic
Ever since Eurozone performance. I always thought that reinventing government in Greece
entry, the Greek economy would push potential output well beyond the 4% real GDP growth achieved
has boomed on the back yearly on average since the early 1990s. It was actually then, after a period
of macroeconomic and of political and economic instability in the 1980s, that a serious effort of
structural adjustment and adjustment was undertaken with the objective of bringing Greece to the
the easy money condi- core of Europe. This success, which entailed substantial efforts in industrial
tions prevailing restructuring, privatisation, financial liberalisation and fiscal consolidation,
worldwide, with Greek was crowned by the admission of Greece to the Eurozone club. Ever since,
GDP growth at least 2 the Greek economy has boomed on the back of macroeconomic and struc-
percentage points higher tural adjustment and the easy money conditions prevailing worldwide, with
than in the rest of the Greek GDP growth at least 2 percentage points higher than in the rest of
Eurozone. the Eurozone.
Despite all this success, a dichotomy unfolded between the dynamism of
the private sector and the backwardness of the state. The latter was unable
to adjust to developing trends in the global economy – hostage, to a certain
*by Michael Massourakis, extent, of well-entrenched interest groups, be they labour unions in the
World Economics, public sector or business interests in traditional and/or low-productivity,
Vol. 11, No. 2, low-value-added industries. These groups felt threatened by the challenge
April-June 2010 of competition forces sweeping the globe, and saw their interests better
The state as a hindrance There is no better way to ponder the weight of the Greek state than to look
to competition into the number of employees in the public sector and, more importantly,
the sectors of activity in which they are employed. Table 1 shows that 22%
of the labour force is employed in the wider public sector (and this does not
include the clergy). This is a staggering figure, especially if one takes into
consideration that core government (public administration, services to the
public and social security administration), where only civil servants are
employed, represents only 38% of the total. This means that 62% of public-
sector employees are employed in activities that, potentially, could be pri-
vatised! The figure may be reduced somewhat if the provision of basic edu-
cation and health services to various means-tested income groups is con-
sidered. But this still leaves a huge amount of public-sector employees
working in areas where higher-quality services could be offered with greater
efficiency by the private sector.
Given that 73% and 64% of the people employed in education and health,
respectively, are government employees, one should probe a little deeper
into those two sectors. There is a myth in Greece of ‘free education’ and
‘free health’, in the sense that all levels of education and health are avail-
able free of charge to the population if one chooses to go to a state school
or hospital. However, the reality is that the public system operates in such a
way so as to require parents almost universally to pay considerable
Tertiary education in Greece
amounts of money to prep schools or individual teachers so as to bring the
can be provided only by state
students up to par for the exams. Similar issues have emerged in the provi-
universities, with a ban on
sion of hospital services, where additional payment is sometimes required
private universities, and
to expedite service from hospital administrators and doctors, usually by
therefore effectively on
people who think this is the normal procedure.
competition, imposed by the
Constitution. The result is that Tertiary education in Greece can be provided only by state universities, with
Greek universities function as a ban on private universities, and therefore effectively on competition,
government agencies of low imposed by the Constitution. The result is that Greek universities function
productivity and service. as government agencies of low productivity and service. The performance
table 2: Greece (Gr) and uSa (uS) - ease of doing business rank
GR US GR US
EASE OF DOING BUSINESS (rank) 109 4 Paying taxes (rank) 76 61
Payments (number per year) 10 10
Starting a business (rank) 140 8 Time (hours per year) 224 187
Procedures (number) 15 6 Total tax rate (% profit) 47.4 46.3
Time (days) 19 6
Cost (% of income per capita) 10.9 0.7 Trading across borders (rank) 80 18
Min. capital (% of income per capita) 21.4 0.0 Documents to export (number) 5 4
Time to export (days) 20 6
The Greek state’s idea of Dealing with construction permits (rank) 50 25 Cost to export (US$ per container) 1.153 1.05
support has been protection, Procedures (number) 15 19 Documents to import (number) 6 5
protection, protection. The Time (days) 169 40 Time to import (days) 25 5
Cost (% of income per capita) 50.7 12.7 Cost to import (US$ per container) 1.265 1.315
result has been detrimental to
all industries involved, with the Employing workers (rank) 147 1 Enforcing contracts (rank) 89 8
exception of shipping. The Difficulty of hiring index (0-100) 44 0 Procedures (number) 39 32
Rigidity of hours index (0-100) 67 0 Time (days) 819 300
latter could pick up and go (or
Difficulty of redundancy index (0-100) 40 0 Cost (% of claim) 14.4 14.4
rather sail) to set up business Rigidity of employment index (0-100) 50 0
elsewhere. Redundancy costs (weeks of salary) 24 0 Closing a business (rank) 43 15
Time (years) 2.0 1.5
Registering property (rank) 107 12 Cost (% of estate) 9 7
Procedures (number) 11 4 Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 44.2 76.7
Time (days) 22 12
Cost (% of property value) 4.0 0.5
Source: Doing Business 2010, World Bank, IFC.
The state as a hindrance Greece is all about location. Traditional industries in Greece, such as agri-
to economic development culture, energy, tourism and shipping, are all intimately related, as far as
their development is concerned, to the natural endowments of the country.
Of course, a reliance on nature to bring growth should be supported with
proper policies. The Greek state’s idea of support has been protection, pro-
tection, protection. The result has been detrimental to all industries involved,
with the exception of shipping. The latter was able to escape the suffocating
embrace of the Greek state simply because of its mobility. It could pick up
and go (or rather sail) to set up business elsewhere. Restrictions on crew
The Greek state IMF involvement in the support package for Greece would be instrumental
in the reformatory in ushering in a new era in the field of structural reform. Indeed, the IMF’s
Memorandum of Understanding, dated 3 May 2010, contains significant
IMF involvement in the support changes in the institutional framework aimed at freeing the economy from
package for Greece would be the yoke of the Greek state. All these initiatives are expected to boost the
instrumental in ushering in a competitiveness of the Greek economy. They are absolutely necessary if
new era in the field of the ‘competitiveness gap’ with other economies is to be bridged. To high-
structural reform. Indeed, the light the issue, the competitiveness differential between Greece and the US
IMF’s Memorandum of is depicted in Table 3. Certain components of competitiveness referring to
Understanding, dated 3 May the institutional framework, and product and labour market flexibility indica-
2010, contains significant tors, are referred to so as to demarcate the road left to be travelled if
changes in the institutional Greece is to become an efficient world-class economy. Progress has been
framework aimed at freeing slow in the past because good times and easy money tend to hide ineffi-
the economy from the yoke of ciencies and shortcomings, which become apparent in more difficult times.
the Greek state. All these Greece has entered a brave new world with the activation of the ‘ultima ratio’
initiatives are expected to EU–IMF € 110 billion three-year support package. A substantial part of the
boost the competitiveness of imposed conditionality concerns, as expected, fiscal adjustment. The Greek
the Greek economy. They are government has already adopted a major tax reform bill with a view to tackling
absolutely necessary if the tax evasion, and a pension reform bill is in the pipeline. The support package
‘competitiveness gap’ with contains specific commitments in the area of social security such as:
other economies is to be
• raising the retirement age of female government-sector employees to 65
bridged.
by 2013 starting in 2011 (so as to equalise it with that of male employees)
• raising from 37 to 40 years by 2015 the minimum period of social security
contributions so as to be entitled to a pension
• raising the minimum age of early retirement to 60, while reducing eli-
gibility
• restricting the list of so called hazardous and unsanitary occupations
entitled to early retirement
• automatic raising of the retirement age on the basis of changes in life
expectancy
• granting of a basic pension to all above 65 on the basis of income criteria
and of a supplementary pension in line with life-time contributions
• limiting disability pensions.
With respect to the national health system, emphasis will be placed on
table 3: Greece (Gr) and uSa (uS) - ease of doing business rank
RANKING (out of 133 countries) 71 2
TOTAL SCORE (out of 7) 4.0 5.6
Institutions 3.83 4.81
Property rights 5.0 5.5
Intellectual property protection 4.1 5.4
Diversion of public funds 3.1 5.0
Public trust of politicians 2.4 3.4
Judicial independence 3.7 5.3
Favouritism in decisions of government officials 2.7 3.4
Wastefulness of government spending 2.7 3.3
Burden of government regulation 2.4 3.4
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes 3.2 4.6
Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations 3.2 4.3
Transparency of government policymaking 3.9 4.9
Business costs of terrorism 5.3 4.4
Business costs of crime and violence 4.9 4.6
Organised crime 5.6 5.3
Reliability of police services 3.9 5.9
Ethical behaviour of firms 3.5 5.5
Strength of auditing and accounting standards 4.9 5.3
Efficacy of corporate boards 4.2 5.2
Protection of minority shareholders’ interests 5.0 5.0
Goods market efficiency 4.09 5.13
Intensity of local competition 4.9 5.9
Extent of market dominance 3.8 5.5
Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy 4.1 5.4
Extent and effect of taxation 3.3 3.6
Total tax rate (profit tax, labor tax and other taxes), of profits (hard data) 47.4 42.3
Number of procedures required to start a business (hard data) 15 6
Days required to start a business (hard data) 19 6
Agricultural policy costs 3.2 3.9
Prevalence of trade barriers 5.1 4.9
Tariff barriers (hard data) 1.1 1.7
Prevalence of foreign ownership 4.9 5.3
Business impact of rules on FDI 4.1 4.9
Burden of customs precedures 4.1 4.6
Degree of customer orientation 4.5 5.7
Buyer sophistication 3.7 4.7
Labour market efficiency 3.80 5.76
Cooperation in labour-employer relations 3.6 5.0
Flexibility of wage determination 3.1 5.8
Rigidity of employment index, 0-100 (worst) scale (hard data) 51 0
Hiring and firing practices 3.0 5.4
Firing costs, in weeks of wages (hard data) 24 0
Pay and productivity 3.1 5.1
Reliance on professional management 4.0 5.9
Brain drain 3.0 6.0
Female participation in laboru force, ratio (hard data) 0.71 0.85
Source: Doing Business 2010, World Bank, IFC.
Epilogue The political class in Greece has failed the Greek people miserably. The
political class in the Eurozone, through action or inaction, has condemned
the fiercely independent Greeks to austerity and submission, under the
banner of community solidarity. With the Greek budget on the skids, an
issue of misreporting in 2009 was blown out of all proportion, eventually
becoming an issue of stability for the euro, requiring € 110 billion to fix –
and who knows how much more if there is contagion.
Whatever may be said about the Greeks, one thing is certain: their inge-
nuity, endurance and adaptability cannot be denied. This is clearly seen in
their dominance of world shipping. When outside Greece, Greeks usually
It is high time that Greeks have excel. It is high time that Greeks have a state commensurate with their abili-
a state commensurate with ties and aspirations. Greeks are ambitious, resourceful, competitive and
their abilities and aspirations. pragmatic. They are hard workers and risk takers, ready to move (even to
other countries) to improve their lives. They love and seek out opportunity.
So, the current restructuring taking place in the Greek economy and soci-
ety is a step in the right direction. Archimedes, proud of his prowess in the
mathematics of levers, once said: ‘Give me a place to stand, and I shall
move the Earth!’ Paraphrasing this, I would say: ‘Give Greeks a state that
functions, and they will work miracles!’ Of course, nobody will give Greeks
a state. They have to look inside and find the strength and courage to rein-
vent themselves. Because they are the state.
Introduction In this paper we argue that the current global economic crisis will not be
properly understood without explaining the impact of global macroeconomic
imbalances (GMI) as the major factor behind its eruption and propagation
The current global worldwide. We specify GMI as the rapid growth, over 2001-2007, of large
economic crisis will not current account (CA) surpluses in the world creditor economies (CEs)
be properly understood including China, Japan, Germany, Switzerland and a number of other
without explaining the emerging economies, which were reflected in equally sizeable CA deficits in
impact of global the world debtor economies (DEs), including the USA, the Eurozone (except
macroeconomic Germany and Netherlands), the United Kingdom and a large number of
imbalances (GMI) as the emerging economies, especially in Central and Eastern Europe.
major factor behind its
These GMI reached unprecedented proportions by 2007, triggering a crisis
eruption and propagation
first in the financial sector of the USA, the major global DE, which was
worldwide. We specify
promptly diffused to the financial sector and the real economies worldwide,
GMI as the rapid growth,
including the major CEs. The process of recycling of CEs surpluses into the
over 2001-2007, of large
financial systems of DEs, supporting their domestic demand expansion
surpluses in the world
through over-borrowing by households and governments, and thus sustain-
creditor economies (CEs),
ing the exports of CEs, eventually reached its limits. Once deleveraging by
which were reflected in
households and governments in DEs began, in the wake of the financial cri-
equally sizeable CA
sis, CEs could no longer sustain their export-led growth falling also into
deficits in the world
recession and making the crisis global.
debtor economies (DEs).
The scant importance placed on the role of GMI in precipitating the 2007-
2009 financial and economic crisis has resulted in a timid and probably
inadequate global macroeconomic policy response: Firstly, the incompati-
bility of monetary policies followed by the FED and the ECB in the period
between August 2007 and July 2008 led to the abnormal appreciation of
the Euro and the surge of oil and other commodity prices, precipitating the
unprecedented decline of the world economy in H2 2008 and H1 2009.
Secondly, there are still signs of a destabilizing persistence by some major
CEs on policies aiming at real exchange rate undervaluation as a tool for
*by Demetrios K. Maroulis, the eventual recovery of their economies via net exports. Thirdly, the poli-
Manager, Economic cies of monetary and fiscal stimuli applied in the wake of the crisis in CEs
Research Division, were either inadequate, as domestic consumption in these countries barely
Alpha Bank grew in H1 2009, or directed mainly towards investment and aid in trad-
Georgios Anastasiadis, ables, or even investment in valuable raw materials (as in the case of
adjunct Professor, China), thus increasing further their existing excess production capacity.
American College Overall, the unprecedented financial crisis and the ensuing global reces-
of Thessaloniki, sion of 2007-2009 has contributed to the dampening of GMI, as the CA defi-
International Journal of cits of the US and many other DEs have shrunk in the first half of 2009 and
Economics, Vol. 4, No. 1, at the same time the large CA surpluses of the CEs have been contained
June 2010 (See also IMF, October 2009). For example, in the Eurozone the trade bal-
GMI as analyzed The debate on GMI before 2007 has primarily focused: a) on the growing
before the financial US current account deficit vis-à-vis the rising surpluses in developing econ-
and economic crisis omies, b) on the factors behind the generation and expansion of the US
deficit and the corresponding surpluses in the CEs, and c) on arguments
for or against the sustainability of the CA deficit in the US and some emerg-
ing DEs.
In fact, the growing US external deficit was considered as the key manifes-
tation of GMI while the deficits of other advanced DEs and more importantly
those of emerging DEs were hardly considered. The Eurozone as a whole
was considered as a CE, placing Germany and the Netherlands, the major
European CEs, in the same basket with Spain, Portugal, France, Greece
and others, that have been major DEs, especially since the beginning of the
decade. In this respect, as it was pointed out by The Economist (August 8th
2009), for much of 2008, a stock phrase in the monthly press statements by
the ECB’s Governing Board was that “the euro area does not suffer from
major imbalances”. This claim was based on the fact that until September
2008 the Eurozone’s CA was roughly in balance. But this was mainly due to
Germany’s huge CA surplus, which was being offset by the huge CA defi-
cits of Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Portugal. Finally, regarding the
overall surplus of the developing world, the DEs of Central and SE Europe
were bundled together with the group of emerging CEs like China, South
Korea, Singapore, India, Russia and others.
On these grounds, GMI were seen as constituting a paradigm change from
the traditional economic development model where emerging economies
would rely on external deficits while advanced countries would be capital
exporters. In this traditional context, GMI could not have been perpetuated
since, especially in the case of developing economies, external deficits
Creditor and debtor We specify GMI as the rapid growth, over 2001-2007, of large CA surplus-
countries and GMI es by the world CEs, which were reflected in equally sizeable CA deficits
by the world DEs. Most prominent amongst the CEs since 2001 have
been China, Japan and other Asian economies as well as Germany, Swit-
zerland, Holland, Sweden, Canada, the economies of Middle Eastern oil
producers and Russia. The most prominent DEs have been the USA, the
United Kingdom (UK), the Eurozone (except Germany and Netherlands),
Australia, Eastern Europe (including Turkey) and the Baltic States.
For most developing DEs (e.g. Eastern Europe and some Latin American
countries), the financing of their huge CA deficits was facilitated through
the intermediation of major financial institutions from the key world finan-
cial centers of New York, London, Frankfurt and Tokyo, as well as the
minor banking centers of Sweden for the Baltic States and those of Aus-
tria, Italy and Greece for SE Europe and others. For example, according
to the OECD, total assets of Austrian banks in the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe are estimated at $ 267 billion. In Diagram 1 we present
the combined surpluses of various categories of CEs, as well as the com-
bined deficits of various categories of DEs. The GMI accumulating over
2001-2007 had some particular characteristics, which distinguish them
from other periods of equally important imbalances. These characteristics
can be summarized as follows:
In the camp of CEs an important role is played by large developing
countries, namely China, India, Malaysia, Philippines, Brazil, Argentina
and Russia. In fact, the emerging and developing economies as a whole
Source: OECD
The world’s CA imbalances grew rapidly in the period 2001-2007 and reached
much higher levels than in any previous period (Diagram 1). Moreover, had
the financial crisis not erupted in July 2007, these CA imbalances would have
continued to grow leading eventually to a crisis in the absence of concrete
policies towards rebalancing. As a background to the creation of GMI over
2001-2007, in the next section we provide an account of the key economic
and policy developments for the main CEs and DEs around the world.
Economic policy in China’s entrance into the WTO in 2001 on the one hand opened the
countries pursuing the world economy to cheap Chinese exports and on the other opened the Chi-
ICCAS growth model nese market to huge inflows of FDI from all around the world. Both exports
and FDI inflows were boosted in China by the application of the ICCAS
growth model. China’s exchange rate and domestic incomes policies
implied a continuous devaluation of its real effective exchange rate (REER),
with respect to relative unit labor costs, even from its already low level in
2001. In the last years there has been extensive academic and political dis-
cussion about whether China has been unfairly manipulating its exchange
rate or its domestic monetary system and income policies, in order to pre-
Source: Reuters
The result of these policies is shown in Table 1. In the early 2000s, China’s
ULC was very low (competitive) relative to trading partners. This competi-
tive advantage increased further at least up to 2006, mainly due to the
exchange rate policy analyzed above (Diagram 2). China changed slightly
its exchange rate policy from July 20, 2005, proceeding with a 2.1% appre-
ciation of the Yuan against the dollar and then a gradual upward (appreciat-
ing) shift until July 2008. Since then, the fixed CNY/USD parity has been
reinstated. The total appreciation of the Yuan against the USD in the 4-year
period from July 2005 to July 2009 reached 17.4%. In the same period the
Yuan has also appreciated against the Euro by 5.3%. However, considering
the still rising Chinese CA surpluses (even during the first five months of
2009), it is evident that the Yuan is still substantially undervalued.
The 1998-2000 emerging markets crisis contributed to a drastic change
in the policy stance of many emerging economies, especially in South
East Asia, that shifted their economic growth model from DDCAD until
1998, to an ICCAS model. Large CA surpluses and holdings of big foreign
exchange reserves have been considered as insurance against potential
Source: Reuters
Countries applying the ICCAS model through the policy of carry trade:
In the cases of Japan and Switzerland, currency undervaluation, as shown
in Diagram 4, was mainly maintained through the policy of carry-trade. This
Source: Βloomberg
The effect of an earlier In this situation the effect of an earlier tightening by the Fed, cannot be
tightening by the Fed, unambiguously determined even today (see Diagram 5). For example, an
cannot be unambiguously earlier increase of short term rates would not necessarily have resulted in a
determined even today. corresponding increase of long term rates and the arrest of the housing
For example, an earlier bubble. In fact, it could have instead attracted even higher capital inflows
increase of short term implying even lower long term rates. Central Banks of CEs would have con-
rates would not tinued to buy US bonds pushing their prices up and lowering their yields. In
necessarily have resulted fact, it was the abnormally low long term interest rates that determined
in a corresponding mortgage and in particular subprime loan rates. It is worth noting that since
increase of long term the collapse of the equity boom in 2001, portfolio capital inflows were over-
rates and the arrest of the whelmingly directed towards the US securities market and Central Banks,
housing bubble. especially from Asia, were the dominant investors (Eichengreen, 2006).
Although capital inflows to the US by foreign private entities remained dom-
inant, the share of Central Bank money after 2004 increased from an aver-
age of 4% to more than 20% of the total (Report to the President, 2009).In
this situation, private investors had no other choice but to follow the world’s
Central Banks. These Central Banks were (and continue to be even today)
the main supporters of the US dollar, despite the fact that a number of
However, the effect of the crisis was even more pronounced in the
case of DEs in the Eastern Europe: A significant change in attitude took
place in these countries over 2003-2007, as domestic credit expanded at
unprecedented speed with consumer and real estate lending taking the
lead despite concerns by international institutions that lending in foreign
currency, as was the case for around 60% of total loans (primarily to non-
hedged borrowers), constituted a significant risk from potential exchange
rate instability. This was more so, given the rising CA deficits and the key
role of pegged exchange rates to the Euro in sustaining confidence and low
inflationary expectations. Even so, the mostly foreign owned domestic
banks in these countries continued to extend credit at relentless rates, with
The alleged causes of The main events leading up to the 2007-2009 global crisis are well known by
the financial crisis and now. However, the great danger in the present environment of international
the role of GMI politics is for world leaders to continue avoiding the issue of GMI in their dis-
cussions regarding the design of a new international financial architecture
The great danger in the following the financial crisis. In fact the G-20 leaders have highlighted the fol-
present environment of lowing two issues as the main threats to a world wide economic recovery: a)
international politics is for Protectionist measures taken by individual governments which may lead to
world leaders to continue a substantial contraction in international trade and capital movements. b)
avoiding the issue of GMI The application of uncoordinated reforms in the financial systems which
in their discussions would impede international capital flows and investment. Concerning pro-
regarding the design of a tectionist measures it would be naïve to concentrate attention to specific
new international financial export subsidies or import impediments in favour of domestic products and
architecture following the to neglect the importance of exchange rate protection policies in building up
financial crisis. the GMI. Concerning the current debate for designing and implementing
reforms on various aspects of the financial system in order to avoid future
financial crises, the role played by existing regulation and supervision in the
financial system in causing and propagating the current financial crisis
should be properly specified, taking also into account the catalytic effect of
GMI. In the present section we try to place the alleged causes of the finan-
cial crisis into proper perspective, analyzing them in the context of the inter-
national macroeconomic environment prevailing in the 2000s.
The consensus view regarding the main culprits contributing to the financial
and economic crisis focuses chiefly on the following Issues: a) The prob-
lematic functioning and regulation of the financial system and in particu-
lar the insufficient regulatory framework applied in recent years, coupled by
an evident lack of regulation enforcement and supervision, as well as by the
insufficient (or non-existing) self-regulation of financial institutions and the
adverse effects of the application of International Financial Reporting Stan-
Both the Fed and the
dards (IFRS) in times of exceptional market volatility. b) The expansionary
ECB have argued that the
(bubble generating) macro-economic policies followed by the US FED
developments in the U.S.
and the US government. c) The insufficient functioning of the market
subprime market were
mechanism in the context of globalization.
only one aspect of a
much larger and more Concerning the problematic functioning and regulation of the financial
encompassing credit system, it is generally accepted that the US subprime debacle triggered
boom whose impact the crisis. Moreover, both the Fed and the ECB have argued that the devel-
transcended the opments in this market were only one aspect of a much larger and more
mortgage market to affect encompassing credit boom whose impact transcended the mortgage mar-
many other forms of ket to affect many other forms of credit and financial instruments. Aspects
credit and financial of this broader credit boom over 2002-2006 included widespread declines
instruments. in underwriting and bank lending standards, breakdowns in lending over-
Epilogue In recent months, there has been a gradual change in perceptions assign-
ing a primal role to GMI as a factor behind the crisis and hence the need for
Πηγή: Υπουργείο Οικονομικών. Πηγή: «The 2009 Ageing Report», Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή.
Ελλάδα ΕΕ-12
Διάγραμμα 9. Οι άνω των 65 ετών ως ποσοστό του ενεργού πληθυσμού (15-64 ετών).
Η μεταρρύθμιση του
ασφαλιστικού συστήματος
συνίσταται στην
ορθολογικοποίηση των ορίων
συνταξιοδοτήσεως και των
ποσοστών αναπληρώσεως
Πηγή: Πρόγραμμα Σταθερότητος, Προβλέψεις Αlpha Bank.
των συντάξεων, και στην
ουσιαστική αποκατάσταση Πιο συγκεκριμένα, η μεταρρύθμιση του ασφαλιστικού συστήματος συνί-
της διασυνδέσεως των σταται στην ορθολογικοποίηση των ορίων συνταξιοδοτήσεως και των
εισφορών και των παροχών ποσοστών αναπληρώσεως των συντάξεων, και στην ουσιαστική αποκατά-
των ασφαλισμένων, με σταση της διασυνδέσεως των εισφορών και των παροχών των ασφαλι-
ενίσχυση των κινήτρων για σμένων, με ενίσχυση των κινήτρων για ένταξη των εργαζομένων στο
ένταξη των εργαζομένων στο ασφαλιστικό σύστημα. Το νέο ασφαλιστικό σύστημα θα συμβάλλει στην
ασφαλιστικό σύστημα. αύξηση των εισφορών και των συνταξιοδοτικών αποταμιεύσεων και θα
μειώσει την επίπτωση της γηράνσεως του πληθυσμού στην αύξηση των
δημοσίων δαπανών για συντάξεις στις 2,5 π.μ. του ΑΕΠ, αντί για τις 12,5
π.μ. του ΑΕΠ, όπως προαναφέρθηκε. Όπως φαίνεται και από το Διά-
Τα μέτρα για την
γραμμα 8, αυτό θα έχει ως αποτέλεσμα τη μείωση των δαπανών για
ελαστικοποίηση της αγοράς
συντάξεις από 24,1% του ΑΕΠ, στο 14,2% του ΑΕΠ, περίπου δηλαδή στο
εργασίας οδηγούν σε αύξηση
αντίστοιχο επίπεδο δαπανών για συντάξεις στην ΕΕ-12, που είναι 11,5%
του δυνητικού ρυθμού
του ΑΕΠ.
αναπτύξεως της οικονομίας.
Τα μέτρα για την ελαστικοποίηση της αγοράς εργασίας οδηγούν σε απο-
κατάσταση της δυνατότητας των εργοδοτών να προσλαμβάνουν εργαζό-
Οι ανωτέρω πολιτικές, σε
μενους σύμφωνα με τις ανάγκες τους, δυνατότητα των εργαζομένων για
συνδυασμό με μία
παραγωγική απασχόληση, αύξηση των ποσοστών απασχολήσεως και του
συντονισμένη και
εργατικού δυναμικού, αύξηση της παραγωγικότητας της εργασίας, και,
συστηματική προσπάθεια
επομένως, αύξηση του δυνητικού ρυθμού αναπτύξεως της οικονομίας.
στον τομέα των
ιδιωτικοποιήσεων και της Οι ανωτέρω πολιτικές, σε συνδυασμό με μία συντονισμένη και συστημα-
αποτελεσματικής τική προσπάθεια στον τομέα των ιδιωτικοποιήσεων και της αποτελεσμα-
διαχειρίσεως της δημόσιας τικής διαχειρίσεως της δημόσιας περιουσίας, μπορούν να συμβάλουν
περιουσίας, μπορούν να στη μείωση του ελληνικού δημοσίου χρέους από 133% του ΑΕΠ το 2011,
συμβάλουν στη μείωση του περίπου στο 105% του ΑΕΠ το 2020 και κάτω από 80% του ΑΕΠ το 2030
ελληνικού δημοσίου χρέους (Διάγραμμα 11). Εάν δε ο ρυθμός αυξήσεως του ονομαστικού ΑΕΠ απο-
από 133% του ΑΕΠ το 2011, δειχθεί υψηλότερος από τον πολύ χαμηλό ρυθμό που προβλέπεται από
περίπου στο 105% του ΑΕΠ την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή στη δεκαετία του 2020 (3,6% ετησίως), τότε το
το 2020 και κάτω από 80% δημόσιο χρέος της Ελλάδος ως ποσοστό του ΑΕΠ μπορεί να μειωθεί
του ΑΕΠ το 2030. κάτω του 60% του ΑΕΠ από τα μέσα της δεκαετίας του 2020.
Αλλά δυστυχώς και πάλι, τα βήματα προόδου που γίνονται είναι μικρά
και άτολμα και γίνονται χωρίς πεποίθηση για την αναγκαιότητα και χρη-
σιμότητά τους. Έτσι, διαμορφώνεται σταδιακά ένα συνονθύλευμα ετερό-
κλιτων παρεμβάσεων οικονομικής και διαρθρωτικής πολιτικής, σε ένα
κλίμα γενικευμένης απαισιοδοξίας για το μέλλον του τόπου. Το κλίμα
αυτό επηρεάζει αρνητικά τις προσδοκίες καταναλωτών και επιχειρήσεων,
πράγμα που οδηγεί σε εμβάθυνση της υφέσεως καθώς μειώνονται ή
αναβάλλονται οι καταναλωτικές και οι επενδυτικές δαπάνες.
H πορεία δημοσιονομικού Όπως φαίνεται από το Διάγραμμα 15, η επιδείνωση των δημοσιονομικών
εκτροχιασμού και υπήρξε αλματώδης στη δεκαετία 1980-1990. Είχαμε τεράστια αύξηση
επαναφοράς σε του δημοσίου χρέους μέχρι το 1993 οπότε και σταθεροποιείται. Στη
ισορροπία δεκαετία 1990-2000 δημιουργήθηκαν σημαντικά πρωτογενή πλεονάσμα-
τα (έως και 5 π.μ. του ΑΕΠ) στην προσπάθειά μας να ενταχθούμε στη
Ζώνη του Ευρώ (ΖτΕ). Εντούτοις, μετά την είσοδό μας στο Ευρώ το
2001, ξεκίνησε και πάλι η χαλάρωση της δημοσιονομικής πολιτικής (Διά-
γραμμα 15). Αντί να διατηρήσουμε τα πρωτογενή πλεονάσματα, αρχίσα-
με να ξοδεύουμε χωρίς να μαζεύουμε φόρους. Με το κόστος του χρήμα-
τος δεθνώς σε πολύ χαμηλό επίπεδο, ο δανεισμός αυξήθηκε κατακόρυ-
φα. Και έτσι φθάσαμε στο σήμερα.
Πηγή: European Economy, The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Eurostat,
Government Finance Statistics.
Πηγή: European Economy, The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Eurostat,
Government Finance Statistics.
Πηγή: European Economy, The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Eurostat,
Government Finance Statistics.
Μακροοικονομικές Το Πρόγραμμα προβλέπει μείωση του πραγματικού ΑΕΠ κατά -4% και
υποθέσεις και -2,5% το 2010 και 2011 αντιστοίχως. Ένα πρόγραμμα που ενσωματώνει
σταθεροποίηση του υποθέσεις για μεγάλη ύφεση είναι πιο αξιόπιστο, καθώς δημιουργεί την
δημοσίου χρέους αίσθηση στις αγορές και τους αναλυτές ότι η επίτευξη των στόχων επιτυγ-
χάνονται με τη λήψη μέτρων και όχι μέσα σε ένα ευνοϊκό οικονομικό περι-
Πηγή: Κεντρικές Τράπεζες, Εθνικές Στατιστικές Αρχές, Eurostat, ΔΝΤ, Bloomberg, Alpha Bank.
Διάγραμμα 29. Ιδιωτικό και δημόσιο χρέος ως ποσοστό του ΑΕΠ (2009).
Οι ελληνικές τράπεζες είναι Οι ελληνικές τράπεζες είναι νοικοκυρεμένες. Ένας από τους λόγους, που
νοικοκυρεμένες. Ένας από δεν επηρεάσθηκαν από την παγκόσμια χρηματοοικονομική κρίση είναι ότι
τους λόγους, που δεν έδειξαν σχετική αυτοσυγκράτηση όσον αφορά στην παροχή δανείων προς
επηρεάσθηκαν από την την πελατεία τους την εποχή του φθηνού χρήματος, όπως φαίνεται στο
παγκόσμια χρηματοοικονομική Διάγραμμα 28. Το χρέος των ιδιωτών προς το τραπεζικό σύστημα στην
κρίση είναι ότι έδειξαν σχετική Ελλάδα είναι πολύ μικρότερο από ό,τι είναι στην Ευρωζώνη. Αλλά ακόμη
αυτοσυγκράτηση όσον αφορά και εάν προστεθεί το δημόσιο στο ιδιωτικό χρέος, η Ελλάδα έχει μικρότε-
στην παροχή δανείων προς ρο συνολικό χρέος από ό,τι χώρες όπως η Ολλανδία, η Ιρλανδία, η Ισπανία
την πελατεία τους την εποχή και η Πορτογαλία (Διάγραμμα 29). Τέλος, όπως φαίνεται από τoν Πίνακα
του φθηνού χρήματος. 2, η έκθεση των ελληνικών τραπεζών σε δανειακά κεφάλαια (δηλαδή η
διαφορά καταθέσεων και χορηγήσεων) είναι σχετικά μικρή στην περίπτω-
ση των ελληνικών τραπεζών ενώ είναι πολύ μεγαλύτερη στη Ζώνη του
Ευρώ. Επίσης, οι ελληνικές τράπεζες έχουν υψηλά κεφάλαια ως ποσοστό
2009 2010
2008 2009
6μηνο 6μηνο
Εμπορικό Έλλειμμα -44.048,8 -30.760,3 -15.363,0 -15.266,1
-Εισαγωγές 63.861,7 46.078,3 22.803,5 23.059,2
-Εισαγωγές χωρίς καύσιμα και 41.165,8 31.289,9 15.520,9 14.165,0
πλοία
-Εξαγωγές 19.812,9 15.318,0 7.440,5 7.793,1
-Εξαγωγές χωρίς καύσιμα και 13.976,5 11.483,1 5.597,5 5.321,9
πλοία
Ισοζύγιο Αδήλων Συναλλαγών 13.342,0 6.073,7 1.772,4 878,5
Ισοζύγιο Αδήλων Συναλλαγών/ 30,3 19,8 11,5 5,8
Εμπορικό Έλλειμμα (%)
-Ταξιδιωτικό Συνάλλαγμα 11.635,9 10.369,1 3.158,8 2.783,9
(εισπράξεις)
-Μεταφορές (εισπράξεις) 19.188,3 13.552,2 6.731,7 7.724,7
-Εισπράξεις από την ΕΕ 8.920,7 5.661,1 3.563,9 2.716,1
Ισοζύγιο Τρεχουσών Συναλλαγών -30.706,8 -24.686,4 -13.590,6 -14.387,6
με κεφαλαιακές μεταβιβάσεις
Ισοζύγιο Τρεχουσών Συναλλαγών με 12,7 10,4 5,7 6,0
κεφαλαιακές μεταβιβάσεις (% ΑΕΠ)
6,158 6,048.8
Αφίξεις Τουριστών (' 000) 6.473,9 6.803,2
(7μην) (7μην)
Καθαρή επενδυτική θέση -179.182,4 -201.209,0 … …
Καθαρή επενδυτική θέση (% ΑΕΠ) 74,9 118,0 … …
Πηγή: Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος, ΕΛ. ΣΤΑΤ. και ΥΠΑ.
6. ΧΡΗΜΑΤΙΣΤΗΡΙO
(εκατοστιαίες μεταβολές, στοιχεία τέλους περιόδου)
9. ΠΛΗΘΩΡΙΣΜOΣ
(ετήσιες εκατοστιαίες μεταβολές, στοιχεία τέλους περιόδου)
2007 2008 2010 (Αύγ.)
Δείκτης Τμών Καταναλωτή τέλος περιόδου (ΔΤΚ) 2,0 2,6 5,5
-Δομικός ΔΤΚ 3,4 2,0 3,6
-Αγαθά 0,0 2,3 6,7
-Νωπά Οπωροκηπευτικά 8,1 -7,1 6,1
-Υπηρεσίες 4,6 3,1 4,0
-Ενοίκια Κατοικιών 3,9 3,6 2,3
Εναρμονισμένος ΔΤΚ 2,2 2,6 5,6
Εναρμονισμένος Δομικός 3,4 1,8 3,9
Εναρμονισμένος ΔΤΚ στη Ζώνη του Ευρώ 1,6 0,9 1,6
Πηγή: Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος.